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			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
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				<article-title>The hands of Donald Trump: Entertainment, gesture, spectacle</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Commentators from a broad range of perspectives have been at pains to explain Donald Trump’s transition from billionaire businessman to populist presidential candidate. This article draws on cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and rhetorical theory to argue that the success of Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 Republican primary was in part due to its value as comedic entertainment. We examine the ways that Trump’s unconventional political style, particularly his use of gesture to critique the political system and caricature his opponents, brought momentum to his campaign by creating spectacle. Post-structuralist and neo-Marxist scholars have asserted that late capitalism values style over content: Trump took this characteristic to new heights. The exaggerated depictions of the sociopolitical world that Trump crafts with his hands to oppose political correctness and disarm adversaries accrue visual capital in a mediatized twenty-first-century politics that is celebrity driven.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Commentators from a broad range of perspectives have been at pains to explain Donald Trump’s transition from billionaire businessman to populist presidential candidate. This article draws on cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and rhetorical theory to argue that the success of Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 Republican primary was in part due to its value as comedic entertainment. We examine the ways that Trump’s unconventional political style, particularly his use of gesture to critique the political system and caricature his opponents, brought momentum to his campaign by creating spectacle. Post-structuralist and neo-Marxist scholars have asserted that late capitalism values style over content: Trump took this characteristic to new heights. The exaggerated depictions of the sociopolitical world that Trump crafts with his hands to oppose political correctness and disarm adversaries accrue visual capital in a mediatized twenty-first-century politics that is celebrity driven.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>The hands of Donald Trump






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Kira Hall. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.2.009
The hands of Donald Trump
Entertainment, gesture, spectacle
Kira HALL, University of Colorado Boulder
Donna M. GOLDSTEIN, University of Colorado Boulder
Matthew Bruce INGRAM, University of Texas at Austin


Commentators from a broad range of perspectives have been at pains to explain Donald Trump’s transition from billionaire businessman to populist presidential candidate. This article draws on cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and rhetorical theory to argue that the success of Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 Republican primary was in part due to its value as comedic entertainment. We examine the ways that Trump’s unconventional political style, particularly his use of gesture to critique the political system and caricature his opponents, brought momentum to his campaign by creating spectacle. Post-structuralist and neo-Marxist scholars have asserted that late capitalism values style over content: Trump took this characteristic to new heights. The exaggerated depictions of the sociopolitical world that Trump crafts with his hands to oppose political correctness and disarm adversaries accrue visual capital in a mediatized twenty-first-century politics that is celebrity driven.
Keywords: comedy, entertainment, gesture, humor, depiction, politics, spectacle


Donald Trump Jr.’s description of his father as a “blue-collar billionaire” during the 2016 Republican primary season highlighted a contradiction that has puzzled commentators on both sides of the political spectrum since the beginning of Trump’s rise in the election polls: How does a businessman situated in the uppermost tier of American wealth capture the allegiance of the working classes? Academics, journalists, and other writers have been at pains to explain the early pollster finding that a billionaire developer became the favored choice of a population whose economic interests differed radically from his own. Linguist George Lakoff (2016) attributes Trump’s popularity among conservatives to his projection of a moral universe that valorizes punishment and individualism and thus resonates with a “Strict Father [72]worldview.” Anthropologist Tanya Luhrmann (2016) draws from ethnographic scholarship on religion to explain Trump’s appeal among followers as having less to do with political anger than with the contribution that Trump’s taboo-violating behavior offers to “religious imagination.” Sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) narrates the ways that Tea Party supporters are motivated by a sense of unfairness in a time of economic stagnation. J. D. Vance (2016), bestselling author of Hillbilly elegy, explains Trump’s appeal among impoverished white Appalachians as based in a concern with gun ownership in a destitute environment that denies rural populations other forms of political agency. As the November 2016 national election nears, commentators remain puzzled as to how a class of struggling wage earners, as Trump’s base is often described, came to accept the populist discourse of a man who called the money he received from his father in 1978 to start his career a “small loan of a million dollars.”
Our analysis of Trump’s rise in the 2016 Republican primary season suggests that a focus on economic distance between Trump and his voting base is misguided. Not only is Trump’s reach apparently much broader than initially suggested in pollster and media assessments (Silver 2016), his historical uniqueness as the Republican presidential nominee lies not in wealth but in lack of political experience. We argue, in contrast to these accounts, that Trump’s campaign to become the Republican nominee was successful because it was, in a word, entertaining—not just for the white rural underclass, not just for conservatives, but also for the public at large, even those who strongly oppose his candidacy. Whether understood as pleasing or offensive, Trump’s ongoing show was compelling. Our analysis thus refrains from defining segments of the population as economically, socially, or psychologically vulnerable to Trump’s messaging and instead explores why we are all vulnerable. Many good analyses offer insights on Trump’s popular appeal, and we draw on some of these discussions here. But we believe it is also important to consider the specifics of Trump’s entertainment value—that is, how Trump’s comedic media appearances over the course of the Republican primary season built momentum in a celebrity and mediatized culture. Social scientists and humanities scholars from both neo-Marxist and poststructuralist perspectives have long asserted that late capitalism values style over content. Trump’s rising popularity during his journey from candidate to Republican presidential nominee provides a strong example of this claim.
Scholars in a variety of fields have considered entertainment as a value by positioning it as key to comprehending class relations. Historian Peter Burke (1978) highlights the role of entertainers such as ballad singers, jugglers, puppet masters, and comedians among the peasantry in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. He offers the important insight that these performers, by attracting the attention of audiences across the class spectrum, enabled mutual permeability between elite and popular culture. Similarly, philosopher and literary critic Mikhael Bakhtin’s (1984) Stalin-era writings on the French Renaissance novelist Rabelais illuminate the power of carnivalesque entertainment: fools and clowns subvert the social order through acts of parody, poking vulgar fun at the mystique of political rulers and stirring rebellion in their audiences. Anthropologist Anton Blok (2001) draws from these discussions to develop a structuralist argument regarding the historical significance of a broad category of “infamous occupations” that includes criminals [73]as well as entertainers. For Blok, the position held by reviled professionals in times of political transition is paradoxical: “liminal and out of place, defining and credited with magical power, marginalized and yet part of the community, despised and indispensable” (Blok 2001: 65). Once Peter Stallybrass and Allon White (1986) extended Bakhtin’s carnivalesque to broader modes of cultural and class analysis, entertainment became a common anthropological trope for examining contestations of social hierarchy in everyday life, particularly with respect to humor, joking, and laughter.
These examples reveal how street performers, clowns, criminals, or jokers may become popular—and valuable—precisely because of their skill at entertaining. In the liminal space of comedic entertainment, distinct identities of “high” and “low” culture may remain in the interpretation of verbal and gestural form, but viewers laugh, even if not for the same reason. Humorous performance, as Erving Goffman (1959, 1961) once argued, is protected from the scrutiny that would be applied in other discursive domains (cf. Chun 2004; Jaffe 2000). In this sense, humor functions as a kind of containment strategy (Irvine 2011; Fleming and Lempert 2011), enabling its users to invoke taboo topics without breaching the norms that define these topics as toxic (Goldstein [2003] 2013). Although some audiences may interpret particular forms of entertainment as bad taste, it is also seen as bad taste to critique a fun-loving enterprise. It is hard to critique a clown: we are too busy laughing. We must therefore consider the protective benefits of entertainment value: entertainers have license to disobey rules. As anthropologists have long known, liminal spaces of time and affect such as carnival are special in that rules of ordinary everyday life do not apply. Yet even if carnival suspends social rules temporarily, its subversive potential is often lost in the return to everyday life: at the end of the day, it may preserve the very class, race, and gender values it inverts while in motion (Goldstein [2003] 2013; Scheper-Hughes 1992). Entertainment involves a densely mediatized apparatus that early scholarship on carnival did not consider, but in this sense it is similar.
Drawing on cultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, and rhetorical theory, we consider how Trump elevates his entertainment value by crafting comedic representations of his political opponents as well as himself. These representations take the form of a kind of embodied performance primarily discussed by scholars studying gesture. Characterized by several interrelated terms that include bodily quoting (Keevallik 2010), transmodal stylizations (Goodwin and Alim 2010), full body enactments (Mittelberg 2013), gestural reenactments (Sidnell 2006), and pantomime (Streeck 2008a), these bodily acts involve the dramaturgical replaying of an actual or imagined event, action, or behavior (cf. Goffman 1974), often by assuming another’s alleged subjectivity. They are most clearly seen in Trump’s impersonations of political opponents at campaign rallies. Through the use of gestural methods, Trump metonymically reduces others to laughable portrayals while elevating himself. During the Republican primaries, some of Trump’s more notorious gestural enactments—as we call them here—included contorted wrist and facial movements when rebuking a disabled reporter; downward hand chops and sidewise throat slices to convey how ISIS has treated American citizens; and a slumped torso with closed eyes to depict Republican competitor Jeb Bush. Many of these enactments were repeated across multiple campaign speeches and became [74]emblems of the political persona that Trump presented to his electorate. The media’s conflicted response to the social meaning of these bodily displays, together with Trump’s easy deniability of what he intended by them, suggests that comedic gesture may accomplish ideological work that exceeds even what can be conveyed in the already protected category of verbal humor.
Trump’s enactments received unprecedented attention during the Republican primaries by inspiring countless news discussions, video compilations, and comedy skits, many of which we reviewed for the writing of this article. Together we observed twenty-seven hours of video data to make the claims expressed here, with nineteen of those hours coming from campaign speeches delivered in sixteen different locations. Perhaps one answer to why Trump’s behavior appears atypical for a presidential candidate is that it deviates from the gestural prescriptivism that has dominated the American political arena. For instance, Jürgen Streeck’s (2008b) analysis of gestures used by Democratic presidential candidates during the 2004 primary season reveals that candidates avoided using pictorially oriented depictive gestures (also called iconics in McNeill’s [1992] taxonomy). For Streeck, this avoidance invites comparison with prescriptions articulated by Roman orator Quintilian in the first century CE, who characterized gestures that provide visual displays as theatrical and lacking rhetorical gravitas. What are acceptable for use by the rhetorician are what gesture scholars sometimes call interactive or pragmatic gestures (Bavelas et al. 1992; Kendon 2004), hand movements such as beats or points that do not depict the social world but rather accentuate or illustrate the rhetorical structure of a speech. As Robin Tolmach Lakoff (1992) suggests in her analysis of George H. W. Bush’s transition to a limited set of these gestures during the 1988 campaign, presidential advisors instruct their candidates on techniques of bodily comportment as well as speech. Pragmatic gestures are now the subject of a growing body of research on political style, which includes analyses of Barack Obama’s precision-grip (Lempert 2011) and Howard Dean’s indexical point (Streeck 2008b). But the depictive gestures deployed by Trump—especially the type that caricatures opponents by embodying a behavior or activity associated with them—rarely surface in the same literature. How do we explain the success of Trump’s divergence from what appears to be normative gestural behavior for politicians seeking the Oval Office?
We make sense of Trump’s gestural repertoire by viewing it as part of a comedic political style that accrues entertainment value as it opposes the usual habitus associated with US presidential candidates. When used in coordination with verbal strategies similarly designed to lampoon opponents, Trump’s enactments craft essentialized characterizations of identity categories that simultaneously cast their members as problematic citizens, whether Democrats, disabled, lower class, Muslim, Mexican, or women. These depictive gestures operate cross-modally to signal to Trump’s base that he challenges what is widely viewed as the political establishment’s debilitating rhetoric of political correctness. When Trump promises to tell the truth (Muslims are terrorists; some women are uglier than others; Mexicans are rapists), he aligns himself with opposition to political correctness, with a stance that rejects rhetorical caution regarding minority religions, genders, and ethnicities. Yet as entertainment, his gestures intensify the force of his words, attracting and holding the attention of the wider public as they dominate the news cycle. When framed [75]against the more restrained style of old school politics, Trump’s gestures serve him well, particularly in a mediatized and visually oriented twenty-first-century politics that is celebrity driven. If the roles of celebrity and politician have merged in the public sphere, as a voluminous literature suggests (e.g., Brummett 2008; Duffy and Page 2013; Hariman 1995; Lempert and Silverstein 2012; West and Orman 2003; Wheeler 2013), entertainment forms once associated with genres such as stand-up comedy—including the exaggerated bodily characterizations of the sociopolitical world that Trump deploys to diminish his adversaries—now make good political sense. Gesture helps create the excess necessary for comedic routine.
We argue Trump’s unconventional political style receives attention that helps rather than harms his candidacy because it is absorbed as entertainment by a heavily mediatized public sphere. Trump’s embodiment may be incongruous with how strong political embodiment is normatively understood, but its dense link to entertainment now brings voters along with viewers. The electoral allure of Trump’s “grotesque body”—to borrow a phrase used by Bakhtin (1984) to describe the subversive humor of the medieval marketplace—suggests that scholarship on society as well as gesture may benefit from a deeper consideration of comedic entertainment as an important social vector at this transitional moment in US political history. We have found it productive to analyze the complexities of a billionaire mogul’s political success through the three-way lens of entertainment, gesture, and spectacle.

Entertainment
Sociologist Paul Fussell (1992) suggested two decades ago in his acclaimed text on the American class system that the most important characteristic of the top-earning super rich is that they remain “out of sight” (27). Yet Fussell wrote before the emergence of the current celebrity culture, where the super rich are very much “in sight” across television, radio, satellite, and social media. Trump, who belongs to this billionaire culture, is a mastermind at keeping his celebrity status frontline news, a talent he exercised for decades as a corporate millionaire in the public eye. In a mediatized environment dependent on celebrity news, a politician can now be given the same treatment as a celebrity and become “the collective fetish of the masses . . . for whom every tidbit about the celebrity’s physical, sartorial, characterological, discursive, and other biographical features is worthwhile to their attentive collection and appreciation” (Lempert and Silverstein 2012: 8). In the case of Trump, however, rather than a politician turned celebrity, we have a celebrity turned politician. If Trump is a “rule breaker,” as the front cover of Time (2016) proclaimed, it is because he used his craft as an entertainer to forge a new hybrid of politics and comedy. Trump is certainly not the first celebrity entertainer to become a politician, and his ascendency in the Republican primaries is in many ways unsurprising given the ongoing hybridization of politics and entertainment in contemporary US society. But Trump’s dense use of a derisive form of comedic entertainment to attract media attention—no matter how negative that media attention may be—is a strategy that previous entertainer candidates such as Ronald Reagan did not pursue.
The entertainment dimension of Trump’s resume has not gone unnoticed by his critics, with some labeling him an entertainer in the hope of discrediting his [76]candidacy. “Showtime is over everybody, we are not electing an entertainer-inchief,” pronounced New Jersey governor Chris Christie in a speech at Saint Anselm College (before he became a Trump supporter). Obama chastised the media during a press briefing for their delicate treatment of Trump: “This is not entertainment; this is not a reality show.” Journalists and commentators have noted Trump’s entertainment appeal for years (Singer 1997; Taibbi 2016), with editorial cartoonists depicting Trump variously as clown, jester, King Kong, Lone Ranger, juggler, and master of ceremonies (US News 2016). Indeed, a cartoon on the front cover of the New Yorker (Blitt 2016) caricatures Trump as a political entertainer on a television screen, his waving hands and wide mouth earning the concerned gaze of five presidential icons—Kennedy, Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, FDR, and finally Washington, who covers his eyes with his hands. Seen in relation to presidents in the predigital era, Trump epitomizes twenty-first century visual excess and hyperbole.
In fact, Trump used his entertainer credentials during the Republican primaries to deflect criticism over his verbal behavior. “Many of those comments are made as an entertainer,” he responded when questioned about the tone of his campaign (On the Record 2015). Later in the same interview, Trump defended his behavior by linking it to his performance on the reality-TV game show The Apprentice, where his role as tough love boardroom businessman dramatized a corporate bully who trains apprentices to become cutthroat entrepreneurs. Trump’s performance delivered its punch by denigrating contestants, and this became central to the show’s appeal. His celebrity entertainer status thus lent him deniability during the primaries: relations between form and meaning established in one discursive field (entertainment) excused behavior in another (politics). That Trump’s political personality seemed to mimic his Apprentice persona suggests that the genre of reality TV may succeed in manufacturing “authenticity” via the magical qualities that derive from the form’s ambiguity. Reality TV is of course not reality per se but rather a staged parody of reality delivered by the culture industry (Andrejevic 2004). It is magical, in the sense of early anthropology, because it contains within itself the contradictory frames of existence expressed by its name: reality and television. “Positivist” viewers who believe in its reality and “savvy” viewers who recognize its contrived nature are both able to respond to the entertainment value of the genre (Andrejevic 2004). The same ambiguity offered a peculiar advantage to Trump during the Republican primaries: Was Trump’s bullying behavior reality or performance? His claim of an entertainer identity protected him from the media firestorms that followed other candidates when they engaged in comedic derision. Those who tried to defeat Trump using Trump’s methods could not succeed. Florida senator Marco Rubio even felt compelled to register a rather dramatic public apology after he joked about the small size of Trump’s hands (and by implication the small size of his penis) at a campaign rally in Roanoke, Virginia. A long-term politician, Rubio was not protected by the entertainer magic that shielded his adversary.
Over the last several decades, the United States has experienced a noticeable intensification of celebrity culture in politics. Ronald Reagan, “the Teflon President,” was a Hollywood celebrity whose life story also differed from the traditional political narrative. His campaign accelerated the use of advertising techniques based on “image marketing” so that “democracy itself [became] style” (Ewen 1988: 268). The political system that supports Trump is much closer to entertainment than what was [77]experienced in the Reagan years, not merely in the way it awards politicians celebrity status but also in the way it creates politicians out of celebrities. Certainly we have seen precursors to Trump in the gubernatorial rise of entertainers like Hollywood actor Arnold Schwarzenegger and professional wrestler Jesse Ventura. But image consumption in the Trump era operates at a very different scale, exploiting the stylized techniques associated with comedic entertainment as political platform.
To watch Trump perform a stump speech is to experience something like stand-up comedy. His words, gestures, repetitions, and interactive style tag his routines as comedic, if also crude and bawdy. Indeed, prominent comedians such as Samantha Bee, Trevor Noah, and John Oliver have themselves noted that Trump’s routines mirror a comedic format (see, for instance, The Daily Show 2016). His performances recall the signature elements of stand-up introduced to the American public in the 1960s and 1970s by comedians such as Lenny Bruce, George Carlin, Carl Reiner, Mel Brooks, and Richard Pryor, all recognized as comedic geniuses who employed taboo language to create comedy (Seizer 2011) and to insinuate the abject (Limon 2000). At a political rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Trump questions why Clinton arrived late to the previous night’s debate stage after a break. “Where did she go?” he asks the crowd. “I thought she quit, I thought she gave up! I know where she went and it’s too disgusting! Wasn’t this a weird deal?” Minutes later, Trump reminds the audience that Clinton “got schlonged” by Obama in the last primary, using the Yiddish word for penis to keep risqué talk in play. In a speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, Trump abruptly interrupts a woman as she asks “I was wondering what you would say to President Obama . . .” with the reply “You’re fired!” The performative has a vulgar emphasis on the [f] (see Figure 1a) as he throws his index finger forward to make the shape of a gun (see Figure 1b).[78][79]


Figure 1a: Trump’s Pistol Hand gesture (start), CBS North Carolina.



Figure 1b: Trump’s Pistol Hand gesture (finish), CBS North Carolina.



Figure 2: Trump’s Pistol Hand gesture, The Apprentice (2006), Associated Press Images.

This is Trump’s infamous pistol hand gesture, the one he also used on The Apprentice to fire unworthy contestants (see Figure 2). The crowd gets the intertextuality and irrupts explosively into cheers, whistles, and screams.
This is not the usual stuff of stump speeches but rather comedic performance. At Trump’s campaign rallies, a New York billionaire’s routine built on “bad taste” is displayed in carnivalesque fashion to a self-selected audience that understands his humor as funny. Literary scholar John Limon’s (2000) understanding of comedy as “the resurrection of your father as your child”—that is, the performance of punishing father and naughty son all at once—may in part explain the hilarity of Trump’s routines, particularly to those who subscribe to Lakoff’s (2016) analytics of the Strict Father family. Laughing with Trump, supporters are empowered; their differences with respect to social class or economic interests appear trifling. One need only remember how America wanted to have a beer with George W. Bush and how this small feature about the man increased his likeability. Laughter has always been understood as a weapon of the weak (Scott 1985; cf. Goldstein [2003] 2013), but it is perhaps also a weapon of the powerful. Trump makes people laugh, even if they are not laughing at the same thing. Media broadcasts of public reception spotlight some who laugh because they find Trump’s daily insults funny and others who laugh in disbelief and outrage. Yet both sides seem equally engaged by the question: “What did Trump say today?” Trump’s material is based on strong image projection (“Make America great again”; “Be a winner”), comedic gesture (mimetic enactments, histrionic facial expressions, rolling eyes, torso shrugs), sarcasm (“yeah, right”), repetition of packaged comedic routines (planes flying overhead at campaign rallies used as props to joke about military opponents), adversarial stance (anti-political correctness), staged rituals of masculinity and femininity (competitive one-upmanship involving braggadocio and beauty), and the bullying of opponents (“Look at that face”; “Jeb is a boring guy, basically a loser”). If viewers read Trump as an entertainer, it is because of these performances, where insults and gestures are produced in excess and often coordinated to enhance comedic effect.
We have never seen a presidential candidate quite like this one. Nothing Trump did during the Republican primaries moved his supporters away from him. Much ink has been spilled over the negative aspects of Trump’s person—his ignorance, unpresidentiality, misogyny, racism, unpredictability—but no one seems able to explain why his popularity did not plummet, even after he told the nation that his hands were big and his genitals fine. Politicians have been ruined by much less. Gerald Ford was labeled a “klutz” after slipping on the stairs of Air Force One. Al Gore was ridiculed for sighing and rolling his eyes in debates with George W. Bush. Dan Quayle was deemed “stupid” because he had to learn from a sixth grader that potato is not spelled with “e.” Howard Dean was recast as “hysterical” because of a scream he delivered to his supporters after a third-place finish in the Iowa primaries (“Yeeeeeeeeaaaaaahhhh!!”). But would any of these actions have damaged Trump’s candidacy? Our argument is precisely that it is the style of Trump—his speech, his gestures, his comedic timing—that brings entertainment value and explains his political success. We agree with Dave Eggers (2016) in The Guardian when he says: “The moment [Trump] ceases to entertain—to say crazy shit—he will evaporate.” Indeed, if we break from our temporal frame of the Republican [80]primary season and flash forward to the federal election, it does appear that a more restrained Trump has fallen in popularity.
With visuals of Trump widely distributed across diverse media, the nation has now viewed so many instances of unpresidential behavior that almost anything seems acceptable. This development has led some commentators to revisit “the Howard Dean moment” in an effort to understand how the comparatively minor offense of a rallying cry could destroy a presidential campaign. Media scholar Robert Thompson asks in a recent documentary on fatal campaign blunders (History Channel 2016): What must Howard Dean be thinking now? Dean’s scream allegedly made him appear high strung, even hysterical. But did Dean really sound so out of control? Weren’t his poll numbers already fading? Jürgen Streeck (2008b) argues that Dean’s mistake was actually not the scream at all but rather his overuse of an index finger point that made him look as if he was always scolding the audience. Audio engineer Jen Munson points out that sound technicians brought down Dean’s candidacy by isolating the scream from background noise and making him sound more ramped up (Avirgan and Malone 2016). Michael Lempert and Michael Silverstein (2012) suggest that Dean’s scream was the culmination of a long line of political blunders that engendered a negative public opinion of his character. Given Trump’s success in spite of much grander gaffes, we suggest another explanation: the scream mattered because Dean was judged as a politician, not as an entertainer.
Consider Trump’s use of the pistol hand, a gestural signature brought over from the genre of entertainment. A comparison between this highly emblematic gesture and those normatively used by presidential candidates reveals the semiotic limitations of politics as usual (for an early discussion of emblematic or quotable gestures, see Kendon 1992). Trump’s pistol hand is depictive, a show move, flashy; typical gestures for presidential politicians are pragmatic, emphatic, didactic. When Trump uses the pistol hand as a boardroom executive on The Apprentice, it conveys arrogance, sovereign power, and commanding force. Trump is the kind of guy who will never admit his own failures and rarely gives others a second chance. The gesture is understood through the iconicity of its production, where swiftness and precision accompany a gun shape in the striking down of an unworthy opponent. Yet the gesture is also playful: when Trump thrusts his hand forward to mimic the firing of a gun, he converts the sovereign force behind the performative “you’re fired” into comedic appeal. He brings a child’s pantomime of shooting an enemy—the use of hands to imitate the action of killing—to the firing of an adult in an entrepreneurial battle. The repeated image of a grown man unearthing child’s play on nightly television to dismiss contestants functions as comedy, recalling Limon’s (2000) symbiotic merger of punishing father and naughty son. Celebrity businessman and politician are brought together in a playful image of executive power.
Even more critically, Trump’s hands differ from those of his competitors in that their movements are already established as part of the Trump brand. Trump’s use of the pistol hand gesture can be traced back to his involvement with professional wrestling, an entertainment genre in which competitors craft a persona through a particular move that is packaged for fan consumption through staged comedic routines of violence. Trump has developed his own persona at WWE (formerly WWF and World Wrestling Entertainment) since at least 1988, when he brought [81]WrestleMania IV to Trump Plaza in Atlantic City. Two weeks after The Apprentice debuted in 2004, Trump attracted media attention when he attempted to trademark the pistol hand gesture together with the catchphrase “You’re Fired!” (McLeod 2005). The news item was viewed as laughable by both journalists and fans, who marveled at the audacity of Trump for thinking he could trademark such a common (and in this case, comedic) expression, much less a movement of the human body. Yet Trump’s attempt was consistent with branding practices in professional wrestling, where performers claim ownership to gestures, nicknames, and wrestling moves to advance their celebrity character. In fact, Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again,” which he trademarked in 2015 at the start of his presidential run, follows from his earlier promise in professional wrestling venues to “make WWE great again.” Trump’s reduction of competitors to nicknames like “Low Energy Jeb,” “Little Marco,” “Lyin’ Ted,” “Pocahontas,” and “Crooked Hillary” is a comparable branding tactic used for decades in this industry (although other-directed instead of self-directed), as is his use of impersonation, which we analyze below as a nicknaming practice waged in the modality of gesture.
Trump has also imported tactics from the world of professional beauty pageants, a business he was likewise involved in for over a decade. His running commentary on the attractiveness of female adversaries recalls the judging rituals associated with pageant culture. Of note are his comments regarding Republican primary competitor Carly Fiorina (“Look at that face! Would anyone vote for that?”). Such comments demonstrate some of the accepted ranking practices found in beauty pageant culture. Beauty competitions do for femininity what wrestling competitions do for masculinity: they create a world of gestural performance based on an exaggerated and idealized notion of gender. They are about style not content, a point exemplified by the interview portion of many pageants. Contestants perform silently before the judges for hours in the bathing suit and evening gown competitions but are then given twenty seconds to answer a question. Trump’s importation of ranking practices into insults launched at political competitors illustrates his ability to surpass unspoken rules of decency by reframing his behavior as speaking the truth and rejecting the culture of political correctness. After calling attention to physical features of women, Trump declares to the media, “I respect women, I love women, I cherish women,” with no apparent awareness that such behavior might be perceived as misogynist. For some, his beauty rankings offer a funny pushback to political correctness and a no-nonsense display of campaign toughness; for others, it is simply unbelievable.
Like all depictive gestures, Trump’s signature move exemplifies a form of metonymy, a semiotic process that reduces a whole to its parts (Mittelberg and Waugh 2014). One of the clearest ways to understand metonymy as social practice is through the concept of celebrity brand. According to rhetorician Robert Hariman (1995), “To become a celebrity, one has to master and distinguish oneself within a rhetoric of gestures—virtually every star has a defining gesture or gestural effect” (80–81). This is a practice intensified by digital media: politicians become fragments of bodies and voices spread daily across thousands of media platforms. Their every step is converted into digital material recontextualized for different sectors of a consuming audience. Hariman views today’s fragmentation of the body as continuous with courtly culture, where royals manifest sovereign power [82]through looks and poses. The branding of US presidential politicians through gestural metonymy—for example, Nixon’s double-V victory gesture, Clinton’s thumbs up gesture, Obama’s fist bump, Merkel’s diamond—is thus a contemporary version of an old practice. Yet many of these gestures differ from Trump’s pistol hand in that the media is primarily responsible for granting them their significance. Although politicians often come to embrace the brandings attributed to them, there is little evidence in the historical record of candidates actively crafting emblematic gestures in their campaign speeches as indexical of political persona, as in the case of Trump.
Trump’s gestures are part of a complicated mediation of Trump’s celebrity image as it relates to his overall brand. Trump is known as a famous figure with a long career of entertaining the mass US audience through performative humor. His humor works because it incorporates that central Bakhtinian trope called vulgarity. In Trump we find a Rabelaisian character that deploys bawdy humor to entertain his audience. He provides carnivalesque moments as he pokes fun at other candidates, at their bodies, at their fluids, at their stiffness. Like Rabelais, Trump understands that crude humor has the power to bring down the princely classes—aka, the political establishment—as well as anyone who opposes him. He uses it to advance the “antipolitics politics” that has been building in the US public sphere since at least the early 1990s. Viewers stay amazed by Trump’s expressions of physical disgust regarding the embodiment of others, whether in reaction to Megyn Kelly’s menstruation, Hilary Clinton’s toilet behaviors, or Marco Rubio’s sweating. By reducing his opponents to bodily behaviors, Trump assumes the position of a Rabelaisian clown, bringing down the old guard by exposing the grotesque body beneath. This strategy is key to understanding Trump’s gestural depictions, the subject of the next section.


Gesture
What is it about Trump’s public movements that allow him to appear comedic yet serious enough to become the Republican Party candidate? We turn now to the power of gesture as a modality particularly suited to the accomplishment of comedic insult in mediatized political forums. True to entertainer type, Trump violates many of the normative bodily standards of presidential propriety expected for the political stage. Most notably for our purposes, he produces emblematic gestures as self-branding, performs a contrastively large gestural space, and enacts reductive gestural depictions of his opponents by framing their bodies as grotesque. When Trump exposes the “truths” of the body as part of his comedic routine, he exploits a widely circulating language ideology in the United States: the body is thought to speak its own truth beyond the ephemerality of words. Trump’s opponents interpret his gestures as truth of discriminatory attitudes that exist beyond the comedic act; his supporters read the same gestures as truth that he is not afraid to express his opinions, even when confronted with the censorship ideals of political correctness. Trump’s bodily expressions thus enable plausible deniability by defying standardized interpretation. It is the body’s ambiguity that calls forth media spectacle. When Trump rejects the offending meanings his [83]opponents proffer, the media responds by giving credibility to divergent interpretations, rebroadcasting the performance across the news cycle as commentators debate gestural meaning (cf. Boyer and Yurchak 2010 on media reception of Obama’s facial scratch). The spectacle has been created, but the entertainer politician emerges unscathed.
Depictive gestures such as enactments are formed by incorporating bodily knowledge of the social world, abstracting qualities exhibited by the targeted object such as height, weight, shape, and speed (LeBaron and Streeck 2000; Mittelberg and Waugh 2014; Streeck 2008a). Yet because this incorporation is selective, such bodily acts also produce contextualized meaning, exemplifying an ideologically saturated semiotic process known as indexicality (Bucholtz and Hall 2016). For instance, Trump’s use of a firing squad gesture (see Figure 3) does not merely resemble the action of execution; it also unites moral and material worlds to critique Obama as losing ground, being weak in confronting terrorism, and making poor deals. When imitating a firing squad in a campaign speech in Greensboro, North Carolina, Trump registered a critique against the US government for exchanging five Guantanamo prisoners for Sergeant Bergdahl, a US army soldier captured in Afghanistan and thought by some to be guilty of desertion if not treason. “In the old days,” Trump says, “it would have been—”; then he pauses to enact the sideways firing of a rifle as if part of a firing squad. When performing this same routine in a campaign speech in Doral, Florida, he repeats the gesture twice before professing his love for the Second Amendment. The gesture thus materializes both a time period and a moral position that preceded political correctness, when punishment for betrayal was acceptable practice. In this way, gestural enactments have much in common with what linguists such as Niko Besnier (1993) and Deborah Tannen (1986) have identified for reported speech: they are citations disguised as quotes that “leak” the citer’s own imagining of social life and the ideologies that constitute it. Even the most conventionalized of depictive gestures inscribe broader societal discourses within the affordances of the body, transforming these discourses into an action.
For many viewers, the exaggerated displays that we outline in this section recall a moment-to-moment reality television star whose character role is built on spontaneity. Linguist Jennifer Sclafani has observed that Trump is “turning political discourse into reality TV,” noting in particular the way he uses large gestures to remind viewers of his “big personality” (Atkin 2015). Sclafani is not alone in noticing an iconic relationship between Trump’s gestures and Trump’s personality: certainly, the editorial cartoons mentioned above play off this reading, as does widely circulating metacommentary on the meaning of Trump’s gestures (BBC News 2016; Bloomberg Politics 2016; Civiello 2016; Rozzo 2016). Donald Trump has done for presidential campaigns what Jerry Springer did for tabloid talk shows: he has inserted a level of lowbrow drama, humor, and violence into the genre through exaggerated appeals to the body. Trump’s body matters to advocates as well as opponents. To advocates, Trump’s gestures suggest a man who is spontaneous and real instead of scripted. He is an unplanned man, even an honest man, who tells it how he sees it. To opponents, Trump’s gestures suggest a man who is vulgar if not offensive. They reveal a different sort of spontaneity: a buffoon, even a fake, who only poses as a politician.[84]


Figure 3: Trump’s Firing Squad gesture, Ghetty Images.

Trump exploits both kinds of attention when he uses bodily performance to characterize the less competent behaviors of political opponents. This strategy is an important one for an entertainer new to politics; above all, it enables Trump to reposition the job experience of his opponents as a drawback instead of a qualification. Tellingly, the most common enactments used by Trump for established politicians involve the performance of small gestural space. Although gesture scholars often discuss gestural space (the personal space appropriated in the execution of gesturing) as a matter of individual, cultural, and contextual concerns (McNeill 1992; Sweetser and Sizemore 2008), Trump’s essentializing poses, repeated multiple times across campaign speeches, make it clear that gestural space can also be a matter of ideology (Hoenes del Pinal 2011; R. L. Lakoff 1992). They include the performance of a hunched body reading from a script for Hillary Clinton (see Figure 4), a stiff upper body for Mitt Romney (see Figure 5), and a huddled sleeping body for Jeb Bush (see Figure 6).
With depictions like these, Trump uses gestural space to drive home his critique of the political establishment. The discourse goes something like this: politicians are people who do not act, who are not business people, and who do not know real risk. When mapped onto a restricted torso, an elite political class materializes as bookish, stiff, and lackluster. The mimicked gestural spaces of his opponents contrast sharply with the gestural space Trump inhabits in his own persona. Excessive gestural space is often negatively associated with tropic representations of social groups (e.g., the flamboyant gay man, the sassy black woman), but Trump uses gestural excess to convey the impression he is a new kind of politician, unconstrained by petty rules and competent at accomplishing daunting tasks. His performance of a large gestural space thereby becomes acceptable, if not politically desirable. In effect, Trump has expanded the space allowed for political gesture (at least for outsider politicians like himself).[85]


Figure 4: Script-Reading Hillary, Associated Press Images.



Figure 5: Stiff Mitt Romney, Associated Press Images.



Figure 6: Low Energy Jeb, CBS North Carolina.

[86]The gestural enactments outlined here function similarly to nicknames, crafting a metonymic representation of the referent that purportedly captures some essential truth. In the early anthropological literature, nicknames were discussed as part of the brick and mortar of local social systems (Pitt-Rivers [1954] 1961; Cohen 1977; Gilmore 1982; McDowell 1981). But nicknames also form part of an oblique naming system that belongs to comedic insult and “can be understood as a play upon form: that is, as a joke, or rather, the punchline of a joke” (Blok 2001: 157). In other words, the purpose of a nickname is not just to mock but also to entertain. In the new political process orchestrated by a comedic billionaire, the public watches as Trump rolls out nicknames for each successive opponent. The gestural nicknames are initially coarticulated with verbal nicknames such as “Low Energy Jeb” but later take on their own independence as detachables. In Bakhtinian perspective, this naming process accomplishes something important. Through metonymic reduction, nicknames connect the subject to the grotesque body, thus becoming comic and provoking hilarity. By mocking the subject and making the named person look foolish, nicknames give special powers to the provider. After all, the one who is the master of nicknaming is the person declaring the public secret.
We turn now to three widely mediatized gestural enactments that display Trump’s antagonism to political correctness by invoking discourses of disability, class, and race. These enactments are more elaborate and extended than the nicknames performed above, but they similarly reduce a target perceived as an opponent to an action of the body: the Wrist-Flailing Reporter, the Food-Shoveling Governor, and the Border-Crossing Mexican. Trump’s bodily parodies deliver the message that he rejects progressive social expectations regarding how minority groups should be represented. In each case, the media responded by moving away from an initial critical stance to a discussion of the meaning conveyed by Trump’s body.


The Wrist-Flailing Reporter
One of the most cited of Trump’s gestural spectacles involves a full-body enactment of Washington Post reporter Serge Kovaleski. Trump quoted Kovaleski on the campaign trail as saying fourteen years earlier that Muslims were celebrating in response to 9/11, an allegation Kovaleski denied. At a rally in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, Trump responded to this denial by framing Kovaleski as one of many “incompetent dopes” together with the president, politicians, and journalists. The theme of the speech is thus about incompetence. As with the firing squad example, Trump’s speech is particularly focused on the ineptitude wrought by political correctness, which in his view keeps politicians from speaking the truth and doing the right thing. But Kovaleski also happens to be afflicted by a muscular condition that involves contracture of the body muscles and joints. In his gestural depiction of Kovaleski, Trump transforms a discourse of incompetence into the action of flailing, limp wrists (see Figure 7a–c) and produces a multimodal image depictive of disability. (Due to space constraints, the images included in Excerpts 1 and 2 capture only a single frame of the extended depictive gestures used in these enactments; Trump also uses a number of pragmatic and interactive gestures that we do not notate in the transcripts.)[87]

Excerpt 1: The Wrist-Flailing Reporter
Written by a nice reporter. Now the poor guy, you gotta see this guy. (Mimics Kovaleski’s voice and actions.) [“Uhaaaaaaaaaaaa I don’t know what I said uhaaaaaa!]7a [I don’t remember!”]7b He’s going like [“I don’t remember uh doh, maybe that’s what I said.”]7c (He returns to his own voice, shouting.) This is fourteen years ago he still— They didn’t do a retraction? Fourteen years ago, they did no retraction.



Figure 7a: Wrist-Flailing Reporter, RightSide Broadcasting.



Figure 7b: Wrist-Flailing Reporter, RightSide Broadcasting.



Figure 7c: Wrist-Flailing Reporter, RightSide Broadcasting.

In this excerpt, a perceived opponent is metonymically represented by a flailing bodily habitus (uncontrolled, limp-wristed movements), facial contortions (rounded o-lip), and incoherent speech (loud elongated vocalizations produced in the back of the throat). The depiction produces a recognizable emblem in US popular culture of physical and mental disability. Emblematic gestures may sometimes be used in place of speech to displace responsibility for taboo topics (Brookes 2011), but the highly negative public response to Trump’s enactment suggests that this gesture cannot easily escape its performative associations. Yet Trump was nevertheless able to deny this interpretation in a follow-up statement: “I have no idea who Serge Kovaleski is, what he looks like, or his level of intelligence. I merely mimicked what I thought would be a flustered reporter trying to get out of a statement he made long ago. I have tremendous respect for people who are physically [88]challenged.” Trump thus retroactively characterizes his act as “mimicry,” but he denies the public interpretation of that mimicry as a biographically specific impersonation targeting a category of disabled persons. Although the media response was initially condemning, Trump’s defense transformed the critique into an interpretive discussion. Regardless of the relationship between the performance and the object depicted, Trump moved political discourse to a new place by highlighting gestural ambiguity through comedic routine.


The Food-Shoveling Governor
A second gestural enactment that caught the attention of the media is Trump’s depiction of Ohio governor John Kasich shoveling a pancake into his mouth (see Figures 8a–d), which was performed at a rally in Warwick, Rhode Island, in response to widely circulated images of Kasich eating at a New York restaurant. The depiction invites comparison with the Wrist-Flailing Reporter, except that it draws from discourses of social class instead of disability. (Again, the images below are provided as single-frame examples of the main gestural depictions used in the excerpt.)

Excerpt 2: The Food-Shoveling Governor
Now you look at Kasich, I don’t think he knows what— you know, did you see him? He has a news conference [all the time when he’s eating.]FSh (Crowd laughs.) I have never seen a human being eat in such a disgusting fashion. (Crowd laughs and cheers.) I’m always telling my young son Barron, I’m saying—and I always with my kids, all of ’em— [I’d say, “Children, small little bites,]SB small.” (Crowd laughs.) This guy [takes a pancake]BP and he’s [shoving it in his mouth]FSt you know.
(Crowd laughs and cheers.) It’s disgusting. Do you want that for your president? I don’t think so. (Crowd boos “no!”) I don’t think so. It’s disgu— honestly, it’s disgusting.[89]



Figure 8a: Food-Shoveling gesture (FSh), MSNBC.



Figure 8b: Small Bites gesture (SB), MSNBC.



Figure 8c: Big Pancake gesture (BP), MSNBC.



Figure 8d: Food-Stuffing gesture (FSt), MSNBC.

In this dramatization of Kasich’s table manners, we are again confronted by a display of discomfort with nonnormative bodies. It is well known that Trump avoided the fray of vernacular embodiment on the campaign trail by rarely eating with locals, even though this activity is expected of presidential candidates. In fact, Trump is famous for eating even fast food with a knife and a fork. Anthropologists familiar with the work of Norbert Elias (1982) and Pierre Bourdieu (1982) on the importance of table manners to class distinction would recognize Trump’s enactment as a veiled class assault: Kasich is a slob, a low life, a “subhuman” who would have difficulty being presidential. Trump, in contrast, is a man who teaches his children to exhibit good manners and eat politely in “small bites.” When returning to this same routine later in the speech, Trump illustrates that even his youngest child (named Barron) knows that Kasich’s behavior is wrong: “He said, ‘Daddy, look!’ I said, ‘Don’t watch. Little bites, little bites.’” Trump performs versions of this routine in at least four other campaign venues. Each time, as in the above excerpt, the crowd’s laughter, cheers, and boos suggest alignment with Trump’s perspective, even as he portrays Kasich as eating like a pig.
We again turn to the power of entertainment to understand the rhetorical effects of Trump’s display. His stint on Kasich incorporates recognizable techniques from impromptu stand-up comedy. He performs the voices of others as prompts for mockery (his young son), involves the audience through call and response (“Did you see him?” “Do you want that for your president?”), uses a repetitive verbal refrain to thematize a mocking stance toward his target (“disgusting”), and employs the method of abjection by calling attention to another candidate’s eating habits. Moreover, Trump creates the caricature of Kasich by assuming the roles of punishing father and naughty son, with Kasich in the role of the latter. In sum, these cross-modal stylizations provide the ground for the rhetorical call-and-response that comedic routine relies on while also signaling the inability of Kasich to perform competently as president.
Trump’s one-upmanship form of humor reinforces his superiority to those he critiques, a process noted by laughter theorist Henri Bergson (1921) almost a hundred years ago. His gestural enactments produce the comedic callousness that is central to his political persona. The emblematic gesture that accompanies “You’re [90]Fired” lacks the power to be felicitous when Trump utters it in a political context, making it all the more comical for its absurdity. This explains why commentators posting about Trump’s pistol hand on video sharing sites such as YouTube indicate a playful enjoyment of the gesture even when they do not necessarily agree with its message (“Not a fan of him at all. But honestly, that was actually funny.”) (Live Satellite News 2015). It also explains why audience members at a campaign rally in Madison, Alabama, break into uproarious laughter when Trump fires his pistol hand three times at a random plane flying overhead (“What is that? Oh. Uh oh, it’s ISIS, get them down!”), and why audience members laugh in Manchester, New Hampshire, when Trump points to another plane and suggests it might be carrying Mexicans. As with the Kasich example, these are packaged comedy routines, cliché gags, shticks. If Trump brags about his ability to deliver a speech without a teleprompter (“I don’t need those notes because I don’t need notes. Aren’t I lucky?”), it is because he knows how to exploit what is unfolding in the world around him as a comedic prompt. Specifically, he incorporates the immediate environment into the performance of his own comparative competence. Trump’s gestural enactments, as with parody more generally, thus exhibit a dual indexicality that points to the teller of the joke as much as to its target (Hill 1999; cf. Hall 2005). They may denigrate a social group by linking them to stereotyped body movements, but they also point back to him as a fun-loving guy who breaks the rules to enjoy a good joke. In short, Trump’s body becomes a spectacle that resembles stand-up comedy, where politically correct language and sensitive topics are breached for entertaining effects.


The Border-Crossing Mexican
Trump has developed a series of depictive gestures that coordinate with his promise to build a wall at the Mexican border. These depictions work together to construe Mexicans as bodies out of place. The “huuuge” wall that Trump performs in several campaign speeches—wide out-stretched arms to illustrate width, tall upright arms to illustrate height, a sharp L-shaped drawing pattern to illustrate strength—positions Mexicans as a wandering people who need to be stopped. Trump even performed a gestural enactment of Mexicans as “candy grabbers” at several venues when discussing outsourcing (with fingers pulling toward the palm), again suggesting a greedy people who put their hands in places they do not belong (“Mexico has been taking your companies like it’s candy from a baby, right?”). With these and related gestures, Trump expresses disdain for individuals whose lives are structured around migration.
A prominent media spectacle during the Republican primary season was a video broadcast of Trump disembarking from his car, climbing through a fence to cross over a concrete structure, and walking across a field to enter the back door of a stadium surrounded by protestors in San Francisco, California. When he finally arrives at the podium, knowing that his actions are being followed in real-time on cable news, Trump leads his audience in laughter by comparing his trek to “crossing the border.” His darkly satirical portrayal draws its humor from the absurd image of Trump the billionaire in the role of a border-crossing Mexican immigrant. This enactment differs from the previous two examples in that it is a reinterpretation of Trump’s own bodily movements televised earlier. Yet the performance has [91]all the elements of comedy. It turns something tragic and sad into something funny and absurd (Goldstein [2003] 2013). A privileged well-dressed body is reimagined in the role of impoverished migrant: Trump-the-immigrant crossing dangerous regions filled with protesters in order to get to his podium.
Circulating videos of the verbal and gestural enactments discussed in this section keep Trump at the forefront of national attention. As each day of the campaign passes, news consumers want to know: Who did Trump offend this time? Yet the question we pursue is a relatively uncharted area for gesture studies: How do Trump’s bodily acts keep supporters as well as adversaries coming back for more? Scholars working on conversational interaction provide one possible answer by illustrating how gestural enactments elicit heightened displays of attention, build a form of shared common ground, enlist coparticipation, and provoke laughter (Sidnell 2006; Thompson and Suzuki 2014). This body of research offers empirical support to Bergson’s early characterization of gesture as “something explosive, which awakes our sensibility when on the point of being lulled to sleep and, by thus rousing us up, prevents our taking matters seriously” (1921: 144). Perhaps it is true that Trump has become America’s newest “guilty pleasure” (Grossman 2015), dominating newsrooms, comedy sketches, social media, classrooms, and everyday conversation. Through gestural stylization, Trump creates a spectacle to be consumed. It does not matter whether the spectacle is respected, simply tolerated, or even abhorred, the outcome remains the same: we keep on watching. The public’s attraction to the political character known as Donald Trump is the subject of our third and final section.


Spectacle
The Trump empire brings together many of the elements analyzed by scholars as spectacle in late capitalism: hyperbole, casino capitalism, branding, simulacra, nostalgia, mediatization, excess, consumption, and vacuousness. Indeed, many of Trump’s known interests and business endeavors are coincident with the thematic focus of influential spectacle theorists. Trump’s engagement with professional wrestling recalls Roland Barthes’s ([1957] 2009) essay on wrestling as “the spectacle of excess.” His construction of nostalgic hotels like Trump Taj Mahal and Trump Castle Casino evokes Jean Baudrillard’s (1988) theorization of simulacra and the hyperreal in postmodernity. The Republican primary debates could be seen as their own kind of simulacra, turned by Trump into a mass-mediated spectacle that was in many ways predicted by Guy Debord’s ([1967] 1970) work on the increasing importance of the mediated image to the formation of social relationships in capitalism. David Harvey (1990, 2006) perhaps makes the most explicit connection between public space, capitalism, and spectacle when he speaks of the “mobilization of spectacle”—that is, the movement of capital to urban spaces in periods of intensified competition and entrepreneurialism, as we now understand to have happened in Las Vegas and Atlantic City, places shaped by Trump’s hand. According to Harvey (2006, building on Sennett [1974] 1992), this mobilization serves to mask and disguise the fundamentals of class relations, bringing as its final scene a thorough depoliticization of these spaces.[92]
Trump as a branded commodity to be consumed—or rather, TrumpTM—has entered politics in a way never seen before, as technological and institutional forces harness the power of Trump as old-school capitalist and entrepreneur of spectacle and escort his brand into the political spectrum. His ability to bring previously distinct forms of semiotic extravagance together (reality television, beauty contests, wrestling matches) and insert them into his candidacy for the most powerful position in the world is precisely what makes Trump a never-ending spectacle. It is perhaps redundant to remind the reader that Trump’s business narrative is everywhere saturated with examples of late-capitalist excess—restaurants that offer all-you-can-eat menus; investments that earn money through bankruptcy; branding schemes that are several times removed from the brand itself. It seems that we have decisively arrived in the era of late capitalism critiqued by each of the above theorists for fetishizing style over content and for ultimately serving as a depoliticizing force.
Yet it is style, of course, that makes spectacle entertaining. In this article, we have tracked Trump’s use of comedic style as it informs his gestural behaviors on the campaign trail, where he reduces diverse forms of social complexity to buffoonish movements of the human body. Trump’s gestural spectacles in public, even if they earn him more adversaries than supporters, maintain steady reception as they incite landmark media coverage. As we know from other examples of negative spectacles, the gesture and its source can maintain media coverage in spite of the message. We are reminded of the global response to the widely circulated spectacle of US soldier Lynndie England’s thumbs up and pistol hand gesture, which she performed before naked Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison during the US-led Iraq war. This gesture, initially associated with torture and institutional military excess, was later transformed into hilarity through its mediatization on a British visual blog website (see Hristova 2013). Over the course of a few weeks, England gradually became a victim of her own gesture as participants began to upload photographs of unattractive people in unglamorous occupations “doing a Lynndie.” Even the most perverse of depictive gestures—in this case, a “photo cliché” that instances a dark moment in US history—is easily fetishized as comedic spectacle, particularly when subjected to the digitized imaginings of citizen photographers. Gestures are certainly open to a variety of ideological interpretations (cf. Alim and Smitherman 2012 on Obama’s fist bump as a “terrorist fist jab”), and we expect Trump’s gestures to be cast in new ways as the campaign moves forward. But if these bodily acts are ultimately interpreted as entertainment rather than other possibilities (ableist, classist, racist, nativist, sexist, etc.), then it is possible that even Trump’s most offending gestures can be depoliticized.
Yet Trump is also a vernacular spectacle (cf. Androutsopoulos 2010), a multimediated image fueled by linguistic and gestural features that are densely indexical of New York City. The 2016 presidential election is one of the first in many decades where a New York vernacular style is as much an asset as it is a hindrance, contributing to positive as well as negative media attention. Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders share styles reminiscent of less elite boroughs, specifically Brooklyn and Queens. Perhaps this turn of events was encouraged in the aftermath of 9/11, when Rudy Giuliani famously declared, “We are all New Yorkers now.” The nation saw and heard—and even came to respect and possibly [93]idolize—what had previously been considered a brash New York style, opening the potential for the rise of both Trump and Sanders. In fact, at several junctures in the primary election cycle, Trump invited what he believed to be antiestablishment Democratic voters supporting the progressive candidate Sanders to join his campaign. The ideological gap that separates these two candidates should not be underestimated. While Trump may be ushering in a depoliticized era bereft of content, our sense of things is that Sanders added in content previously missing. But this would be another article, and we are trying here to understand what keeps Trump from losing ground in spite of a relative lack of substance and many rhetorical gaffes.
In her ethnography No billionaire left behind, Angelique Haugerud tracks the rise of political satire in an American public sphere that lacks deep investigative reporting and increasingly relies on “personality more than issues, style more than substance, and tactics more than context” (2013: 189). She focuses on a group of satirical activists who began appearing at political events at the turn of the twenty-first century under the title “Billionaires for Bush,” precisely when the super-rich billionaire class began to attract attention. Haugerud poses the question: What follows “after satire”? We suggest that it is the comedic debauchery of Donald Trump that follows. His rise is the next logical chapter of a hypermediatized politics that lacks content, sells itself as entertainment, and incorporates comedic stylistics so as to immunize itself from critique. In contrast to the parodies discussed by Haugerud, Trump’s performances depend on his self-proclaimed successful billionaire status and alleged competence. We are hesitant to elevate Trump’s programmed routines by calling them satire, but it is precisely their comedic effects that work for him as political entertainment.
We have written this article with some concern that our analysis will bring even more attention to the comedic and gestural techniques that have assisted Trump’s rise, yet we also believe that there is much to be learned from the anthropological and linguistic insights expressed here. In our view, the benefits of revealing the processes through which Trump gained momentum outweigh the dangers of adding to his media presence. Shortly after the Republican primaries concluded, large naked statues depicting Trump’s grotesque body began to appear in urban public areas around the country, perhaps in an attempt to confront Trump with his own comedic weaponry. This article is meant to be similarly confrontational in its exposition of the value accrued by Trump’s bodily behaviors. Trump has done what a previous generation thought impossible: he has turned a billionaire caricature into a wildly popular political brand. During the Republican primaries, Trump repeatedly promised the public that he would “become presidential,” cease his whack-a-mole tactics against adversaries, and bring respectful demeanor back to the campaign. As we conclude this article two months before the national election, we have yet to see Trump’s promise materialize. But we are struck by the words he used at a campaign rally in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: “At some point I’m going to be so presidential that you people will be so bored.” Perhaps Trump has it right. Now that the American public has taken its seat in the perversely compelling theater that we have outlined throughout this article, politics as usual cannot easily follow.[94]


Acknowledgments
The authors are deeply grateful to HAU editors Giovanni da Col, Amira Mittermaier, and Michael Lambek for their quick and generous shepherding of this paper. We would also like to express our appreciation to five anonymous reviewers, editors Molly Mullin, Sean Dowdy, and Michelle Beckett for their keen insights, and the many colleagues who provided feedback along the way: Niko Besnier, Anton Blok, Barry Brummett, Mary Bucholtz, Alison Cool, Kristen Drybread, Kate Goldfarb, Candy Goodwin, Tamara Hale, Arlene Hall, Leo Hall, Angelique Haugerud, Olivia Hirschey, Lonia Jakubowska, Carla Jones, Velda Khoo, Peter Koester, Michael Lempert, Laura Michaelis-Cummings, Carole McGranahan, Arielle Milkman, Chris Morris, Lindsay Ofrias, Nick Remple, Richard Sandoval, Muhammad Sheeraz, Magda Stawkowski, Jürgen Streeck, Irina Wagner, and Sydney White.


Appendix: Figure Permissions
Figure 1a–b: Trump’s Pistol Hand gesture. Raleigh, North Carolina, 12/4/15. Reprinted with permission from CBS North Carolina.
Figure 2: Trump’s Pistol Hand gesture. The Apprentice, 2006. Reprinted with permission from Ghetty Images.
Figure 3: Trump’s Firing Squad gesture. Doral, Florida, 10/23/15. Reprinted with permission from Ghetty Images.
Figure 4: Script-Reading Hillary. Eugene, Oregon, 5/07/16. Reprinted with permission from Associated Press Images.
Figure 5: Stiff Mitt Romney. Tampa, Florida, 6/11/16. Reprinted with permission from Associated Press Images.
Figure 6: Low Energy Jeb. Raleigh, North Carolina, 12/4/15. Reprinted with permission from CBS North Carolina.
Figure 7a–c: The Wrist-Flailing Reporter. Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, 4/25/16. RightSide Broadcasting. Reprinted under fair use.
Figure 8a–d: The Food-Shoveling Governor. Warwick, Rhode Island, 11/24/15. MSNBC. Reprinted under fair use.


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Les mains de Donald Trump: Entertainment, gestuelle et spectacle
Résumé : La transition, opérée par Donald Trump, d’homme d’affaire à candidat présidentiel populiste a laissé plus d’un commentateur perplexe. Cet article s’appuie sur les outils de l’anthropologie culturelle, linguistique et sur la théorie réthorique pour suggérer que le succès de la candidature de Trump tient en partie à sa valeur en tant que forme de grand divertissement comique. Nous examinons notamment la manière dont le style politique hors norme de Trump, son utilisation de la gestuelle pour critiquer le système politique et caricaturer ses opposants donnèrent un élan à sa campagne en la rendant spectaculaire. Des théoriciens poststructuralistes et néo-marxistes ont soutenu que le capitalisme tardif valorise le style au dépend du contenu: Trump donne un nouveau souffle à cette tendance. Le portrait-charge du monde sociopolitique que dessinent les gestes de Trump lorsqu’il s’attaque au politiquement correct ou lorsqu’il tente de désarmer ses adversaires, crée du capital visuel dans un univers politique contemporain médiatisé et sous-tendu par la célébrité.
Kira HALL is a linguistic anthropologist in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Colorado Boulder, with a courtesy appointment in the Department of Anthropology. In addition to the edited volumes Gender articulated: Language and the socially constructed self (Routledge, 1995) and Queerly phrased: Language, gender, and sexuality (Oxford, 1997), she has authored diverse journal articles and [100]book chapters on the subject of language, identity, and embodiment in India and the United States.
Kira HallDepartment of Linguistics295 UCB, Hellems BuildingUniversity of Colorado BoulderBoulder, Colorado 80309-0295USAkira.hall@colorado.edu
Donna M. GOLDSTEIN is professor of cultural anthropology at the University of Colorado Boulder and author of Laughter out of place: Race, class, violence, and sexuality in a Rio Shantytown (University of California Press, 2003), winner of the 2005 Margaret Mead award. She writes within the fields of medical anthropology, anthropology of the environment, and Science and Technology Studies (STS) and is currently working on a project that examines the history of Cold War science and nuclear energy in Brazil.
Donna M. GoldsteinDepartment of Anthropology233 UCB, Hale BuildingUniversity of Colorado BoulderBoulder, Colorado 80309-0233USAdonna.goldstein@colorado.edu
Matthew Bruce INGRAM is a PhD student in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Texas at Austin with a focus on rhetoric and language studies. His research draws from sociocultural and rhetorical understandings of embodiment to study how human actors use their embodied resources to represent themselves and others as well as make sense of their social worlds.
Matthew Bruce IngramDepartment of Communication StudiesCMA 7.112, 2504A Whitis AvenueUniversity of Texas at AustinAustin, Texas 78712-0115USAmatthew.ingram@utexas.edu
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Understanding ritual performances in terms of changes of perspective is increasingly common in anthropological analyses. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that perspectival transformations not only make up the internal dynamics of a given ritual but also connect it to other rituals. Drawing on a series of related Watchi-Ewe rituals (divinatory, initiatory, funerary, and hunting), this article proposes to analyze ritual space as a system of perspectival transformations operating both within and between rituals. By conceiving of each ritual as constructing the same relational architecture from a different point of view, it becomes possible to understand the relationship between female diviners and male hunters within the context of a larger set of interconnected relations (between men and women, humans and animals, masters and slaves, the living and the dead), realized in the virtual space of ritual performance. Understood as a controlled variation of perspective, the transformational analysis of ritual thus becomes a valuable methodological device, both to elucidate the model through which a society conceives its relational universe and to render intelligible seemingly contradictory and otherwise unexplainable ethnographic facts.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Understanding ritual performances in terms of changes of perspective is increasingly common in anthropological analyses. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that perspectival transformations not only make up the internal dynamics of a given ritual but also connect it to other rituals. Drawing on a series of related Watchi-Ewe rituals (divinatory, initiatory, funerary, and hunting), this article proposes to analyze ritual space as a system of perspectival transformations operating both within and between rituals. By conceiving of each ritual as constructing the same relational architecture from a different point of view, it becomes possible to understand the relationship between female diviners and male hunters within the context of a larger set of interconnected relations (between men and women, humans and animals, masters and slaves, the living and the dead), realized in the virtual space of ritual performance. Understood as a controlled variation of perspective, the transformational analysis of ritual thus becomes a valuable methodological device, both to elucidate the model through which a society conceives its relational universe and to render intelligible seemingly contradictory and otherwise unexplainable ethnographic facts.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>From village to bush in four Watchi rites






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Klaus Hamberger. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau4.1.005
From village to bush in four Watchi rites
A transformational analysis of ritual space and perspective
Klaus HAMBERGER, Laboratoire d’anthropologie sociale, EHESS


Understanding ritual performances in terms of changes of perspective is increasingly common in anthropological analyses. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that perspectival transformations not only make up the internal dynamics of a given ritual but also connect it to other rituals. Drawing on a series of related Watchi-Ewe rituals (divinatory, initiatory, funerary, and hunting), this article proposes to analyze ritual space as a system of perspectival transformations operating both within and between rituals. By conceiving of each ritual as constructing the same relational architecture from a different point of view, it becomes possible to understand the relationship between female diviners and male hunters within the context of a larger set of interconnected relations (between men and women, humans and animals, masters and slaves, the living and the dead), realized in the virtual space of ritual performance. Understood as a controlled variation of perspective, the transformational analysis of ritual thus becomes a valuable methodological device, both to elucidate the model through which a society conceives its relational universe and to render intelligible seemingly contradictory and otherwise unexplainable ethnographic facts.
Keywords: Space, ritual, transformation, Ewe, Watchi, Togo


Understanding ritual performances in terms of changes of perspective is increasingly common in anthropological analyses (Kapferer 1997; Viveiros de Castro 1998; Empson, Humphrey, and Pedersen 2007; Ishii 2013). However, less attention has been paid to the fact that perspectival transformations not only make up the internal dynamics of a given ritual but also connect it to other rituals, each of which can thus be understood as enacting the same relations and processes from an alternative point of view. Such an approach takes proper account of the common ethnographic observation that people themselves frequently explain their rituals by reference to other rituals—as, for example, when Watchi Ewe of Southeast Togo present a hunting ceremony as a mortuary rite for animals, or describe a female initiation rite as a replica of the burial reserved for victims of violent death. As I shall argue, it is the total set of such transformations, both within and between rituals, that turns the multiplicity of ritual perspectives into a space—not just in the sense of an abstract analytical structure, but as the concrete experiential architecture of ritual performance. Conceptualized as a system of perspective transformations (rather than as their invariant framework), ritual space not only becomes accessible to transformational analysis but also provides the latter with a new grounding, by turning symbolic oppositions into vectors of intersubjective relations. Thus reshaped and reoriented, the transformational analysis of ritual space becomes a valuable methodological device, both to elucidate the way in which a society conceives its relational universe and to render intelligible seemingly contradictory and otherwise unexplainable ethnographic facts.

The transformational concept of space
Ever since Arnold Van Gennep’s Les rites de passage (1909), space has been central to the study of ritual. Not only has the focus on spatial structure and patterns of movement proved to be a fecund method for analyzing rites of passage, but generalizations of Van Gennep’s model by anthropologists such as Victor Turner (1967) have increased the importance of spatial concepts for ritual theory to the extent that David Parkin (1993) proposed that ritual action might be conceptualized entirely in terms of movement, directionality, and spatial orientation. While this mainly meant that space was appreciated as the principal medium in which ritual action takes place, an increasing number of studies have concentrated on the way in which space itself is shaped and produced by ritual.
An important step in this direction was taken with the introduction of Susanne Langer’s (1953) concept of “virtual space” into the theory of ritual (Williams and Boyd 1993; Kapferer 1997, 2004).1 Langer developed this concept to analyze the working of (plastic) art. According to her theory, art uses sensory and symbolic devices (including, but not necessarily, figurative representation) in order to produce a configuration of imaginary relations exhibiting a genuine spatial structure. This virtual space differs from an optical illusion in that it is not continuous with the physical space in which the artwork is located, but constitutes a self-contained, autonomous system, a full-fledged form of perception, which, however, is not organized in the same way as is ordinary vision. This peculiar form of perception serves a symbolic function, not in the sense that it represents external objects, but in that its structure corresponds to the dynamics of subjective experience—the morphology of feeling and emotion, rendered perceivable in the work of art (Langer 1953: chapter 5). Langer’s model was innovative in more than one respect: it conceptualized representation as the means rather than as the aim of artistic creation, perception as its product rather than as its origin, and emotion as its meaning rather than as its effect. Moreover, it analyzed “emotion” as having a relational dimension, especially when dealing with the virtual space of architecture, considered as an embodiment of the patterns and rhythms of social or religious life.
The fruitfulness of this model for conceptualizing how ritual works is obvious (see also Williams and Boyd 1993: 145 f.). First, it dissolves the opposition between two seemingly different interpretations of ritual: one that sees ritual as constituting an autonomous realm and the other that sees ritual as pointing to an external reality. The representational elements in ritual act as devices to produce a self-contained relational structure (an approach further elaborated by Houseman and Severi [1998]). Moreover, by conceiving of this relational structure both as a model of social relationships and as a mode of spatial experience in and of itself, it helps us to understand how ritual, without necessarily producing the social relationships it models (any more than art necessarily produces the feelings it expresses), can nonetheless translate them into sensory perceptions, much in the way Pierre Bourdieu (1970) has shown for Kabyle domestic architecture. As Bruce Kapferer (2004: 44) has pointed out, Bourdieu’s study of the Kabyle house can, in this respect, be considered as a model for the analysis of ritual.
Although most anthropologists today would agree that movement is the primary form through which ritual space is created and social relations are embodied, another key insight of Bourdieu’s seminal study has been relatively neglected. Movement not only mobilizes a spatial relation (between departure and arrival), but also entails changes of perspective, that is, transformations of the totality of relations that make up a given space. One of the merits of Bourdieu’s study is to have demonstrated that a transformational concept of space is not restricted to abstract geometry but is equally applicable to social space. At the same time it provided a spatial interpretation of the Lévi-Straussian notion of transformation, affording the latter a coherent epistemological framework and in a sense putting it on its feet. However, Lévi-Strauss’ (1971: 603) verdict that ritual was not only different from but opposite to the logic of mythical thought persistently inhibited the application of transformational analysis to ritual. Such approaches remain few in number (see, for example, De Heusch 1980; Albert 1985; Désveaux 2001), and still fewer of them focus on spatial structure.
One notable exception is Stephen Hugh-Jones’ (1995) exploration of Barasana ritual, which shows how changes in ritual perspective entail inversions of ritual space. The orientation of the ceremonial house changes from upriver-facing to downriver-facing, according to whether it is envisaged from the inside or from the outside. These transformations in turn involve others: the house opening becomes either a male mouth or a female vagina, and so on. Hugh-Jones’ analysis makes clear that, without a methodology that recognizes the importance of variable perspective, the superimposition of inverse symbolic structures on the particular ritual space that is the Barasana ceremonial house would have remained a mass of contradictions (which in turn might well have been interpreted as a sign of “liminal” antistructure).
This result can be generalized. Much of what has been conceptualized as a ritual condensation of opposite relational poles (Houseman and Severi 1998) may actually be the sign of a change of perspective, which, far from being an instance of antistructure, can provide a key to the understanding of both the internal structure of a given ritual and the way in which rituals are linked together.
This multiplicity of perspectives is constitutive of the structure of ritual space. Rather than model the fabric of social relations exclusively from one dominant point of view, ritual allows its participants to perceive it from a variety of perspectives; and it is through the controlled variation of these perspectives that its distinctive topology is shaped. Ritual space thus provides not so much the miniaturized image of a social and symbolic universe as the generative scheme that underlies its construction—a construction that proceeds by transformation, both within and between rituals. It is by virtue of a transformational conception of ritual space that the latter can be understood, not just as a spatialized image of a symbolic structure deriving from the model of language, but as a spatial structure in its own right, whose elements are alternative viewpoints, and whose dichotomies instantiate relations between the self and the other.
One of the major insights offered by studies on Amazonian perspectivism (Viveiros de Castro 1998) is that relations of alterity, insofar as these correspond to transformations of perspective, always imply some sort of attention, aggression, or desire—the paradigm being the relation between predator and prey. Correspondingly, there is an intimate link between perspectivism and hunting, not necessarily as an actual mode of production, but as a relational model (ibid.: 472). These results draw on data from a particular cultural area and refer to cosmology rather than to ritual. However, once we consider ritual space, we find the connection between hunting and perspectival transformation evidenced in many cultures far beyond those with explicit “perspectivist” cosmologies or hunting economies. The perspectival approach is in fact not so much bound to specific cultural areas as to specific relational contexts. In West Africa no less than in Amazonia, rituals that deal with hunting, homicide, and violent death abound with perspective inversions, while rituals that focus on persons capable of a double perspective, such as diviners, spirit mediums, or twins, are imbued with the symbolism of hunting; and all of them are organized around a fundamental division of ritual space into a human and a nonhuman realm—“village” and “bush.” This is not just because the frontier between the home and the wild is a particularly salient division. Strictly speaking, it does not constitute a specific division at all, but rather a general relational schema that can be applied at any level and in any perspective: “village” and “bush” are the respective places of the self and of the other.
The relation between humans and animals is only one way in which this general schema is realized. Others include relations between the living and the dead, and between men and women. The mutual combinations and reiterations of these various dichotomies engender complex topologies of houses and cemeteries, parlors and chambers, courtyards and enclosures. As has long been remarked by anthropologists (see, among others, Mosko 1985 and Strathern 1998), the generative logic underlying these topologies often entails some characteristic inversion of the inside/outside dichotomy—as, for example, when the innermost part of a woman’s domicile is symbolically aligned with the “bush.” Transformational analysis helps us to understand these inversions, which, far from rendering the notions of “inside” and “outside” ambiguous, in fact give them their precise meaning.


The ethnographic setting
I will start with an enigma of the sort just described. It consists in the prevalence of hunting symbolism in the rituals performed by a class of African female diviners using bush spirits—such as the Ewe amegasi, the Mossi kinkir-baga, the Senufo sando, and the Lugbara ojou. As I have already indicated, the connection of bush spirit divination with hunting is quite common in Africa. The spirits who initiate, help, or possess the diviner are frequently the masters of game animals; and in several societies the diviner’s career starts when he kills an animal whose spirit guardian, after haunting or kidnapping the hunter, becomes his auxiliary. Hunting, however, is a male domain, so this does not apply to female diviners. Yet the spirits they work with, and the symbolism of their divinatory practice, are also associated with the hunting sphere.
One possible solution to this apparent contradiction might be sought in a gender ambiguity that is characteristic of the diviner’s liminal state (cf. Peek 1991). But this would not explain why, while female diviners, as we shall see, may ritually transform themselves into men, they never assume the role of hunters. Another explanation might draw on analogies between hunting and childbirth as activities intimately linked to fortune and peril. The initiatory “madness” of Mossi female diviners is usually released by complications following delivery (Bonnet 1982: 79 f.), and in several West African societies the bush spirits engaged in divination are both the guardians of wild animals and the carriers of unborn children (see Hamberger 2012 for a discussion). Still, this approach would not explain why the diviner’s auxiliary spirits are located at the intersection of male and female domains, as allies (or enemies) of both hunters and mothers.
There may be several other hypotheses to render account of the relational configuration that connects women, hunters, and spirits, none of which are satisfactory, precisely because the relational configurations enacted in ritual cannot be understood in and by themselves. To understand them, we have to adopt the shifting perspective methodology of ritual itself, while at the same time extending it beyond the single rite to explore the configuration as it is transformed across a series of connected rituals.
The rituals that will be analyzed in this article are taken from the ethnography of the Watchi Ewe of Southeast Togo.2 Like many other West African societies, Ewe conceptually organize their environment by means of a dichotomy between the village or house (aʃe) and the bush (gbeme or gbedzi), which is applied to numerous conceptual domains (animals, vodus, the dead, etc.). As already indicated, this constitutes less a determinate division than an overarching scheme of relative spatial construction, as becomes clear in the use of the terms: aʃe means “home” (the place of the subject), while gbedzi means “the outland.” In Ewe as in other West African societies, the “bush” is the place of the other (see Cartry 1979). This, however, does not mean that it is simply defined as land beyond the village. Whether as the home of the animals and bush spirits from whom humanity obtained its cultural techniques, or of the autochthonous population that first received the village founders, or of the Northern slaves that became the ancestresses of today’s villagers, the bush is the condition of the village rather than its negation.
This relation also holds in the context of ritual. Here, the “bush” generally corresponds to an area physically or symbolically separated from its profane environment, and at times partly inaccessible to the audience located at the “village” side of the frontier. This detachment from actuality endows the bush with the characteristic otherness that Langer (1953: 45 f.) has emphasized as a condition of virtualization. In this sense, the virtual space of ritual is constructed from the bush, centered on the other’s place. This does not mean that the village remains outside virtual space—virtual space has no outside. However, as noted by Langer (1953: 95, 72), the virtual space of religious architecture integrates actual space as its context and frame. Contrary to the virtual space of pictorial art, it contains its own border. In fact, the basic difference between the rituals we shall consider consists in the way in which this border is crossed.
In the four sections that follow, I will outline the architecture of Ewe ritual space through a series of rites (divinatory, initiatory, funerary, and hunting), considered as complementary aspects of one and the same relational structure. As I shall endeavor to show, these different aspects can be transformed into one another by inverting the basic orientation of movement that takes place within this structure. This systematic variation of perspective will enable us to understand that the female diviner’s relation to hunting is not a residual or analogue of the male diviners’ role as (real or symbolic) hunters, but its inversion: rather than a feminized hunter, the female diviner is a humanized bush creature. This conclusion cannot be drawn solely from the divination rite itself, which gives us only some hints to it. It emerges gradually as, passing through its serial transformations, women appear as foreign slaves, as victims of violent death, and as wild animals.


Female divination (xɔyɔyɔ)
Ewe divination practices are dominated by the system of geomancy known as “Afa,” which they share with the neighboring Fon and Yoruba (see Surgy 1981). There is, however, another type of divination, a form of necromancy called xɔyɔyɔ (literally “to call in the chamber”), whose practitioners—almost all of them women—are called amegãsi (hereafter written as “amegasi”).3 These female diviners work with the help of a bush spirit, called “Age” or “Aziza,” who serves as a messenger between the living and the dead. Like his Mossi and Senufo counterparts, Age is a small, dwarf-like creature, and like his Lugbara homologue, he appears cut in half with a single leg. At the same time, every amegasi is the adept (vodusi) of a spirit (vodu) that is connected to the bush dead (dzogbeku, a category comprising all those who have experienced violent deaths) and that is transferred—albeit discontinuously— along the female line (as among the Senufo, the diviner’s vocation stems from a uterine ancestress). Transmission of this spirit announces itself by illness or other calamities within the maternal family, and culminates, after a long period of initiation, in the erection of a shrine4 within the home of its new custodian. The Watchi Ewe refer to this particular vodu as “tro” (trɔ̃); accordingly, Watchi amegasis are also commonly called “trosi” (trɔ̃si).5
Although the title “amegasi” can be used of a wider class of diviners, it is applied particularly to necromancers. Yet we also find this term in ethnographic materials collected by Jakob Spieth in the early twentieth century (1906: 896) where it denotes a person possessed by, and later becoming a priest of, the bush spirit Ade. The distinctive marks of Ade priests reported by Spieth—such as the raffia cord, the cowrie bracelets, and the prohibition on eating food cooked by other people (ibid.: 850, 896, 912)—are shared by present-day amegasi diviners. However, Spieth makes no mention of divination in this context. According to him, Ade confers on his priests success in hunting, not the power to summon the dead. Hunting connotations still characterize present-day Ewe bush spirit divination. Age—the bush spirit whom Spieth’s informants called Ade (literally “hunter”) and who is the messenger of contemporary amegasis—remains intimately linked to hunting: he reigns over the bush, protects the wild animals, and thwarts the plans of any hunter who has failed to turn him into an ally. However, while hunting among Ewe was and remains a male activity, today’s amegasis are almost exclusively female.
In principle, xɔyɔyɔ divination consists in the evocation of any soul (se), including that of a living person. However, in the vast majority of cases, it is the dead who are consulted. The séance takes place in a rectangular hut within the amegasi’s walled courtyard (or “convent,” kpame). The hut is divided into parlor and chamber; a white blanket covers the door connecting the two rooms (see figure 1). While the clients take their place in the parlor, the amegasi enters the chamber, where she will remain hidden for the duration of the séance. Similar arrangements are reported from elsewhere in Eweland (Spieth 1906: 490–94; Pazzi 1976: 300; Amouzou 1979: 197–98.)


Figure 1: Necromantic session

Recent ethnographic accounts of amegasi divination are remarkably sparse in number,6 which might appear to confirm Albert de Surgy’s (1981: 10) prediction of the institution’s rapid decline. Such a conclusion, however, is belied by a vivid regional network of tro diviners who are regularly consulted for a variety of reasons (from vodu installation to classmate seduction), most frequently to inquire into the reasons of the death of a close relative. The following description is based on two sessions I attended at Afagnan-Gbléta in April 2004 and in August 2006.
The session starts with the sound of a bell that the amegasi rings to summon Age. His high-pitched voice is heard immediately, asking the clients to explain the nature of their request. They tell the bush spirit where to find the dead they wish to contact (that is, the houses where the dead once lived) and negotiate a moderate fee (some hundred francs CFA) for his services. Contrary to other West African forms of bush spirit divination, Age merely acts as a go-between and is not consulted in his own right. In addition to his faculty of speech, his principal qualification for performing this function is the extreme rapidity with which he is able to cross territory, a speed approaching bilocation. He returns a few moments later, announcing the deceased’s arrival. This is preceded by the sound of a rattle that the amegasi shakes, and continues to shake for as long as the dialogue between the deceased and the clients lasts. The acoustic contrast between the sound of the bell and the sound of the rattle corresponds to that between Age’s voice, which is rapid, high-pitched, and nasalized, and that of the deceased, which is slow, hollow, throaty, and frequently unintelligible (so that the amegasi has to intervene as interpreter and commentator). The deceased’s voice is said to emanate from the tro installed in the chamber.
The tro chamber is forbidden to any person other than the priestess. However, on certain ritual occasions the tro is brought out and shown to the public, so that we can describe some of its external characteristics. The tro is a huge calabash, wrapped in a white percale blanket, whose only visible content is a long stick of Zanthoxylum wood (considered as a defense against witchcraft) that protrudes from it at both ends. The nature of the other contents of the calabash remains obscure. Some amegasis told me that it contains the clothes they wore and the utensils they used during the initiation ritual at the bush cemetery. Certain origin stories speak of calabashes containing innumerable twin puppets (a common representation of Age). There also is a rumor that the key component of the tro’s contents is a human skull (which talks when animated by the soul of the dead). Surgy (1988: 215 f.) describes the necromancer’s shrine in Southwest Togo as a clay idol in the shape of a head, elevated on a “dish” (which could be a large half-calabash), and covered with a white blanket. In accordance with my own information, the whole rests on a table or rack adjacent to a shrine of Age, which Surgy describes as a couple of twin figurines.
Imaginary or real, these traits are well integrated into tro symbolism. The idea that the calabash contains clothing worn by the novice during her initiation suggests a relation of equivalence between the tro and the trosi’s body. Moreover, in Ewe and neighboring cultures the calabash is a common symbol of the female womb, and more generally of the woman. The equivalence between trosi and tro is corroborated by the image of the head described by Surgy, and compared by him to an idol used by Afa geomancers as a materialization of their own personal soul or destiny (se). Be it as a womb (the calabash) or as a head (the clay idol or skull), the tro represents the amegasi’s body—a body shared with the dead she evokes. The corporeal connection between trosi and tro can also be observed during the nocturnal procession when the newly consecrated amegasi, leaving the convent of her apprenticeship, carries the tro on her head to its new home, dancing, swinging her hips, and swaying the calabash gently. This movement ceases abruptly the moment the calabash is taken from her: symbolically beheaded, the trosi falls like a corpse into her companions’ arms. Here, the calabash appears not only to contain but actually to replace the head.
It would, however, be insufficient to consider the relation between trosi and tro only with respect to the calabash. As one amegasi put it, the core of the tro resides in the gokɔnu (“lap pocket”), the apron knot at the level of the pubic region, where the amegasis put the wooden figurines representing Age. The image evokes a maternal relation—indeed, in this context, Age was explicitly characterized as the amegasi’s child.7 This relation has another, more particular dimension, however, because the wooden puppets produced in Eweland—generally referred to as togosu, a term meaning “twin”—represent dead twins (replaced by puppets in order to deceive the surviving twins who otherwise would follow them). Now, the idea of a dead person worn in a container that serves as an external representation of its carrier’s womb also characterizes the tro calabash. It is thus hardly surprising that certain origin tales state that the calabash contains twin puppets. The tro calabash and the twin figurine represent the two poles of the maternal relation (womb and child), and at the same time two alternative ways of connecting the living and the dead. While the tro calabash accomplishes this function as the single body of two persons, Age does so as a single person with two bodies. This difference can be restated in terms of movement: while the calabash serves explicitly as a trap immobilizing souls, blocking their return from the living to the dead, Age’s extreme mobility enables him to bring the dead to the living.
This movement is hardly visible in physical space. Ewe bush spirit divination is characterized by marked disembodiment. It involves neither dance nor trance. There is almost no bodily motion: the amegasi remains seated on a stool or mat throughout the ritual, and has no visual contact with the client. The ritual takes place in a closed chamber behind a veil, in a closed hut within a walled courtyard within a house within the village. One can hardly imagine a more interior place. Yet the tro is connected to the bush dead buried outside the village, and Age is known above all as the protector and guardian of the wild animals. This association of the extreme inside (chamber) with the extreme outside (bush) is characteristic of the amegasi’s liminal position. But characterizing it in this way does not yet mean understanding it.
The amegasi’s divinatory practice in bringing the dead to the living, and the bush to the village, cannot be fully grasped without taking into account a second and inverse movement—that of bringing the living to the dead. This inverse movement is a constitutive part of the amegasi’s initiation, which takes place symbolically in the very heart of the bush; and in this ritual, movement from one realm to the other is visibly acted out.


Diviner initiation (dzogbedɔdɔ)
The formation of an amegasi is by far the most testing and most expensive of all vodusi apprenticeships in Southeast Togo. Its median duration is seven years, and some amegasis have spent more than twenty years in their mistress’ tro’s “convent” (kpame, lit. “enclosure”). Throughout the apprenticeship, the novice is subject to strict rules of obedience, poverty, and chastity. She wears a dirty white blanket around her haunches, a cotton cord around her neck, and her long hair is matted into dreadlocks. Once the training is complete, however, her appearance changes radically: she is adorned with necklaces of precious beads, perfumed, painted, sprinkled with talcum powder, and literally wrapped in money in the form of numerous rows of cowrie bracelets around her ankles, wrists, and arms.
This contrast is linked to the character of the tro. This particular vodu is closely associated (at times almost identified) with Tchamba, a vodu constructed by the descendants of slave owners (the term “Tchamba” refers to the region of northern Togo considered to have been the principal source of slaves). The cowries on the amegasis’ arms symbolize the money with which their ancestresses purchased slaves, the highest expression of family wealth; some amegasis perform while sitting on the ancestress’ cowrie-adorned stool, a component of the Tchamba vodu. At the same time, however, Tchamba is also a vodu of slave descendants, thus incorporating simultaneously the spirits of slaves and of their masters (Brivio 2007; Hamberger 2009). Like the tro, Tchamba is transmitted along female lines, as were formerly money, beads, cowries, and slaves. And because slaves (at least theoretically) became full members of the uterine family of their buyers, a female slave’s descendants are also the descendants of her mistress, and both—the slave and her mistress—become exchangeable in the Tchamba vodu.
As noted earlier, the embodiment of the two opposite poles of a relation in one and the same vodu is also characteristic of the tro. The tro serves as a common body of diviner and invoked dead, just as Tchamba represents both slave owner and slave. It is noteworthy in this respect that one of my interlocutors identified the secret content of the tro as a slave’s skull. Moreover, the uterine bond that links the amegasi to Age as her child also links her to the tro as the embodiment of her ancestress. Despite its individualized character and the fact that it is destroyed after its priestess’ death, every tro is supposed to “return” within the same uterine family, which has then to reconstruct the vodu and provide another amegasi to replace the deceased.
The final rite of passage of an amegasi novice (which includes the construction of a new tro) consists in spending one night at the bush cemetery, the dzogbe. The term dzogbe (lit. “bush of fire”) denotes, in its narrow sense, the burial place, usually not far from the village, of those who have suffered a violent or unnatural death. In its wider sense, the term refers to the area beyond the range of human habitation and cultivation that is the domain of bush fires, wild animals, and hunters (significantly, death during a hunt is a “bad” death). Still more widely, dzogbe figures in the term used for the wilderness of the north (dzogbedzi, lit. “on the bush”) where Ewe locate the unknown home of slaves. Whether as origin or as final destination, the dzogbe is the place of those who die away from home.
It is in this no-man’s-land that the amegasi novice undergoes her transformation from epitome of slavery into allegory of wealth. I base my analysis on the ritual I observed at Tonoukondji in August 2006. The ceremony starts at midnight in front of the convent, where the novices are wrapped, like corpses, in burial mats and white burial cloth, similar to the percale that wraps the tro calabash. Senior amegasis hold up a ring of cloth to shield the novices from external view. Thus transformed into lifeless parcels, the novices are carried in a funeral cortege to the bush cemetery, where they are placed within a circle drawn with flour on the ground, around which the senior amegasis sit on their stools. Spectators and a set of drums are installed at some distance behind a straight line of flour, the space between the drums and the “corpses” serving as a dance floor (see figure 2). As the drums intonate the gaʋu (“iron drumming”) rhythm, pairs of amegasis leave the circle at regular intervals and dance toward the drummers, always returning just before they reach the “borderline.” When, at a certain moment, the drums switch to the gbenyanya (“battue”) rhythm, all the amegasis run around the novices. They then perform a war dance at the border, before rushing into the surrounding bush. The same scene is repeated just before dawn, after more dancing, but this time the amegasis break through the border, and hit the spectators with leaves and branches before rushing back into the bush. At sunrise a ring of cloth is again formed around the novices, who emerge upright, each with an iron cane in her hand, and finally return to the convent. The consecration of the calabashes takes place in front of the convent some hours later. Again, the novices stand in the middle of a circle while the senior amegasis dance around them. Many of the dancers hold a ram or goat between their legs. Afterward the throats of the animals are cut, and the amegasis, followed by the novices, carry the carcasses around the calabashes, tracing a circle of blood on the ground while singing “we are a ram” (miawoe nye agbo), a well-known vodu song. The calabashes are then carried into the convent, followed by their owners.


Figure 2: Amegasi initiation

My observation of the ceremony largely confirmed what I have been told in interviews, with one important exception: all my interlocutors had affirmed that the novices remain alone in the bush, in the exclusive company of the dead,8 these being visible only to the novice who spiritually visits the netherworld while physically “sleeping” in the bush (the name of the ritual is dzogbedɔdɔ, “to sleep at the bush cemetery”). Yet the behavior attributed to the dead by my interlocutors corresponds closely to that of the amegasis I observed at Tonoukondji: the dead were said to form a circle around the novices, to sit on stools, to dance, and to fight with the humans who try to retrieve their “sleeping” children by chasing the dead away. The battue dance (gbenyanya, literally “chasing the bush”) is in fact commonly interpreted by Watchi Ewe as a fight between the living and the dead. Clearly, then, the women I saw rushing among the spectators and brandishing vegetation represented not so much the attacking (living) humans as their adversaries. The gbenyanya dancers assume a human or nonhuman aspect depending on the particular direction they take (from village into bush or vice versa), and the bidirectional movement of the dance is a diachronic representation of what is actually conceived of as a simultaneous confrontation. This twofold orientation is also inherent in the relation of equivalence between the trosi and the tro, which is most manifest in the dzogbe ritual. Not only are both wrapped in burial cloth but the dead are said to construct the tro at the bush cemetery (though the tro is actually assembled in the convent) from things wrapped in the same blanket as the novice. Again, aspect corresponds to direction: while the trosi is transformed into a corpse in going from the village to the bush, the corpse is transformed into the tro in returning from the bush to the village.
The initiation ritual is thus structured by three successive scenes, linked by converse movements across a diametrically divided space (see figure 2). This fundamental structure is drawn on the ground: the line of white flour separates the sphere of the village, occupied by the living (the spectators and the drummers), from the sphere of the bush, reserved for the dead (the novices/corpses and the amegasis/ghosts). The three scenes take the form of three circles, each of which isolates, as it were, a particular term of the trosi/corpse/tro equation. First, a circle of cloth surrounds the novices on their burial mats in the village; then, a circle of white flour surrounds their corpses in the bush; and finally, a circle of animal blood is traced around the tro calabashes back in the village.
Each circle is produced by the senior amegasis (upright holding the cloths, sitting on their stools, or dancing with rams between their legs). However, while the amegasis encircling the corpses in the bush represent human beings who have suffered violent deaths, those dancing around the calabashes in the village identify themselves with animals that have met violent ends. True, the song that goes “we are a ram” is not peculiar to tro rituals. But the image of dancing dead animals emerges clearly from the account one amegasi gave of the vision she had during the night in the bush. The dead who receive the novices in the netherworld were described by her as animals, dancing in front of the novices and serving them food. Yet communion with wild animals carries the potential for a deadly outcome: they will devour any novice who has violated a taboo during her apprenticeship.
This interpretation gives further significance to the fact that the dawn battle between the living and the dead is conceived of as a collective hunt. It also explains why the tro, a vodu of those who have died a “bad” death, is intimately connected with Age, the protector of wild animals. And it clarifies why the amegasis observe strict taboos on eating game, and wild animals generally. Except on certain ritual occasions, amegasis are also forbidden to eat ram, an animal that, though domesticated, is associated with the bush. Living in Age’s home—the termite hill—the ram is conceptualized as a transformed buffalo (which in turn bears the surname agbo, “ram”). In fact, the identification of the amegasis with rams seems to be a particular instance of a more general identification with wild animals that is established during the night in the bush. At an enthronization festival I witnessed in summer 2007, the newly consecrated amegasi was called from her enclosure by a song implicitly equating her with wild game that hunters drive from the bush with fire: “the fire is falling upon the bush, the animals are hiding, if there is a hidden animal, get out!” (edzo dze gbe, e lãwo be, ne lã ɖe bea, ne to!). “Bush of fire” is the literal meaning of dzogbe, the bush cemetery (also called akladzame, “hiding-place”); and to! (“get out!”) is the standard call of beaters during a drive. Thus, the gbenyanya attack, which concludes the night in the bush cemetery, does more than chase away the beasts in order to retrieve the novices—it also targets the novices who are assimilated to beasts. In effect, the novices are targeted by humans and animals, by the living and the dead, and both parties are represented by the same group of women.
The simultaneous identification of the amegasis with rams and ram killers has yet another aspect because rams can also represent human beings. Ram sacrifices are generally considered to substitute for human sacrifices, and the term agbota, “ram head,” is a euphemism for a human skull. The amegasi who recounted her vision of the animal dance did not mention rams specifically, but spoke of beasts being “killed for the talking drums” (taʋuga). Now, while the usual victims in talking drum rituals are domesticated goats, they nevertheless represent wild animals, and their immolation is staged as a mimed shooting, accompanied by hunting songs. Moreover, the “animals” originally killed for the talking drums are said to have been humans, bought as slaves or hunted in the regions of the north (dzogbedzi). Today’s ceremonies recall this history: the hunting mime that accompanies the immolation is followed by the representation of a slave being captured for the purpose of sacrifice.
This association of wild game and slaves also characterizes the amegasi’s enthronization ritual. The “animal” that emerges from its hiding-place (the convent) is a slave’s descendant, and its coming out precedes the immolation of sacrificial animals inside the tro enclosure. However, far from being shot or maltreated as in the talking drum rituals, this “animal/slave” is placed on the ancestress’ throne, which will serve as her seat in the necromantic sessions.
This multiple condensation of opposite relational poles—masters and slaves, hunters and animals, killers and victims—is more than the transitory effect of the liminal stage common to all rites of passage. While the three-staged process from the village to the bush and back that characterizes the initiation ritual conforms to the classic structure described by Van Gennep, the symbolic death followed by rebirth involved in the ritual does not just transform a novice (slave) into a priestess (master). The full-fledged amegasi is a slave on the master’s throne, a dead person among the living, an animal in human form—at least during the necromantic sessions. The liminal state is here perpetuated as a permanent latent condition that is reactivated every time the amegasi enters the “hiding-place” of the tro chamber, sits on the slave’s stool, and speaks in the foreign voices of the dead and wild animals.
Yet the amegasi’s role in divination does not just repeat her role in the initiation ritual; it inverts it. In both cases, ritual space has the same basic structure. The veiled door between chamber and parlor in the tro hut replicates in miniature the line of flour separating the bush from the village. However, the sphere of the bush is projected into the inner chamber, while contiguity with the village characterizes the outer parlor of the tro hut. This spatial inversion corresponds to reversals in movement. In the initiation rite, the amegasi twice crosses the border, becoming a guest of the dead and the wild animals while “sleeping” in the bush. In the divination session, she remains at home while the dead and the bush spirits come and go. Initiation and divination are complementary structures, belonging to a single pattern of reciprocal crossings of the border between bush and village. To explore this architecture further, let us now consider it from yet another perspective.


Funeral in the event of violent death (gaʋu)
The mock burial of the trosi novices at the bush cemetery draws on the model of the funeral ceremony for actual victims of violent or unnatural death. Yet in some respects both rituals are directly opposed. The dzogbe burial ritual is commonly called gaʋu (“iron drumming”) or kpoʋu (“stick drumming”), after the special drum rhythm for these occasions, sometimes also gbenyanya, after the battue sequence of the dance. These concepts are closely connected: the “iron” machetes and wooden “sticks” brandished by the dancers represent not only the weapons of warriors but also the instruments beaters use during a drive. This contrasts with the amegasis’ variant of the gaʋu dance, in which the dancers representing warriors are unarmed. A more obvious difference is of course the sex of the participants: while the amegasi dancers are exclusively women, the “original” gaʋu dancers are all men, and the gaʋu songs explicitly describe violent death as male.
Dzogbe burials are systematically performed in all cases of violent death (today most frequently road accidents). The following account is based on two cases I witnessed at Afagnan-Gbléta in August 2005 and in July 2006. As in the case of the dzogbedɔdɔ ritual, the funeral site is divided by a straight line traced on the ground; the section closer to the bush contains the corpse, while the drummers sit in the section closer to the village (see figure 3). Again, the bush is the sphere of the dead, the village the sphere of the living. However, contrary to the dzogbedɔdɔ case, the dancing ground is here situated between the drums and the border, that is, in the domain of the living rather than of the dead. Since in both rituals paired dancers move slowly towards the border, the two variants appear as mirror images of each other. If one were to project the true dzogbe burial and its amegasi replication onto a single space, male warriors and female ghosts would be dancing face to face.


Figure 3: Bush funeral

This directional contrast becomes decisive at the moment of the battue (gbenyanya) sequence when the dancers, passing over the border, deploy into the bush, beating the underbrush with their weapons and cutting vegetation to violent shouts of to! to! (“get out! get out!”). The amegasis cross the border in the opposite direction when they invade the “village,” beating the spectators with branches and leaves. While their dance only hints at “chasing the bush,” their primary ritual action consists in a counterattack on the village by the bush creatures. However, such a countermovement is also discernible in the original version of the gbenyanya. After rushing through the bush, the dancers return with branches and leaves that they throw, one after the other, into the coffin until the deceased becomes in a sense covered by the bush. By contrast, the amegasi gbenyanya precedes the resurrection of the dead, who return to the world of the living, leaning on metal canes. While each of the gbenyanya variants involves a contrastive diachronic change of direction, they do so from opposite perspectives, and with a different outcome: whereas the male warriors, after invading the bush with sticks and iron weapons, surrender the corpse to the bush (which covers it with leaves and branches), the female bush creatures, after invading the village with leaves and branches, surrender their prey to the village (which guides them back with iron sticks).
The fact that in both cases the intruder (the village in the burial rite, the bush in the initiation rite) loses the body to the other party seems at odds with the popular interpretation of the dance as a fight for control of the corpses. In fact, the song that accompanies the (original) gbenyanya—“a warrior has died, take him away!” (aʋawɔtɔɖe dzo, mi tsɔ yi boo!)—suggests that the ritual is less concerned with retrieving the deceased than with chasing him permanently into the bush. This is certainly the intention of a dzogbe burial: the tomb, together with the deceased’s personal belongings, is supposed to disappear without trace in the underbrush. Restless and haunting, victims of bad deaths constitute a menace to their living relatives, and the dzogbe burial ensures that they do not come back.
The same interpretation can be advanced for the dzogbedɔdɔ: the novices’ return to the village does not signify defeat of the bush creatures but rather prolongs their intrusion into the world of the living. The novices have become creatures of the bush during the night at the bush cemetery, and when they return, they bring the bush with them—represented by Age, the lord of the bush (gbetɔ), whom they have adopted as their child. Whereas the humans, via the burial rite, try to make those afflicted by bad death disappear forever in the bush, the bush creatures, via the initiation rite, install themselves permanently in the village.
While the funerary and the initiation rite both stage the gbenyanya dance as the alternation, or confrontation, of two opposed movements—from the bush to the village and vice versa—each rite ultimately emphasizes a different direction. The “original” gaʋu is oriented to the bush, the dzogbedɔdɔ to the village. Yet the latter is not a simple inversion of the former. Contrary to the linear movement of the funerary rite, that inscribed in the initiation rite is circular: a death ritual is followed by a resurrection, and the bush creature that returns to the village is in fact a human being who was previously sent to the bush. For a complete inversion of the dzogbe burial, we need to turn to another ritual: the ritual that is performed following an animal’s violent death.


Hunting ritual (adenu)
Every hunter who has killed a large animal (such as a buffalo or warthog) has to undergo a ritual purification. This involves the construction of a permanent sanctuary called aklamakpa (lit. “aklama’s enclosure”), which is a small enclosure in which the skulls, horns, and jaws of wild animals are piled upon buried liturgical leaves. The sanctuary constitutes a vodu that is transmitted to the hunter’s agnatic descendants (comprising, in a wider sense, all the residents of the hamlet or village quarter) who make offerings and prayers to it before going to hunt, and add skulls and jaws to it after a successful trip. The purification ritual (called adenu, “hunting affair,” the generic term for all hunting rites) is still practiced in regions such as the Mono valley where deforestation has not yet put an end to the (illegal) hunting of large animals. It has, however, become relatively rare, and I have not yet had the chance to witness an adenu other than within the framework of hunters’ funerals or festivals, contexts that have increasingly replaced that of actual hunting. The following account is therefore based on the testimony of eyewitnesses.
According to my interlocutors, the ritual begins with seven days of seclusion in a “hunting hut” (adexɔ) erected in the village.9 Afterward, the hunter is washed with lustral “hunting water” (adetsi) while the aklama enclosure is constructed in his house. Great hunters bring skulls and jaws and dance around the pile, while the characteristic “hunting rhythm” (adeʋu, also called kpokpo) is played on the great talking drums and a broken metal vessel. Hunting scenes are mimed, secret hunting stories are told, and the bones are doused with palm wine and flour diluted in water. These descriptions basically correspond to those collected a century ago by Spieth (1906: 389ff.).
As indicated by the use of the broken vessel drum (which otherwise is only played at dzogbe burials), the aklamakpa construction represents an inverted gaʋu: instead of human victims of a bad death being interred in the bush (leaves covering their buried bones), animal victims of a bad death are entombed in the village (their bones covering buried leaves). True, while the gaʋu ritual is carried out to appease the victims, the adenu dances are destined to purify the killers. But these are two aspects of the same purpose. A hunter who does not undergo the ritual not only fails to make further kills. The spirit of the animal attacks and renders him mad, causing him to hurt or kill his fellow humans, whom he mistakes for animals. According to other informants, the dead animal—or its surviving spouse—transforms itself into a human being and comes to the hunter’s home to take its revenge. In a widely known Watchi tale, the vengeful animal becomes the hunter’s wife (Hamberger 2011: 580 f.). In both instances there is a confusion of roles: in the first, the hunter mistakes humans for animals; in the second, he mistakes animals for humans. This confusion of roles is an inversion of perspective. Significantly, according to Spieth (1906: 830, 850), persons possessed by Ade have “an animal’s look” until ritual purification transforms them into Ade’s priests, whom Spieth’s informants call “amegasi.”
In fact, a series of similarities links the aklamakpa to the vodu of the amegasis, including contemporary female necromancers. Both aklamakpa and the tro are devoted to those (animals or humans) who have suffered bad deaths. Both are constructed on a skull (visible or invisible), situated in an enclosure, and conceived of as a sort of “trap” for the bush creatures they “call” into the village.10 Like the future tro priestess, the owner of aklamakpa is said to dream of dancing animals, to which the skulls in his enclosure belong. In order to understand this affinity between male hunting and female divination, we need to take a closer look at the notion of aklama.
The term “aklama” is today almost exclusively used in the sense of a person’s “luck” and “good fortune,” especially in escaping from a great danger. Such luck is typical of a hunter returning from a successful hunt—the animal he killed could just as easily have killed him. Aklama is personified as a sort of guardian spirit, and in a still wider sense identified with a person’s soul or destiny (se). Surgy’s comparison of the tro with an altar of the se, represented in the shape of a head, corresponds strikingly to how some of my interlocutors interpreted the aklamakpa: according to them, aklama is a person’s spirit (se), represented by her head. By taking the animal’s skulls, and thus their spirits, to his home, the hunter keeps them from working against him in the woods. The same informants, however, subscribe to the general view that aklamakpa is a representation of the hunter’s own aklama—as if the spirit of luck represented by the skulls were simultaneously that of the killer and the victim.
This apparent ambiguity is in fact a distinctive feature of hunting. The destinies of prey and hunter are inextricably linked—good luck for one is bad luck for the other. In a sense they share the same guardian spirit, who, in protecting one, abandons the other. This is indeed the Ewe conception of Age’s role in hunting: on the one hand, he is the protector of animals and the hunter’s deadly enemy; on the other hand, he is the hunter’s indispensable ally, for only when Age abandons an animal, can it be shot. Still more explicitly, the western Ewe call the protector of animals Ade (“hunter”). This series of synonymous bush spirit names—Age, Aziza, Ade—also includes the term “Aklama.” In Spieth’s account (1906: 515, 811, 840),
Aklama is expressly identified with Ade. Less explicitly, my interlocutors define aklama as “Age’s force,” and all agree that offerings to aklama are a way of making contact with the lord of the bush. This intimate connection between the personal soul and fortune in hunting is essential to the Ewe concept of the person—a concept that includes fundamentally the link to another person in a relation of equivalence and opposition. Aklama is not only conceived of as a person’s double; it is a double person. Hence, the standard representations of Age as a pair of twins, a bisected creature, a bilocated runner.
The twofold direction of Age’s attacks makes manifest the inversion that this redoubling involves. On the one hand, he is said to kidnap the hunter and hold him captive in the termite hill, releasing him to return home with dirty clothes and long, matted hair. On the other hand, he is said to persecute the hunter, following him home and “living with” him (that is, possessing him). Both movements—from the village to the bush and vice versa—are aspects of the hunter’s displaced status: a human among animals, or an animal among humans. The construction of aklamakpa puts an end to this condition. But at the same time, it perpetuates the inversion of bush and village: as one origin story explicitly states, “aklama’s enclosure” is no other than a reproduction of Age’s home.
The aklama enclosure is not the only example of the projection of the bush into the village. The tro convent, Age’s village domicile, is another. The amegasi’s apprenticeship, as indicated by her matted hair, replicates the hunter’s captivity, and the reciprocal movements that characterize Age’s relation with the hunter (kidnapping and possession) also characterize his relation with the amegasi (initiation and divination).
This correspondence is not surprising in itself. Both hunters and necromancers act on the frontiers between the village and the bush, the living and the dead. The hunting rituals summon living animals to join their dead companions, while the necromantic sessions summon dead humans to visit their living relatives. As already noted, in several West African societies diviners are former hunters. The specific feature of Ewe amegasis is that they are women, and that the tro, unlike the aklamakpa and everything else that has to do with hunting, is transmitted through the uterine line. The almost perfect homology between hunters and amegasis makes their opposition all the more radical. Far from representing a female hunter, the amegasi is forbidden to eat wild animals, and the hunting songs refer to her as game.
In fact, the hunting rite provides direct evidence of an equation between women and wild animals. As I mentioned, I have not yet witnessed an aklamakpa construction rite. But I was able to attend a hunting ceremony organized in January 2010 by the hunters’ association of Kouvé as part of the funeral rites of a deceased comrade. The sacrificial animals had already been immolated within the aklama sanctuary when the public part of the ritual began in the courtyard of the mortuary house. It essentially consisted in dancing around a huge pile of skulls, jaws, horns, tails, and guns heaped up around a big bowl (kolo) resting on a warthog’s jaw, while dousing the pile with palm wine and flour water, drinking large quantities of palm wine from horns (a privilege reserved to buffalo killers), and performing extensive hunting mimes. It was thus largely a reduced version of what elderly hunters (and earlier ethnographers) had described, with one major exception: the participants included women.
The same song introduced the hunting mime as accompanies it in the talking drum ceremonies: egli be lã me le o vɔ—“Egli [or any other hunter’s name] says: there are no more animals,” meaning that people have no more animals to eat. In talking drum ceremonies this song continues with the line ma yi kpɔ dzogbedzi (“I am going to the bush”), accompanied by the mime of a hunter shooting the sacrificial animal. In the adenu rite at Kouvé, however, the role of prey was not played by livestock. As the song continued with the line lã kpo ye aɖu (“he will eat only animals!”), the male participants took horns and skulls from the pile and put them on the heads of the women, who, thus transformed into buffalo and antelopes, retired to the rear of the yard, which represented the bush. Somewhat later the hunters followed, miming the tracking and shooting of buffalo: after determining wind direction by allowing sand to trickle through their fingers, they crawled towards the animal, “shot” it, “cut its tail and ear” to mark it as their property, and covered the carcass with leaves to protect it against the shafts of sunlight. At the same time, the women, far from acting as frightened or enraged animals, danced in front of the hunters with smooth, seductive movements, gently balancing the horns on their heads. A smooth and gentle walk is said to be characteristic of buffalo when unaware of a hunter close by. However, the buffaloes’ dance, performed directly in front of men with guns trained on them, almost seemed to enact the popular Watchi tale of the hunter who surprised a female buffalo in the shape of a beautiful maiden.
The division of ritual space between bush and village in the adenu ritual at Kouvé (see figure 4) thus corresponds to two different representations of wild animals: as dead skulls piled up in the village, and as living women dancing in the bush—the transition being effected by placing the skulls on the women’s heads. It is noteworthy that the amegasis proceed in a like manner when putting the tro (which is said to contain a skull) on the head of a dancing woman, the newly consecrated trosi, whose movements recall those of the “buffalo.” In one sense, she resembles an inverse buffalo: instead of being killed in the bush and buried inside the aklamakpa in the village, she is “killed” in the village (before the tro convent) and buried in the bush. However, one should remember that the village is not, strictly speaking, the amegasi’s starting point. She entered the tro convent to represent another woman, the ancestress issued from the northern wilderness. This wilderness, dzogbedzi, described as a hunting ground in the pivotal song “there are no more animals,” is the origin point not only of buffalo but also of slaves, the mythical female ancestors, and, ultimately, of all women. Like slaves and wild animals, women are not buried where they are born11—as one Tchamba priestess emphasized in order to explain why dzogbe burials are the responsibility of the maternal family. One of Spieth’s informants even affirms that all women are buried in the bush, as they “have no home of their own” (Spieth 1906: 634). Viewed from this angle, the revival of the buffalo and the bush burial of the amegasis appear as two aspects of the same event, just as the novice’s dream had described. For hunters and dead warriors, the way to the bush is the way to the outland. For buffalo and women, it is the way home.


Figure 4: Hunting ritual



Conclusion
The four rituals we have discussed construct the same virtual space from different but complementary angles. These differences can be expressed in the way each ritual envisages the border crossing between the village and the bush. The funerary rite for the victims of violent death (gaʋu) centers on a movement from the village to the bush; the hunting rite (adenu) on a movement from the bush to the village; the initiation rite for female diviners (dzogbedɔdɔ) entails a movement in both directions (from the village to the bush and back); and the necromantic session (xɔyɔyɔ) evokes the same back-and-forth movement but in reverse.
To be sure, none of these rituals can be reduced to a single movement. As we have seen from the battue sequence that is common to the funerary and initiation rituals, or from the animal (buffalo or ram) dances that figure in the initiation and hunting rites, each ritual is a complex composition of to-and-fro movements, spatial subdivisions, and changes of perspective. Yet these changes of perspective are more than reiterated inversions of a single basic relation. The passage from the village to the bush (or vice versa) does not take the same form for men and women, for humans and animals, for the living and the dead. All these oppositions have a spatial expression, and the common line dividing bush and village that traverses all four rituals is only the abstract of a multiplicity of relations that generate a complex, pluridimensional space.
It is by considering several rituals as complementary views of this space that we can grasp its architecture and understand how its constituent relations are interconnected. Taking each ritual in isolation would have lead us to envisage separate hypotheses to account for the fact that women represent men (in the initiation rite), animals (in the hunting rite), and dead persons (in the divination rite): the gender ambiguity of liminal roles, the violence inherent in sexual relations, or the symbolic affinity of childbirth and violent death. Taking the rituals together, we understand how women dancing on the “bush” side of the boundary in the initiation and the hunting ritual can represent both dead men and living animals, according to whether they are considered as mirror images of dead animals (accumulated buffalo skulls or immolated rams on the “village” side), or of living men (who, in the funerary ritual, perform the same dance in the opposite direction).
The specificity of the divination rite consists in activating these transformations within the village itself, by projecting the bush into a woman’s chamber. This projection of the extreme outside into the extreme inside constitutes in a sense the divination rite’s characteristic movement, whose visible manifestation is reduced to the amegasi’s entering and leaving the chamber. At the same time, it reveals the fundamental topological feature of Ewe (and much of West African) social space: its innermost place, the female dwelling (or body), is a transformation of the bush, the place of the other. The amegasi’s sanctuary represents in concentrated form the home of all those who are not buried at home—women, slaves, victims of violent death, and wild animals—, and it is in this capacity that it serves as a passage for souls that speak through a foreign body. Clearly, this connection between the diviner and the bush is not the same as in the case of male diviners, considered as (actual or virtual) hunters. More precisely, it is the same connection, but viewed from the opposite angle. The rich ethnographic record regarding hunting and (male) divination only seems inapplicable to the case of female diviners if we hold to the hunter’s perspective. Once we add the animal’s point of view, the relational configuration characteristic of female divination and initiation becomes recognizable as a transformation of the configuration that obtains in male hunting and burial rites.
These interritual transformations provide the context of meaning for the dynamics at work within each ritual—not just in the sense of an analytical device but as an effective ritual technique. By quoting a bush burial, which in turn quotes a collective hunt, the novice’s ritual resurrection links itself to the correlative movements that specify amegasi initiation: the return of the bush dead to the village (the making of the tro), and the return of the animal victim to her bush home (the succession of the slave’s descendant to the throne of her ancestress). Each ritual engenders virtual space by evoking other rituals as latent alternative perspectives. This does not mean that the rituals examined in this article should be thought of as parts of one well-integrated superritual. A number of other Ewe rituals—such as the rite performed following the birth of twins, the talking drum ceremony, or the installation of the Tchamba vodu—could have served as points of departure to retrace the construction of the virtual space discussed here. As emphasized by Langer (1953: 84), virtual space does not exist by itself. It only exists as far as it is produced and supported by the elements to which it gives form, and there are countless ways in which it can be presented. If we can nevertheless recognize the same virtual space in many different rituals, this is because its creation is, by its very essence, transformation.


Acknowledgements
Fieldwork between 2004 and 2012 has been supported by grants from the Wenner Gren Foundation, the Agence Nationale de Recherche, and the Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. I am much obliged to Marc Chemillier, Stéphan Dugast, Gideon Freudenthal, Michael Houseman, Emmanuelle Kadya, Karen Middleton, Ismaël Moya, and the anonymous referees for their many valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. Its title renders homage to the work of the late Michel Cartry.


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Du village à la brousse en quatre rites ouatchi: une analyse transformationnelle de l’espace rituel
Résumé : Les analyses anthropologiques accordent une attention croissante aux transformations de perspective comme outil de compréhension des rituels. Or, le fait que les transformations de perspective contribuent non seulement aux dynamiques internes des rituels, mais servent aussi à les relier entre eux, a reçu moins d’attention. Cet article s’appuie sur des analyses d’une série de rituels éwé (divinatoires, initiatiques, funéraires et cynégétiques) pour conceptualiser l’espace rituel comme un système de transformations de perspective qui se déploie à la fois à l’intérieur et entre des rituels. Si l’on conçoit chaque rituel comme un processus de construction d’une même architecture relationnelle d’un point de vue différent, il est ensuite possible de situer la relation entre devins féminins et chasseurs masculins dans le contexte plus large d’une série de relations interconnectées (entre hommes et femmes, humains et animaux et les vivants et les morts), qui se réalise dans l’espace virtuel de la performance rituelle. L’analyse transformationnelle d’un rituel, entendu comme une variation contrôlée de perspective, devient donc un puissant outil méthodologique qui permet en même temps d’élucider le modèle qu’utilise une société donnée pour comprendre son univers relationnel et de rendre compréhensible des faits ethnographiques qui, autrement, auraient l’air contradictoires ou inexplicables.
Klaus HAMBERGER is Associate Professor (Maître de Conférences) at the Ecole de Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris). He has undertaken regular fieldwork in Southern Togo since 2004 and is working on space, kinship, and ritual.
Klaus HambergerLaboratoire d’AnthropologieSociale Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales52 Rue du Cardinal Lemoine, 75005Paris, FrancePhone : +0033 (0)1 44 27 17 56klaus.hamberger@ehess.fr


___________________
1. While Williams and Boyd apply Langer’s concept of “virtual space” directly to the analysis of ritual (Williams and Boyd 1993: 15), Kapferer’s interpretation draws equally on Deleuze’s concept of “virtuality.” The two concepts are to some extent complementary. While Langer emphasizes the discontinuity of virtual and actual space as a condition of virtualization, Deleuze conceives of virtuality as a field from which actuality is continuously produced. As applied to ritual, the first approach focuses on the construction of ritual perspectives, the second on the reshaping of quotidian perspectives through ritual. For yet another use of the concept in the analysis of ritual see Stépanoff (2013).
2. The field material used in this study was collected between 2004 and 2012. The xɔyɔyɔ, dzogbedɔdɔ, and gaʋu rituals are presented in greater detail in Hamberger 2011.
3. Amegã (literally “big person”) is a title of both ancestors and chiefs, and the particle si (literally “wife”) is the common suffix characterizing the initiated adepts of a vodu. One possible interpretation of the term draws on the fact that victims of “bad” death are collectively called “the big ones” (amegãwo).
4. The term vodu denotes both the “spirit” and the “shrine,” which do not exist as separate concepts.
5. Actually, trɔ̃ is a euphemism that in western Eweland denotes all vodu. The western Ewe identify this particular vodu by descriptive terms such as dzogbekutrɔ, “vodu of the bush dead” (Surgy 1988: 129).
6. Rosenthal (1998: 177) and Friedson (2009: 2) mention amegasis in passing; they do not figure in Lovell’s 2002 monograph. Lovell (2005: 108) remarks on female tro cult leaders but without reference to divination. Brivio (2007) describes amegasis as adepts of the Tchamba cult but not as diviners. For a review of earlier accounts see Hamberger 2009.
7. This is common in female divination: for example, the spirit helper of the Mossi kinkir-baga starts the divination session by asking, “what’s on, mum?” (Dim Delobsom 1934: 55).
8. Surgy (1988: 217), who witnessed the ritual at Vogan and Akoumape, similarly states that the novice is left alone in the bush.
9. According to some informants (as well as Surgy 1988: 147), the seclusion hut is erected in the bush.
10. Aklamakpa serves both to arrest the dead animals’ spirits and to attract their living conspecifics. As my interlocutors put it, “the heads call more heads.” In Spieth’s (1906: 390) description, flour and palm wine offerings to the skulls are accompanied by an invitation to call their fellows.
11. Ewe society is virilocal, and (at least theoretically) women are buried in their marital houses.
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						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>26</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2022</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date>
			<volume>12</volume>
			<issue seq="203">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2022 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1666" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1666/3926" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1666/3927" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article revolves around the theoretical and ethnographic experiences of an ongoing anthropological study with contemporary Aymara families about how “education by attention” is produced throughout their cosmopraxis. At the same time, it explores how an anthropology of life and in particular Tim Ingold’s fight for a recalibration of anthropology in a biosocially integrated sense are of intrinsically political-ethical interest, considering the messy and misaligned times we humans have worked ourselves into. Beyond romantic interpretations and essentialist representations, a committed inquiry into indigenous practices that habilitate people for ecological-cultural “correspondence” and affective reciprocity—uywasiña—enables the exploration of important educational attitudes and habits that can lead to necessary realignments of human relations with the world/earth. I discuss these enskilling practices through a conversation with theorizations of attentionality, agencement (the “doing-undergoing” of habit, in Ingold’s terms), and affectionality.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/2032</identifier>
				<datestamp>2026-05-02T14:10:34Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">2032</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/740626</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Menstruation in a transitioning body: The embodied experience of menstruation among Chinese kua xingbie (cross-gender) people</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Li</surname>
						<given-names>Xiaolin</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>02</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2026</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date>
			<volume>16</volume>
			<issue seq="304">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau16.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2026 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2032" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2032/4656" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2032/4657" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article delves into the unique menstruation experiences of Chinese kua xingbie (cross-gender) people, emphasizing how the “kua xingbie” concept diverges from the Western academic discourse on transgender. It develops a temporospatial material approach to understanding the kua xingbie body, stressing the material agency of menstruation and sanitary products in shaping kua xingbie identities. Situated in the Chinese cultural, medical, and institutional contexts, this perspective sheds new light on the gender/sex debate, as well as on discussions on social recognition of gender and biological essentialism, showing how kua xingbie individuals navigate and exploit biological essentialism in their daily gender expression. Menstruation, as central to this entanglement, extends beyond the personal and private realm and shows significant social impact in different scenarios, including public restrooms. By comparing the experiences of kua xingbie men and women, the article underscores the diversity and uniqueness of their experiences.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1417</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-07-04T08:12:21Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1417</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/707953</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Free AccessNobodies and somebodies: Power, bureaucracy, and citizenship in a London rehousing hub</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Burraway</surname>
						<given-names>Joshua</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>jb9jh@virginia.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="301">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
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			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1417" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1417/3440" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article draws on ethnographic research to examine the bureaucratic matrix of temporal, material, and legal scales that come together to constitute the rehousing process for a group of rough sleepers seeking passage out of homelessness in contemporary London. Further, it explores the ways in which different bureaucratic technologies mediate the relations between the rehousing hub’s staff, its homeless clients, and local housing authorities, paying particular attention to the way these economies solidify the already asymmetrical power relations that existed between the homeless and those employed to manage them. For the homeless, this process is constituted by a spatiotemporality of confinement and seemingly endless waiting that shunts them into the margins of citizenship, caught between being a nobody and a somebody. Thinking through contemporary debates in political theory, this article approaches the rehousing process (or failure thereof) not as a linear pathway but as a constellation of disciplinary and bureaucratic procedures within which exceptional structures of sovereignty and neoliberal governmentality intersect. Applying these ideas anthropologically, I demonstrate how this intersectionality works to continually shape and reshape the existential realities, possibilities, and aspirations of the hub’s homeless clients.</p></abstract>
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				<datestamp>2025-04-29T23:51:39Z</datestamp>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
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				<article-title>Seeking antassu: The making of a Muslim barber in South India</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Saidalavi</surname>
						<given-names>P. C.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<surname>Admin</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>29</day>
				<month>04</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="202">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Defined as work undertaken by the body on oneself or others, bodywork has been understood as a key aspect of the service economy today. Since it involves encountering strange bodies, dealing with intimate parts and their waste products, such workers are looked down upon. Global inequality in terms of race, caste, and class structures the relationships between bodyworkers and their clients. Despite such iniquitous social relations, I suggest, bodyworkers construct antassu (dignity) for their work and themselves. I conceptualize Muslim barbers’ work in South India as dignified labor—labor as mediated by ideas of independence, autonomy, and integrity, achieved through the ownership of labor and their means. I suggest that we need to look at such stories as well, rather than attending only to narratives of inequality and suffering.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>Mindful in Westminster: The politics of meditation and the limits of neoliberal critique</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Mindful in Westminster: The politics of meditation and the limits of neoliberal critique</trans-title>
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				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Cook</surname>
						<given-names>Joanna</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>UCL</aff>
					<email>joanna.cook@ucl.ac.uk</email>
					<uri>http://www.ucl.ac.uk/anthropology/people/academic_staff/j_cook</uri>
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					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>16</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2016</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date>
			<volume>6</volume>
			<issue seq="308">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau6.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2016 Joanna Cook</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2016</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relationship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. But how do we decipher its limits? Taking political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus, I explore theoretical categories of neoliberalism and “responsibilization” that cross-cut emerging forms of governance in contemporary British society. I chose this particular ethnographic focus in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political inquiry. I argue that practices of subjectification are never totalizing, that politico-economic concerns remain central to professional interest in self-governance, that subjectification practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings, and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is a motor of political process.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relationship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. But how do we decipher its limits? Taking political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus, I explore theoretical categories of neoliberalism and “responsibilization” that cross-cut emerging forms of governance in contemporary British society. I chose this particular ethnographic focus in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political inquiry. I argue that practices of subjectification are never totalizing, that politico-economic concerns remain central to professional interest in self-governance, that subjectification practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings, and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is a motor of political process.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>mindfulness, neoliberalism, governance, mental health, subjectification, responsiblization, meditation</kwd>
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	<body><p>Mindful in Westminster






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Joanna Cook. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.1.011
Mindful in Westminster
The politics of meditation and the limits of neoliberal critique
Joanna COOK, University College London

Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relationship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. But how do we decipher its limits? Taking political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus, I explore theoretical categories of neoliberalism and “responsibilization” that cross-cut emerging forms of governance in contemporary British society. I chose this particular ethnographic focus in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political inquiry. I argue that practices of subjectification are never totalizing, that politico-economic concerns remain central to professional interest in self-governance, that subjectification practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings, and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is a motor of political process.
Keywords: mindfulness, neoliberalism, governance, mental health, subjectification, responsiblization, meditation



Identifying the limits of neoliberalism
The concept of neoliberalism has been central to social scientific analyses of the relationship between changing forms of state responsibility, socioeconomic organization, and forms of reflexive self-governance. “Neoliberalism” is used to account for the development of a more technocratic and managerial role for the state (Gledhill 2004; Ferguson 2006) based on a belief in the justice of the market leading to deregulation, flexible working, the liberalization of capital, the reduction of the state, and restrictions on public spending. This is sometimes characterized as a move away from a theory of social welfare as the responsibility of government through a reinterpretation of the governability of subjects (Rose 1999a, 1999b). [142]Risk and uncertainty increase as a result of changing socioeconomic structures at the same time as technologies of “responsibilization” proliferate (Rose 1996a, 2001, 2007; Shamir 2008), by which state involvement in social welfare is reduced and replaced with groups and individuals who are encouraged to “take responsibility” for self-governance and decision making (Bennett 2008). Sennett suggests that under such conditions individuals must dwell “in a continual state of vulnerability” (1998: 83; see also 2006). Writing of flexible corporate practice, he argues that people are driven to achieve, but the institutional structures by which this might occur are left open and flexible. The economic necessity to pursue multiple possibilities and the capacity to adapt to volatile and changeable demands requires a particular strength of character, “that of someone who has the confidence to dwell in disorder, someone who flourishes in the midst of dislocation” (Sennett 1998: 62). Sennett argues that the freedom of the flexible capitalist is amoral, and that the demands of spontaneity and flexibility can be self-destructive.1 The individual is responsible for maximizing her emotional capital, and needs to protect herself in a condition of endemic uncertainty. The management of risk, engagement, and response becomes the responsibility of the individual (Beck 1992). With the diminution of the events and conditions that influence experience (the “happ” of happiness), experience must be privately created. Resilience and flexibility are required in an environment of uncertainty and risk, in which institutional supports have been rescinded to the capricious demands of consumer capitalism.
Drawing on Foucauldian theory, Rose has analyzed neoliberalism as a practice of governance for the minimization of costs and maximization of profits, as “a ‘way of doing’ directed towards objectives and regulating itself through continuous reflection” (Foucault 2008: 318). He argues that neoliberal governance is achieved through techniques that encourage subjects to take responsibility for their decision making and subject formation (Rose 1999a). Neoliberal governance is understood to be based on processes of “subjectivation”—identity-forming processes by which the subject is constituted. The state and professional organizations assume the role of managing populations for optimal productivity, while subjects take responsibility for their own self-governance. These processes of self-governance lead subjects to act in ways that reinforce their subjection (Rose 1996b). Under this transformed understanding of governance and responsibility, the subject is “free” to make choices concerning her own welfare, guided by the management of an “empowering” state. Such responsibility is meted out to all subjects irrespective of the structural or socioeconomic factors that might impinge on any form of decision making (Rose 1999b; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ong 2006). The neoliberal subject becomes “an entrepreneur of himself” (Foucault 2010: 226), and work upon the self becomes an investment in capital. Gershon characterizes this as “a self that is a flexible bundle of skills that reflexively manages oneself as though the self was a business” (2011: 537).2 Governing individual dispositions, emotions, and motivations then becomes [143]an individual responsibility and the site of governmental focus, structured by economic interests and market logic (Rose 1996a, 1996b). Individuals become productive members of society, not only through their labour, but also through the labour to shape themselves as such. The subject has to be educated (“made up,” in Rose and Miller’s terms [1992]) through techniques that enable her to take herself as a project, as if she were her own entrepreneur.
Analytically, the concept of neoliberalism helps to account for the relationship between forms of governance, self-governance, and capitalist market forces. But how do we decipher its limits? Are there forms of governance and reflexive self-governance that are not accounted for by a focus on neoliberal “entrepreneurialism”? As Hilgers asks, “Should we regard any mode of government that adopts a principle of optimisation, sometimes in a single domain, as neoliberal?” (2010: 360). In this contribution, I consider the limits of neoliberalism through an ethnographic focus on political interest in mindfulness-based interventions in civil society. In the United Kingdom, mindfulness is a political concern. Mindfulness meditation, an awareness practice which originated in Buddhism, is being interpreted as a positive intervention for societal problems as wide ranging as depressive relapse, criminal recidivism, children’s academic performance, and worker burnout. It is believed to help practitioners cope with life (from stress, anxiety, and depression to impulse control, emotional regulation, and intellectual flexibility) and is now taught in major civil society institutions in the United Kingdom, including hospitals, prisons, schools, and private businesses. In 2014, an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) was established in Westminster, committed to investigating the ways in which public policy might incorporate mindfulness-based practices. From May–December 2014, eight parliamentary hearings of the Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group (MAPPG) were held in Westminster, each focusing on a different area of public life. An inquiry report was drafted by the supporting secretariat outlining key policy recommendations for funding, implementation, and research, and this was launched in Parliament in October 2015.
As a focus of public policy, is mindfulness training placed in the service of neoliberal governance? Through an ethnographic consideration of parliamentary hearings on mindfulness, participant observation with the secretariat (the Mindfulness Initiative), interviews with members, and analysis of the final policy document, Mindful Nation UK, I examine the ways in which issues of self-governance and responsibility were motivated, debated, and framed. In the following, I argue that an analysis of political interest in mindfulness as “neoliberalism” frames subjectification as making people totally responsible for their mental health, detached from a broader socioeconomic and structural context. This is not borne out ethnographically. Furthermore, I argue that an analysis of self-governance as neoliberalism assumes that practices of subjectification are always already in the service of neoliberalism. Rather than offering either a critique of, or an apology for, mindfulness, I take political interest in mindfulness as my ethnographic focus in order to examine the multiple meanings and values invested in subjectification practices, and the ways in which diversity is maintained through the structure of political inquiry. Mindfulness as a political focus is being framed in multiple ways simultaneously, many of which lie beyond the limits of the analytic framework of neoliberalism. I [144]argue that the political value of the inquiry process rested on the maintenance of multiplicity in the meanings and values of self-governance.


Mindfulness in Parliament and the establishment of the APPG
Mindfulness, as it is now found in British workplaces, education, healthcare, and criminal justice, originated in Buddhist meditation. It gained legitimacy as a secular and therapeutic practice following the development of mindfulness-based stress reduction in the 1970s and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy in the 1990s, and subsequent scientific research into their efficacy. Beginning in the 1950s in Southeast Asia, reformist monks developed, reinvigorated, and propagated a form of meditation, vipassanā, based on a Buddhist text, The Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta (see Jordt 2007; Cook 2010; Braun 2013). The propagation of vipassanā was presented as a move away from “esoteric” meditative practices toward a more “rational” and “authentic” practice for salvation, available to monastics and laity (Van Esterik 1977). Mindfulness (Pali: sati) was understood to be an ethically positive perspectival awareness, which could be cultivated through meditative discipline, requiring morality, concentration, and wisdom. In the 1970s, Jon Kabat-Zinn developed mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, originally to address chronic pain and a range of conditions that were difficult to treat (Kabat-Zinn 1990).3 He interpreted mindfulness as a universal human capacity that could be developed by patients in order to alleviate suffering. In his foreword to the APPG Inquiry Report, Mindful Nation UK, he writes that mindfulness—

being about attention, awareness, relationality, and caring—is a universal capacity, akin to our capacity for language acquisition. While the most systematic and comprehensive articulation of mindfulness and its related attributes stems from the Buddhist tradition, mindfulness is not a catechism, an ideology, a belief system, a technique or set of techniques, a religion, or a philosophy. It is best described as “a way of being.” (Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group UK 2015: 5)
In his development of MBSR, Kabat-Zinn sought to routinize mindfulness in targeted interventions in order to address the suffering of ill health in pragmatic ways.
Drawing inspiration from MBSR, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) was developed in 1991 by Zindel Segal, Mark Williams, and John Teasdale in Cambridge, England, as a psychosocial intervention for the prevention of depressive relapse (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013). In the cognitive framework for depressive relapse, suffering was interpreted as resulting from the ways in which patients related to experiences, rather than the experiences themselves. As such, if patients could learn to relate to experience differently, they would suffer less. Thus, [145]the cognitive framework of MBCT rests on the premises that there is a cognitive component to depressive relapse and that people have the capacity to learn ways of relating to their thoughts and feelings that will enable them to maintain mental and emotional balance, even in the face of challenging experiences. MBCT was found to reduce depressive relapse in three randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) (Teasdale et al. 2000; Ma and Teasdale 2004; Kuyken et al. 2008), following which it received recommendation from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and was mandated on the National Health Service (NHS) for people who had experienced three or more depressive episodes, but who were currently well. The contemporary interest in mindfulness results, in part, from an increasing evidence base for mindfulness-based interventions and their subsequent uptake.4
Despite the findings of the RCTs and the NICE recommendation, MBCT remained widely inaccessible across the NHS. One of its developers, Mark Williams, proposed the introduction of mindfulness courses for politicians in Westminster in order to bring MBCT to their attention. As one of the chairs of the APPG commented, he “decided the only way to get the policy establishment really engaging with mindfulness was to take it to them.” Williams collaborated in an in-Parliament initiative led by Richard Layard, an economist and life peer in the House of Lords, and Chris Ruane, then a Labour MP,5 to establish mindfulness courses for parliamentarians. To date, 130 parliamentarians and 220 staff have completed an adapted MBCT course in Westminster. The course is taught in groups of eight to twelve led by a trained therapist, over an eight-week period. The most commonly used definition of mindfulness in this context is “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgementally, to things as they are” (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013: 132). The group meets once a week for two and a half hours. Aspects that are taught in the course include attentional control (mindfulness) cognitive skills (decentering, observational capacity), and behavioral skills (developing active/movement body-based skills) (ibid.). The course is built up of a series of intentional exercises, including mindfulness of breath, mindful movement, a body scan, mindful eating, as well as intentionally bringing an attitude of kindly awareness to everyday activities such as doing the washing up, eating, or bathing. Each session is followed by “homework”—guided mindfulness practices which participants listen to at home, bringing mindful awareness to specified routine activities, and pleasant and unpleasant events calendars; in the penultimate week, participants also complete an action plan.
In a presentation to the London Buddhist Society, one of the key nonparliamentary members of the APPG commented, “The thing about politicians is once they get the taste of something they want to do something. And this is an important point actually, because the doing has a sort of driving momentum.” Politicians who had [146]completed a mindfulness course sought to establish an APPG to identify problematic issues that were being faced in four areas of civil society—the criminal justice system, the national curriculum, the NHS, and the workplace—and the potential for mindfulness-based interventions to address them. APPGs are informal cross-party groups brought together to develop policy recommendations for government on subjects for which there is cross-party interest. Nominally run by members of the Commons and Lords, the secretariat is provided by individuals and organizations from outside Parliament. The APPG was supported by the Mindfulness Initiative, an advocacy/“secretariat” group comprised of professionals from a range of areas, drawn together by their professional and personal commitment to mindfulness. These included a senior journalist, the directors of Bangor and Oxford University Mindfulness Centres, the founder of the Mindfulness in Schools Project, the clinical lead for an NHS trust, and a senior economist and peer. Associates of the Mindfulness Initiative included a director of the Royal Society of Arts, a director from the corporate sector, experts in mindfulness and the criminal justice system, clinical psychologists, the chief operating officer of an educational trust, and others. The mission of the APPG was set out as providing a forum for discussion in Parliament about the role of mindfulness in public policy, promoting mindfulness in tackling a range of critical challenges that the government faced, advocating for more research to strengthen the existing evidence base, and showcasing best practice.
In May 2014, the APPG was launched in Parliament in an atmosphere of anticipation. In a large meeting room in Westminster, there was standing room only as approximately three hundred people, including thirty members of Parliament (MPs), crowded in attendance. Professor Willem Kuyken, a cognitive psychologist and the director of the Oxford Mindfulness Centre, described the meeting as “a wow moment,” and a palpable sense of excitement filled the room. After the launch, eighteen people came forward to the organizers and asked how they could help. As one of the organizers said later, “They covered such a wide range of skills and backgrounds . . . this is 80 percent volunteer effort.” From May–December 2014, eight parliamentary hearings of the APPG were held in Westminster, each focusing on a different area of public life. These were: mindfulness in the workplace; mindfulness and mental health; mindfulness in the criminal justice system; mindfulness and physical pain and mindfulness for NHS staff; mindfulness in education; mindfulness in the workplace II; mindfulness and policing; and mindfulness and gangs. Following the inquiry period, a report was written by the Mindfulness Initiative on behalf of the MPs who had chaired the inquiry. The report was launched in Parliament in October 2015. It outlined the character and scale of the challenges identified in health, education, the workplace, and the criminal justice system, and the existing evidence for mindfulness-based interventions. It called for targeted interventions in each area and funding for further research.6 Each section of the report was written by two or three members of the Mindfulness Initiative, and these sections were then edited into a single document by two editors. The contributions of each of these people were smoothed into a single voice and there are no authors named in the final document.[147]


Mindful neoliberals?
Over the period of the inquiry process, public interest in mindfulness reached unprecedented heights and mindfulness made frequent appearances in the media. The primary academic analysis of the popularity of secular mindfulness practice has been that it is a neoliberal tool: it has been analyzed as reflecting changing frameworks of state responsibility and an increasing emphasis on the “responsibility” of subjects to self-manage at a time of increasing privatization. It has enabled governance at a distance by making people responsible for their own mental health. For example, Purser and Loy (2013) write of recent interest in mindfulness,

There is a dissociation between one’s own personal transformation and the kind of social and organizational transformation that takes into account the causes and conditions of suffering in the broader environment. Such a colonization of mindfulness also has an instrumentalizing effect, reorienting the practice to the needs of the market, rather than to a critical reflection on the causes of our collective suffering.
Žižek (2001) has gone further and proclaimed that “Western Buddhism . . . is establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism.” He argues that a “western Buddhism meditative stance” functions as an ideological supplement to the stress of capitalist dynamics, and is “arguably the most efficient way for us to fully participate in capitalist dynamics while retaining the appearance of mental sanity.” Such critiques extend into the relationship between “emotional self-optimization” and happiness. For example, Binkley (2014) argues that through self-help books, spiritual mentoring, business management, and relationship counseling, happiness is presented as attainable by everyone, irrespective of their socioeconomic circumstances, dispositions, or life experiences, and this leads to a moral responsibility to be happy. As he writes, “We are all complicit in our own asphyxiation everyday. We do the work of asphyxiation, we call it our freedom, our enterprise, and our happiness. And we should stop” (ibid.: 175). Similarly, Ehrenreich (2009) argues that positive thinking has entered a symbiotic relationship with capitalism in America, with an emphasis on unending consumption and an imperative for growth. She argues that in the United States, happiness is in the service of a rightwing neoliberal agenda in which it becomes a moral and a personal responsibility.
According to such critiques, happiness and wellbeing are psychologized and individualized, such that they become the responsibility of the individual rather than reflective of broader structural, political, or social inequalities that require redress. A search for happiness becomes now a self-conscious project of self-improvement that can be trained and cultivated, and mindfulness is a means by which this might be achieved.7 In the United Kingdom, Davies has argued that the emotions have become enslaved to neoliberalism:[148]

Once social relationships can be viewed as medical and biological properties of the human body, they can become dragged into the limitless pursuit of self optimization that counts for happiness in the age of neoliberalism. (2015: 213)
Davies argues that a focus on happiness as a personal responsibility deflects attention from socioeconomic struggle. It is suggested that individualizing and psychologizing wellbeing or mental health does nothing to address the structural inequalities or forms of political disenfranchisement that may lead to the experience of negative feelings in the first place. Stress, anxiety, and depression are reframed as personal, not political, problems. In a consideration of the micromanagement of individuals, he writes:

If a certain physical context (such as work or poverty) is causing pain, one progressive route would involve changing that context. But another equivalent would be to focus on changing the way in which it is experienced. . . . If lifting weights becomes too painful, you’re faced with a choice: reduce the size of the weight, or pay less attention to the pain. In the early twenty-first century, there is a growing body of experts in “resilience” training, mindfulness, and cognitive behavioural therapy whose advice is to opt for the latter strategy. (2015: 35)
While this is a poor account of “resilience” training, mindfulness and cognitive behavioral therapy,8 we might make his argument better. It could be argued that training in mindfulness is creating exactly the forms of reflexive subjectivity on which neoliberalism thrives. Mindfulness is being encouraged in civil society as a technique for cultivating a particular reflexive perspective, which fosters intellectual flexibility and emotional resilience. Through repetitive and ongoing training, practitioners seek to develop a different relationship to thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations. Thus, developing an analysis of mindfulness as a neoliberal tool, we could argue that mindfulness not only aligns with neoliberalism, but it also provides the motor for it: learning practices of emotional regulation and reflexive awareness “responsibilizes” practitioners, who are simultaneously “resilient” enough to remain unaffected by the emotional and psychological effects of neoliberal uncertainty and individualism. Suffering becomes the responsibility of the individual rather than a result of sociopolitical influences such as class, race, gender, or the happenstance of misfortune. Furthermore, individualizing suffering silences the possibility of addressing it as a social or a political issue. In such a reading, the current political interest in mindfulness is indicative of broader political [149]shifts in which state responsibility for social welfare has been ceded to technocratic managerialism.


The limits of neoliberalism
Is mindfulness in Parliament a neoliberal tool of “responsibilization” at a time when the state is assuming an increasingly managerial role, social welfare provision is being radically reduced, and significant funding cuts to the NHS are leading some to argue that we are witnessing a process of “stealth privatization” (Lacobucci 2013)? In the following, I will develop an ethnographic argument critiquing such a position by demonstrating that subjectification practices are never totalizing, that politico-economic concerns remain central to professional interest in self-governance, that subjectification practices may hold multiple and/or diverse meanings (cf. Cruickshank 1999), and that the maintenance of this multiplicity is essential in the process of political inquiry.
Mindfulness practice encourages practitioners to “turn toward” difficulty. It is a technique that is explicitly intended to enable a practitioner to relate to herself differently, with an attitude of “friendly curiosity” and compassion (Feldman and Kuyken 2011). This fits comfortably within a framework of subjectification and reflexive self-governance. But, as I will argue, to theorize this as a practice of neoliberal “responsibilization” by which the practitioner is made totally responsible for her own mental health detached from her socioeconomic and structural context is not borne out ethnographically. In part, this theorization rests on an assumption that neoliberalism has achieved what is feared, that the subject who learns to “take responsibility” for her own wellbeing and happiness does so totally: if we are not there yet, then we are on the verge of a Huxleyan dystopia in which “happiness” is achieved though the soma of mindfulness. Recognizing the limits of neoliberalism moves us away from a conceptualization of neoliberalism as a totalizing ideology and allows us to explore the practices of people who recognize collective and structural causes of suffering at the same time as seeking practices of subjectification for improving wellbeing.
Throughout the inquiry process, participants worried over the unhappiness reported in large-scale surveys and the prevalence of mental health issues presented in epidemiological statistics, basing their discussions on professional and personal experience. In contexts of limited institutional and financial support, many had introduced mindfulness courses into their work in an effort to address suffering. Speaking with a mental health nurse from Devon, I asked him how he had developed a mindfulness course at work.

Well the real challenge is the practical stuff . . . and the culture. At work there’s no time and no money. I’m working with patients all day, under pressure, there’s never enough time. And I had to work hard to set it up. I couldn’t have done it without my supervisor’s support . . . finding a room was a nightmare.
Outside of the hearings, discussion oriented around governmental cuts to funding, the increasing prevalence of mental health issues presented in epidemiological [150]statistics, and the challenges that speakers had experienced in establishing mindfulness courses. For the people involved, mindfulness was not understood as a mask for austerity. They understood mindfulness as an intervention that might help people deal with stress, anxiety, and depression in contexts of social and political disenfranchisement. This came as a response to the immediate challenges of working with people who face mental health issues during a time of privatization and a shrinking state mandate for social welfare. Mental health was framed as a major problem in the United Kingdom, and this was, in part, because of the increasing risk, inequality, and hardship that people in different populations in the country were thought to face. Rather than looking at the macro-level of neoliberal forces, which can appear totalizing in their colonization of wellbeing and the responsibility to self-manage, by exploring the ethnography of political process we can account for the concerns and interests of people working in different sectors of civil society. The promotion of mindfulness in public policy was an effort to do something about the tangible struggles that professionals describe witnessing in each of their sectors, given that each sector is undergoing transformation.
The relationship between self-governance and political economy is an important one. Governmental emphasis on patient empowerment emerges from changing relationships between state and citizens, and the role that the state plays in the welfare of citizens. It is not a coincidence that austerity and a discourse of “patient empowerment” are developing simultaneously. But not taking this seriously enough casts it as merely a smokescreen for austerity (cf. Howell 2015).9 Encouraging subjects to take responsibility for their mental health is understood as a form of governance that “tricks” them into self-governance and effaces political-economic relations. Practices of self-governance are interpreted as only individualizing and psychologizing suffering, and thereby obfuscating the social or political causes of mental health issues at a time of increasing social welfare cuts. Patient empowerment, then, becomes a mask for austerity.
While anthropologists have theorized neoliberalism as a mode of governance based on an entrepreneurial model that emphasizes individual risk and responsibility (Gupta and Ferguson 1992), they have noted that it is rarely, if ever, totalizing in practice. Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) consider the limits and challenges to theories of neoliberalism highlighted by the implementation of neoliberal policies. They point to the unevenness of neoliberalism’s spread and the ways in which it articulates and intersects with other political-cultural formations and governing projects. Their aim is “to treat neoliberalism as a process rather than a fait accompli” (ibid.: 115; see also Maskovsky and Kingfisher 2001), thereby highlighting the production and reproduction of patterns of inequality, and questioning the [151]totalizing nature of neoliberalism. In so doing, they are able to provide analytical space to consider the limits of neoliberalism. Elsewhere, anthropologists have demonstrated that local manifestations reveal the limits of neoliberalism and its articulation with other cultural, political, and economic forms (see Gledhill 2004; Freeman 2007).
Healthcare policy provides fertile ground for thinking about these limits. Patients are increasingly encouraged to make decisions for themselves, which are simultaneously embedded in broader networks of responsibility and care (Zignon 2010; Fordyce 2012). Trnka and Trundle (2014) suggest that ideologies of patient “empowerment” in which the citizen is imagined as independent and responsible, self-managing, and acting in a way that promotes her own health and wellbeing may in practice be neither realized nor desired. Forms of identity, collectivity, and interpersonal connections may intersect with and contest neoliberal frames. Trnka and Trundle argue that “social actors . . . move between different moral, ethical, and affective valences of what it means to be ‘responsible’ subjects without necessarily feeling conflicted, in need of resolution, or necessitating ‘moral breakdown’” (ibid.: 141; see also Zigon 2010). Social relations incorporate multiple framings of responsibility, sometimes accounted for through neoliberal logics of self-responsibility and care of the self, and sometimes interpreted in terms of interpersonal responsibility and obligation. As Trnka and Trundle argue, “Despite its flexibility, neoliberalism cannot encompass the breadth of subjectivities and collective relations that constitute contemporary enactments of responsibility” (2014: 141) Furthermore, guidelines promoting self-managed care may be interpreted in multiple ways, informed by preexisting understandings of responsibility and accountability in healthcare (Scheldeman 2008; Trnka 2014). Responsibility has been central to a range of anthropological concerns, including: political justice and an equitable system (Rawls [1971] 1999; Corsín Jiménez 2008); national identity and kinship (Gammeltoff 2007); personal and professional ethics (Brodwin 2013); agency and moral blame (Davis 2012); and self-care and decision making (see Mol 2008; Premkumar 2015). A theory of neoliberal “responsibilization” helps to account for the ways in which the subject becomes responsible for emotional self-regulation. But if the category of “responsiblization” remains limited to the neoliberal framework, it becomes hard to account for other forms of responsibility or responsiblization that might be in play, or the multiple effects of reflexive self-governance.


The meanings of mindfulness: Maintaining multiplicity
A danger of theorizing practices of subjectification as neoliberal is that they come to be read as always already in the service of a neoliberal agenda. If neoliberalism has permeated the regulation of the emotions, then there is no room to understand attempts to address what are identified as the dehumanizing effects of neoliberalism through practices of subjectification as anything other than more neoliberalism. The way in which the subject relates to herself is both the symptom and the cause of neoliberalism: the symptom because anxiety and depression result from the uncertainty and individualism of neoliberal structure; and the cause because reflexivity and emotional regulation are necessary for neoliberalism to flourish. [152]Not only is neoliberalism a totalizing reality, but also any response to it that entails subjectification tightens its colonization of emotional life. As Reveley writes, subjectification is interpreted as “producing a wholly negative, disempowering form of strangulating self-entrapment” (2015: 88).
The political authority of the APPG rested, in part, on the orchestration of participants from different social worlds without reducing the diversity of their interests and perspectives. Evidence was presented which suggested that mindfulness-based interventions might be of benefit for a range of different problems (e.g., criminal recidivism, impulse control, emotional regulation, and depressive relapse) without reducing them to the same problem, or supposing that mindfulness might be helpful for addressing all or some of them for the same reasons. Throughout the inquiry process, mindfulness was understood to help practitioners cope with life in different ways. Divergent emphases on the meaning of mindfulness reflected the heterogeneity of those involved and the diversity of issues under consideration. While they were understood to share some characteristics, the differences between them remained present. The eight parliamentary hearings focused on a different area of civil society, which coalesced beneath four broad headings: health, education, criminal justice, and the workplace. In the hearing on mental health, it was reported that up to 10 percent of the UK adult population will experience symptoms of depression in any given week and that depression is two to three times more common in people with long-term physical health problems. In the hearing on education, emphasis was placed on the value of “character building” and “resilience” in the promotion of nonacademic skills and capabilities for students. In the hearing on mindfulness and the workplace, the meeting was told that the leading cause of workplace sickness absence in the United Kingdom is mental ill health. Interest also oriented around the use of mindfulness in the development of higher cognitive skills such as working memory functioning and decision making. Executive control and emotional regulation were also of central concern in the hearing on mindfulness and the criminal justice system. Violence in prisons and rates of reoffense were linked to, but not reduced to, problems in psychological processes and states. In the description below, I will draw on events from the hearings on criminal justice, the workplace, long-term physical health conditions, and NHS staff. Each parliamentary hearing was specifically targeted to address an area in which high levels of mental health diagnoses, stress, or anxiety had been identified. Each followed a similar structure incorporating: participation in a mindfulness practice; presentation of statistics on the scale and form of a particular societal problem and its economic implications; personal testimonies from people for whom mindfulness practice had been radically transformative; the existing evidence for the efficacy for mindfulness-based interventions in each area; and reports on the implementation of small-scale mindfulness interventions.
Hearings were held in large wood-paneled committee rooms in the Houses of Parliament, overlooking the Thames. Each of the hearings was full, and I was told that it was unusual to have so many ministers present at APPG meetings, and even more unusual for them to stay for any length of time. Over the course of the hearings, upward of eighty people presented statistics on challenges being faced by populations in different areas of UK life, accounts of research on mindfulness, their experiences of implementing mindfulness-based courses, and their personal [153]experiences of practice. These people were drawn from different areas of expertise and work, and included but were not limited to researchers, civil servants, MPs, ex-offenders, probation managers, patients, school children, third-sector officers, private sector workers, NHS service commissioners, healthcare professionals, psychologists, and teachers. The orchestration of such a broad and specialist group of people was made possible by a clear agenda for the running order and tight time keeping by the chair of each meeting (usually a politician). Speakers were encouraged to keep to time, usually no more than five to ten minutes. This, and the range and volume of information being presented, gave a clear pace to the proceedings. Each meeting followed a similar running order: a welcome from the chair; a short mindfulness practice; statistics on the range, scale, and character of a problem; an overview of research evidence for mindfulness; testimonials from people who had benefited from mindfulness; accounts from professionals who had implemented mindfulness-based initiatives in their area; discussion around the barriers to adoption of mindfulness in a given area; and an open discussion on coordination and next steps.
At the start of each hearing, assembled professionals, MPs, and peers were invited to settle into a short mindfulness practice led by a respected mindfulness teacher. As one of the cochairs commented at the hearing on mental health, the short mindfulness practice was important because we were there to discuss mindfulness, and this ought to be done mindfully. At the APPG on long-term physical health conditions and NHS staff, the practice was led by a consultant clinical psychologist and mindfulness teacher from the NHS:

So, bringing awareness into the body and perhaps noticing the contact of the feet on the floor. . . . Feelings of touch, pressure between the body and the chair. Now, taking our position in a way that has a quality of wakefulness. . . . A sense of dignity. . . . Being present with our experience. Choosing whether to close the eyes now or keep them open but with a downward gaze. . . . Guiding the attention inward. . . . Noticing the thoughts or images running through the mind. . . . What feelings are around for you? What’s the emotional tone, if you will? . . . What sensations are presenting themselves in the body? . . . Not trying to change anything here, just tuning in to what’s here for you. . . . And now, narrowing the focus of attention to the sensations of the breath in the body. . . . Noticing the movement of the breath, coming up close to these sensations and recognizing them. . . . Noticing the breath moving in the abdomen. . . . Stretching and relaxing back the muscles of the abdomen as you breathe. . . . Following the in-breath for its full duration. . . . And the out-breath for its full duration. . . . Allowing the breath to be natural, not trying to change it or control it. . . . Being with these breath sensations. . . . Noticing how the mind moves off into thinking, guiding it back to find the breath once again. . . . And now expanding awareness around the breath to include a sense of the body as a whole. . . . Noticing subtle movements throughout the whole body. . . . Opening up to felt experience in the whole of the body right now. . . . Noticing the shape of the body and the space it takes up. . . . The boundary of the body in the environment. . . . Noticing sensations of clothes against the skin. . . . Expanding awareness beyond the body now to include a sense of the environment, perhaps [154]noticing the temperature, the feeling of air against the skin. . . . Noticing sounds. . . . Being aware of the room. And if eyes are closed, beginning to open them, bringing awareness to what is seen. . . . Being in this room, sitting together. . . . And carrying this awareness into the next moments of our being together.
Participation in the mindfulness practice changed the feeling of the hearing significantly. Each time, the bustle of arrival gave way to a quieter and more focused sense of engagement. Each hearing then continued with the presentation of statistics identifying the character and scale of the problem that was to be considered that day. For example, at the hearing on criminal justice, statistics collected by the prison reform trust revealed that nearly half the prison population suffer from depression or anxiety (Ministry of Justice 2013) and the suicide rate is almost fifteen times higher than in the general population (Department of Health 2004; Samaritans resource pack 2004). At the hearing on mindfulness and the workplace, it was reported that since 2009 the number of sick days lost to stress, depression, and anxiety has increased by 24 percent (Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 2013).
An autobiographical narrative then followed from someone for whom the problems identified in the hearing were personally relevant and who had benefited from mindfulness. Here, the value of mindfulness extended much further than the problems presented statistically (such as absenteeism, recidivism, burnout, chronic pain, etc.). Mindfulness was presented as having had a profound and transformative effect on the speaker. For example, an ex-offender told the hearing on criminal justice of his previously troubled life, his discovery of mindfulness, and how much he had been affected by this. Preventing reoffense was implicit in his account, but he placed emphasis on his overall experience of life and his relationships with others:

I was diagnosed with PTSD [posttraumatic stress disorder] when I was five. My carers were violent. I didn’t know what was happening. If you grow up in a war zone, you become a warrior. I got into alcohol and drugs. I ended up in prison. I had regret for the past and fear for the future. I was robbed of the present, and mindfulness gave that back. It’s revolutionized my way of seeing the world and myself. My kids have never seen me violent and I’m trying to teach them through mindfulness. You have to try it. As they say in Glasgow, “Better felt than telt.” I could tell you about all the miracles in my life, but you have to go out and taste it for yourself. Five years ago I was in a homeless shelter and now I’m sitting in Parliament.
Similarly, at the hearing on mindfulness and the NHS, an Accident &amp; Emergency mental health nurse who works nights and has two teenage sons reported that she joined a mindfulness course at work out of curiosity and that it had a radical impact on her life:

It’s been quite life changing for me. I found quite quickly that my thought processes changed and I hadn’t realized that maybe I had got quite bogged down in things; I just thought it was the passage of life and it takes its toll on everyone. You know, we all have bereavements, we all have losses, things go wrong in our lives. During the course, I was just like my old [155]self, just like when I was a lot younger. I was happy, I was feeling joy in things, and I hadn’t realized that that part of my life had gone.
Testimonials were then followed by econometric data on the forecasted cost of mental health problems to the state, and a presentation of the quantitative evidence for the efficacy of mindfulness as a targeted intervention to address specific problems. This was followed by accounts from professionals who had introduced mindfulness-based interventions in their given field and the challenges that they had encountered. At the hearing on criminal justice, a senior representative for the Welsh probation service presented her experience of running a mindfulness pilot project in a probation hospital in Cardiff. This was conducted with two high-risk sexual offenders and one high-risk violent offender, all of whom had spent at least five years in prison. Simultaneously highlighting economic efficiency and personal transformation, she presented a case study of a violent offender who had used mindfulness to control his impulse to commit a violent act. He had witnessed a young man being disrespectful to an older lady at a bus stop and was immediately awash with powerful fantasies of violence. He vividly imagined putting the young man’s head through the screen of the bus shelter, to the extent that he heard the glass breaking and smelt the blood. At the same time, however, he heard his mindfulness teacher’s voice in his head, saying, “Notice what is happening right now. Move towards the positive.” The probation executive told the hearing, “He was able to witness the thoughts in a nonjudgmental way, and allow them to pass without reacting to them and being violent. We costed up that scenario and found that it would have cost £100,000 in services if he had followed through on that impulse.”
By collecting together sets of evidence the breadth and character of different problems were represented at different scales (personal, societal, epidemiological, and professional). Mental health issues were framed as sharing a common identity and as being unique to each domain. This enabled the range and character of challenges experienced by different groups of people to be discussed without the differences between them being elided. Maintaining this multiplicity of meaning and the breadth and specialism of the contributors was understood to mark the success of the inquiry process and the drafting of the inquiry report. Participants identified diverse societal problems, and the inquiry process was intended to explore the evidence and potential for mindfulness-based interventions in addressing them. In the course of this process, mindfulness was understood through different frameworks. This shifting ground—the meaning of mindfulness, and the range of problems that were under consideration—was held together through the structure of the inquiry process itself. That is, while the “meaning” of mindfulness was multiple and the populations and problems were diverse, the pattern and sequence of the process created coherence between seemingly very different scales and orders of issues. This did not flatten diversity but, rather, enabled it.


Conclusion
In her ethnography of UN-sponsored international conferences, Riles (1998) explores the challenge that negotiators face in holding multiple levels of action in [156]view at once. She asks, how does institutional knowledge achieve its effects, and what effects does it achieve? She argues that the production and ratification of intergovernmental agreements involve nonrepresentational patterning. In focusing on the aesthetic form to which information in documents adheres, rather than the meaning of information, she is able to consider “the way that the form of the documents made manifest a reality of levels and levels of realities” (ibid.: 379). Similarly, standardization in the inquiry process brought together multiple levels of reality—the scale changing of statistics and personal testimonies, for example—and also multiple realities—the experiences of people in diverse parts of civil society dealing with different problems. The overall aesthetic of the process enabled multiple meanings of mindfulness and societal problems to be considered in one coherent endeavor.
The inquiry process was constituted through the orchestrated dialogue of a diverse and professionalized group of people rather than a “top-down” implementation of “big policy.” Throughout the inquiry process and the drafting of the report, social problems from disparate areas of civil society were collected together. This multiplicity of meaning was maintained through the development and enforcement of a clear pattern of procedures, which enabled the representation of multiple levels of reality within and across each focus. This ensured integrity of approach in the presence of diversity of meaning. The narrower focuses of each hearing (such as preventing depressive relapse or improving students’ attentional control) were contained within the standardization of the proceedings. The development of the inquiry process required methods for creating reliability of information across domains, agreed methods of gathering information, and some sense of integrity (of data, evidence, and recommendations) that stretched across local contingencies, interpretations, and meanings. Both scales of information and the framing of mental health issues remained multiple throughout the process. The aesthetic of the inquiry acted as a container allowing for multiple meanings of mindfulness without demanding consensus.
I have argued that an analysis of self-governance as a neoliberal tool risks interpreting “responsibilization” through a totalizing framework: practices of self-governance are read as individualizing and psychologizing suffering, and thereby obfuscating the social and political causes of mental health issues at a time of increasing social welfare cuts. But this leaves analysis of governance limited to a framework of top-down intervention and does not account for diversity in the motivations, experiences, and efforts of people practicing self-governance and the collaborative nature of the political processes by which it is promoted. Self-governance, then, becomes a mask for austerity. I have suggested that it is possible to identify the limits of neoliberalism by resisting the temptation to move beyond the ethnographic movement. In so doing, the motor of political process is revealed to be the maintenance of a diversity of meanings of self-governance.


Acknowledgments
I am very grateful to Harry Walker and Iza Kavedžija for their feedback and encouragement throughout the process of writing this article. I would like to thank [157]the two anonymous reviewers at HAU for their careful reading, engagement, and encouraging provocations in response to earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Giovanni da Col for his insightful comments and suggestions, and Justin Dyer and Sean Dowdy for their skillful editing.


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Pleine Conscience à Westminster: Politique de la méditation et les limites de la critique néolibérale
Résumé : Le concept de néolibéralisme rend compte de la relation entre des formes de gouvernance, des formes d’auto-gestion, et les forces du marché capitaliste. Mais comment établir ses limites? En m’intéressant au concept de mindfulness avec une étude ethnographique, j’explore les catégories théoriques du néolibéralisme et de la “responsabilisation” qui traversent les formes émergentes de gouvernance de la société britannique contemporaine. J’ai choisi ce sujet pour ma recherche afin d’étudier les multiples sens et valeurs investis dans les pratiques de subjectivation, et les façons dont une diversité est maintenue à travers la structure de l’enquête politique. Je montre que les pratiques de subiectivation ne sont jamais totalisantes. Les préoccupations politico-économiques demeurent centrales aux intérêts professionnels dans l’auto-gestion, et les pratiques de subiectivation peuvent avoir de nombreux et divers sens: le maintien de cette variété est le moteur du processus politique.
Joanna COOK is an anthropologist at University College London. She is the author of Meditation in modern Buddhism: Renunciation and change in Thai monastic life (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and the coeditor of The state we’re in: Reflecting on democracy’s troubles (Berghahn Books, 2016), Detachment: Essays on the limits of relational thinking (Manchester University Press, 2015) and Southeast Asian perspectives on power (Routledge, 2012).
Joanna CookDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity College London14 Taviton Street London WC1H 0BWUKJoanna.cook@ucl.ac.uk


___________________
1. Similarly, Bauman (2007) has argued that social forms and institutions no longer act as frames of reference, and individuals learn to be flexible and adaptable under conditions of unending precarity.
2. For Gershon, neoliberal agency creates relationships that are morally lacking and over-looks differences in scale.
3. Earlier movements had sought to explore the benefits of dialogue between psychology and Buddhist and meditative practice (for a history of the dialogue between Buddhism and psychology in America, see Metcalf 2002; on the relationship between psychology and Zen Buddhism, see Fromm, Suzuki and De Martino 1970; on the psychological framing of Transcendental Meditation, see Williamson 2010).
4. There is increasing evidence that MBCT might help large numbers of people experiencing depressive affect and patterns of recurring depression (cf. Baer 2003; Coelho, Canter, and Ernst 2007). Kuyken et al. (2008) demonstrate that MBCT is equivalent to maintenance antidepressants for the prevention of depressive relapse but is superior in terms of quality of life and residual depressive symptoms.
5. Chris Ruane was the member of Parliament for the Vale of Clwyd. He lost his seat in the General Election of May 2015.
6. The report can be viewed online (see Mindfulness All-Party Parliamentary Group 2015).
7. In such a reading of mindfulness, the emotionally “fit” are happy. They put their time in on the meditation mat, and the result is hedonic buffness. As Nandy puts it, such a conceptualization rests on “a self-conscious, determined search for happiness from a mental state to an objectified quality of life that can be attained the way an athlete—after training under a specialist and going through a strict regimen of exercises and diet—wins a medal in a track meet” (2012: 45). The implication of this is that unhappiness does not result from external circumstances but is a personal failure.
8. For example, mindfulness practitioners learn to pay more attention to thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations, not less. Mindfulness-based interventions that address depression and anxiety are premised on the theory that patterns of emotional avoidance function to reinforce negative emotional states. Learning to pay attention “in a particular way, on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgmentally” may alleviate suffering because aversive patterns that contribute to emotional distress are reduced (Segal, Williams, and Teasdale 2013).
9. In Howell’s research on psychological resilience in military settings, resilience training is understood to optimize military force, and to reduce healthcare costs by preempting mental distress in soldiers at a time of shrinking defense expenditure. It is possible to interpret this as a form of training by which soldiers are made responsible for their own mental health, which has the effect of effacing a politics of austerity in which welfare entitlements are shrinking. But Howell argues that this is an insufficient analysis of the aims of military resilience programs, which are to enhance (not just to responsibilize) soldiers, “a more ambitious aim than responsibilisation” (2015: 69).
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						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>05</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2023</year>
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			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date>
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			<issue seq="303">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.3</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2022 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In the 1890s, at the height of the rubber boom, steamboats dominate the rivers of Bolivian Amazonia. The technophile discourse of the period presents the steamer as a revolution that changes everything: it allows social progress and economic development, it frees transport from the constraints of the geography, it reinforces national sovereignty and, at the same time, it overcomes interethnic conflict. Nevertheless, a careful reading of the historical sources allows us to question whether it is reasonable to reduce the rubber-transporting steamer to an icon of progress and the nationalist agenda. A historical anthropology of the steamer helps to understand what happens with the vessel itself beyond political economy, nation-building processes, and the Amazonian landscape, while also aiming to reconstruct the biographies, histories, and imaginaries of the steamboat itself and its people, and in turn an integral fluvial experience that embodies novel perceptions of alterity of the river and the Bolivian jungle.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>Lost and found: Contesting isolation and cultivating contact in Amazonian Ecuador</article-title>
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					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
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					<aff>Anthropology, University of Edinburgh</aff>
					<email>c.high@ed.ac.uk</email>
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						<surname>Admin</surname>
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					<name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<surname>High</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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				<day>23</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2013</year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In May 2003 a group of Waorani men in Amazonian Ecuador led an attack against their “uncontacted” Taromenani neighbors, resulting in a massacre that has fueled ongoing debates about the rights of indigenous people living in “voluntary isolation.” In this article I consider how Waorani understandings of the attack point to indigenous formulations of alterity that challenge what Lucas Bessire (2012) has described as the contemporary politics of isolation. I draw on recent discussions of kinship as a form of mutual belonging that extend beyond common substance (Sahlins 2013), and consider how, in the aftermath of the killings, many Waorani came to see spatially distant others as kinsmen who became disconnected from Waorani in past times. Understood by Waorani as kin of victims, the Taromenani have become both a source of desired relations and a potent image of indigenous strength and autonomy in the context of social and economic transformation.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In May 2003 a group of Waorani men in Amazonian Ecuador led an attack against their “uncontacted” Taromenani neighbors, resulting in a massacre that has fueled ongoing debates about the rights of indigenous people living in “voluntary isolation.” In this article I consider how Waorani understandings of the attack point to indigenous formulations of alterity that challenge what Lucas Bessire (2012) has described as the contemporary politics of isolation. I draw on recent discussions of kinship as a form of mutual belonging that extend beyond common substance (Sahlins 2013), and consider how, in the aftermath of the killings, many Waorani came to see spatially distant others as kinsmen who became disconnected from Waorani in past times. Understood by Waorani as kin of victims, the Taromenani have become both a source of desired relations and a potent image of indigenous strength and autonomy in the context of social and economic transformation.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Lost and found






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Casey High. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau3.3.008
Lost and found
Contesting isolation and cultivating contact in Amazonian Ecuador
Casey HIGH, University of Edinburgh


In May 2003 a group of Waorani men in Amazonian Ecuador led an attack against their “uncontacted” Taromenani neighbors, resulting in a massacre that has fueled ongoing debates about the rights of indigenous people living in “voluntary isolation.” In this article I consider how Waorani understandings of the attack point to indigenous formulations of alterity that challenge what Lucas Bessire (2012) has described as the contemporary politics of isolation. I draw on recent discussions of kinship as a form of mutual belonging that extend beyond common substance (Sahlins 2013), and consider how, in the aftermath of the killings, many Waorani came to see spatially distant others as kinsmen who became disconnected from Waorani in past times. Understood by Waorani as kin of victims, the Taromenani have become both a source of desired relations and a potent image of indigenous strength and autonomy in the context of social and economic transformation.
Keywords: alterity, politics of isolation, kinship, mutuality, violence, Amazonia, Waorani



In this article I consider the indigenous logic and social implications of a massacre carried about by Waorani men against their so-called “uncontacted” Taromenani neighbors in Amazonian Ecuador in 2003.1 I suggest that, beyond revealing the ways in which Waorani understand and interact with outsiders, local responses to the attack demonstrate an Amazonian formulation of alterity that challenges the notion of “lost people” in Western social imagination and the contemporary politics of isolation in debates about indigenous rights. In contrast to the emphasis placed on isolation and segregation in attempts to protect people living in “voluntary isolation” (Bessire 2012), in the aftermath of the 2003 killings many Waorani insisted on their social and historical links with the victims and devised strategies to cultivate social bonds with their uncontacted neighbors. In this context Waorani people conceive of relations of otherness not merely in terms of exclusion and enmity but also in terms of potential social connection and intimacy (Stasch 2009). The ways in which they construed their relations with the Taro-menani after the attack in reference to mutual experience and belonging points to how, for many Waorani, what is at stake in this context is not merely a politics of isolation but more centrally a question of kinship.
In recent years Amazonia has gone from being a relatively unknown and radically other ethnographic region to being an almost obligatory reference point in anthropological discussions of how alterity operates in different cultural worlds. Whether in studies of “tribal warfare” (Chagnon 1968), cosmologies of predation (Viveiros de Castro 1992; Fausto 2007; Bonilla 2005; Taylor 2000; Vilaga 2010), or indigenous understandings of shamanism and assault sorcery (Whitehead and Wright 2004; Fausto 2012; High 2012), the dangers of potentially violent others appear to encompass and permeate social life in this part of the world (Viveiros de Castro 2001). As everyday life involves an ongoing struggle to incorporate or transform various kinds of others into people or kin (Vilacja 2002; Gow 1991; McCallum 2001), Amazonia presents to us new ways of thinking about social othering and relatedness that depart in significant ways from conventional Western concepts of society and the individual. Only relatively recently, however, have anthropologists considered how these cosmologies relate to wider political and economic processes that are themselves part of the transformation of Amazonian lived worlds.2 In the Waorani communities of Amazonian Ecuador, the speed and scale of economic development and the intensification of intercultural relations in recent years have brought these processes into focus in sometimes dramatic ways. One of the central questions I address in this article is what indigenous Amazonian forms of alterity look like in this transformational context.
Since the establishment of the first mission settlement among the Waorani half a century ago, Evangelical missionaries and anthropologists alike have noted a remarkable transition from intergroup revenge killings to relative peace among the Waorani (Yost 1981; Robarchek and Robarchek 1996; Boster, Yost, and Peeke 2004). As Waorani settled in permanent villages within a legally recognized reserve, many embraced peaceful relations with kowori (non-Waorani people), whom they previously assumed to be dangerous cannibals (Rival 2002). These transformational processes, and indigenous understandings of them, emerge as an important part of social memory in Waorani villages today (High 2009a). However, we should be careful not to uncritically adopt an Evangelical narrative of change from precontact violence to postcontact peace that ignores the forms of violence that Waorani people experience today both as victims and as perpetrators. The presence of multinational oil development and illegal logging on indigenous lands are among the socially disruptive forces that contribute to violent conflicts within and between indigenous communities. Rather than viewing Waorani people simply as victims of powerful outsiders, in this article I focus on how these processes become embedded in Waorani understandings of sociality, alterity, and revenge.
In a recent ethnography of Papua New Guinea, Rupert Stasch (2009) observes that his Korowai hosts “know relations by events, and … search for relational meanings in events” (17). In this article I argue that, for Waorani, violence appears to set off a particular kind of search for relational meanings, one that highlights the mutuality of victimhood and intimacy. While my hosts and neighbors were generally critical of the killings that occurred during my fieldwork, these events caused people to imagine and desire new kinds of relations in a society where victimhood is a key marker of social proximity. This becomes clear in Waorani speculations about people living in voluntary isolation within the Waorani ethnic reserve (Cabodevilla and Berraondo 2005). Typical Western understandings of un-contacted or isolated people conjure an image of wild and primitive populations, untouched by the corrupting influences of history and civilization. In contrast to this enduring image, Waorani people understand their uncontacted neighbors to be both fierce warriors reminiscent of their ancestors and kinsmen who became disconnected from other Waorani in past times. These enigmatic “lost people” have become both a valued source of potential relations in the aftermath of violence and a potent image of indigenous strength and autonomy.


The Taromenani massacre of 2003
In May 2003, after having spent most of the previous year in Waorani villages along the Curaray River, I was visiting the frontier city of Puyo when a group of young men from the official Waorani political organization (ONHAE)3 approached me at an open-air restaurant. They told me the latest news: a group of Waorani men had attacked the longhouse of an uncontacted group living in voluntary isolation within the Waorani reserve. Visibly concerned, they explained that a large but unknown number of people were killed in the raid, which was carried out by men from the eastern part of the Waorani reserve. At this point they did not appear to know many details about the attack, but shared with me a letter from the organization’s president to the local military authorities estimating that around twenty-five people described as “Taromenani” had lost their lives in the massacre.
In the days that followed, news of the killings spread across Amazonian Ecuador; before long the news became a headline story in the national media. I soon found myself sitting in the homes of Waorani officials in Puyo, listening to their accounts of the killings between news reports on the television about “tribal violence” in the Amazon with chronological lists of past Waorani spear-killings. It was during one of these visits that a Waorani acquaintance showed me a necklace that had been taken from one of the bodies at the scene of the killings. It was made of a dozen or so palm fiber strings tied together to form a single, thick necklace. Around the moist and pungent-smelling strings were many small pieces of colorful plastic, rubber, and aluminum strung up as beads. Some of the beads were made from chopping up plastic tubing into small pieces, which were placed in alternating colors alongside bottle caps and peccary teeth. For me, this chilling object conveyed powerfully its owner’s social isolation from and material coexistence with the oil camps that surround many of the most remote parts of the Waorani reserve.
Sometime later, amid growing gossip and speculation about the attack, another Waorani man in Puyo invited me to his home to show me a video he recorded at the site of the massacre a few days after it occurred. He had joined a group of Waorani men from ONHAE and Ecuadorian soldiers on a trip in a military helicopter to investigate the scene. i sat with him, his wife, and two small children as we watched the footage of ONHAE representatives looking through the contents of a burnt longhouse that was ignited by the attackers during the struggle. it looked very much like a durani onko (traditional Waorani house) in size and shape, and the blowgun and spears recovered from the scene appeared similar to those used by Waorani. Keenly interested in these objects, my host pulled down from his wall a blowgun he found at the scene, comparing its likeness and specific differences to one made by his uncle.4
The video then focused on the bodies of several victims, which were riddled with spears. My host explained to me that the men at the scene were fearful, knowing that survivors could be hiding nearby, waiting to take revenge. He and his wife then explained to me the further danger that any contact with blood spilled in killings can cause sickness, as touching the blood of a person who is killed causes wounds to form on the surface of the skin. The man was concerned that his trip to the site of the attack might affect his infant son and other members of his household. in order to prevent becoming sick from contact with the blood, he explained, he would need to be whipped with a vine by an elder—and preferably someone who has killed in the past.
The man who recorded the video was one of many Waorani who expressed deep concern about the killings and curiosity about the victims. Both in Puyo and upon my return to Waorani villages, i heard varied accounts of the attack from Waorani people. in the months that followed, much of the gossip, conversation, and reflections on the past that i heard around the cooking hearth in the evenings turned specifically to this event. Some explained that nine men from Waorani villages to the east carried out the attack, shooting scores of victims with rifles supplied by mestizo loggers operating along the Tiguino River. Others explained the attack as an act of revenge for killings carried out by uncontacted people decades earlier. Some described how the killers decapitated their victims after spearing them, placing their heads on the ends of spears left protruding from the ground.
Now, a decade later, the series of events that preceded the attack have become somewhat clearer, as have some of the motives of the killers. The 2003 massacre and more recent killings have become a telling example of how so-called uncontacted groups are caught between processes of aggressive economic development, the indigenous rights movement, and frontier policies in present-day Amazonia. Establishing an accurate picture of what happened is important for addressing the current situation of these marginal groups and defending their human rights in the face of increasing threats to their very existence (Cabodevilla 2004a). Useful as this knowledge may be for preventing violent encounters between uncon-tacted people and their neighbors in the future, it is equally important to explore what these groups living in voluntary isolation mean to Waorani people with whom they share a territorial reserve and certain aspects of social organization and material culture.


Waorani, Tagaeri, Taromenani
Most of the total Waorani population—around 2,500 people—live on an officially recognized ethnic reserve between the Napo and Curaray rivers, an area covering more than one million acres in Amazonian Ecuador. Prior to their conflicts with oil companies in recent years, Waorani people were best known in Ecuador for their isolation and violent resistance to sustained contact without outsiders.5 Elders describe how, in previous times, they avoided contact with non-Waorani people, whom they call kowori, because they feared them to be violent cannibals. Waorani relations with kowori have since transformed in significant ways after the establishment of an Evangelical mission, decades of oil development, state schools, and sustained contact with other Ecuadorians. While in the period prior to mission settlement most Waorani lived in relatively isolated clusters of longhouses, today most live in the roughly forty semipermanent villages that spread across disparate parts of the reserve. One of the largest and most politically significant of these villages is Tonampari, one of the main sites of my fieldwork.
In Tonampari, one of the central concerns after the 2003 killings was the question of who the victims actually were. Waorani generally describe uncontacted people within their territory as Tagaeri—referring to the legendary group of Tagae, who fled into isolation many years ago when most Waorani came to live at the missionary settlements. They became famous in the region for their mobility and resistance to contact with Waorani villages, missionaries, oil workers, and other outsiders.6 Although “Tagaeri” is a general term for people described locally as uncivilized or durani bai (“like the ancient ones”), most Waorani are familiar with the specific story of Tagae and, in some cases, their kin relation to him or members of his following. While the Tagaeri have a prominent place in social memory, most Waorani say that Tagae himself was killed years ago and that few if any members of his original group survive today. Despite their reputation for hostility toward kowori and Waorani villages, my hosts identify the Tagaeri and their descendants unambiguously as Waorani people.
In the aftermath of the 2003 killings, many Waorani referred to the victims as Taromenani, a group they described as distinct but similar to the Tagaeri. They live in the central and eastern part of the Waorani reserve, in an area that was designated by Ecuadorian law in 1999 as the Tagaeri Untouchable Zone.7 Extending north from middle course of the Curaray River, the Untouchable Zone was intended to offer a degree of protection to the Tagaeri and other uncontacted groups whose lands have been encroached upon by oil development and illegal logging in recent years. While Tonampari and other Waorani villages near the headwaters of the Curaray River are located several days walk to the west of the Untouchable Zone, many Waorani to the north and east live in much closer proximity to this reserve within a reserve. The village of Tiguino, for example, is connected to the city of Coca by an old oil road (the “Via Auca”) that has become a major conduit for the colonization of Waorani lands by mestizos and the trade in hardwoods extracted illegally from the reserve. It was from this frontier village that the men involved in the 2003 massacre began their journey downriver to attack the Taromenani.
While ecological factors were a consideration in creating the Untouchable Zone, the reserve was established for the benefit of people in voluntary isolation who may in fact not be aware of its precise existence. Despite the official reserve, uncontacted indigenous groups continue to live in the path of extractive industries with few state controls. As with the Tagaeri in previous decades, who were repeatedly involved in violent clashes with outsiders and other Waorani, there were concerns well before 2003 about the Taromenani and their violent encounters with loggers, oil camps, and Waorani. In the year prior to the 2003 attack, my hosts described other encounters in which loggers and uncontacted people were killed.
But who exactly are these Taromenani people? In the weeks following the attack I heard dozens of explanations, many from Waorani who disagreed about whether or not the Taromenani victims were indeed Waorani people. Although some suggested that the Taromenani are the survivors of the original Tagaeri group, their actual identity appeared to be somewhat of a mystery. Some people insisted that they speak the Waorani language (Wao-terero), while others claimed that they do not and are from a completely different indigenous group. Several insisted that they are tall, have whitish skin “like gringos,” and come from far away in Peru to the east. Despite the disagreements and uncertainties, everyone attributed great strength and speed to these forest-dwelling people, much as they do to the Tagaeri and their ancestors.8


Lost people and intimate others
There is no denying that anthropologists working in Amazonia and elsewhere have at times been seduced by an image of indigenous people living in isolation from other societies, the reach of nation-states, or the effects of Western culture. Napoleon Chagnon’s (1988) claim that his study of Yanomami warfare in the 1960s revealed a state of human nature uncorrupted by Western contact is a famous example of this tendency—one that has been widely refuted by other anthropologists (Albert 1989; Ferguson 1999). While anthropologists and historians have done much to counter this image, the idea that certain “lost tribes” live in a state of “primitive” isolation from outside influences remains a powerful popular media representation of indigenous people. Rarely does a year pass without a major news story about aerial sightings of an uncontacted Amazonian tribe or a dangerous encounter with people assumed to be living as if in the Stone Age.
While the myth of lost tribes presents indigenous populations as living in a “natural” state of isolation, the situation of specific uncontacted groups is invariably at least in part a result of political and economic processes that extend beyond the local (Kirsch 1997: 64). In many cases, as with the groups living in voluntary isolation within the Untouchable Zone, this isolation appears to be, above all, an active refusal to engage in unequal or undesirable relations with powerful outsiders. In this sense, they are indicative of a much wider historical process of intercultural relations in Amazonia. As Stuart Kirsch suggests, “The lost tribes of the Amazon are the product of centuries of colonial relations. Their discovery is made possible by virtue of their long history of retreat and resistance; their isolation is a social creation rather than a natural condition” (1997: 62). Even if much about uncon-tacted people living in the Waorani reserve remains a mystery, it is clear that the changing social, political, and economic landscape of Amazonian Ecuador contributed to their relative isolation, whether in the form of missionization, oil development, or the more general condition of frontier violence and displacement that indigenous Amazonian people have suffered for centuries. By ignoring the historical power relations from which uncontacted groups continue to emerge, the myth of lost tribes implicitly absolves Western society from responsibility for the often precarious situation of these groups (Lutz and Collins 1993: 214–15; Kirsch 1997: 59). Rather than reproducing the myth that uncontacted or “lost” tribes constitute a state of pristine nature, my aim is to illuminate how these transformative processes effect and become part of indigenous formulations of violence, alterity, and kinship.
In the contemporary world, the image of naturally isolated tribes is not merely an object of media fascination but also part of legal discussions of culture and rights on a global stage. In what Lucas Bessire (2012) describes as the contemporary politics of isolation, indigenous people living in voluntary isolation have come to be valued as the most “pure” form of multiculturalism. The politico-legal category of isolation, Bessire observes, “presumes that social relation itself is a line of exclusion cutting through the category of culture. It thus parses indigenous kinds of life into opposing regimes of authenticity based on a degree of associative relations, which are then set against one another and vertically ranked by politics” (2012: 470).
Isolation, construed as a natural state rather than a product of social relations, has become an important feature of indigenous rights campaigns. Whether in the adoption of new national laws in Ecuador or in the UN Human Rights Council’s Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and in Initial Contact (2009), “non-relational life” has come to be seen as the ultimate expression of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination (Bessire 2012: 477). The paradox of this notion of isolation-as-right, Bessire notes, is that it “presupposes a legal subject that must remain outside the law itself” whereby “segregation is the only possible form of solidarity with isolated subjects” (2012: 47780).
While this politics of isolation has deep roots in Western imaginings of indigenous peoples in places like Amazonia, Waorani understandings of uncon-tacted people suggest an alternative to our own insistence on social and ontological boundaries defined ultimately by segregation and unified collectivities. Rather than focusing on the age-old process of social “othering” by which indigenous Amazonian people have become the object of Western fascination, or the contemporary politics of indigenous identity in Amazonia, my interest is in how Waorani themselves imagine and engage in relations with their own others. The act of defining a certain person or group as “other” to oneself is not simply a statement about difference but also a boundary through which people posit and engage in relations of unity and closeness (Stasch 2009). As Stasch suggests, rather than assume other people in other places engage in these processes in ways that parallel the contemporary politics of isolation, we should be open to alternate ways of conceptualizing and organizing relations of alterity.
While anthropologists have challenged popular stereotypes about lost or uncontacted people, rarely do we stop to consider seriously what indigenous people like the Waorani have to say about their neighbors who live in voluntary isolation. This may be the result of our general reluctance to engage at all with the idea of uncontacted peoples after the self-conscious purging of the concept of isolated, primitive societies from anthropology.9 While anthropologists were surely right to shed this image, approaching the position of seemingly enigmatic groups like the Taromenani in terms of Amazonian formulations of alterity can open up new ways of thinking about how and why indigenous Amazonian people respond to key contemporary events in the ways they do.
The 2003 attack and its aftermath reveal the multiple ways that Waorani people conceptualize, cultivate, and in some contexts violently demand relations with their uncontacted neighbors. For many Waorani, the Taromenani are an object of social othering at the same time as they present, at least for some, an ideal source of potential relations. As Stasch observes in Melanesia, the very qualities of otherness are in some contexts a focus of social connection, such that social bonds are a synthesis of otherness and intimacy that “exist[s] through concrete channels of communicative contact and separateness” (2009: 16). In Waorani accounts of uncontacted people, however, this process of living separately and cultivating or imagining proximity involves very little in the way of communication. Whether in describing the Taromenani as long lost kin or taking revenge on them for previous killings, the kind of alterity that Waorani people find in the Taromenani is one that diverges significantly from the paradigm of nonrelational life promoted in indigenous rights advocacy.
As my hosts lamented the deaths of people they described as their potential kin, it became clear that the 2003 killings contributed to a growing sense of closeness to the Taromenani. In a cultural context where people define themselves collectively as “prey” to violence (Rival 1999), the attacks were a catalyst for Waorani to imagine what they share in common with their uncontacted neighbors. For Waorani people being a victim of violence presents a contrast to the aggression associated with rival groups and kowori people. Laura Rival describes how, for Waorani people, killing creates otherness, both in terms of the killer’s anger transforming him from kin (guirinani) to nonkin (warani) and in precipitating future revenge killings (Rival 2002: 64). After the Taromenani attack, however, my hosts were more concerned with asserting their identification with the survivors based on a shared position as kin of victims rather than mounting a raid against the men they denounced for the killings.10
Waorani commentaries about Taromenani people after the attack allow for rethinking what has come to be known as the “moral economy of intimacy” in studies of Amazonian kinship and sociality (Viveiros de Castro 1996: 189). Ethnographies of this part of the world evoke numerous examples of how kinship is conceived as an effect of shared experience, where everyday conviviality forms bodies and makes transpersonal unities out of others.11 In certain ways Amazonian concepts of consanguinity and affinity present a radical alternative to notions of biological relatedness in Western kinship ideologies. As consanguinity in Amazonia is often understood to be the result of human action or intention—rather than procreation—kinship is constituted more by memory than it is by genealogical descent, that is, “as a set of relations between living people which are actively produced in time” (Gow 1991: 288).12 Waorani understandings of marriage, procreation, and the effects of living together evoke a sense of relatedness that is “made” through shared experience. As Rival notes, Waorani who live in the same longhouse become “of the same flesh”: “The physical reality of living together, that is, of continually feeding each other, eating the same food and sleeping together, develops into a common physicality, which is far more real than genealogical ties”
This emphasis on consubstantiality and conviviality as the basis of relatedness can be seen in Waorani couvade practices, in which a husband becomes “one flesh” with his wife and newborn by sharing specific dietary restrictions for an extended period before and after childbirth (Rival 1998: 622). A similar logic emerges when a household member falls ill—such as in cases of snakebite—when coresidents are expected to conform to taboos on eating most game meat. Wao-rani explain that failing to observe these restrictions collectively results in the wound growing more severe, bleeding profusely, or rotting (High 2006: 161). Whether it is through consuming the same things collectively or avoiding them, the notion that “the repeated and undifferentiated action of sharing … turns co-residents in a single, indistinct substance” (Rival: 1998: 621) has come to define the kinds of mutuality and well-being associated with the “moral economy of intimacy” in Amazonia.
In this way kinship—or more specifically consanguinity—is “made” out of an encompassing background of “potential affines” (Viveiros de Castro 2001). As a dominant relational principle in much of Amazonia, affinity is a generic or “given” potentiality often attributed to enemies and wide range of others who, as potential affines, constitute a source of what Eduardo Viveiros de Castro calls “virtual sociality” (2001: 24). The distinction between affinity (as virtuality) and kinship (as actualization) can be seen in how Waorani men address their male kowori coworkers in oil camps by the term menki (“brother-in-law” or “cross-cousin”), while in actual marriages a Waorani man is understood to be an outsider who gradually comes to share the same substance as his affines by living with them and sharing dietary restrictions with his wife before and after the birth of their child (see Rival 1992, 1998).
Waorani concepts of consanguinity and affinity not only challenge Western assumptions about the biological basis of kinship but also illustrate the need to sidestep the traditional dichotomy between the “biological” and “social” (Carsten 2013: 249). My hosts’ descriptions of uncontacted people as their kin after the 2003 killings resonate with Sahlins’ approach to kinship as “a manifold of intersubjective participations, founded on mutualities of being” (2011a: 12). Drawing on Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics and a range of other theorists, Sahlins views kinship in terms of the “larger meanings of mutual belonging” by which people come to sense “the same entity in discrete subjects” (2011a: 10). Challenging the traditional focus on procreation in anthropological discussions of kinship, he notes that mutuality of being “encompasses and goes beyond the notions of common substance, however such consubstantiality is locally defined and established” (2011a: 14).
The comments I heard from Waorani people in response to the 2003 killings insisted on a certain mutuality of being that has little or no reference to shared substance or the conviviality often emphasized in studies of kinship and sociality in Amazonia. Rather than positing kinship only in terms of local commensality and physical closeness, they expressed a sense of social proximity and mutuality at a spatial distance. For many Waorani, the Taromenani are their kin not because they live together or even know each other in person, but because, to use Sahlins’ phrasing, they envision themselves as people who “live each other’s lives and die each other’s deaths” (2011a: 14). It was precisely the 2003 attack and the status of the Taromenani as victims of violence that contributed to this expression of mutuality between themselves and their uncontacted neighbors. While Sahlins describes mutuality as a fundamentally human sentiment of belonging shared between people who are “co-present in each other” (2011a: 11), after the attack many Waorani expressed a similar sentiment in contemplating unknown others as their kin.
While Waorani understandings of uncontacted people demonstrate how mutual belonging can be imagined at a distance, the qualities of mutuality proposed by Sahlins, such as people seeing one another as “members of one another” or as being “joined and interdependent,” are not restricted to kinship (Bloch 2013). Nor is this mutuality always desirable to people who experience it. While Sahlins and other theorists of kinship tend to focus on the positive aspects of mutual belonging, Janet Carsten (2013: 247) reminds us that kinship also has a “coercive edge,” involving relations of differentiation, hierarchy, and abuse that people often experience as negative qualities of mutual being. This “darker” side of kinship suggests certain connections between kinship and magic (Leach 1961; Viveiros de Castro 2009), both of which can act or be imagined at a distance. Drawing on Edmund Leach’s (1961) suggestion that malicious relationships such as witchcraft can also be conceptualized as a form of mutuality of being, Giovanni da Col (2012: 13) describes witchcraft as a kind of “perverted commensality” or “uncontrolled related-ness” in which “the witch devours the vital force of neighbors and kin.” It appears then that mutuality of being is at once much more and less than the actualization of kinship.


A political economy of revenge
Both in the national media and in indigenous communities, there was much controversy and intrigue about what caused the unprecedented scale of violence in 2003. It has become increasingly clear, however, that indigenous cosmology and the changing face of economic development in Amazonia both had their part in the killings. The area around the village of Tiguino, where the killers assembled before the attack, has long since been a zone of frontier violence and tension between Waorani, oil companies, and colonists (Cabodevilla 2004b: 27). In the early 2000s, these tensions were exacerbated by an influx of illegal loggers who used the old oil road between Tiguino and the frontier city of Coca to extract timber from Waorani lands. This is the same road built in the 1960s to open the area up to oil development, which ultimately resulted in the loss of a significant part of Waorani ancestral lands to colonization, deforestation, and industrial pollution.13 By 2003 one of the men who led the raid was a local gatekeeper between the loggers and the village of Tiguino, receiving payment for allowing timber extraction downriver in the direction of the Untouchable Zone and the Yasuni National Park (Cabodevilla 2004a: 19–21).14 According to many Waorani, the loggers, who sought to eliminate uncontacted groups from an area they routinely exploited for timber, provided rifles, ammunition, and payment to the killers in compensation for carrying out the attack. While it is difficult to establish whether or not logging interests were directly involved in the 2003 massacre, it is clear that past and present extractive economies have contributed in a major way to the tensions that persist in the area.
According to the accounts of my Waorani hosts after the attack, the external influences of money, guns, and frontier development in Amazonia were only part of the story behind the Taromenani massacre. Even as many Waorani lamented the killings, their accounts also addressed the logic that motivated the killers. They explained that the attack was carried out according to indigenous understandings of revenge, whereby the death of a kinsman should be avenged, even if decades after the initial killing. Lingering memories of absent kin evoke grief, anger, and in some cases retaliation against not only specific people but also a killer’s entire household. Several Waorani explained that the 2003 killings were intended to avenge the death of Carlos Omene, a Waorani man who was killed by Tagaeri in 1993. Omene was speared on an excursion into the Untouchable Zone, where he and other men from Tiguino intended to return a young Tagaeri woman previously captured by Waorani.15 The fact that several of the men who carried out the 2003 killings were close kin of Omene indicates that the violence in 2003 was part of a series of confrontations that extends decades into the past. Memories of violence are called upon to justify and motivate further violence in addition to evoking a sense of collective victimhood. Miguel Angel Cabodevilla reports, for example, that prior to the attack Omene’s widow tearfully recounted her husband’s death at the hands of the Tagaeri, reminding the men in Tiguino that his death ten years before still had not been avenged (2004a: 23).
Much debate remains about several details of the actual attack, especially as this event has rapidly become part of both Waorani oral history and media intrigue in Ecuador. What we do know is that none of the killers were arrested or prosecuted by the Ecuadorian authorities. One question raised by Waorani and outside commentators alike is the extent to which guns were used in the attack. In their interviews soon after the massacre, some of the killers insisted that they only fired their guns initially to frighten the Taromenani upon entering the dark longhouse, which they set ablaze before chasing and spearing their victims outside.16 While it is difficult to confirm or deny many of the details reported by the killers and other Waorani, it appears that guns, spears, and machetes were used extensively. Regardless of these details, the dramatic economic changes of recent decades are only part of story of how and why the Taromenani massacre occurred.


Kin as victims
Given the enthusiastic use of radio communication between even the most remote Waorani villages, news of Taromenani killings quickly became a heated topic of conversation and speculation. From the beginning there was a great deal of debate surrounding the motives of the killers and the actual identity of the victim group. After hearing people in Toñampari lament and criticize past killings in their oral histories, I was not completely surprised to hear them denounce the May 2003 attack. What did surprise me was how upset and concerned they were about the fate of a reportedly hostile group living far away and in isolation from their own homes and lives. Their accounts illustrate how, for many Waorani, the killings led to a sense of shared experience with the victim group. Instead of attempting to elucidate a complete or objectively true account of what happened, I am concerned here with the particular discourses that emerged in the aftermath of the attack and what they reveal about Waorani perspectives on intergroup violence.
Although nobody in the villages where I carried out long-term fieldwork participated in the killings, this event and the fate of the victims loomed large in the following months. some people were concerned that the surviving Taromenani would soon take revenge on Waorani villages. However, the most pressing concern was the possibility that some of the deceased may have been distant kin. Despite the debate about who the victims were, some Waorani speculated about cousins and other relatives who may have been living among the Taromenani. They explained that, although the Tagaeri fled into voluntary isolation from Waorani settlements many years ago, some members could still be alive, having been incorporated into the mysterious Taromenani after years of intergroup violence. some even spoke of local elders weeping over the massacre of specific Tagaeri relatives. They described the Taromenani as innocent victims who, despite their reputation for hostility and isolation, were actually hoping to settle among Waorani neighbors like themselves. Much like the stories Waorani tell about their ancestors being killed, they positioned the Taromenani as targets of unjustified violence.
People in Toñampari generally described the killings in morally charged terms, referring to them as ononki (unjustified, mistaken) and the killers themselves as wene (bad, evil). They lamented that most of the victims were women and children, which for local people added to the deplorable nature of the violence.17 Many adults objected to the 2003 massacre in much the same way that they talk about killings that occurred in the distant past. Despite the different versions and details of the attack that were circulating at the time, most people could list most or all of the men who participated.18 Alongside accounts of how loggers supported the attack and descriptions of the specific methods used in the attack, some told of the dialogue between the killers and their victims and stories of children being abducted from the scene. Nearly all of the accounts that I collected in the months following the attack, however, deeply sympathized with the plight of the Taromenani.
I heard one of these accounts from Wakewe,19 a man who described the attack to me a few days after it happened. He explained how his uncle, a well-known elder, was one of the men who led the raid. According to Wakewe, after a journey by canoe downriver followed by a long trek through the forest, his uncle was the one who began shooting upon entering the dark interior of the Taromenani longhouse. While some of the unsuspecting victims managed to escape from the house, others pleaded with the attackers not to kill them, insisting that they wanted to live together with Waorani people in Tiguino. Since other people had told me that the Taromenani did not speak the Waorani language, I asked Wakewe about how the victims communicated with their killers. He assured me that at least some of them do speak Wao-terero, albeit in a different way, and that during the attack these individuals communicated a desire to end their isolation. This desire for closer relations with Waorani neighbors appeared to be the very basis of Wake-we’s frustration with his uncle and the other killers. He explained, in much the same way that Waorani elders describe their own history of missionary settlement, that the Taromenani wanted to become “civilized.” He also described how one of the men who participated in the attack tried to prevent the others from firing their guns on the Taromenani. Wakewe, who has many relatives who live near the Tagaeri Untouchable Zone, predicted that the survivors would go into hiding before eventually seeking revenge by attacking Waorani villages.
Wakewe was not alone in seeing the attack as a missed opportunity to bring the Taromenani into peaceful contact with Waorani villages. Kowe, another elder, expressed a similar concern about possible revenge killings. As he lamented the attack, he referred to his own specific kinship links with the Tagaeri at the point when Tagae and his followers became isolated from other Waorani decades ago. Kowe explained that Tagae himself was his cousin and listed the names of other Waorani who may have living relatives among the Taromenani. Despite the dangers associated with these uncontacted people, Kowe spoke of them with respect and admiration. He described them as physically superior to what he called “civilized” Waorani, emphasizing their strength, speed, and stamina in moving through the forest and their ability to throw spears at amazing lengths. What stood out most strongly in my discussions with Kowe after the attack was his keen interest in establishing social ties with the isolated group. He even spoke of his desire to travel personally to the Untouchable Zone with other elders to attempt to bring them into the realm of “civilization.”
Both of these men not only denounced the attack but also raised the possibility of (re)establishing social ties with the uncontacted group. For Wakewe, this was on the basis that the Taromenani actually wanted to live among “civilized” people like himself. Kowe too expressed a desire to incorporate the Taromenani into his own social world and even asserted his kinship relations to members of the Tagaeri who may or may not still be alive. Whereas the men who participated in the attack apparently intended to eliminate as many Taromenani as possible, most of my Waorani hosts were more interested in them as a source of past or future relations.
This emphasis on expanding the possibilities for intergroup sociality and engaging in relations with dangerous or unknown outsiders is a common theme of discussion in Waorani communities that often emerges in accounts of missionary settlement in the 1960s. Many Waorani envision themselves today living in a period of growth and expansion in terms of territory, population, and the making of social ties beyond local households and villages, despite the central place of violence that persists in social memory across genders and generations. Recognizing the 2003 attack as a potential threat to this period of relative peace, they denounced what they saw as the dangerous consequences of the massacre. Above all, they remembered their social links with the Tagaeri much more after the attack than they had before.
These responses to the Taromenani attack point to how violence creates new ways of conceptualizing relations and relatedness between Waorani and their many others. Such an emphasis on social closeness to victims and their kin is also extended to kowori people who were killed in the past. For example, the two principal North American missionaries who established the Evangelical mission settlement among the Waorani in the 1960s were the widow and sister of a missionary killed by Waorani in 1956. It appears likely that Waorani people accepted the missionaries in part because they understood them to be, like themselves, the close kin of victims previously killed by Waorani (High 2009b). Even as any interpretation of this historical encounter is necessarily conjectural, elders today remember the early missionaries in much the same way that they define themselves: as kin of victims.
Waorani people describe in a similar light some of the Catholic missionaries who have worked in the eastern part of the Waorani territory since around 1965. In 1987 the Spanish priest Alejandro Labaka and a nun (Ines Arango) who accompanied him were killed in an attempt to make contact with a Tagaeri group. They were speared soon after they were dropped by helicopter near an isolated longhouse in what is today the Untouchable Zone. At the time Labaka was hoping to negotiate a truce between uncontacted groups and oil companies after the expansion of oil exploration on Waorani lands had already led to violent confrontations between Tagaeri and oil workers. Labaka’s death has become part of Wao-rani lore, in which the priest is presented as an archetypical victim of violence. Fondly remembered by many Waorani today, Labaka is described in much the same way as kinsmen killed by enemies in past spear-killing raids.
While Labaka, like other missionaries, preached against violence, it appears that some Waorani were intent on avenging his death at the hands of an uncon-tacted group more than fifteen years after he was killed. His status as kin to many Waorani appears to have had at least some bearing on the attack on the 2003 killings. One of the killers who arrived at the Catholic mission in the town of Coca soon after the attack announced that he and his group had avenged the death of both Carlos Omene and Labaka (Cabodevilla 2004c: 62). Without exaggerating the influence Labaka’s death had in the subsequent Taromenani massacre, examples like these illustrate how relations with missionaries and other intimate kowori are interwoven with Waorani revenge killings as much as they are with kinship. They suggest that it is not only the external political and economic forces of oil development and illegal logging that produce local forms of violence but also intercultural relations that have become part of the most intimate aspects of Waorani memory and experience.


Cultivating contact
My hosts’ frequent reiteration of the Taromenani as a source of past or potential relations, whether in remembering kin in the past or desiring contact with them in the future, presents a contrast to Western ideas about “lost” or uncontacted people. For many Waorani, isolation is as much about questions of kinship as it is about politics. Just as they insist on the social closeness they see in uncontacted people, outsiders tend to define and value these groups essentially in terms of segregation and the assumed cultural “purity” that isolation confers upon them in Western imagination. And yet, Waorani claims to mutuality with the Taromenani do not necessarily entail a sense of shared substance or even physical presence. As Sahlins notes in his proposal for a sociocentric perspective on kinship,

“being” in a kinship sense denies the necessary independence of the entities so related, as well as the necessary substantiality and physicality of the relationship…. If kinsmen are members of one another, then in the manner and to the extent that they are so, experience is diffused among them. Not in the sense of direct sensation … but at the level of meaning: of what it is that happens, which is the human and discursive mode of experience, and as such capable of communicating the appropriate feelings and consequences to others. More or less solidary in their being, kinsmen accordingly know each other’s doings and sufferings as their own. (2011b: 227–31)

I do not know if the Taromenani share this sense of kinship with their Waorani neighbors in the way some of my hosts claim, but this is beside the point. It is clear, however, that many Waorani embraced a certain sense of mutuality with uncontacted people as they came to see their “doings and sufferings as their own.” Despite the physical distance that separates them, many Waorani came to see the Taromenani as victims of violence, or more specifically, people who died their own deaths and today live their own lives as kin of victims. Both in this vision of mutual victimhood and in the killers’ logic of revenge, death can be seen to rearrange relations among the living in important ways (Lambek 2011). This rearrangement is intense and potentially far-reaching in cases of violent death, which has been described in Amazonia to both produce and dissolve relations.20
While Waorani ideas about uncontacted people appear to sit well with Sahlins’ project of decoupling kinship from questions of biology, substance, and procreation, they also reveal something of the temporal dimensions of mutuality. Carsten, noting that Sahlins’ focus on mutuality of being prioritizes the positive qualities of kinship over its negative and coercive qualities, describes how mutual belonging also “accumulates or dissolves over time” (2013: 247). This temporality refers not just to how people and relations are part of a remembered past, but also, as we see with Waorani comments on the Taromenani, how they imagine potential kinship futures that “remain unknowable” (Carsten 2013: 248). While it remains to be seen whether my hosts will someday actualize the kinship they see in uncon-tacted people, their status as victims of violence appears to present an opening to a potential future. As Maurice Bloch reminds us, drawing on Rita Astuti (2009), the explicit statements people make about kinship are best understood “not as ontological proposals for what is, but rather as declarations of what should be” (Bloch 2013: 255).
Even as Waorani have come to understand the Taromenani in terms of their own concepts of kinship, alterity, and revenge, the politics of isolation described by Bessire (2012), like the politics of indigeneity more generally, has important implications for Amazonian peoples regardless of their degree of integration within national societies. Like Waorani youth who wield spears at frontier folklore festivals or Kayapo elders who draw international media attention from their lip-plugs and colorful body decoration at protests in Brazil, isolation is a potent marker of cultural authenticity in the modern world. In some cases indigenous people draw effectively on this trope in their engagements with nonindigenous people. Those who fail to live up to these expectations of autonomy and authenticity risk being accused of “losing their culture” and, as a result, having their rights claims ignored in national and global political arenas (Conklin 1997).
At the same time, indigenous Amazonian perspectives on uncontacted people tend to be more complex than the Western fantasy of “lost tribes.” Whereas most outsiders view “contact” with isolated groups as necessarily degrading a pure or natural state of being, many Waorani view the isolation of the Taromenani as a tragic and dangerous situation that should be overcome. Their stories about past spear-killings describe a time when Waorani groups lived in relative isolation in distant parts of the forest, a time when confusion and fear made visits and marriage alliances between families extremely difficult. In these stories, it is not the past in general that elders lament but more specifically the sense of fear, loss, and social isolation associated with past revenge killings. While a strongly egalitarian ethos leaves considerable scope for individual and household autonomy (Rival 1996; High 2007), there is also a sense that being alone for too long can be dangerous and should generally be avoided. The association between isolation and potential violence can be seen in how Waorani people express, on the one hand, the importance of living in villages, while on the other insist on their ability to abandon villages in times of conflict. In a similar way, they embrace the Taromenani as exemplars of Waorani autonomy and strength, while at the same time recognize their isolation as a dangerous condition.
It was this concern about the dangers of isolation that my hosts in Tonampari appeared to be voicing after the attack when they identified the Taromenani as potential kin and called for their civilization and incorporation into Waorani communities. For Waorani who live much closer to the Untouchable Zone, this at least partial identification with the Taromenani can be seen as both an act of self-protection and of cultivating contact. since the attack in 2003, some Waorani have built traditional longhouses (durani onko) for the first time in decades so that Taromenani in the area might recognize them as Waorani and not outsiders. The majority of Waorani houses today are similar to those throughout much of rural Amazonian Ecuador, consisting of a basic square construction of machined hardwood planks raised above the ground, with a thatch or corrugated sheet metal roof. A traditional longhouse, in contrast, can be distinguished clearly by its long, bending roofline that extends unbroken from the ground up to the apex of an Aframe structure, which is almost entirely covered with interwoven palm leaves on all sides. These longhouses, which were the mainstay of large extended families prior to the mission, are very similar in appearance to those of the Taromenani discovered at the site of the 2003 massacre and to those seen in aerial photographs of groups living in the Untouchable Zone.
While uncontacted people are widely thought to be hostile to contact with outsiders, including Waorani, some of my hosts describe how the Taromenani are able to distinguish between Waorani houses and those of nonindigenous people. One young man explained that his relatives replaced their previous kowori-style house with a traditional longhouse to deter potential attacks by Taromenani. In his view, the widespread use of Western construction materials and clothing risk making Waorani indistinguishable in appearance from kowori, leading Taromen-ani to think he and his neighbors are in fact kowori. A similar concern about mis-recognition emerged in discussions of hunting, whereby some men began hunting without clothes so that the Taromenani who see them in the forest would not mistake them for kowori colonists or loggers. In recent years Waorani have reported fleeting encounters with uncontacted people while hunting or traveling through remote parts of the reserve. Some of them describe Taromenani visiting Waorani gardens to gather food or even seeking shelter in abandoned houses near a village. They also describe peaceful encounters prior to the 2003 attack, in which Taro-menani approached Waorani elders in remote areas and explained their tentative desire to live among the Waorani. Regardless of what actually happened in these encounters, many Waorani emphasize the need to prevent revenge attacks and to make peaceful contact with the Taromenani possible.
Since the 2003 killings, the Taromenani have become an object not only of fear, but also of respect and fascination for many Waorani, particularly young people. One young man described to me how he wished to marry a Taromenani woman and join her group to live, as he described, “like the ancestors” (durani bai). While in certain intercultural contexts, Waorani reproduce colonial fantasies about “wild” Amazonian warriors (High 2010), their response to the 2003 killings and their comments on the Taromenani also challenge popular ideas of what it means to be uncontacted. For many Waorani, these are not “naturally” isolated people, but instead long-lost relatives, potential spouses, and a powerful symbol of ancestral power, autonomy, and violence in the face of colonization.
In Amazonia and elsewhere, anthropologists have described how and why indigenous people have sought to establish contact with white people and other outsiders at specific historical moments. In some cases, such as that of the Wari described by Aparecida Vilaca (2010) in Brazil, these encounters presented opportunities to make or renew relations within indigenous societies. Despite the proliferation of writing on alterity among anthropologists, few consider indigenous perspectives on encounters with so-called uncontacted people.21 One exception is Fred Myers’ (1988) description of how, in the context of a headline story about the discovery of a lost tribe in Australia in 1984, his aboriginal Pintupi interlocutors insisted that their newly contacted neighbors in the Western Desert were in fact “relatives” who were tragically “left behind” in previous times (614). Like my Waorani hosts today, they fundamentally challenged the nonrelational status often attributed to so-called uncontacted people. But more importantly, in both of these cases indigenous people can be seen to draw on such encounters to insist on their own cultural autonomy. For the Pintupi, the ability to define the event of “contact” on their own terms constituted a political stance against the intervention of white people and the government. At the same time, a global politics of isolation that presumes segregation to be the will of “isolated subjects” can render indigenous leaders “inaudible in the name of self-determination” when they seek interventions that would challenge segregation (Bessire 2012: 480–81).
After the 2003 killings, Waorani political leaders drew on a combination of this politics of isolation and popular media representations of tribal violence to deter state intervention. As the massacre came to be defined as an “indigenous issue,” the national media wasted little time in presenting it as the latest outbreak of Wao-rani violence, reminding the wider public of missionaries and oil workers killed by Waorani since the 1940s. Stories that circulated about the attackers using traditional spears rather than guns, and images of a severed head taken from a victim, only reaffirmed the “primitive” nature of the attack. So excited were journalists about the prospect of documenting apparently genuine tribal violence that some of the killers were offered trips to the Ecuadorian coast for interviewing and sightseeing (Cabodevilla 2004c: 62). Rather than being prosecuted for acts of murder, which some of the killers openly admitted to, they became an emblem of indigenous autonomy and exotic savagery, the “wild” auca warriors of colonial imagination (Salomon 1981; Taussig 1987; Whitten 1988). What appeared to be ignored in this articulation of the politics of isolation were the external causes of violence and isolation in Amazonia. Instead, the taking of a Taromenani head and the killers’ insistence that they used only spears asserted indigenous autonomy and appealed to popular imagery of indigenous violence.
The repercussions of this situation continue to be felt up to the present day in Waorani communities. As many predicted after the 2003 killings, the tensions between Taromenani and some Waorani have led to further violence. In March 2013, an elderly Waorani couple were attacked and killed in their home by an uncontacted group with whom they reportedly communicated on several occasions before the incident. It is widely reported that the couple were speared after failing to provide sufficient pots, machetes, and other goods demanded of them in previous encounters.22 Only weeks later, several Waorani from the surrounding area, heavily armed with guns, launched a revenge attack in which as many as thirty members of the uncontacted group were killed. Even as two young girls were abducted from the scene and continue to be held captive in a Waorani community, to my knowledge there has been little significant state intervention on behalf of the captives or their surviving relatives.23 The situation of these girls is emblematic of the precarious social place of uncontacted groups like the Taromenani in Ecuador, caught as they are between increasingly lethal frontier violence and the wider politics of isolation.
The recent killings have led to renewed tensions between Waorani families and communities, perhaps even more so than in the 2003 attack. The repeated statements of Waorani political leaders against state intervention mask what has become a potentially dangerous division between Waorani with regard to so-called uncontacted people. For some, the fact that the captive girls speak a recognizable form of the Waorani language, alongside their status as kin of victims, confirms their identity as long-lost kin. For others, they are members of an enemy group they seek to eliminate in avenging their own deceased kin. But even for the Wao-rani killers, vengeance is not the only kind of relationship at stake with people living in voluntary isolation. As in Waorani accounts of spear-killings in the distant past and more recent dealings with kowori, it appears that the recent killings and abductions were carried out with a view to incorporating certain “enemies” into their homes and everyday lives. This is to say that these uncontacted people may also be potential affines who, over time, may become familiar in the actualization of kinship.


Conclusion
Whether we consider the logic of revenge that appears to have motivated the killers or Waorani concerns about losing potential kin, the Taromenani massacre and subsequent revenge killings illustrate how violence at once creates and transcends boundaries between self and other, kin and enemy. A number of anthropologists have described how relations of enmity and revenge are an integral part of Amazonian symbolic economies, where personhood and the reproduction of society are often closely tied to ideas about killing and predation.24 Yet Waorani reactions to the recent killings also reveal how indigenous understandings of violence are closely related to wider political and economic processes that extend beyond relations within and between indigenous societies. However, rather than explaining violence as simply an effect of externally-driven power relations, whether colonial history or current development agendas in Amazonia, I have focused on how Waorani people make sense of these translocal processes according to their own concepts of how relations are constituted.
Their interpretations of the 2003 Taromenani attack point to how the revital-ization of so-called “tribal” violence in Amazonia cannot be simply explained as the result of either external forces or a preexisting traditional cosmological order. Rather than affirming, as a Western politics of isolation would have it, an artificial analytical divide between “traditional” forms of violence and “modern” processes, I suggest that these two seemingly distinct levels of analysis cannot in fact be separated. As Stasch (2009) argues, one of the key tasks of anthropology is not simply to examine how “people’s social lives are structured by non-local institutions and cultural influences,” but to study otherness “as an internal feature of local social relations and local social practices” (2009: 9). In this way, missionaries, oil companies, loggers, and anthropologists all—as others—emerge as part of a Waorani lived world, whether as dangerous enemies or as kin. After the transformations of recent decades, it should not be completely surprising that missionaries and Taromenani have become part of indigenous conceptualizations of this changing social world. For many Waorani certain kowori appear, like the Taromenani, not just dangerous but also familiar and close to themselves.
In describing how violent practices acquire specific cultural meanings within indigenous formulations of alterity, I have attempted to illuminate how people comprehend and challenge the dynamics of intergroup relations. One of the major obstacles missionaries faced in their attempts to make peaceful contact in the 1950s was that the Waorani feared kowori outsiders to be cannibals bent on devouring them. As most Waorani today are confident that this is not the case, the notion that real or potential kin are victims of violence has been extended to include those kowori with whom they appear to share this mutual position. Both the mysterious Taromenani and particular missionaries, who at one point were identified as dangerous others, have come to be seen as socially proximate to Wao-rani people, as people with whom they share a certain sense of mutuality. The act of killing an enemy, perhaps the ultimate act of crossing sociocosmological boundaries, produces new kinds of people and new relations. For Waorani people, however, it is being a victim that distinguishes internal sociality in contrast to the violence of others, even if people as close as kin are always at risk of becoming others through their grief and anger.


Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my Waorani friends and hosts for their generosity in opening their homes to me and for sharing their concerns and ideas about the Taromenani and the events discussed in this article. This article has also benefited from the questions and comments of colleagues in research seminars at the University of Edinburgh, St. Andrews, and Durham. In addition to the helpful suggestions of three anonymous reviewers of HAU, I thank Magnus Course, Jason Sumich, Maya Mayblin, and HAU’s editor Giovanni da Col for their useful suggestions on previous drafts.


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Perdus et trouvés. Contester l’isolement et cultiver le contact en Amazonie équatorienne
Résumé : En mai 2003, un groupe d’hommes waorani d’Amazonie équatorienne a mené une attaque contre leurs voisins Taromenani « non contactées », résultant en un massacre qui a alimenté les débats actuels sur les droits des peuples autochtones vivant dans « l’isolement volontaire ». Dans cet article, je considère comment la compréhension waorani de l’attaque relève de formulations autochtones de l’altérité qui contestent ce que Lucas Bessire (2012) a décrit comme des politiques de l’isolement contemporaines. Je m’appuie sur les récentes discussions de la parenté comme forme d’appartenance mutuelle qui s‘étend au-delà de la substance commune (Sahlins 2013), et examine comment, à la suite des massacres, beaucoup de Waorani en sont venus à considérer ceux dont ils sont spatialement distant comme des parents dont ils auraient été séparés dans le passé. Désormais perçus par les Waorani comme parents des victimes, les Taromenani sont devenus à la fois une source de relations souhaitées et une image puissante de la force indigène et de l’autonomie dans un contexte de transformation sociale et économique.
Casey HIGH is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Edinburgh. His research has focused on violence, memory, and relationships between indigenous cosmology and development in Amazonian Ecuador. He is coeditor of two edited collections, including The anthropology of ignorance: An ethnographic approach (2012) and How do we know?: Evidence, ethnography, and the making of anthropological knowledge (2008). His forthcoming monograph, Victims and warriors: Violence, history, and memory in Amazonia, will be published by the University of Illinois Press in the series Interpretations of culture in the newmillenium.
Casey HighSocial AnthropologySchool of Social and Political ScienceUniversity of Edinburgh15a George SquareEdinburgh, UK EH8 9LDC.High@ed.ac.uk


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1. I hope to make clear in this article that typical descriptions of the Taromenani and other indigenous groups as “uncontacted people” are misleading. Their relative isolation is in many ways the product of wider social, political, and economic processes involving other groups and the state, rather than a “natural” or primordial condition (Kirsch 1997). I use the terms “uncontacted” and “voluntary isolation” in reference to current discussions of the Taromenani in Ecuador, while at the same time critically analyzing the assumptions often built into these categories.
2. Recent examples of this emerging trend in Amazonianist anthropology include Albert and Ramos (2000); Bonilla (2005); Cepek (2008); High (2010); Vilaça (2002); and Kelly (2011).
3. The Organization of the Huaorani Organization of Amazonian Ecuador (ONHAE) has since been replaced by a similar organization called NAWE, which stands for the Waorani Nationality of Ecuador.
4. See Cabodevilla (2004a) for a comparison between the objects recovered from the scene of the 2003 attack and Waorani material culture. In addition to the spears, blowpipes, and other traditional items, a number of steel axes, machetes, and other manufactured goods were discovered at the scene, indicating clearly that the group’s relative isolation should not be mistaken for ignorance of foreign people and technology.
5. Their reputation for violence and resistance to contact with outsiders grew considerably in 1956 when Waorani killed five North American Evangelical missionaries.
6. See Cabodevilla (1999) for a detailed history of how the Tagaeri became isolated from other Waorani.
7. Ecuador’s Executive Decree 552 was signed by President Jamil Mahuad in 1999, and the reserve was later renamed the Tagaeri-Taromenani Untouchable Zone (Zona Intangible Tagaeri-Taromenani). The official boundaries of the Untouchable Zone were only finalized in 2007, in part as a result of the 2003 killings (Rival 2010: 6).
8. Rival (1996) also describes the mythical qualities Waorani attribute to the Taromenani, whether as contemporary neighbors or legendary people of the past. See Gow (1993) for further discussion of this theme in western Amazonia.
9. See Bessire (2012: 468) for a more comprehensive review of how so-called “uncontacted” or “primitive” societies have ceased to be a relevant object of anthropological study.
10. It is important to recognize that Waorani assertions of victimhood are also evoked to legitimate future revenge killings. As Robarchek and Robarchek (1998, 2005) have noted, the notion of lost autonomy and victimhood are often the very basis of “rage” among the Waorani.
11. While we should be careful not to ignore certain aspects of relatedness that are in part determined by birth and descent (Lepri 2005) there is a noticeable emphasis on the processual or performative character of Amazonian kinship. See, for example, Gow (1991), Overing and Passes (2000), McCallum (2001), and Vilaça (2002).
12. Taylor (1993, 1996), Vilaça (2005), and Fausto and Heckenberger (2007) also contribute considerably to discussions of how memory is central to considerations of kinship and the body in Amazonia.
13. See Stoll (1982) and Kimerling (1996) for a more detailed historical and political commentary on the impact of the oil industry on Waorani communities in this area.
14. The Yasuní National Park, which covers nearly 10,000 square kilometers, is considered to be one of the richest areas of biodiversity in the world. Designated as a UNESCO biosphere reserve in 1989, it is also home to several Waorani communities and is a site of intensive oil production.
15. See Cabodevilla (2004a: 137–38) for a more extensive history of the conflicts between Waorani from Tiguino and the Tagaeri.
16. Cabodevilla (2004a: 38–39) provides an account of how some of the men involved described the attack.
17. It was reported that the bodies of twelve victims were found at the scene (Cabodevilla 2004a: 29). It is difficult to guess the precise number of people killed or injured in the attack, as some of those who escaped may have died later as a result of their injuries.
18. Some people were more eager to talk to me about the attack than others. Given the small scale of Waorani society, some were close relatives of the men who carried out the attack, which probably influenced whether or not and how they spoke to me about it.
19. All of the Waorani names I use in this article are pseudonyms.
20. See, for example, Taylor (1993), Whitehead (2002) and Whitehead and Wright (2004). See also Harrison (1993) for an example from Melanesia.
21. One exception is Howard’s (2002) writing on the expeditions of Waiwai people in search of uncontacted “tribes” in northern Amazonia.
22. Other accounts suggest that the killings may have been an act of retaliation for the poisoning of several members of the uncontacted group who died after poisoned food was dropped by a helicopter. See Cabodevilla (2013) for a more extensive description and discussion of the most recent attacks.
23. However, in November 2013 Ecuadorian state authorities intervened to detain six of the accused killers and took custody of one of the captive girls. At present there is much debate in Ecuador about whether the recent massacre should be understood as a case of “indigenous justice” or genocide.
24. A few examples include Viveiros de Castro (1992), Taylor (1993, 2000), Fausto (2001, 2007), Vilaça (1993, 2010), and Rival (2002).
 </p></body>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1593</article-id>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Born again, again: Witchcraft, Pentecostal conversions, and spiritual rebirth in the Trobriand Islands</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>MacCarthy</surname>
						<given-names>Michelle</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>09</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2021</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue seq="207">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau11.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1593" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1593/3780" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1593/3781" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In the Trobriand Islands of Papua New Guinea (PNG), yoyowa (consistently translated as “witches” by English-speaking Trobrianders) are a constant threat, causing illness and death to those who arouse their envy or ire. While some women are widely known to be yoyowa, accusations are never made publicly, and there are no reprisals. People exercise caution when dealing with known or potential yoyowa, and always try to “make them happy,” in a common phrase. Recently, however, with the arrival of Pentecostal Christianity and a broader Revival movement, some Trobriand women who undergo spiritual rebirth have publicly acknowledged their previous status as yoyowa. In this paper, I examine the parallels and paradoxes, as well as the broader implications, of being born again in Trobriand cosmology—first, to become a yoyowa, and later, to reject such a status in favor of being reborn as a true believer in Christ.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/2000</identifier>
				<datestamp>2025-10-27T03:25:41Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">2000</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/737757</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Two eyes, two natures: Jean Rouch’s “shared ciné-anthropology” and its ontological implication</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Yanai</surname>
						<given-names>Tadashi</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>27</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="203">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2000" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2000/4592" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2000/4593" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The purpose of this article is to examine the implications of Jean Rouch’s work—taken in its entirety—for ethnographic theory. I propose here to go outside of the category of visual anthropology with which it is usually associated, and reconnect it to the much broader area of anthropology-and-cinema where Rouch, in reality, worked. After some preliminary discussions, I first revisit Rouch’s biography and then analyze one of his early films, Yenendi: Les hommes qui font la pluie (1951), in order to identify some fundamental motifs of his work. I then comment on three essential Songhay ontological ideas (bia, hampi, and hunde) and show how these ideas directly constitute the backbone of Rouch’s major films, including fiction films such as Gard du Nord (1965). I suggest that his work was a sort of ontological anthropology avant la lettre, realized by other (i.e. cinematic) means, and it also helps us think further on the issue of “controlled equivocation.”</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1369</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:06:58Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1369</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/705581</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>The digitalia of everyday life: Multi-situated anthropology of a virtual letter by a “foreign hand”</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>KAUR</surname>
						<given-names>Raminder</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>rk39@sussex.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>13</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2019</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date>
			<volume>9</volume>
			<issue seq="504">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau9.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2019 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2019</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1369" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1369/3341" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1369/3342" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The article considers the transmissions and effects of a digital letter, and its implications for multi-situated—as opposed to a multi-sited—anthropology. Multi-situated moves beyond multiple sites as supplementary contexts to the life flows of people, materials, and ideas, to consider multi-ontological, dynamic, and temporally contingent situations constitutive of such movements in the making, that are embedded and/or enfolded along several intersecting planes on- and offline. The public letter was written collaboratively in May 2012 by activists in Britain, agreed to and signed off by supportive British members of Parliament among others, and addressed to the then prime minister of India and the chief minister of the state of Tamil Nadu. The letter’s contents pertained to the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in south India, with concerns about mandatory procedures in the construction of a nuclear power station, and democratic and human rights abuses against nonviolent protestors. By focusing on the emergence, travels, and receptive trajectories of the letter, the article makes a case for the increasing need to encompass aspects of digital anthropology not as a discrete subdiscipline, but as an integral part of core anthropological focus and method for the study of “onlife” entanglements—what effectively has become the digitalia of everyday life.</p></abstract>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>field, ethnography, social media, documents, digital anthropology, nuclear power, transnationalism, nation-state, India</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1784</identifier>
				<datestamp>2023-12-23T13:43:27Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1784</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/726621</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>The entrepreneurial self of market socialism: Life insurance agents in rural central Vietnam</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Nguyen</surname>
						<given-names>Minh T. N.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>23</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2023</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="303">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1784" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1784/4162" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1784/4163" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Casting the self as the primary unit of profit-making and value creation, the entrepreneurial self evolves from neoliberal ideas of self-enterprise and self-development to find ramifications in varying contexts. This article characterizes the entrepreneurial self of market socialism through the case of life insurance agents in Vietnam, where despite deepening marketization, socialist genealogies remain salient alongside cultural frameworks of care and belonging. In their entrepreneurial pursuits, the sales agents must present themselves as both caring and real believers in life insurance as a modern form of care while framing their goals in patriotic and relational terms. This morally activated market actor has emerged in the new economy, where the mandate to be self-entrepreneurial and self-responsible sits alongside the mandate to be a collectively spirited person. Remoralized through collective frameworks, the entrepreneurial self of market socialism betrays the illusory power of the self as it navigates contradictory moral demands.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/965</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-11-09T16:49:15Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.2.029</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.2.029</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>“Wasting time” the Veratan Way: Conspicuous leisure and the value of waiting in Fiji</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">“Wasting time” the Veratan Way: Conspicuous leisure and the value of waiting in Fiji</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Eräsaari</surname>
						<given-names>Matti</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Manchester</aff>
					<email>matti.erasaari@manchester.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores time as a vehicle of values in Fiji through an analysis of abundant nonworking time. The analysis centers on the Fijian chiefdom of Verata, where an appreciation of slowness, preparedness, relaxing, or even “time wasting” illustrates an alternative to abstract, labor-based valuation of time. The article employs a village-centric viewpoint from just outside Fiji’s main metropolitan area, in Naloto village with a dispersed citizenry comprising both salaried urbanites and resident villagers with no access to wage work. From their point of view, it is argued, time-wasting might not be as precious as a good job in town, but can be a bearer of value nonetheless.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores time as a vehicle of values in Fiji through an analysis of abundant nonworking time. The analysis centers on the Fijian chiefdom of Verata, where an appreciation of slowness, preparedness, relaxing, or even “time wasting” illustrates an alternative to abstract, labor-based valuation of time. The article employs a village-centric viewpoint from just outside Fiji’s main metropolitan area, in Naloto village with a dispersed citizenry comprising both salaried urbanites and resident villagers with no access to wage work. From their point of view, it is argued, time-wasting might not be as precious as a good job in town, but can be a bearer of value nonetheless.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>Fiji, time, value, leisure, Protestant Christianity</kwd>
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	<body><p>“Wasting time” the Veratan way






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Matti Eräsaari. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.029
“Wasting time” the Veratan way
Conspicuous leisure and the value of waiting in Fiji
Matti ERÄSAARI, University of Helsinki


This article explores time as a vehicle of values in Fiji through an analysis of abundant non-working time. The analysis centers on the Fijian chiefdom of Verata, where an appreciation of slowness, preparedness, relaxing, or even “time wasting” illustrates an alternative to abstract, labor-based valuation of time. The article employs a village-centric viewpoint from just outside Fiji’s main metropolitan area, in Naloto village with a dispersed citizenry comprising both salaried urbanites and resident villagers with no access to wage work. From their point of view, it is argued, time-wasting might not be as precious as a good job in town, but can be a bearer of value nonetheless.
Keywords: Fiji, time, value, leisure, Protestant Christianity


This article explores time as a vehicle of value for the people of Naloto village in the chiefdom of Verata in Fiji. The time under discussion here is the abstract, resource-like time used as a measure of labor and exemplified by the clock rather than the passage of historical time associated with change. The focus of the article is on a village just outside Fiji’s main metropolitan area, with limited access to the urban economy or wage work but with abundant time resources. One cannot exchange one’s time for money within the village, though one can leave the village in order to take up paid employment in Fiji’s urban centers or tourist resorts. Consequently, the village population of about three hundred people is constantly changing, the formerly urban employed retiring to the village, village residents moving out, and others wavering in-between.
For the sake of argument, this article accepts the claim that “time is money,” but in so doing also asks how else time can be valuated. What else is time besides money? The political-economic tradition has shown us how thoroughly our understanding of time is embedded in the capitalist mode of production, but this standardized, disciplined “clock time” has effectively also spread far beyond the [310]contexts in which it originated. Kevin Birth (2012) argues that in using inherited objects like the clock to tell and standardize time, we are practically allowing the dead to think for us. Long before Birth, E. P. Thompson (1967) argued that the clock accompanies an ethos that directs our ability to value and appreciate time. Today that valuation of time reaches even communities and settings where time cannot be “money”: labor reserves, refugee camps, or other “surplus” populations caught in-between worlds who, though conscious of the value of labor, are often unable to realize it themselves. This article examines one such context to ask when, or how, it is possible to resist or challenge the valuation inherent in clock time.
Fiji was both colonized and Christianized in the late nineteenth century, and as early as 1908, Australian Methodist missionaries were reporting the death of “Old Fiji” and the birth of the new:

The shrill whistle—morning, noon and night—follows hard upon the heels of the discordant bell and summons the “labour” to the dirty, wheezing, groaning mill or to the warm, wet cane fields. The river is alive with fretful, panting steam launches, tugging and straining impatiently at sluggish, ungainly cane punts. Ever and anon screeching whistles or tooting horns or scrambling sirens hideously and braggartly declare that the New Fiji has been born. (Burton 1908: 262)

The full history of wage labor in Fiji is complicated, involving protectionist policies upheld with Indian migrant labor (e.g., Kaplan and Kelly 2001): the workforce summoned by the sugar mill whistle in the quote above actually refers to Indian indentured laborers rather than an indigenous labor force. For a long time, both the missionaries and the colonial administration acted to “protect” indigenous Fijians from the alienating market economy. This has shaped indigenous Fijian tradition, altered in contrast to European and Indian ways just as much as it has evolved from immemorial custom. The well-known and widely advertised concept of “Fiji time” attests to the continued significance of time in Fijian cultural politics.1
Clock time arrived in Fiji even before indentured labor. Already in 1865, The Sydney Morning Herald (August 21) reported the newly established Council of Chiefs’ decision to impose an annual poll tax levied on all adult males, one pound of which could be substituted with ten days’ work, at eight hours per day. Later, during the colonial era, clock time was added to the official school curriculum: the Education Ordinance of 1916 introduced time, money, and linear measure together at Stage 4 Arithmetic; in 1929 “telling the time” and “mental money sums up to 2s.” were moved to year 3 in Non-European Registered Primary Schools. The clock remains part of the curriculum from year 3 through to year 6 in present-day Fiji.
In other words, European clock time has been around Fiji long enough to have established more than just a transitional presence (cf. Smith 1982). Correspondingly, this article argues that Fijians value time in multiple ways, and that “time” in the [311]postindustrial sense can bear values even antithetical to puritan time thrift. That this should happen under conditions in which time resources appear abundant rather than scarce may sound obvious, yet it should be borne in mind that a matter of values is not just a matter of choice: one cannot simply pick one’s values and expect them to have purchase. Not everyone is in a position to make “superfluous” time a thing of value.
My ethnographic focus is on Verata, a chiefdom whose claim to senior status is based on debated colonial-era mythology (Tuwere 2002; Eräsaari 2013). Verata evokes the gravitas of seniority: it is “slow but sure” in comparison to its traditional rival, the chiefdom of Bau. This provides Veratans with a specific means for converting their abundant time resources into a thing of value, a kind of dignity that references objectified indigenous tradition. Veratans are particularly well placed to uphold an alternative value system that enables them to appreciate superfluous time even as a vehicle of aristocratic virtue in a manner more reminiscent of Veblen’s conspicuous leisure than of Marx’s labor time.

Time as a bearer of value
In Capital, Marx highlights the importance of time in the quantitative process of price determination, identifying in time the “secret hidden under the apparent fluctuations in the relative values of commodities” (Marx [1887] 1999: ch. 1, section 4). He recognizes time as a standard of valuation: a measure that serves the purpose of creating relations of equivalence between things that in themselves carry no common denominator. In common Euro-American parlance, the same idea is expressed as “time is money.”
The extraordinary value of time under the capitalist mode of production is inseparable from the form we give to time as measurable units of duration. This might not altogether relativize all temporal phenomena, as Alfred Gell ([1992] 1996) shows, yet it remains a fact that capitalist time is unique in its concern with measure. This is evident in the worldwide project of standardization whereby the odd collage of solar, lunar, seven-unit, twelve-unit, and sixty-unit measures has gained an almost universal reach (see Birth 2012). These measures have traveled beyond the societies in which they were born.
The clock is a case in point. Though it was not invented by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century industrialists, its rise to prominence in Britain was instrumentally connected with the large-scale industrialization that occurred there. As Thompson (1967) has shown, so thorough was the ensuing change in time-orientations that in addition to widely displacing the task-based orientation that preceded it in Britain, “clock time” also changed the dissenting Methodist Church into guardians of time discipline. It made time thrift a virtue, and eventually saw even the labor movement adopt the clock-driven viewpoint, where clocks had previously been used to discipline the workforce.
In “Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism” (1967), Thompson discusses at length the discrepancies between “task time” and “clock time.” Task time, so called because it estimates time through natural rhythms and the duration of tasks, is characterized by an “attitude to labour [that] appears to be wasteful and lacking in urgency” (ibid.: 60). Thompson charts the ideological battle that took [312]place over people’s time, epitomized in religious doctrines that teach the virtuous to scorn rest and leisure (also Weber [1905] 1930). He saw the shift into clock time as nearly all-encompassing; indeed so thorough that he ended up questioning people’s ability to value the increasing amounts of nonworking time that they would spend in the future as a result of growing automatization: “What will be the capacity for experience of the men who have this undirected time to live?” (Thompson 1967: 95).
Thompson’s question remains highly relevant, though what he queried as experience or enjoyment, I regard as human valuation. Hence my reformulation of Thompson’s question is: “Could we valuate time as something else besides money?” With respect to the Fijian case discussed in this article, one theory of alternate valuation seems particularly relevant: Thorstein Veblen’s (1899) notion of “conspicuous leisure,” or the unproductive consumption of time practiced in order to display the ability to remain idle.
Veblen portrays conspicuous leisure as the product of a class-based need for distinction: an upper-class display of sufficient resources to not engage in productive work. But like Thompson, Veblen extends his analysis of leisured life beyond this simple point to show how this need expands into a full-blown social system that, in effect, serves to elaborate and embellish the appreciation of time. Veblen builds from the observation that the whole of the life of a gentleman (or gentlewoman) of leisure cannot be spent in public view:

He should find some means of putting in evidence the leisure that is not spent in the sight of the spectators. This can be done only indirectly, through the exhibition of some tangible, lasting results of the leisure so spent—in a manner analogous to the familiar exhibition of tangible, lasting products of the labour performed for the gentleman of leisure by handicraftsmen and servants in his employ. (Veblen 1899: ch. 3)

Veblen elaborates not just how aristocratic status is accompanied by highly time-consuming manners and requirements, but also how manners become the norm—a social fact. The aristocrat has to verify his or her propriety, and the verification of leisure status requires the services of various specialists whose job is to wait on others: the valet, the butler, and the lady’s maid all serve the conceived necessities of the leisure class—the time-taking proprieties of high society.
Veblen describes this aristocratic decorum as a hierarchy of domestic servants wherein specialist skill correlates with status, and status with waiting. He argues that the further up we look upon the ranks of domestic servants, the more clearly waiting on someone becomes indistinguishable from just waiting. They are part of what amounts to a potlatch-style realization of value: the unproductive use, waste, or sheer destruction of time which results in a conceived sense of the unworthiness of productive work for those at the top of the pyramid. This inventive rendering of aristocratic dignities highlights a core juxtaposition of productive labor time vs. unproductive waiting. In Veblen’s stratified model, social esteem is maintained by expending time nonproductively, which underlies an entire internalized temporal regime.
Veblen inverts not just Marx’s idea of socially necessary labor time, but also the related notions of time discipline or the Protestant work ethic advanced by Thompson (1967) and Weber (1930), respectively. To complement an austere time [313]discipline, Veblen highlights what could be labeled a leisure discipline. However, Veblen regarded “conspicuous leisure” as an intermediary “stage” in what he envisaged as development toward the conspicuous consumption of money, whereas I depict “conspicuous leisure” as a contemporaneous alternative to “clock time.” Just as “leisure” is commonly defined as time free from working, so the value of displaying abundant spare time is more likely to emerge in contrast to the relative scarcity of time, “time poverty.” But the question then arises: Under what condition is the positive valuation of “time wasting” possible? Does it have to be an upper-class privilege?
Compare Veblen’s leisure to Yasmine Musharbash’s (2007) study of superfluous time in the Australian Aboriginal settlement of Yuendumu. Surplus time can hardly be glossed “leisure” in sedentarized postcolonial settlement life, inasmuch as “leisure” implies a break from work. Instead, Yuendumu surplus time turns into boredom: “killing time” with endless card games, substance abuse, and so forth. Instead of being (positively) valued, the “present becomes oppressive, like a cage in which one is caught, in which one experiences the same thing over and over again without any possibility of escape” (ibid.: 313).
Musharbash examines boredom as an explicitly modern phenomenon comparable to Thompson’s view of our inability to enjoy undirected time under clock valuation. Boredom, thus framed, can be viewed as a byproduct of a particular way of valuing time. Musharbash writes of a mismatch between Yuendumu life and irreconcilable values: positive valuation of time is hard when people extend little control over their surroundings. “Boringness” becomes a quality associated with “the insufferability of ‘it’—life, the universe, everything” (ibid.: 312). Correspondingly, one can focus on socioeconomic status to underline the ways in which privileged status allows some to talk of “investing” their time where others feel their time is “wasted” or “killed” under similar conditions (Jeffrey 2010: 75).
This article offers a further example of the valuation of time from Fiji. I present this as a point of comparison against the extremity of boredom and meaningless waiting; not in order to deny the experience of boredom in settings such as Yuendumu, but to highlight the conjuncture that allows a group of relatively marginalized people to conceive their surplus time in a positive, or at least in a not-altogether-negative, sense. The underlying assumption of this article is that it is not a simple matter of choice to allocate value to “wasted” time, but something that requires other cultural resources in order to be conceivable.


The Veratan way
Naloto village is part of the traditional chiefdom-cum-administrative division of Verata in the province of Tailevu, on the island of Viti Levu in Fiji. Naloto villagers lead a semisubsistent life just outside urban Fiji; Nausori town, the end-point of Fiji’s main metropolitan area (“the Suva–Nausori corridor”), is only an hour’s lorry ride from the village, but transport is too irregular to make permanent urban employment possible from a village base. Hence approximately three hundred people, either born or married into the village, live there practicing agriculture and fishing, and augmenting their subsistence by selling produce at the urban market [314]and with assistance from urban relatives. Twice as many Nalotans—roughly six hundred men and women listed at birth as members of Naloto’s landowning clans (mataqali)—live outside the village owing to marriage, work, or both. Residence in the village is fluid: people move in and out all the time. Excepting the immigrant village-school teachers, only two or three people have managed to take up paid employment while living in Naloto. As a rule, one has to move away from the village to be able to hold a job. Still, most urban-based Nalotans plan to settle back in the village at the end of their work careers.
Naloto is the largest of the seven villages that make up the traditional chiefdom of Verata. Roughly a mile from the paramount village of Ucunivanua, it is known for having served as the Verata paramount’s (Ratu mai Verata) stronghold during the Bau–Verata wars (1850). Verata, for its part, is famous for two things: first and foremost, it is the home of a chiefly lineage in which all Veratans take great pride. Owing to close affiliation with the colonial-era “Kaunitoni” migration myth (France 1966), Veratans not only claim descent from the first “king of Fiji” but are often acknowledged as such by other chieftaincies invested in this mythology. Long after losing rank to Bau, Verata maintains a particular status in indigenous Fiji. The Verata paramount is outranked by various other paramount chiefs, yet Verata’s claim to seniority persists.
Besides chiefs, Verata is also proverbially known for solosolo vakaVerata, or doing things slowly in the Veratan fashion. Solosolo means slow pace, as in vaka-solosolo, “slowly” (Capell [1941] 2003), but it also means “collecting” things. A 1954 phrasebook translates solosolo vakaVerata as something “said of a person who fiddles around and is slow in his movements” or “of one who collects a lot of small and useless articles” (Raiwalui 1954: 16–17). Nalotans and neighboring villagers often jokingly translate it as “wasting time the Verata way,” something best exemplified during funerals and other traditional events, to which Veratans can be expected to arrive hours late.
Slowness is also an observable part of the village lifestyle, while hurrying is, if not precisely frowned upon, at least something that people are uneasy with. Whether leaving to attend a funeral or just to catch a bus, every departure is always marked by an unhurried spell of waiting or “relaxing” (cegu), and the same applies to arrivals, meals, work efforts, and meetings. Even a sociable pastime such as kava drinking typically concludes with a spell of relaxed waiting before the drinkers can disperse and go home.
This made many Nalotans claim that time has no significance in the village, or even—as it was phrased by Maciu,2 a village-based subsistence farmer in his late sixties—that solosolo vakaVerata means that “there is no time” in Verata. For him, “time” means discipline and punctuality. Maciu, who in his youth worked a while in Suva and overseas, associated “the Veratan way” with “Fiji time” and contrasted these to Europe, where “time is time.” “Veratan slowness” can thus be regarded a special case of and largely overlapping with the notion of “Fiji time,” including various anxieties about Fiji’s lack of progress and development, but excluding the added commodity value from the tourism industry in the Western Division.[315]
Timoci, a family man who worked in various tourism-related jobs in the Western Division before settling down in Naloto, is one of many who think time means something else in the village. His account comments on both the urban and the village-based viewpoint:

“Na gauna na ilavo”? [“Time is money”?] Yeah, we use that in town, in the cities, that kind of saying. . . . ’Cause here in the village, whether you’ve got something or not, you still can survive. You’ve got everything that you can survive on without using money. Like, in town, you’ve got to work for money . . . you go to work for the time, after that comes the money. But in the village, no: you can just roam around, you come home, you eat—the food is there. Everything is there, you go out, you just get it, or somebody can get it for you. You’ve got your neighbors, your relatives, your cousins that’s living near to you.

Timoci, like many other Nalotans (cf. Eräsaari 2013: 39–44), explains the difference as affluence: “everything is there” in the village. One can always rely on the generosity of neighbors and relatives for food and other basic necessities. The villagers all partake in the ideal of sharing anything that is not deemed immediately necessary to its owner, though the practice is more complicated. Easy access to most basic necessities, combined with a fair availability of arable land and conditions which make at least the favored cassava grow with minimal effort, leads to what can be described as ample free time—“leisure,” as long as one remembers that leisure refers to time away from work, hence requiring a historically particular idea of work.
Whilst Timoci proves that wage labor is a well-attested reality in Fiji, the Fijian language itself does not appear to distinguish between “working,” “doing” and “employment.” Constantinos Gounis and Henry Rutz (1986: 62) illustrate the matter through the statistical oddities of the 1976 census, which ended up classifying virtually all males aged fifteen years or older as “economically active,” while, owing to the exclusion of “unpaid home duties,” women’s statistics were driven in the opposite direction. Gounis and Rutz (ibid.: 73) point out that the Fijian word for work, cakacaka, is “neither a specialized or institutionalized sector of activity nor is it restricted to the market as an exchange of labour for wage remuneration”; they further point out that “work” designates virtually any activity that is not labelled “rest,” cegu.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the author of “The original affluent society” is a Fiji scholar. Although Marshall Sahlins’ (1972: 1–39) essay was written with reference to hunter-gatherer populations living in particularly challenging settings, it seems apt for Fijian village phenomena too. For the way in which he defines hunter-gatherer affluence as a rejection of surplus needs is relevant for understanding Fijian village ideals as well. The vast majority of Naloto villagers articulate their ideas of a good or proper way of being as a subsistence lifestyle wherein one can produce all the necessities of life with minimal effort: food is easily available and housing can be constructed from traditional materials (should one wish to do so). And if one requires tea, sugar, or other commodities the village cannot produce, all one has to do is to ask. Money is said to be unnecessary in the village because “everything is there,” though in practice village residents use a combination of small-scale cash cropping and remittances to pay for electricity, transport, school fees, [316]and so on. But the village discourse ignores these expenses and thereby makes it possible to liken village life to “Paradise” (Parataisi). Like Sahlins’ affluent hunter-gatherers, Nalotans also “keep banker’s hours, notably less than modern industrial workers (unionized), who would surely settle for a 21–35 hour week” (ibid.: 34–35).
I have conducted two small-scale surveys on time usage in Naloto in 2007. The first was something of a failure, if an illuminating one: I asked ten households to record their daily working times and received lists of the tasks they had performed. I mention this to show that in the village, a task orientation may in many respects be more relevant than clock time. Yet it also coexists with wall clocks and prestigious wristwatches; the church, school, and transport schedules and TV program times: task and clock orientations are not binary either/or alternatives, especially for a population alternating between agrarian and urban employed livelihoods.
My second survey was too small in scale to be more than indicative of time use in the village in a very general way, but serves as an example nonetheless. To make an estimate, I spent a week surveying the amounts of time that men on the northern half of the village spent away from home—which is where most Nalotan men’s work tends to be—arriving at the rough estimate of five hours a day.
The estimate excludes men who spent an entire day resting: had I included them, I would have arrived at daily working hours of slightly below two hours per day. At the other extreme, the daily averages went up considerably owing to a fisherman who spent two nights out on the reef, sleeping in his boat with fishing lines tied to his fingers and toes. Nor does this imprecise estimate reflect the fact that weeks differ from one another, or that working hours are not evenly spread across the working week. The relaxed pace of early week picks up toward the weekend, when a number of villagers are always busy readying their produce for the Suva and Nausori marketplaces. A week preceding a traditional ceremonial event requires more working hours from the entire village community, whilst a week after tends to be more relaxed. And women spend more time on tasks that are predominantly domestic and even harder to classify apart from “nonwork”: in addition to domestic tasks like laundry and cooking, they also collect clams or forage for other foodstuff and sometimes firewood as well, plait mats, take turns preparing lunch at the village school, and so forth.
This crude estimate can nonetheless serve as a point of departure for examining how village-based men spent the abovementioned five hours. Here is an exemplary working day from October 2007, translated and condensed from my field diary:

After breakfast we relaxed a while together with Mosese and then set out for the clan’s garden lands at 9.30. Maika joined us on the road to the farms, which we reached after a 45-minute walk. We then decided to take a break by Luke’s “bush house.” After a half-hour rest other men of the clan arrived, and we rested with them for another while. After the break, some of us took word of an upcoming event to three houses, all within a stone’s throw. Exchanging news and relaxing a while took another half an hour. After relaying the messages, the group decided to move indoors to Luke’s bush house, where we relaxed for another half an hour or so. Finally, at about noon it was decided that we should get started: we walked some ten minutes into the bush until we reached the clan garden, where the younger men pulled up the cassava while the older sat nearby [317]supervising. This took another half an hour (we did not plant new ones to replace the old). We then sat down for a while and enjoyed a couple of green drinking coconuts before carrying the sacks back to the road, where someone suggested another break. Instead of resting, however, everyone embarked on the busiest spell of the day: climbing trees for breadfruit, collecting ota [an edible fern], searching for vines to tie up bundles, and so on. One and a half hours later the village lorry picked us up. We were back in the village at three o’clock; bringing the day’s working time to five and a half hours.

This abundant relaxing was not an isolated occurrence: sometimes we watched movies after walking to the farms; once or twice someone even commented that people back in the village would think we had been keeping busy. The busiest days were spent accompanying individuals to their gardens without a crowd of fellow-villagers, but relaxing was always part of work all the same—and that applied to women’s work, too.
The Fijian word for resting—vakacegu—is derived from the root word cegu, “to breathe,” “to take a break.” It connotes both resting after an exhausting activity as well as more generally taking it easy, but the villagers usually translate it as “relaxing.” The term vakacegu also carries religious connotations: while in North European Protestantism, one “rests in peace” only in the afterlife (and toils hard in the present one), Fijian Methodism often seeks to assert resting or relaxing as virtues in this world. In Naloto Methodist Church sermons, vakacegu3 is contrasted to undesirable rapid change, whilst both the Methodist Hymnbook and even the Pentecostal gospel groups’ repertoires abound with references to rest and resting. And of course there are the endless debates on the Sunday Sabbath. As Henry Rutz and Erol Balkan (1992) have pointed out, the Sunday Observance Decree, which declared Sunday a sacred day for everyone in Fiji irrespective of their religious background, was one of the first political actions taken by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka following his 1987 military coup. The Sunday ban has been a recurring topic for political debate ever since, and was endorsed again by the Methodist Church annual conference in 2007, only months after the December 2006 coup.
To highlight the contrast: the famous (North European) Protestant work ethic (Weber [1905] 1930) puts rest beyond this world—gives it an outworldly orientation (Dumont [1986] 1992: 23–59)—while the Fijian ideal of vakacegu requires obeisance in this world, too. The church elders in the village preach on the merits of resting; the villagers repeatedly praise village life for the rest it affords. Indeed, when a villager employed outside the village retires—vakacegu—he or she at least expects to do so moving back into the village (see, e.g., Overton 1993, who calls Fijian villages “retirement homes”).4 Vakacegu, relaxing, is also something that is offered to honored guests in the village. And though hard work, too, is highly valued there, young men, in particular, who try to spend too much time working can easily become subject to jokes from their peers.[318]


Leveling with time
Fijian words for busyness, oga and ososo, both indicate being busy with people. The first implies traditional ceremonial obligations and hence is often synonymous with worry, the latter means being crowded with people. Busyness implies the bustle of ceremonial events, everyone working day and night. But these collective efforts also reflect an ideal that allocates more time for relaxing when there is no particular reason to work hard.
At one extreme there is collective work (solesolevaki, lala) organized under traditionial vanua protocol with chiefly leadership and customary reciprocal obligations.5 This mode of organization is used for large-scale work such as house building or clearing new gardens, typically with the presence of senior men to provide an air of respectability, and with kava provided at various stages of the work effort to the same effect. Often this gives collective labor an inefficient appearance: junior men work in short shifts interrupted by tea breaks and “breathers” (cegu), senior men give support to the work effort, while women take turns providing food and refreshments to wherever the work takes place. But as a retired Nalotan teacher pointed out, collective labor is a way to accomplish efforts too big for one man or household. With no wages or other rewards save for the kava at the end of the day, it would be pointless to push people to toil harder. The work will be done “slowly but surely”—which is another way to translate solosolo vakaVerata.
Henry Rutz (1984) has studied the phenomenon in terms of the time resources expended on house building. In an article that seeks to explain the popularity of the inferior “modern” (corrugated iron) house type in village Fiji, he contrasts the “social time” of ceremonial work with “budgeting time according to the clock” to argue that the social value of work according to traditional protocol counterbalances the efficiency of modern housebuilding. But in choosing the “tin” house, Rutz argues, the household unit takes control of its own time resources (ibid.: 113–15).6
In Naloto village, time is regularly treated as a communal resource rather than a simple matter of individual or household-level decision making. Time often finds a parallel in land, which in indigenous villages is held communally by kin groups (mataqali). Here one is reminded of Tim Ingold’s ([1995] 2000) suggestion that time may be embedded not just in the tasks people carry out but also in the social groups that perform the tasks. This is evident in ceremonial collective labor .
But even ordinary joint efforts like visiting the clan’s common gardens tend to be conducted at a relatively slow pace, sometimes alluded to as “eating the time” (kania na gauna). Compared to this, working on one’s own is efficient, and typically when one needs to get more work done—for example, get produce ready for the urban market—one does not ask others for help, except household members.
The idea that effective work is conducted on one’s own is evidenced in Nalotan lifecycle patterns, too. Young families often have to move outside the village perimeters for a period to accumulate the resources for a house, children’s schooling, and other expenses. The decision is always explained in terms of efficient time [319]utilization: living away from the village proper, close to one’s gardens in a so-called “bush house” (vale ni veikau), one goes to sleep early, wakes up early, and concentrates on farming rather than storytelling and kava drinking. Ideally, a young farmer living next to his farm ought to wake up at five in the morning and leave the house when the sun rises, work until it gets too hot, then have lunch and rest until the weather cools down in the afternoon, and work again until it gets dark before an evening meal with the family. Young housewives, likewise, are busy working on their own while possibly also attending small children. Though most families who strike out on their own expect to do so for a fixed period—a year or two—the motivation for moving out into the “bush” is always expressed in terms of better time management. For young men this includes avoiding kava drinking and storytelling, group activities which are virtually inescapable when living within the village boundaries.
In the village, time use is subject to a greater deal of peer pressure, which may even amount to a kind of leveling. Jokes and remarks are addressed to people who are seen as toiling too hard. But social pressure on time use is best evidenced in kava drinking, an activity where it is easy to lose face in front of one’s peers. Young men are particularly prone to take each other’s slights seriously, to the degree where leaving a company of kava drinkers before others gets very difficult. Even senior men are not immune to this: I have seen a seventy-year-old clan elder, aching with fever, being pressured by his peers to join the kava circle.
Besides the kava drinking that accompanies storytelling in the evenings, simply calling someone over or otherwise engaging him or her is a thing that cannot be ignored without a proper excuse. There is even a Fijian word for seizing or “tying up” someone else’s time: vesumona (lit. “tying the brain,” with a wide range of meanings extending from “hypnotizing” to “seduction”). Joeli, a married man in his early forties, defined vesumona as keeping somebody tied up for one’s own ends against his or her will. Akuila, a few years his junior, defined vesumona as “taking somebody else’s time.”
He provides an extreme example of vesumona. On a Friday evening in October 2007, Akuila—back then in his early thirties and father to a small baby—was preparing his garden produce for the market in town when a group of young men walked up to his house demanding to buy kava. Knowing where this would lead, he tried to tell them that he had none, but failed because they had earlier seen him drying kava roots outside his house. The men hence produced 12 FJD and demanded to buy twelve bags, making Akuila pestle the entire amount for them. Once the task was finished, they told him to produce a mixing bowl. Akuila still tried to refuse, whereupon they told him they would drink their kava in his house nonetheless. Since he considered this an unacceptable alternative, he had no option but to host the group as demanded until the small hours.
At the informal level of young cross-cousins’ joking relationships, this is simply considered light-hearted pranking, as my interlocutors were keen to explain. No one is forcing anyone; there is always a choice—you either host the kava session and earn the good esteem of your cross-cousins, or you go on and do what you have to in order to earn your children’s upkeep, though you thereby risk the spite (kakase, gossip) of your peers, as village-based Mosese explained to me. Which, of course, is how social scientists typically describe the experience of peer pressure.[320]
Normal kava drinking works in a similar fashion. Quitting a kava session (talanoa, “yarning”) before others requires permission: making the request may in itself be considered embarrassing, but it is also entirely possible that one will not be granted “release” (tatau) by one’s peers, which would certainly make the requester the object of others’ jokes. The typical course of action for young men in particular is to “flee” (dro) without asking permission if they cannot take the drink anymore or otherwise need to leave. But since this also leaves the one who flees open to all kinds of jokes, it is a course of action rarely adopted: most of the time the majority of drinkers finish together. This applies particularly to young men, but no one is exempt from the pressure to stay in company; it is a matter of respect, people often explained to me.
Kava induces a pleasant, drowsy atmosphere for storytelling and good company, but there comes a point in most informal, pastime kava sessions whereupon everyone is too sleepy for conversation, people doze off against the walls or just sit in silence interrupted only by the occasional request to “please tell a story” (talanoa mada). If villagers usually give kava drinking and storytelling as prime examples of “eating time,” it is worth asking: Whose time is being eaten in the kava ring? The fear of ridicule and corresponding pressure to conform are also the prime mechanisms of what village youth call “spoiling”: “pulling” or “bringing down” someone at the brink of an accomplishment, comparable to chasing away a school of fish rather than allowing another to catch it (see Eräsaari 2013: 47–52).
Obviously, remaining in company is also a matter of respect, not just toward one’s fellow-villagers but toward received protocol as well. Kava drinking is a fundamentally chiefly, hierarchical activity, and even if Nalotans every so often disregard the actual chiefs themselves, the ritualized formality of the kava circle lends itself to an air of respect and dignity that is best described as “chiefly” (vakaturaga). From the visible pride of the youths allowed to participate in the first place to the pride which men display serving the drink or the pride of someone being allowed the first cup, a kava session is an event in which one does not just lose face but also wins esteem. One of my village interlocutors even likened kava to a work career: “Some dream about a good job in town; others dream of getting respect by drinking yaqona [kava].”
But a career in kava drinking is also frowned upon. Marika, a Lautoka-based man from Naloto whose career was made in the tourist industry, once criticized the village as a whole for being “asleep,” staying inactive when villagers ought to strive toward development. This is a common enough critique of village life, typically voiced by the urban employed. Over the course of the conversation, Marika went on to castigate his village kin for trying to aggrandize themselves in the kava ring: “Today, everybody wants to be the chief, to drink first.” In so doing he was evoking another popular criticism, one most commonly heard at the end of a disapproving account of the state of affairs in the community: levu na vievie turaga, “so many want to be chiefs” or “people do not know their place anymore.” He was, in short, criticizing the villagers for not being ambitious enough and for being too ambitious—or for misdirecting their energies.
The “chiefly” or status aspect of kava drinking is only one facet in the complex valuation of time that takes place in the village. Certainly the leveling of time points in an opposite direction, and no one dreams of claiming rank on the basis [321]of relaxing at the plantation. Yet it is also true that a slow, deliberate comportment goes with seniority and positions of rank, such as that of the elder supervising collective work or the chiefly kava. They are examples of an ideology which, at the top of the hierarchy, associates paramount chiefs with stasis—“just sitting still” (Sahlins 2004: 60; Tomlinson 2014: 58). And it is because of the cultural values expressed in such ceremonialized articulations that the high appreciation of a dignified, leisurely comportment may also be expressed as coercive behavior. It is almost as if the village enforced relaxation on its inhabitants to parallel the decorum of more formal contexts. This may even appear as a norm capable of exerting external constraint upon individuals: a schoolteacher from the neighboring province, for example, explained that not resting awhile with others after completing a kava session would feel like an offense—he would “start to feel bad.”


Verata in the blood
As noted above, Veratans regard their chiefdom senior among the chieftaincies of eastern Fiji and the former seat of power of a mythical king of Fiji. Verata appears to have once been a ruling power in historical terms, too, though its authority has been declining for centuries (on Verata, see, e.g., Tuwere 2002; Sahlins 2004; Eräsaari 2013). Sahlins portrays Verata as a “kingdom of [the] blood” (matanitu ni dra) vis-à-vis Verata’s ancient enemy, the powerful but genealogically junior chiefdom of Bau, the “kingdom of force” (matanitu ni kaukauwa). The two stand for different, coexisting ideologies of political justification: Verata for the gravitas of seniority and Bau for the celeritas of force (Sahlins 2004: 67–68). This was recently evidenced by prophesies that circulated Fiji in the aftermath of the 2006 military coup, which claimed that Fiji would only know peace once a true chief emerged from Verata. Similarly, a Naloto clan elder once explained to me that solosolo vakaVerata indicates “proper discussion” and “fairness”: decision making that leaves no one unhappy.
Discussing the topic of time with a group of senior Naloto men in 2015, they collectively rejected the translation for solosolo vakaVerata that people had used in 2007. It does not mean “wasting time,” they explained, but rather that someone is well prepared: “slow but sure.” This echoes the explanations that were taught in Fijian schools and phrasebooks (Raiwalui 1954). Solosolo vakaVerata used to be part of the established curriculum on Fijian traditions, taught alongside the old myths pertaining to Verata—the first king of Fiji, the running contest to determine his successor, the stolen whale’s tooth that was the mark of the king’s authority, and Verata’s fall from power. I asked the group of senior men if it is significant that one does things slowly in the “Veratan way”—why not talk about, for example, solosolo vakaBau—acting slowly in the Bauan way? After a moment’s stunned silence, everyone hastened to point out that Bau is known for a different thing—vere vakaBau (sometimes also politiki vakaBau)—plotting or scheming in the Bauan fashion.
In saying that venerable old Verata should be known for slow but sure action, the villagers were also assigning a stately dignity to slowness. Not only does it yield better decisions (one of the men exemplified the point by referencing the film Home alone, where haste causes a child being left home unattended), by contrasting Veratan slowness with Bauan rashness in a conversation that carried on to the [322]following day, they also indicated that chiefly authority reflects these characteristics, inasmuch as both chieftaincies are encompassed and personified by their paramount chiefs. Much like Geertz’s ([1983] 2000) analysis of the various guises in which authority or charisma appears, we could say that Veratans depict chiefliness as slow. The reverse—imagining slowness as chiefly—is contestable, however.
Most of the time, the village is home to just one-third of the people registered as Naloto landowners, and while the majority of village-based Nalotans seem to value relaxing and a slow pace, many emigrant villagers express the opposite view. In the village, where people predominantly live off the land, it is a common assumption that many urban residents “eat money” (kana ilavo) in town—they eat into their earnings by having to pay for food, rent, and things they would get for free in the village. The idiom has a double meaning, though, since “eating money” also means wasting it, and what is more, the implication often is that one who is “eating money” is wasting it for personal indulgence whilst it ought to have benefited the entire community. From the communal viewpoint, “eating money” means “using money that does not belong to you,” as one man defined it. Hence to understand the implications of the ideal of sharing, it is necessary to keep in mind that even long-term urban residents such as Adriu, a middle-class insurance sales representative from Lautoka town, say that “all your income’s not all only yours. You have to share it. . . . Because you know, at the end of . . . one day you go back to the village.” The critique of “eating money” thus echoes the ideals of a community where sharing remains the morally acceptable thing to do with any surplus, even if in practice the issue is more complicated.
But it is also possible to criticize villagers’ time use in similar terms: the village is “asleep” where it should be developing; the villagers are “eating time” (kania na gauna) where they ought to be striving to make improvements. “Doing something that’s worthless or nothing,” as a former tourist resort employee explained to me the notion of “eating time”. Joji, a man in his late thirties trying to earn his child’s upbringing at a “bush house” outside the village, explained in 2015:

Kania na gauna, eh? Like we sleep all days. We’re doing something meaningless or worthless, like staying home, relaxing. . . . Kania na gauna means you just stay home watching video or maybe drinking yaqona. . . . Yes, that’s famous for the village people [i.e. “villagers are famous for”]. Because that’s what we do. But that’s something you have to . . . like . . . to move up from, the wasting time.

The descriptions of emigrant Nalotans highlight the degree to which solosolo vakaVerata encapsulates the coercive power of a Durkheimian social fact. While village-based Nalotans are more likely to translate solosolo VakaVerata as “slow but sure,” “slow and steady,” or “well prepared,” emigrant villagers are more likely to explain it as lateness, excessive kava drinking, and missed opportunities. The double meaning of the idiom was illustrated during a three-way conversation with a Naloto clan chief (turaga ni mataqali) in Suva in 2016: he was explaining solosolo vakaVearata as “slow, steady, and good,” while his daughter, laughing, kept on interrupting her father to tell me it means “berabera”—“slow” or “late.” A Nadi-based Naloto migrant explained that solosolo vakaVerata refers to the ancestral times when a Veratan army reached the battlefield too late and therefore lost to Bau.[323]
But these views are not a simple village vs. town binary; the population of Naloto is constantly shifting. Yet the village can be persuasive. I once interviewed a freshly returned immigrant from the Western Division who, during the interview, explained the Veratan way as time wasting and tardiness, but a week later told me that it actually means preparedness. The head of the Methodist Agricultural School near Nausori town also acknowledges the power that village Fiji has; the school, he told me, monitors its graduates after they leave school to keep them from backsliding. Even after years of disciplined time management, they may still “end up wasting time; drinking grog [i.e., kava], solevu [ceremonial events]. . . . One ceremony today, another the next day,” as he described the domestic life of the school’s former pupils.
These pressures often extend beyond the village. Three Nalotan women, all living away from the village, defined solosolo vakaVerata independently of one another as something that they carry “in their blood”. One of them was Laisani, a middle-class civil servant from Lautoka town who left the village more than fifteen years ago, during which time she has converted to one of the prosperity churches and back to Methodism. She explained in 2015:

Most of the time, I’m on that mode. Like, I always have it with me, but I want to quit of it. Most of the time most people told me: “You shouldn’t do it. Come on. Does not matter that you’re from Verata when you act slow like that. Now it’s . . . times change. You should switch your time to this time, don’t always late, late, late.” . . . It’s not a good thing. But it’s like inside of me. . . . In the blood.

It is easy to hear echoes of Thompson (1967) on the emergence of time discipline here, or Weber on the Protestant work ethic. Such critiques of Veratan time juxtapose slowness with propriety, improvement, and progress. The Methodist Church took a particularly active part in this discourse in its early twentieth-century efforts to give birth to the “Fijian Methodist industrial man” (Close-Barry 2015: 94). The establishment of vocational schools in particular was intended to teach Fijians the dignity of work and industrious habits as the means for “every individual to reach the fullest all-round development of which he is capable” (Rev. L. M. Thompson, in Education Commission 1926: 67–68). The emphasis on the work ethic survives in exemplars like Hymn 360 of the Wesleyan Hymn Book, originally written for the Davuilevu Boys’ School by the Methodist educator R. A. Derrick:

So, ra dau nanuma wale (some people have idle thoughts);
Nodra mamarau e dai (enjoying the day);
Gunu wale, veimau tiko (just drinking, playing);
Vakaoti gauna mai (wasting time away).
Sega tu na toro cake (there’s no progress);
E na sala ca ko ya (in that bad way);
Vu ni noda lutu sobu (the reason of our downfall);
Bula gogo, madua (feebleness and shame)

But as I have tried to show above, the idea that idleness leads to moral decay is (to a degree) counterbalanced by a gravitas of unhurried action, which makes the positive valuation of relaxing possible. To frame the matter differently, the two ways of relating [324]to time can also be regarded as a value conversion of sorts: the people engaged in wage work convert their labor time into money, whilst people who cannot do this get something else for theirs. I like to think of this “something” as a form of dignity in reference to Susana Narotzky’s (2016) work on Spanish popular calls for dignity and social worth by people who are otherwise regarded as surplus to requirements.


Convertibility of time
Often “value conversion” is used interchangeably with “substitution” in a way that points toward commodity exchange and relations between things (e.g., Thomas 1995). With regard to time, this echoes the classic Marxist theory: in Capital ([1887] 1999) it is not the use value of a thing, nor ultimately even the material costs, that dictate the prices of commodities exchanged in the market. Rather, exchange value is derived from the amount of labor time spent in the production of a thing. From this point of view, time is necessary for estimating the value of a commodity; time is what makes disparate things substitutable with one another in the market.
Yet time carries other values as well, though these may have little to do with the commensuration of things. These would be better discussed in terms of Louis Dumont’s ([1986] 1992: 237) use of “value” as “a word that allows us to consider the most diverse estimations of the good,” though maintaining C. A. Gregory’s (1997: 7–33) emphasis on coeval valuations. Gregory reminds us of the constant switching between systems that people are prone to do: “Human beings are never trapped in a single set of values” (ibid.: 8)—though neither can they fully disengage from these systems.
Alfred Gell ([1992] 1996) has highlighted the relevance of multiple valuations with regard to superfluous time. In his view, it is other, feasible worlds that make us capable of even talking about “wasting” or “killing” time:

We say things like “Henry spent the afternoon killing time,” which suggests that the afternoon in question was surplus to Henry’s requirements. But what this really means is that Henry had to wait out the afternoon, engaging in irksome, obligatory, underfinanced consumption, when in another world, he could have been engaged in activities more to his taste. . . . It is not the “‘objective” facts which make time surplus or deficient; “surplus” time is simply time which we have to spend doing X when we would rather be doing Y. (Gell [1992] 1996: 211)

The example Gell uses to elaborate his point is Sahlins’ (1972) interpretation of Charles Mountford’s 1960 Arnhem Land data. Sahlins labels the time-rich Arnhem Landers “affluent,” whilst Peter Just (1980) would label them “unemployed.” In Gell’s Justian interpretation, the Arnhem Landers “invest a lot of time in low-cost consumption, hanging about, conversation, football, etc. . . . the Arnheim-landers have such a leisurely lifestyle because they are poor, not because they are affluent” (Gell [1992] 1996: 213). Gell then goes on to deny Just’s view, too, pointing out that in order to be “unemployed,” one would have to at some level be able to entertain the hopes of employment, a condition he thinks does not apply to the Arnhem Landers in question.[325]
Gell’s idea of the value of time is thus defined by the existence of another, alternative set of activities that one has to be able to imagine substituting for whatever one is presently doing. Compare this to Yasmine Musharbash (2007: 315), who describes Yuendumu boredom as a mix of being “neither-there-anymore” (the boredom-free presettlement past) and “not-there-at-all” (the mainstream), showing how a sense of entrapment outside these worlds creates boredom.
There are traces of similar issues from colonial Fiji. “The Fijian now finds himself with a large amount of leisure time for which he has little or no use,” D. W. Hoodless warned in 1926 (Education Commission 1926: 91), claiming indigenous Fijians lacked “hobbies” owing to the discontinuation of traditional crafts. “The majority [of schooled Fijian boys] are idle because there are no vacancies in the clerical line for which they have been trained,” warned the Bua district chief Ratu Deve Toganivalu (ibid.: 93). Even “the modern Suva Fijian girl” required “something at which she can work in her spare time,” wrote Miss Tolley (1932: 7) of the Methodist mission. Yet I have never heard anyone complaining of boredom in twenty-first-century Fiji. Nor I have ever heard Nalotans expressing discontent with surplus time under other labels.
I have elsewhere (Eräsaari 2013: 44–56) discussed village discontentment as summed up by a family man in his late thirties whose career in the capital had failed. He called the village “the last place,” a fallback option when all other options had been exhausted. But as he himself hastened to emphasize, he was only speaking for himself; not everyone shares his evaluation. Yet, although there is an undeniably growing division now between the haves and have-nots, this does not divide people into “time investors” and “time wasters,” as in Craig Jeffrey’s (2010) description from India. Naloto villagers are constantly evaluating village life in comparison to life in town or overseas. Typically, a paradisiacal view of village life is constructed vis-à-vis the expenses of life in town: “In town everything costs money, in the village everything is free.” At the same time, the urban consumer lifestyle remains something Nalotans look up to as an achievement; even the nouveau riche, vucuniyau (“brimming with wealth”), are not scorned as much as respected, to a degree where even Paradise may appear a second choice. The “time surplus” available in Naloto might not translate into similar riches. But it does not constitute the worthless here-and-now of unemployment or boredom either.


Conclusions
In this article, I have looked at the notion of solosolo vakaVerata using Veblen’s idea of conspicuous leisure as a framework against which one can see how superfluous time can be valued. From the value of rest and relaxing to the use of time as a medium for leveling, “surplus” time can be seen as a bearer of value well beyond mere unrealized labor or an absence of activity. Like in Veblen’s model, so in Naloto, too, the value of time is “systematized” in interpersonal relations. The coercive power of leisure time offers an easy route to affirming its continuing relevance: attempts to denounce the leisure discipline make it only more tangible. It persists “in the blood.”[326]
In Naloto village, the positive connotations of solosolo vakaVerata are expressed in terms of “careful preparation,” “leaving nothing behind,” and reliability; ideals that may also be associated with Fijian tradition vis-à-vis a counterpart constructed out of the market economy, urbanization, Indo-Fijians, or simply change. But I have argued here that Verata, as a case in point, goes beyond that to provide a particular legitimating component. The expression solosolo vakaVerata evokes an idea of chiefliness, though not realized as Veblenian distinction as much as a positive alternative that complements Gell’s negative, boredom-creating alternate worlds.
“The Veratan way” could not be exactly like “conspicuous leisure,” a concept that emphasizes aristocratic entitlement together with the need for distinction. Moreover, neither the chiefdom of Verata nor the people of Naloto have the authority to enforce such ideals on the world surrounding them. The villagers may evoke chiefliness in a referential sense to dignify slowness, but this hardly means that others have to agree to slowness as value. Indeed, the career-making urbanites with whom I have discussed the matter were more likely to condemn their Naloto-based relatives’ delusions of grandeur and their “sleeping” village than to uphold the status of solosolo vakaVerata as a recognizable “good.”
Whether this should be discussed as stubborn insularity, “resistance,” a postcolonial reflex, or a subaltern value system of the Nalotans discussed here is beyond the scope of this article. Here I only want to point out the remarkableness of the feat: to be able to hold up such a valuation using the very medium—time—that has been the vehicle of market valuation and discipline requires rare circumstances. In a politically peripheral village such as Naloto, a career with a good salary and a pension fund carries prestige of a different order. But in a village where, I have repeatedly understood, most adults would happily swap village life for a good job in town, solosolo vakaVerata appears to rescue a degree of dignity for those who have been left behind by their wealthier urban relatives.
Ultimately, this is what ought to make “wasting time in the Veratan way” interesting beyond just the ethnographer’s curiosity. Regardless of the fact that the value extracted out of surplus time in Naloto remains contested—actually seems to be worthless outside Naloto?—it remains that Nalotans, unlike many other peripheral, displaced, or “reserve” communities, manage to realize the value of their surplus time in their own terms.


Acknowledgments
The research conducted for this article was made possible by a British Academy Newton International Fellowship and the Finnish Foundations’ Post Doc Pool grant. In addition to the funders, I would like to thank everyone who commented on versions of this article at conferences and other presentations: AAS 2015, ASA 2016, Canberra, Sydney, and my colleagues in Manchester. Finally, I thank Matt Tomlinson for his help, and the anonymous reviewers whose suggestions and comments made this a better article.[327]


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“Perdre son temps,” façon Veratan: le loisir ostentatoire et la valeur de l’attente à Fiji
Résumé : Cet article explore le temps comme vecteur de valeur à Fiji à travers l’analyse de l’abondance du temps libre. L’analyse ethnographique est menée auprès de la chefferie Fijienne de Verata, où l’appréhension de la lenteur, de la préparation, de la relaxation et même de la “perte de temps” illustre une alternative à l’estimation du temps abstraite et fondée sur le travail. Cet article fixe sa focale sur le village de Naloto situé tout juste en dehors de l’aire métropolitaine de Fiji, et qui comprend une communauté hétéroclite de travailleurs salariés de la ville et de villageois permanents sans accès au travail salarié. L’article suggère que de leur point de vue, la perte de temps n’est peut-être pas aussi précieuse qu’un emploi stable à la ville, mais est néanmoins un vecteur de valeur.
Matti ERÄSAARI is an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Researcher in social anthropology at the University of Helsinki. His research interests span time and value, food and drink, ceremonial exchange, money, as well as the early contact period in Fiji. He is the author of “We are the originals: A study of value in Fiji” (University of Helsinki, 2013) and the coeditor (with Katja Uusihakala) of Ruoan kulttuuri (SKS, 2016), a Finnish-language volume on the anthropology of food.
Matti EräsaariSocial and Cultural AnthropologyP.O. Box 1800014 University of HelsinkiFinlandmatti.erasaari@helsinki.fi


___________________
1. The racialized history of wage labor and labor time in Fiji is an integral part of the issue discussed here. I have examined the historical trajectories of Fiji time in more detail elsewhere (Eräsaari, unpublished). Moreover, this history has produced a set of ethnic assumptions, which are also linked with the kinds of self-understandings discussed in this article. However, in order to avoid further stereotyping interethnic relations, I will leave discussion of these assumptions to an occasion where I can do it in more detail.
2. All names used in this article are pseudonyms.
3. The word covers a range of meanings, from relaxing and resting to what might be best translated as “serenity,” “peacefulness,” and so forth.
4. Vakacegu is also used to relay news of a death, and some urban employed Nalotans associate village retirement with “waiting for death.”
5. On the difference between vanua, koro, and lotu organization in Naloto, see Eräsaari (2013: 112–13); on vanua ideology, see Tuwere (2002); Nabobo-Baba (2006).)
6. In Naloto, “tin houses” are also built collectively.
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						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>08</day>
				<month>08</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="107">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1946" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1946/4484" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1946/4485" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In Pakistan’s Karakoram Mountain range, two Shi‘i Muslim communities write monumental messages in stone. Nizari Isma‘ilis celebrate the continuation of their Imamate, a divine political institution led by a Hazar [present] Imam. Twelver Shi’a signal their loyalty to their own system of Imamat, which paused at the concealed twelfth Imam whose return promises to restore justice to the world. Shi‘i mountain writing is found in direct conversation, surfacing the theological schism that bifurcates these Muslim communities, and inviting acts of comparison between two interpretations of the divine institution of Imamate. This article contends that the scale of analysis in this comparative exercise is the present, understood here as a theological interface that connects immediate and latent situations, and affairs that lie beyond the human horizon.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/932</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:35:50Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">698360</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/698360</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Divining, testing, and the problem of accountability</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Divining, testing, and the problem of accountability</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Beisel</surname>
						<given-names>Uli</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Bayreuth</aff>
					<email>uli.beisel@uni-bayreuth.de</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Calkins</surname>
						<given-names>Sandra</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology</aff>
					<email>calkins@eth.mpg.de</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Rottenburg</surname>
						<given-names>Richard</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Halle</aff>
					<email>richard.rottenburg@ethnologie.uni-halle.de</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>21</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2018</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date>
			<volume>8</volume>
			<issue seq="407">1-2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau8.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2018 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2018</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698360" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/pdf" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698360/3123" />
			<self-uri content-type="text/html" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698360/3124" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Rejoinder to Whyte, Sue Reynolds, Michael Whyte, and David Kyanddondo. 2018. “Technologies of inquiry: HIV tests and divination.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 97–108</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Rejoinder to Whyte, Sue Reynolds, Michael Whyte, and David Kyanddondo. 2018. “Technologies of inquiry: HIV tests and divination.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 97–108</p></abstract-trans>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1757</identifier>
				<datestamp>2023-06-18T20:32:29Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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<article
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1757</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/725343</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Uncanny ethics: Locating the coordinates of the ethical in the COVID-19 pandemic</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Farah</surname>
						<given-names>Sumbul</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>18</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2023</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="205">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The recent anthropological focus on “ordinary ethics” emerges out of a concern to attend to the ethical aspect of social action that is intrinsic to the human condition. Ethnographic and theoretical contributions to this literature have drawn on a variety of philosophical approaches to the study of the “everyday” and the forms that ethical practice takes therein. However, a world affected by the COVID-19 pandemic is far from the “everyday” that is the domain of ordinary ethics and calls for a reconceptualization of the ethical, which could provide coordinates of meaningful interaction in the unfamiliar social. In this “uncanny” world, I seek to explore the layered meanings of care and its implications for an ethics of the uncanny. While the uncanny is an epistemological condition of modernity itself, the alteration brought about by the pandemic makes it ontologically uncanny too. Locked in a cyclical relationship, the uncanny and the everyday inexorably follow the other, making it imperative to conceptualize an ethics that can accommodate the singularities of both.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>Becoming like money: Proximity and the social aesthetics of “moneyness”</article-title>
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					<aff>Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU)
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article I take the scene of a group of South Indian villagers perceiving and counting a heap of collective money as a starting point to look at qualitative, subjective, and contextual variations through which money manifests itself as valued properties, circuits, performances, acts, repertoires, and capacities in social and personal life. As I argue, this requires us to scrutinize the shifting proximities between money objects and money subjects. I trace these through the notion of “moneyness,” and more precisely through the relational property of being (or getting) “in,” “at,” and “out” of what money is, becomes, and represents.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article I take the scene of a group of South Indian villagers perceiving and counting a heap of collective money as a starting point to look at qualitative, subjective, and contextual variations through which money manifests itself as valued properties, circuits, performances, acts, repertoires, and capacities in social and personal life. As I argue, this requires us to scrutinize the shifting proximities between money objects and money subjects. I trace these through the notion of “moneyness,” and more precisely through the relational property of being (or getting) “in,” “at,” and “out” of what money is, becomes, and represents.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Becoming like money






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Jens M. Zickgraf. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.1.022
Becoming like money
Proximity and the social aesthetics of “moneyness”
Jens M. ZICKGRAF, Universität Heidelberg


In this article I take the scene of a group of South Indian villagers perceiving and counting a heap of collective money as a starting point to look at qualitative, subjective, and contextual variations through which money manifests itself as valued properties, circuits, performances, acts, repertoires, and capacities in social and personal life. As I argue, this requires us to scrutinize the shifting proximities between money objects and money subjects. I trace these through the notion of “moneyness,” and more precisely through the relational property of being (or getting) “in,” “at,” and “out” of what money is, becomes, and represents.
Keywords: money, moneyness, value and values, form and abstraction, becoming and being



“Her voice is full of money,” he said suddenly. That was it. I’d never understood before. It was full of money—that was the inexhaustible charm that rose and fell in it, the jingle of it, the cymbals’ song of it. (F. Scott Fitzgerald, The great Gatsby [1925] 1995)

One might agree that money is a common resource or token that is transacted, pooled, stored, and even multiplied as currency and debt in the name of value. And as Simmel argued, “The more people develop relationships with one another, the more abstract and generally acceptable must be their medium of exchange” ([1900] 2005: 348). However, anthropologists of money (for an overview, see Parry and Bloch 1989; Maurer 2006; Hart and Ortiz 2014) are increasingly fascinated with the idea that pecunia is subject to continuous change and appropriation, while as medium and “process” (see especially Dodd 2014: 272) it has to “bridge the gap between everyday personal experience and a society whose wider reaches are impersonal” (Hart 2008: 5).[304]
As to that, my concern in this article is with the socioaesthetic process that brings money objects and money subjects into mutual existence. Rather than starting from money as such—that is, by treating money as an object in its own right, or by placing an “arbitrary limit . . . on the use of the word” (Mauss [1925] 2016: 91, ch. II, n. 29)—I take “monetization” or “becoming like money” as a point of departure. Contrary to an epistemology of (infinite) distancing and abstraction, I use ethnography to show that (relative) closeness, form, and quality are fundamental with regard to that process. And, insofar as I refer to “social aesthetics,” I think of “culturally patterned [fields of] sensory experience . . . composed of objects and actions” (MacDougall 1999: 5), of habitus and embodiment (Bourdieu 1977), and of the role that money plays in that it resonates with our “style of life” (Simmel [1900] 2005: ch. 6).1
In the following I will discuss and in some respect redefine the qualitative notion of “moneyness,” which, I believe, provides an important angle for anthropologists. Subsequently I shall turn to an ethnographic case of South Indian villagers creating, perceiving, counting, and embodying a heap of village money. The rest of the article discusses how “moneyness” may be addressed as a relational property of money objects and money subjects that emerges and vanishes with forms of physical and ascribed proximity.

Moneyness
As far as I am aware, “moneyness” has remained both unchallenged by and without conceptual appeal to anthropologists. Perhaps this is not too surprising. Where scholars employed the term at all, it was to account for what Simmel called the “essential quality of money” ([1900] 2005: 117) and which he subsequently specified as “the purest expression and embodiment” (ibid.) of “the value of things without the things themselves” (ibid.: 119). Thus, according to Ingham (2004: 5, 12, 14) moneyness is what uniquely specifies money regardless of form. Having identified “measure of abstract value” (for Ingham as well as for Keynes: the money of account, created by the state) and “transporting this abstract value” as the prime conditions of money, he contends that it is through the former that moneyness is “assigned” or “conferred” to whatever “form” of money (ibid.: 70–71).
Both my project and my definition are different. Most monies, of course, share the common feature that they “enable us to transform qualitative relations between values into quantitative ones” (Dodd 2005: 409; cf. Simmel [1900] [305]2005: 278). Yet the same feature is only attractive because it also holds the other way round: money in hand, or, more generally, “control over monetary means,” enables us to express and extend identity (Simmel [1900] 2005: 327f.), to transact desire (Buchan 2001; Yuran 2014), power, status, and history (E. Wolf 1982; Gregory 1997; Graeber 2011), to determine what money does or how and for what it pays (Zelizer 1994: 18–21, 201; Maurer 2015), and thus to realize qualitative relations and concrete “values.” One can thus agree in some respect that moneyness is both assignable and conferrable and that it has something to do with transporting and comparing value. However, I argue that it is the dialectic tension between value-realization and value-abstraction that specifies moneyness in the form of monies—plural and, importantly, as facts, qualities, and capacities in human life.
Therefore, I am not at all in line with Ingham where he explicitly points out the “widespread category error whereby ‘moneyness’ is identified with a particular ‘form’ of money” (Ingham 2004: 14, cf. 70–80). Quite to the contrary: the true category error emerged when Simmel philosophized upon “pure money” while he knew that such money could not exist in any strict sense (see Dodd 2007: 275). It was this working fiction, through which Simmel and many of his followers imagined money a priori as the “the most terrible destroyer of form” ([1900] 2005: 274) and then—of all things—pointed to an “empirical world” where the quality of money was precisely that “only money is free from any quality and exclusively determined by quantity” (ibid.: 281). This was at the heart of what Simmel ([1900] 2005: 221, 478–84) regarded as an overall socioaesthetic process of “distancing” (Distanzvergrößerung) which he thought to be characteristic of modern life and, simultaneously, the result of monetization (see also Simmel [1896] 2009). However, as we shall see, distance, closeness, capacity, and form are densely interwoven in the social fabrics of money—and moneyness, the quality, may be more usefully applied to the contextual uses and manifestations of money: a dollar or an Indian rupee are interchangeable units of account and their moneyness can render things comparable or rank values in terms of a quantitative assessment. But what if dollars not only monetize but dollarize? And if the rupee, to quote a former Indian finance minister, “reflects and captures the Indian ethos and culture”?2 More generally: If abstract value is a key feature of money precisely because it represents the potential of realizing concrete values, how about thinking of moneyness as the relational property which pertains to such realization? Obviously, this means turning to another kind of definition.
Notably, research on derivatives has challenged the idea of money insofar as derivatives may be seen as “money in a newly created self-mediating form” (LiPuma and Lee 2004: 48) that “serves to blur the distinctions between money and capital” (Bryan and Rafferty 2011: 177). Now, in the technical language of finance practitioners, the term “moneyness” refers to an indicator that describes the “condition” of a derivative, namely as being “in,” “at,” and “out” of the money. It does so by way of relating its strike price (fixed by contract as an option to be exercised up to the expiration date) to its underlying asset (at any current rate). In other words, “moneyness describes [306]the intrinsic value of an option in its current state”3—and this state solely refers to the question of what would be if the option were to be exercised right now—that is, if it were to become like money. Of course, from the trader’s technical point of view, such final “realization” means just gain or loss. Yet the terminology of being “in” (signifying a temporary potential), “at” (break-even), and “out” of the money (signifying temporary failure) is intriguing, because it indicates the proximity of an option (and of its holder!) to what money represents in a given but still developing scenario.4
In the following, I borrow these terms, but I do not intend to use them exactly at par: according to my definition, moneyness is a relational property that concerns the potential and the power of becoming and being like money the social fact and process rather than the quantitative expression: that is, moneyness is an embodied and dialectically constructed relation with the shifting potential of being “in,” “at,” and “out” of what money as medium represents, demands, and allows for—at a given time, place, and situation (hence the “realization” of money). In this sense, I suggest thinking of moneyness in more aesthetic and semiotic terms—namely with reference to the physical or ascribed proximity of something or somebody to whatever is represented in or conferred through the focal relation(s) that money constitutes as a concrete medium, a process, and a common reference to value.
For the sake of brevity, the rest of this article focuses on observations of people’s moneyness, which is, anthropologically speaking, of particular importance (i.e., money is made, valued, perceived, and used by people). The following example of an annual ceremony of physically counting village taxes in rural South India provides a rich opportunity to enter into a broader analysis of how moneyness is in fact not a quality of money as such but emerges from social, cultural, and indeed sensual and bodily interaction among people as well as through acts of “getting in touch” with and connecting through a seemingly neutral but in the process actively value-laden (monetary) medium.


Perceiving the money heap

The human gaze has a power of conferring value on things; but it makes them cost more too. (Wittgenstein 1980: 1e)

Consider the following scene: a group of no more than twenty South Indian villagers sit or stand in front of their main temple. All are male, most are elders, and all belong to the same ethnic community. The main village (ur) and fourteen associated hamlets (hatti) are also exclusively inhabited by this community. They are small tea growers, tea factory owners, and educated professionals. Today those who are formally required and those who are interested to join have gathered for the [307]purpose of counting the village tax. Two weeks earlier the tax was collected along with considerable donations among the “thousand houses” (ur and hattis) in cash. This was done in the course of the annual celebration of the villagers’ main religious festival. As we shall see below, the festival, the collection of taxes and donations, and the counting mark the end as well as the beginning of a yearly ritual and fiscal cycle.5
Since the group has assembled at the temple, all are barefoot. Besides this there is little formality. Most have dressed in white dhoties (dhoti: long cloth wound around the hip). Some of the men are wearing white shirts, and one, the village headman, also wears a white turban. Together, these three items make up the traditional men’s attire worn during all ritual and festive occasions, but it is not a requirement for the present event. A few distinctions are thus visible in the men’s manner of dress: the headman, the oldest man in the village, two minor headmen who each preside over a part of the main village, the priest of the village’s main deity, a retired politician who used to be a district treasurer, a lawyer, and a few cultivators wear white dhoties and white shirts. Meanwhile two others wear a white dhoti with striped, colored shirts. One is the comparatively young son of the priest who works as a life insurance agent. The other is a retired engineer who used to work for a major Indian company and has often traveled to Europe. Yet three other men are dressed in strikingly different attire: one, a retired teacher, wears pleated trousers, a white shirt, and a blue slipover. Another wears blue jeans and a striped business shirt. He is one of the local tea factory owners. One man’s dress, however, stands out in particular: he is a factory owner, but he is also the undisputed patron of the entire area, owning not one but several factories, a private school, and a gated community, as well as extensive landholdings. Moreover, he is the financial trustee of the village fund. This man is dressed neatly in black trousers, a light blue shirt, a yellow jacket, and a golf hat.
The priest opens a side door of the temple. He lights a lamp and conducts a small puja (offering to the village god). The bright sound of a bell and the smell of camphor are in the air. Blankets are laid out on the floor under the temple’s canopy, and most attendees sit down, forming a closed circle (fig. 1). The son of the priest opens a number of thick white bags containing the collected tax and additional donations. He also opens a few boxes containing offerings made at the temple during the festival. With a propitious susurration and jingling, he pours the money onto the ground. He empties one bag after another, and a heap grows in the center of the circle. The money is now the focus of all attendees. A few people comment on the “happy” sound of money, some others on the optical distribution of denominations, while others try to estimate the total amount or to compare the size of the money heap with memories of preceding years. As soon as the last bag is emptied, all who are present collectively touch the money. Then the sorting and counting begins. The money heap remains the focus while multiple hands mingle with each other as rustling notes and jingling coins are spread flat and distributed within the circle. The flurry of activity seems chaotic, but the scene is thoroughly structured.[308]


Figure 1: Counting village money. (All photos by the author.)

First, three men maintain a distance from the money. Like everyone else, they touched the money once all the bags were emptied, but now they do not sit within the circle. These three are the priest, the village headman, and the rich patron. Of them, the priest keeps the largest physical distance from the money heap while still watching the whole procedure. During the last village festival he and the village headman jointly led a procession of devotees who, over a period of several days, visited all the “thousand houses” of the village and its hamlets in order to collect the tax. Even then, the priest did not touch the money and never performed the gesture of receipt, only giving blessings in return. Now, the collected money is counted in the name of the village deity. Representing the god, the priest’s presence is indispensable. Yet, except for the moment of collective touching, he remains physically detached from the money. Similarly, the headman is not involved in counting. Unlike the priest, however, he sits on a bench close to the circle. When the counting is done, he will receive the money on behalf of the village and will publicly announce the final amount. Though he is the political authority of the village, and though he is responsible for the money, throughout the year he will not keep the money with him. That is the role of the third man: the rich patron. Seated next to the headman, the patron will be entrusted by him with the economic management of the village money. Since the rich patron has an undisputed capacity to guarantee the money, he will take and invest (on-lend) it throughout the year and as long as the money is not needed by the village. Though some villagers notoriously hold different opinions, it is also true that he shares the profit from on-lending with the village. Apart from that he will also quickly advance and often donate cash wherever it is needed for the common good. Like the headman and the priest, the rich patron does not sit and count within the circle. As the trustee, his role in the procedure is to cross-check the bundles of banknotes counted by the others with final authority.[309]
Second, three persons within the circle assume different functions. One is the son of the priest. He takes part in the counting, but was also responsible for opening the bags and pouring the money out. Another is the retired teacher. He also counts, but his main duty is to note the value of each counted bundle on a sheet of paper and, finally, to add up the total amount, which will later be cross-checked by the patron. However, there is one man in the circle who neither counts nor sorts, nor staples, that is, the oldest man of the village. He sits close to the temple wall and appears to do nothing. Yet all banknotes, after having been sorted, bundled, counted (inside the circle), passed to the patron, approved (outside the circle), passed back to the teacher, and listed (inside the circle), are kept next to him.


Figure 2: From left to right: the patron, the headman, the oldest man, the factory owner, the politician.

Third, although there is no formal role for the other people in the seated circle, the performances of at least three stand out. One is the former district treasurer. He had a considerable career as a politician, and still maintains good contacts with and beyond the local administration, police, judges, parties, associations, and businessmen. In town he runs a registered chit-fund (Rotating Savings and Credit Association), and it is also an open secret that he is capable of mediating bribes and acting as a broker of big finance. Apart from that he is a forthright, charismatic person and a respected village elder who is always consulted on village and family affairs. Though he owns a big house and his influence may be feared by many, he displays, and indeed leads in some respects, a simple village life—wearing nothing but traditional dress, serving the community, attending festivals, funerals, and meetings, chatting with ordinary people, and working his own garden. In all this, he is well aware of the mysterious aura he radiates through his ascribed proximity to money, power, and people; and he knows how to play it perfectly. Thus, after the initial phase of rough presorting, he immediately grabs the big banknotes—first the 1,000 rupee notes, then the 500 rupee notes. This causes a few spontaneous joking comments. Yet what follows (to his great and joyfully staged pleasure) is that everyone who digs out big banknotes from the collective heap passes them over to him.
Meanwhile, the performance of the factory owner wearing the blue jeans and striped shirt is nearly the complete opposite. His dress is not really appropriate for the temple, but the choice indicates both his economic status and his modern attitude. Normally he is not much interested in village affairs, but like all local factory owners he has considerable economic influence, makes (and is expected to make) huge donations to the temple, and advances money to peasants prior to the festival. Presently, however, he faces an acute shortage of liquidity. It is a badly kept secret [310]that he came to the temple with the intention of borrowing village money for interest as soon as it is given to the patron. Throughout the entire counting process, he engages in subtle understatement: he modestly prefers counting smaller denominations—50 rupee notes, 10 rupee notes, 5 rupee notes, and, ultimately, even the smallest of the coins.
A third member of those involved in counting, the retired engineer, sits not next to but close to the teacher. Indeed, he carefully watches, announces, and comments upon what the latter notes. Later he also helps to check and confirm the teacher’s calculations. Commenting on this performance, which did not, however, particularly deviate from that of other men on the left and right of the teacher, an informant later identified him as being “always close to the [collective] funds,” remarking, moreover, that he was anxious for cross-checking and correctness since members of his family had recently accused him of mishandling joint land documents.
Other participants in the counting did not stand out in particular. Nevertheless, there were observable nuances concerning individual dress, gestures, speech, and so on, as they each embodied village money through their presence, personality, relations, and behavior, and through the fact that they had each contributed their own tax and donations, representing their house and family, to the heap. Importantly, the latter is true for all the “thousand houses” of the village (ur and hattis). All villagers are “in” the money of the scene (and all villagers could attend the counting), but some are even more so, some are particularly close.
What the scene thus shows is a set of people creating, experiencing, and indeed personalizing moneyness in a shared and enfolding monetary context that includes cash, the village, the temple, the preceding festival, the known identities, formal roles, and spontaneous acts of those who are present. The entire scene is contained within an atmosphere that embraces sacredness, cooperation, and togetherness. Yet overall there is the focal relationship to the coins and notes which is constituted by the centricity of the money heap, by the physical and ascribed proximities of attendees, by each attendee’s personality, body, and background, as well as by the collective spirit with which village money—now visible, audible, tangible, and countable—is already imbued.


Village money or villagers’ money: What’s “in” their heap?
There remains a considerable lack of ethnographic research on money and monetary culture in India. Yet money hardly possesses the same kind of autonomy with which it is credited in the West. Parry, for example, tends to locate the flow of Indian monies within a more encompassing process of circulation that includes souls and substances and “which maintains the cosmic and social orders” (1989: 81). In precolonial South India, a great deal of exchanges in goods and services used to be embedded in relations of caste and kin, whereas the flow of money appeared abundant precisely where it marked life-cycle events as well as the spiritual, social, and political integration of society (see Parthasarathi 2016). This also resonated with the revenue system and the state, whose power “continued to be constrained by the power of local communities” (ibid.: 18), while the institutions of (village) temples and temple endowments were linchpins of taxation and decentralized rule [311](see Appadurai 1978; Morrison and Sinopoli 1992). More generally, the legacy of Indian money was and perhaps still is not that it veiled or alienated social, moral, material, and spiritual relations, but that it could help make and exemplify such relations (see also Miller 1986; Rudner 1994; Chari 2004).
How does this pertain to the villagers and the counting scene? And in which sense does moneyness provide us with a viable lens? “Village” refers in this case to a complex of a “thousand houses” (roughly true) which comprises the main village (ur) and fourteen surrounding hamlets (hatti). The latter were founded either by descendants of the main village or—as violations of the general rule of patrilocality are not altogether uncommon—by affine groups who joined later but “bow down” (i.e., pray and pay their tax!) before the political authority of the ur, the main temple which is called “the first house,” and the joint council over which the headman presides.6 The god, an avatar of Shiva, is identified as the mythical founder of the village and the ancestor of the main local lineage. It should also be noted that the entire complex is part of a far larger regional settlement structure of the same endogamous community. The “thousand houses” are thus related through their various agnate and affine ties that constitute and permeate the levels of their territorial, political, economic, and ritual integration both within and beyond the hattis and the ur.
Relatedness involves strong normative values of cooperation, respect, and solidarity that pertain with varying force to all levels of such integration. However, within the whole, individuals and groups compete for influence and recognition while economic development, too, tends to reformulate local relations in many ways. Income, education, profession, social commitment, and reputation are crucial determinants of an individual’s achieved status in society. At the same time a person’s reputation, contacts, power, and wealth are shared through large networks of kin, alliance, neighborhood, friendship, and patronage. Notably, when tea cultivation and industrial tea production became the community’s economic mainstay during the twentieth century, factory owners emerged as powerful modern elites, while hamlets, with the financial help of “their” factory owners, sought to enhance public recognition and to create a “relative” sovereignty within the “thousand houses”—constructing, for example, new temples, celebrating their own festivals, selecting their own (minor) headmen, priests, and councils, collecting a separate tax, creating their own funds, and investing in common goods such as village schools, roads, bus stops, community halls, cooperative stores, certain kinds of mutual insurance (in particular for funeral expenses), and so on.
Now it is important to note, although I cannot do it due justice here, that there is virtually no fundamental relation among villagers and in fact among the entire community at all that is not accompanied by a whole set of monetary expressions: ritual payments that must be made to honor the relation with gods, territories, ancestors, as well as (living) family elders; both bridewealth and dowry to create and maintain the ties between affine lineages; intergenerational networks of mutual monetary support that mobilize and meticulously record (in writing) the visits and the monetary gifts of even very distant relations in the frequent events of family [312]functions, funerals, house constructions, sickness, and hospitalization; taxes, fees, and fines with respect to all kinds of traditional authority and membership; an even more complex culture of fundraising and donation; advance payments “free of interest” in the competitive supply chain of tea production; a financial landscape that reflects (and often renegotiates) relatedness in terms of cheap or dear, secured or unsecured loans, or, indeed, in terms of running into debt for a beloved one or a good purpose, as well as in terms of the performance of collective monies such as are involved in self-help groups, rotating and accumulating savings and credit associations, cooperative banks, and village, funeral, and temple funds. “No money prospers without relations,” or “without relations there is no use for money,” to use villagers’ common expressions.7
What, then, is the value of the money heap? And how was the heap created? As I indicated at the beginning, the money was collected by a large procession of voluntary devotees during the villagers’ main festival, which is celebrated in the name of Shiva and the founding ancestor. In the course of several festival days, the procession had crossed all internal divisions. Each time they conducted a puja and paid a kanike (small ritual tribute in cash) to the community’s various ancestor and border stones. At various points of the track they were zealously hosted with coffee breaks and feastings along with up to several thousand guests.8 In turn the procession “brought the god” to each of the “thousand houses,” where they collected the tax and blessed the members. Finally, at the temple ground and under the frenetic applause of spectators, the procession had moved one by one through a trench of glowing embers with nothing but their bare feet—and, with divine blessing, all of them “walked very nicely,” and none of them “got burned.” Collecting and bearing the villagers’ money, for some time the procession had rendered the flow of money equal with both the movement and the belonging of people9—demonstrating to themselves as well as to outsiders the strength of their community, and literally earning in this way the blessing of their ancestral god. As villagers say: “If the village is good, there is good money rolling.”
By no means is this to be taken for granted. The festival and the tax collection pertain to the unity of all the “thousand houses,” but it is not an easy task to make money go round smoothly in the village and across all of its factions and leaders. As Béteille put it more generally with regard to south Indian villages “unity . . . [313]is a changing reality, varying according to context and situation” (1965: 75; cf. R. K. Wolf 1997). Throughout the year, conflicts (about land, money, tea prices, politics, love, marriage and divorce, ritual responsibilities, council decisions, claims to sovereignty and leadership, etc.) are the norm rather than the exception; and “unity” may involve “units” as diverse as the house, the neighborhood, the family, the lineage, the hamlet, the small growers and factory owners, the individual patrons and their clients, the young and the old generations, the modernists and the traditionalists, and so on. It is commonplace that lingering conflicts escalate prior to or during the festival. If conflicting parties cannot be pacified, sometimes the entire festival and the collection are canceled (though this is very rare), or (more frequently) the procession cannot visit some of the houses or hamlets (meaning that some are either not allowed or not willing to pay their tax). Another consequence even of minor tensions may be that devotees burn their feet or have to “run” in the course of the fire-walk. Hence, what makes the value of the money heap is first and foremost the fact that (or the degree to which) the money was “successfully” collected among all their “thousand houses.”
Beginning with elaborate preparations, the entire festival, the rituals, the procession, and the collection combine into a staged performance of the villagers’ dynamic relations. As far as the flow of money is concerned, it is crucial to note that the festival involves not only the collection of taxes but also donations. Taxes are nominally levied to cover the expected expense of the festival (and in fact many other collective expenses throughout the year). They are equal and bearable for each house and in this sense each house contributes an equal share. In contrast, donations are voluntarily given both in cash along with the tax (which is relatively unproblematic and mostly given on behalf of a house’s married daughters) and in kind according to the material needs of the festival—in particular the prestigious events of hosting the procession and guests at variable(!) points along their route. Donations are rhetorically framed as prayers or loving commitments but implicitly they are also given (and expected) to reflect the pride, status, power, and wealth of an individual, a house, a lineage, a factory, or an entire hamlet. These are often interlinked. Thus, a factory owner may cover the major expense of a feasting in his hamlet. His patrilineage may contribute the necessary workforce and, if the council of that hamlet approves, it may support the cause before the “thousand houses” council and finally levy a small tax among its own houses to make sure that the whole hamlet contributes. However, beforehand, those who want to “show their love” (and strength) toward the community may also be strongly opposed by others. Since coffee breaks and feastings in particular are not only expensive, but also affect the exact route of the procession, how long they will stay in which place and not least the number of visitors who will join in that place, these need to be collectively approved and organized weeks before the festival starts. In fact, it is precisely where distinct units seek to make outstanding contributions to the common good that conflicts almost habitually erupt prior to the festival and threaten the unity of the “thousand houses.” However, insofar as villagers do finally succeed in reconciling their prevailing tensions in terms of mutual cooperation and compromise and thus to celebrate the festival “without disturbance,” the sum of donations may easily cover and exceed the total festival expense while the (equal) tax makes sure that everybody, including the ancestral god himself, is “in” the money. This is what [314]makes village money prosper—that is, what makes heaps and collective funds grow and what informs and reflects at least in one sense all other monetary flows and all the relations in the village: past, present, and future. It is the moneyness of village money—and this can hardly be better expressed than with the words of the priest, who explained:

The money which is given at the festival will roll around the village until it comes to the deva mane [main temple, first house]. This is considered as very prosperous and will give a good new year with good money rolling. Without festival there is no money and no history. (A. Pujari, “thousand houses,” 2012)



Money subjects and money objects, or: The value of personal action and the value form of money
Notwithstanding the fact that monetary value has quantitative dimensions, what I hope to have shown so far is how money may simultaneously be enacted, charged, and embodied as value through concrete people’s actions, behavior, formal responsibilities, and personality (i.e., the counting ceremony), as much as it may appear and flow (i.e., the heap and the procession) as an embodiment of the generalized values and relations that are shared, enacted, and ritually incorporated by a larger kind of community (i.e., the “thousand houses”). As Graeber notes:

Value is simply how we represent the meaning or importance of our own actions to ourselves. . . . This must also necessarily happen through some material medium: if not money then treasures, tokens, performances, privileges, and so on. . . . Since value may only be realized in the eyes of others . . . “society” largely emerges as the audience . . . for the realization of value. (Graeber 2009: 108, my emphasis)10

Importantly, values (plural) may not only be objectified as value (singular) through the form of money but also be generalized as “ethical value” (Lambek 2013: 141–44) incorporated in and circulated through “performative acts,” “judgment,” and what Lambek calls the “cumulation of acknowledgments” (ibid.: 156). Lambek illustrates this in an intriguing reinterpretation of the gift and the Maussian obligations to give, accept, and return. As he argues, the latter are “acts that are the gift and . . . the gift qua object is merely the materialization of the acts” (ibid.: 151, original emphasis). In a similar vein one could argue that the core feature of money is neither the thing nor abstract value as such, but being transacted.
In this regard, a hallmark in the field was Munn’s (1986) restudy of Melanesian valuables in terms of Gawan spacetimes.11 Munn starts with the question of how [315]value rests on a community’s (or person’s) capacity to become an “agent of its own value creation” (ibid.: 20). This capacity, she argues, is procedural and lies in the “act” of manipulating the expansion and contraction of “intersubjective spacetimes.” In speaking of value, she therefore does not strictly distinguish between value and values but rather points to the complementary “templates” (ibid.: 121) of “more general” and “more particular” levels of value that Gawans experience when they throw into circulation and thus into the spatiotemporal sphere of public consideration (and memory) not only exchangeable goods and prestige items but indeed the transactors’ valuable bodies, names, and hierarchies, the spacetimes of fame, and the qualisigns of both their joint and individual performances and characters (see also ibid.: 8–9, 11f.). Crucially, where Munn refers to exchange as such, she borrows the Marxian term of the “value form” in order to indicate that an element, conceived as “an act and its medium . . . finds ‘the form of its own value’ in the shape of another” (ibid.: 148, n. 34, emphasis added). Value thus “emerges in action” (Graeber 2001: 45). What appears as money (or medium) is in fact just one value form among others.
It is precisely in regard to these notions that, in the remainder of this article, I turn to a more general discussion of how moneyness—that is, what I defined as the relational (and therefore predominantly contextual) property that is grounded in the potential of getting “in,” “at,” and “out” of what money as medium, form, and socioaesthetic process represents, demands, and allows for—may be approached through notions of physical and ascribed proximity.


Physical proximity

The individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in his pocket. (Marx [1939] 2005: 157)

Proximity marks the intensity of the merger between money subjects and money objects. A direct form of personal moneyness thus emerges and vanishes with physical closeness to or distance from that which appears to be the money media. As in the example of the counting, it can enfold through acts of grabbing, holding, carrying, operating, or standing close—and, in a more general sense, through any condition of effective or even affective access. Literally, if one holds money in one’s hand or when one opens a purse, one is “at” the money—and the degree of being “at” the money indicates a temporal, subjective potential of becoming “like” money (or of money becoming like you).
Insofar as money derives its multiplicity from the differentiated meanings conferred whenever it is in our possession (see Zelizer 1994: 208–11), the condition of being “at” the money has powerful connotations: the bearer gets “in”-to the immediate (physical) control of what the money does and where it goes next, to whom or what it conveys meaning, value, and moneyness, as well as when, how, and why. At the same time, somebody who is “at” the money is neither independent of those who may be otherwise involved as initial givers, receivers, supplicants, owners, co-owners, or spectators (i.e., society, Graeber’s “audience”; see above), nor is he or she independent of need, of moral or social context, location, and atmosphere. As the bearer gets “in”-to it, so are other aspects already contained with the money.[316]
In the example of the money heap, it is the preceding festival, the aura of the temple, the known identity of each attendee and indeed all the members, events, disputes, and memories of the “thousand houses” that are already “in” the money of the scene. All individual proximity is further structured: the priest, the headman, and the richest man each keep a distance in respect of their status, wealth, or office. Their physical distance in turn highlights the closeness of all other attendees: those villagers who sit in the circle but do not particularly stand out; the district treasurer, who deliberately grabs a few 1,000 rupee notes from the heap and attracts in this way a directional flow of 1,000 rupee notes full of social meaning; the factory owner, who counts only small denominations but wears blue jeans and speculates on the possibility of borrowing the collective money afterward; or the oldest man, at whose back the counted and approved money rests for some time in undisputed neutrality. What constitutes moneyness is thus neither the money media themselves nor individual subjects but their joint presences and what their shifting proximities relate, how, when, and why.
There is, however, more involved in physical proximity than people, their personalities, and just any kind of money. It is the particular form of the money medium which resonates with the closeness of attendees—the tangibility, audibility, and visibility of coins and notes that weigh, jingle, rustle, and attract the eye when they are counted or change hands; the perceptibility, centricity, and beauty of a growing heap; the impression of quantity; the variance of denominations, which enables counting big notes or small coins as well as the order that emerges when notes are bundled and coins are stacked, to be placed at the old man’s back. The quality of the money medium is valuable as it speaks to the senses, responds to action, and allows for the articulation of aesthetically embedded practices such as collective touching12 or darshan,13 the joint performance of counting, and the appropriation and testimony of flows and directionalities. In short, the form, quality, and physical presence of the money medium constitute the attendees’ corporeal and cognitive options of creating, sharing, and transacting moneyness through gesture, vision, performance, sensation, and embodiment (fig. 2).
The counting itself also pertains to significant transformations of form: this starts with the creation of a money heap, which includes among other things the impression of “size,” which attendees instantly compared with memories of the preceding year. It continues with counting, bundling, and adding, before it results in the final inscription of the heap’s total content as mere “quantity” on a sheet of paper (fig. 3). Ultimately, all attendees sign this paper before the headman reads out the total amount of the collections, the total expenses of the preceding fiscal year (or ritual cycle), and the net income (first in front of the temple and again at the next meeting of the “thousand houses” council). Finally, once everybody is informed, the headman takes the paper to the village files, where it will be kept for the perusal of future generations (together with the account books of the entire [317]tax collection and an extra list of the more outstanding donors). The same kind of transformation allows the patron to deposit the money “formally” into a bank account held jointly with the headman, and to “informally” lend the money to the factory owner. Crucially, the transformation of form pertains not to the thing as such. Coins and notes remain coins and notes: having been collected, displayed, sorted, counted, added, deposited, on-lent, expended, and, in this way, “valued” through a sequel of “performative acts” (see previous section), they are subsequently dispersed into a myriad of other contexts where the just-bestowed value(s) may become entirely meaningless. Coins and notes may move from one kind of proximity “out” to distance “in”-to new proximities. Yet what remains grounded in the attendees’ bodies and minds as well as in village files and the villagers’ collective memory is the experience (or tale) of what money can be and who one can be in relation to that money. Now, at least in the concrete case, neither the transformation of form nor the alienability of the money media is absolute. In some sense the villagers do think of the coins and notes as inalienable and uniquely charged with their collective spirit, history and substance: they are “in” the money and the money has become like them. Therefore, they indeed hang on to a few coins and notes from the heap and reinsert them into their collection bags and boxes as a starting point for next year’s procedure.14


Figure 3: Transformations of monetary form.

Moneyness as physical proximity thus depends on and varies according to individual closeness, the closeness of others, the physical form of the money media themselves, and the a priori content contained “in” the money of a concrete situation. These coherences, contradictions, and transformations are well recognized in the anthropology of money: looking among other things into his own wallet, [318]Maurer (2015: 96) not only demonstrates the multiplicity of monetary form as an almost personal property, but simultaneously insists on addressing the “ecologies” of monies and payment (ibid.: 48 and 130)—the local and global, communal and commercial “infrastructures of value” (ibid.: 71) and “the diverse repertoires for using money” (ibid.: 48). Pickles (2013), too, looks at pockets and shows how Highland Papua New Guineans literally “carry with” them elaborate “personal” systems that allow them to control and differentiate their monies while a person’s pockets are subject to public discourse and speculation. Yet, beyond pockets, following Zelizer’s (1994) path-breaking work on the social practices of “earmarking” American dollars, Truitt (2013: 104–16), for example, demonstrates how citizens in Ho Chi Minh City have developed a range of cultural techniques of carrying, displaying, smelling, and grading diverse physical forms of money (coins, notes, plastic cards, and both national and foreign currencies), and how these monies are involved in the process of redefining social identities, citizenship, and moral values in the context of market liberalization, postwar politics and, well, “dollarization.”
Notably, while “cash” in these “ecologies” is in a certain sense more alienable than credit, book, or virtual money, it is also more tangible, and its materiality may be directly shared and appropriated by those who are close. Conversely, “book money” may seem physically detached, but it establishes other dimensions of proximity precisely because of its ability to overcome spatial distances, national borders, or physical barriers in short times (Leyshon and Thrift 1997), because of its capacity to generate personal data (Hart 2001), and because it links money objects and money subjects through personal accounts and new money media such as plastic cards, mobile phones, the Internet, servers, displays, tags, and readers (Maurer 2015). The interactions of transacting agents may henceforth include short messages, missed calls, and absent presences, as Kusimba et al. (2013) describe in the case of mobile money networks in Kenya; or high-speed “scalping” and painful index fingers “hovering in readiness” slightly above the mouse, as Zaloom (2005: 255–56, 263) describes the “discipline” of speculators who also count in ticks in order to avoid the irrational “feeling” of being “affected” in terms of the real world’s money. In turn, Maurer points to the possibilities of “re-imagining the relationship between numbers, money and embodiment” (2010: 179) by adding scanning technology to gesture, juxtaposing gesture with number, and connecting body, personality, and the social through electronic payment. Money, he speculates, could become a tale, while “quantities would always be the qualities of specific individuals . . . connecting identity and money” (ibid.: 183). Artist Heidi Hinder for example, already uses wearable payment technology (tags, readers, and a chip charged with credit) in order to create a number of interactive gestures that authorize payment, including the hug, the handshake, the high five, and the tap-dance. Calling her project “Money no object,” and having implemented this project in the field of donations, she says: “I have been looking at the role that physical currency plays and how it might become obsolete in future—and maybe if it does become obsolete with the rise of digital currencies what we might therefore value instead and in its place.”15[319]
Hence what is valued? What is the valuable? The money or the hug? The heap or the amount? The sign or the thing? The tale, the dance, or the transaction? From an anthropological point of view it is crucial neither to neglect the aesthetics of the monetary form, which, as a medium, contains qualia, the “experience” of which may be explored as a fact of sociocultural life (Chumley and Harkness 2013: 4; cf. MacDougall 2006), nor to ignore the transformations of form, content, and value that occur almost permanently when people become like money; when money in turn becomes “bitter,” “hot,” “barren,” or “fertile” (Shipton 1989, Znoj 1998); when it transports a previous owner’s substance and thus needs to be digested (Parry 1989); when money’s uses, flows, and creations contract time and space (Munn 1986; Pryke and Allen 2000); and when situatedness brings realms of “conveyances” and “conversions” into being (Guyer 2004; cf. Bohannan 1955).
Money flows and thus transports value, but in its orbit the medium defines and is subject to modes of interaction and of personal appropriation. Wherever the money medium “occurs” in its multiplicity of forms, physical closeness is effective and the moneyness that it bestows is perceptible and contains something that belongs to us. And whenever we are “at” the money, we posit our identity in relation to an object or idea, which embodies the deeds, the memories, as well as “the desires and wealth of all the other members of society” (Hart 2001: 259; cf. Buchan 2001).


Ascribed proximity
Ascribed proximity—the other side of moneyness—posits identity as closeness to money as the “social fact,” not the (tangible) media. It refers to the way in which we link certain ideas, models, or expressions “of” and “for” money with the interaction of what Bourdieu (1977) describes as “disposition” and “habitus” (the system of dispositions, a way of being) and of what he understands as the conditions of their evolution, the “dialectic of objectification and embodiment” (ibid.: 73ff., 87ff., 214). Ascribed proximity obviously rests on a vast field of cultural stereotypes, ideational constructs, aesthetic concepts, and moral values. It may be, and indeed often is, correlated with monetary capacity. Yet analytically it refers more directly to the symbolic productions of society and pertains to conditions of being “in” and “out” of the money, irrespective of whether one is physically “at” the money or not (such as Americans being close to dollars and dollarization, and yet—according to a well-known slogan—“99 per cent” of them also claim to be close to what it means to be “out” of this money). In other words, ascribed proximity concerns the question of how we are recognized and posit ourselves in relation to society (as audience) and to the money which we share as a common reference to value.
In part this has been demonstrated using the counting ceremony, the overall context of “village money,” and how attendees of the counting related to that money as persons, dignitaries, and characters in society. Yet we may also turn to Geertz, who long ago provided us with an intriguing example: “What makes Balinese cockfighting deep is thus not money in itself, but what, the more of it that is involved the more so, money causes to happen: the migration of the Balinese status hierarchy into the body of the cockfight” (1973: 436). Geertz carefully distinguishes the [320]innermost circle of “true” Balinese cockfighters from its immediate orbits and the cockfight’s periphery. In all these circles it would seem that people gamble for money. Yet, although the highest individual amounts of money are at stake in the center, and though money marks the intensity of this game, it is also here that monetary profit is (or should be) the least motivation. It is the center-stage of “deep play”—a tournament of value (Appadurai 1986: 21)—where we find “the really substantial members of the community, the solid citizenry around whom local life revolves.” Theirs is a game of honor, as Geertz put it. “The focusing element in these focused gatherings” (Geertz 1973: 435), this game is not about money as “value” but about value in society: as cockfighters become like money (and cocks, of course), “everybody” who engages money “in” the cockfight, from center to periphery (and at least in one sense “everybody” in Balinese society), strives to become like them. Why? True cockfighters “put their money where their status is” (ibid.: 434).
If only to take one more realm into the picture: as Martin (2002) has explored, first among others, it is hard to overlook the ways in which the contemporary finance industry has assumed center-stage, not only in that it posits itself as an intermediary regime “at” the money, which we pool like villagers as each of us—banked, loaned, salaried, invested, and insured—forms part of the financial machine (perhaps with Wall Street as the main temple), but also because it draws upon and re-creates images and disciplines of how we should marry our lives, needs, intentions, dreams, professions, and indeed monetary personalities with our own assets and the industry’s volatilities, stakes, and creations. Again, this is a tournament of value with centers, orbits, and peripheries. Traders and investors produce their own modes of discipline, morality, and reason (Zaloom 2005; Ho 2009). They are cockfighters, in a sense—and this means that they again embody another public model for becoming like money. Yet in this case the entire game at the heart of contemporary capitalism also rests on an institutionalized cultural premise that money—following the superior laws of a mystified extrasocial market, and yet largely derived from cultural techniques of imagining, prizing, and insuring the otherwise unknowable future—is value in its own right, thus fooling the audience: nobody wants to be and nobody really needs to become like “abstract value” or like “the men in grey” who “steal people’s time” (see Ende [1973] 1984). “Financial markets are explicitly designed to be a world apart” (Zaloom 2010: 21). Distance is their crucial apotheosis. They are central icons of capitalism, daily in the news, but out of focus or public control. Nevertheless, “when finance becomes you,” Martin argues, one not only subjects oneself “to the reason of finance,” but is also assured “that henceforward one will never act alone” (2002: 101).16
Social and economic life thus not only use and produce different monies but also reproduce and transact models and morals, characters and careers, institutions and entire societies, in relation to that money: agnates and affines, old men and young men, creditors and debtors, cockfighters, traders, gamblers, and devotees, blue- and white-collars, moneybags and Mandevillian bees, Americans, Chinese, and Europeans, Rotarians and punks, beggars and priests, headmen, big-men, [321]moneylenders, patrons and finance ministers, artists and tap dancers (see above), thieves and jealous welfare scroungers, housewives and rainmakers, or great female icons like Mother Theresa or Lakshmi (Indian goddess of prosperity, fortune, and money; often equated with the just-married wife, her love, and the money of her relatives).
The list, of course, could be endlessly continued, precisely because money relates models and meanings everywhere, every day. Agents in turn may personalize such relations. Consciously or unconsciously, depending on their identity, conviction, situation, and counterparts, as well as on their disposition of monies, models, morals, and aesthetic concepts, they may get “in” and “out” of what money represents in society. Indeed, moneyness as ascribed proximity is subject to tricksters (from petty hucksters to village politicians and nation-states) who actively create proximities and distances in order to attract and exploit what people ascribe, and thus to become attractive, powerful, fearsome, loveable, trustworthy, or persuasive.
Again, wherever money “occurs”—now in its multiplicity as a social fact—there is an a priori relation between people who create and embody value, that which people circulate, and what they mutually ascribe in the name of such value. We permanently create this relation, from exchange and identity, through history (or memory, see Hart 2001), and through our personal proximities, which we internalize in everyday experiences of becoming and being like money, that is, of getting “in” and “out” of what money represents to us.


Conclusion: Isn’t it about value—in deed?
From giant carved stones to threaded shells; from holy cows to dear deerskins and mighty bucks; from plundered bullion to mined bitcoins; from Indian silver rupees to eurodollars and Chinese-owned US bonds; from copper pennies to elite credit cards and “African airtimes” (see Kusimba et al. 2013); from the king’s circulated portraits to the transmitting gestures of cyberbodies; and from noble social obligation to the fantastic realms of global finance and investment—monies, multiple not singular, “evolve” as they represent the worlds writ large and small which people create, differentiate, interconnect, and value through exchange and identity (Weiner 1992; Godelier 1999), personal action and public consideration.
In this article I have suggested tracing the quality of moneyness not through an odd epistemology of abstract value and (infinite) distancing but through relations of form and proximity which include acts and performances, heaps, circuits, movements and perceptions, qualia, signs, and models. Therefore I have taken “moneyness” as the relational property that concerns not money, the thing, but the “realization” of money, the process. This doubtless needs further exploration. There remains, of course, the overall question of justice, distribution, and capacity, of the corresponding degrees of closeness, power, and inequality, and—most importantly—of what or whom society, as an audience, in Graeber’s words (see above), values and what or whom it actually pays for. Yet, inevitably, answering these questions depends on how we imagine and construct our monies and how we account for the relations which money and human life constitute in the name of value.[322]
Observing what we (the people) do and are, perhaps even imagining in a more applied sense what we could do, value, and be, with and in relation to our monies, rather than believing in the power of abstract value, or the system and universal monetization, is the “Kantian task” (Hart 2010) which the “anthropology” of money has gradually opened. Indeed, as Dodd remarks, this may lead us to a “broader assessment of money’s capacity for reinvention” (2014: 272).
Looking at moneyness, I would argue, adds to this project because it means to address (and perhaps question) the qualitative manifestations of money. After all, this world is as monetized as it is monetizing: We already have multiple monies at hand, and we are free to create more of them. Perhaps we could create monies that “hug,” “dance,” and “share” instead of “exploit” and “accumulate”; or monies that “vote” and “honor” instead of “price.” Of course, we might also end up with more monies that pretend to equality and embrace all humanity while they discriminate, kill, inflate, and leave our highest values “out” of the money. In any case, forget about the sedating excuse of abstract value—money is not anywhere, but precisely in our hands and minds! It is a joint human property. And it is the concrete expression of the ways in which we—you(!)—are, act, and become like money.


Acknowledgments
Special thanks go to Frank Heidemann and Emma Battell Lowman for their dense reading of a first draft. I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers and to Giovanni da Col, Michael Lambek, and Justin Dyer, who have tremendously helped to improve the present version. I also wish to thank Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) for funding my research from 2012 to 2015. Publication of this article was supported by the Open Access Funding program of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg.


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Devenir comme de l’argent: la proximité et l’esthétique sociale de l’argent comme qualité
Résumé : Dans cet article, je prends comme point de départ l’image d’un groupe de villageois d’Inde du Sud comptant un tas d’argent perçu collectivement  pour étudier les variations qualitatives, subjectives et contextuelles à travers lesquelles l’argent se manifeste comme un bien précieux, mais également comme des circuits, des mises en représentation, des actes, des répertoires et des compétences dans la vie sociale et personnelle. Comme je le suggère, cela requiert que nous analysions les proximités changeantes entre les objets de l’argent et les sujets de l’argent. Je trace ces variations grâce à la notion d’argent comme qualité ou qualia, plus précisément à travers les propriétés des rapports (rapprochement, accès, éloignement) à ce qu’est l’argent, ce qu’il devient et ce qu’il représente.
Jens M. ZICKGRAF is a research assistant at the South Asia Institute (Department for Anthropology), Heidelberg University. He recently accomplished his Ph.D. in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich). From summer 2012 to spring 2013 he was an affiliate researcher at the Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS). Since 2010 he has conducted fieldwork on finance, money, and monetization in rural South India.
Jens M. ZickgrafSouth Asia InstituteDepartment for AnthropologyHeidelberg UniversityIm Neuenheimer Feld 33069120 HeidelbergGermanyzickgraf@uni-heidelberg.de


___________________
1. Indeed, it was Simmel ([1896] 2009) who coined the term “Soziologische Ästhetik.” More recently, the term (social aesthetics) was independently developed in visual anthropology (MacDougall 1999, 2006) to account for the “manner in which humans present themselves in space in order to constitute effective and affective social behavior” (Burns-Coleman 2013: 10; cf. Heidemann 2013), and how “each social landscape is a distinctive sensory complex, constructed . . . by material things . . ., human activities and the bodies of human beings themselves” (MacDougall 2006: 58). A philosophical but closely related approach is Böhme’s concept of “atmosphere” as the “common reality of the perceiver and the perceived” (1993: 122).
2. Pranab Mukherjee, budget speech 2010–11 (held on February 26, 2010).
3. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneyness.asp (accessed March 17, 2017, emphasis added).
4. Recent work has addressed the performative and creative dimensions of “the capacity to generate theoretical prices” (MacKenzie 2003: 855) as well as the contingencies of techniques, knowledge-gaps, philosophies, and dreams in the construction of (financial) markets (Miyazaki 2013).
5. I have chosen to leave the villagers and their collective money anonymized. The entire scene which I describe in the following was documented on February 27, 2013 in the course of a long-term field study. Documentation of the concrete case includes 302 photographs, some of which were later analyzed and discussed with informants who attended the event.
6. In precolonial times, the ur and its headman were responsible for paying a tax in cash to regional chiefdoms.
7. For a detailed analysis, see Zickgraf (2015).
8. The festival is an important social event. It is an occasion for all family members (including married daughters, their spouses and children, migrant sons, etc.) to join and to invite relatives and friends from many other villages as well as “honorary guests” like business partners, officials, or local politicians. While feastings are huge collective happenings that take place in the evening hours, together with the devotees of the procession there is also a permanent coming, going, and mutual hosting between all the houses and all the relations of the village during the entire festival week.
9. More generally, Heidemann’s (2013) study of “the cultural dimension of movement and space in South India” is highly indicative of the widespread relevance of the sensation of (social and physical) closeness in performances such as processions, public gatherings, and formal visits, the hosting of guests and relatives, as well as collective practices such as touching, seeing, and eating.
10. Elsewhere, Graeber addresses at length the claim that “value is the way actions become meaningful to the actors by being placed in some larger social whole” (2001: 254).
11. Graeber draws on Munn (1986) in order to make an argument very similar to that of Lambek (2013), namely that “if one gives another person food and receives a shell in return, it is not the value of the food that returns to one in the form of the shell, but rather the value of the act of giving it” (Graeber 2001: 45).
12. Regarding the importance and magical connotations of touching money in South India, see Parthasarathi (2016: 10–13).
13. If broadly applied: a Hindu way of sharing a substance through vision. In orthodox terms: the practice of seeing the god (the idol) and of receiving the god’s gaze and grace (see Vidal 2004).
14. In a different context, Weiner (1992) observes the paradox of “keeping while giving” (see also Godelier 1999)
15. Video: http://www.watershed.co.uk/dshed/money-no-object (accessed on March 20, 2017).
16. In this regard, it is illuminating to read Zaloom’s piece on evangelical financial ministries teaching how “to endow budgets with the capacity to reveal God’s hand in the world and the budgeter’s acts of faith” (2016: 325–26).
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				<day>20</day>
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			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau5.2</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2015 Jane Parish</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2015</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>While it has been extensively recorded how the West African occult economy allows for a metanarrative critique of modernity, this article analyzes a convergence between witchcraft discourses and the capitalist market, looking through the local lens of Akan spirit shrines in New York City. Rather than being in awe of the “mysterious workings” of the marketplace, Akan occult practices fully engage with American mass production and neoliberal orthodoxy. In this process, the American automobile, the object par excellence of the American dream, embracing an ideology of escapism and individualism, has become, I argue, a local symbol against the extravagant consumerism worshipped in New York and at more established shrines. Young shrine priests, I explain, hold up as an alternative beacon of opportunity an age of Detroit automotive production in order to spiritually manufacture a different type of industrialism—the (re)cycling by Akan shrines of the iconic Pontiac automobile.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>While it has been extensively recorded how the West African occult economy allows for a metanarrative critique of modernity, this article analyzes a convergence between witchcraft discourses and the capitalist market, looking through the local lens of Akan spirit shrines in New York City. Rather than being in awe of the “mysterious workings” of the marketplace, Akan occult practices fully engage with American mass production and neoliberal orthodoxy. In this process, the American automobile, the object par excellence of the American dream, embracing an ideology of escapism and individualism, has become, I argue, a local symbol against the extravagant consumerism worshipped in New York and at more established shrines. Young shrine priests, I explain, hold up as an alternative beacon of opportunity an age of Detroit automotive production in order to spiritually manufacture a different type of industrialism—the (re)cycling by Akan shrines of the iconic Pontiac automobile.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>Akan spirit shrines, cosmology, capitalism, witchcraft, automotive</kwd>
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	<body><p>Beyond occult economies






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Jane Parish. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.2.009
Beyond occult economies
Akan spirits, New York idols, and Detroit automobiles
Jane PARISH, Keele University


While it has been extensively recorded how the West African occult economy allows for a metanarrative critique of modernity, this article analyzes a convergence between witchcraft discourses and the capitalist market, looking through the local lens of Akan spirit shrines in New York City. Rather than being in awe of the “mysterious workings” of the marketplace, Akan occult practices fully engage with American mass production and neoliberal orthodoxy. In this process, the American automobile, the object par excellence of the American dream, embracing an ideology of escapism and individualism, has become, I argue, a local symbol against the extravagant consumerism worshipped in New York and at more established shrines. Young shrine priests, I explain, hold up as an alternative beacon of opportunity an age of Detroit automotive production in order to spiritually manufacture a different type of industrialism—the (re)cycling by Akan shrines of the iconic Pontiac automobile.
Keywords: Akan spirit shrines, cosmology, capitalism, witchcraft, automotive



Look at this Buick engine... stare real hard madam at this flowmaster pipe. The 81’ model had a cylinder deactivation system. Rocker... covers over two cylinders always broken. Pressure, pinging, the whole damn engine was a piece of crap.... I want to take it apart, the engine blocks, suspension, ignition, grille, transmission. Me... me, an auto wrecker. Me, an auto dismantler. I’m an auto salvager. Me... I be the Lord... and I be with Satan. I’m going to rebuild the world with my image... but super different. Look and believe the new energy with... each piston and plug in the glory... give me the space to worship and glorify with its image. This is like life. We got too used to broken ways and we split with our broken selves. We gotta change man... and I can help your fate... with power.
—AJ, Shrine Priest, Brooklyn

[102]In the African postcolony, the popularity of occult narratives as moralizing discourses about modernity and materialism assumes new heights. The perception exists of witchcraft discourses and the wider “occult economy” as representing an “exotic” turning to magical protest, however unrealistic and futile, against “illicit” material ends (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). For example, African witchcraft narratives thrive as commentaries on “selfish” wealth, “immoral” accumulation, and “excessive” consumption (Rowlands and Warnier 1988; Sanders 1999; Ashforth 2005). The highly visible diaspora of West Africans throughout the United States since the early 1980s, and especially over the last fifteen years, has led to Akan spirit shrines and witchcraft narratives slowly spreading to cities such as New York, home to one of the largest Ghanaian populations outside of Africa (Parish 2011). Yet, amid the extravagant spending, riches, and conspicuous material consumption found in Manhattan, how to reflect the incredible occult imagining of Akan shrine practitioners in the New York consumer marketplace? In this article, I show, how the notion of the “occult economy” obscures a time-space compression whereby transnational Akan shrines in New York City draw on different cultural elements from Ghana, New York, and other American cities and periods of history. This includes a time of American mass manufacturing production, eighteenth-century Peoria Native American conflict, and a social trajectory in present day New York where enormous accumulation is equally admired and disdained. Furthermore, I argue that rather than assuming the “occult economy” to be at the mercy of the “immoral” and “mysterious mechanisms of the capitalist market,” magical interpretations of modernity are to be seen as the subject of critical discourses locally. If at shrines a critique of private capitalism and excessive materialism is made, this is to focus upon a type of venture capitalism evidenced particularly in New York and in other consumer capitals. Yet, among some young shrine priests concerned with the worship of “unobtainable” wealth, especially by priests at more established shrines, their response to the social issues caused by a dysfunctional marketplace is not a moral dismissal of the ethos of wealth and accumulation per se but a recalling of an older model of industrial manufacturing. Moreover, at all shrines, the ideology of economic competition is seen as something that is challenging, rewarding, and empowering, even as the neoliberal economy falters and huge discrepancies in wealth become clear across the New York landscape.
The notion of the occult economy therefore conceals not only complex cultural undercurrents but also very significant ideological dynamics. As older Akan priests advise clients in pursuit of self-gain and younger priests seek to heal the body of their clients through an appeal to a historical stage of mass production, the American dream is propped up and its ideology reinvented, not least through the metaphor of the automobile. This is able to happen, I contend, because there is more than a simple amalgamation of Akan spirits and industrial processes to produce a hybrid religious imagination. Instead, Akan spirits forcefully tackle neoliberal orthodoxy head on, I argue, as shrine priests appear able to recycle their own versions of the magic of commoditization and “read economic conceptions through a thick cosmology” (da Col 2012: 192). Examining the relationship between indigenous cosmology and Western political ideologies, June Nash (1993) identifies how traditional Andean cosmologies and American political rhetoric have been integrated without dissonance into the same belief system that plays a fundamental role [103]in creating the Bolivian mining landscape. Stephan Palmié (2002), in discussing the meanings associated with Afro-Cuban tradition, argues that Marx’s monstrous world of commodities points to a world that has spread beyond the conceptual space occupied by Western modernity to produce a subterranean convergence with Caribbean cultural practices that are part of the same complex history of Atlantic modernity. Or, as Peter Geschiere (2010) highlights, when talking about belonging in a globalized world, the same preoccupations can acquire great mobilizing appeal but in different settings (Geschiere 2010: 45). This is particularly true, argues Roger Sansi, of the discourse of the fetish and he describes capitalism as not only comparable and adaptable to African sorcery but as part of the same fetishism of modernity (Sansi 2011: 19). In an age of recession and destitution but also the extreme veneration of objects and the commodification of people—the worse paradoxes of industrial America and global mass culture—I suggest, are refracted through Akan occult narratives. The “intraconnective” nature of Akan shrine practices encompasses the movement of American mass-produced commodities and transports these things into the spiritual realm where “beings are more subject than object to one another” (Handleman 2008: 182). I consider how shrine discourses flow far beyond an occult economy and into the fetishized marketplace of corporate America, as shrines make their own particular realities, and “esoteric registers are shifted to material registers and back again as presences pour into objects” (Johnson 2014: 3).
While at more established shrines an obsession with celebrity and conspicuous consumption is rampant, among young shrine priests that reality is put aside in favor of privileging an iconic America through a golden era of industrial motor manufacturing. In Sex, drink and fast cars, Stephen Bayley (1986) describes how the production of cars enabled the American consumer to assert mass individuality through the infamous manufacturing techniques of the assembly line after Henry Ford introduced the continuous production belt in 1914 (1986: 12). Detroit, the home of American automotive production, became a center of “visual entertainment but working in chrome rather than celluloid” (Ingrassia 2012: xiv). The car turned into an object of desire, “interlocking social and cultural practices” that stretched far beyond the car as an object of emotion and memories and a “vehicle of conspicuous consumption” (Urry 2006: 26). Among young shrine priests, classic automobiles such as the Pontiac Firebird and Torpedo personify the American dream of freedom and prosperity but also a dynamic relation between the spiritual and material realm (see Tassi and Espirito Santo 2014). By recreating cars, young Akan priests are depositing spiritual contingency and uncertainty into the standardized American productive process of cause and effect established by Ford (see also Ishii 2012).
There are many different African religious practitioners in New York. Among these are a number of Ghanaian shrines set up in the 1970s—and the years since— to promote African Traditional Religion and Akan philosophical ideas about sacredness to a wider African American audience. Few in number, the Akan spirit shrines discussed in this article are not to be confused with these formal organizations. Rather, the secret and clandestine activities of spirit shrines described here, based on fieldwork carried out between 2005 and 2011, operate very much “underground,” and are concerned primarily with witchcraft, an extremely taboo topic rarely spoken about in public. Clients attending the shrine do so in extreme [104]secrecy, seldom revealing this to family or friends. Some shrine clients are also Pentecostal Church members and describe how critics of spirit shrines believe “fetish priests” to be “evil,” “satanic witchdoctors,” and “criminals” who practice “ju-ju.”
I originally conducted fieldwork on witchcraft and shrines in Brong-Ahafo Region Ghana in the early 1990s; as part of the growing African diaspora I traced a number of Akan shrines to Europe over the next ten years. Through these links and Ghanaian contacts in West Africa and the United States, I was eventually able, over a period of six or so years, to set up fieldwork in New York among a small number of shrines. At Akan spirit shrines, many shrine priests are immigrants who arrived in the United States since the 1980s as illegal migrants from Ghana. Younger shrine priests at less established shrines are usually more recent migrants, largely arriving since the turn of the twenty-first century (Huewelmeier and Krause 2010). All priests are employed in a variety of business activities, which are not always on the “right” side of the law, especially if priests have few shrine clients and need to supplement their income. They trace their ancestry to the Ghanaian spirit shrines (obosom-obrafo) that flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century against witchcraft and to the Akan linguistic group, which includes the Twi speakers of the Asante region of Central Ghana and the Brong-Ahafo region of Western Ghana (Ward 1956). Among the Akan, the spirit (sunsum) of the god (obosom) is found hidden in stones, twigs, and other things in the densely vegetated African bush. In New York, the spirit (sunsum) of the god has called out to priests from various objects such as a clock, a walking stick, a pair of jeans in a department store, a candy wrapper, or even the inner tube of an old bicycle. In other cases, the god has been pulled from the Hudson River, concealed in a pebble, or buried in a paper bag discarded in a refuse dumpster on the Lower East Side. Rescued by the priest, the bag was covered with leaves and dirt and placed in a brass bowl that became its altar in a boarded up liquor store once managed by the priest’s uncle. Indeed, shrines are found hidden in a variety of covert locations throughout New York City and apartments in Brooklyn, Harlem, Queens, and the Bronx, frequently moving around and shutting down only to appear in a new guise, months or even years later.
Akan shrines activate in a series of social relationships, priests, materials, and invisible spirits (Ishii 2012). This is accomplished, in New York as in Ghana, during possession, which is the dominant activity at Akan spirit shrines (Goody 1957). Possession involves a set of exchanges that signify the presence of the god in order to hear the details of a client’s case. In New York, during possession the shrine priest carries the spirit of the god (obosom) held over his head—at one shrine, in an old milk carton on which he has stuck the picture and description of a missing person. The spirit (sunsum) of the missing person is believed to assist the god in his day-today living arrangements—buying the god whatever he desires, helping him dress and keeping him fed, and keeping guard over magical talismans (asuman). In this complex world of spirit-objects, the Akan describe how witchcraft (obayi) within the kin group works like an owned object (Ishii 2012). Since by virtue of the blood (and the womb) a person belongs to the matriline, lineage ideas determine the individual’s place in the matrikin (Ishii 2012). This also gives the witch (obayifo), commonly believed to be an envious and greedy woman in the kin group, the right [105]over the individual and, according to witches, to “kill” him or her or cause misfortune, as and when they want (Rattray 1927; Debrunner 1959).
Robert Weller (1987) explains how worship at ghost shrines in Taiwan expresses a world of individualistic, utilitarian, and amoral competition. Embracing the obsessive pursuit of unimaginable wealth, Akan shrine priests in New York in the early twenty-first century became the poster boys for a type of American neoliberalism. They embodied the American dream of late 1980s and 1990s America—of Wall Street, money markets, and commoditization. The dynamics of shrine discourses about wealth drew upon an explicit relationship between witchcraft and private accumulation that flourished during colonial times among the Akan (McCaskie 1981; McLeod 1981). James Ferguson summarizes how wealth in West Africa is either “the kind that feeds the people or the kind that eats them” (2006: 73). Among other things, cocoa money in the early twentieth-century fueled excessive individual accumulation at the expense of kinship obligations and witchcraft accusations escalated, fed by increasing guilt, depression, and conflict among relatives (Field 1960). In Ghana, the conflicting perceptions of the family as the locus of support during times of economic insecurity and as a drain on the wealth of prosperous relatives results in wealth being seen as both a blessing and a curse (Parish 1999). In other words, although money may have a liberating effect for its owner, it can lead also to an asocial denial of community and accusations of witchcraft (Van der Geest 1997; Lentz 1998). Akan shrines appeared and disappeared very quickly (Field 1940; Goody 1957) as shrines in Ghana tried to manage the anxiety that came with the pursuit of new forms of accumulation (Drucker-Brown 1975). Rumors flew in Ghana of “greedy” relatives participating in blood money rituals (sika aduro) to obtain “immoral” and “selfish” prosperity. In response, at Ghanaian shrines were found many magical objects (suman) and sacred medicines (adura) used to protect individuals’ accrued savings from witchcraft forces (see McCaskie 2008).
Michael Taussig (1980) portrays the intertwining of the commodity fetish and magical beliefs mediated through the image of the devil whereby men sell their soul for untold wealth and riches. In New York among shrine clients, many of whom seek economic success, fame, or celebrity and see the witch as preventing this, the defeat of witchcraft has come to be based on a private dream, private interest, and the market logic of the cult of the winner (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000). In New York City, the sacred space of Akan shrine divination is made relevant by gods who understand that the shrine is not a closed microcosm but that its religious spirits and materials compete for attention alongside the fetishization of luxury objects that appear to have a life of their own amid fantastical consumer spending. Indeed, the city itself is no longer a location. Rather, the modern quintessence of New York City appears to be, as Mayor Bloomberg once proudly observed, a luxury product and nowhere perhaps is wealth more keenly spent than on Fifth Avenue. Shrines and clients revered the cutthroat business practices and economic individualism of corporate America and the shrine became a place that, especially among its young African client base, epitomized the relationship between the conspicuous consumption of commodities and social status.
In New York, Akan spirit shrines thrive as people secretly visit them not only from the New York metropolitan area but from across the United States, with all [106]sorts of economic desires and problems. Shrines deal with many different types of anxieties—loneliness, drug addiction, adultery—often centered on feelings of anger, resentment, and revenge and presented in clusters by clients so that it is difficult to entangle one problem from another; shrines in New York predominantly deal with economic misfortune and individuals who feel that they would be more healthy, both physically and financially, if witchcraft was not blocking their path to success. Fears found at shrines about West African witchcraft highlight the idea that intimate relationships can be extremely dangerous although progressively operating at a distance as kinship networks assume an expanding horizon (see Geschiere 2013: xvii). In his work on Malawi, Harri Englund (2007) demonstrates how witchcraft discourses increasingly mediate relationships by enabling subjects to imagine and theorize sociality on an indeterminate scale. Certainly in New York, among some young shrine-clients, the social relationships that make up the transnational kinship network now extend to include an altogether different type of familiarity, as they aspire for more than they currently own and believe that their hidden talents remain undiscovered. This is the intimacy of fans with their idols through Internet blogs, and Twitter, television, and celebrity magazines. This is significant because in the contemporary entertainment age we have established close relationships with stars we have never met but feel that we personally know (Parish 2013). The Akan spirit shrine, through popular witchcraft discourses, pulls the mass-produced aesthetic of celebrity together within the ever broadening intimacy of kinship/family networks in the African diaspora through the body of the witch who hides behind the make-believe images of fame in the shadow of celebrity (Parish 2013). Witchcraft therefore links persons and mass-produced subject/objects through the imaginary.
The focus of the priests’ knowledge is on the wealthy and how to be like them— whether Manhattan socialite, CEO, or Hollywood movie star. Shrines produced photographs from American celebrity magazines to indicate that only they could see the “secret” witch perched on the shoulder of the rich and famous. In one of the most modern cities in the world, shrines represented being ahead of the game and a place where, for a fee, clients could also access this “sacred” knowledge and pursue their private dreams of fame (Parish 2011). Young black African clients came to the shrine wanting the money for Balenciaga leather purses or Louis Vuitton’s trash bag purse (which cost $2000) or the Air Jordan VII sneaker, “otherwise I go quench.” Others wanted help to achieve their dream job working for PR agencies and to personally represent stars like Beyoncé. Some wanted to live in a downtown apartment in the East Village or Midtown but felt that witches in their family were obstructing these dreams and were jealous of their clothes and lifestyle. They felt that “sly” relatives, out of jealousy, desired them to scale down their ambitions and secretly saw them as wasting money on shoes and fashion accessories. They wanted the “ju-ju man” to bring them “disappearing medicine” or make them “bank” and a “triple dollar” talisman to “ginger my swagger.” One young Ghanaian woman, who worked as a cashier in a liquor store in Queens, illustrated what a lot of her peers at shrines felt was pressure from relatives to look for mundane, low-paying jobs: “Tweaa.... Don’t disturb they say... you gotta get a real job... they throw shade
... girl for wanting me a loft... advise oneself... but I ain’t getting out of my home [107]... less than $500 a day.” Another, who answered phones for a cab firm in the West Village, said, “I ain’t carrying no bolo bag.... I want Hermes.”
Clients usually fall into two camps. A large proportion of shrine clients are the young sons and daughters of immigrants and unregistered aliens from Ghana and other West African countries who only migrated to the United States since the 1980s and especially in the last fifteen years (Stoller 2001). Given the rapidly increasing mobility of people, Geschiere (2010) points to the notion of “belonging as assuming great preoccupation” (2010: 53). Jemima Pierre (2004) looks at how migration and the ethnic identity process in the United States is based within a larger ideological framework. “Celebratory discourses of equality and opportunity became a corner stone of ethnic identities” (Pierre 2004: 143). The ultimate success or “bootstraps model” of all ethnic groups functions as proof that the American dream is fair, “reasonable and attainable by all, ignoring the significance of racism and the position of blackness in America” (143). Buying into the myth of African American ghetto culture, they see their own cultural repertoire as superior and separate. Some have graduated from high school and are studying for further educational qualifications. While their parents and older relatives are employed in typically African occupations in the United States as taxi drivers, traders, and nurses, young shrine clients see themselves as much more ambitious and want to work in better-paid and more glamorous occupations (Parish 2011).
The other most clearly identifiable group of shrine clients is composed of older African American men and women (Parish 2011). They resent the fact that although they have worked all their lives—often in menial and unskilled jobs—and respected the decisions of their elders at home and their superiors at work, they have not achieved the economic status in life that they had hoped for: running their own business, becoming a supervisor, or progressing up the promotion ladder. Moreover, and in opposition to the African migrant, they regard themselves as model citizens with a very strong work ethic.

The magic of the American dream
In the pursuit of the American dream there is always some other interpretation and formulation at shrines that draws upon multiple coexisting worldly spaces. Recognizing that Akan shrines are actors in a broad economic stream that includes not only the realities of immigration and its aspirations but also a wider history of witchcraft and magic, how has the car become representative of a magical politics of hope at Akan shrines, given the collapse of the manufacturing economy in the United States? While the financial meltdown of Lehmann Brothers in 2008 merely temporarily slowed the process of material accumulation, the Occupy protests in New York (and throughout the world) are a sign of protest about greed, and also indicative of a sense of injustice and exploitation that the global rich are becoming wealthier at the expense of the masses. In this socio-economic environment, shrines look to magical discourses to make sense of the poverty and inequalities between clients and it is here that shrine approaches begin to diverge.
[108]Under a predatory type of neo-liberalism some younger priests, in response to the deteriorating social and economic status of their clients, began to reinvent themselves as “Bonnie and Clyde” type characters by robbing the rich to feed the poor, even while they still professed an adoration for America, and particularly, its blue collar industrial legacy. The classic economic individualism espoused by older shrines in New York in the early twenty-first century was increasingly condemned as an ethics of greed and selfishness. Young priests felt that the old gods had grown insatiable for cash (like the fat cats they protected) and they had lost their moral compass. They used the analogy of cattle eating so much that they vomit, only to eat this later, savoring the same meal over and over again. The old gods did the same. They ate their own shit. They became swamped by money. They shouted how the gods were now too fat and slow to trap witches. They retreated into their own bubbles of success and were now returning to Ghana as wealthy men. They were likened to hedge funders who robbed the poor of their actual savings. They spoke of how the old gods could be spied gorging at night on the life savings of their clients as they exited their limousines, caught in the glare of the headlights of luxury cars such as the Lexus, BMW, Mercedes, and Lamborghini. Indeed, many priests spoke of how these gods possessed fleets of luxury cars and would have witches as their chauffeurs. They spoke of these gods patrolling, no longer the night skies, but the roads—Lexington, Fifth Avenue, and Broadway—in limousines. The well-known five o’clock shadow in Midtown on a Friday, and the darkness caused by fleets of limousines whisking business executives away to The Hamptons, is mimicked in the world of the gods, who are too lazy to stay in New York to work.
In effect, these young shrine priests reject the ethos of a new form of venture capitalism proffered by the few most established shrines. They view this as a type of “quick” wealth that comes from “nowhere.” Alternatively, these newer shrines promote an economic model of hard work and production rather than the consumption of luxury items and celebrity images. Witchcraft in Ghana, they argue, always embraced the individualistic pursuit of wealth at the cost of reciprocal kinship relations, as witches in Ghana were simply fighting for their status alongside other types of new capitalist enterprises that grew up under canonicalization. They wrecked the wealth of others, including innovative entrepreneurs, in order to protect their own empires, just like the fat cats of the American corporate landscape and the venture capitalists who make a profit from destroying the business of rivals. Today, these witches are firmly enmeshed in the corporate landscape, helping the rich become more so at the expense of the poor. Therefore, the role of the newer shrine is to pursue and destroy the mega rich and the witch who helps them, and, in this process, aid the poor economically and socially through encouraging those enmeshed in poverty to work hard and realize their own dreams in their day-to-day jobs (not through the support of rampant material desires, which the witch embodies). While everyone desires to “truly make it in America” and aspires to wipe the slate clean, to start again, or to triumph over the forces that are keeping them from attaining their true potential, this is no longer possible without the help of shrines because of what young priests call a culture of cannibalism practiced in the United States. At New York shrines, the city of Detroit became illustrative of this culture and of a “1% versus 99%” style of class warfare and a profound, growing disillusionment with the more recent venture capitalist style of American capitalism. Indeed, [109]among the shrine clients who had travelled from New York’s outer boroughs or from cities such as Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Cincinnati, the bubble of conspicuous consumption synonymous with Manhattan seemed far removed from the realities of their daily lives.
At newer shrines a spatial desegregation began to occur between young African clients from New York obsessed with material consumption and other African and African American clients who travelled to shrines in New York from less wealthy cities who did not care about owning the latest designer clutch purse. Nor were they envious of those who had achieved this, for the material side of capitalism had begun to exist independently of their human existence. One client told of how her boyfriend was never home and, since she had lost her job, she had no money to pay for heating her small apartment that also housed her two young cousins. Another client, Gwen, described how the walls of her studio sublet were damp with sewage fluids from the bathroom above. These clients wanted jobs. They wanted money to send back home. They hoped the shrine could weave its magic by selling them sacred talismans, asuman, to achieve this and fight witchcraft and misfortune and bring about a change in their economic circumstances.
Among the many low-waged and unemployed black African and African American shrine clients, young priests heard about the poverty among their extended families in cities such as Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Detroit. Priests began to travel to these cities, lodging with entourages and with family and friends. They “passed word about,” warning individuals to be wary of “trading their souls for blood money” and a “quick” wealth that is conjured out of nowhere by the witch. Those on the breadline were told to remember to buy magical asuman in order to be alert to witchcraft and, instead, carve “fresh and exciting” employment openings. In Detroit, many new migrants from Ghana, Nigeria, and other West African countries come to the city for educational and professional opportunities; they speak English and try to take advantage of a prosperous niche markets by starting businesses such as hair braiding, restaurants, and import-export firms (Cunningham 2006). They do this however within a decaying metropolis. By the economic meltdown of 2008, General Motors and Chrysler asked for federal aid and filed for bankruptcy, Chapter 11, but started producing again after a two-month shutdown and massive restructuring (De Lorenzo 2006; Rattner 2010; Ingrassia 2011). Shrine priests use the Detroit motor industry to attract the business of both the young unemployed and low-paid worker, but also more prosperous black Africans who “respect” the ostentatious and luxury brands of European motor such as “wab” (Mercedes Benz). The popular Ghanaian movie Zinabu (1987) is referred to in order to warn individuals of the danger of selfish desire and of not sharing their wealth among their less prosperous kin. Carmela Garratino (2013) describes how in the movie, Kofi, a poor auto mechanic, exchanges what he refers to as “his manhood” for unlimited wealth offered by a beautiful witch, Zinabu, on the condition that he agrees (with his life) “to abstain from all sexual relations, with her or any other woman” (2013: 72). The “almost instantaneously affluent Kofi” is seen driving a new car but eventually finds “sexual temptations too great” and is killed by Zinabu, “asphyxiated in his new vehicle” (73). In other words, money is associated with esteem and consumption but also needs to circulate in the productive economy. It is corrupting and linked to immorality if “selfishly splashed out on big mansions, gold chains, polished shoes and Italian clothes” (74).
[110]Among the newest shrines and youngest priests, they have reinvented the American dream—especially a belief in hard work and opportunity in what they see as a retrograde type of American capitalism—which is ironic given the wealth and inequality generated by this older form of industry. At these shrines this is symbolized by the Detroit automobile where cars are a self-symbol, writes Jeannette Mageo, for most people in the United States and “Americans have a cultural model of the self as a free individual” (2011: 41). A forty-year-old priest, Sonny, an illegal migrant from Ghana, had several times visited Detroit and taken requests from people wanting the help of his god. Outside of his shrine in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, he told me that it was important to celebrate the pioneer spirit of the early founders of the “Motor City” and the hard working ethic of the work force and not the European and Japanese car companies and the workers he considered to be suspicious strangers:

Garbage, garbage.... Detroit is in a hole... killed the labor, the good men making autos here. We need to remember the spirits with souls... pioneer spirit.... Chevrolet, big men like him... mavericks... not government... not big men from NYC... the big apple.... No government contracts... heal Detroit. We have to remember the autos with the blood... made them... the creative process

For those clients in Detroit, young shrine priests stories center on the fighting spirits of indigenous Native Americans in the Michigan area. This is summed up at shrines by priests who chant the popular slogan that in Detroit it is only the weak who are killed and eaten. Indeed, a traditional Native American headdress adorned the front of the 1950s Pontiac Chieftain, which was discontinued in 2010 so General Motors could concentrate on the Buick. Of specific importance here to priests is the spirit of Chief Pontiac, an Ottawa Native American who led the rebellion against the British in 1763 in the Great Lakers Region. He was assassinated in 1769 by a Peoria Native American. To be murdered by a fellow American is an illustration of the distrust of young priests of the current American corporate landscape stalked by anonymous global entities. These priests preach that the American dream is not working in its current state: it is based on the mass slaughter of men such as Chief Pontiac and the American and African working class. They see the Pontiac motor as representing a rebellious character that they desire their clients to identify with as they seek to repair the make-up of both the car and body of the client.


American cars and idols
Shrine priests prefer clients to visit them in New York where the shrine of the god is located. It is here, at shrines, that my interviews took place between 2005 and 2011. Although some young priests have travelled to various cities, no shrine (to the best of my knowledge) has set up a practice in Detroit. Some priests use the images of Detroit without ever having been there, but see cars made in Detroit parked in New York and use these as a reference point. For Sonny, it is “Yankee” automobile brands that are the center of his attention, especially Pontiac, armed with the spirit of Chief [111]Pontiac, embodying a “fighting”,” rust-and-dust Detroit legacy. Sonny cried that Chief Pontiac had disappeared. He pictured a Pontiac brand, which was now too big and clumsy to compete with the more streamlined models of automobiles made by Japanese car manufacturers. In an attempt to repair this broken industry, Sonny pulls apart the automobile piece by piece and then infuses a small talisman (suman) made from a fender, gas pedal, or hood pad he has picked up in a scrap yard with intangible sunsum, amid a complex cluster of images and concepts. Sonny told a client, in my presence, that he had spoken to the spirits of the dead men who had worked on the car assembly lines in Detroit. Likewise, AJ, a twenty-eight-year-old priest in Brooklyn, described to me how it was important not to see just the product of the car, but the souls and hearts of the workers:

Detroit you already know... caught in a gaffle... zombie workers whose blood and flesh has been screwed... over... by executives... everything is broken... strip it all down and you see bull... hoodrats.... And the worker is exposed with no union rights, pension, nada... so I can protect him.... Exhausts and mufflers with impact protect the engine... possess my clients extra protection... them resistant to life and the harsh economic climate out there in the projects. They’re not with the noise.... Look say my brother, make a noise man... feel mans’ place in the world. We can build good money... great autos together, not like the past and with our own business strategy. Rebuild and recharge with the future. Transmit and engage... long lasting service and challenges... strip the auto down and stare at the man who built it.

AJ had looked into the humanity of workers and saw the care and energy that they put into work. Likewise, AJ constructed narratives for every car component as he striped the motor down—the rocker covers of the Buick Century, he said, were made in Pontiac City by men with strong arms who sweated blood and tears and drank hard but knew the meaning of hard work. Each car component becomes “a symbol for agency to achieve” (Mageo 2011: 19). The suspension and giant engine of the Buick Skylark represents the strong backbone of blue-collar workers everywhere and the hard journey that they make each day. The ignition of the Pontiac Firebird symbolizes the “switched on brain of a man” who will not accept his poverty or dehumanization. The tail fin of the Chieftain represented the swooping African bird who “gonna no be caught by no man.” In this process, the body of the worker becomes both producer and product (see Martin 2001). By focusing on the imaginary space between people and things and by conceptualizing the assembly of the car as a series of metaphors for the desired self, AJ attempts to show how the imagination of the shrine client can travel faster armed with this technology that conducts new meanings and powers (Sneath, Holbraad, and Pedersen 2009). Special attention is given by AJ to this process:

I’m bruva Randolph Hearst. I’m bruva his homie Rockefeller with options. Bring it on.... Me... I’m my own captain of industry to take down Wall Street.... I’m gonna take what I’ve got, look around and take your body and build... my... machine.... I... gonna take... wiper blade and... suspension shock and implant it in... guts... make my bruva a superjack like your papa remembers... an auto with no guilt [112]... a thousand bucks fuel injected super system... of bruva blood and horses and metal.... I... make me a supermonster to take down them rich fuckers... them that ride of the backs of the devil

AJ illustrates how smell is important in this process of deconstruction, of protecting and rebuilding the client so that they are open to positive ideas, using mufflers and automobile air fresheners to fix the client and their “broken parts” and make them feel like “new” men. During one interview at his shrine he described the following:

Strip burning sensations from your nostrils... it’s the smell of gasoline.... Godzilla will burn down spewing his radioactive breath. Burning rubber... barf... muffle my nose.... California car scents... I’m bashing with... Hawaiian Garden... Palm Springs Pineapple... Colorado Cherry ...smell... rejoice with the hood...

The alienated worker becomes a worker who cannot smell and whose nose must be unblocked by car air fresheners in order that he or she truly recognizes his or her plight. By reveling in and celebrating the concrete form of the Detroit product, the automobile, Sonny and AJ seek to restore anew the American ideal of a land of freedom and opportunity by moving objects—exhausts, suspensions, brakes— from the place originally assigned to them. As one priest said “I can drop stuff here and everywhere... meet ma superhero when I be driving hard.” The car becomes an even swifter, moving object that both allows a private journey and also becomes a metaphor for the fantasies of the self, a so-called “technology of the imagination” (Sneath, Holbraad, and Pedersen 2009: 5).


A case study
Take the case of Andrew, a young Ghanaian shrine client in Detroit. Andrew came to AJ’s shrine in New York several times in 2010. I was present at one such visit over a period of three days. Andrew was born in Germany but, as a very young child, resettled in Detroit with his Ghanaian mother and his father, who was already living in the United States. Housed in AJ’s studio apartment, the shrine was indistinguishable from piles of cartons of take-out food, coke cans, and old sneakers. Here, the god’s altar, surrounded by gifts—kente cloth, cigarettes and eggs, and cooked oma tuo drizzled by the hot Ghanaian sauce, shito—brought by grateful clients, will hear cases of misfortune and give his replies and help during possession times through the mouthpiece of the priest. In my presence, Andrew spent several hours with AJ, each day paying a fee of $50 for which he also received two meals a day including goat shank stew, okra, and black eyed peas. He had heard about AJ’s shrine from word of mouth among his cousins. AJ, he thought, was a “radical” priest like Osama Bin Laden who understood that life was “hard in the hood.” His god, he had heard, was like an invisible Godzilla, a plastic lizard that had been pulled from the sewers underneath DUMBO, Brooklyn. Godzilla was full of “African venom” and “Yankee” anger against corporate America that had undermined “real” American values and beliefs about entrepreneurship and opportunity. Godzilla had played a role in bringing the US banking system to its knees a few years ago. He was also [113]impressed that AJ was a member of a major street gang in Flatbush, but that when AJ had wanted to leave Godzilla had protected him from fellow gang members and kept him alive both “on the street” and later, allegedly, in jail.
Andrew loved living in Detroit but he complained that his family increasingly found this difficult and he despaired that he would ever obtain residency. His father had lost his job as a mechanic after the auto repair shop he worked at for many years, run by a cousin, went into liquidation. He had subsequently suffered ill health since 2007. He had no medical insurance to pay for the treatment he now required for diabetes. There was no alternative full-time work in Detroit and Andrew told AJ that he felt choked to death by the suffocating decay of Detroit and the rottenness at its core. At the shrine, when talking about the city of Detroit, he said to me:

What up doe? Get the drop on the taste of metal in my mouth... in my nostrils. I’m a loser and stink like some loser.... Crunk.... It’s the smell of me falling off the edge of the world... like the autos pilling up in the stock yards.... I’m trash... smell like a decaying corpse... the walking dead... that’s me man... autos bright and shiny... cruise round my neighborhood.... We all suffer from the same terminal disease... all of us dependent on government handouts... trash... well out of gas.

Andrew, on the second day of his visit to the shrine, spoke to me of how he admired the cars and the way in which his relationship with his father and, indeed, America was filtered through the car, but that the American brand, like Detroit, was now in terminal decline. Andrew looked at the social apartheid that characterized Detroit. His father, he felt, had never obtained work at the General Motors Plant because he was African. He remembered visiting in his youth a car showroom with his father and being taunted by the African American salesman that Africans could not drive cars, only ride camels. He also recalled gunshots being fired at his father’s garage by rival African American car dealers who painted graffiti of monkeys on the pavement. However, as the automobile industry went into decline, the work dried up and African Americans were also left with no alternate employment and so gave up the leases on their automobiles, meaning that his father’s work repairing motors also dried up. He described at the shrine how his family members had “outlived their market value” and that he was now seen “as useless to the market.”
Andrew told to me how he worked as a cashier in a local convenience store that kept him out late, and how he and his girlfriend and their child survived on less than $400 a month. His savings account contained $35. He and his girlfriend fasted on alternate days to ensure that her child could eat. Often, food consisted of a bag of potato chips, which they would measure out to last several days. A reminder of his limited employment prospects appeared as he walked past the derelict and redundant motor plant. Andrew felt that wherever he went, he took the stench of decay of moldy litter and the crumbling of his family’s lives with him as Detroit fell apart. This smell he said “clouded my judgment” and “like bad breath ate away at confidence.” In spite of looking for work as far afield as Mississippi and Florida, he felt tired and worn out and was unable to find any work beyond the most menial and temporary. He felt harassed as a Muslim, and as an African he was harassed by [114]African American youths. He stopped wearing “African clothes” in order to blend in more, especially at night when he felt most conspicuous. He told AJ,

I’m a working man... anonymous.... How do I compete... big men. It’s like fighting Godzilla. Shit... stunt... money corporations. He crushes me with his giant lizard feet. I can’t even blind the big guy— face... faceless douchebags... mop up.... L. Brooks Patterson eating my soul. All stunt.... Everyone vanished gone.... Nobody left once them douchebags ran off with the stash... gone. Factories, [auto] shops, homes, gone... my drive home and hope and care and my papa who worked to give it me...

On the other hand, as the above quote illustrates, Detroit also represents a squandered legacy of Detroit politicians such as County Executive Patterson who AJ believed “did not work for the black man” and corporate executives and suppliers who “bled the black man dry” cried AJ. Andrew, during his stay at the shrine, spoke of the fragility of Detroit—“the douchebag of corruption” as he called it as the auto industry got bigger and bigger “and the wheels came off.” AJ sought to expose the dark side of corporate power—that the market quickly moves production to a new, cheaper location with lower labor costs—from the inner city of Detroit, to the suburbs of Flint to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and India. AJ asked Andrew, like with other clients, to look out for conspiracies on the news and on the Internet about the large global corporations that stalk the American landscape, such as Enron and AIG.
At shrines, the automobile represented a little piece of creative enterprise of the maverick inventors whom Andrew’s father worshipped, who worked in the great car plants on the Torpedo model. Like the founders of the motor industry, Mr. Chevrolet and Mr. Cadillac, the shrine gods compare themselves to these romantic, iconic figures, coming from poor rural areas to make their fortune as the Akan gods did in nineteenth-century Ghana from cocoa production. These spirits became entrepreneurs but lost their fortunes to the British, who wiped them out just as Chevrolet suffered at the hands of General Motors. The objective of AJ became to rearticulate and to reinvigorate the spirit of the Pontiac model, which now literally, to him, had festered into a bulkiness and unwieldiness; a rotten object that seemed out of touch with more innovative models. The object of desire, the automobile, is made magical again by distancing it from the industry that made it and the associated structural inequality, infusing it with magic, and relating it to Andrew’s personal experiences and private memories. On the last day of Andrew’s visit, AJ told him,

Wash away the stink of corruption... it’s the urine trails of dogs stinking up the sidewalk. Stank... the trash piles up and manholes add... the stank of damp and heat in the summer. Wash this away man... from the wheels.... Keep those hubs fresh man... with the promised land.

In an effort to combat the lingering odor of decay and crumbling that smothered Andrew, AJ asked him to reveal his favorite smell and touch from his love of the Pontiac and recreate a new aroma and environment. Andrew told AJ how the old Torpedo felt to him and captured him in its scent when he visited car shows to look [115]at vintage models—the silky shape characterizing the Torpedo, the curve of the fender and tail fin bent in one beautiful piece of bright polished metal. The interior felt like velvet to the touch and smelled like his grandfather’s tobacco and boot polish. He recalled the white electric clock on the dashboard “that made the sweetest ticking sound.” As he spoke to AJ, Andrew fantasized about the smell of candy he associated with his childhood, sitting in cars parked in his father’s garage:

Smell wild memories like boy, candy in a tub. Jaw breakers, Nik-L-Nips, suck the goodness out of here. Circus peanuts mixed in a fruity cloud of fluff... marshmallow as you like from the back of a classic Torpedo... sitting in luxury on leather cushions, banana flavor swell my nostrils and make my big heart huge.

On his final day at the shrine, Andrew is transported by AJ back into a realm of optimism and expectation by recreating the smell and texture of the Torpedo, recalled by him in his youth—a new setting and imagination that links to the nonmaterial realm and creativity (see Sneath, Holbraad, and Pedersen 2009). In the last few hours of his visit to the shrine, Andrew is asked by AJ to remember this sense and to value this as the basis of a new life and new fortune. These intangible feelings are captured by the priest and blended into a magical suman—a small piece of fender metal—that Andrew is told to wear about his person. In this sense, the suman can be regarded as a thing that refuses the dichotomy between things and spirits, or between materiality and power (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2006, cited in Ishii 2012). The magical metal object acts as a positive conductor for wealth, AJ conveyed to Andrew, “like belong to Mr. Henry Ford and Mr. Firestone” and an enterprising promise that is kept intact by a number of rituals designed to aid an “industrial spirit” and ward off witchcraft. These rituals include touching the fenders of three black cars every morning, rubbing one’s hands in dirt from the street in the morning and evening, inhaling the smoke of a cigarette before bedtime, chewing flavored gum no more than twice a day, and lighting scented candles around his bed. In taking the car apart, its unwieldiness is removed and the fear and violence and other structural inequalities suffered under recession, including witchcraft, are replaced to reveal countless circumstances for personal enchantment and excitement. This opens up Andrew’s world to endlessly pursue happiness and prosperity afresh.


Conclusion
Miho Ishii (2012) illustrates how the efficacy of shrines in Ghana may only be judged in how they worked or not through the linking of spirits, things, and social relations. In New York, Akan occult narratives function at shrines as a magical framework for the capitalist workings of the free market and encompass the extreme economic inequalities found in the United States, and the excessive veneration of wealth and celebrity in locations such as Manhattan since the global recession of 2008. While New York City is proudly declared by its political leaders to be the ultimate luxury product and Manhattan has become a fetishized space of ostentatious wealth and conspicuous spending, the workings of economic power [116]has become increasingly spectral as the fascination of producing something from nothing seems ever more desirable in an abstract economy and consumerism gains appeal as part of this neoliberal ideology. In an age of consumer excess that grew at the expense of America’s manufacturing infrastructure, Akan shrines provide alternative frames of hope created from their own materials, an “intraconnective” universe of beings and objects (Handleman 2008). By focusing on how a “technology of the imagination” between people and things is realized, we can see how at shrines the realm of the material and the spiritual intersect (Sneath, Holbraad, and Pedersen 2009; Tassi and Espirito Santo 2014). Akan occult discourses and witchcraft practices engage with free market mechanisms to include new mass produced subject-objects such as the celebrity and spirit-objects such as the car that also acts as a metaphor for the body. While established shrines venerate wealth and encourage the pursuit of personal riches and fame among shrine clients obsessed with the fetishization of mass produced celebrity and conspicuous consumption, young shrine priests, more recently arrived in New York, look for an alternative dream and the worship of a different commodity. In order to materialize the occult economy in a more radical manner, young priests invoke a vision of the industrial that characterizes the old automobile industry in Detroit: a celebration of the politics of the concrete over the abstraction of financial capitalism in centers such as Los Angeles, Miami, and New York and a rhetoric of substance and loss that can be mapped onto the American industrial landscape—Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit.
The American car represents at shrines the great dream of individuality and escapism and a golden industrial era of lost “legitimate” values rather than the pursuit of “selfish” wealth, fame, and celebrity. By demystifying the capitalist fetishism of the big Detroit automobile producers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler— shrines challenge these clients not to fearfully perceive themselves as dehumanized workers or as human waste and disposable, but to take on the cavalier and exciting spirit of the great American motor industrialists and their legacy represented by the iconic Pontiac. By animating materials and manufacturing a new miraculous commodity-fetish, priests are infusing the contingent and unpredictability of spirits into standardized, Fordist, automotive production (Ishii 2012). As a metaphor for the body of the shrine client, the rotten, bulky, and slow vehicle that has become corrupted by unscrupulous business practices and bankruptcy and that can no longer compete with sleeker Japanese models is made magical again and its engine parts revitalized (Mageo 2011). The “effects” of this are that in spite of the hardship that clients suffer, rather than rejecting the American ideal, it has instead been rejuvenated and the American dream has lost none of its allure. The industrial history of Detroit, as one of a city of opportunity, is humbly declared by young shrine priests to represent the glory of America’s past. Through a process of auto-making, the shrine bequeaths to clients a new world of enchantment and magical connections denied by the collapse of an older type of capitalism in major manufacturing cities in the United States. They reinvigorate capitalist ideology and make magical the individual experiences and memories taken from producing a mass commodity—the smells and desires invested in this—to open up a fantastical world to the sharing of wealth and to new prospects and possibilities among impoverished [117]clients who desperately cling to the American dream during the current economic recession in the United States.


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Au-delà des économies occultes: les esprits Akans, les idoles New-Yorkaises, et les automobiles de Detroit.
Résumé : S’il est solidement établi que l’économie occulte d’Afrique occidentale permet une critique métanarrative de la modernité, cet article se propose d’étudier la convergence entre les discours associés à la sorcellerie et le marché capitaliste, par l’analyse du cas des maisons des esprits Akans dans la ville de New York. Les pratiques occultes Akans, loin de se tenir à une distance prudente du « fonctionnement mystérieux » du marché, abordent frontalement la production en masse américaine et l’orthodoxie néolibérale. Dans cette optique, l’automobile américaine, l’incarnation par excellence du rêve américain, d’une idéologie sous-tendue par la désir d’évasion et l’individualisme, est devenue, selon l’interprétation défendue ici, un symbole local s’inscrivant en faux contre l’extravagant consumérisme new-yorkais également associés à des lieux de culte plus établis. Les jeunes prêtres des maisons des esprits brandissent l’ère de la production automobile à Detroit comme la promesse et le projet d’une autre forme d’industrialisme—le recyclage par les temples Akans de l’iconique voiture Pontiac.
Jane PARISH is an anthropologist at Keele University researching West African witchcraft and Akan spirit shrines among Ghanaian communities in the United States and Europe.
Jane ParishSchool of Sociology and CriminologyKeele UniversityKeeleStaffordshire ST5 5BGUnited  Kingdomj.a.e.parish@keele.ac.uk
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				<article-title>Alternative me? Anthropology and self-alteration</article-title>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Contemporary life across the globe is awash with enterprises, programs, and practices that purport to foster self-alteration. Developing the self; self-care; transcending the self; self-actualization; expressing the self; empowering it: the myriad of terms testifies to myriad actions of the self on the self, facilitated by activities in a huge number of social domains. Anthropology as a discipline has an intense interest in the way that different societies constitute personhood or selves. Yet in itself the self has been of more central interest for certain other disciplines than it has been for anthropology. This essay sketches out an anthropological prolegomenon to the theme and practice of self-alteration. It concludes that the study of self-alteration should begin not with cultural models of the self but with the revealing of its new structures caused by modes of alteration themselves.</p></abstract>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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				<day>29</day>
				<month>04</month>
				<year>2025</year>
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			<issue seq="207">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.1</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Online phenomena are frequently examined for how they connect humans socially through technology, with connectivity often considered as a state of being or doing that implies the mutually exclusive binary: connect or disconnect. This study of Airbnb Online Experiences, an online phenomenon that emerged during COVID-19 as a way for people to connect to the world through live interactive events facilitated by video calling, introduces new dynamics of (dis)connection as an emergent process rather than an established binary through the unexpected and ultimately uncontrollable nature of technological connectivity. Through an ethnographic examination of technological (dis)connective happenings that emerge within Airbnb Online Experiences, the study explores the ways in which these happenings are enfolded by a larger consideration of connectivity. Drawing on posthuman relational perspectives, the article proposes connectivity as an agential process, one which involves shifting entanglements of humans and nonhumans always transforming from within and unfolding in new ways.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>Clothes for spirits: Opening and closing the cosmos in Brazilian Umbanda</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Clothes for spirits: Opening and closing the cosmos in Brazilian Umbanda</trans-title>
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					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Espírito Santo</surname>
						<given-names>Diana</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Anthropology Program
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile</aff>
					<email>gimmefish@yahoo.com</email>
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			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau6.3</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2016 Diana Espírito Santo</copyright-statement>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article I argue for alternative models to understanding the relationship of spirit cosmologies to their social surround. In my ethnography, I show that fluidity and plasticity are central to a particular urban sector of the Brazilian spirit religion of Umbanda. Some contemporary Umbandists, particularly in the city of São Paulo, see that “culture,” read as the Brazilian historical imaginary, becomes the stuff by which the spirits self-reflexively “clothe” themselves. However, using Don Handelman’s division between cosmoses held together “from the inside” or “from the outside,” I also argue that Umbanda practitioners take varying degrees of openness and closure of their cosmology, including the urban sector I focus on, whose plastic cosmos is essentially ruptured, and thus needs to be “believed” in.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article I argue for alternative models to understanding the relationship of spirit cosmologies to their social surround. In my ethnography, I show that fluidity and plasticity are central to a particular urban sector of the Brazilian spirit religion of Umbanda. Some contemporary Umbandists, particularly in the city of São Paulo, see that “culture,” read as the Brazilian historical imaginary, becomes the stuff by which the spirits self-reflexively “clothe” themselves. However, using Don Handelman’s division between cosmoses held together “from the inside” or “from the outside,” I also argue that Umbanda practitioners take varying degrees of openness and closure of their cosmology, including the urban sector I focus on, whose plastic cosmos is essentially ruptured, and thus needs to be “believed” in.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>Umbanda, spirit cosmos, possession, plasticity, identities, perspectivism, rupture</kwd>
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	</front>
	<body><p>Clothes for spirits






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Diana Espírito Santo. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.3.010
Clothes for spirits
Opening and closing the cosmos in Brazilian Umbanda
Diana ESPÍRITO SANTO, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile


In this article I argue for alternative models to understanding the relationship of spirit cosmologies to their social surround. In my ethnography, I show that fluidity and plasticity are central to a particular urban sector of the Brazilian spirit religion of Umbanda. Some contemporary Umbandists, particularly in the city of São Paulo, see that “culture,” read as the Brazilian historical imaginary, becomes the stuff by which the spirits self-reflexively “clothe” themselves. However, using Don Handelman’s division between cosmoses held together “from the inside” or “from the outside,” I also argue that Umbanda practitioners take varying degrees of openness and closure of their cosmology, including the urban sector I focus on, whose plastic cosmos is essentially ruptured, and thus needs to be “believed” in.
Keywords: Umbanda, spirit cosmos, possession, plasticity, identities, perspectivism, rupture


In an article on Melanesian anthropology, Ron Brunton argues against Peter Berger’s assertion that man has a universal propensity for order (Berger cited in Brunton 1980: 113). Order is often more a product of the institutional and intellectual drives of the researcher, he says, than of the culture he studies (Brunton 1980: 113). This is a critique by and large now familiar in anthropology (see, for example, Barth 1987). But Brunton suggests more attention should be paid to fluidity, incoherence, inconsistency, and idiosyncrasy. This may be even more imperative in contexts where religious experience is born from just these idiosyncrasies, uncertainties, and immanent transits of deities, such as in the African-inspired traditions of Cuba and Brazil.
However, that scholars have tended to come to terms with these ontological fluidities through recourse to their psychological, sociological, or political counterparts is arguably telling of the ultimate frames of such analyses, which assume that [86]cosmological dissonances can be understood with reference to other, more “real” aspects of political, social, and cognitive life. Thus, for Brunton, “cognitive consistency may only be necessary in contexts where inconsistency leads to political vulnerability” (1980: 122, my emphasis). In his fascinating ethnography of Kalahari Bushman religion, Mathias Guenther argues that a whole series of social-structural factors explain the ambiguous and highly variable quality of people’s belief complex, in which Tricksters figure prominently (1999). Guenther describes the first of two orders of Kalahari existence (the first being the “primal,” mythological order, and the second being the “present,” historical order) as peopled by entities whose capacity for mutation is absolute, such as the “Trickster,” who disguises himself in this or another skin, with one or another face, at once animal, human, and spirit (1999: 66–70). Indeed, Guenther describes these orders not as separate or sequential; the primal, mythological time pervades the historical present (1999: 66).
This scenario would not be unfamiliar terrain to anthropologists of Amerindian worldviews, who are accustomed to documenting the ontologically transformative and expansive capacities of shamanic technologies, nor indeed to scholars of Native American folklore, which is replete with transgressive Coyotes and other tricky creatures (Radin [1956] 1973; Hyde 2010), and so on. The question that arises is how to theorize these aspects of ontological mutability in themselves. This implies understanding them not as epiphenomena of other social and political forms of uncertainty, but as alternate (and alter) cosmological orderings. For Guenther, the malleability of the Bushman’s cosmology is a function of an equally malleable social matrix, where uncertain social classifications coupled with the absence of a defining political system yield broader metaphysical manifestations of uncertainty. Both a strong individualist ethos and the absence of ritual specialists to render complex beliefs systematic, result in interpersonal variation, diversity, and change (Guenther 1999: 81–83). Ambiguity, he suggests, or chaos, is a form of living, and thus also a form of thought.
But while this functionalist tack is food for thought (functionalist in the sense that an understanding and experience of cosmology is predicated entirely on social structure), the presence and persistence in otherwise non-“chaotic” cultural universes of immanently transgressive entities such as the African or Afro-Caribbean inspired Trickster reminds us that what is at stake is not always a lack of cultural consensus or even broader social uncertainty—nor even the absence of an expert orthodoxy—but the existence of cosmologies, or facets of the cosmos, that are uncontained by the categories or tropes reserved for them. This means placing the idea that spirit cosmological order is a precondition of religious experience under scrutiny: first, perhaps, by paying closer attention to the transformational logics underscoring its specific mutations, fluidities, and their clearly also social effects; and second, by not assuming that people experience spirit cosmology in only one way.
In the ethnographic case I will describe, Trickster also tells us that there is more trickery than meets the eye; we should pay closer attention to instances of ontological malleability in a broader—and not simply exceptional—sense. Our anthropological obsession with finding exceptions to order goes to the heart of the limitations of our representationalist thinking—where, as Karen Barad says, we assume sharp edges between entities in the world, and relations of absolute exteriority between them, as also between knower and known (2003). This is particularly the case, I will [87]argue, with spirit possession practices, whose scholars must deal not simply with the social life of invisibles but also invariably with complicated embodied histories, mimesis, concepts of persons, things, and material possessions, that are assumed in some form to be shaped by their historical surround. In his recent volume on genealogies of spirit possession languages, Paul Johnson argues that “spirit possession is a theatre of potential pasts, selectively activated by ritual performers for purposes in the present” (2014: 15). But that it is a far from straightforward theater is emphasized by Michael Lambek (2014) in his afterword to the same book and elsewhere: possession may be ambiguous, just as discourses surrounding it ironic. Further, it is not just people who animate or empower spirits but also the other way around— “power goes both ways,” precluding any simple binary distinction, for instance, between master and slave, defeat, conquest, or resistance (Lambek 2014: 263). In this essay I will think through my ethnography of a Brazilian religion called Umbanda and imagine other conceptual languages with which to understand a moving spirit universe and its relationship to people, one that does not reduce a spirit repertoire in a direct form to a cultural and historical “imaginary,” but introduces more creative means of grasping the relationship between the two.
Perhaps no other spirit mediumship tradition in Brazil has evoked so forceful and direct a relation between cosmology and the particulars of the society in which it exists than Umbanda, described by its early scholars as the first truly “Brazilian” religion (Bastide [1960] 2007; Ortiz 1978). The most common origin myth among Umbandists is that of seventeen-year-old Zélio de Moraes, who, upon involuntarily incorporating an indigenous “Caboclo” spirit in a white Kardecist Spiritism session in Rio de Janeiro in 1908, much to the displeasure of the mediums present, revealed the birth of a new religion that would embrace spirits of all “races” and degrees of “evolution.” Against the backdrop of what was an elitist white Spiritist community on the one hand (Spiritism is a nineteenth-century “scientific” religion designed by Frenchman Allan Kardec), and the largely tight-knit, African-inspired religious traditions on the other, Umbanda appeared conciliatory at least and revolutionary at best. While scholarly consensus would ultimately place Umbanda’s formalization in the first decades of the twentieth century as a middle-class attempt to recover the magical efficacy of the Afro-Brazilian religious universe while largely erasing its ties with “a backward and uneducated Africa” (Capone 2010: 74–75; Brown [1986] 1994), anthropologists have repeatedly sought recourse to a vision of Umbanda as a repository of a national symbolic imagination, reiterating a native view of Umbanda as quintessentially “Brazilian” (if not always democratic).
Certainly, the identity make-up of its spiritual denizens seems to point to an inclusivity of social stereotypes. Many of those entities in wider circulation among Umbandists today—among which are the Pretos Velhos (Old Black Slaves), Caboclos (Indians, native Amazonians), Crianças (child spirits), Ciganos (gypsies), Pombas Giras (women of “ill repute,” prostitutes, courtesans), Bahianos (natives of Bahia, migrants from the north), Boiadeiros (cowboys of the arid Brazilian backlands), Marinheiros (sailors), and others—reflect a porosity so evident in spirit mediumship traditions elsewhere, particularly those where strong historical and cosmological entanglements obtain.
However, in this article I propose to explore the overlooked dimensions of what we could call ontological “plasticity,” which in the first instance remits us to the [88]domain of the Tricksters of the Afro-Brazilian cosmos, the Exus. Exus are especially relevant here because they tend to be the darlings of an anthropology that sees an immediate and unproblematic correlation between a certain class of entities in a popular ecstatic cult and a widely shared imaginary on the persistent problems and contradictions of Brazilian social life and its underbelly—poverty, inequality, sexism, exploitation, and corruption (cf. Prandi 1994), even if this correlation is fraught with ambiguity, irony, and inversion. But Exu’s transgressiveness must be understood not as a departure from order (or its inversion), which would reify this very order, but as indicative of this order’s very logic, a logic of plasticity rather than transgression. I take my understanding of plasticity from Catherine Malabou, for whom it means being transformed without being destroyed. For her “plasticity” is that which “renders possible the appearance or formation of alterity where the other is absent. Plasticity is the form of alterity without transcendence” (2010: 66); it is, thus, an internal property of that which is transformed. One of the overarching points here is that we can and should experiment with conceptual alternatives to causal understandings of spirit identities and their changes, and that as a concept, plasticity allows us to understand this topological mutability of forms without necessarily positing an external, reductive frame of reference.
The argument in the first section is that ontological plasticity, as it is articulated by an elite group of contemporary practitioners in urban [89]São Paulo, has a long history stretching back to the very inception of Umbanda’s orthodoxy in the 1930s and 1940s. These first Umbanda intellectuals posited spirits as anonymous beings of light that could “camouflage” themselves with different appearances or “clothes” generated by Umbanda’s main intent: the embracing of racial and ethnic diversity. However, their intention was also to distance Umbanda from its “African” “uncivilized” origins. Contemporary intellectuals, particularly in São Paulo, posit a similar cosmography of metamorphosis but frame it in terms of symbolic “archetypes”—Jungian-type imagery seen to be sustained by a collective consciousness (and unconscious). Both dissolve the opposition between cultural construction and ontology by proposing that the latter (spirits) use the former (cultural imagery, archetypes) to constitute (or clothe) themselves. In contemporary São Paulo, this idea is particularly vibrant. Practitioners of Umbanda Sagrada (Sacred Umbanda), an intellectualist movement that began in the 1990s, in effect conceive that spirits “wear” culture, so to speak, a conceptualization betrayed by language that separates spiritual form (that which is worn) from essence or content (the wearer), a displacement that both has roots in early Umbandist writings and innovates from them.
But as Maya Mayblin argues (2014), there is an ultimate unknowability of divine forms that characterizes the movement between distance and proximity that people experience in relation to Brazilian deities. In an article on popular Catholicism in the northeast of Brazil, Mayblin argues that people understand saints and other sacred figures ambiguously—both like them (as flesh and blood, gendered) and not like them (ungendered, divine, not-human), and they shift between these poles depending on context and discourse. We could argue that this may be a sacred dynamic applicable to some of Brazil’s other cosmologies, seen, for instance, in the context of the contemporary Umbanda movements described in the first part. In the second section, then, using my ethnography from both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, I will show that practitioners experience varying degrees of “openness” and “closure” of their cosmology. This in turn either engenders conditions for an identification of spirits as ex-people, with particular stories and deaths, creating proximity, or it creates an ontological distance between person and spirit that swallows up their archetypical characteristics as biographically arbitrary and recycles them as moral “perspectives.”
I take my understanding of the differential ways of viewing cosmology from Don Handelman (2008), for whom some cosmoses are bounded, meeting their own limits, and held together from without themselves, and some are not (2008: 182). A good example of the former is a monotheistic cosmos where a barrier separating God and human beings creates an absolute difference that necessarily requires “belief ” to hold it together (2008: 184). Belief comes to the fore, according to Handelman, when the cosmos is constituted on a rupture, or is ruptured; it cannot know itself except through outside itself, which is why belief in a transcendent is imperative. A nonbounded cosmos, on the other hand, holds itself together “from the inside,” “intra-grating” through itself (Handelman 2008, 2014), and belief holds little importance. In this cosmos innovation is commonplace. Much like the Cuban spirit cosmos that I also study (Espirito Santo 2015), much of Umbanda’s cosmology is continuous with itself, with few abrupt shifts or ruptures between people and other-than-people. Handelman’s preoccupation, which is also mine here, is to show how “worlds are holding together through the metaphysics of the human, through the imaginaries of the human” (2014: 96). He refers to “cosmos” as the “entirety of the phenomenal lived-space of all entities—human and other-than-human—the entirety of a world of all dimensions of existence” (2014: 96), which is how I will take it.
But I also argue that in certain Umbanda contexts, this cosmos of spirits is essentially recursive—the spirits are aware of themselves as spirits and able to effect categorical changes on their own appearances. While this characteristic apparently places Umbanda in the “fuzzy” continuous-with-itself cosmos category, I argue that in the Umbanda sectors I mostly look at in this article, there is a move to transcendentalize Umbanda’s entities and thus to “close” the cosmos, making it impermeable to people. There appears to be an oscillation between different degrees of “encompassment” in an understanding of spirits, depending on practice context, and indeed, it is the practice context itself (the phenomenology of trance) that allows the cosmos to “open” again. My contention is that spirit cosmoses should not merely be regarded as a refraction of wider, more tangible processes but in their own terms as much as possible, and as such, irreducible in an immediate sense to sociological facts. Rather, the point here is the opposite: to acknowledge how Umbanda generates ontological possibilities that afford their own disentanglement from just such modes of social and racial determinism.

Trickster shapeshifting, now and then
Roger Bastide observed early on how Umbanda’s cosmology—based on seven lines of spirits headed by the African gods cultivated in Brazil, the orixás, but subdivided recursively into many others legions and sublegions bridging numerous identities [90]and ethnicities—is constituted by an “extraordinary syncretism” and system of correspondences ([1960] 2007: 324). Umbanda linked Spiritism with Candomblé, the popular West African–inspired religion of the orixá gods by placing the souls and spirits at the latter’s disposal, for orixás were “higher” types of beings on a “moral” scale (even though some Umbanda temples also call their spirit entities orixás); and it resolved the problem of syncretism with Catholicism by appropriating a popular, even magical Christianity, sublimating the former in the process (Bastide [1960 2007: 327–28). Umbanda has appeared, in this sense, as a both provocative and mollifying modern religious form. In a religious context where the benchmarks of “tradition” have been the Candomblé temples of Bahia on the one hand (Gois Dantas 1988), and European-derived Spiritism on the other, Umbanda has tended to be regarded as a “bureaucratic compromise” (Brown [1986] 1994), so predicated on an inherently syncretic constitution that early scholars alternately regarded it as a degraded form of Afro-Brazilian religion, and a “low Spiritism” (Giumbelli 2003; Maggie 1992).
But Umbandists have long found ways to resist its definition as a religion of mixtures, lacking in idiosyncratic roots or self-identity. For instance, in my fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro in 2010, I met the leaders of an Umbanda federation in existence since the 1940s who categorically refused what they called the “conspiracy theory” view of Umbanda’s history, promulgated by Diana Brown among others. “Umbanda is not a middle-class phenomenon designed to whitefy Candomblé,” they told me, annoyed at the thought, or “a white version of African religions, as some anthropologists would have it. It is wrong to see Umbanda as a mixture of pre-existing religions.” (For a detailed reading of how anthropologists politically and socially create the field of “Afro” religions, see Palmié 2013; Capone 2010; Gois Dantas 1988.) Rather, they place Umbanda’s beginnings among the “red people,” the Indians of Brazil who possessed sacred knowledge (but no more): the point of Umbanda is to revive it. In the early days of Umbanda’s codification, intellectuals backed by Umbanda’s first federations during the Estado Novo period de-historicized Umbanda—positing its genesis in distant lands, from India to Atlantis (Ortiz 1978). This occurred in the context of the continuous persecution of the religions of “African” inspiration in Brazil, which these leaders (partly successfully) hoped to extricate themselves from. Recent innovations are arguably more sophisticated.
As an ethnographic example of this contemporary state of affairs, I forward a brief description of an Umbandist temple I observed on several occasions in 2011, whose philosophies trascendentalize spirit identities in a slightly different way to the Umbanda federation mentioned above. Just before the end of an unpaved road in a wooded, lush corner of Jacarépaguá in Rio de Janeiro is Templo Estrela Guia, headed by a husband and wife team in their mid-30s, and whose Exu sessions made a lasting impression on me. Estrela Guia’s pai-de-santo (father-of-the-saint, priest), a large white man called César, would oscillate during any one evening in his “incorporation” of his two main Exus: Lalu and Meia Noite (Midnight).
On one of these evenings when he did come, Seu Meia Noite, as he was fondly referred to, released a loud, wide cackle that resonated through the bodies of all the audience members. One of his ritual children swiftly draped him with a black, silky cape with a purple interior and a cosmogram of two pitchforks sewn in green on the exterior. A necklace made of thick, shiny, black beads was placed around his [91]neck, a pendant hanging in the shape of a skull. Meia Noite had stripped off César’s black t-shirt, leaving his round belly showing. He would strut around the terreiro for the next couple of hours, torso naked, and caped. “Good evening,” he said slyly to us. “Is that song meant to not wake up the children?” he chuckled ironically. Then he strutted outside with candles in hand, and placed a lit one outside each of the spirit “houses,” ending at the Exu house, which looked much like a cave, inside which were statues of Zé Pilintra and Maria Padilha, two iconic Exu spirits. Exus are also known as “people of the street” (o povo da rua), a category bridging prostitutes, pimps, hustlers, conmen, tricksters, and otherwise street-savvy personas characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s in Rio, and are widely understood to form one of Umbanda’s metaphysical cornerstones.
“Save the people of the crossroads!” said Meia Noite upon returning. People began to play songs more intensely now on the drums. Meia Noite paced around the terreiro slowly but dramatically, whiskey bottle in hand, cigar in mouth. He had perfumed himself generously from a bottle he had received as a gift. We all clapped and sang. The tunes were catchy, the lyrics simple and repetitive. Meia Noite stood at the center of the terreiro and gazed at all of us. He then said:

Terreiros are just the stage, the theater where things happen momentarily. But when the entities leave the heads of their mediums, and the mediums leave the stage, the entities keep on working. We work all the time, at every hour. When you get here, we’re already working. We don’t get tired, people, tiredness is of the dense, material world. . . . I travel with the speed of thought. I can be here now, with you. But I can be incorporated in 10, 20 mediums at the same time, in different places.

Later in the same evening, after a switching of guard, so to speak, Exu Lalu had piqued my interest by somewhat sarcastically observing, at several moments of the gira (the possession rite, literally meaning “to turn”), how misunderstood Exus were in the public’s imagination. “People think we’re the devil, but we work against devils. We are given access to the dark zones so we have to look like we belong there.” Lalu’s statement points to something other than that implied in debates on what Exus are, where popular representations portray them as malandros, scoundrels, and untrustworthy types, and sometimes, accomplices of the devil (cf. Hale 2009; Negrão 1996). His allusion to camouflage, mimesis, and metamorphosis— couched in moral terms (you need to look like the devil to fight him)—pointed instead to the importance of what Exus do. Indeed, at another point in the evening he said, chuckling, “There are many Exus that people think are Caboclos,” leveling his criticism at another temple leader who was attending the ceremony; “I am Lalu, but as I explained to you, I come as Caboclo, I come as you wish, Preto Velho, Criança. Exu gives form, spirituality.” This concern with the inherent arbitrariness of spirit appearances is prevalent among the more scholarly urban Umbandists, who have taken Trickster’s message close to heart.
From the 1990s onward there has been a theological “turn” among educated (mostly white) elites in urban Umbanda, especially in the city of São Paulo, indexed by a proliferation of Umbanda theology courses and literature (among other ways), some of which has provided an implicit critique of Umbanda’s traditional cosmological models. In part, these have done so by forwarding a universe of spirits [92]whose identities and appearances dialogue reflexively with a national archetypal repertoire, rather than merely reflect it. For some members of a new generation of urban Umbandists, Umbanda’s cosmos reveals itself as aware of itself and its capacity for categorical and thus symbolic shifts in both perspective and form. Far from just “bits” of the Brazilian past harnessed into the present through forms of mediumship, spirits are thought to borrow their appearances from a human, historical, cultural repertoire. So, for instance, this group of Umbandists would argue that it is precisely because the Brazilian population has an image of the slave as a historically passive, humble, subservient type that certain spirits come “as” Pretos Velhos. This Umbanda category of spirits manifests as elderly, bent-over, needing a cane, and exceedingly good for their insight into domestic life. They are referred to affectionately in kinship terms: auntie, uncle, grandmother, grandfather. But according to some Umbandists, this may be only their disguise, modeled on human concepts; behind these benign, simple appearances are spirits of exceeding vitality. Thus, the spirits articulate a version of Umbanda that is highly conscious of its own categories and their culturally (humanly) constituted nature.
One group of people for whom this is true is followers of São Paulo’s Umbanda Sagrada (Sacred Umbanda) movement. Among other things, this movement has reappropriated the Brazilian popular imaginaries of identity in order to regenerate Umbanda’s cosmology in sophisticated ways. In their view, it is not the spirits of the (Brazilian, national) dead that wield symbols, but symbols that wield the (often anonymous) spirits. In proposing this, Umbanda Sagrada subverts dominant representations of Umbanda as the recipient of “lesser,” more “popular” spirits (in comparison, say, to Candomblé, cf. Capone 2010), as also, perhaps unwittingly, anthropological renditions of Umbanda as a nostalgic reproducer of some distant historical or romantic imagination. As a collection of theological precepts, Umbanda Sagrada was “received” by inspiration from the spirits (specifically, from a Preto Velho spirit called Pai Benedito) through the middle-aged medium Rubens Saraceni, its charismatic leader and promoter before his death in 2015. Fighting against what he saw was an insular, elitist culture of secrecy and mystification in Umbanda, Saraceni opened Brazil’s first public Umbanda “college” in 1999. He also began to publish many volumes of books of complex theology on the genesis and spiritual organization of the universe (Saraceni 2013), which have arguably triggered a renewed interest among the young in what was a declining religion in the 1980s and 1990s. The core of this success is his reformulation of Umbanda’s understanding of the “symbol” and its dividends. Saraceni has written almost fifty books, which have sold over one million copies.
Some people regard Umbanda’s spirits literally—as spirits or souls of people who have lived, namely, as a slave, or an indigenous person, or a child, or a prostitute—and who now labor through mediums, whether for their own moral “evolution” or that of others. Umbanda Sagrada, in contrast, regards spirits as manifesting an aspect or quality of God, called a “mystery,” and as such, not as intermediaries between a higher entity and a human world but an end, or message, in themselves. According to Saraceni, “Caboclo” is a degree of being, rather than an identity, one that refracts itself as qualities of the same degree in the different lines; for example, Caboclo of Oxossi is a guide that shapes itself as a Caboclo with the quality of the orixá-saint Oxossi. Their shapes, Saraceni maintains, are given by ideas sustained in [93]a kind of national collective consciousness (or indeed unconscious), the archetypes: patterns of thought and behavior, imagery conforming to ideas of distinct ethnic and professional identities in Brazil. Saraceni calls these forms, formas plasmáticas, which would roughly translate as “expressed forms.”
Umbanda Sagrada’s young theologians and leaders understand that spirits have the ability to shape or mold themselves according to particular imagery in Brazilian imaginary; that they do so through metaphysical figures that speak to the fundamental values of humility and simplicity is seen as evidence not of Umbanda’s inferiority vis-à-vis an Afro-Brazilian religious “continuum” (Camargo 1961), or of its mediatory position between moral and religious poles (Negrão 1996), but of its ontologically sophisticated design as the religion of the people, accessible in form and language. This new theorization has as one of its corollaries the de-coupling of cosmos from nation, by way of posing the former as internally and generatively conscious of the latter. Saraceni writes the following about this relationship:

The spirit, the deity, even the saint has shown herself in a particular way. A specific way of dressing, a color, a shape, in spirit. These “clothes” are symbolic. It is all a process of showing the living the power to whom he must direct his thought or prayer. . . . All divinities do this. The living must have some kind of reference. How would I be able to focus on Jesus if I don’t have a physical, material reference in mind for what he looks like? In this case, it’s a human form. But culturally this may vary. If the spirits were to present themselves in Brazil as dragons, as some do in China, people would be scared. They would run, not interact. We have protective spirits that take shape and description according to the religion. And according to the country and its archetypes. . . . If there is no image inside the mind, there is no reference point for that shape. (Saraceni 2013: 17–18)

Since 1999, Saraceni’s Colégio de Umbanda has taught leaders and followers from hundreds of Umbanda temples in the São Paulo area. Alexandre Cumino, a young Umbandist theologian and teacher, is one. For him, Umbanda’s “archetypes” result from the strong prejudices of Brazil.

This prejudice in relation to race, sexuality, freedom, to women’s power. . . that’s why Umbanda has archetypes. None of the spirits need to make an elaborate speech to teach you to love the Indio, to love the black man, to love the child. But when one of them says, I am a Preto Velho, I am an Exu—you will never know who he is. What matters is what he wants to convey. (Interview with Cumino, October 2013, São Paulo)

The spirits’ individual identities become a language of manifestation rather than its precondition, a language determined by but not reducible to historical contingencies: a language that can change constantly. More important here is the idea that the spirits themselves become anonymized, separated by an ontological gulf from their human counterparts who will never see or experience them as persons, or rather, ex-persons-now-spirits. In this separation, according to Cumino and others, lies the effectiveness of their moral message—freedom, tolerance, peace, and so on. It is only by virtue of the first that the second is conveyed.
These Trickster ideas are not new, however; they have a long history in Umbanda, tracing back, in fact, to its very inception.[94]
Some of Umbanda’s most important and influential early twentieth-century texts also reveal foundational concerns with what I call “ontological plasticity”— the property of a cosmos (in this case of spirits) to change, re-form, and recreate itself, in this case, in relation to a social, human reality, to which it also gives shape. At stake, I would argue, is not just the metamorphosis or differential identity politics of spirits for the sake of efficacy or deceit but a self-reflexive spirit perspective that articulates a purposeful and ontologically impactful relationship to human “culture.”
One of the first Umbandist authors and intellectuals to tell his audiences of “trickster” spirits was Antônio Eliezer Leal de Souza, who warned not just of false or charlatan mediums but of imposter spirits, too (1933: 28). Like many others of his time, Leal de Souza saw Exus as malefic, irritable creatures that exercise their whims in centers that practice black magic (1933: 38), and that forge cosmic battles with their opposites: the White Lines of Umbanda. More interesting, however, is his characterization of the “protectors” of the White Lines: the Caboclos and Pretos Velhos. Leal de Souza defends the thesis, based on Kardecist Spiritist concepts of metempsychosis, that:

Between the Caboclos, many were Europeans in previous incarnations, and their reincarnation in the heart of the forest does not mean a regress, but the beginning, through their identification with their environment, of a mission that as spirits, after a learning period in space, they would have to carry out on earth. Others belonged, in their last existences on earth, to white or Western peoples, or to the yellow Asian peoples, and never came through our tribes. (Leal de Souza 1933: 58, my translation)

While clearly subject to the racial prejudice of his time, Leal de Souza nevertheless gives us what is perhaps the first glimpse of what we can call the disjuncture between spirit’s “real” identities and their appearances, namely, by way of an appeal to their past lives. “The protector, in the White Line, is always humble, and, in his incorrect or clumsy-sounding language, he causes a sorry impression of ignorance, but frequently, in practicing the duties of his mission, surprises the consultants with his high level of knowledge” (Leal de Souza 1933: 58, my translation).
For Leal de Souza, this “camouflage” is part of Umbanda’s message in itself. He notes, for instance, how the spirits often come speaking in a tongue-rolled way, apparently disfiguring the language. This is not because they cannot do better, Leal de Souza suggests, but precisely because they wish to give the impression that they are backward, namely, so that the “individuals who think of themselves as superior and are forced to appeal to the humility of inferior spirits,” or so they think, “perceive and understand their own inferiority” (Leal de Souza 1933: 46, my translation, emphasis added; cf. also Giumbelli 2013). He tells of an occurrence he witnessed once whereby a Preto Velho, while treating a woman with his pipe smoke, candidly told her that she had a heart problem that should be attended to. Upon being examined by a doctor that was present, the Preto Velho proceeded to explain the medical problem in precise, technical terms, surprising the doctor, who disbelieved that the spirit could really be “African” or black. The Preto Velho then explained that indeed he was “black,” but that he did not “come down” in “roda de doutores” (Spiritism sessions with doctors), lest he become as arrogant as them (Leal de Souza 1933: 59, [95]my translation). With this story, Leal de Souza places his loyalty firmly within Umbanda and its exaltation of the principle of humility and anonymous charity, articulating it with his conception of the spirits’ forms and identities. This is done both with Spiritism, through an appropriation of the notion of multiple lives and existences, and against it, through a denunciation of its arrogance vis-à-vis the heterogeneous spirit world that is not always what it seems. Indeed, Leal de Souza denounces not just the arrogance of assuming a Preto Velho knows little of medicine but also of taking the spirits and their appearances at face-value.
It is tempting to see in the stances explored in this section an example of what Diana Brown ([1986] 1994) has identified as a primary drive in the movements of early Umbandists—an appeal to the expansion of Spiritism to its “outer” unacceptable edges but by way of the redemption of the “other’s” spirits and rites. In what would then become the best of both worlds, the Pretos Velhos, Caboclos, and others, could be still seen in this light as “evolved,” perhaps even white, spirits, under the guise of symbolic spirit “costumes.” Thus, spirits divested of their “primitivity.” This was probably the case for the older writers, such as Leal de Souza and W. W. Matta da Silva, among others. Furthermore, the concept of a spirit “body” or “form” subject to changes of appearance or to shifts or unfoldings of qualities is not one specific to Umbanda proper in its milieu, but inherits from and expands Kardecist Spiritism’s notions of the “perispirit,” or “astral body.” In his dualistic cosmology of the person, the perispirit is conceived of by Kardec as a subtle mediatory principle or body, a semimaterial substance linking the perceptions, sensations, and experiences of the time-framed physical body to the recesses of the immortal spirit or soul (cf. Cavalcanti [1983] 2008: 28–29). In the Book of spirits, Kardec’s spirit informant states, “the spirit changes its envelope as you change a garment” (Kardec 1857: book 2, chapter 1, question 94); the perispirit “can assume any form that the spirit may choose to give to it” (Kardec 1857: book 2, chapter 1, question 95).
There is a sense in which we could ask the same of newer versions of this argument, such as those wielded by Umbanda Sagrada, but I have no evidence ethnographically or historically to sustain that it is a will to “cleanse” the “African” aspect proper. However, whatever their intentions for doing so, both camps de-essentialize identity-driven understandings of spirit forms, symbols, functions, and meanings, namely, by introducing what appears to be a fundamental principle of ontological plasticity in a reading of the cosmos. As I will explain below, however, this plasticity ends up divorcing this same cosmos from the immediate grasp of its mediums.


Fracturing the cosmos
One of the easiest levels of analysis for the material presented in the last section is a perspectivist approach. For instance, in North Asian contexts, according to Morten Pedersen, there is “a potential interior spiritual quality in things” (2001: 414), whether natural “things” or animals or even spirits. In an article on Mongolian and Siberian animistic ontologies, Pedersen and Rane Willerslev ask what exactly is meant by soul (2012: 466). The animist soul, they say, cannot be treated as fixed referent but as “an inherently relative or deictic phenomenon, whose form depends on who perceives it and from where” (Pedersen and Willerslev 2012: 467).[96] For the Siberian Chukchi—contrasting with the Judeo-Christian conception of the physical body as substantially different to the immaterial soul—there is a sense in which souls are bodies. They can eat, drink, and be hunted by other creatures. These authors argue that a perspectivist ontology is better applicable in their ethnographic context than one that separates soul from body. The reader may know that perspectivism is a term-concept-theory employed by some Amerindianists, and most notably developed by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro to describe a cosmos “inhabited by different sorts of subjects of persons, human or nonhuman, who apprehend reality from distinct points of view (1998: 469), subject to a common “soul” and distinct “bodies” (thus, multinaturalism). Through the work of Aparecida Vilaça, Pedersen and Willerslev argue that the Amerindian “soul,” conceived as a quality that identifies it with all other beings, is characterized by its capacity to take on new bodily appearances (Pedersen and Willerslev 2012: 471). According to them, “the soul is not simply one body that ego cannot presently see . . . ; it is all the potential bodies that ego might take at some future point” (2012: 472). When we apply this concept to their North Asian context, this means that the soul of the soul is another body, or all the other bodies that a body could be.
Among the Umbandists I have spoken about in this section, the Umbanda “entities” are also bodies, of sorts, relaying a moral perspective on the world of humans through a message or archetype specific to that “skin.” The “soul” beneath or under these bodies may take on a multiplicity of perspectives and shift, perhaps at will. For these Umbandists, “culture” (social and psychological history) constitutes the materials by which the spirits fabricate their “bodies” or “clothes.” This means that “culture”—articulated by my interlocutors as a substance that exists and is sustained in a collective consciousness—is not understood representationally, epistemologically, as something produced and accumulated by representing minds; it must be seen in the light of its effects on a cosmos of beings. If we combine these insights with Marcio Goldman’s articulation of the concept of “virtualities” (2007, 2009), we can conceive that spirits can change, adapt, and multiply not just as a function of time and space but of their own internal metamorphic properties.
Everything in the universe of the Candomblé that Goldman studies is a diversification and a crystallization of axé, an all-encompassing force of nature (2007): people, deities, stones, and so on. In this “total” cosmos, multiplicity is an inherent property, although relations must be worked into existence, for example, through sacrifice and possession. The point of underlining Goldman’s ideas here is that virtuality, or the capacity to become, is forthcoming from the very definition of an entity in certain temples of Umbanda, that see it not as a god or a deity, or even a self-contained soul or spirit, but closer in kind to a vibration of sorts, one that has the ability to refract itself beyond a single form. The form itself, then, could be considered the spirit’s perspective, from a moral and archetypical point of view.
For instance, Bernardo, a young São Paulo–based Umbanda Sagrada medium, says the following:

You go to an Umbanda terreiro and you chat with Caboclo Pena Branca (White Feather). Do you know how many Pena Branca exist? Thousands! Everybody incorporates a Pena Branca. Who are they? We don’t know who they are. Do you know why? Because it doesn’t make the slightest difference who he is. He doesn’t come to bring his personality. . . . He brings a particular strength. (Interview with Bernardo, September 2013)[97]

But this is an understanding of cosmology that is characteristic of a relatively small, socio-economically elite, highly literate group of people throughout Brazil’s twentieth-century history. Indeed, perspectivism locks the Umbandist’s cosmological gaze in a very specific type of relation, one that is simply not always the case, as I will briefly show in the next section. Instead, we may need to experiment with a more plastic, pragmatic, and even individual understanding of cosmology, then, that does not see cosmology itself as a static, collective sort of representation, with each “cosmology” a whole unto itself relating or encompassing other aspects of a culture’s ethos.
Allen Abramson and Martin Holbraad have argued that classical understandings of cosmology were holistic in character, where ethnographers went “outside” their own culture, conceived of as a modern, complex, and relatively homogenous core, and “imagined themselves as charting the outer reaches of the social universe” where “this same whole curled inward in myriad places, organizationally similar (as worlds or totalities), but culturally differentiating and diverse” (2012: 37), and inevitably irrational, albeit not within themselves. Indeed, “their variously fanciful, less-than-true character was felt to be the abiding theoretical problem that they presented” (2012: 39). The point of this cosmos, they say, is that it is based on a uniform nature, described by science, subject to different epistemological viewpoints.
This idea that cosmologies are totalizing orderings of the world is rooted in the notion that societies themselves are naturally integrated (Abramson and Holbraad 2014: 6); thus, in a classical image, cosmology was imagined more or less as a reflection of other aspects of the socio-cultural order—kinship, politics, economy, and so forth. The anthropology of spirit possession is so exemplary of this ethnocentric holism that it is practically impossible for scholars to conceive of a spirit cosmology in its own terms, without recourse to other more “real” causes. Instead, “these approaches present indigenous cosmologies as inventive reactions to, or refractions of, more encompassing—and in that sense also more real—global processes” (Abramson and Holbraad 2012: 40). We are reminded of Charles Taylor’s argument on the historical emergence of the humanist “buffered self,” impermeable to outside forces, translated into a secular modernity that is closed in on itself, immanent, amenable only to differences in thought (2007: 35). Spirits are, then, essentially mental constructs, projected onto the often-unconscious body somehow, the differences of which can be located in various aspects of the environmental, cultural, and political landscape. As Erika Bourguignon—considered by many as the premier authority on trance, possession, and altered states of consciousness— has written, spirit possession “beliefs are present in large portions of the contemporary world and find expression in ways that closely tie in with various aspects of cultural and social change,” whether economic displacement, epidemics of disease, or anything else (2007: 374).
Morten Pedersen argues that the ambivalence with which certain authors have dealt with spirit possession, shamanism, witchcraft, and other occult phenomena in their respective ethnographies has led to a view of these as “symbolic language,” which in no way accounts for the Siberian shamanistic cosmology that he studies.[98]
These phenomena are typically analyzed “within a neo-Marxist model of social reproduction, where some cultural-ideational stuff is projected onto some political-economic stuff, or vice versa, in ways that are always in, or against, the interests of the powers that be” (2014: 176). In his ethnographic case, spirits were not caused by turmoil and uncertainty in Mongolia; they induced it. Pedersen asks whether it makes sense to speak of “non-representational cosmologies—of cosmologies that are not ordered reductions of the world but are instead specific enactments of its complexity” (2014: 178).
In a similar vein, what I am suggesting in this article is that we lend scope for a nonrepresentational understanding of spirit cosmologies that are not uniformly ordered or holistic, but inherently fractured and variable in their capacity to dialogue with their socio-cultural surround. The idea is to allow for a multiplicity of concepts to arise according to the specific ethnography at hand. This means being willing to treat spirits as relations, effects, and other phenomena that do not rely on notions of substance, for instance. I am reminded, for example, of Aisha Beliso-De Jesús’ excellent monograph on Santería transnationalism, where spirit entities and oricha-saints are conceived not substantially, but assembled and disassembled as electric impulses and currents, which travel through people but also televisual and electronic media, constituting copresences that transcend the normative boundaries of space-time (Beliso-De Jesús 2015).
Some of these languages locate spirits in the “interior” of people, where they can be understood as constituents of an expansive self in the process of becoming. For example, in an article on spirit possession in Mozambique, Morten Nielsen asks how “seemingly exterior entities might relate through a process of what could best be described as ‘interior swelling’” (2012: 435), thereby increasing people’s agentive potential from within themselves. As Alcinda Honwana (Honwana cited in Nielsen 2012: 438) explains, not only do people assume the personalities of spirits, the “spirits live and grow in people’s bodies,” for instance, as ancestors. This means, according to Nielsen, that a “dynamic interior assemblage of spirit and human is consequently established, infusing both with a social meaning that is projected outward as a reflection of the cosmological principles guiding social life in the local universe” (2012: 438). Among some of the consequences of the reconstitution of the acting agent as a “singular interiority expanding outward” (440), a sea of interior relations (with family spirits, for instance), are new assemblages on the outside, such as cleared land (441) to be claimed by means of these new “inner socialities” (Handelman 2002). In this particular context, spirit cosmology is understood to fold, swell, expand, travel outward from inner ontological components.
Other languages see a “curving ” of cosmology (and ritual). In an innovative article inspired by Don Handelman’s framework of “ritual in its own right” (2004), Matan Shapiro analyzes the ritual dynamics of two apparently very different religious spaces in Maranhão, Brazil—a context of oração (prayer) in an Evangelical church, and possession in an Afro-Brazilian temple (2016). According to Shapiro, Handelman “develops a unique gaze: rather than assume a priori a symbiotic relationship between the flow of everyday life (the ‘surround’) and the activities that take place during demarcated ritual events, he treats those events as distinct phenomena that hold together coherently and cohesively from within themselves” (2016: 48). Rituals self-organize to degrees linked to different levels of complexity[99]. Handelman conceives of rituals as literally “curving” or “folding” in the continuity of space and time (Shapiro 2016: 49); the more complex and self-organized, the more they “curve.” Shapiro says, paraphrasing Handelman (2004: 12–13), that “the ‘curve’ enfolds as suspension of regular social order, a distinct dynamic that participants feel on both sensorial and cognitive levels, and it is the experience of this ‘enclosure’ that makes the event temporarily autonomous from its surround” (2016: 49). According to Shapiro, the point of “curves,” for Handelman is that we can relinquish the idea that ritual events surround themselves with concentric fields of significance, only against which they are understood (Shapiro 2016: 49).
In the Afro-Brazilian Tambor de Mina, Shapiro discusses the spiritual biography of Carlos, who first experienced uncontrollable episodes of possession, then organized his orí (his head, the site of multiple spirits, once unruly), and then opened a temple. If at first possession was isolating, “curving” inward and suspending Carlos’ mental capacities, in a second instance, his entities began to interact and exchange with others in his surround, as Tambor de Mina entities are wont to. “Possession thus engendered new intimate linkages between Carlos and meaningful others, both humans and nonhumans” (Shapiro 2016: 54). This is contrasted substantially to the Evangelic rites also in Maranhão, which manifest a comparatively “flat” curve. The act of praying in this context—oração—itself entails a slow transformation of subjectivities (55), invoking an “ideological polyphony shrouded under the authority of a unitarily authoritative voice” (55). Consciousness awakes slowly; oração unfolds flatly (58). In Shapiro’s ethnography then, cosmology enfolds and outfolds, curves, twists and torques. By no means is its relationship to its social surrounding simple.
In the next and final section I wish to make a similar cosmological distinction from the point of view of Umbanda, also by way of Handelman. I take my argument from the article “Returning to cosmology—Thoughts on the positioning of belief ” (2008), which extends the argument made in 2004 on ritual to cosmology more broadly. I will argue that while most Umbanda can be modeled on Handelman’s open, organic, intraconnective cosmos approach, in cases such as the Umbanda Sagrada movement I describe above, there is a tendency to close off cosmos, creating breaches between persons and (unknowable) transcendent spirits that require a theological “belief-system” to hold them together from the “outside.” It is not God that encompasses the cosmos here (although He also inevitably does) but a whole array of higher-level entities whose designs for humans are largely unknown and whose appearances are extrinsic to them. However, this ontological gap is difficult to sustain in practice, and in possession sessions, mediums incorporate the same archetypical spirits as everyone else in Umbanda, manifesting them in their bodies and justifying this as “moral perspectives” in spirit bodies. The paradoxes that threaten to consume and unify this divided cosmos are thus exactly related to possession experiences.


Discussion: Opening and closing the cosmos
Handelman describes the “open-ended” cosmos as continuous with itself and, “so long as its entities are interrelated, can go on and on without meeting its own [100]boundedness, its own limits, since it is not held together from outside itself ” (2008: 182). He gives an example of this cosmos through Henry, a Native American shaman he met thirty years before. Henry inhabits a cosmos that is sentient, conscious, and densely interrelated, so that “beings affect one another—a change in one is likely to generate changes in others” (2008: 182). This is quite consistent with much of Umbanda itself, which demonstrates an ontological creativity characteristic of organic, porous spirit possession cults worldwide that dialogue closely with their immediate surround. Thus, José Bairrão (2004) argues that the recent increase in child Exu spirits—Exus mirins—being incorporated in trance and worshipped in Umbanda temples/centers reflects growing concerns in the 1990s and early 2000s with urban street children’s delinquency and propensity for crime. These mirins, he says, are the antithesis of childhood innocence, purity, or beauty; generally described as ugly, sensitive, and needy, but dangerous street creatures (2004: 63). One mãe-de-santo describes these spirits in terms close to those used for child criminals: “They’re afraid, but they make you more afraid than them, so they can intimidate you, exactly like a street punk” (2004: 63). Another interlocutor tells him that the spirit she “passes” (is possessed with) known as Mirim da Mata da Beira da Estrada (Mirim of the Bush of the Edge of the Road), had no mother or father, but was raised by prostitutes who sheltered and took care of him. He would steal from the wallets of their clients while they were in the act. Mirim da Mata da Beira da Estrada was murdered by the owner of a food warehouse that he stole from because he was so terribly hungry (65). Another group of child spirits of a temple Bairrão studied died, burned to death on a cold night. They were sleeping on the floor draped by newspapers when someone set them on fire. They didn’t react because they were high on drugs (65). Given Brazil’s level of child homelessness, violence, and substance abuse, it is entirely unsurprising that Bairrão links these Umbandists’ possession experiences of these spirits directly with the nation’s state of affairs. In this sense, Umbanda serves as an immediate, open-ended reflection on some of Brazil’s most pressing historical and social facts.
On the other hand, Umbanda also serves as a moral gauge or compass of its surround. It not only lives amid an ecology of what Stephen Selka has called competing moral orders (2010: 293), but has largely emerged as an organized movement through its selective appropriation of specific moralities. It is unsurprising that Exus are overwhelmingly described as lowly or inferior beings in this greater scheme. Kelly Hayes (2011), for instance, observes that Umbanda is riddled with references to the Devil or Lucifer, to Hell, and to demonic forces, particularly in Exu-related imagery, songs, and rituals. However, for her, Pomba Gira discourse (which she analyzes in her book) is not explicitly concerned with right or wrong, or indeed darkness or subversion, but “in dialogue with normative ideals,” which include feminine morality and sexuality (2011: 29). The very biographies of the spirits attest to the social inversions, albeit not always with resolutions or happy endings, made explicit and, to some extent, available by their presence in the lives of devotees. Take the story of Maria Molambo, a famous Pomba Gira:

In the story’s most basic form, Maria Molambo was the daughter of a wealthy landowner who fell hopelessly in love with a young man against her father’s will. Learning of his daughter’s affair, the landowner arranged for [101]her to marry a husband of his choosing. The girl and her lover ran off, were persecuted relentlessly, and eventually were captured. To restore his name and honor the father disowned the daughter and ordered his henchmen to kill her lover. With nowhere to go, Maria Molambo was forced to live on the streets, prostituting herself to survive. (Hayes 2011: 44–45)

For Hayes, Molambo’s story conveys messages that are consonant with women’s concerns with gender, sexuality, morality, and female agency (Hayes 2011: 46). The Umbandista protagonist in her book, Nazaré, gives form to the incongruities experienced by many women in Brazil: “Embodied in Pomba Gira, the holy harlot, these tensions are made dramatically manifest in the material world, thereby becoming subject to human reflection and manipulation” (Hayes 2011: 10). According to Hayes, all other Afro-Brazilian spirit entities provide a set of “symbolic resources” by which people like Nazaré become empowered. At first sight then, Umbanda is the prototype for Handelman’s “fuzzy” cosmos, which is continuous-with-itself in the sense that there is no rigid boundary between spirit cosmology and “real life”: identities, events, and characters transit easily between them, some crystallizing on the former end as spirit forms.
However, even in less prosperous zones of Rio de Janeiro, Umbanda’s entities seem to be far from clear-cut. Once, on a bus back from a beach ceremony with a traditional but poor temple in northern Rio, one with roots in Brazil’s Islamic slave ancestry, which Bastide called the “Mussulman religion in Brazil” (2007: 143), Francisca, one of the temple’s oldest and most trusted ritual children spoke frankly about the nature of her spiritual entidades. She said that while Caboclos were probably “higher” sorts of entities who had lived in the forests, the Exus and the Pretos Velhos were entities “of the earth” (entidades da terra) who had lived lives and made errors and who now came to tie up loose strings. However, she said, these spirits could have lived lives as professionals, doctors, engineers, tailors, or teachers—not just slaves, or people of the street, for that matter. At stake here for Francisca, we can infer, was not whether Maria Molambo lived the life and death as described for her and came back to work with Umbanda mediums but whether Umbandists conceive that other spirits (not related to her specific biography) may “assume” her identity in order to work. Francisca’s cosmos, in other words, has aspects both of an organic, intragrated universe that obviates the necessity of belief and a cosmos that has been fractured and is showing an increasing rift between the world of people and a world of the divine that remains somewhat inaccessible. Thus, the Preto Velho may not have been the spirit of a black slave at all, but a nineteenth-century French engineer, and Francisca would never know. In a similar vein, the leader of one of São Paulo’s Umbanda federations once asked a Preto Velho why it was drawing mandalas on the ground with chalk, instead of the usual cosmograms. He responded that he was a Buddhist but that he “came as” a Preto Velho because he liked “their energy.” Other spirits, such as Pombas Giras, however, were regarded far more literally—as women who had lived on the street. Here “belief in the unfathomable” is somewhat important to overcoming this discontinuity of identities (Handelman 2008: 181), which are not restricted in any way to merely Exus.
The closer we get to São Paulo’s intellectual Umbandist elite, characterized by Umbanda Sagrada among others, the more closed the cosmos becomes. Thus, [102]Adriano Camargo, a well-known Umbandist leader and book writer in São Paulo known as “the herbalist,” told me in 2013 that

Umbanda doesn’t have any personalism. It’s not like in Spiritism where you get messages from a spirit called José da Silva, or whomever. In Umbanda it’s the force of corporation, the battalion, the archetype, that counts. And the archetype is not a collection of beings but a thought form. So, the Caboclo is not a Caboclo—he has a symbolic name that determines his strength, his field of action. But there is no personalism. (Interview with Adriano Camargo, October 2013)

This lack of personalism has come hand-in-hand with sophisticated theological treatises that chart the organization and functioning of the universe according to certain spirit “masters,” such as Saraceni’s Pai Benedito de Aruanda, and which need to be studied, understood, and “believed” in before the cosmos can manifest in its fullest possibilities. In conversation with me, Saraceni asserted that Pai Benedito has merely provided the skeleton of a growing body of doctrine and knowledge. He added that while spirit manifestation itself is potentially infinite, there are certainly keys that are immutable, for instance, the “mysteries.” These “mysteries” of God may express themselves in myriad ways crossculturally, or even within Umbanda itself, but are inherent to nature of the universe, to the order of things, and to the character of human existence. Umbanda itself then becomes a symbol, or set of symbols, for a greater truth, manifest though plastic spirit identities.
But with the concept of “mystery,” among others, Umbanda Sagrada effectively has its cosmos encompassed by God and His unknowable aspects (spirits, forces). As Handelman says, “belief accepts (indeed, invokes) cosmic closure by believing in boundless, infinite God beyond the radical, paradoxical rupture between the infinite and the finite” (2008: 187). This particular Umbanda cosmos becomes thus much closer to a monotheistic religion than to a spirit possession cult proper, losing its plasticity on a more human level while gaining it on a transcendent one. But according to Handelman, even monotheistic cosmoses need some mode of passage from below to above—from the finite to the infinite—or they will lack integrity (2008: 187–88). While for Judaism, Christianity, or Islam it is belief that accomplishes this task, for a discontinuous Umbanda such as that manifest in the variations of Umbanda Sagrada, it is possession that does. It accesses the “inaccessible” through moral and archetypical perspectives wielded by spirit forms. But this, like Catholicism itself, which paradoxically promises to afford the believer some contiguity with the otherworldly, only to retract the boundary of the otherworldly to the world of humans (through the way the church changes its grounds for considering sainthood, for instance; see Handelman 2008: 186), is ultimately illusory too.
For Adriano (above), for example, the medium’s own history is an integral part of the message: he argues that it’s at this personal level, which determines the regional languages of spirit manifestation, that there are variations, or changes, not at the level of the archetype. For him, the force of the archetype was designed way back and remains fixed throughout Brazil’s cultural geographies, with the spirits manifesting in exactly the same ways with only slight variations—the Preto Velho will always come as a bent-over old man who needs a cane, the Caboclo as an energetic Amazonian Indian, the Criança as the prototypical child who wants (and [103]works through) candy, and so on. For Adriano, each temple projects its own energetic “designs” within these archetypes, which are what will determine the exact phenomenology of trance. “Umbanda has that freedom,” he says; “it resonates with your mediumship. The entities are not created individually, but by the force of a group.” However, these “perspectives” are not regarded as “evidence” of spirits but as the culturally sanctioned means by which these very (anonymous) spirits give evidence (in the form of advice, counsel, predictions, healing, and so on).
There is a sense in which this double-cosmos resembles a Catholic cosmology that has “always been peopled with anthropomorphically recognizable figures, with creatures shaped very much “like us”” (Mayblin 2014: 273). Corporeal identification with the divine always matters, Mayblin says (2014: 273). What lies beyond this identification becomes, however, largely a matter of faith. In monotheism, Handelman says, the boundary between the divine and the human is constituted as paradoxical; Mass shows this well. The first half prepares participants to approach the divine while on the level of the human; in the second half—through the ritual transformation of bread and wine, for instance—it is the Divine Presence that encompasses worshipers. In the end, “the agency is that of the Divine, not of the human” (2008: 186). In the “closed” Umbanda I have described, a similar case occurs: the divine “is, or becomes, entirely its own referent” (Handelman 2008: 186).


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Des Parures pour les esprits: ouvrir et fermer le cosmos dans la religion brésilienne Umbanda
Résumé : Dans cet article, je propose des modèles alternatifs pour comprendre la relation des cosmologies incluant des esprits avec leurs entourages sociaux. Dans mon ethnographie, je montre la valeur accordée à la fluidité et la plasticité dans un secteur urbain de la religion spiritiste Brésilienne Umbanda. Des fidèles Umbandistes actuels, en particulier dans la ville de São Paulo, veillent à ce que la « culture », c’est à dire l’imaginaire historique brésilien, devienne le médium avec lequel les esprits, réflexivement, se parent. Cependant, si l’on a recours à la division, établie par Don Handelman, entre les cosmos qui se tiennent « de l’intérieur » et ceux qui sont maintenus « de l’extérieur », il apparaît que les Umbandistes adoptent des degrés variés d’ouverture et de fermeture par rapport à leur cosmologie, notamment dans le secteur urbain que j’étudie, dont le cosmos malléable est aussi essentiellement brisé, d’où la nécessité d’y croire.
Diana ESPÍRITO SANTO (PhD, UCL 2009) has worked both on concepts of knowledge and person in Afro-Cuban spirit mediumship and on notions of cosmology and change in Brazilian Umbanda. She is author of Developing the dead: Mediumship and selfhood in Cuban Espiritismo (2015, University Press of Florida), and she is coeditor of three books, including The social life of spirits (2014, University of Chicago Press). She is currently assistant professor of social anthropology at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago.
Diana Espírito SantoPrograma de Antropología Instituto de SociologíaPontificia Universidad Católica de ChileVicuña MacKenna 4860Macul, SantiagoChilegimmefish@yahoo.com
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Malinowski’s classic accounts of Trobriand sociality have left anthropology with many lasting conundrums. This two-part article examines two such puzzles revolving around contradictory reports over the agencies involved in magical chants (megwa). On the one hand, consistent with his pragmatic and functionalist theories of language and culture, Malinowski claimed that, although ancestral baloma and other spirits are typically invoked in most spells, those incantations’ efficaciousness derived instead from the power of the enunciated words. On the other, as part of his evidence in support of Islanders’ “ignorance of physiological paternity,” he conceded that spells intended to produce pregnancy in village women were instead expressly aimed at eliciting appropriate ritual actions from baloma spirits as agents of conception and birth. On the basis of ethnographic data recently gathered at Omarakana village interpreted through specific adaptations of the “New Melanesian Ethnography” and Tambiah’s earlier “participation” theory of ritual practice, I argue that for Trobrianders the magical power of words is the power of spirits, and vice versa. This insight has important implications for classic and contemporary debates over the nature of “magic,” controversies over paternity and so-called “virgin birth,” theories of personhood and agency, and the character of dala “matrilineage” relations.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Malinowski’s classic accounts of Trobriand sociality have left anthropology with many lasting conundrums. This two-part article examines two such puzzles revolving around contradictory reports over the agencies involved in magical chants (megwa). On the one hand, consistent with his pragmatic and functionalist theories of language and culture, Malinowski claimed that, although ancestral baloma and other spirits are typically invoked in most spells, those incantations’ efficaciousness derived instead from the power of the enunciated words. On the other, as part of his evidence in support of Islanders’ “ignorance of physiological paternity,” he conceded that spells intended to produce pregnancy in village women were instead expressly aimed at eliciting appropriate ritual actions from baloma spirits as agents of conception and birth. On the basis of ethnographic data recently gathered at Omarakana village interpreted through specific adaptations of the “New Melanesian Ethnography” and Tambiah’s earlier “participation” theory of ritual practice, I argue that for Trobrianders the magical power of words is the power of spirits, and vice versa. This insight has important implications for classic and contemporary debates over the nature of “magic,” controversies over paternity and so-called “virgin birth,” theories of personhood and agency, and the character of dala “matrilineage” relations.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>magic, procreation, personhood and agency, kinship, Trobriand Islands</kwd>
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	<body><p>Malinowski’s magical puzzles






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Mark S. Mosko. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau4.1.001
Malinowski’s magical puzzles
Toward a new theory of magic and procreation in Trobriand society
Mark S. MOSKO, Australian National University


Malinowski’s classic accounts of Trobriand sociality have left anthropology with many lasting conundrums. This two-part article examines two such puzzles revolving around contradictory reports over the agencies involved in magical chants (megwa). On the one hand, consistent with his pragmatic and functionalist theories of language and culture, Malinowski claimed that, although ancestral baloma and other spirits are typically invoked in most spells, those incantations’ efficaciousness derived instead from the power of the enunciated words. On the other, as part of his evidence in support of Islanders’ “ignorance of physiological paternity,” he conceded that spells intended to produce pregnancy in village women were instead expressly aimed at eliciting appropriate ritual actions from baloma spirits as agents of conception and birth. On the basis of ethnographic data recently gathered at Omarakana village interpreted through specific adaptations of the “New Melanesian Ethnography” and Tambiah’s earlier “participation” theory of ritual practice, I argue that for Trobrianders the magical power of words is the power of spirits, and vice versa. This insight has important implications for classic and contemporary debates over the nature of “magic,” controversies over paternity and so-called “virgin birth,” theories of personhood and agency, and the character of dala “matrilineage” relations.
Keywords: magic, procreation, personhood and agency, kinship, Trobriand Islands



PART 1: THE MAGICAL POWER OF BALOMA

This power [of magic] is an inherent property of certain words, uttered with the performance of certain actions by the man entitled to do it through his social traditions and through certain observances which he has to keep. The words and acts have this power in their own right, and their action is direct and not mediated by any other agency. Their power is not derived from the authority of spirits or demons or supernatural beings. It is not conceived as having been wrested from nature. The belief in the power of words and rites as a fundamental and irreducible force is the ultimate, basic dogma of their magical creed.
— Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, p. 427

Trobriand Islanders and their culture as interpreted by Malinowski and subsequent fieldworkers and commentators have presented the discipline with numerous lasting conundrums. This two-part article draws attention to two such interconnected ethnographic puzzles: one has largely escaped anthropological attention, namely the mechanisms underpinning the supposed efficacy of indigenous “magic”; the other revisits one of anthropology’s most colorful debates, the so-called “virgin birth” controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, as regards Islanders’ beliefs in the spirit insemination of humans and their supposed “ignorance of physiological paternity.”1 Together these puzzles bear upon numerous other dimensions of Trobriand ethnography and regional Oceanic cultural variation as well as classic and contemporary anthropological theory as concerns the general nature and rationale of “magic” and “kinship” and the possibly intrinsic relation between the two.
As regards the first of these puzzles, on which I concentrate in Part 1, Trobrianders are renowned for highly elaborated forms of magical practice employing vocalized megwa “spells,” “chants,” or “incantations” in accompaniment with nearly all social activities—in gardening, fishing, kula exchange, courting, procreation, canoe construction, sorcery and curing, milamala harvest celebrations, warfare, and so on.2 Over time, Malinowski’s descriptions of these activities and his theorizing about them have proven both influential and controversial.3 However, in all those discussions, few fellow post-Malinowskian ethnographers have addressed the role, if any, of ancestral baloma and other spirits in Trobriand magical performances. Baloma, in brief, are the invisible, immaterial “souls” or “spirits” of living humans which, upon corporeal death, depart the corpse and enter the spirit world of Tuma, the “land of the dead.” There they enjoy a spirit existence, but eventually, as Malinowski described ([1916] 1948), baloma spirits age and are transformed into “spirit children” (waiwaia) to be reincarnated as new humans by means of inseminating women of their same matrilineal (dala) identity.
Now during the time of their existence in Tuma, baloma especially, along with other categories of nonhuman spirits, are invoked by practicing magicians in megwa “spells,” particularly the most important ones—that is, those closely identified with the baloma spirits’ own dala membership and identity. I stress this because, on the one hand, Malinowski (e.g. [1916] 1948: 201; 1922: 398, 404, 451; 1935b: 213–50) staunchly maintained, as in the epigraph above, that it was the words (biga) spoken in megwa spells and not the spirits expressly invoked therein which Islanders considered to be the agents responsible for producing the desired magical effects.4 On the other hand, over the twenty months of ethnographic research I have recently conducted in the Trobriands, virtually every knowledgeable adept of traditional megwa ritual with whom I have consulted contends unhesitatingly, contra Malinowski, that it is named spirits who are the critical magical agents, now as in Malinowski’s day and presumably earlier.5 In these experts’ view, the correct chanting of the other words and expressions to which Malinowski attributed efficacy, basically enumerating the spell’s specific themes, intentions, and ingredients, is necessary to its effectiveness, but without the active participation of spirits those words in and of themselves are insufficient to produce the desired results.
Like Malinowski, I shall focus here on that class of megwa known as tukwa considered to be most critical in how they underpin the traditional system of kinship (i.e. dala “subclan” or “matrilineage” identity and rank) and, thereby, the indigenous system of hereditary chieftainship and leadership.6 Largely by monopolizing such dala-based hereditary ritual assets, chiefs (guyau, gum gweguya) and local leaders (tolivalu) are able to organize their communities. And it is through a detailed consideration of these quandaries over Trobriand magical efficacy that, in Part 2 of this essay, I am eventually guided to shed new light on the other major puzzle regarding indigenous views of the participation of baloma spirits in human procreation and the character of kin relationship.


Spirits and words in magical and religious practice—Recent debates
One might reasonably expect that the numerous field studies conducted in the Trobriands subsequent to Malinowski, the foundational contributions to the anthropology of magic, and the many other debates spawned by his other writings would have attracted considerable interest to this issue before now. After all, Malinowski’s treatment of magic and his pragmatic theory of language in alignment with Frazer’s view of magical instrumentality were important in the later works of Austin, Langer, Wittgenstein, Burke, Winch, and others (see Tambiah 1990: 53–83) and contributed to the development of modern sociolinguistics and other approaches that were deployed in critique of structuralism. However, “magic” generally has proven to be among anthropology’s most intractable topics, to the point that, as Graeber (2001: 241) has noted, the term has long been largely abandoned or replaced by other rubrics.
In the past several years, however, interest in and debates over “magic” have reemerged as a result of new field studies that go well beyond the philosophical “rationality debate” of the 1960s but resonate with aspects of the puzzle over baloma spirit agency. These recent arguments have arisen largely in consequence of the development of experimental ethnographies informed by phenomenological and reflexivist approaches. A central issue concerns the epistemological and ontological status of research subjects’ and researchers’ experiences, attitudes, and claims regarding the beings and forces involved in “magical” practices (here defined inclusively with “religion,” “ritual,” “witchcraft,” “sorcery,” etc.); namely whether the spirits, gods, demons, pagan deities, supernatural forces, and so on, experienced by participants might truly exist or not, and the extent to which such expressions should be taken as manifestations of human power relations or as either valid or skeptical declarations of sincere belief (e.g. Favret-Saada 1980; Luhrmann 1989, 2012; Turner 1993; Greenwood 2000, 2005, 2009, Graeber 2001: 239–47; Lohmann 2003; Fountain 2013; Morgain 2013; Stoller and Olkes 2013; Blanes and Espírito Santo 2014; see also the Book Symposium published in this journal, HAU 2013). Related to many of these arguments is the claim that the culture-bounded ethnocentrism of the Western “rationalistic,” “empiricist,” “objectivist” orientation under which most prior anthropological research on magic had been conducted, in presupposing the nonreality of a spiritual world beyond the realm of sensory experience, has severely limited the anthropological understanding of what could be taken as a universal magical consciousness. For some, this seems to involve a problematic mixing of theology and anthropology. As formulated most forcefully by Greenwood (2009), however, the limitations of strictly rationalistic approaches to magic can only be overcome through intense, direct participatory engagements in its practice, which require the investigator’s suspension of disbelief.
Revisiting Malinowski’s magical puzzles from the perspective adopted here, I suggest, may indirectly help illuminate some aspects of the current discussions. By “indirectly,” I merely say that I do not pretend to offer anything approximating an answer as to the ontological reality of baloma or other spirits invoked in Trobriand spells. That choice seems to me a false one: that is, the necessity of either rejecting or accepting their ultimate reality. Instead, I focus on the kinds of new insights can be attained by viewing villagers’ expressed beliefs and attitudes regarding the efficacy of spirits as if they are real—a viewpoint compatible, on the one hand, with Luhrmann’s (2012: 16–17) methodological and ontological agnosticism. I cannot say that the spirits of Tuma are “really real,” since for my purposes it ultimately doesn’t matter either way. It is true, as I have described elsewhere (Mosko 2004), that some of my past fieldwork experiences have caught me suspended between my usual selfconscious scientific rationalism and my occasional convictions that the powers of indigenous (North Mekeo) magic might be real after all.
On the other hand, that concern is not the critical ethnographic point, which is instead, following Graeber (2001: 240, 245–46), among others, the intimate tie of magic to the nature of social capacities. If, as Malinowski correctly observed, Trobriand magic is an indispensable aspect of most if not all indigenous pursuits, but if he was wrong in attributing magical efficacy to the words of spells alone rather than to spirits, then our ethnographic understanding of the gamut of Trobriand institutions and their creative potentialities—kinship, chieftainship, yam exchange, harvest celebration, kula, mortuary exchange, procreation theory, etc.—is in considerable need of revision.
Not surprisingly, these recent controversies over magic have their counterparts in the wake of the contemporary “turn to ontology” in the anthropological study of religion. As Michael Scott (2014) has lately characterized the situation, there appear to be two main ontologies currently at play: the conventional “Cartesian dualism” of Western science dominant in most earlier twentieth-century anthropology, and what he terms a “relational nondualism” cohering from diverse, recently influential writings (e.g. Horton 1993; Ingold 2000; Viveiros de Castro 2007; Willerslev 2007; Holbraad 2009; Latour 2009; Rose 2011), including, of particular relevance to Melanesia and this essay, those of Marilyn Strathern (1988) and Roy Wagner (1975, 1991), among others, within the framework of the “New Melanesian Ethnography” (Josephides 1991; hereafter NME). The issues germane to the first of Malinowski’s magical puzzles concerning the efficacy of words versus spirits, I suggest, historically anticipate the tensions between Scott’s two ontologies. Malinowski’s generally pragmatic orientation fits well with the established “wonder-occluding” scientism, while the material I offer here underscoring villagers’ notions of spiritual agency resonates with the “wonder-sustaining” terms of “relational nondualism,” particularly those of its lineaments connected to the NME.
But more importantly, I think, the basic empirical questions concerning Trobrianders’ attitudes toward spirit efficacy played a fairly critical but tacit role earlier on in Stanley Tambiah’s initial “performative” theory of magic (1968, 1973), which he later reformulated in terms of “participation” (1990). Reviewing that transformation in Tambiah’s seminal thought, I suggest, has possibly important implications for ways in which the solutions to Malinowski’s magical puzzles might point to fruitful conceptual refinements in both the NME and Scott’s ontology of “relational nondualism” more generally.
Before turning away from contemporary discussions over magic, however, it must be noted that Malinowski’s two magical puzzles converge rather perfectly with Viveiero de Castro’s recent reminder of the “co-implication of the two founding problematics of anthropology, kinship and magic” (2009: 246). There, Viveiros de Castro insightfully treats magic (alternatively presented as “animism”) and kinship as cognate expressions of Maussian gift exchange, which, as I describe below, also informs my NME theoretical approach to the puzzles over magical efficacy and the nexus of relations involved in procreation. More specifically, he argues that both kinship and magic qualify as processes of “personification.” Following Gregory (1982) and Strathern (1988, 1992), he argues that just as kinship is conventionally seen as an exchange of persons as gifts, things and people in gift economies assume the social form of persons, hence qualifying both as ontologies of animism or magic. Understandably, Viveiros de Castro’s main illustrations of these ideas are drawn from what he terms “multinaturalist” Amazonia. Hopefully, the treatment I offer of Malinowski’s puzzles over Trobriand magic and kinship reckoning will be seen as an endorsement of Viveiros de Castro’s insight from an additional cultural realm, one far removed from Amazonia but familiar, thanks to Malinowski and other Massim ethnographers, to a large number of Euro-American anthropologists globally.


Tambiah’s “participation” theory of magic and the New Melanesian Ethnography
According to Graeber, nearly all modern anthropological treatments of magic “[have] been, in one sense or another, an elaboration on Tambiah” (2001: 241). Graeber makes special note of the two early signature works of Tambiah’s “performative” theory of magic (1968, 1973) which reanalyzed the foundational works of Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard, respectively. In his demonstration of “how the language of ritual [including magic] works” (1968: 188), Tambiah reexamined the vatuvi spell of Omarakana’s gardening magic, rejecting Malinowski’s (1935b: 3–74) crude pragmatism and focusing instead on the analogical (i.e. metaphorical and metonymical) relations between the words of megwa to account for their meaningfulness and persuasiveness to participants. At the very juncture of launching into this analysis, however, Tambiah remarked that he considered deliberations over the agency of words versus spirits to be symptoms of a “Frazerian hangover” (1968: 176) and a “somewhat barren debate” (183). He thus simply proceeded to examine the symbolic functions of the vatuvi spell’s words only, accepting without further consideration Malinowski’s assertions of the nonagentive participation of ancestral baloma spirits. So although his performance theory went considerably beyond Malinowski’s pragmaticism, the agency of spells still resided for him in words and the relations between them.7
In Tambiah’s other influential early essay (1973), reinterpreting Evans-Pritchard (1937) on Azande magic, he similarly focused upon the analogical connections, here involving enchanted “medicines” rather than spoken spells, to the neglect again of spirit participation. In terms I shall examine below, in other words, by dismissing spirit agency from consideration, Tambiah’s early performative treatments of both classic reports of magical efficacy had presupposed the Western distinction of “objects” as distinct from “subjects.”
This is important inasmuch as some two decades later in Tambiah’s more mature theorizing over “magic” and its relations to “religion” and “science,” he clarified a distinction between two basic orientations to reality: “causality” and “participation.” The laws of causality were characteristic of science and mathematico-logical reasoning. Tambiah’s main interest, though, was in the alternative aesthetic and religious orientation, inclusive of magic, whereby “laws of participation,” following Lévy-Bruhl mainly, but also Leenhardt, Wittgenstein, Febvre, and Bloch (Tambiah 1990: 84–94), effectively muted the subject–object distinction so as to include spirits and similar suprasensible beings as agents in ritual processes and procedures: for example, “the idea of mana, emanating from the individual as suffusing his shadow, hair and nails, his clothes and his environment … taboos and avoidances, rites of intensification, rites of severance … participation between the dead, especially the ancestors, and spirits and deities with the living’ (1990: 96). He quotes Lévy-Bruhl, who could well have been speaking specifically of the Trobriands:

The notion of society, too, is entirely different for the primitive [sic] mind. Society consists not only of the living but also of the dead, who continue to “live” somewhere in the neighbourhood and take an active part in social life before they die a second time.… [T]he dead reincarnate in the living and, in accordance with the principle of mystical participation, society is as much merged in the individual as the individual is merged in society. (Lévy-Bruhl, quoted in Tambiah1990: 86)8

Now Tambiah’s later participation theory very closely approximates the other approach already mentioned on which I am seeking theoretically and methodologically to base my treatment of Trobriand magical agency: namely the NME introduced above. But there are conceptual problems here also, some similar to and others distinct from those in Tambiah’s work. Marilyn Strathern’s The gender of the gift (1988) has come to be widely accepted as the NME’s foundational text. There Strathern (1988: 12–15) is similarly critical of the analytical distinction of “individual” and “society” in Melanesian contexts, which is implicit in Tambiah’s quote from Lévy-Bruhl when “person” and “relations,” respectively, are substituted. Also, where Tambiah, in line with Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of participation, breaks down the “subject–object” distinction, this also aligns with Strathern (1988: 19). But for Tambiah, the resulting “participation” consists of persons both distinguished from and identified with one another in terms of what amounts to criteria oriented to the distinction of the sacred and the profane.
On this last score, Tambiah’s and Strathern’s modeling partly diverge in critical ways. Insofar as the persons who mystically participate with one another are thereby merged in Tambiah’s framework, we have a theoretical precursor approximating the “dividual” or “partible person,” a central concept in the NME. According to Strathern’s (1988) formulation following Mauss’s (1967) theory of gift exchange, persons are composite beings constituted of the elicitive detachment, attachment, and exchange of their respective parts, seen as previously transacted relational elements of still other persons, whether they take the form of material objects, body parts, linguistic expressions, nonverbal performative actions, items of knowledge, and so on. In Tambiah’s participation view, just as “things” or “objects” qualify as parts of persons, so also do the imagined spiritual beings toward whom living humans oftentimes orient their actions in ritual and other contexts. In Strathern’s view of Melanesian partibility, however, the components of persons are more or less strictly construed in the gendering identities and capacities of masculinity/femininity and same-/cross-sex relations. Unquestionably, Trobrianders conceptualize themselves, their relations, and the world around them in gendered terms which sometimes articulate with discernments of relative sanctity and secularity (see, e.g., Mosko 2013, in press-b). But in Strathern’s analyses, the gendered dimension of personhood tends to singularly eclipse all other dimensions of personhood such as, in particular, sacred and profane identities and/or their analogs. It is noteworthy that Strathern’s inspirations for both the specific notion of personal partibility and the general framework for her perspective on Melanesian sociality—McKim Marriott’s (1976) exposition of the “dividual” of caste India and Roy Wagner’s (1975: 120–25) depiction of the dynamics of “innovation” and “convention,” respectively—were formulated with significant regard to complexities flowing from the sacred–profane opposition.
Strathern’s formulation of Melanesian sociality and personhood thus runs parallel with Tambiah’s initial performative theory of magic but deviates from his later participation model in effectively occluding the participation of beings such as baloma and other spirits marked as to their relative sacredness. This is so even in her foregrounded contexts of ceremonial exchange and initiation rituals where persons may well engage in elicitive transactions of the parts/relations of their persons in terms separate from or compounded with their gendered components.
Therefore, in adapting the NME and its core notion of personal partibility to the analysis of Trobriand magic and kinship, I am seeking to effect a shift analogous to that between Tambiah’s earlier and later approaches. We cannot understand Trobriand practices in past, present, or changing circumstances without taking into account villagers’ perceptions of the participation of baloma and other sacred beings in their persons and lives.9
The identities and capacities following from the Trobriand version of personal partibility, I argue, characterize the relations between living persons and spirits and thereby animate indigenous notions of magicoritual agency. In terms of Trobriand cosmology outlined below, moreover, not only are persons and spirits identified together, but the magical words of megwa spells and the features of the “natural world” to which they refer are all potent components of one another.


“Magic,” “religion,” and the character of personhood
It is worth noting how Malinowski’s account of Trobriand magic resonated (1) with the views of Tylor (1871) and Frazer (1922), current at his time, over the nature of and distinction between “magic” and “religion,” and (2) with individualist assumptions about personhood and agency which have persisted in much anthropological theorizing up to the present, the emergence of the NME notwithstanding. These two discussions, I argue, are intimately connected.
For Tylor and Frazer, agency in the sphere of “magic” was presumed to reside in beliefs in the impersonal, technical powers inhering in entities other than conscious beings, or persons—that is, in forces of the natural world actuated, for example, by verbalized spells and incantations. Ritual powers attributed instead by participants to conscious, supernatural beings of a personal sort, such as spirits with capacities analogous to humans and requiring propitiation, were classified as belonging to the sphere of “religion.” The presupposition of the universal existence of these two separate spheres thereby justified Malinowski’s portrayal of beliefs concerning ancestral baloma and other spirits as manifestations of the people’s “religion” while largely excluding them categorically from participation in “magic.” In elaborating upon insights from the NME as outlined above, therefore, I seek to demonstrate that the magical powers attributed by Malinowski and others to impersonal words and their combinations are the magical powers of persons, spiritual as well as human.
But there is more to my proposed modifications of the NME as conventionally conceived. The agnostic “as-if” position noted above fits, I think, comfortably with Strathern’s (1988: 7–9) and Wagner’s (1975 passim) presentations of their own “as-if” models as analytical “fictions” or “inventions.” And their approaches are much to the same sort of purpose as I adopt here in revisiting Malinowski’s magical puzzles: that is, of revealing the distortions that might arise from unconscious biases in anthropology’s and my own predominantly Western cultural orientation. So in response to the charge of NME essentialism, I suggest that, by following such a tactic, it is possible to legitimately forestall the seeming necessity of assuming either that “otherworld” spirits exist or that they do not. This is thus one way in which adjustments of the NME along the lines proposed here can contribute to debates of an epistemological as well as ontological sort which have once again captured the discipline’s imagination.


Austronesian comparisons
Malinowski’s magical puzzles pertain not only the Trobriands but also to Melanesia and the Pacific generally, where, differently from the West, sacred powers are conceived as being immanent in all manifestations of reality. Some ethnographies of Austronesian- and non-Austronesian-speaking societies assert that local ritual practitioners are believed to recruit spiritual persons of various kinds—ancestors, spirits of nature, creator deities, etc.—as agents of their magico-ritual practices. Others maintain, like Malinowski, that magicians are generally understood to rely instead upon impersonal forces of nature named in spells and incantations to perform their miraculous feats.10 Despite their differing implications otherwise, the supposed efficaciousness of words and spirits share one key feature that is definitive of Oceanic cultures: the notion that all beings and entities of people’s conceived worlds participate in or are animated by mystical forces, mana being the most obvious example (e.g. Codrington 1891: 119–20; Lawrence and Meggitt 1965: 6–9; Chowning 1977: 64–66; Trompf 1991: 66, 73–74, 84–87; Sillitoe 1998: 215–16). Answers to questions deriving from Malinowski’s magical puzzles as to the relations between persons, spirits, magical spells, and the beings and entities of the world named in them do not only bear on contemporary debates over magical efficacy and the nature of kinship but also respond to long-held views about the Pacific generally.


Magic and “virgin birth”
As already suggested, Malinowski’s puzzle over magical efficacy has an additional twist entangled with controversies surrounding Trobriand notions of “virgin birth.” It will be recalled that Malinowski ([1916] 1948, 1932) had reported that Trobrianders were “ignorant” of the facts of physiological paternity. His disavowal of the agency of spirits in magical performance thus parallels his denial that villagers possessed knowledge of the procreative contributions of fathers to children. However, there is a flip side to Malinowski’s assertions regarding Trobriand views of procreation which has attracted considerably less notice, namely that in some of his and others’ reports, rather than fathers, the principal agents supposedly responsible for causing (or preventing) human pregnancy and birth are baloma spirits of the dead: not only the reincarnated waiwaia “spirit children” which supposedly effect the actual insemination of women, but other baloma spirits which are sometimes claimed to transport the waiwaia from Tuma, the spirit world, and insert them into the bodies of their mothers-to-be. In some circumstances, as my own field inquiries confirm, those spirits are believed to do so in response to megwa spells performed by married couples or living relatives on their behalf (Malinowski [1916] 1948: 219–20, 222–23; 1929; 1932: 146–52, 154, 156, 160–61, 168; see also Austen 1934–35: 108–11; Weiner 1976: 44, 122, 251n.; 1988: 54–55; 1989: 40; 1992: 39, 74, 76, 121–22).
In his rejection of Islanders’ knowledge of physiological paternity, therefore, Malinowski accepted assertions that baloma spirits were regarded as the source of magical efficacy, but with respect to his denial concerning practically most other indigenous magical practices he regularly insisted that the words of the spells themselves and expressly not baloma spirits served as effective agents. As I shall attempt to show in Part 2, this seeming contradiction is a critical one. The ambiguities surrounding Malinowski’s magical puzzles and the “virgin birth” controversy are of one piece.


Omarakana, cultural change, and the current “Paramount Chief”
By now, some readers will be perplexed by the extent to which this analysis may appear to disregard the facts of historical change which Trobrianders have undoubtedly experienced since Malinowski’s time. I fully appreciate the extent to which Islanders’ lives have been deeply affected by colonialism, capitalism, commodification, electoral politics, Christian conversion, formal education, and so on. I justify the basically synchronic approach of the current exercise largely on the unusual circumstances which prevail at Omarakana, my research base, as well as factors concerning the state of change across the region. Omarakana is the initial site of Malinowski’s pioneering field studies and, not coincidentally, the home of the Tabalu “Paramount Chief.”11 Omarakanan viewpoints including those of the Tabalu, senior members of Tabalu dala, and other village elders are widely taken today, and likely in Malinowski’s time, to represent the most authoritative contemporary source of Kilivila gulagula or “Northern Kiriwinian sacred tradition.”
It must be appreciated also that the Tabalu of Omarakana is known to have in his possession the two most powerful ritual items upon which the powers of other subclans and villages still depend for their livelihood: the female tokwai spirit, Kabwenaia, embodied in an igneous stone, and her male counterpart, Kaisusuwa, inhabiting a wrapped wooden stick. In their conjugal-spiritual intercourse, these two are viewed traditionally as the “source” (u’ula; see below) of agricultural plenty and scarcity and epidemic illness for the entire archipelago. But Omarakana continues to retain its regional preeminence inasmuch as the sacred knowledge possessed by the current Tabalu, Pulayasi Daniel (Figure 1), is nowadays unrivaled. It is widely known that Pulayasi was formally adopted as “son” (latu tau) and personally groomed from infancy by his “uncle” (kada), Mitakata—a contemporary of Malinowski who reigned as Tabalu successor to To’uluwa from 1929 to 1961 and who is generally regarded as the greatest “Paramount Chief” of the modern era. As such, Pulayasi is considered to be the nearly complete embodiment of Mitakata’s (and thus his predecessors’) person and office and the singular reservoir of Tabalu tukwa, or traditional knowledge and ritual powers. Although some Islanders might question particular details of Pulayasi’s viewpoints, anyone familiar with the contemporary Trobriand scene will appreciate how even those contestations are largely configured with reference to the dominant Omarakana-Tabalu viewpoint as personified in Pulayasi.


Figure 1: Tabalu Pulayasi Daniel resting among graves of deceased Tabalu relatives, Omarakana village. (Photo by Mark Mosko 2012.)

More generally, I argue that it is impossible to develop a full and accurate account of Trobriand historical change when the ethnographic baseline for those transformations is seriously flawed or incomplete, as I think is the case with current ethnographic knowledge of indigenous megwa. If, as Malinowski and others have maintained, magic is an essential component of virtually all indigenous activities, any attempt to chart the course of change in those areas must needs begin with a robust understanding of the indigenous logic and content of those magical practices.
Take, for instance, Islanders’ conversion to Christianity. The large majority of Northern Kiriwina villagers profess to be “Christian,” but that Christianity is strongly inflected and syncretized with the traditional understandings set out here as regards the people’s indigenous relations with ancestral and other spirits. None of the local Christians or even their leaders whom I have interviewed, including Pentecostal pastors, deny the existence of baloma and other spirits as powerful, albeit evil and malevolent beings. Virtually all Kiriwinan deaths that take place nowadays are interpreted as the result of “sorcery” (bwagau) produced by magicians’ manipulation of evil bilu baloma spirits (see below), now often identified with “Satan” and “devils” of the Christian pantheon. In nearly all cases of serious illness caused by suspected sorcery at Omarakana and other villages, patients and their families first consult native curers (tayuvisa), whose efficacy is attributed to baloma spirits. Only later do villagers seem to consult church deacons and pastors for spiritual healing purposes, much along the lines of indigenous curing rites. Only as a last resort do patients present at the Island’s health centres. Sunday services of the dominant United and Catholic churches are attended overwhelmingly by women and children, while the men who monopolize megwa tend to stay away. Not coincidentally, male gardeners and fishers who profess to be nominally Christian tell me they still practice their private gardening spells oriented to indigenous spirits, sometimes appealing also to Yaubada, the Christian God. Men from across the Island still regularly visit the current Tabalu, Pulayasi Daniel, with requests for traditional magical assistance. When in 2010 the critical burning of the gardens was delayed for well over two months owing to unrelenting rain, on September 13 the men of Kabwaku village led by their Toliwaga chief, Toguguwa Tobodeli, came en masse to Omarakana with a substantial payment (susula) to induce Pulayasi to use his traditional sunshine spells to dry out their gardens. Sergio Jarillo de la Torre (2013) reports that modern-day carvers, even when they petition Christian spirits, employ traditional magical techniques to seduce potential buyers, including European tourists, into buying their wares. As I have recently described (Mosko in press-a), cultural innovations such as men’s gambling with cards have adapted indigenous magical practices of courting, kula exchange, and warfare in appeals to ancestral and other spirits for support in winning. None of these cultural changes, I maintain, can be accurately gauged without a sound grasp of their indigenous precursors.


The spirits, the spells, the words, and the puzzle
The word baloma refers to the internalized “soul” of living persons and that soul’s existence as a “spirit” being once it is released from the body upon death. Baloma in the latter sense, then, are human ancestral spirits (Malinowski [1916] 1948). A broader category, bilu baloma, refers to those and additional spiritual beings, including tubu daiasa “creator deities,” tosunapula “first to emerge” spirits of particular dala matrilineages, tokwai “nature sprites,” and potentially malevolent mulukwausi “flying witches,” kosi “ghosts,” and itona/tauva’u “warrior spirits.” To my knowledge, Malinowski never attempted a systematic classification of these.
Malinowski’s claims regarding the supposed noncontribution of spirits to the effects of magical spells are inconsistent with his accounts of the tenor of relations between living humans and spirit inhabitants of Tuma in five main additional contexts: procreation and reincarnation (as noted above), dreams and trances, funerary rites, annual milamala harvest celebrations, and, most significantly in the present context, supposedly perfunctory ritual “food offerings” or “sacrificial oblations” (ula’ula) in accompaniment with megwa and other activities. When presented by magicians to spirits as preliminaries to megwa performances, the latter offerings were supposedly separate from the causes and effects of the magic itself (Malinowski [1916] 1948: 214, 243; 1935a: 279, 468–69; but see 1916 [1948]: 215; 1922: 422–23; 1935a: 95, 279).12 Otherwise, for Malinowski, baloma spirits conducted their spirit lives in the spirit world, Tuma, largely absorbed in their own affairs some remove away from Boyowa, the visible world of their living human descendants.13
As Malinowski observed ([1916] 1948: 196, 199–215; 1922: 428–63; 1932: 182; 1935b: 92), megwa spells are typically structured as three sequential segments (u’ula “base,” tapwala “body,” and doginala “tip”) in accord with a particular botanical imagery employed in virtually all indigenous contexts of activity—indeed, which he appreciated as “characteristic of native canons of classification” (1932: 143, my emphasis), despite his indifference otherwise to structural concerns. In the opening u’ula section (meaning “base,” “origin,” “foundation,” “cause,” “reason”), the main purpose of the spell is enunciated and ancestral baloma predecessors and other spirits are invoked by personal name or kin term (e.g. “grandfathers”). In the tapwala middle section (“body,” “trunk,” “stem”), the specific magical actions intended to take place with respect to the patient, target, or victim are declared. In the spell’s concluding doginala (“end,” “final point,” “tip”), the magician states the anticipated results. The most well-documented spell exhibiting this three-part structure is the Omarakana vatuvi “striking of the soil” spell as presented by Malinowski (1935a: 96–98) and reanalyzed by Tambiah (1968: 191–92). Not mentioned by Malinowski, with megwa and other contexts of u’ula-tapwala-doginala sequencing there is typically a fourth element, the spell’s keyuwela (“fruit,” “offspring”), whereby its results materialize (Mosko 2009; 2013: 498–502).
Malinowski reported that the opening u’ula invocation of spirits constituted “the most prominent, persistent and universal, feature of Trobriand magic” (1932: 328), and that the spirits’ names were typically recited also in the doginala “tip.” But those two segments are distinguished also by the inclusion of the spell’s general theme and intended results, respectively. On those grounds alone, one might reasonably assume that such direct incantations are expressly addressed to the spirits and predecessors as instructions for performing the tasks enumerated in the middle tapwala segment. It will prove useful to examine carefully Malinowski’s claims on this matter.
In “Baloma,” published between his first and second fieldtrips, he commented:

That the names of the ancestors are more than a mere enumeration is clear from the fact that the ula’ula [“oblation”; see above] is offered in all the most important systems.… But even these presents and the partaking of the sagali [i.e. distributions of food and other wealth], though undoubtedly they imply the presence of the baloma, do not express the idea of the spirits’ actual participation in fostering the aim of the magic; of their being the agents through whom the magician works, to whom he appeals or whom he masters in the spell, and who perform subsequently the task imposed on them.… The baloma participate in some vague manner in such ceremonies as are performed for their benefit, and it is better to keep on the right side of them, but this view by no means implies the idea that they are the main agents, or even the subsidiary agents, of any activity. The magical virtue lies in the spell itself. ([1916] 1948: 214; see also 196, 213–15)

In his postfieldwork publications, Malinowski expressed the same reservations even more forcefully. In Coral gardens, his most mature and through treatment of Trobriand magic, for example, he noted:

But in every community, among the Trobrianders quite as definitely as among ourselves, there exists a belief that a word uttered in certain circumstances has a creative, binding force; that with an inevitable cogency, an utterance produces its specific effect, whether it conveys a permanent blessing, or inflicts irreparable damage, or saddles with a lifelong obligation.… It is this creative function of words in magical or in sacramental speech, their binding force in legal utterance, which, in my opinion, constitutes their real meaning. (1935b: 54)14
The words are supposed to exercise a mystical effect sui generis on an aspect of reality. This belief is due to certain properties and associations of these words. (1935b: 219)

So, what empirical documentation might have led Malinowski to dismiss the participative or agentive role of spirits in Trobriand megwa? Midway between his two fieldwork experiences, he noted:

The data here given concerning the role of ancestors in magic must speak for themselves. It has not been possible to obtain much additional information from natives upon this subject. The references to the baloma form an intrinsic and essentially important part of the spells in which they occur. It would be no good asking the natives “What would happen if you omitted to invoke the baloma?” (a type of question which sometimes reveals the ideas of the native as to the sanction or reason for a certain practice), because a magical formula is an inviolable, integral item of tradition. It must be known thoroughly and repeated exactly as it was learnt. A spell or magical practice, if tampered with in any detail, would entirely lose its efficacy. Thus the enumeration of ancestral names cannot conceivably be omitted. Again, the direct question, “Why do you mention those names?” is answered in the time-honored manner, “Tokunabogu bubunemasi [our old custom].” And in this matter I did not profit much from discussing matters with even the most intelligent natives. (1916 [1948]: 213–14, emphases added)

Given this absence of native exegesis, the repetitive “rubbing” or “impregnation” of the words of voiced spells into objects which accompanied many recitations impressed him as the “most effective and most important verbal action” (1935b: 216) of megwa performance. For example,

He prepares a sort of large receptacle for his voice—a voice-trap we might almost call it. He lays the mixture on a mat and covers this with another mat so that his voice may be caught and imprisoned between them. During the recitation he holds his head close to the aperture and carefully sees to it that no portion of the herbs shall remain unaffected by the breath of his voice. He moves his mouth from one end of the aperture to the other, turns his head, repeating the words over and over again, rubbing them, so to speak, into the substance. When you watch the magician at work and note the meticulous care with which he applies this most effective and most important verbal action to the substance; when afterwards you see how carefully he encloses the charmed herbs in the ritual wrappings prepared, and in a ritual manner—then you realise how serious is the belief that the magic is in the breath and that the breath is the magic. (1935b: 216; see also 215–18; 1922: 406–8; 1935a: 93ff.)

My contemporary informants describe these actions as yopu’oi wodila, literally “put into something with mouth.” They argue that the kekwabu “images” and peula “powers” of the words of the spell as a complete form (ikuli, i.e. as a gwadi “child” of the magician; see below) do indeed impregnate the object, but insist that it is only with the agency of bilu baloma that this transference can be effected, similarly to how ancestral baloma are understood to impregnate women with fetuses from Tuma (see Part 2).
Nonetheless, at several critical moments in his postfieldwork writings, Malinowski revealed lingering doubts as to whether his unequivocal denials of baloma magical efficacy accurately reflected the native point of view. For example, in an appendix to Volume 1 of Coral gardens titled “Confessions of ignorance and failure,” he wrote:

[T]here remained a great many lacunae in my data, simply because I did not spend enough time in the field collating and synthesising them. Take, for instance, the problem of the part played by the spirits in general, and ancestral spirits in particular, in native tribal life. … What exactly is the relation between the mischance brought about by the offended spirits and mischance brought about by malicious magic? I cannot say, for again I have not investigated this problem as fully in the field as I should have done. I occasionally enquired whether it was really the wrath of the baloma or the evil intent of the magic. But the answer would usually be “I do not know”… [H]ere again I have not gone deeply enough into the subject to ascertain what they [spirits] do and whether they are really believed to be there. (1935a: 467–68, emphases added)

Malinowski in his own mind, therefore, had sufficient reason to leave open the possibility that in the view of his interlocutors baloma and other spirits might have played a critical agentive role in magical practice after all. And in this regard, it is notable that in the spells provided by Malinowski, the person(s) stated in middle tapwala segments to be performing the stipulated actions were sometimes identified by the first-person pronomials (i.e. singular “I” and plural “we”), but shifted at other times, even within the same spell, to singular and plural second-person “you.” Malinowski took this to suggest that “[t]he spirits stand in the same relation, as the performer does, to the magical force, which alone is active” (1922: 423). But as Tambiah (1968: 190) recognized, this points specifically to a conceptual identification, and hence potential “participation,” of the invoked spirits with the magician— a view to which I shall return below.


Magical agency in post-Malinowski ethnography
Reports from the many ethnographers who followed in Malinowski’s wake variously address questions of megwa agency. Linguist Gunter Senft (1997, 1998, 2010), who has most closely studied megwa, largely defends Malinowski against the criticisms of Tambiah in affirming that Trobrianders (Kaileuna Island) consciously attribute a special Frazerian efficacy to the power of magical words independent of their metaphorical and metonymical meanings and performative functions. But also, at certain junctures, Senft, like Malinowski, seems to equivocate over whether baloma might after all be included among the possible agents of megwa. At one point, for example, he widens the scope of magical interactions (“participations”) so as to include not only the kind of analogical meanings identified by Tambiah but also the animate, inanimate, and spiritual beings named in spells, including them among the addressees and/or agents (Senft 1997: 371–86). In other instances, Senft points to invoked ancestral baloma as the relevant mediating agents through identifications with the magician; in yet others, the addressed ancestral baloma are grouped with the named animate, inanimate, and nonhuman entities as the agents of the spells but distinguished as beings separate from the magician (1997: 374–79, 381, 382–86, 387); and in still other contexts, these addressees function as patients subject to the power of the magicians’ magical words (1997: 388–89).
Annette Weiner’s account of the location of magical agency in “hard words” is similarly ambiguous as to spirit participation. She (1976: 218) initially followed Malinowski in attributing the power of magic to “spoken words,” which she amplified in her later treatments (1983: 691–92, passim; 1988: 71), conceding ritual efficacy to words through Tambiah’s repetitive metaphorical and metonymical significances while couching her analysis in a theory of language closely approximating Malinowski’s pragmaticism: “[H]ow Trobriand magic is thought to work can be understood only from a theory of Trobriand language in use, not from a theory of magic as such” (1983: 691–92). In the latter work she related how “objects” addressed in spells (e.g. animal and plant species, implements, other items of the physical environment which absorb a spell’s words) serve as mediating agents carrying the magician’s verbal message to the target or patient (702–4), more or less consistent with Malinowski’s notions of how the words of spells are “rubbed,” “impregnated,” or “breathed” into “objects” (704; see above). However, at one point she includes “deceased former owners of the spells (ancestors)” (702) among those “objects.”
In her analysis of the art and aesthetics of expert (tokabitam) canoe carving (Vakuta Island), Shirley Campbell reports that carvers, the items they carve, and the materials employed in their work become “imbued” with magic (2002: 43), and that carving magic is “thought to have a life of its own” as a “separate power that is not only used by the owner but also, to some extent, uses the owner” (54; see also 61ff.). However, she does not offer an account of the mechanics of magical performance or specify indigenous views of purported agency. Nevertheless, at one point, Campbell implies that baloma cannot be agents of the megwa employed in kula voyaging. Just prior to departing on a kula expedition, the canoe owner (toliwaga) entreats the male baloma spirits of his dala to stay back as their presence “is thought to adversely affect the canoe’s ability to manoeuvre rough open seas.” Campbell reasons, “Baloma reside underground while waiting to be reborn. Their subterranean abode connects them to the heaviness of land where they are immobile, in stasis between death and rebirth” (160). My Omarakana informants insist that magical rites performed at sea are directed chiefly at the onboard spirits, flatly rejecting any suggestion that ancestral baloma are constrained by the heaviness of land or subterranean abodes. And although Malinowski did not consider spirits to be the agents of sailing magic, he was given to understand that ancestral baloma did accompany living kin on kula voyages (1922: 435–36).
Gioncarlo Scoditti’s treatments of canoe art and oral poetry (1990, 1996, 2012) on Kitava Island include numerous references to megwa spells in the inheritance, initiation, composition, memorization, and performance of ritual carvers and poets. But following Tambiah, among others, he (1990: 88, 97 n. 6; 1996: 11, 68, 270; 2012) stresses the metaphorical and aesthetic values of spells rather than their inherent magical potency, such that the participation or possible agency of spirits is barely considered. His interpretation of the “unusuality” and secrecy of megwa words (1990: 68n, 97n), however, recalls the efficacy of utterances themselves as variously argued by Malinowski, Senft, and Weiner. Elsewhere, Scoditti (1996; 2012) groups megwa with the “songs” and “poems” (wosi) composed by contemporary poets, concentrating again on the subtle aesthetics of the words and images as thought and experienced by performers and audiences, eliding again indigenous views of magical agency. Nonetheless, he hints that Kitavans might regard baloma and other spirits as magical agents after all when, with one spell, the magician-carver invokes his deceased father, from whom he presumably acquired the spell, “as a protective deity” (1996: 213). Even more suggestively, he notes that human chanters of megwa are equated with the spells’ ancestral baloma authors (119n, emphasis added).
From Kaileuna Island to the west of Kiriwina, Susan Montague (1983) reports that men’s capacity for performing miegava (cognate with megwa) or “noise force” depends on their inherent gender identities and their proper observance of dietary “taboos” (see below). The latter, when violated, produce blockages in magician’s bodies, preventing the internally stored mental/magical energy from being externalized. Miegava itself, she records, “consists of non-substantial force possessed by baloma residing in the non-substantial part of the universe. It is manifest and available in living people in terms of sound, as are all other non-substantial forces” (41, emphasis added). Miegava force is said to consist in the “ability to ‘order the natural elements’” (42; see below). Somewhat confusingly, she states that “[t]he crop in the ground [i.e. garden fertility] ‘magic’ probably is not magic at all, but encouragements sent to baloma to infuse the plants with animation and growth” (45n). In any case, Montague’s information seems to leave open the possibility that in traditional Kaileunan reckoning, baloma spirits and the baloma souls of magicians are intimately related with the words of miegava and that spirits are at least indirectly involved in the effectiveness of spells.
Harry Powell, who conducted fieldwork near Omarakana in the early 1950s, did not investigate the topic of magic deeply, but still noted that unseasonable weather could result from spirits’ dissatisfaction with people’s misbehaviors toward them by making mistakes in the performance of spells or failing to provide them with enough food, presumably through ula’ula oblations (see fn. 12 above). Also, he reports that baloma spirits invoked in Omarakana’s rain magic were understood to have “their [i.e. the spirits’ own] magic”:

[I]t was no use trying to make rain magic against the baloma. The rain was obviously the result of their magic, and as they include in their numbers all of the dead and gone magicians of the past, and as the baloma are spirits anyway, obviously no mere human rain magician’s efforts could hope to prevail against them once they really got cracking. (Powell 1950: 12)

Frederick Damon, reporting on the kaluwan (cognate of baloma) spirits of Muyuw Island, provides no data regarding the possible role of spirits in magic. However, he (1990: 258n) concedes that, for several reasons, his informants were “extremely reluctant” to give him knowledge of magical spells, resulting in a significant gap in this dimension of his ethnography.
Among the previous generation of Northern Massim ethnographers, only Nancy Munn (1986: 82–84, 288n) explicitly names ancestral balouma as effective agents, but immediately after making that assertion with reference to a single instance, she cautions against generalizing to other Gawan spells.
Recently returned from doctoral fieldwork, Sergio Jarillo de la Torre (2013) reports that informants in several communities to the south of Omarakana affirm that indigenous spirits are the principal agents of traditional carving spells, which have in certain respects been joined by spirits of the Christian pantheon.
Despite Malinowski’s strident protestations of the magical effectiveness of words, his own writings and those of subsequent investigators and commentators offer at least fragmentary evidence that ancestral baloma might well be perceived by Trobrianders as playing critical agentive roles, similar to reports from some other parts of Melanesia. What exactly that role is and how it relates to the efficacies which have been attributed also to other entities and beings—words, metaphorical/metonymical relationships between words, nonhuman spirits, other animate and inanimate beings of the “natural” world, and so on—have yet to be rendered intelligible.
Framing the issue in these terms inevitably calls for a detailed reconsideration of the relevant aspects of Trobriand cosmology, which, on the basis of recently gathered ethnographic information, is more complicated and differently configured than has been reported thus far. What follows is a condensation of innumerable hours of discussion, questioning, rethinking, and reanalyzing the existing ethnographic corpus guided by my village interlocutors’ knowledge. Readers should be advised that, to the best of my ability, the following account strongly reflects the authoritative viewpoints of the inhabitants of Omarakana, and particularly the current Tabalu and his cadre of both Tabalu dala and non-Tabalu followers, and other Islanders I have interviewed as well.15


Cosmology
All beings and entities of the traditional Trobriand “universe” (kwetala valu, literally “one village” or “place”), whether perceived as animate or inanimate, material or immaterial, or human or nonhuman, are enlivened by a property termed momova, variously translated as “life,” “vital spirit,” or “vital breath” (Scoditti 1996: 68; 2012: 67ff.; Lawton 2002; Baldwin n.d.), or, as I prefer, “vital essence.” My informants’ elaborations on these meanings indicate that even those entities which appear in their outward, material form to be inanimate or lifeless nonetheless harbor invisible momova. Thus all beings and entities of the visible, material world of Boyowa including humans, plants, animals, rocks, features of the land, sea, and sky, and so on, possess, embody, and/or participate in inner momova.
Critically, however, the momova of any particular being or entity of Boyowa is also considered to coexist as, or to be a component of, its invisible counterpart in Tuma, the realm labeled by Malinowski ([1916] 1948) “land of the dead.” This latter designation is misleading, though, insofar as it implies that the various occupants of Tuma are somehow lacking in momova or the capacities of life, when according to informants they are actually the source or essence (u’ula) of life, including the life of their material manifestations in the visible world, Boyowa. This does not mean, however, that Trobrianders lack a notion of “death” (mate); far from it. But “life” and “death” are for them differently conceived than in the West. The spirit world, Tuma, and the beings and entities inhabiting it are saturated with momova, the essence of life, on which the inhabitants of Boyowa depend for their very material existence.16


Tuma and Boyowa
To explain this fully, one must first comprehend the specific spatio-temporal location of the two realms and their general relations to each other. Ethnographic reports of Tuma’s purported location have been quite varied, ranging from the island of Tuma, lying north of Kiriwina or Boyowa; the underworld beneath the land surface of Boyowa or other islands of the archipelago; the initial underground habitation of all beings and entities of Boyowa before their cosmic emergence from the cave, Obukula, near the present-day village of Labai to Omarakana’s north; the subterranean “holes” or “houses” from which initial dala matrilineage ancestors (tosunapula) are believed to have emerged in the aftermath of cosmic creation; and the invisible abode of all bilu baloma spirits, including human ancestral baloma and other categories of spirit beings yet to be described (i.e. nonhuman tokwai “nature sprites,” itona or tauva’u “warrior spirits,” tubu daiasa “creator deities”).
Tuma, as presented to me at Omarakana, however, is the hidden, invisible “inner” (olumwela) dimension of the universe, interpenetrating the visible, material “external” (osisuna, yosewa) world of Boyowa so that the two realms coincide. This is how humans, animals, plants, physical features of the world, and so on, in their material manifestations can exist outwardly in Boyowa, yet harbor inwardly the momova of Tuma. Perhaps prototypically, the invisible insides (lopola) of bodies are part of or participate in Tuma. It is through this intimate, mystical connection of the two realms that living humans of Boyowa are able to communicate and interact with ancestral and other spirits of Tuma.
Villagers have impressed upon me often that Boyowa and Tuma are like “mirror images” (saribu) such that every being or entity of outward material or bodily existence (yo’udila) has its inner immaterial (kekwabu, literally “image” or “image-like”) counterpart. This relationship of material body to immaterial image characteristic of the two realms is reversible, however. As it was explained to me in terms of the culture’s prevalent “canoe” symbolism, for example, to living humans Boyowa is the “hull” (waga) that carries them about, with Tuma as the “outrigger” (lamila) that guides or supports the craft, but for bilu baloma spirits Tuma is their “hull” and Boyowa is their “outrigger.” This relationship of mutual, reciprocal interdependence between Tuma and Boyowa constitutes the broader context through which islanders’ megwa and other ritual practices are understood to acquire their efficacy.
When my informants elaborated on the mirror-like relation between Boyowa and Tuma, the question occurred to me: What is the mirror image of a living human if his/her soul only enters Tuma upon death? Or phrased conversely, if everything in Tuma has a material complement in Boyowa, what is the Boyowan counterpart of a person’s baloma “soul” once the person identified with it has died and disappeared from Boyowa? The answer to both questions is the same, as suggested already: living humans are in critical ways the material Boyowan embodiments (yo’udila) of Tuman spirits, and bilu baloma in Tuma are the reflections or images (kekwabu) of Boyowan beings and entities.17


Kekwabu images and peula powers
While the beings and entities of Boyowa and Tuma are both “alive” in being animated by momova, within each realm their specific kinds or types of momova differ from one from another as qualitatively varied “forms” or “configurations” (ikuli) of distinctive kekwabu “images” which accordingly possess distinctive peula “powers” or “capactities” as exhibited in their Boyowan manifestations. These two aspects of movova—kekwabu “images” and peula “powers” or “capacities”—draw us considerably deeper into the base of Trobriand magic and, as I shall explain in Part 2, kin relations.
The notion of kekwabu, first, has been mentioned in several previous ethnographies, variously translated as “shadow,” “reflection,” “characteristic,” “valuable characteristic,” “photo,” “drawing,” “spirit substance,” “image,” “resemblance,” “spirit part,” “spiritual essence,” “spiritual aspect,” “ensemble of pieces/parts,” “element of knowledge”; and occasionally it has been equated with the baloma “spirit” or “soul” of something, even of nonhumans (e.g. Seligman 1910: 734–35; Malinowski [1916] 1948: 150–51, 156, 167, 180–82; 1922: 512–13, 184; [1926] 1948; Weiner 1976: 82, 199; 1988: 42; Scoditti 1990: 58; Campbell 2002: 98, 106; Lawton 2002; Mosko 2009: 694; Baldwin n.d.; Hutchins and Hutchins n.d.).18 It is peculiar, therefore, that almost nothing has been made ethnographically till now of its cosmological significance, at least as it is comprehended at Omarakana. Each of the glosses listed above carries a degree of indigenous meaningfulness, but the English gloss for kekwabu which I take to be most useful for present purposes is that of “image,” namely the momova-laden, nonsubstantial image components or characteristics of anything which, by virtue of different associated peula (“powers,” “capacities”), differentiate and assimilate beings, entities, species, and so on, of Tuma and Boyowa from and to each other.
Peula “power” or “strength” (also “active,” “force,” “strong,” “robust,” “hard”), as a second inherent aspect of momova, has occasionally been mentioned ethnographically also (e.g. Weiner 1983: 693; Powell 1995: 74; Lawton 2002; Senft 2010: 76; Baldwin n.d.; Hutchins and Hutchins n.d.) but rarely analyzed. By a sort of indigenous post facto logic operating similarly to Oceanic mana, the visible attributes and capacities of any being or thing in Boyowa are considered by Islanders to be expressions of specific inner peula powers inextricably tied to the perceived contours of the form of that being’s or thing’s invisible kaikobu images. The exact expression of those inner powers and images is understood to be an instance of “emergence” (sunapula) directly analogous to the mythical, creative mythical coming forth of the visible Boyowan cosmos from the cave, Obukula (see Part 2). Accordingly, any configuration of kekwabu images with its paired peula power(s) has a dual existence, if you will—as the potent nonmaterial form of some invisible being or entity of Tuma and, through the effect(s) of the peula powers or capacities intrinsically associated with those internal images, as its embodied material counterpart as a visible manifestation of Boyowa.
From what I have learned, kekwabu images and peula powers are understood to operate between the two realms in something like the following way: When you peer upon anyone or anything of Boyowa and then quickly close your eyes, that immaterial but definite image which remains in your mind (nona) is a kekwabu (actually, an ikuli “formation” of many distinct, separate kaikobu) initially internal to that person or object which, through expression of its peula capacities—hence coming forth or emerging (sunapula) from Tuma—has been projected so as to be detached from that person or thing so that it appears internally as an element of your “mind” (nona, nano) and “thought” (nanamsa), hence a component of your own person.
Those readers versed in the NME will readily recognize in this presentation, at least to this point, the generalized dynamics of personal partibility inherent in indigenous understanding of virtually any interaction between persons (and “things”) of Boyowa as mediated through and manifested by the kekwabu images and peula powers arising ultimately from Tuma. Others more familiar with corresponding Oceanic animistic notions will, again, hopefully appreciate the extent to which Trobriand thinking in terms of internal and manifested kekwabu and peula approximate the classic renderings of mana. The relevance of Lévy-Bruhl’s, Tambiah’s, and others’ notions of “participation” and the pan-Pacific immanence of sacredness mentioned above should also be evident in these details of momova “vital essence” in its various transactable forms. But these and additional aspects of kaikobu, peula, and human-spirit relations, to which I next turn, challenge what in the West are recognized to differentiate categorically “persons” from “non-persons”, “things” or “objects”.


Human spirits, nona “mind,” and nanamsa “thought”
Among the scattered ethnographic references to kekwabu listed above, there are instances where the inner kekwabu of specific nonhuman objects or beings have been described as being equivalent to those entities’ baloma “souls,” as if animals, plants, natural phenomena, and so on, that embody momova are constituted of the same order of baloma “souls” as humans and ancestral spirits. I have occasionally heard such attributions myself in the field. However, when I asked my interlocutors for clarification on this point—do these entities possess baloma “souls” or “spirits” in the same sense as human beings?—they uniformly told me “no,” explaining that allusions to the immaterial kekwabu of nonsentient beings and entities as baloma are common enough but technically inaccurate. While those other beings are constituted of momova-laden kekwabu and associated peula that generate their material manifestations in Boyowa, those images and powers do not include nona “mind” and nanamsa “thought,” which critically distinguish persons. Pigs, garden plots, trees, reefs, winds, and so on, of Boyowa do not possess mind or thoughts and thus cannot communicate through words with humans—unless they happen to harbor beings which are otherwise constituted of mind and thought (see below).
The baloma “souls” of living humans are partly composed of momova in the specific kaikobu and peula forms of “mind” and “thought,” thereby distinguishing them as “persons” (tomota; see below) separate from nonsentient beings and things of creation: that is, those which lack the images of nona “mind” and powers of nanamsa “thought.” Upon being released from their bodies following death, human baloma “souls” continue to exist in their immaterial baloma “spiritual” forms with the retained capacities of mind and thought of persons.
But the baloma of humans, living and deceased, are not the only beings in the cosmos which possess images and powers of nona and nanamsa. Rather, all those beings which have appeared in the literature and are construed by Islanders as bilu baloma or “spirits” in the generic—ancestral baloma, tubu daiasa, kosi, tosunapula, tokwai, itona/tauva’u, mulukwausi, etc.—are classified as such on the basis of possessing or being constituted of nona and nanamsa. And it is on the criterion of sharing those qualities that all sentient beings can potentially communicate with one another as “persons” (tomota), as Trobrianders define that notion. Nonhuman bilu baloma spirits such as itona/tauva’u “warrior spirits” and tokwai “nature sprites” along with human baloma, kosi “ghosts,” and mulukwausi “flying witches,” in other words, qualify as “persons” precisely in this sense of being composed of the kekwabu images of mind with the associated peula capacities of thought.
Furthermore, on this basis, not only can humans and spirits communicate with one another, but in the context of megwa they do so through the medium of structured images and powers of nanamsa thoughts as realized in ordered sequences or formations (ikuli) of words. In this specific sense, the magical power of words, as conceived by Malinowski and others, is the magical agency of persons, including bilu baloma spirits of Tuma and humans of Boyowa. The words of megwa spells are thus potent images among the definitive components of the beings in whom they are incorporated as persons. The u’ula and doginala invocations of megwa as illustrated in the vatuvi and other spells thus do not merely pay mythological homage to magicians’ ancestors and predecessors, as proclaimed by Malinowski; in the view of Omarakanans and other Islanders, those words as structured kekwabu have the peula capacities of identifying the magician with the named bilu baloma spirits, thereby reconstituting them as the persons empowered to act in the present as they had done in the past since the time of the spell’s origination.
This can be explained partially by recalling how Malinowski (1922: 315, 409–10, 412; [1925] 1948: 76) and others (Tambiah 1968: 184; Weiner 1976: 218, 252; Scoditti 1996; 2012; Senft 1998) have variously reported that megwa are seen as being stored in a magician’s “belly” (lopola) after entering his person through the larynx or vocal organs of his throat, the seat of “intelligence” or “mind” (nona or nano) also located in some accounts with the dabala “head.” As explained to me by my Omarakana friends, all of these assertions are correct but only partly so and in subtly different senses. When a magician transmits a spell to his successor and as the recipient learns it, they both voice it repeatedly, externalizing in the one case and internalizing in the other. Thereafter, the words of the spell as potent (but not activated) images are stored as separated images in the initiated magician’s bodily lopola.
Here, the term lopola refers not only to a person’s “belly” or “abdomen” but also to his/her generalized “insides,” including the head, larynx, mouth, torso, limbs, organs, and so on, insofar as all inner body regions enclosed by skin are infused with watery blood (buyai). Thus the words of the spell with their attached powers, once learned, course disjointedly through the fluid blood of the magician’s body, where, in that decomposed condition, they are magically inert or “cold” (tula). The critical faculty of nona mind, concentrated in the magician’s “head” or “brain” (dabala, inclusive of the larynx, as has been reported by some), is to draw up the disconnected images and powers of the spell from the magician’s “belly” and to organize or structure them into a particular coherent sequence or form (ikuli, simuli) of words—that is, as a nanamsa “thought”—exactly as the spell was initially internalized by the magician and his bilu baloma predecessors. It is the nona “mind” located in the head or larynx, my informants insist, where the megwa is thus first recongealed, or, as Malinowski characterized it, “crystallized” (1932: 409; see also Montague 1983: 45n).
When the images of the spell in that form are voiced by the larynx and other vocal organs at the oral tip of the magician’s body, they become energized or “hot” (yuviyavi). In that condition, projected as invisible sound into the air or wind (yagila) and thus into invisible Tuma, they emerge from the magician’s mouth as the spell’s potent “fruit,” “offspring,” or “child” (keyuwela, gwadi; see Part 2). This means that the vocalization of the structured sequence of kekwabu images recreates and reinvigorates the identity and relations of the persons of both Boyowan and Tuman realms associated with the spell—the magician and the invoked bilu baloma—as one person.
Those spells which are regarded as hereditary to members of a given dala (tukwa) can only be learned and effectively used by persons constituted of the appropriate dala images and powers. Here the claim is that the kekwabu and peula ingredients of a given dala’s spells are contained or stored in the blood of dala members. However, only those principally male members who are able secondarily to learn the ordered, structured sequencing of the verbal images or words as a fully formed megwa spell from a suitably knowledgeable predecessor—that is, through the human capacities of mind and thought—will be able to effect the desired results. This, incidentally, explains why men are unable to perform effectively the hereditary megwa of dala with which they possess no identification even if they mentally learn the spells, further refuting Malinowski’s claims as to the exclusive magical agency of words. One needs to have embodied the appropriate inner kekwabu and peula stored in one’s blood, prototypically through kin relations, in the first place.
There is considerably more significance attached to these processes of storing, forming, and producing megwa. As my Omarakana confidants sometimes portrayed it, the summoned bilu baloma instantly come to occupy space at the magician’s shoulders or back, and then proceed invisibly and instantly as spirits through Tuma to enter the lopola (including the head and mind) of the patient or target, where the peula powers of the spell’s kekwabu images are activated, meaning that they alter the form (ikuli) of the patient’s previous configuration of images and powers.19 To be sure, the words of the magicians’ spells are kekwabu images possessing specific peula powers, but not separately from the bilu baloma of which those images and words are themselves detachable parts. In other words, the resolution of Malinowski’s magical efficacy puzzle lies in the ways that the words of spells are construed cosmologically as personal components of the invoked spirits as well as the invoking magician.
But still, this is not the complete story as it is understood at Omarakana. Those beings and entities of the cosmos which do not qualify as sentient tomota “persons” in the sense considered here, while they may also embody momova-laden kaikobu images and powers which partake of both Boyowa and Tuma, do not harbor baloma “souls” or “spirits” properly speaking since they lack the inner, invisible kaikobu constitutive of the peula powers specifically of mind and thought.
Nonetheless, those non-person kinds of beings and entities do play certain active roles in megwa spells and contribute to their effectiveness. To explain how they do so in concert with the minds and thoughts of human and spirit persons, it is necessary to probe even deeper into the indigenous cosmogony, into the initial creation of the universe as Trobrianders traditionally understand it and the developments which mythically ensued. But also, it is by virtue of the mythical interactions between the initial inhabitants of Tuma and Boyowa consequent to cosmic creation that the relationships underpinning contemporary Islanders’ relations to each other in terms of kinship, clanship, and rank through various mechanisms of gift exchange were established.


PART 2: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF TROBRIAND CREATION AND PROCREATION

The wording of magic is correlated with a very complicated dogmatic system, and with theories about the primeval mystical power of words, about mythological influences, about the faint co-operation of ancestral spirits, and much more important, about the sympathetic influences of animals, plants, natural forces and objects.
—Malinowski, Coral gardens and their magic, Vol. 2, p. 222 (emphasis added)

In seeking to solve the puzzle of the source of agency in Trobriand magic thus far, I have focused on information indicating the terms by which Islanders conceive of a personal identity between magicians and the spirits invoked in their spells, namely through the compatibilities of inherited and learned kekwabu images and peula powers involving mind and thought. In his writings, Malinowski conceived of this very linkage as “mythological” in nature. For example,

There is another side to the lists of ancestral names in magic, which must be remembered here. In all Kiriwinian magic a great role is played by myths, underlying a certain system of magic, and by tradition in general. How far this tradition is local and how far it thus becomes focussed on the family tradition of a certain subclan has been discussed above. The ancestral names mentioned in the several [magical] formulae form therefore one of the traditional elements so conspicuous in general. The mere sanctity of those names, being often a chain linking the performer with a mythical ancestor and originator, is in the eyes of the natives a quite sufficient prima facie reason for their recital. Indeed, I am certain that any native would regard them thus in the first place, and that he would never see in them any appeal to the spirits, any invitation to the baloma to come and act, the spells uttered whilst giving the ula’ula [oblation, see below] being, perhaps, an exception. But even this exception does not loom first and foremost in his mind and does not color his general attitude towards magic. (Malinowski [1916] 1948: 215, emphases added)

This identification of magician with ancestors as being “mythological” evidently provided Tambiah with a reason to exclude ancestral spirits from his initial performative treatment of Trobriand magic (see Part 1):

The three parts [of a spell; i.e. u’ula, tapwala, and doginala] appear to present the following progression. The u’ula, which is brief, states the basis on which the spell is constructed, firstly the major theme or metaphorical idea which is elaborated in the spell and secondly the mythical heroes and ancestors who wielded the magical powers in question and with whom the magician himself becomes identified. This second feature is the portion of the spell that relates the magic to myth, which I do not discuss. (Tambiah 1968: 190, emphases added)

However, there is much more in Trobriand mythology and cosmology generally that is relevant to questions of magical efficacy, particularly the role not only of sentient persons but also of the other nonsentient beings and entities named in spells through the medium of words. How, then, did the entire Trobriand dual universe of Boyowa and Tuma in their spiritual, human, and nonhuman dimensions get mythically established? The answer to this question will eventually touch on the second major puzzle left by Malinowski concerning the indigenous cosmogony and those aspects of kin relationship consequent to human procreation.


Cosmogony
Over the course of numerous in-depth discussions, Tabalu Pulayasi, members of my principal research team at Omarakana, and others have provided me with the following details regarding the sacred story (lili’u) of bubuli, the mythical events of “creation.” In summary, at the beginning there was only the primal god, Topileta, and his female counterpart, Tugilupalupa, locked in the embrace of sexual union (cf. Seligman 1910: 679, 732–34; Malinowski [1916] 1948: 156–59, 242; Baldwin 1971: 318, 369–73; Glass 1986, 1988; Ketobwau 1994; Malnic 1998: 185, 196). Topileta is the paternal (tama) spirit or god (baloma, tubu diasa) of the universe, described by Malinowski and others as the chief or master of immaterial Tuma. But Tuma, my informants add, was initially Tugilupalupa’s womb; hence she is regarded as the mother (ina) of creation, and her vagina through which all of beings and entities emerged is considered to be the legendary cave, Obukula, at the northerly end of Kiriwina Island near Labai, the ancestral Tabalu village.20
From the separation of this primal pair, the universe and all beings and entities it contains were born or created (bubuli) as their “children” (gwadi). The visible world of Boyowa and all of its inhabitants thus emerged (sonapula) from invisible Tuma, the womb of Tugilupalupa, with progenerative characteristics of paternal Topileta also.21 As offspring (i.e. keyuwela “fruit”) of the two gods, every momova-laden being and entity of creation thus embodies and is animated by certain of the specific sacred characteristics and capacities (i.e. kaikobu and peula) of the divine parents. Accordingly, every subsequent emergence of beings and entities from Tuma to Boyowa—including in particular, as we shall presently see, the vocalization of megwa spells and the reincarnation of humans—thus recapitulates the cosmic procreation of the universe or some focused aspects of it.
The first children to emerge were the spirits referred to, like their divine parents, as tubu daiasa, which can conveniently be glossed as “creator deities.” The term tubu is a variant of the word tabu, which in kinship terms nominally refers to “grandparent,” but in this context applies more generally to “first ancestor” or “progenitor.” The term daiasa here means “our.” Some of the more mythically famous tubu diasa appear as central characters in various recorded myths, the most popular and frequently cited being the tale of the cannibal monster Dokanikani, heroic Tudava, and his mother Malita (or Mitigis, Bulutukwa) (Malinowski [1926] 1948: 122–24; 1927: 111–14, 244, 340; 1935a: 68–75; Baldwin 1971; J. Leach 1971; Lawton 1993: 181–82; Malnic 1998: 164–73).
According to Tabalu Pulayasi, however, the most notable of Topileta and Tugilupalupa’s tubu daiasa offspring is a different Tudava, Ika’ili Tudava, who has often been confused and/or conflated with the Tudava of the Dokanikani story correctly named Ikuli Tudava. These two Tudava characters are father and son. The more famous Tudava, Ikuli Tudava, who was mythically born of Malita and who mythically killed the Dokanikani monster, was the son of the other Tudava, Ika’ili Tudava, also known in some Massim myths as Dovana or Gere’u. Ika’ili Tudava, the father, was the first son of Topileta and Tugilupalupa to emerge from Obukula, and he was of Tabalu dala. The son, Ikuli Tudava, like his mother, Malita, was of Tudava dala.
The term ika’ili means “speaking/saying things, they come into existence.” Thus in Pulayasi’s cosmogony, Ika’ili Tudava had the power or ability inherited from his parents, Topileta and Tugilupalupa, to “say” things into being either by speaking their names from his mouth or by blowing them out through a conch shell. In this fashion, the originally divine kekwabu images and peula powers distinctive to various species acquired their embodied, material character in Boyowa from the interior images and powers of Ika’ili Tudava’s person.
As he moved about, Ika’ili Tudava created many of the inhabitants and features of the land, sea, and sky orally, as distinct from the way that his female tubu daiasa paramour, Malita, mythically gave vaginal birth to her plant, animal, and other children, including the son, Ikuli Tudava.22 Ika’ili Tudava’s capacity of generating children from his mouth thus stands as a masculine sort of procreative capacity comparable with the ability of females to reproduce children through their vaginas. And in coming forth or emerging in this way, Ika’ili Tudava’s children embody kekwabu and peula of their father and mother according to their specific characteristics and, through them, those of the primal cosmic pair, Topileta and Tugilupalupa.
Now in many accounts of Ikuli Tudava’s birth, he was conceived after water dripping from the top of a cave opened his mother’s vagina (see Malinowski [1916] 1948: 228; Campbell 2002: 179). However, sopi, the term for “water,” is commonly used to refer to the magic transferred from one man to his successor orally (Kasaipwalova 1975; Scoditti 1996: 96, 199; Campbell 2002: 56). By implication, Ika’ili Tudava’s son, Ikuli Tudava, was mythically conceived for emergence into the universe through the voice of his father’s words. In some accounts of the Tudava story, it is he, Ikuli Tudava, who, after slaying the ogre Dokanikani, traveled about the Massim archipelago performing many acts of verbal creation. But according to Pulayasi, these feats were those of the father, Ika’ili Tudava.
Pulayasi adds that Ika’ili Tudava was not the only tubu daiasa spirit offspring of the primal pair with the ika’ili capacity of creating children through the agency of voice. That capacity was shared with Topileta and Tugilupalupa’s other offspring known as tosunapula, “beings who emerged [from Obukula]” or “first emergent ancestors”. These are the brother–sister couples standing as the primal antecedents of dala matrilineages.23 Through their spirit pedigrees they together possessed the masculine-paternal capacity of ika’ili, calling things into existence through voicing their names and other characteristics with words. But the tosunapula pioneers of distinct dala inherited different kekwabu images and peula powers from their respective progenitors, and it is those distinctive configurations which continue to differentiate dala matrilineages, and much else, from each other.
According to Omarakana elders, Ika’ili Tudava not only created many of the features of the world, he also instructed ancestral tosunapula of separate dala upon their emergence from Okukula to migrate from Labai and lay claim to specific parcels of land and sea. As they did so, those tosunapula called into existence various animals, plants, and other phenomena of the world which, like them, embodied some of the images and powers distinctive to their respective dala identities. It was in this way during the phases of creation and migration that the universe was eventually populated by most of its now-known occupants and features. Accordingly, the world is currently inhabited by beings and entities, each of which (or each species of which) is a “child” or partial embodiment of the tosunapula persons of a specific dala identity. But also, the beings and entities thus created along specifically dala lines of differentiation, or at least those kekwabu and peula powers associated with their respective dala, are among the sacred possessions (tukwa) shared among all humans of those respective dala identities. Other components of a dala’s tukwa include its living and deceased human members, similarly associated nonhuman tokwai spirits, lands, decorations, insignia, titles and rank, totems, myths, and so on (see below).
It will be helpful to elaborate on a few critical details. All beings and entities of the cosmos are descended as children from the primal gods, Topileta and Tugilupalupa, and are thus animated by momova “vital essence,” including the specific images and powers ultimately inherited from them. That vital essence was in the first instance procreative in an explicitly sexual sense, deriving from the conjugal union and separation of the primal couple and the procreative acts of the tubu daisa creator gods.
In the following episodes of creation focused upon human tosunapula, however, that vital force was manifested not in the form of giving birth sexually or vaginally, insofar as tosunapula brother–sister couples observed the taboo against dala incest. Instead, as they migrated, they reproduced orally and thus quasi-incestuously through the recitation of kekwabu images as words that have associated with them specific peula powers. Thus the primal powers exhibited mythically by Ika’ili Tudava and tosunapula of different dala are duplicated in the capacities nowadays exhibited by magicians in the performance of megwa through the detachment or enunciation of sacralized words.
Consequently, as I shall explain below, present-day megwa spells are the creative vocalizations of tosunapula employed at the time of creation and subsequently transmitted intact to living human descendants. However, the miraculous feats of the tubu daiasa of creation result not from the mere utterance of megwa “words,” as Malinowski maintained, insofar as those words are personal components of the sentient beings who contributed to the creation of the cosmos, or parts of it, along dala-specific lines. Therefore, when magicians call forth the personal images of their predecessors (and other bilu baloma spirits; see below), they are effectively replicating or reenacting events and events of creation. As Malinowski ([1925] 1948: 74–75) reported, all of the megwa in existence today are unchanged from the time of creation.
Now because the tosunapula siblings ancestral to a specific dala are understood mythically to have also verbally created distinctive kinds of nonhuman beings and entities, those latter species are likewise viewed as “children” (gwadi) of those tosunapula, thereby sharing with their human co-descendants some of the same dala-specific identifying kekwabu images and associated peula powers. I stress some here because, as in the case of strictly human procreation as traditionally understood by Trobrianders, children inherit some, perhaps all, of the characteristics of each of their parents.24 This means that every dala constituted as a human collectivity is connected by means of shared images and powers to a unique population of nonhuman beings and entities of both Boyowa and Tuma. Thus, for example, the chiefly Tabalu dala has various animal, plant, and celestial beings with which it identifies. Members of Yogwabu, a commoner (tokai) dala based also at Omarakana, recognize yet other beings and entities mythically created by its tosunapula with which they identify, and so on.
The general principle here is that, if the word naming a certain species or any of the other features associated with it is mentioned in a megwa, that species and its characteristics are part of the tukwa of that particular dala, inherited unchanged from the time of creation. That species, in other words, is seen as sharing kindred kekwabu and peula with persons who also identify with that dala. Taking the example of the tapwala segment of the vatuvi gardening spell discussed by Malinowski (1935a: 96–98; 1935b passim) and Tambiah (1968: 191–92), the “grubs,” “blights,” “insects,” “beetles,” and so on, that “bore” and “destroy” crops and that are to be “swept” and “blown away” are constituents of the tukwa of the magician’s and his predecessors’ dala.
This indicates why the meaning of dala goes far beyond “subclan” or “matrilineage group”—the usual definition in anthropology since Malinowski—as it includes also the beings and entities of the cosmos which together embody, in whole or in part, the same images and powers. I believe that until now Montague (1974: 43–49, 71, 103–4) alone has perceived that dala consists not in a corporate group or matrilineage of people but in essentially shared magical capacities—what I have presented here in terms of shared kekwabu images and peula powers. The bird, fish, mammal, and plant species, koni emblems, designs and decorations, traditional lands, and politico-ritual rank as well as the people and the megwa they embody as common descendants of the same mythical tosunapula are thus all parts of or participants in the same dala identity, its tukwa. A dala’s store of tukwa images and powers is the ultimate source (u’ula) of the life (momova) of its human and other members, and to those dala members with the capacity of mind and thought those tukwa images and powers are “sacred” (bomaboma). They should avoid ingestion of them in the exactly the same sense as people should avoid dala incest (suvasova).
There are two critical qualifications regarding the scope of dala, however. First, not all tosunapula who emerged as children of Topileta and Tugulupalupa at the time of creation are genealogically ancestral to humans. These others are Tuman “spirits” (bilu baloma) of specific kinds who also migrated and “settled” (sibogwa) across the land- and seascape but never adopted the practices initiated by humans which followed the eventual occupation of specific locations by tosunapula ancestors. As one result, these other spirits do not undergo the death and reincarnation that is consequent to the initiation of exogamous, inter-dala heterosexual reproduction. These nonhuman tosunapula emergence spirit beings are thus immortal, with the characteristics and capacities of mind, thought, and perpetual life (momova) of inner Tuma, living underground, in large trees, grottoes, large stones, and so on.
These nonhuman tosunapula are the spirits which have been described ethnographically as tokwai “nature sprites.”25 The world’s tokwai in this sense emerged from Obukula alongside or being carried by their human counterparts, thereby sharing with them the same kekwabu and peula so as to identify and classify them according to dala distinctions. And just as the human tosunapula progenitors were distributed among specific locations of the land and sea, their nonhuman tosunapula relations were scattered accordingly. It is for this reason, for example, that the human tolivalu “owners” of specific partitions of land and seabed share dala identity with the tokwai that invisibly inhabit those locations, since those tokwai are also regarded as tolivalu “owners” or “leaders” of the same tracts and included among the magician’s tukwa.
The tokwai which emerged and migrated alongside particular human tosunapula were endowed by their divine parents with the same kekwabu images and peula powers of mind and thought. This originating class of emergent tokwai spirits, in short, qualify as tomota “persons” even though they are not human. It is for this reason that magicians can communicate with them through megwa, invoking them by name along with ancestral baloma in u’ula and doginala passages of spells. Moreover, a given magician personally identifies with those summoned nonhuman bilu baloma as parts of his own person through the sharing of tukwa images and powers, even though he is not descended from them in the same sense that he is from his human progenitors, that is, by parturition. Thus nonhuman tokwai spirits can participate in the magician’s magic as component relations of his person.
Secondly, not all of the beings and entities of Boyowa and Tuma that are proclaimed to harbor tokwai spirits are sentient, possessing the images and powers of mind and thought. Here, as with the term baloma (see above), the term tokwai carries a certain ambiguity. While the, let us say, “ordinary,” visible animals, plants, and other material features of Boyowa are understood to be animated by invisible momova “vital essence” of Tuma and to share many of the images and powers of the original nonhuman tosunapula-tokwai of creation, on their own they lack the characteristics of mind and thought. As some informants put it, these visible material beings and entities might well incorporate tokwai in the sense of kekwabu and peula, but they are distinct from the mindful tokwai of creation with which they are thereby connected. Thus, presently, magicians can refer to and draw upon the images and powers of animals, plants, and other features of Boyowa in their spells insofar as those species are animated by the same dala-specific characteristics as the original nonhuman tosunapula with whom magicians are also identified.
A magician as participant in his dala therefore enjoys a “totemic” relationship with the sentient and nonsentient tokwai that emerged from Obukula with his tonsunapula ancestors and thus with the specific animal, plant, and natural species associated or identified with them. The shared images and powers connecting them are the kekwabu and peula that are mainly voiced in the tapwala segments of spells.26 In general, people of a given dala must observe dietary and other restrictions associated with exactly the beings and entities that are called upon in the tukwa spells of the dala with which they identify. These are the “taboos” mentioned by Malinowski and others that accompany specific megwa.27 Parents instruct their children on which foods or other behaviors they must avoid, even if they do not know the exact wording of their dala’s spells. This way, when grown, the children will be eligible to receive and use those megwa. Violation of one’s dala’s taboos renders one unrecognizable to the bilu baloma who observed those proscriptions while they were alive. Rather than performing actions as the spell instructs, the spirits turn their back on anyone they do not recognize as themselves in terms of shared images and powers. Violation of the taboos of one’s dala is thus analogous to the commission of dala incest (see below), which similarly compromises one’s dala identity.
Now, the many distinct species of animals, plants, and “natural” phenomena populating Boyowa are related to one another through the perceptions of them that that people hold through their capacities of mind and thought. As Pulayasi and others explain, this is how seemingly distinct beings and entities of the visible world can nonetheless embody the same or analogous kekwabu and peula. Even though black clouds and maua, a species of black fish, are clearly different entities, sharing the quality of “blackness” enables them to be meaningfully voiced together in Omarakana’s weather magic for producing heavy rains. On yet other kekwabu and peula criteria, the sea-passage of Kadilabona, the village of Labai, de’u leaves, and the leaf ribs of coconut palms jointly cited in the vatuvi spell are assimilated to each other.
These are exactly the kinds of metaphorical and metonymical connections which Tambiah (1968) through his initial performative approach insightfully recognized as explaining what he interpreted as the power of magical words. However, in the view of the indigenous cosmology elaborated here through my adaptations of the NME and consistent with his later participation theory (see Part 1), the power of those words has everything do with Islanders’ understanding that their significations and effectiveness are equivalent to the personal constitution and agency of the magician as identified with invoked bilu baloma spirits.


Megwa as reproduction
This leads me finally to consider the agency of spirits in connection with procreation as a key dimension of Trobriand kin reckoning along with magic. From the very beginning, my field interlocutors have been adamant regarding the magical agency of bilu baloma rather than words alone with megwa. My initial impression was that, through invoking those spirits, the magician was recruiting them to transport mystically the invisible images and powers of the named nonsentient species from their specific locations in the Boyowan external world, bringing them together and manipulating them outside the magician’s body before being transferred by the named spirits to the target or patient to produce the desired results.
In subsequent discussions, though, my informants portrayed a significantly different scenario. The kekwabu and peula of “natural” species and phenomena that the magician calls forth in the vatuvi spell, for instance—the grubs and beetles swept and blown away, etc.—are seen as coming instead from the magician’s own bodily interior (lopola), where they have been stored for vocalization and projection, then to be carried forth invisibly by or as the spirits through Tuma to the intended destination. Moreover, the complete externalized, vocalized megwa is regarded as the magician’s “child” (gwadi)—indeed, equivalent to a “person”—modeled on the characteristics of the mythical tosunapula children, human and nonhuman, generated by their procreative separation from the deities of creation described above as well as on the ordinary reproduction of offspring to human mothers and fathers. The utterance of megwa through men’s oral cavities is thus analogous in different but complementary ways to the masculine ika’ili creative acts of spirit ancestors, on the one hand, and to the giving of birth through women’s vaginas, on the other.
Recall my description above of the procedures by which megwa are supposedly produced within and without the magician’s body, namely how megwa vocalized by the magician repeatedly emerge from his vocal channel into the initiate’s oral cavity; how the megwa are repeatedly voiced by the recipient so that they can be internally formed or memorized, indicating that no one can learn a spell through a single repetition; how the memorized words are dismantled from one another, enabling them to flow through and be stored in the blood of the magician’s body; how in being recalled as megwa they are summoned to the magician’s mind; how there they are reconstituted or re-formed by the mind into a coherent, ordered thought; how that insubstantial but ordered thought can then be repeatedly enunciated by the organs of the throat and mouth for emergence, at once to Boyowa, to outside the magician’s material body, but invisibly also to be constituted in the internal, invisible realm of Tuma.
These steps follow closely the processes involved in indigenous views of human procreation and birth as I elsewhere summarized them (Mosko 1995, 2005) on the basis of the reports of previous investigators but subsequently affirmed in general outline by my Omarakana informants.28 I present the key connections here as a series of analogies between procreation (in bold) and magical generativity (in italics):

Children are conceived partly as a formation (ikuli) of the gendered elements or contributions of two gendered parents, a feminine, largely substantial but fluid or bloody mother and a masculine, largely insubstantial but nonfluid, inelastic father.
Megwa consist of a formation (ikuli) of elements drawn from two gendered parts of the human body (i.e. disconnected words stored in/flowing amorphously through the body’s bloody lopola interior and masculine, largely insubstantial/reasoned/structured nona mind).
 
Human children are the products of the formation of a fetus wherein the disconnected images and powers flowing in the blood of the mother’s lopola are drawn down and coagulated in the womb by the forming influences of the father.
The disconnected words of a spell stored in the blood of the magician’s body are drawn up into the throat by the reasoning or thinking capacities of the magician’s mind.
 
From the vaginal-end of the woman’s body, she gives birth to material children identified as tukwa of her dala.
From the head-end of the magician’s body, he gives birth to immaterial children identified as tukwa with his dala (see below).
 
The father sexually penetrates the vagina of the child-to-be’s mother.
The magician mentor provides the spell which enters the magician’s body through the mouth.
 
The father’s contribution to the child consists in the feeding (vakam) of immaterial, invisible images that have the capacity of conveying form (ikuli) to the child.
The mentor’s contribution consists of immaterial, invisible images that have the capacity of giving form to the disconnected images and powers of the spell otherwise dispersed in the initiate’s body blood.
 
The father feeds the fetus through the mother’s vagina with repetitions of sexual intercourse, resulting in the fetus “child” being ikuli “coagulated,” “congealed.”
The mentoring magician orally recites the spell numerous times for it to be received, internalized, and ikuli “coalesced” as his “child” formed in the initiate’s memory.
 
The mother contributes two components to the child which identify her and it with her dala: the distinctive character of her substantive blood and the insubstantial waiwaia spirit child sent from Tuma.
The magician correspondingly embodies substantially the tukwa images and powers of his dala along with the insubstantial bilu baloma immanent in his own person.
 
The waiwaia spirit child is brought to the mother by baloma spirits of Tuma who identify with the mother’s (and also the father’s) or fetus’s dala.
The spell as recited by the magician and transferred to the patient is accompanied by baloma spirits of Tuma who identify with the dala of the magician (or his father; see below) and mentor.
 
The repeated acts of sex between the parents shape or coagulate the images and powers of the mother contained in her blood so as to form a fetus in the mother’s lopola, after which repeated acts of sex are suspended.
The magician’s and mentor’s repeated reciting of the spell continues until the spell has been completely formed or memorized, whereupon it is stored in the magician’s lopola.
 
The fetus gestates in the mother’s lopola until such time as she gives birth through her vagina.
The spell resides inertly in the magician’s belly until such time as he is ready to externalize it through his mouth.
 
The mother’s reproductive organs consist of a moist inner lopola container (bam “womb”), delivery tube (bulabola, wila “vagina”), clitoris (kasesa), and labias (bilibala, bila).
The magician’s vocal apparatus consist of a moist inner lopola container (wadola “mouth”), delivery tube/throat (kayola), uvula (kasesa), and lips (balola, bila).
 
In the process of giving birth, women excrete red fluids likened to blood along with the newborn child.
When magician’s speak their megwa, they typically excrete or spit red fluids likened to blood from their mouths (i.e. betel spittle, as the chewing of betel is a normal preliminary or accompaniment of reciting megwa).
 
The human child who emerges is constituted of the images and powers of its baloma ancestral spirits in Tuma.
The enunciated magical spell is constituted of images and powers shared with the magician’s ancestral baloma spirits in Tuma.
 
In order to conceive and give initial birth, women must be penetrated by some external physical means, since being of a given dala identity (tukwa) is of itself insufficient to conceive and give birth to children.
In order to learn a spell sufficiently to use it, a magician must internalize the spoken contents of the spell, since being of a given dala is not sufficient to mentally know and perform the tukwa spells of that dala.
 
When parents fail to inculcate their images and powers into their children properly or exactly as according to their respective dala, the children will be ineffective in their own lives.
When magicians fail to learn and operationalize their megwa perfectly (as, for example, in leaving words out, violating related taboos), the magic will not work properly.
 
The child born to a woman contains the images and powers of the bilu baloma spirits of their dala.
The megwa spell voiced by a magician contains the images and powers of its bilu baloma predecessors.
 
Children born of women embody the distinctive images and powers of human and baloma “persons” (tomata), with mind and thought, who are thus capable of exhibiting agency.
The megwa children (i.e. spells) created by magicians contain the images and powers (i.e. words) distinctive to tomota human and bilu baloma “persons” with mind and thought, who are thus capable of exhibiting agency.

From these parallels, it can be inferred that the magical words of megwa do have pragmatic and performative effects, but not only in the narrow manners claimed by Malinowski and Tambiah initially. The magical powers of the words of megwa are inseparable from the personal characteristics and capacities of the persons of both living human magicians and the spiritual beings who embody them through dala or other relationships and identities.


Discussion and conclusion
For the sake of conclusion, I shall concentrate on the clarifying light which this last point and the above analogies shed on indigenous views of human creativity, procreative as well as magical, along lines consistent with Viveiros de Castro’s formulation of the intrinsic relation between magic and kinship. The momova “vital essence” given expression in megwa is as magically creative as human procreation is magical.
Returning to Pulayasi’s rendition of cosmic generation, the tosunapula ancestors of the various dala were born of the sexual separation of the primal deities, and they inherited from them their definitive images and powers. But during their creative journeys before settling, the human tosunapula did not utilize their genital organs in sexual relations to reproduce offspring of their same dala kinds. They were brother–sister pairs who together, while conforming to dala prohibitions against sexual incest, nonetheless possessed the capacity of creating “quasi-incestuously” from their oral cavities “children,” or beings and entities of the eventually settled world with whom they shared dala-identifying images and powers. Once settled and entering into relations with persons of other dala, however, those children proceeded to reproduce human offspring heterosexually and exogamously from the opposite ends of women’s bodies, their vaginal “tips.” Seen in this light, the creative images and powers of megwa issuing from magicians’ mouths in the present are what remain among living humans of the original creative images and powers of mind and thought emergent in tosunapula ancestors. And insofar as those megwa “children” emerge from men’s mouths similarly to how women as “mothers” conceive and give human birth from their wombs, the procreative agency of magicians is masculine and paternal even though their spells are among the tukwa of their own supposedly matrilineal dala identities.
But after all, the ika’ili magical powers of the tosunapula brother–sister pairs were endogenous as to dala. Human tosunapula of different dala affected their diverse miraculous creations without interacting with one another until the time of eventual “settlement” (sibogwa) on the land. Thereafter, life, including the giving of birth, death, and reincarnation for the descendants of the human tosunapula (i.e. their baloma offspring), changed. From this it follows that dala entities incorporate images and capacities necessary to magically reproduce children, and thereby themselves, both with and without contributions from beings or entities of other dala. A single dala by definition thus contains certain capacities of both endogenous and exogenous reproduction—capacities nowadays still embodied in the blood of people’s bodies but formed and externalized as human sons and daughters by women vaginally and as megwa by men orally.
Now this conclusion resonates undeniably with the classic reports of Trobriand “virgin birth” insofar as pregnancy is seen as resulting from the inseminating influence of a waiwaia “spirit child,” except for three critical ethnographic caveats.29 First, waiwaia “spirit children” are seen as originating in Tuma, an invisible womb-like, maternal kind of place as illustrated by Obukula cave. But a waiwaia “spirit child’s” constituent images and powers, being invisible and nonsubstantial yet eventually manifested in its physical appearance in Boyowa, are to that extent masculine or paternal (see Mosko 1995: 667–70). As noted above, the internal baloma “soul” of a living person, grown from the implanted waiwaia, is intimately connected with the insubstantial images and capacities constitutive of that person’s eventual nona “mind” and nanamsa “thought” or “reason,” qualities categorically identified with men and masculinity. To that extent, the inseminating waiwaia, although it is of the same dala identity as the mother, qualifies as a masculine sort of contribution to the child’s person. In short, inseminating waiwaia “spirit children” are masculine entities, although they can secondarily take the form of either males or females in the children into which they can develop. This is essentially the same recipe as when senior dala males transmit their spells to their dala juniors and when male magicians give voiced form to the images and powers of spells cursing through their blood. In short, acquiring the images and powers of one’s dala through birth by women is not enough to effect those capacities magically; one needs also to combine those disjointed images and powers through the structuring, forming, ikuli-making agency forthcoming from same-dala men, that is, endogenously.30
Secondly, in the bodies of living humans, the lopola “interior” is viewed as primarily feminine, substantial, and wet, whereas the nona “mind,” as seat of nanamsa “thought” or “intelligence” to which the baloma of a human is initimately associated, is viewed as insubstantial, dry, and thus mainly masculine (cf. Montague 1983; Scoditti 1996: 69; 2012: 69–71; n.d.).
And thirdly, even if in some sense the waiwaia “spirit child” embodies masculine qualities to be fused or formed (ikuli) with the same-dala images and powers flowing in the mother’s blood, it is still understood to be transported to Boyowa by other baloma of Tuma, which, according to some reports, are inseminating male ancestors (Malinowski [1916] 1948: 219; 1932: 148–49, 150; Weiner 1989: 40), or even by baloma ancestors of the fetus’ human father’s dala (Malinowski 1932: 147, 150). This, it will be recalled, constituted one of the ethnographic contexts that contradicted Malinowski’s theory of the magical power of words (see Part 1).
In sum, even if the waiwaia child’s dala identity is that of its female mother, it is “male” as regards its insubstantial masculine character, and the spirits seen as responsible for transporting it to the mother are, in the course of doing so, accordingly masculine and hence “paternal,” even if “incestuously” as per shared dala identity.31
This should not cause total surprise. Within the framework of “matrilineal inheritance” of dala identity as it has been presupposed in most prior ethnographic accounts, there are numerous indications from the indigenous cosmology of complementary masculine-paternal spiritual agencies—agencies which in one way or another involve contributions of images and powers outside of or separate from the lineaments of strict dala maternity.
This is my main, final concern. Virtually the same logic applies with the intergenerational cycling of megwa spells. Since the tosunapula settled and initiated the exogamous heterosexual reproduction of their human descendants, their megwa spells have not been typically or by rule inherited directly or automatically by nephews from uncles or other dala elders. To Malinowski’s considerable consternation ([1916] 1948: 226–27; 1932: 345, 349; 1935a: 177), the most important and powerful megwa, such as those of chiefs, village leaders, garden magicians, and others (i.e. tukwa spells), were regarded as among the collective wealth of their matrilineal dala groups, but the dala men supposedly entitled to inherit those formulae had to pay heavily (pokala) for them when, even more perplexing, magicians’ sons were typically given them “freely” by their fathers even though they possessed different matrilineal dala identities. For Malinowski, this illogic was a manifestation of what he saw as a conflict between principles of “matriarchy” and “patriarchy,” or “motherright” and “father-love.”
My research has revealed that the children (latu) of male members of a given dala are classed as a particular subcategory of dala members and hence as part of their father’s dala’s tukwa. These children of men are termed litulela (and reciprocally a person’s father’s maternal dala kin are called tubulela), as distinct from the children of dala women (veyolela). Litulela dala affiliates receive through procreative and other contributions the distinctive kekwabu and peula of their father’s dala, not only those of their mother. Fathers and children are thus anything but “strangers” (tomakava) to one another, as reported by Malinowski (1932: 3, 5, 16; cf. Weiner 1976 passim). Not only is this directly relevant to indigenous theories of procreation, but it also explains why it is that magicians customarily transmit their secret megwa to their sons rather than to their legitimate dala heirs (see also Mosko 2013, in press-a).
Edwin Hutchins (1980: 19–43; pers. comm.; see also Powell 1956: 391, 393–97; Weiner 1976: 125, 157–59, 163; Campbell 2002: 52) has clarified the inheritance between men of dala land which applies in most particulars to the transmission of megwa, since both are tukwa. Fathers are understood not to give their land or spells as “free” gifts to favored sons (even less so to nephews) but rather as reciprocities for the kaivatam indulgences (food, labor, betel, tobacco, money) that considerate loving sons customarily present to fathers over the full course of their lives. This is the basis of the intimate litulela–tubulela relationship which encompasses the people of father’s dala and the children of men of one’s own maternally defined dala. Such gifts and other observances are accepted as sufficient justification for a father to give important items of wealth imbued with the images and powers of his own maternal dala to one or more of his favorite sons, who, as litulela, are “one dala” (kwetala dala) with him. Mainly because of the usual residence pattern of patrivirilocality, a man’s male dala relatives (uncles, brothers, nephews) are practically excluded from those same opportunities; hence, it is much later in their adulthood that male veyolela maternally related kin might become able to present substantial pokala solicitations to their elders, more or less substituting as the kaivatam gifts of sons, with the intention of acquiring land, megwa, or other dala wealth. Although Hutchins does not make this point explicitly, my Omarakana informants stress that those pokala prestations are intended to cultivate in the uncle or dala elder dispositions analogous to those routinely generated through paternal relationship. Through pokala, in other words, dala juniors attempt to establish “adoptive” (vakalova) father–son relations with their own dala seniors. It is according to the identical logic that chiefs and local leaders will often formally adopt a young chosen nephew as “son” to succeed them, as in the case of Pulayasi.32
The result is that before the megwa spells of a specific dala are transmitted endogenously across generations, they commonly pass from “fathers” to “sons”—including to “nephews” or others “adopted” as “sons,” and nominally, therefore, to men in that specific respect “outside” of the maternal dala— before they can exogenously reenter the dala of their matrilineal origination. If a dala elder’s son has already received megwa from his deceased father, then the father’s male dala relatives must make a special payment (katuyumali), more or less equivalent to pokala, to the son who has “replaced the father” (keymapula; Weiner 1976: 196–97; Mosko 1995: 771), so as to elicit the megwa of their own dala from him.
In short, megwa “children” are regenerated within a dala according to processes analogous to how human “children” are procreated with their endogenous masculine and feminine dala identities and through extra-dala “paternal” contributions. Although the capacities of megwa recapitulate the asexual-endogenous masculine creative powers of tosonapula before settlement, the processes by which they are reproduced nowadays within and between dala reflect as well the exogamic exchanges inaugurated by dala ancestors subsequent to their mythical settlement on the land.
To close, the notions of “personal partibility” and magical “participation” thus provide a new lens through which two prominent puzzles of Trobriand culture can now be reconfigured and hopefully solved. The crucial conceptual innovations here are that in the Trobriands persons are not viewed as unitary subjects in the sense of the canonical Western “individual” separate from the inanimate “objects” or “things” that they “possess” or “own.” Instead, they are composed of the detachable, elicitive components of other persons, including the elements and relations of baloma “souls” and “spirits” and the kekwabu “images” and peula “powers” of which all beings of the cosmos are constituted and in terms of which they participate with each other. As concerns Malinowski’s puzzle over magical efficacy, the words of spells are effective not following from their categorical differentiation from baloma and other spirits, but because they are spirits, or at least detachable, personal components of them. As for the enigmas over “virgin birth,” the inseminating influences of spirits, waiwaia, blood, warmth, dripping water, and so on, are in the terms of the culture and cosmogony not separate from the agency of procreative fathers; they embody the personal images and powers of paternity.
However, the utility of personal partibility and participation as demonstrated in this essay does not stop there. Without it, the images and powers of megwa might initially have been taken to be mere “objects” while the kekwabu and peula of parents, children, and baloma might similarly have been seen as “subjects,” and thus not immediately comparable. After all, it is the analytical faculty of personal partibility and participation to dissolve the distinction of persons and things which has enabled me to compare indigenous views of magical and procreative agency as analogs of one another.


Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association at Washington, DC, anthropology seminars at the Australian National University (2009) and the University of California at San Diego (2014), and the Melanesian Research Seminar in London (2013). The ethnographic information contained herein was gathered at Omarakana and neighboring villages on eight annual fieldtrips totalling twenty months between 2006 and 2013. Initially I was the personal guest of the Tabalu, Pulayasi Daniel, but before the end of the first visit I was adopted to become a member of Tabalu dala, a younger brother of Pulayasi, and a kinsman and affine to others. I mention this detail because it greatly impacted the caliber of my relationships with residents of Omarakana and the surrounding community. I am immeasurably indebted to Tabalu Pulayasi and other members of my research team (Pakalaki Tokulapai, Molubabeba Daniel, Kevin Kobuli, Mairawesi Pulayasi, Vincent Yogaru, Toliwaga Toguguwa Tobodeli, George Mwasuluwa, Tobi Mokagai, and Modiala Daniel) and many other Northern Kiriwinans for their faith and confidence in me and my work. Generous funding from the Australian Research Council, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, and the School of Culture, History and Language at the Australian National University made the research possible. I have been greatly aided by the resources made available to me at the DEPTH archives at California State University (Sacramento). Allan Darrah, Fred Damon, Michael Young, Jordan Haug, Kathy Lepani, Ed Hutchins, Andy Connelly, Harry Beran, Ralph Lawton, Sergio Jarillo de la Torre, Susan Montague, and five anonymous referees provided invaluable comments and criticisms of earlier drafts. This article’s appearance is largely due to Giovanni da Col’s unrelenting encouragement and support. Remaining errors and omissions are my own.


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Les énigmes magiques de Malinowski: vers une nouvelle théorie de la magie et de la procréation dans la société trobriandaise
Résumé : Les écrits classiques de Malinowski sur la socialité trobriandaise ont laissé à l’anthropologie de nombreuses énigmes durables. Cet article en deux parties examine deux de ces énigmes relatives aux descriptions contradictoires des agents impliqués dans les chants magiques (megwa). D’un côté, en accord avec ses théories pragmatique et fonctionnaliste de la langue et de la culture, Malinowski a affirmé que, si les baloma ancestraux et autres esprits sont généralement invoqués dans la plupart des sorts, l’efficacité de ces incantations dérive plutôt de la puissance des mots énoncés. De l’autre côté, en guise d’évidence de « l’ignorance de la paternité physiologique » des insulaires, il prétendait que les sorts destinés à produire la grossesse chez les femmes du village avaient expressément pour but de susciter des actions rituelles appropriées des esprits baloma en tant qu’agents de la conception et de la naissance. À partir de données ethnographiques récemment recueillies au village d’Omarakana, interprétées sous l’angle de la « nouvelle ethnographie mélanésienne » et de la théorie de la « participation » dans la pratique rituelle formulée antérieurement par Tambiah, toutes deux ici revisitées, je soutiens que pour les trobriandais le pouvoir magique des mots est la puissance des esprits, et inversement. Cette nouvelle compréhension a des implications importantes pour les débats classiques et contemporains sur la nature de la « magie », les controverses sur la paternité et la soi-disant « immaculée conception », les théories de la personnalité et de l’agencéité, ainsi que les caractéristiques des dala « matrilinéaires ».
Mark S. MOSKO is Professor of Anthropology in the School of Culture, History and Language at the Australian National University. He is author of Quadripartite structures (1985) and Gifts that change (forthcoming) and coeditor (with Margaret Jolly) of Transformations of hierarchy (1995) and (with Fred Damon) On the order of chaos (2005) as well as many journal articles and book chapters. In recent years he has reoriented his earlier research interests concerning North Mekeo (Central Province PNG) symbolism, social organization, and change to ethnographic comparisons with the Trobriands and reinterpretations of earlier analyses of their culture. Recent publications include “The fractal yam” (JRAI 2009), the 2008 RAI Curl Prize essay “Partible penitents” (JRAI 2010), and “Omarakana revisited” (JRAI 2013).
Mark S. MoskoDepartment of AnthropologySchool of Culture, History and LanguageCollege of Asia and the PacificAustralian National UniversityCanberra ACT 0200 Australiamark.mosko@anu.edu.au


___________________
1. The “virgin birth” debate, as it came to be known, was initiated with an essay by Edmund Leach (1966) based on Malinowski’s report (1932) and other ethnography conducted by that time (e.g. Austen 1934–35; Powell 1956). Additional major contributions to the debate focusing on Trobriand procreation include Edmund Leach (1968), Powell (1968), Spiro (1968), and Montague (1971). Others have subsequently entered the fray (e.g. Weiner 1976, 1988; Delaney 1986; Van Dokkum 1997; Mosko 1998, 2005).
2. The term megwa is nowadays used to refer both to “magic” generally and to specific spells or chants. There is an archaic term, yopa, which is occasionally used to refer to verbalized spells (Malinowski 1922: 299).
3. An incomplete list of critics on topics other than those addressed in this essay would include, for example, Firth (1957); Tambiah (1968, 1973, 1990); Rosengren (1976); Weiner (1976); Stocking (1983); Iteanu (1995: 145–46); Senft (1997); Gell (1998).
4. The word baloma refers to the internal “soul” of living persons and that soul’s invisible, immaterial existence once it is released from the body upon death to become human ancestral spirits (Malinowski [1916] 1948). The term bilu baloma includes among its referents various nonhuman as well as human spiritual beings, as described below.
5. Based on others’ previously published ethnographies, two prior investigators (Philsooph 1971; Darrah 1972; see also Baldwin 1971: 282) came to question seriously Malinowski’s claims as to the efficacy of magical words. There are also statements available from knowledgeable Trobrianders endorsing the view that spirits are the source of megwa powers (Ketobwau is Ketobwau 1994: 22–25; Malnic 1998: 143–44).
6. These spells are among the collective tukwa “property” of dala units (see below). Although Malinowski concentrated on these dala-based incantations, he was apparently not familiar with the named category, tukwa. It should be noted that there exists another category of non-hereditary “private” megwa spells (sosewa) which, unlike tukwa, does not necessarily require the invoking of ancestral spirits but still relies on spirit agency (see Figure 1).
7. Interestingly, in his analysis of Sinhalese and Pali Buddhist rites conducted in the same essay as his analysis of Trobriand magic, Tambiah (1968: 176–80) included the participation of gods, ancestral ghosts, spirits, and so on, as among the effective agents.
8. It is curious that despite this considerable shift between his “performance” and “participation” approaches, in the latter context Tambiah (1990: 65–83) devotes two chapters to Malinowski and Trobriand magic but again elides the question of spirit participation or any implications which might ensue from it.
9. One of the strongest criticisms of the NME is its typically synchronic orientation toward sociality and hence its supposed inability to address change. Elsewhere (Mosko in press-a, forthcoming), I have sought to respond to this criticism, in the first instance dealing with the contemporary practice of Trobriand magic in the context of introduced gambling; and see below.
10. A sample of both views would include Codrington (1891: 119–20); Hocart (1914: 99); Hogbin (1936: 244); Chowning (1977); Lawrence (1988); Lawrence and Meggitt (1965: 6–9); Young (1971; 1983); Valeri (1985); Trompf (1991); Gell (1995); Sillitoe (1998).
11. The designation “Paramount Chief” is an artifact of the establishment of colonial control by British and Australian forces. Here I prefer to use the indigenous title for that position, the “Tabalu.”
12. Evidence I have gathered regarding the logic of ula’ula oblations lends further support to my present argument that bilu baloma spirits are the agents of magic. Their separate treatment, however, raises issues well beyond the question of the magical efficacy of spells in the strict sense and, owing also to length limitations, must await a later opportunity for analysis. For now, it is sufficient to note that ula’ula offerings are essentially sacrifices intended to obligate the named spirits, inducing them to reciprocate by performing the acts as instructed in the next-recited megwa. As I have argued at length elsewhere (Mosko in press-b), the logic of sacrifice fits comfortably with that of personal partibility.
13. To the people of Northern Kiriwina, the term “Boyowa” is the indigneous name of the main island of the Trobriands, nowadays known as “Kiriwina.” However, villagers also routinely refer to the generalized visible, material universe as “Boyowa,” in contrast to the invisible, immaterial world of Tuma.
14. For additional rejections by Malinowski of the magical agency of baloma spirits specifically, see also [1916] 1948: 196, 213–15; 1922: 407, 412, 433, 435–36; 1935a: 452–82; 1935b: 215–18.
15. As I have been advised by the Tabalu, Pulayasi Daniel, the information contained within the following account of the indigenous cosmology is very likely not readily accessible from all or even most Trobrianders. This is partly because it holds a central place as tukwa or sacred hereditary knowledge of members of Tabalu dala, particularly those based at Omarakana (see below). In this as in other instances, knowledge of tukwa, including the content of megwa spells “owned” by a particular dala, is restricted to selected dala members and children of male members. Therefore, while other villagers of different dala may know various bits of Trobriand cosmology as outlined here, it is presumably only Tabalu affiliates, and only some of them at that, who are in possession of the full and most authoritative accounts. Pulayasi adds this as one explanation for why fuller accounts of Trobriand cosmology have not been given to ethnographers working elsewhere in the region.
16. In this sense, Trobriand cosmology would qualify as an instance of Descola’s (2010) ontology of “animism.” But as I shall outline below, on the basis of additional ontological criteria, Trobriand cosmology also qualifies as “totemism” and “analogism.”
17. From the perspective of this mirror-like imagery, the cosmological tie between Boyowa and Tuma is analogical (Descola 2010).
18. Kekwabu is the Northern Kiriwinan dialectical version of kaikobu and kaikwabu as reported from other regions.
19. This process would seem to parallel Malinowski’s (1932:148–49, 152–54, 160) reports of women being inseminated by waiwaia “spirit children” through their heads; see Part 2.
20. The oral traditions of most, although not all, dala include mention of the local emergence of dala ancestors on dala-owned land. According to my Omarakana and other sources, these events occurred mythically in the course of tosunapula migrations before “settlement” (sibogwa) on the lands that their living descendants have come to occupy.
21. This version of Trobriand cosmology, of itself, is consistent with the preponderance of ethnographic evidence which refutes Malinowski’s notorious claims of Islanders’ supposed “ignorance of physiological paternity”; see below.
22. The famous water (sopi) dripping from the stalactite which pierced Malita’s vagina in conceiving Ikuli Tudava is identified by Pulayasi as the watery saliva (bubwalua) of Ika’ili Tudava (cf. Malinowski [1916] 1948: 228; 1935a: 68–75). As I shall discuss below, mouths along with caves are viewed as analogous to vaginas, capable of giving birth.
23. Tosunapula are the same spirit ancestors described by Weiner (1976: 39) and Malinowski (1935b: 262–63) as tabu.
24. The particulars of Trobriand beliefs about human procreation are, of course, immensely complicated and controversial. Thankfully, the Tabalu, Pulayasi Daniel, and my other Omarakana informants have affirmed in broad outline my earlier analyses and the further details presented below.
25. The malevolent, war-like tauva’u or itona thought to cause epidemic disease are a subcategory of tokwai.
26. In this regard, Trobriand cosmology conforms to Descola’s model of totemic as well as animistic and analogistic ontologies. This explains, in part, Seligman’s (1910: 661–735) strong focus on “totems” in his formulation of Northern Massim social organization.
27. The term for these taboos is kikila.
28. Tambiah (1968: 195) observed how Malinowski failed to appreciate the symbolic parallels between garden and pregnancy magic, although his informants were clear on the relationship. My argument here is more general: that in the terms of the culture, the logic of all masculine magical megwa production and creativity is analogous to feminine bodily reproduction and procreation, and vice versa.
29. It is not my intention here to reopen the debate over “virgin birth,” for I do not delve into the many additional data which point to the deep significance of Trobriand paternity. Rather, I focus here on the agentive parallels of baloma ancestral spirits in procreation and megwa performance. This treatment of implicit incest in beliefs regarding spirit impregnation of females also differs substantially from the account of Weiner (1992).
30. In this passage, I allude to the way in which the gender distinction of “male” versus “female,” along with other key dichotomies in the culture, is systematically crosscut such that anything conceptualized initially as “male” is typically composed of both “male” and “female” parts, and the same for any being or entity initially classified as “female” (see Mosko 2013). This formulation comes very close, I think, to exemplifying Strathern’s (1988) notion of androgynous Melanesian persons conceived in terms of cross- and same-sex relations; see also Scoditti (2012: 67).
31. Trobriand attitudes toward “incest” (suvasova) have generated an enormous literature in their own right, the systematic analysis of which goes well beyond the bounds of the present essay, but which I hope to examine more fully in future along the lines provisionally set out here.
32. The contemporary chief of Kwenama dala based at Yolumgwa village, John Kasaipwalova, was similarly adopted as son by his mother’s brother, the previous chief, Nalabutau.
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						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>26</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2022</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date>
			<volume>12</volume>
			<issue seq="208">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2022 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1671" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1671/3936" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1671/3937" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article argues that China’s National College Entrance Exam, the Gaokao, provides routinized charismatic ratification of elite merit and state authority. In his writings, Max Weber differentiates between original and routinized charisma. Whereas original charisma disrupts social orders, routinized charisma legitimizes them by preserving a spark of the extraordinary and the divine. Based on long-term ethnographic research in Chinese high schools, this article examines a mode of charisma preservation that Weber ignored: routinized fateful rites of passage like the Gaokao. Despite being routinized, such events are chancy, their outcomes contingent and undetermined. This indeterminacy is indexed by magical concepts like fate and luck, which lend charismatic authority a divine imprimatur. This analysis illuminates the importance of indeterminacy in understanding the compulsion of charisma, contributes to understanding the dialectical interplay between original and routinized charisma, and explains the Gaokao’s magical-charismatic role in preserving the moral authority of China’s ruling elite.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1422</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-07-04T08:12:21Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1422</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/707641</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Ghost twitter in Indigenous Australia: Sentience, agency, and ontological difference</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Merlan</surname>
						<given-names>Francesca</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>Francesca.Merlan@anu.edu.au</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="306">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1422" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1422/3450" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1422/3451" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>By distinguishing between attributions of sentience and agency we begin to take crucial analytical steps to consider ontological and cosmological differences between groups. Scholars in New Animist and Actor-Network Theory camps sometimes expound broadly generalized notions of agency, thus overlooking the ways in which characterizations of different kinds of beings—and the implications of these characterizations—may apply to aspects of environment and change historically. In Australia there has been debate about the “sentience” of the country as understood by Indigenous Australians. In a broader Australian public culture, there has come about in the last four decades or so an “etherealized” apprehension of Indigenous relations to landscape, which has privileged attention to certain kinds of cosmogenic being (that is, “Dreamings” as world founding agencies). Considering Australian Aboriginal practices and descriptions of spirit, human, other-than-human figures, and sacralized countryside, I take the view that there is incommensurability between Indigenous and non-Indigenous experiences of environment as sentient. Drawing on both my field experience with Indigenous people in North Australia and the broader Australianist ethnographic record, I discuss the many other kinds of being that populate and animate the countryside, showing a wide range of beings and forces. Three themes of continental distribution stand out: continuities between life and death; human-animal ambiguity; and communicative connectivities among life-forms. All these were elaborated in a way of life integral with its surroundings. The article considers change over time to such understandings, reduction in the range of life-forms, and what this may involve.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/868</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-12-22T11:55:22Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
	xmlns="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3"
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3.011</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.3.011</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Economies of obligation: Patronage as relational wealth in Bolivian gold mining</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Economies of obligation: Patronage as relational wealth in Bolivian gold mining</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Winchell</surname>
						<given-names>Mareike</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Chicago</aff>
					<email>mareike@uchicago.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>22</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2017</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date>
			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="406">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 Mareike Winchell</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2017</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.3.011" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Recent scholarship in anthropology offers critical attention to inequality as a constitutive feature of social life to which specific legal, cultural, and religious traditions supply diverging answers. Drawing upon these debates, this article explores the ways that Quechua- and Spanish-speaking subjects in the Bolivian province of Ayopaya imagine, inhabit, and strive to address inequalities stemming from the region’s history of labor violence. While Ayopaya’s history of hacienda servitude lives on in contemporary structures of racialized disparity, I argue that it also conditions particular traditions of exchange that rural groups draw from in order to contest a new gold mining economy. Against more pessimistic accounts of late capitalism as a moment of inexorable abandonment, particularly for indigenous groups, I query the tenacity of obligation and probe its political possibilities as a practice of claim making (and a scholarly heuristic) by which to expose the ethical refusals on which “free” exchange relies.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Recent scholarship in anthropology offers critical attention to inequality as a constitutive feature of social life to which specific legal, cultural, and religious traditions supply diverging answers. Drawing upon these debates, this article explores the ways that Quechua- and Spanish-speaking subjects in the Bolivian province of Ayopaya imagine, inhabit, and strive to address inequalities stemming from the region’s history of labor violence. While Ayopaya’s history of hacienda servitude lives on in contemporary structures of racialized disparity, I argue that it also conditions particular traditions of exchange that rural groups draw from in order to contest a new gold mining economy. Against more pessimistic accounts of late capitalism as a moment of inexorable abandonment, particularly for indigenous groups, I query the tenacity of obligation and probe its political possibilities as a practice of claim making (and a scholarly heuristic) by which to expose the ethical refusals on which “free” exchange relies.</p></abstract-trans>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to comments on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to comments on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Anthropology inside out






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Vita Peacock. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.1.010
MEDITATION
Anthropology inside out
Vita PEACOCK, University College London

Response to comments on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.


Our discipline has always required great care. Balancing one’s ethical duties to research participants and colleagues, to readers, reviewers, and editors, and now with open access to the general public—while striving for an intellectual honesty above all—presents us with no simple task. The intimacy of doing the anthropology of institutions in Europe as an anthropologist in a European institution just makes these duties of care more visible and pronounced. For this reason the article’s moral ambivalence is vital. It is as necessary to do justice to a Teutonic relation as it is to represent its potential for injustice. Whether it succeeds is another matter. One interesting effect of this ambivalence since the article’s publication earlier this year however, has been to produce very different inferences in the minds of its readers. Such diversity is well reflected in the considered responses from Julie Billaud, Cris Shore, and Christoph Brumann.
Billaud enriches the debate with a comparative ethnographic think piece on the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. In the process she explores her own “overwhelming feeling of boredom”—a move that may dismay my interlocutors in the natural sciences who perpetually stressed the importance of “excitement.” An Institute saturated with boredom is quite against the Society’s own self-image. Billaud defends her desire for enchantment against what might be considered a “naive and utopian vision,” but in fact she would be in good company elsewhere in the Society. Scientists I knew echoed her citation of Bateson, telling me their work consisted of “playing around.” So yes, my interlocutors may be dismayed; on the other hand, they would not be surprised. While the directors I worked with were generally popular, there were always [136]veiled references to when “the system does not work,” to other Institutes where the directors narrowed the autonomy of their scientists and hierarchy segued into control. (This is of course implicit in Axel’s claim that the director “could be a king if he wanted to.”) While the affect of boredom she explores is counter-cultural in one sense, in Billaud’s ethnography it still remains the outcome of personalized leadership—a value that consistently out-trumps any other.
What we might also glean from Billaud’s brave offering is that our moral critiques are misplaced. Social theory in the wake of ’68 has been consistent in its attack on the legitimacy of hierarchical relations (Peacock 2015), yet it is not hierarchy as such that produces Billaud’s affects of constraint. It is the way a hierarchical relation is translated into the exertion of control through bureaucratic technologies; as in one sense or another, all of her examples concern the allocation of resources. The fact is that egalitarian systems can execute the same translation. Shore’s perspicacious comparison between directors and “project barons” is salient here because it is through the exertion of resource control that directorship begins to adopt characteristics of neoliberal governmentality. Billaud’s “experience of stuckedness” echoes the hollowing delay that audit culture produces: one in which the charisma of the present is perpetually put on hold in service to some future imperative. Just publish a book and you will have financial security. Just win a grant and you will be promoted. Sometimes these imperatives are so deafening that we can scarcely hear what each other is substantively saying. If something quasi-feudal can so closely resemble something neoliberal, then the moral issue at stake is not one of how to organize people but of these bureaucratic techniques that make a bland mask for domination.
In contrast to Billaud’s concern with affect, Shore’s lucid commentary takes an economistic view. For Shore, dependence is equivalent to “a disguised form of class relationship”: in which “structural violence” produces an “underclass of subaltern researchers.” He then poses the important question as to whether the neoliberalization of academia is entrenching these asymmetries—particularly through the project barons commanding large public sums. Shore’s scholarly suggestion is to resituate the argument within a 1960s literature on patron-client relations: with dependence negotiated by its incumbents as “a calculated exchange relationship and investment strategy.”
While I appreciate the ethnography can be read in this way, I hesitate to follow this kind of economic thinking. Indeed the article as a whole and the thesis from which it is drawn position themselves as arguments against it. At its base the language of class suggests two groups in opposing relations to the means of production, with different personal access to its resources and the perennial threat of conflict. The picture in the MPS is not this. Directors are of course scientists themselves, a sameness that softens their hierarchical difference. Similarly, both are salaried workers on pay scales not wildly dissimilar (certainly nothing like the differentials between professors and university provosts). Intrahierarchical conflict is also very muted. It could be, as Brumann proposes, that all parties are simply “used to” the norms of dependence. Yet my ethnography would suggest that when people are suspended in a relation of complementarity this robust, it can make the rupture that political action requires very difficult. The most viable option, as evidenced by Benjamin (and indeed Billaud it would seem), is to “exit” the organization [137]completely (Hirschman 1970): one clearly assisted by the precariatization of its workforce. These are not then class antagonisms but something much more sinewed. Shore’s analogy with priesthood, mayoralty, and so on is highly apposite but not in the way they were analyzed in the 1960s. The problem with patron-client literature was always its transactionalism (cf. Piliavsky 2014). Social encounters start looking uncannily like the commodity-form, with their historicity lost and the desires that surround them instrumentalized. Faris is strategic but he is not instrumental; the difference is subtle but important.
Shore is right to raise the question of gender. The demographics of directorship are overwhelmingly androcentric. At the time of research in 2011 there were just 22 female directors out of a total of 286, with an even smaller ratio in the hard sciences I studied. Moreover, the Society’s statutes fail to problematize the use of “he” as a gender-neutral term. Yet the fact that there are female directors complicates the issue. The directorship was not (as it was among many varieties of technical staff) an exclusively homosocial position. Having not worked with any female director, I was not positioned to draw conclusions on gender and directorship. Clearly the issue of gender requires further research. For now I will leave these conclusions to a female senior social scientist inside the MPS, who reflected on a comparison I once made between directors and big-men and -women: “I am afraid it is about big men even where (big) women are concerned,” she demurred.
Finally, I must address the commentary of Brumann, who is also a permanent Max Planck employee. As with Billaud, Brumann offers an alternative analysis predicated on the deep knowledge of the insider. He adds important details on German labor law and the impact of some of the media coverage cited in the article on the MPS itself. It is encouraging to see this insider accept unhesitatingly two major struts of the argument, namely that “autonomy builds on precarity” and that dependency within the Max Planck Society is not a specifically “neoliberal product.” Brumann goes even further than my own claims to suggest that the article “explains part of a much broader phenomenon of academic precarity.” Nonetheless, this final remark is also the critique that gives his commentary its overall shape.
Brumann states that the argument “isolates and rarefies” the Max Planck Society too much, denying its significant historical and contemporary overlaps with the university system. Yet through such assertions Brumann is pursuing a syllogistic fallacy: specifically, one drawing a negative conclusion from an affirmative premise. Brumann is extrapolating my statements on the Max Planck Society to infer that these statements apply to only the Max Planck Society. Indeed, this is belied by the very first footnote (which he cites explicitly), as well as my extensive appeal to Fritz Ringer. Intriguingly, Brumann follows the same fallacy in his comments around the Betriebsrat. At no point in the article do I suggest that the Betriebsrat is singular to the Max Planck Society, nor its own “invention.” An interesting question comes next—why would Brumann make this errors of logic? Here I would suggest the surging spirit of the organization is at work. For its sense of its own exceptionalism—interpellated in the discourses of autonomy and excellence—occupies the very heart of the organization’s collective identity. When Brumann asserts that the essay “isolates and rarefies,” he is ventriloquizing the Society’s own vision of itself as isolated and rarefied. When he claims I consider the Betriebsrat a [138]Max Planck invention, he conveys the Society’s conviction of its own inventiveness. This notwithstanding, I welcome Brumann’s demonstrations of the porosity of this hierarchical form with other German institutions. This is precisely the broader resonance that I had hoped others might pursue. As with any work of scholarship, the validity of my conclusions extends only as far as the empirical ground they cover.
There are further points at which Brumann follows the ratiocinations of his colleagues. It is a commonplace within the organization that the Max Planck Society endures because it generates “results.” This is clearly echoed in Brumann’s claim that “the output in terms of publications, Nobel Prizes, ERC Advanced Grants, and the like has so far prevented German lawmakers and taxpayers from questioning the model.” That this were true! British Universities once won around a quarter of all ERC funding (Jump 2015), yet that did not prevent lawmakers from questioning the model. The Max Planck Society endures because it realizes key values articulated during the German counter-Enlightenment, which so far have been successfully modernized. Only when these recalibrations lose their internal and external coherence will the organization fail or change significantly.
Before concluding I must highlight a point of contention and flat inaccuracy in Brumann’s response. He quite rightly notes that the direct translation of Betriebsrat is “works council,” yet the concept does not translate this easily for non-Germans. The function of the Betriebsrat—as one of their number informed me—is to “represent the interests of employees” and act as a “counterweight to the management.” This largely consists of mediating personal disputes and ensuring that the labor laws Brumann discusses are adhered to. For employees in other countries, unions would perform these tasks. One of the major differences is that a Betriebsrat cannot call a strike. What is lost in translation is however obviated by retaining the original German; I then leave it to polyglot readers to translate the term their own way. Finally, I cannot claim the credit Brumann proffers for the “suggestive metaphor” of the stranger-king; that belongs to Marshall Sahlins.
I would sincerely like to thank all three readers for contributing to this debate, as well as Giovanni Da Col for initiating it. While performing our duties of care to diverse others, we must not then forget to attend to ourselves and our own rights as scholars to Billaud’s “surprise, poetic imagination, enchantment or puzzlement.”

References
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jump, Paul. 2015. “UK Leads on European Research Council Cash.” Times Higher Education (THE), July 9. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/championship-form-uk-leads-european-research-council-cash.
Peacock, Vita. 2015. “The negation of hierarchy and its consequences.” Anthropological Theory 15 (1): 3–21. doi:10.1177/1463499614564887.
Piliavsky, Anastasia, ed. 2014. Patronage as politics in South Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 
Vita PEACOCK is an ESRC Future Research Leaders Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Anthropology of University College London, where she is working on a book about the rise of Anonymous in Britain. This research is drawn from her doctoral thesis, “We, The Max Planck Society: A study of hierarchy in Germany.”
Vita PeacockDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity College London14 Taviton StreetLondon WC1E 6BTUKvita.peacock@ucl.ac.uk
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores the first phase of shamanic initiation among the Ikpeng, an Amerindian people living close to the Middle Xingu River in southern Amazonia. Submerged in a nocturnal river or lake and staring up at the dark water surface, the initiate absorbs a swarm of water and forest beings, attracted by the potent aroma of jatobá tree resin, dripped onto the surface above his (or her) eyes, turning the novice’s body into a living container for these spirits. Attempting to unpack some of the topological complexity of this process, I introduce a series of concepts—swarm and anomaly, inoculation, plasma, quasi-events, entanglement, and multiple life—intended as improvised solutions to the contaminations, distortions, and alterations made to Western concepts when exposed to Ikpeng and Amerindian thought.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores the first phase of shamanic initiation among the Ikpeng, an Amerindian people living close to the Middle Xingu River in southern Amazonia. Submerged in a nocturnal river or lake and staring up at the dark water surface, the initiate absorbs a swarm of water and forest beings, attracted by the potent aroma of jatobá tree resin, dripped onto the surface above his (or her) eyes, turning the novice’s body into a living container for these spirits. Attempting to unpack some of the topological complexity of this process, I introduce a series of concepts—swarm and anomaly, inoculation, plasma, quasi-events, entanglement, and multiple life—intended as improvised solutions to the contaminations, distortions, and alterations made to Western concepts when exposed to Ikpeng and Amerindian thought.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>The filter trap






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © David Rodgers. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau3.3.004
The filter trap
Swarms, anomalies, and the quasi-topology of Ikpeng shamanism
David RODGERS


This article explores the first phase of shamanic initiation among the Ikpeng, an Amerindian people living close to the Middle Xingu River in southern Amazonia. Submerged in a nocturnal river or lake and staring up at the dark water surface, the initiate absorbs a swarm of water and forest beings, attracted by the potent aroma of jatobá tree resin, dripped onto the surface above his (or her) eyes, turning the novice’s body into a living container for these spirits. Attempting to unpack some of the topological complexity of this process, I introduce a series of concepts—swarm and anomaly, inoculation, plasma, quasi-events, entanglement, and multiple life—intended as improvised solutions to the contaminations, distortions, and alterations made to Western concepts when exposed to Ikpeng and Amerindian thought.
Keywords: Indigenous Amazonian ethnology, shamanism, insects, topology, conceptual anthropology



Introduction : Permeabilities
This article explores the conceptual topologies of the shamanic cosmology of the Ikpeng, an Amerindian group of southern Amazonia, focusing in particular on ritual initiation and multispecies relations. The concept of topology is employed here in two distinct ways. First, the article explores the Ikpeng topological mathematics of singularity and multiplicity, refracted through the concepts of the shaman as a species anomaly and the species itself as a pack or swarm. Second, topology is here employed to evoke the limits, potentials, and dynamics of a “fluid space” (Ingold 2011), a cosmological milieu in which we can imagine “a biology that starts from the fluid character of the life process, wherein boundaries are sustained only thanks to the continual flow of materials across them” (2011: 86); an idea that echoes Gilbert Simondon (2005), and subsequently much of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (see Combes [1999] 2013).
Many of the ideas here have also been stimulated by the kinds of complex topological distributions of relations that have surfaced in recent anthropological explorations of multispecies containment, contagion, and composition, both within indigenous Amazonia and elsewhere. Anticipated and inspired by the myriad convolutions of topological forms and biological species found in Claude Lévi-Strauss’ epic Mythologiques and their sequels, more recent regional ethnographic examples include Eduardo Kohn’s immersive analysis (2002, 2007) of interspecies ecosemiotics among the Ávila Runa of Ecuadorian Amazonia, Dimitri Karadimas’ exploration (2008) of the transspecies fertilization and composite mixtures of wasps and other species implicated in the emergence of the Yurupari ritual-musical complex in northwestern Amazonia, and Mauro Almeida’s evocation of the topological formation of ant nests from local phenomena in his description of the dissipative structures generated by the indigenous societies of the South American rainforest ([1990] 1999).1
Elsewhere, other recent works can be cited that have a direct relevance to the insect-related themes explored in the present text: these include Giovanni da Col’s analysis (2012b) of a dense topology of containerships and hostings of vital and fortunate energies, poisons, and parasites among Dechen Tibetans, seen through what he calls the elementary cosmoeconomics of life (2012a), and Anne Kelly’s study (2012) of mosquitos, experimental huts, and hosting vectors in Tanzania. All the above-cited works can be perceived as part of a much wider attempt to open up anthropological research to alternative semiotics and transcodifications beyond the symbolic (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987).
The article is structured as follows: in the next section I provide an ethnological overview of the Ikpeng, followed immediately by a recursive analysis of their self-depiction as an insect swarm. This leads into an account of the underwater initiation of the Ikpeng shaman and an extrapolation of some of its ethnological and theoretical implications. The next section expounds on the concept of the shaman as a filter trap for spirits by exploring the Ikpeng description of the cosmological origin of animal species from traps in the deep past, succeeded by the trap-like function of supernatural species anomalies, or yum, in the present: beings who alternately contain and release their animal progeny (our prey). Finally, in the last section I explore Ikpeng shamanic cosmology as an anticipation of future transformation into other species, and the idea of multiple simultaneous lives.


Ant-wasp swarm


Figure 1 : Ikpeng shamans waiting for the start of the moigu beer ritual. Photo by David Rodgers.

Today the Ikpeng number around 500 people split between two village sites in the Xingu Indigenous Park in central Brazil, a 26, 420 km2 area of transitional forest amid an extensive network of rivers and seasonally flooded lakes shared with fifteen other Amerindian peoples (see Franchetto and Heckenberger 2001). Prior to their transfer to this federally demarcated territory in the 1960s, they occupied a forest region to the immediate southwest of their present location, living in either malocas or mobile hunt camps situated mostly on small affluents of the middle and lower courses of the Jatobá and Ronuro Rivers. From these sites they launched seasonal surprise attacks on enemy groups in the Upper Xingu for many decades, what they describe as wasp raids (Menget 1977; Rodgers 2005). As the Ikpeng themselves trace back, their more remote ancestors came from much farther away, detaching at some point in time from a larger complex of Arara peoples— linguistically and culturally identified as a Carib subfamily (Menget 1977; Teixeira Pinto 1997; Meira and Franchetto 2005)—who were dispersed across an interfluvial region to the immediate south of the lower Amazon, a thousand kilometers farther north from their present location. Korotowɨ, one of the Ikpeng teachers, told me that based on oral history, he had managed to extend this trajectory back even farther to the valley of the Jari river, then and still today a region primarily home to peoples speaking Carib languages—along with Arawak, Tupi, Macro-Ge, Yanomami, and Pano, one of the major linguistic groupings of the Amazon region. Ikpeng culture contains numerous traces of these northern Carib and Arara connections. Like the Carib populations and other language groups of northern Amazonia, the Ikpeng are egalitarian, nonsegmentary, and primordially maloca-based with ideally equal relations between autonomous maloca or village settlements (Rivière 1984; also see Gallois 2005 and Albert 1988: 89 on a similar political structure among the nearby Yanomami). Subsistence activities involve a marked but not absolute sexual division of labor based around seasonally-defined short and long range hunting, fishing with small traps, weirs, and timbó vine poison, slash-burn swidden agriculture with a relocation of the main settlement every few years to avoid soil exhaustion, food and resource gathering over an extensively reconnoitered and gradually shifting territory, and, finally, ritual cycles that covered large networks of settlements and included distantly related groups as visitors in part responsible for catalyzing the initiation of local children (Jara 1996).
Culturally and linguistically the closest group to the Ikpeng today are the Arara of the lower Iriri River, the only other surviving population of the once much larger eponymous Arara complex (Teixeira Pinto 1997: 211–18; Menget 1977: 87–99). Similarly to the Arara, the Ikpeng produce a culinary synthesis of manioc and maize, including various kinds of breads, cakes, and beers from these crops, hold a roughly biannual ritual cycle focused on warfare, capture, and initiation (Arara, ieipari; Ikpeng, pomeri) and above all project a hunting and warrior ethos—shared by women as auxiliary participants—that includes or used to include the capture of animal and enemy offspring (egɨnom: pets): the prime motive for warfare, the Ikpeng say, was the abduction of young children to raise equally as their own as a substitute for dead kin.
Internal tensions can lead to the population splitting. However, as far back as the Ikpeng recall, they have always lived in either one or two groups, which would converge, mix, and split again after a few years. Notably this pulsation does not involve a doubling and later reabsorption of the identical, each cell an antagonized reflection of the other, but a symbiosis of the different that allows a certain elasticity: in the past, a split would leave one group continuing to live at a maloca site based around swiddens while the other would frequently become entirely mobile, living in shifting camp sites and focused on long-range hunting and warfare, exploring dense forest in search of populations of game and enemies, in periods lasting from months to several years (Rodgers 2005; also see Alexiades 2009 on the mobility of Amazonian populations).2 Today the same cellular division and reabsorption occurs in the run-up to the pomeri initiation ritual, held roughly every two years, when the entire Ikpeng population assembles and then splits again into a maloca-based section and a camp-based section that explores a sequence of hunting grounds and fishing sites for a period of one to two months. Unlike many egalitarian, semimobile, war-based indigenous peoples, therefore, the Ikpeng have so far always remained a cohesive block. This cohesion can also be traced to the Ikpeng solution to the difference and latent hostility introjected by the capture of enemies and the potential for inequality and segmentation to generate from this differential: as an equalization, all children, both Ikpeng-born and captives, are recaptured by warrior-hunters at the end of the pomeri ritual, prior to each
receiving the distinctive three-line facial tattoos and forming a bonded initiatory set (ukpomerin).
The above are all historically traceable “cultural elements,” then, of the kind detected and emphasized by Western anthropology, but how do they combine—if at all—into a self-organizing cultural-social system? Answering this question requires us to shift to imagining how the Ikpeng themselves imagine (and project) themselves. In fact the Ikpeng provide a very clear self-image as a seasonally modulated population, including the binary pulsation identified above, but inflected through insect behavior. Their autonym Ikpeng also names a composite of what Western science classifies as two distinct hymenopteran species, arayo ants and turum wasps. The ant and wasp types making up this mixed phylum are distinguished not so much by their individual morphologies—the body plans of the two insects, including their stings, are described by the Ikpeng as virtually identical3—but by their distinct ways of exploring and molding the forest habitat. While the preparatory ant phase alternates between nesting and swarming periods on the forest floor, equated4 by the Ikpeng with their own maloca building, foraging, and short hunting trips, the climatic wasp phase alternates between tree nesting and air swarming periods, equated with hunting camps and the hunting excursions or war raids launched from these camps. There is also another phase, though. As well as naming this amalgam of wasp and ant modes, the term ikpeng also refers to the pupal transformation between them. Encapsulated and secluded, this phase evokes two periods of hidden nurture and growth: female gestation and shamanic incubation. The pupal phase is called tɨwonpɨam, “virtual-wings,”5 applied to chrysalides, larvae, and pupae, but also the term used for the soft bird down that covers the heads of women and male shamans during the pomeri ritual.
The ethnonym ikpeng therefore expands into a complex diagram of their activities as a people: a periodic “nested” interval of seclusion, maturation, and metamorphosis, and a seasonal alternation between two “out-of-nest” swarming adult phases of wasps and ants. These phases are called egrɨ, the term for any tinymultiple animal found in swarms, from bees to the bacteria seen in microscopes. The morpheme egrɨ also appears appended to the name of drinks, such as wonkinom-egrɨ, “spirit drink.”6 Swarms are a liquid state of being, just as fermented liquids are brews imbued with minute swarming bodies. I return to the question of the Ikpeng as a swarming multiplicity later.
The combination of ants and wasps is, in fact, a prominent cosmological-ritual theme in northern Amazonia, a region to which the Ikpeng now trace their first emergence as a people. Live insects are applied to young people in various forms and for various purposes. Perhaps the most in-depth analysis is found in Fabiola Jara’s 1996 account of ecology and ritual among the Akuriyó, which describes the application of various kinds of ants and wasps during a child’s maturation, primarily for boys to develop the ability to see and locate game in the forest and in dreams as they turn into hunters. These practices culminate in the malaké initiation festival, widespread throughout the region.7 In these uses, ants and wasps appear as interstitial beings, above all predatory and exploratory en masse, swarming almost invisibly through the different layers of the forest ecosystem (where they make up the largest animal or mobile biomass8) and connecting other animals and plants through their (momentarily) destructive trails. Another modality is possible, though, that of the solitary wasp: predatory and parasitic, producing the idea of a transspecies fecundation, as Karadimas (2008) explores in his remarkable analysis of the Yurupari ritual complex of Northwestern Amazonia.
Live insects are not apparently used as a form of initiation among the Ikpeng, either singularly or collectively. Given the prevalence among northern Carib groups, this suggests a reconfiguration of the function of ants and wasps in their cosmology. As clues to this shift we can note the following: (1) the Ikpeng themselves become the live insects, conceptualized as their own seasonal modulation; (2) dead insects are used: to induce warrior qualities in young boys, including anger, speed, and imperceptibility, the Ikpeng burn empty wasp nests and rub the ash into shallow cuts made in the children’s arms and legs with piranha teeth; alternatively, dead ants may be crushed into a paste applied to the unbroken skin: in this case the strong sour aroma (ebragru) and burning sensation of the formic acid functions as the active ingredient; (3) the initiation of youths using insects becomes an initiation of younger children applying stinging facial tattoos (as among all other Arara groups) with one key active ingredient in the Ikpeng version: jatobá resin, a honey-like fluid that often comes laden with trapped insects; and finally (4) live stinging insects are included in the epic sequence of venomous insects, snakes, and fish responsible for killing and then awakening (initiating) the first made shaman, Imere, the storm god.
As a boy, Imere has an insatiable desire for honey. His father, exhausted and driven to distraction by the continual work of extracting this food, abandons Imere and his mother in the forest on yet another trip to fetch more. His mother dies, her arm trapped in a tree hole occupied by a bee’s nest, and Imere is left to wander lost and alone until adopted by his maternal kin, a type of bee. These answer his calls for help by killing him with their stings and reviving him the next morning by bathing him in the river at daybreak and painting him with red annatto dye (a transformational process involving river submersion and the application of an aromatic-cosmetic surface paint). After the bees, Imere continues his forest journey, meeting and being stung, killed and awoken by an increasingly toxic series of wasps, spiders, scorpions, centipedes, snakes, and finally electric eel, who offers to kill the prone Imere by whip-lashing him with a branch. But the sacrificial platform shatters. Finally the eel picks up the pestle used by his wife to pound maize and this time strikes Imere hard enough to kill him forever, the explosion causing his death-transformation into thunder. Imere immediately returns from the sky to take revenge on his father and his people for killing his mother. After destroying them with rain and lightning—which incidentally unleashes the first seasonal rainfall and burns the first swiddens—Imere abandons the living to embark on an epic journey to the east where the earth and sea meet, trailing the Amazon river in his wake and scattering technologies to all the Ikpeng enemies. At the point of sunrise he ascends and unfolds the dome of the inner sky world, kabo, populating its outer surface with half of the forest world’s talim or passerine birds, whose eyes shine down at us now as stars.
The myth explicates Imere’s trajectory from his overconsumption of honey (a preservative: the Ikpeng say honey is the only thing that never perishes) and abandonment to a maximal accumulation of “tiny deaths” caused by all the forest’s stinging creatures in sequence and an absorption of their potency, which takes the form of pɨanom, tiny arrows (darts)—also the term for shamans and shamanic auxiliaries (spirits). As Jean-Pierre Chaumeil notes in an article on pathogenic substances among various indigenous Amazonian peoples, insects are just one of the projectiles absorbed or injected into the body and responsible for causing sickness, a list in which he also includes darts, thorns, splinters of bone and wood, hair, fur, blades, glass shards, fish scales, stones, quartz crystals, bits of metal, teeth, and small birds, adding, “These little arrows are usually associated with the viscous fluids . . . which softly envelope them (Yagua) or in which they bathe (Jivaro) and which constitute in either case their embryonic or matricial form . . . an embryo conserved in a sort of amniotic fluid” (1995: 68–69; also see Colpron 2005: 116). This nurturing of darts in a womb-like environment also applies to the Ikpeng shaman. First, though, the novice shaman himself has to become the projectile immersed in a birthing liquid: more precisely, the small streams or lakes in which fish are spawned.


Inoculation

The simplest organism, the most elementary, is that which does not possess a mediate interior milieu, but only an absolute interior and exterior. For this organism, the characteristic polarity of life is found at the level of the membrane; it is here that life exists in an essential manner as an aspect of a dynamic topology that itself maintains the metastability through which it exists.
—Gilbert Simondon, “Topology and ontogenesis.”

Preparation for initiation begins with the boy9 aged five to six years avoiding strong, hot, and fat-laden foods and substituting this intake with a few “mild” birds, such as tinamous, a watery porridge made from dissolved manioc, bread, and—the main ingredient—various kinds of pfugu, a generic term for phytotherapeutic concoctions, in this case, plant root infusions.10 If initiation is begun at a later age— adolescence or early adulthood—the shamans produced are almost always predicted to be dangerous since the initiatory process will coincide with increased involvement in hunting and, in the past, warfare expeditions, and thus the inculcation of anger and a desire for revenge. This slow-fermenting rage curbs any talent for curing as it tends to lure precisely the wrong type of spirits: it produces sorcerers instead. If the boy is older, sexual activity should also cease since the body aromas repel the forest and sky beings—a contraindication that also applies to an initiate’s parents and siblings. A few days before initiation begins, the initiate is taken deeper into the forest to inhale the fumes from a sweet-smelling bonfire of tree saps and fruits, including jatobá and copaíba tree resins, plus the fruits of the pequi tree and tucumã palm. At this point the neophyte is emptied, all extraneous contacts curtailed to a minimum, and his body covered and filled only with aromatic fumes. The boy is smoke-cured: like the preserved game and fish stacked on smoking racks in the Ikpeng wokponga hunt camps, the initiate is placed in ontological suspension.
The first immersions take place near to dusk during a new moon and ideally continue until the final sessions are conducted at midnight under a full moon, like an anti–midday-sun.11 After selection of a secluded and deep stream or lake, the initiate dives under the water and holds onto a pole driven firmly into the streambed, looking up at the stream’s surface a few centimeters from his face. While in this position underwater, already initiated shamans on the bank tip burning jatobá resin—katepo-egru—from a gourd-like container roughly hewn from the tree’s bark (katepo-pitu), allowing this pungent “drink” of liquid fire to drip and strike the water surface just above his eyes. The visual ingestion induces bursts of dream imagery from the tšibo-erem or “resin owners,” which are multiple: fish, terrestrial spirits, sky people, thunder, the sun.12 At intervals the initiate swims away to surface and breathe, warming himself by a fire before returning to the water. As the jatobá resin fizzles in the water, its aroma attracts numerous aquatic species and stuns them, leaving them to float near the initiate in the dark and cold liquid in a semitorpid state. The first named as arriving is the electric eel, the demiurge Imere’s final shamanic instructor, followed by anaconda, stingray, river turtle, piranha, alligator, and four tiny shamanic fish species. Apparently dead but actually tongnore, “drunk/comatose,”13 the various aquatic beings fill the inner ears of the initiate with their tumtankom or “other-language.” This din is compounded by the sound of the resin sizzling on the water surface and the approach of Imere, lured by the onset of initiation and angered by the killing of the river fauna, albeit temporarily.
The lightning also attracts another being: wot-imɨ, “fish-patrix,” the source of all fish, which are seasonally released and recaptured through his mouth. This inner populous is outwardly refracted in his multicolored shining scales, combining the colors and patterns of every piscine species. The fish-patrix also falls into a coma from the resin and is hooked out of the stream under his gills by the shamans on the shore. After scraping off and setting aside some of the sticky agyuru film covering his scales, they release him back in the water. The initiate surfaces to breathe and returns under the water in cycles for several hours, until finally emerging from the river, cold, exhausted, and now covered too in a translucent agyuru membrane, likened by the Ikpeng to the epidermal coatings of certain tree species and newborn babies (vernix caseosa). This is mixed with the pungent remnants of jatobá resin semidissolved in the water. Highly irritant, this fragile “fish-skin” (wot-pitu) is nevertheless left intact until the emerged initiate dries out in the night air. Contact with the initiate’s body surface is kept to a minimum, his limbs remaining semiparalyzed and outstretched, his body trembling, his eyes blinded with river water and resin, and his ears still deafened by the din produced by the aquatic beings and storm. The initiate’s emergence from the water is a birth after death (after life), the initiate almost dead—or more exactly almost dead still, just like newborn infants, his skin pale-yellow, sealed by a membranous film with all sensory input diminished and only the acoustic chaos in his ears still reverberating. The novice has become a container for noise, another kind of flute, hollowed out and echoing with inspiration from external agents.
The storm passes and the initiate revives, while the various species in the water also reawaken and disperse. Slowly the noise in the initiate’s ears distils into intelligible sound, musicalized language, the novice shaman’s first absorption of wonkin-eremrɨ, “animal-spirit-music.” Through this extreme somatic and sensory closure—with mouth and nose sealed, eyes filled with water and fire, and submerged in an alien element, the subaquatic world—the initiate becomes an instrument for auscultating the usually inaudible or unintelligible language of other species. In fact the submerged shaman also evokes another kind of instrument dispersed throughout indigenous South America: the “diabolical gourd” used by demons to capture humans (Lévi-Strauss [1966] 1973: 447–49). The initiate can be imagined, then, as an inversion of the dry funeral gourd rattle, whose hidden seeds store and reverberate with the anger of the future living Ikpeng and precipitate revenge warfare: the neophyte shaman becomes the trembling liquid container for the rage of hunted animals.14 This fervor is musicalized: here Melobo added: “His inner ears are full of people now.” After initiation, the shaman begins to be able to hear the spirits of various animal and fish species, allowing his first acquisition of eremrɨ, “songs/music,” a melodic contamination subsequently caught during dreams or overheard while wandering through the forest. The spirits and the shaman become acoustically transparent to each other.
The new shaman attains the function-state of a container or trap: a vacuum waiting to be filled. Floating submerged in the nocturnal stream—like an air-filled flute or gourd pushed down into the water, counteracting his buoyancy as a still living and breathing body—and wrapped in an unseen aquatic population, the novice emerges from the water inoculated by an invisible population of pɨanom shaman-spirits. This inoculation enables his capture in dreams of the voices/music and images emitted by populations of other beings in the forest and subaquatic layers, which in turn allows his interpellation of these beings: calling them and trying to persuade them to act as he wants. These inoculi15 now swirling in his stomach are a population of sting-like spirit eyes that allow him to see and kill game and enemies in the forest at a distance. Finally, shamanic initiation produces another capacity. After carefully removing the dried film on his skin, the initiate is bathed and then painted with shaman annatto, a fragrant concoction made from small quantities of annatto and other fruit extracts and tree saps, combined with the agyuru mucus scraped off wot-imɨ and the initiate himself. Application of this mixture anticipates the shaman’s future technique of spreading annatto paste over a patient’s skin, helping him to remove the alien elements—tiny darts, the pɨanom of enemy shamans, and other hostile beings—hidden deep inside the patient.


Blood supplement

In sorcery, blood is of the order of contagion and alliance.
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A thousand plateaus

One hot afternoon in 2006, as I was sat sharing the contents of a plastic jar of diluted wild honey with Karaiva, too drowsy to give much thought to asking anything in particular, we drifted into talking about the river lines on a satellite map spread out on the table in front of us, and from there to Karaiva’s close encounter with a demon glimpsed running through the forest, and then to the place where he had been initiated into shamanism. After locating the lake used in the Jatobá region, I asked him about female shamans, attempting to clarify a fuzzy notion I had picked up some days earlier that women could, perhaps, become shamans via water initiation too. Karaiva—one of the two living water-initiated (male) shamans— confirmed they could. What he added completely surprised me, though. Telling me about Atšipi, one of two female shamans who had lived in the Jatobá region, he explained that soon after her birth and the subsequent birth of her placenta-twin, after she had been bathed in water scooped from a gourd, her mother had dripped a small mount of blood from her placenta into her eyes. This was mixed with a plant root extract (pfugu) and squeezed from carefully soaked cotton, to avoid causing the blood to spill from the corner of her eye-lids and run down her face, which would have scalded her cheeks, marking her for life.16 The newborn Atšipi then slept for days. After opening her eyes again, she would—just like any other infant—see people around here unseen by her parents: wonkinom spirits. In her case, though, these other people/spirits did not eventually vanish into the invisible over time: the placental blood counteracted the effect of breast milk, and later solid food, in filtering out these spirits from her perception. She had started becoming— or perhaps not stopped being—a shaman.17
Dripping placental blood into a newborn girl’s eyes and using it as a shamanizing liquid echoes the fabrication of various kinds of sorcery poisons from menstrual blood, a pharmacology derived from Kantawo, the first sorcerer, in turn learned from hummingbird, mempui, with its dart-like velocity. As Luisa Elvira Belaunde shows in her survey of hematology in indigenous Amazonia (2006), blood is also conceived as a powerful aromatic intoxicant, luring predators and provoking the desire to kill or have sex—in Ikpeng, both the same verb: wo, “to shoot with arrows”—and a powerful catalyst, hinting at a kind of molecular cannibalism precipitated via the blood stream.


Anomalies

Every Animal has its Anomal. That is: every animal taken in its pack or multiplicity has its anomal.
—Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A thousand plateaus



Figure 2 : Jaguar spots (ocelli): eyes, paw-prints, swarms, and circled packs (or pack-circled prey). In Ikpeng cosmology, these patterns evoke akari-enman, “jaguar-path,” the Milky Way, the trail of stars leading to the inner sky world. Drawing: Nina West (in Stone 2011: 111).

The idea of catalytic blood appears too in the myth of bat and stingray, archetypical blood consumer and blood container in the Americas (Lévi-Strauss [1971] 1981). The Ikpeng also refer to this narrative describing the first emergence of animals as wonkinom muran, “spirit talk.”

Bat and Stingray (rere tšiwan muran)
Bat and his accomplices are fascinated by his mother-in-law, Stingray, owner of a pendulously large and enticing vulva. [Here the narrator cups his hands and places them between his legs, slapping them together while making a sloshing sound, causing his listeners to laugh out loud.] He decides to kill her in the forest. Leaving the maloca secretly, he heads off to a distant camp. There he fakes various signs of lots of people having occupied the site: bits of honeycomb, burnt-out fires, fish bones, and so on. He then returns to the maloca. Everyone else has actually hidden, but he tells his mother-in-law they have all left on a timbó fishing trip and that they will catch up with them later. Bat and Stingray leave and eventually arrive at the specially prepared forest campsite. There she looks, puzzled, at all the debris. Bat tells her all the other people will return soon enough. Meanwhile he promises to catch lots of fish for her while she makes them some manioc bread. Bat goes off to set his ensorcelled kanai traps in a stream nearby. As he sets each trap, he imitates the sound of an animal and tells the trap to repeat it. Eventually a long line of traps extends all the way downstream to a canoe port where he sets the final trap, this time in silence. He returns at dusk, empty-handed. They eat the bread and settle down to an uneasy night. Stingray is nervous about sleeping in an isolated tract of forest. As she begins to fall asleep, the traps start to emit their animal cries one by one. Bat shakes her awake, shouting “wonkin, ime!” “spirits are here, mother!” She opens her eyes, startled, and hears the weird animal sound for the first time. After a while the night falls silent and she dozes once more. All quiet. Then another cry: this time, a jaguar roar. Bat shakes her again and she listens. Again the trap falls quiet and Stingray eventually drifts off to sleep. All night long, the traps yell out the squeals, cries, and roars of all the future animals, as yet unseen until, finally, Bat shakes his mother-in-law but she fails to awaken. She lies in an exhausted deep sleep. He smiles. Lighting a small fire to illuminate the camp, he takes a snake tooth (mori) and slices off Stingray’s big vulva, killing her instantly. Deliriously happy, he cups his bloody trophy to his nose [elated despite being alone, as the narrator explains]. He can’t wait for morning to rush back to the maloca. He places the vulva over a fire to smoke dry.
Dawn soon arrives. He buries Stingray and heads off back to the maloca. There he tells his wife, Stingray’s daughter, that her mother choked to death on a fish. She is angry, guessing what really happened, but everyone else is delighted. They decide to make paint from Stingray’s vulva. So they collect annatto dye, inajá palm oil, charcoal, and so on, and mix all these up with the pulverized and bloody vulva. It makes a big vat full of paint. Dusky titi monkey says he will apply the designs. Whitelipped peccary is the first in line. He is painted all over and then he swallows some of the paint. Yabuga cries “koga, orukuka, kinenpom!” “transform, try it out, show me!” and then startles peccary. As he takes flight, he runs around, squealing and crashing about in the undergrowth, enjoying all this greatly: “it’ll do!” As the first to be designed, he also acquires a special dorsal gland emitting a strong smell, produced by rubbing Stingray’s vulva over his haunch. Next come tayra, coati, otter, agouti, paca, dove, and all the other animals and birds, each acquiring its special paint design, behavior, aroma, and dung (from the swallowed paint). Then each animal has its teeth implanted using arrow tips. The last in line is capybara. He is scared of the pain and, unable to persuade him to be brave, the others fetch manioc stalks and stick them in his mouth (explaining why capybara’s teeth break easily). Finally they make a strong brew of bitter plant roots to drink. This explains why animals take a long time to die. Parrots, though, vomited up their potion and so keel over very easily.

The emergence of animals makes explicit the differentiation of their bodies through designs, behavior (or affects in the Deleuzian/Spinozian sense), aroma, and dung: all induced by the blood paint, either applied on the surface or eaten, metabolized, and excreted. The stingray vulva paint functions as a catalyst for transformation: a “menstruum” or “universal solvent,” in the ancient alchemic sense. As Eduardo Viveiros de Castro notes in a widely cited section of his seminal text on perspectivism (1998: 478), the body throughout indigenous Amazonia appears to be differentiated not through morphology (form) but through precisely these affective qualities. And this makes these differentiating qualities highly transmissible and potentially contagious, especially across species. We return to this point later. For the Ikpeng this “paint affect” involves the shaping of a kind of proto-species body mass: imnu, flesh, pulp, a plasma in the cellular sense (cytoplasm, ectoplasm, and so on). Macro body structure—skeletal form—is not taken as a differentiating factor of species: instead it also indicates a panspecies potential, but here as a woven architectural assemblage, like a maloca, basket, or nest, which secures divergent elements under tension: what the Ikpeng call an ebru. Not coincidentally this term for tensile nesting structure is also applied to the Ikpeng maloca leader who works (via his voice) to keep its population from dispersing. Traps, baskets, woven pouches, nests, and malocas or other kinds of shelter, generically labeled ewrɨ in Ikpeng, all invoke the body as the container of a multiple population, a trap space with the potential to acquire other bodies: indeed this is another prominent Carib theme (see Guss 1989; Matarezio Filho 2010). This is not merely a symbolic connection: Ikpeng shamans also make yukutpot baskets to be thrown into the river to turn into either fish or predators.
But what about the traps in the myth? Invisible in the dark, supposedly empty but emitting the hollow cries of wonkin spirits, they have a distinctly haunting air. Like the novice shaman and the Ikpeng bamboo flutes, the traps filter the river to produce sounds, an opening and closing mouth. In this respect they are also just like the supernatural owners of species, who the Ikpeng describe as continually capturing and releasing their progeny through their mouths (a kind of being found across the indigenous South American lowlands: see Fausto 2008). One of the most prominent species owners is abiana-imɨ, white-lipped-peccary-father, a minute version of a peccary who contains all the new peccaries within him, releasing them (or gathering them) with a cry of his mouth. All the species owners named by the Ikpeng appear as strange versions of their offspring, a feature that approximates them to other kinds of species anomalies. The Ikpeng possess an extensive body of knowledge concerning the rainforest, cerrado, and river ecosystems and their fauna. Nonetheless, sometimes new species variants are encountered. When this occurs, the species is usually approximated to an already known species and named through the addition of the suffix -yum (as in terengyum, the name given to the European honey bee, only recently arrived in the Xingu region). The suffix functions, then, as a filter for absorbing new variants into the Ikpeng lexicon. However this suffixation also carries a deep sense of danger: all other kinds of yum beyond these new additions (which are held in suspicion) refer to highly dangerous predators, such as tunan-yum, “capybara-monster,” or malula-yum, “giant-armadillo-monster.” The convergence of these two suffixes, imɨ and yum, becomes clear when we compare them with cognates from other Cariban languages, where curiously they seem to be the opposite way round. The Wayana suffixes, for example, are the symmetrical opposites: yum indicates a “species-father” (Hurault 1968: 16), while imɨ denotes an “enormous” or “monstrous” form of a certain species (van Velthem 1995: 41). Lévi-Strauss in the example cited earlier notes that the Carib-speaking Kalina call the stingray ereimo, which breaks down as ere, liver + imo, “used to form the names of dangerous animals” ([1971] 1981: 550–51), associating the liver and menstrual blood, and reflecting what he calls the stingray’s “uterus function” in Amerindian cosmologies (see also Waiwai imo, “epic,” “huge”: Fock 1963). Condensing these types of anomaly, therefore, we can identify a particular sequence of qualities: new and unknown, anomalous, shamanic, dimensionally volatile (alternately tiny/looming scales), and paternal or sometimes maternal.
Whatever their gender, which may simply be ambiguous and variable, these anomalous species-parents are encountered elsewhere in Amazonia in various guises identifiable under formulae such as “the owners of species” or “masters of animals.” As Luiz Costa and Carlos Fausto observe (2010: 99), the ethnological literature on human and supernatural owners, “a position involving control and/or protection, engendering and/or possession,” is now expanding.18 Although the Ikpeng do not use their own term for owner (oro) for these beings, the Portuguese dono is freely used and clearly the Ikpeng shamanic anomaly can be included as another example of the same kind of owner. However, my present interest is not in pursuing either a sociological or a sociocosmological analysis of the (species) owner. Instead I wish to reverse the polarity of the analysis and try to extrapolate the cosmological dimensions of all owners as shamanic or shaman-like beings, a concept for which the term anomaly seems to me more adequate. In particular, it helps stress the emergence of the anomalous owner from a population of equals, a pack, or swarm, including the multitude of beings in the primal cosmological time from which all the species anomalies (owners) first emerged: as the Ikpeng insist, these beings were all pɨat-pe, shamanic. Throughout Amazonia, these anomalous owner beings display a highly complex topology often linked to the placenta or uterus (the latter in Ikpeng being tenpano ewrɨ, “people nest”). Writing about the Jivaro, for example, Taylor observes, “during its life, game . . . assumes a male or female form derived from a closed and in principle permanent stock of singular recyclable appearances. Here this reservoir takes the form of a shapeless creature called the ‘game mother’ (kundiniu nukuri), a kind of prototypical exouterus where the temporarily vacant silhouettes cluster” (2000: 323; also see Descola 1986: 124 and 317). Inside, the being is a swarm, a multiplicity peering through the porous boundary of a singularity. In fact, this image recurs throughout indigenous Amazonia, an enveloping container-like structure with multiple internal/external components (the inner-outer ambiguity is intrinsic) that works primarily by filtration, an idea that in turn implies immersion in some kind of fluid ambient: the river-spanning dam made from the mythic-ancestral body of Dokoyi with his catch of multitudes of fish (Enawene Nawe: Mendes dos Santos 2006); the “exo-uterus” of the mother-of-game filled with her recycling stock of prey-progeny (Jivaro); the terrestrial Ayaraetii being with his giant gourd rattle filled with captured souls, doomed to eat honey for eternity (Araweté: Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992: 82); the vagina-glove-spirit-woman filled with ants used to sting initiates (Sateré-Mawé: Figueroa 1997); the ayahuasca designs of the anaconda woman, owner of the drug, outside and inside the drinker’s stomach like the fetus containing itself with its own bodily contents (Piro: Gow 1999: 236–37); the fish-patrix with his skin glittering with the scales of all possible fish species (Ikpeng). Examples can be readily found throughout the South American lowlands. Each can be conceived as an anomaly containing a pack or swarm of elements immersed within a fluid ambient, the outer surface of the filter trap covered with brilliant and complex designs of the contents within (see too Fortis 2010 on “amniotic designs” among the Kuna). All these examples imply that sexual reproduction is inserted within a much more ample biocosmological notion of any population’s inception and continuation, founded primarily on abduction and adoption. Put otherwise, biological reproduction of the species is always preceded by capture of the exotic, the absorption of another species or kind, a viral element that can contaminate and reconfigure the whole and function, design-like, as its outer limit. This is what Deleuze and Guattari describe as the anomal, the border or limit of a multiplicity ([1980] 1987: 244–45). And it is precisely this anomal(y)-pack configuration that seems to me absent from the repertoire of concepts for what ethnology labels social organization.


Pets and evolution
Like most other Amazonian peoples, the Ikpeng population is continually supplemented by an influx of pets or captives19 (the name is the same, egɨnom): these are stray, abandoned, and orphaned samples from other populations, caught and raised from a young age, an influx of “ready-mades,” including parrots, macaws, monkeys, cats, enemies, flutes, researchers, ducks, and chickens, shamanic paraphernalia composed of stones, rodent skulls, and bits of pelt, glass, and mirror, owls, turtles, gulls, and occasionally other less tamable exotica, such as jaguar cubs, spirits, and capybaras—the latter examples suggest a kind of testing of what is already anticipated as impossible. In fact, capture and taming are inherently mutual, two-way attempts at living together. Not only do these captives have to become accustomed to their new people (in Ikpeng: uku: to taste, experiment, adapt, become), the latter have to prove compatible with the captive—a double flow of affective-behavioral adaptation that reveals the dynamic instability of the captorcaptive encounter. Failed and aborted attempts at taming actually seem to equal or outnumber the successful. This failure can indeed be taken as an inevitable quality of “pet-ness” since even long-term captives only ever remain provisionally so: pets remain wild for life, always prone to turning feral or escaping—and, as various myths illustrate, capable of turning the entire captor population into their own kind in their wake through a process of contagion.
One afternoon one of the women in the maloca where I was staying, Agiwo, called me over to see her pet owl and, laughing gleefully, pointed out how it was walking backward across the ground like an Ikpeng dancer. As she explained another day, though, the Ikpeng dances are themselves traceable to tayra (a weasel-like animal that races along logs and up trees), oropendola (a bird that weaves its nests to hang upside down from branches in large colonies) and especially coati (a raccoon-like animal able to climb down trees head first), the latter having shown all the other animals how to dance. As the mythic narratives on the first appearance of various animals exemplify, these distinctive bodily traits emerge from desires rather than vice versa. For example, it is not the anteater’s body that contains and induces the desire to eat ants: it is the anteater’s excessive hunger for ants—excessive to us— its relish or craving for the insects, that instills a sensibility to ant smells, habitats, and movements, and produces the animal's long snout and sticky tongue for scooping up ants and termites, along with its large claws for uprooting tree trunks and breaking down nests. I deliberately use the present tense here, “instills” and “produces,” since this is an on-going evolution of a body adapted—or still adapting—to a primal desire (for ants). In fact, the Ikpeng explicitly formulate this evolutionary theory as the antithesis of the Western biological theory of speciation. At a forest camp on the Jatobá River, one evening in 2006, Aire, an elder woman, was rapidly butchering three spider monkeys with a knife, having first hurled the bodies to the ground like a clutch of dispatched enemies. Watching Aire, Yakuma suddenly turned round and remarked: “You tupi think we evolved from animals. But you’re mistaken: the animals evolved from us.” The animals have left us behind as green, raw people, untransformed, unborn as yet to the future.
If pets are captured as isolates of other populations (and samples of the future), we too can be lured and caught in similar fashion, especially when alone. Singularized people exude a kind of connective vacuum and thus a highly seductive systemic potential: the isolate is a potential captive—mathematically not a one but a minus-one. As numerous Ikpeng myths illustrate, lost beings act as strange attractors. Isolation entails exposure to the risk of being abducted and absorbed by others of any kind (as Taylor 1993 writes on the Jivaro). This exposure through isolation coexists with the desire for autonomy, exemplified by the solitary hunter—but it is precisely this reduction to a pure singularity alone in the forest that appears to maximize the danger of a catastrophic loss of volition. Although this danger is in some senses diffuse, hunters often mention their close encounters with a forest siren called Enoy. Living in the bole of a tree, she lures isolated hunters toward her with her weird, compulsive singing. Yet these incidents are not exactly accidents: her arrival in the vicinity of the hunter is induced by his daydreaming about a lover as he treks through the forest in pursuit of animal tracks. More often he hears just her haunting voice and returns to the settlement or camp site immediately, recounting this near event to others with a kind of wry trepidation: ɨwompɨn enoy, “I almost encountered Enoy.” But if he actually responds to her allure and approaches, he finds her lying beneath a tree with her legs apart, displaying her large vulva and abundant pubic hair. If he attempts to have sex, the hunter discovers too late that her body is in disarray: she lacks a vagina, and in place of a navel, she has another mouth that consumes the hunter, turning him into a being “just like her,” living in her tree-world. A reverse birth or implosion. The hunter’s deathly absorption is thus not into a singularity, but into a plurality which manifests as singular. Consequently, although Enoy appears as a single female—petkom arak, “woman-like”—she actually conforms to a species phenomenon, a latency in the forest.
The formula used for this kind of weird near encounter is iwompɨn, “to almost meet.” The term is frequently used to describe near encounters with other dangerous but elusive beings, wonkin, including jaguars, snakes, anacondas, and an assortment of predatory species anomalies (capybara-yum, opossum-yum, armadillo-yum, and so on). As a noun rather than verb, iwompɨn is also the term for the placenta and umbilical cord (conceived as a single continuum), while the navel of the newborn is called iwolɨ, “encountered.” The name reflects the placenta’s twinlike approximation to the newborn’s body: the placenta is buried in the same way as any twin was in the past (always the second to be born) and for the same motive: both twin and placenta imply a dangerous exposure of the newborn’s soul. The placenta is buried in the blood-stained birthing hammock, directly beneath the mother’s sleeping area, where it remains buried long after the Ikpeng have moved on, but also remains susceptible: any interference or destruction of the placenta can cause harm to its living half, implying a kind of entanglement in the quantum sense, an instantaneous communication of effect or affect between the split elements. This connection between the placenta and the living body persists throughout life and, in this sense, the placenta merges with the dream. Dreams (ongyetum) are anticipations of future events, the future irrupting into the present.20
Our waking lives are just one of the potential after-echoes of our dream experiencees. Dreams therefore involve the same kind of almost-meetings or quasiencounters, iwompɨn, as forest skirmishes with jaguars and other wonkin. This dreamed future is also almost always assumed to be imminent. As among the Ávila Runa (Kohn 2002: 187), the looming of this dream-presence—like sensing a twin in the darkness of the womb—involves a particular temporal sequence: night-to-day or dream-to-awake, which can be contrasted, for example, with the awake-to-dream sequence found in the classical and contemporary Western explanations of nocturnal dreams as the after-glow, or “residual cognitive echoes,” of daytime events.21 As we can note, the dream-awake sequence also matches the sequence of nocturnal river flow and the emergence of differentiated animals from the fish traps in the Stingray and Bat myth, hinting at the subliminal ongoing evolution of animals and other beings from ourselves, made pointedly explicit by Yakuma as another cosmological science to our own.
So what does this (to us) apparently back-to-front temporality imply? Here a moment of linguistic analysis is required. The formula “almost meet” contains the suffix -pɨn, which typically implies an event that almost happened (translated by the Ikpeng into Portuguese as “quase aconteceu”). Applied to nouns, the same suffix can indicate “ex,” as in etšit-pɨn, an old campsite, or panana ewrɨ-pɨn, an empty banana crate, but it can also indicate “virtual” or “future” as in tɨwonpɨam, the term for bird down, tɨ+won+pɨam [plural form], “future wings.” So as a temporal-modal marker, pɨn translates as both past and future state, suggesting that these modalities can be more accurately assigned to the virtual or almost, something nonactualized but still actualizable. This state of the quasi-event—taken as an event that seemed would or will happen but has not (yet)—is echoed by the anomaly (yum) as a strange species variant, a specimen that seems like a typical example of a species but diverges in some slight but telling way: in both instances, we are dealing with a kind of haunting prior to abduction, or what the Ikpeng would describe as potential soul-loss (see Vilaça [2006] 2010 on accounts of jaguar abductions among the present-day Wari’).


Plasma
So far I have used the terms body, soul, and world unremarked. Undoubtedly one of the main points of consensus in indigenous South American ethnology since the 1980s has been the centrality of the body in indigenous sociocosmologies (already delineated in the seminal text by Seeger, DaMatta, and Viveiros de Castro 1979). As Aparecida Vilaça (2005) observes, two images of the body seem to emerge from the literature: on one hand, the body as a point of stabilization and connection between kin, the nucleus of a local group, with shared food becoming shared substance and fabricating an extended body of kin; on the other hand, an image of the body as a point of destabilization, containing a undesired potential—or a desired capacity—for metamorphosis. This is what Vilaça describes as the chronic instability of the Amazonian body, a condition that, as she emphasizes, is implicit in the idea very of ceaselessly making bodies: “the [Amazonian] idea of a body under continual fabrication contains in itself the notion of transformation” (2005: 459).22
This analysis of stabilization and the ever-present possibility of metamorphosis obviously applies perfectly to Ikpeng accounts of their future selves and other beings. A problem arises here, though. While trying to develop my linguistic research a bit more systematically than usual by compiling a lexicon, a number of the Ikpeng told me that their own language has no word for body—or for world: referring here to the Portuguese corpo and mundo. This seems to imply the (desired) absence of any kind of organic totalization.23 At the same time, the Ikpeng have very readily appropriated and adapted two other concepts from Portuguese— alergia (allergy) and vitamina (vitamin)—to refer, respectively, to the effects of contraindicated foods and behaviors, and to their own remedies (pfugu). Both of these examples involve what we would identify as a molecular interaction between body and world. The apparent conceptual gap identified by the Ikpeng themselves in remarking on the absence of these two concepts could be simply ignored as trivial, or filled with what seems a near-equivalent in the other language and the problem assumed to be adequately resolved. Taking my cue from the Ikpeng, though, what interests me here, and in general in terms of trying to produce ethnographic theory (da Col and Graeber 2011), are the concepts that can emerge as provisional and improvised solutions in the absence of our own metaconcepts (Strathern 1988: 11). Here I propose the following partial solutions to the (positively marked) absence of body and world, which filter through four Ikpeng concepts:


Figure 3 : No body, no world.

(1) Our totalizing concept of world turns into an enveloping but limited combination of a shamanic anomaly and a surrounding milieu (etšit), the zone of influence of this shamanic being: in effect, an open (boundless) world with multiple population containing-and-emitting singularities: what Deleuze and Guattari call a nomad, supple, or smooth space ([1980] 1987; also see Ingold 2011 for discussion of these terms); (2) The concept of the body turns into a two-phase notion of plasma. The Ikpeng in fact sometimes use imnu as a translation of body, especially in relation to medical treatment, indicating the body (flesh) as a passive receptor. However as the Ikpeng imply by declaring the absence of the concept of body in their language, there is something else missing from our own concept: the Ikpeng body as an active multiplicity. I therefore suggest the term plasma as a translation of the Ikpeng terms imnu and egrɨ (liquid swarm) since the biological and physical associations of plasma—either as a viscous cellular and intercellular fluid, or as a high-energy state of matter (after the states of solid, liquid and gas)—together imply precisely this kind of dual modality: the Ikpeng population as a kind of low-energy body of kin, visible, life-size, molar, formed through food sharing, especially the distribution of game meat, fish, and manioc products, comparable to the bulk and slow speed of tapirs and sloths (both of which are tenpano, or people, to us too, rather than just tenpano to themselves); and the Ikpeng population as a high-energy, molecular state, attained in ritual, warfare, and shamanic trance: a nearinvisible swarm. As we have seen in the exploration of the autonym ikpeng, this is precisely how they project themselves.


Quasi-topologies and multiple life
Although the river or lake submergence involved in the Ikpeng initiation of the novice shaman appears to be unique in indigenous South America, and perhaps way beyond, the idea of transformation following immersion in flowing, turbulent, or effervescent water, and the application of a new, vibrant skin surface after emergence, does appear in the cosmologies of many other Amerindian peoples, especially the entry of the dead into the afterlife: the Wari’, for example, describe the cooking, eating, recomposition, and revitalizing bathing of the dead after their arrival in the subaquatic world, from where they subsequently climb up to the water surface and into the forest as peccaries (Vilaça [2006] 2010: 157). Among the Araweté the dead arriving in the sky are cooked by the gods and the remains of the soul-body later revived in a bath of effervescent water (Viveiros de Castro [1986] 1992: 211 ).24 Ikpeng thanatology is a little different since while the cannibalism remains, the revitalization is absent: the inner sky, the postmortem destiny of all nonshamans, is inhabited by spirits who eat the dead as they arrive, both ourselves and tapirs (also people like us), transforming us people (tšimna) into the same amorphous spirit-mass as themselves, a celestial hell where everyone is a stranger to everyone else, forever. Notably the inner sky is described as rotten under foot, as though in a permanent state of biological decomposition: the dead spirits have to walk around on tree trunks to avoid falling into the litter and slime.25 This ceaseless putrification amounts to a disconnection: unlike on the forest floor here below, nothing new, however alien, ever emerges from this process and there is no communication between the aimlessly wandering celestial spirits and the terrestrial Ikpeng.
If death is an informational black hole, prebirth is comparable to the other side of the depths of a whirlpool. These are identified by the Ikpeng as portals into and out of the subaquatic world, itself inhabited by new/green (enu) beautiful spirits, once taken to be the source of their enemies and thus many of those people captured by the Ikpeng during warfare in the past (Menget 1977; Rodgers 2005), as well as being the adobe of numerous kinds of other spirits. It is these beings and the forest spirits that the Ikpeng say a newborn infant continues to see after birth, becoming invisible only with parental feeding and the fixation of the infant’s volatile soul in its slowly nurtured and molded body (at least while awake: when asleep, everyone’s soul wanders again, recollected or experienced lucidly as dreams).
The whirlpool as an effervescent source of spirits and enemies, the shaman’s initiation with jatobá resin in the spirit-infested river or lake, and the first appearance of animal voices and bodies from the combination of fish traps and stingray blood all implicate a set of cosmological factors for the emergence of any population within a constant flux of differential elements. This image seems to me highly evocative of Simondon’s formulation of the “topology of ontogenesis” (2005), the biophysiological processes involved in the simultaneous individuation of a singularity and a contained population—such as a multicelullar organism with other cells captured inside—from a preindividual milieu of elements and forces, but reimagined within the parameters of an Amerindian transformational cosmology (Désveaux 2001). Adapting Simondon’s ideas, then, the river birth of the shaman can be seen to involve a strange (for us) kind of genesis: an ontogenesis were the individual organism’s development leads to a sudden phylogenesis (the shaman becoming the anomalous container of a new mixed phylum) and the shaman’s own capture by the original phyla of these captured elements: the shaman’s soul is itself captured by the spirits from the forest and aquatic worlds, living with them, through a process of entanglement (see above).


Figure 4 : Shamanic transformation (inoculation and entanglement)

Obviously Simondon’s description of ontogenesis itself emerges completely transformed by its transplantation into an indigenous Amazonian milieu. As the split in the diagram above indicates, one factor in Ikpeng cosmology—and perhaps in Amazonian cosmologies in general—completely alters the conditions of this schema of individuation: we can live multiple lives simultaneously.26 As we have seen, the internalization of forest spirits within the shaman’s body demands an extreme input of differential elements, combined with intense catalytic ambiental conditions, and produces a complex output of topological (encapsulating) forms or populations connected by the same process apprehended from different points: inoculation, the containment and nurture of a swarm of tiny pɨanom, “shamandarts,” that combine the functions of visualization (as forest eyes) and predation (as arrows), and entanglement, the live capture of elements as pets from another population that still live with their source population. Both of these—inoculation and entanglement—form part of a two-way process that involves the spirit living with the shaman’s people or the shaman living with the spirit’s peoples. Although entirely exotic to Western cosmological science and philosophy, this kind of dual or multiple-living is actually a pervasive feature of shamanic cosmologies in Amazonia and beyond, manifest either in the form of animal doubles, or their equivalent. As among the Yanomami, this may be all pervasive with everyone having an animal double (Albert 1988: 91),27 or it may appear more sporadically and incidentally through soul capture and alliances between shamans and spirit spouses,28 which often include the production of “swapped offspring” between both these entangled populations: animal spirit children born and living among us people (see L. Costa 2007: 335 on spirit children among the Kanamari), or our children been fathered by shamans (or captured) and living among animals and other beings (see for example Belaunde 2006: 145 on dolphin children)—in sum, an interspecies fertilization (Karadimas 2008) and a transversal genetics. In all cases these multiple lives involve the capture of soul-bodies: called egaronpɨn in Ikpeng, meaning shadow, reflection, echo, reflex, the soul is also defined as imnu eram, “true flesh,” echoing a description made by Iokore, an Ikpeng teacher, of spirits as the “true living beings.” And it is precisely these soul-losses that the Ikpeng shaman works to recapture, enabled through his or her own spirit inoculation and entanglement: the shaman functions as a metastable system, a quasi-topology of connections and recaptures composing and containing a local population.
In this article I have tried to allow the influx of Ikpeng concepts and ethnographic-analytic theorems to reach a certain saturation point in order for the milieu of “coconcepts” linked to any particular concept to begin resonate with their own connections (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994). One of the problems in a lineal exposition of Ikpeng shamanic initiation is precisely how to conjure the flow and combination of elements involved in what is simultaneously a climatic process and a mere moment in the shaman’s evolution (see Perrin 1986: 109, 119–20; also Losonczy 1990). These catalytic elements would be something like the following: darkness, moon glimpsed underwater, burning jatobá resin, seeping residue, electric eel, storm, fish anomaly, congealing skin, and so on. Stunned by the jatobá resin, thrown in the nocturnal lake water like timbó poison, the new shaman feels what it is like to be killed as a fish. And then what it is like to wake up as the container for a swarm of other people.


Acknowledgments
This article explores the concepts of the Ikpeng anomaly, insect swarm and shamanic initiation originally contained in a text published in Portuguese (Rodgers 2002) and some of the ideas contained in a more theoretical paper presented at ANPOCS 2004 (Rodgers 2004), kindly read for me in my absence by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, who I also thank for a later conversation on the topics introduced in these papers, including the idea of almost/quasi explored in the final sections of the present article. My special thanks to the HAU reviewers and editors, as well as Patrick Menget, Bruna Franchetto, and Rosângela Tugny for their support at various critical moments. Finally my unbounded thanks to the Ikpeng for their own boundless welcome and patience with a very slow tupi. The research is based on fieldwork conducted in 1996–1999 and 2005–2006 with financial support from the ESRC in the United Kingdom and UNESCO/FUNAI and FAPEMIG in Brazil.


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Le filtre piège. Essaims, anomalies, et la quasi-topologie du chamanisme ikpeng
Résumé : Cet article explore la première phase de l’initiation chamanique chez les Ikpeng, un peuple amérindien vivant  à proximité du cours du moyen Xingu dans le sud de l’Amazonie. Immergé dans une rivière ou un lac nocturne, les yeux fixés sur la surface de l’eau sombre, l’initié absorbe un essaim de créatures aquatiques et forestières, attirés par l’arôme puissant de la résine d’arbre jatobá, tombée goutte  à goutte sur la surface au-dessus de ses yeux, transformant le corps du novice en un contenant vivant pour ces esprits. L’article s’efforce de saisir la complexité topologique de ce processus, et présente une série de concepts—essaim et anomalie, inoculation, plasma, quasi-événements, enchevêtrement, et vie multiple—conçus comme des solutions improvisées aux contaminations, distorsions et modifications imposées aux concepts occidentaux lorsqu’ils sont exposés  à la pensée ikpeng et amérindienne.
David RODGERS is an anthropologist currently based in Brazil. Since 1996 he has conducted research in southern Amazonia (Xingu Indigenous Park, Mato Grosso state, Brazil) with the Ikpeng, focusing on cosmology, ritual, mythology, politics, and shamanism, as well as coordinating and producing a series of technical studies and reports for the Ikpeng land claim in the Jatobá region.
David Rodgersdav.rodgers@gmail.com


___________________
1. Also see Almeida (2012) on accounts by indigenous peoples and rubber tappers in Amazonia of the metamorphosis of ants into vines and the intervention of parasitical fungi (and Peruvian biologists).
2. Gonçalves on the Pirahã (1993), Clastres on the Aché (Guayaki) ([1972] 1998) and Rival on the Hourani (2002), for example, all provide superb monographs on highly mobile peoples, while Fausto (2012) provides a unique historico-ethnological analysis of the splitting of the Parakaná into a mobile, warfare-based block and a more fixed, agriculture-based block, defying the essentialization of either mode as a default state.
3. As Surrallés observes among the Candoshi of Peruvian Amazonia, this seems to apply more generally: ethology not morphology is the determinant factor in speciation (2003:37). Amerindian bioscience is nonhylomorphic: I return to this point later.
4. The term used by the Ikpeng to formulate this equation is arak, which translates as two, double, twin, alike. This likeness is not so much symbolic as symbiotic, indicating a potential and often actualized transfer or transduction (Simondon 2005; Combes [1999] 2013) of behavioral affects between the equalized (doubled) entities. I intend to develop the idea of analogic transduction in another paper.
5. The word breaks down as tɨwon [won, wing, in the fourth person possessive form, indicated by the nominal prefix tɨ-] plus pɨam, the plural form of pɨn, which I translate variously as virtual/ex/potential/quasi (this temporal-modal uncertainty is discussed later). “Fourth person” is a subject position embedded at syntactical level as noun and verb prefixation, which—following the explications of the Ikpeng themselves—refers to the absent and remote other, or the other of the other. As in this case, it is often used as a generic or universal.
6. The suffix -grɨ seems to be a variation on -gru, “liquid,” appended to the terms for blood, spit, aroma, and smoke, for example. The Arara cognate is kuru: Teixeira Pinto provides an excellent description of how the liquids with this suffixation compose a recycling flow of vital substances (1997: 159–64). Barros (1994) describes the operation of the cognate term, ekuru, in the cosmology of the Bakairi, another southern Carib people. As far as I know, this idea is not elaborated by the Ikpeng (though see Menget [1981] for an analysis of Ikpeng theories of hot and cold food substances): it may be that the increased mobility of the Ikpeng after their differentiation from the Arara block led to the fading of the idea of egru/kuru being obtained primarily through the subsoil and swidden-cultivated plants, and thus a rupture in a terrestrial recycling of liquid body substance, transferred instead to the cosmic intensification of a insect-warfare thematic.
7. See also Matarezio Filho (2010) on the use of ants in initiation among the Waimiri Atroari and other groups. Among the Wayana, ant stings create a new skin (epidermis) for the initiate, then worn until death (van Velthem 1995: 182; Fock 1963: 63–65).
8. As Kohn notes in relation to Ávila Runa descriptions of interspecies ecosemiotics (2002), plants and trees are also mobile, just at a much slower pace. The mixtures of plants and insects therefore amounts to a combination of the two extremes of velocity, a topic to which I return later in relation to the Ikpeng themselves. It is also worth noting that the symbioses and parasitisms involved in plant-insect convergences revolve around the toxicity of plant defense compounds and insect responses.
9. Or sometimes a girl: most people said that only boys could withstand the physically exacting process of becoming a shaman, but see below.
10. This description is based on a recorded account told to me in Ikpeng in 1998 by Melobo, the most experienced Ikpeng shaman. Awato kindly helped me with transcribing, translating, and understanding the narrative. Told to me (and Awato) in an instructive mode—that is, in the second person: you do X, then Y, and so on—it closely matches Melobo’s own initiation in a small but deep lake, said to contain subaquatic jaguar spirits, feeding into the Jatobá river, which took place prior to the Ikpeng transfer to the Xingu Indigenous Park. Another boy, Karaiva, was initiated simultaneously and some information is added from an informal talk with him in 2005. Other attempts have been made to initiate new shamans since and some may well be ongoing right now, but because training is highly volatile and dangerous to the novice, it is also ideally kept secret for years from anyone except the older shamans involved and the initiate’s immediate kin. The Ikpeng population is also filled with many “little shamans” who become so through other methods: primarily a hyper-intake of tobacco smoke until fainting, accompanied by temporary reclusion, a practice learnt and adapted from Upper Xingu shamans.
11. As in the cosmologies of numerous other Amazonian peoples, the sun is said to shine down at night onto the inner sky (the world of the dead). Emphasizing this link between the moon and the antisun, the halo surrounding the full moon on nights with thin cirrus cloud is described as a lunar burial hole, a sign of imminent death: like the lunar or solar eclipse, the full moon is a hunter of people.
12. Hymenæa courbaril. Jatobá resin is also called animé (from French), “so called because it often contains so many insects as to be, figuratively, animé or animated” (OED). This resin is usually found congealed under earth at the base of the tree. Left there for millions of years, it forms amber. This conservation of “catatonic insects,” their undead suspension in a congealed liquid within a forest container, clearly anticipates the future shaman as a container of pɨanom darts. Jatobá trees are also among the oldest and tallest in the rainforest and frequently attract lightning strikes, suggesting an implicit link to Imere, the storm god, though I never heard this connection elaborated.
13. Compare tönnye in Panare (Carib), which describes the intoxicating effect of fish poison (Dumont 1972: 60).
14. Ikpeng amengo flutes, made from the aerial roots of the stilt palm, Socratea exorrhiza, are likewise stored underwater—returned to the flux of the river—for the timespan of the pomeri ritual season when not being played by the Ikpeng flautists (which suggests they are being played by other people as the river flows through the tubes).
15. “Inoculation” comes from the Latin inoculāre, to implant or graft (composed of in + oculus eye, bud): extrapolating this idea, exposure to forest spirits can be seen to lead to an implantation (via the stinging jatobá tree resin) of tiny “eye grafts.”
16. Fausto (2001) also provides a detail from Parakanã sorcery techniques that resonates strongly here: “In dreams it is also possible to learn how to prepare extremely potent poisons; these are equally associated with blood and the –pyji’o smell: one such venom is produced with the placenta of a newborn; another with the sap of the Brazil nut tree, which, they say, ‘is just like blood.’” Ikpeng mythology associates Brazil nuts with a cannibalistic toad, pfuron, living in the extreme west, a swampy region where earth, water, sky and the sun meet.
17. This suggests that shamanism is more like a reopening or reexpansion of capacities lost or blocked during the infant’s adaptation to its new life with parents and other kin: I interpret the latter feeding and nurturing process as a slowing down, a congealment, which eventually begins to dissolve with age (and fat loss).
18. See for instance Erikson (1987); Fausto (1999, 2012); Bonilla (2005); Kohn (2002); Cesarino (2010); Costa (2010); the central text here being Fausto (2008), which focuses on the political economy of Amerindian ownership.
19. On pets in indigenous Amazonia, see Erikson (1987); Fausto (1999); Cormier (2003); and Kohn (2007).
20. See Basso (1987) on what she calls a “progressive theory of dreaming” among the Kalapalo. Amazonian ethnology is filled with indigenous accounts of dreaming as a form of precognizing the future: more precisely, encountering and experiencing a possible future, one that can be actualized or perhaps avoided (Chaumeil 1983: 220–23; Fausto 2001: 277–85).
21. This night-to-day transition involves dawn, awakening, and sunrise as the cusp of Ikpeng cosubjectivity when the dreamer wakes up within a simultaneously awakening population (the Ikpeng suffix X-ninkɨn used to designate a cluster of people associated with a particular maloca leader derives from the verb root inkɨ, to sleep, and implies “the people who sleep-and-awaken with X”). The concept of dawning/awakening as a people appears throughout Amazonia: the Muinane, for example, use ritual techniques to ensure animals “dawn” as prey rather than as predatory spirits (Londoño-Sulkin 2000: 181).
22. See also Taylor (1996: 207) and (1998: 318).
23. In his account of the body among the Candoshi, Surrallés writes “among the Candoshi the idea seems to prevail that the body is substance in development. The notion of vanótsi does not refer to the body as an autonomous organism but rather to the dynamic of matter” (2003: 37). The autonomous organism can also be taken to be the individual qua formal origin, an idea explored in Simondon’s critique (2005) of hylomorphism: I return to this point shortly.
24. Viveiros de Castro adds here, “the immersion of dead Araweté in a body of circulating water signifies a process of initiation” ([1986] 1992: 211).
25. Just about everyone I spoke to about the sky dead intensely disliked even mention of this subject, avoiding it wherever possible. This is in sharp contrast to the frequent and good-humored anecdotes about near misses with forest and river spirits. In fact even staring at the night sky too much is considered inadvisable.
26. This multiple life theory is not the same as a multiple world (or multiversal) theory, though to an extent they converge. The possibility of multiple simultaneous lives— effectively a theory of simultaneous reincarnation through soul capture, splitting, and the entangled multiplication of soul-bodies—may help explain what Descola identifies as the perspectival variant of animism (Descola [2005] 2013: 138–43; Viveiros de Castro 1998). Conceived nonhylomorphically, I suggest, it is the capacity to split into multiple lives—by being captured and absorbed—that allows the emergence of double (or triple, or multiple) soul-bodies as (in)dividual forms, not the other way around. These questions will have to be explored more comprehensively elsewhere.
27. The connection described by Bruce Albert is precisely one of entanglement: “The fate of the animal and that of the person are indissociable: the killing of one inevitably entails the death of the other” (1988: 91).
28. Among just some of the many possible examples, see Vilaça (2002: 349, [2006] 2010:310) on the spirit families of Wari’ shamans in southwestern Amazonia; A.M. Costa (2010) on the shaman’s spirit-wife among the Nambikwara; Colpron (2004) on the spirit spouses of male and female shamans among the Shipibo-Conibo; or elsewhere Hamayon (1990) on spirit spouses among the Buryat peoples of Siberia.
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				<article-title>The folds of the world: An essay on Mesoamerican textile topology</article-title>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores a Mesoamerican topology based on the figure of the fold. It argues that the operation of folding represents a crucial concept for understanding indigenous cosmology and ontology. The fold is what allows the separation and articulation of the two domains into which the indigenous cosmos is divided: the solar state, extensive and discrete, which humans and other ordinary beings inhabit, and the intensive, virtual sphere, where spirits dwell. In turn, the fold refers to textiles, which likely represent a basic model for invention and transformation in Mesoamerican cultures. The article examines certain classical themes in Mesoamerican anthropology in light of this topology: a human being’s make-up, ritual operations, folding of the body, the sacred bundles, and the substance of time. At a more general level, this work is an attempt to contribute to what could be called an Amerindian transformational topology, a kind of imagination where certain “forms” or “figures” reappear in different domains of the world as transformations one of another.</p></abstract>
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				<day>27</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="208">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2005" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2005/4602" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2005/4603" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Cultural resource management (CRM), or contract archaeology—archaeological work conducted upstream to land development projects—has come under criticism for enacting neoliberal and colonial agendas. While this criticism is sound, it is also “negative,” in that it entertains an alienating narrative by eschewing resistance attempts by CRM archaeologists. I draw on my own work as an organizer amongst Quebecois CRM workers, as well as on the process of epistemic frictions as the dissenting development of shared truths, to flesh out a “positive” criticism of the practice. Through three frictions that unfolded from 2017 to 2020, I show how CRM workers organized around the collective construction of their knowledge to define the constraints posed by their practice’s hierarchical class structure and reconfigure it through the definition of new norms. These frictions map what epistemic work will be needed to enact anticapitalist and decolonial change.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1384</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-02-13T10:25:48Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1384</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/706762</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Calling through the water jar: Domestic objects in Nahua emotional assemblages</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Raby</surname>
						<given-names>Dominique</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>dominiqueraby@colmich.edu.mx</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>11</day>
				<month>02</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date>
			<volume>9</volume>
			<issue seq="103">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau9.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1384" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1384/3376" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1384/3377" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article re-examines human–object relations in an Indigenous Nahua context in Mexico. Inspired by the Deleuzian notion of assemblage, the study shifts the focus from the agency of objects to emphasize the emotions of human and nonhuman animals as “persons.” Artifacts like clothes and water jars emerge as intersubjective connectors that transfer human substance and voice in short-lived, but emotionally charged, domestic assemblages. The focus on quasi-plain domestic artifacts defines love, the Nahuas’ mode of relating, and motherhood, as central to their understanding while, more broadly, reframing the status of objects beyond anthropomorphism.</p></abstract>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>assemblage, objects, nonhuman animals, emotion, gender, agency, Nahua, Mexico</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
</article>			</metadata>
		</record>
		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1901</identifier>
				<datestamp>2024-11-16T04:42:35Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1901</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/732474</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>As through a glass darkly: Rethinking sincerity through the lens of ikhlāṣ</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Hartmann</surname>
						<given-names>Ida</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Carey</surname>
						<given-names>Matthew</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>16</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2024</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date>
			<volume>14</volume>
			<issue seq="203">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau14.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2024 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1901" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1901/4396" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1901/4397" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Standard Euro-American ideas of sincerity revolve around an idea of the transparent alignment of one’s outer acts with the inner self, such that the audience can clearly deduce the latter from the former. The development and spread of such ideas has been widely linked to the emergence of modern subjectivity. This article expands upon these analyses, contrasting them with Islamic notions of sincerity (ikhlāṣ) which is predicated not on transparency, but on purity of intention. This apparently minor difference has significant implications: it allows for sincerity to be opaque or deceptive; it gestures towards radically different technologies of self-formation; and it questions the facile and widespread elision of modernity with a particular version of sincerity.</p></abstract>
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				<kwd></kwd>
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		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/725</identifier>
				<datestamp>2015-10-26T00:19:37Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau5.2.008</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau5.2.008</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>What is anthropology's object of study? A counterresponse to Deeb and Schielke</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">What is anthropology's object of study? A counterresponse to Deeb and Schielke</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Fadil</surname>
						<given-names>Nadia</given-names>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Counterresponse to Meditations by Samuli Schielke and Lara Deeb on Fadil, Nadia and Mayanthi Fernando 2015. “Rediscovering the 'everyday' Muslim: Notes on an anthropological divide.&quot; HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (2): 59–88.  </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Counterresponse to Meditations by Samuli Schielke and Lara Deeb on Fadil, Nadia and Mayanthi Fernando 2015. “Rediscovering the 'everyday' Muslim: Notes on an anthropological divide.&quot; HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (2): 59–88.  </p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>What is anthropology’s object of study?






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Nadia Fadil and Mayanthi Fernando. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.2.008
MEDITATION
What is anthropology’s object of study?
A counterresponse to Schielke and Deeb
Nadia FADIL, KU Leuven
Mayanthi FERNANDO, University of California, Santa Cruz


Counterresponse to Meditations by Samuli Schielke and Lara Deeb on Fadil, Nadia and Mayanthi Fernando 2015. “Rediscovering the ’everyday’ Muslim: Notes on an anthropological divide.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5(2): 59-88


In their thoughtful and careful responses, both Lara Deeb and Samuli Schielke acknowledge some of the problems with the framework of everyday Islam that we identify in our text but also warn against an overly unifying treatment of the literature on everyday Islam. Our response will not rehash our arguments; rather, we will highlight the methodological process through which our essay took shape and then return to what we believe is an essential point of disagreement that pertains to anthropology’s object of study.


This essay took shape as we witnessed how the question of the “everyday” became an increasingly prominent focus for the study of Islam within (and outside) anthropology and was often counter-posed to the recent focus on piety  and ethical self-transformation. In this shift, Samuli Schielke’s work was often  posited as a central reference, and our decision to concentrate primarily on  his essays was triggered by their impact in steering the conversation in this particular direction within the anthropology of Islam. The publication of Schielke’s book in the spring of 2015 (well after the initial draft of our essay [98]was completed) compelled us to reconsider some of the points we made, and we have added footnotes in those instances where Schielke’s essays and his monograph diverge. However, many of the concerns we had regarding his juxtaposition between “religious” and other societal domains (such as economy, love, or social justice) remain in the monograph, as does Schielke’s diagnosis of Salafism as an unnatural way of living one’s life, as impelled by personal crisis, and as inherently unstable and transient (as illustrated through the figures of Mustapha, Nagat, and Fouad).
A central aim in our essay was to try to account for how the concept of the everyday functions in scholarship on Islam and what its effects are. We do not suggest that there exists a literature on the everyday that is unified in its orientation or in its approach. Rather, we tried to show how this concept of the everyday (or everyday life) has been articulated in these various scholarly works (with their admittedly very distinct theoretical orientations) primarily as a site of contestation and ambiguity. We also tried to show how, at least for certain scholars, this has the concomitant result of excluding those life-forms not seen as demonstrating a similar degree of ambiguity or complexity. As we argued, these life-forms—represented by the figure of the Salafi—are presented as unreal, unnatural, and ideologically driven. Our argument is not that all anthropologists who use the frame of everyday Islam similarly exclude revivalists from the realm of the human but rather that when the everyday functions as a marker of human similitude, and when the everyday is counter-posed to selfdisciplinary piety, the banishment of “fundamentalists” from the realm of the human is ever-present.
As we state in our essay, we do not argue against the analytic of the everyday. But what is this everyday other than the site of human interaction, anthropology’s primary focus of analysis? Furthermore, what is not the everyday? It is indeed hard to imagine any situation mediated by human interaction that would not be part of the everyday. Are objects part of everyday life? Animals? Plants? Angels? Miracles? (After all, one of the discipline’s commitments has been to include the realm of the invisible and the nonhuman in the everyday.)
A more substantive disagreement concerns what Schielke describes in his response as his commitment to complexity and tragic pursuit, which brings us to the kind of analytical work we do. Complexity, in our own work, is not an object of study in itself but rather part of a broader analytical focus on the ways in which individuals try to constitute themselves into legible social beings. This means attending to the practices, vocabularies, and bodily gestures that are (un) consciously adopted in trying to do so. The complexities of everyday life are an intrinsic part of this. Whether it concerns a Muslim in Burkina Faso who struggles to meet the daily requirement to pray (Debevec 2012), or a Muslim in Belgium who doesn’t fast: these practices are, each in their own way, constitutive of ethical self-formation, and often in a manner that is neither easy nor straightforward (see Fadil 2009). Let us turn to the case of sexuality to illustrate our point more carefully. While a conflicting relationship has traditionally been assumed between sexual pleasure and religious orientation, a large body of [99]literature has deconstructed such an assumption by showing how religious traditions like Islam have accommodated and even promoted sexual pleasure, usually within the framework of heterosexual marriage. Yet, in the context of modernity where sexuality exists independently from marriage and is considered integral to what it means to become a full subject (Foucault 1978), it becomes interesting to examine how the norm of being sexual (of sexual being) is navigated and negotiated within one’s ethical life. Does it exist and is it lived in the same way for individuals who consider themselves committed Muslims? How is it experienced in an ethical world in which polygamous marriages are also considered an option (Fernando 2014)? How is the question of sexual pleasure navigated by those who are unmarried or nonheterosexual and who hold a commitment to the religious tradition? How does the latter affect the ways in which these Muslims see themselves? What kind of tensions does it produce? Do these Muslims consider themselves as less of a full subject for not having an active sexual life? Or does sexuality belong to the realm of personal and affective aphasia? Is sexual pleasure enacted through different means? Are these considered halal, makruh, or haram? How do these subjects navigate acts they view as zina (promiscuous), and how do they live through these apparent contradictions? Which acts are considered zina? And what is the status of zina in comparison with other acts that are considered illicit (such as lying, cheating, etc.)? To what extent is there a process of normalization of those acts that are considered illicit by the tradition? How does this occur at an individual or a social level, and to what extent does it result in a new conception of the (Muslim) self?

Our point is that examining the entanglements between ethical selfhood, concrete praxis, and (religious or secular) norms is not a straightforward process, and in that we share the commitment of Schielke and Deeb to consider the complexities of ethical lives. Yet taking up these complexities does not mean dislocating them from norms. Complexities only become meaningful against the backdrop of normative entanglements. This is not only an essential feature of social life. It is an essential characteristic of what it means to become a meaningful human subject.

References
Debevec, Liza. 2012. “Postponing piety in urban Burkina Faso: Discussing ideas on when to start acting as a pious Muslim.” In Ordinary lives and grand schemes: An anthropology of everday religion. Vol. 18. EASA Series. New York: Berghahn Books.
Fadil, Nadia. 2009. “Managing affects and sensibilities: The case of not handshaking and not fasting.” Social Anthropology 17 (4): 439–54.
Fernando, Mayanthi L. 2014. “Intimacy surveiled: Religion, sex, and secular cunning.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 39 (3): 685–708.
Foucault, Michel. 1978. History of sexuality: An introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley. Vol. 1. 3 volumes. New York: Pantheon Books.
 
Nadia FadilAnthropology DepartmentInterculturalism, Migration, and Minorities Research CentreKU LeuvenParkstraat 45—Box 36153000 Leuven, BelgiumNadia.Fadil@soc.kuleuven.be
Mayanthi L. FernandoAnthropology Department361 Social Science 1University of California, Santa Cruz1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USAmfernan3@ucsc.edu
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Activities undertaken during everyday commutes have often been studied to prove the inherent value of travel time to the commuters. Women commuters using the ladies’ compartments of the Mumbai local trains use this time to eat and share food, shop, chitchat, and watch sitcoms on their phones. Undertaken in a gender-segregated space, these activities make women’s mobility an avenue for the performance of their femininities. Thus, while the association between masculinity and mobility stands questioned, what merits enquiry is whether mobility for women is premised on their effective performance of hegemonic femininities.</p></abstract>
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				<kwd></kwd>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/112</identifier>
				<datestamp>2015-02-09T07:46:02Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau2.2.003</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau2.2.003</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Favors and &quot;normal heroes&quot;: The case of postsocialist higher education</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Favors and &quot;normal heroes&quot;: The case of postsocialist higher education</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Humphrey</surname>
						<given-names>Caroline</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Cambridge</aff>
					<email>ch10001@hermes.cam.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>19</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2012</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2012</year></pub-date>
			<volume>2</volume>
			<issue seq="202">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau2.2</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c)  </copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year></copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau2.2.003" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/pdf" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau2.2.003/201" />
			<self-uri content-type="text/html" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau2.2.003/1005" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/epub+zip" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau2.2.003/1160" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/octet-stream" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau2.2.003/1207" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This paper reconsiders the expression “economy of favors” that became popular in the literature about postsocialist societies as shorthand for a variety of illicit practices such as bribery, kickbacks, nepotism, etc. It argues that favors can be singled out and considered in their own right from an anthropological point of view. Favors are carried out in economies that are mainly conducted in other ways—ways that are not favors at all. The paper suggests, based on materials from Russia and Mongolia, that favors are different from transactional exchanges. They are defined by their quality of gratuitousness and by the fact that they require the recipients to be personally chosen. Because neither of these are features of market economic practice, favors tend to be described in the literature as informal, corrupt, etc., but the suggestion here is that favors persist because they enable actors to enhance a sense of self-worth within relevant social circles; they are sources of esteem for “normal heroes” in such life-worlds. Analyzing favors in the sphere of higher education, the paper also suggests that practical operation of favors in an increasingly commercialized and power-differentiated environment is also helpful for understanding how social networks are formed.  </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This paper reconsiders the expression “economy of favors” that became popular in the literature about postsocialist societies as shorthand for a variety of illicit practices such as bribery, kickbacks, nepotism, etc. It argues that favors can be singled out and considered in their own right from an anthropological point of view. Favors are carried out in economies that are mainly conducted in other ways—ways that are not favors at all. The paper suggests, based on materials from Russia and Mongolia, that favors are different from transactional exchanges. They are defined by their quality of gratuitousness and by the fact that they require the recipients to be personally chosen. Because neither of these are features of market economic practice, favors tend to be described in the literature as informal, corrupt, etc., but the suggestion here is that favors persist because they enable actors to enhance a sense of self-worth within relevant social circles; they are sources of esteem for “normal heroes” in such life-worlds. Analyzing favors in the sphere of higher education, the paper also suggests that practical operation of favors in an increasingly commercialized and power-differentiated environment is also helpful for understanding how social networks are formed.  </p></abstract-trans>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1589</identifier>
				<datestamp>2021-11-09T07:55:23Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1589</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/716714</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Found again in translation? Standardizing the authenticity of guaraná among the Sateré-Mawé people (Brazilian Amazon)</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Congretel</surname>
						<given-names>Mélanie</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>09</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2021</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue seq="203">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau11.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1589" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1589/3772" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1589/3773" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article analyzes a certification process undertaken by Sateré-Mawé indigenous people from the Brazilian Amazon, as part of a “global localization” strategy aimed to reappropriate a plant that is both cultivated and globalized. Through their attempt to establish that the guaraná they produce and sell is the original one, they seek to restore the plant’s central role in their social organization and epistemology, while pursuing broader goals of cultural, political, and territorial autonomy. Our analysis focuses on the knowledge politics and on the processes of translation at play in the negotiation of certification standards, in order to show how and to what extent the actors involved manage to understand each other’s ideas and practices, to negotiate shared values and goals, and to establish standards defining what is authentic. It also explores the “generative interfaces” between anthropology and law so as to produce situated ethnographies of how the global is constructed.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1951</identifier>
				<datestamp>2025-10-25T15:25:25Z</datestamp>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/735924</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>A Fanonian anthropology of the atmosphere of felt disasters and felt changes: Revisiting Fanon to explore the felt disasters of war, epidemics, and humanitarian interventions in the tenth Ebola epidemic in Eastern DRC</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Park</surname>
						<given-names>Sung-Joon</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>08</day>
				<month>08</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="112">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1951" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1951/4494" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1951/4495" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This essay proposes a reading of Frantz Fanon to examine resistance during the tenth Ebola epidemic in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (2018–2020). This reading centers on Fanon’s study of atmospheres, which is missing in current debates on atmosphere. Specifically, I suggest that Fanon was less concerned with the justification for violent resistance than with describing the atmosphere of violence that governed the Algerian War of Independence. Fanon seeks to convey the collective presentiment that the liberation struggle ends in a veritable human disaster. Following Fanon, this essay will explore the felt disasters of epidemics and war created by the public health response in the DRC. In addition, I will draw on Fanon to illuminate the felt changes of the Ebola response inspired by an atmosphere of creativity.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1295</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:33:38Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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			<metadata>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">698410</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/698410</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>The absence of the divine</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">The absence of the divine</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Copeman</surname>
						<given-names>Jacob</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Edinburgh</aff>
					<email>jacob.copeman@ed.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Hagström</surname>
						<given-names>John</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Edinburgh</aff>
					<email>j.o.hagstrom@sms.ed.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>21</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2018</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date>
			<volume>8</volume>
			<issue seq="404">1-2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau8.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2018 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2018</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698410" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Rejoinder to Willerslev, Rane, and Christian Suhr. 2018. “Is there a place for faith in anthropology? Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 65–78</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Rejoinder to Willerslev, Rane, and Christian Suhr. 2018. “Is there a place for faith in anthropology? Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 65–78</p></abstract-trans>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1762</identifier>
				<datestamp>2023-06-18T20:32:29Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1762</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/725384</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Ti binni ruyubi, beyond binaries and median points: Methodological reflections on brownness in the field and intersectional reflexivity</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Toledo</surname>
						<given-names>Rodrigo Perez</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Wynn</surname>
						<given-names>L. L.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
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					<name>
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					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
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					<name>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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					<name>
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					<name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
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				<day>18</day>
				<month>06</month>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Using theoretical debates about how to deploy reflexivity in ethnographic research to contextualize anthropological knowledge, this article begins with an awkward encounter between an anthropologist from the Global South and a research participant to reflect on some of the intersectional complexities of identity and relationality when an ethnographer of color does fieldwork within a community of color: in this case, a brown-skinned Mexican researching same-sex attracted Chinese men in Australia. Following Indigenous anthropologists’ calls for more locally grounded frameworks and methodologies, we propose the Diidxazá term binni ruyubi (“person who searches”) to extend concepts of reflexivity beyond the Western/native, insider/outsider, and other binaries and median points, to give a more complex account of intersectional reflexivity, one that attends to the interaction between identity and background characteristics including skin tone, Indigeneity, sociocultural background, language, sexuality, economic status, and colonial histories in Westernized universities.</p></abstract>
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						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
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						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this meditation, Anya Bernstein and Alexei Yurchak discuss Yurchak’s essay, “The canon and the mushroom: Lenin, sacredness, and Soviet collapse,” which is published in the current issue. They elaborate on some points in the essay that are central for the understanding of the figure of “Lenin” and its role in Soviet history, take them in new directions, and link them to other topics that are relevant to anthropology. The themes discussed include sacredness and blasphemy; death, resurrection, and immortality; language, intentionality, and responsibility; voice, ventriloquism, and truth; and more.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In this meditation, Anya Bernstein and Alexei Yurchak discuss Yurchak’s essay, “The canon and the mushroom: Lenin, sacredness, and Soviet collapse,” which is published in the current issue. They elaborate on some points in the essay that are central for the understanding of the figure of “Lenin” and its role in Soviet history, take them in new directions, and link them to other topics that are relevant to anthropology. The themes discussed include sacredness and blasphemy; death, resurrection, and immortality; language, intentionality, and responsibility; voice, ventriloquism, and truth; and more.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>Lenin, Soviet Union, perestroika, Soviet collapse, Stalin, communism, sovereignty, the Party</kwd>
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	<body><p>Sacred necropolitics






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Anya Bernstein, Alexei Yurchak. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.022
MEDITATION
Sacred necropolitics
A dialogue on Alexei Yurchak’s essay, “The canon and the mushroom: Lenin, sacredness, and Soviet collapse”
Anya BERNSTEIN, Harvard University
Alexei YURCHAK, University of California, Berkeley


In this meditation, Anya Bernstein and Alexei Yurchak discuss Yurchak’s essay, “The canon and the mushroom: Lenin, sacredness, and Soviet collapse,” which is published in the current issue. They elaborate on some points in the essay that are central for the understanding of the figure of “Lenin” and its role in Soviet history, take them in new directions, and link them to other topics that are relevant to anthropology. The themes discussed include sacredness and blasphemy; death, resurrection, and immortality; language, intentionality, and responsibility; voice, ventriloquism, and truth; and more.
Keywords: Lenin, Soviet Union, perestroika, Soviet collapse, Stalin, communism, sovereignty, the Party



Anya Bernstein:
In his essay, Alexei Yurchak provides an anthropological analysis of the symbolic dimensions of the Soviet collapse, focusing on the figure of Lenin and the categories of truth and the sacred. My focus in this commentary is on the latter as it pertains to the politics around Lenin’s legacy, including his embalmed body. Since the 1990s we have seen postsocialist bodies being moved around, exhumed, and reburied, while Lenin continues to lie in his mausoleum in the Red Square. While in this piece Yurchak does not address specifically why the necropolitics around Lenin’s body turned out so different from other postsocialist bodies (Gal 1991; Todorova 2011; Verdery 1999; see also Yurchak 2015a), he does raise the issue in the second half of the article of the alleged sacredness of Lenin’s body. In this he is invoking the [200]figure of homo sacer, as elaborated by Giorgio Agamben, who pointed to parallels between the sacred and the sovereign in the sense of both being in some way beyond the law: one is banished from the political and the other transcends it through the power to establish the state of exception (Agamben 1998; Schmitt [1932] 1995).
If Lenin’s body is sacred, argues Yurchak, it is not because there is something essentially “holy” about it. Nor is the “worship” of Lenin to be likened to the veneration of religious relics in Russian Orthodox Christianity, as it has been in the scholarship (Tumarkin 1997). Lenin’s body is first of all political. And if it is sacred, it is so not in the sense of being religious but in this original political sense. Developing Agamben’s analogy, Yurchak argues that Lenin’s body was “doubled internally” into a “canonized” Lenin holding the sovereign prerogative to Truth and a “banished” Lenin, whose writings were regularly excised, rewritten, distorted, and censored.
This argument provides a fresh perspective on long-standing comparisons between communism and religion. It has been commonly asserted—by academic scholars and journalists alike—that Soviet communism was a secular religion with its own rituals, icons, and religious texts. In this context, Lenin’s body was portrayed as a central material relic created for the “backward masses” to worship in place of the bodily remains of Orthodox saints. Early Soviet atheist activists had indeed worked to discredit religious belief by tearing open the saints’ caskets to demonstrate that the relics either possessed no special powers or—as was sometimes the case—were not even there. Activists toured villages using simple chemistry experiments to show how Orthodox icons could be made to appear to weep. The Lenin “miracle,” as this argument would have it, lay in the power of science, which some believed could one day even “resurrect” Lenin from his bodily remains (as influential nineteenth-century Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov and his twentieth-century followers envisioned would eventually happen for every human; Fedorov 1906, 1913).
Yet, as Yurchak convincingly argues, the story is much more complex than the Orthodox relics simply being replaced by Lenin’s body. As he points out in another recent piece (Yurchak 2015a), it was never a goal of Lenin’s embalmers for him to be “resurrected,” as they actually preserved little of his original materiality, removing all organs—including the brain, which was dissected and studied in a research institute created for that purpose. Any sacredness to be attributed to Lenin’s body must thus derive from something altogether different than what operates in the case of holy relics. Pointing out that the Russian language has two words that can be translated as “sacred,” sviatoi (holy) and sviashchennyi (sacred), Yurchak notes that Lenin’s body is most commonly referred to as sviashchennyi and not as sviatoi. Indeed, while sviatoi appears to be used primarily in religious contexts, sviashchennyi does appear in ostensibly “secular” situations.
Since this linguistic distinction is central to Yurchak’s argument, two points need to be made. First, more etymological detail is called for to establish the exact provenance of the distinction in Russian as well as to determine contemporary usage. Second, the analysis might benefit from considering another linguistic doubling related to the notion of sacredness in Russian. At issue here is not the sacred itself but its inverted image or negation that is invoked in the reemergence of blasphemy in postsocialist Russia as a site of moral anxiety. During the Soviet period, the term blasphemy was rarely heard, reentering broad public discourse only during the art [201]trials of the Putin era and the famous Pussy Riot trial of 2012, generating considerable confusion as to its precise meaning.1 The new so-called blasphemy laws in Russia were roundly condemned in the Euro-American media, while going unnoted amid all the attention was that blasphemy is glossed in Russian by two different words: bogokhul’stvo and koshchunstvo. Twentieth-century sources define the verb bogokhul’stvovat’ (to commit blasphemy) as “to desecrate or offend church relics (relikvii) and rituals.”2 Koshchunstvo, in contrast, while also translated as blasphemy, refers to any kind of mocking of anything considered sacred or precious—not necessarily pertaining to religion.3
Working in Russia on related issues, I raised the question with all of my interlocutors, asking how they understood the difference between koshchunstvo and bogokhul’stvo. The majority defined bogokhul’stvo as a form of religious impiety, with the most common examples being the desecration of icons and speaking with contempt of religious notions and persons. Koshchunstvo, on the other hand, suggested a lack of reverence toward a different kind of sacred, leaving my interlocutors struggling to define exactly what counts as an instance. Reaching for appropriate examples, they came up with one with impressive regularity. “Imagine if someone drew horns on a portrait of Lenin during the Soviet times,” ventured one interlocutor. “People would be outraged: ‘How dare you commit such a blasphemy (koshchunstvo)?! This is Lenin! (Eto zhe Lenin!).’” Likewise, the specter of koshchunstvo is commonly invoked in contemporary public discourses around the fate of Lenin’s body. The leader of the Communist Party Gennadii Ziuganov declared the idea of taking Lenin out of mausoleum and burying him a blasphemy (koshchunstvo). Others consider Lenin remaining in the mausoleum a blasphemy (koshchunstvo). Still others regard Putin’s controversial recent comparison of Lenin’s body with Orthodox holy relics a blasphemy (koshchunstvo) in its own right.4 Common to all of these examples is that no one ever applies the formal [202]ecclesiastical term bogokhul’stvo to Lenin, illustrating precisely what Yurchak argues in his piece: Lenin’s body continues to occupy an area of cultural and political sacredness located outside of what is conventionally understood as “religious,” marking a distinction that is often obscured in readings of Soviet cultural politics.
What might be the source and nature of such sacredness? Following Agamben, Yurchak argues that the answer lies in the political exception, as he points out, “Lenin was simultaneously the unquestionable voice of Truth (above language) and was unable or forbidden to speak at all (below language).” The “real” Lenin to which the Party was occasionally determined to return was not only beyond politics but also beyond language, as his voice could only be heard when the Party spoke on his behalf—which, as Yurchak suggests, could be regarded as a kind of ventriloquism. The real Lenin thus was “a subject with an empty voice,” dwelling in the intermittently rewritten and banished texts as well as in his embalmed body with no organs. Not only were Lenin’s texts regularly distorted and his body deprived of its original materiality and artificially recreated and maintained using sophisticated chemical manipulations (Yurchak 2015a), his mind, as artist-provocateur Sergei Kurekhin asserted on Russian national television in 1991, was also distorted by . . . a mushroom. Using the elaborately staged hoax to great comic effect, Yurchak aptly illustrates how the “true” Lenin could be rewritten, obscured, and even entirely displaced by a nonhuman species (Yurchak 2015a, 2011).
Anthropologists, of course, will be very familiar with the kind of mushroom, which Kurekhin claimed to have replaced Lenin—a mushroom with its own kind of sacred agency. Prior to his television appearance, Kurekhin had gone to Mexico, learning about hallucinogenic cacti and mushrooms traditionally used in indigenous shamanic rituals. It was hardly an original pursuit, as ever since the late 1950s Mexico has experienced a long string of Western seekers of psychedelically inspired shamanic wisdom.
Nor was there any need for Kurekhin to have gone as far as Mexico. Almost a century earlier, a Russian anthropologist had pioneered the study of hallucinogenic mushrooms in shamanic rituals in Siberia. During his 1900–1902 expedition, the celebrated Russian scholar Waldemar Jochelson observed the use of fly agaric mushrooms in shamanic rituals among the indigenous Koryaks. The shaman was essentially a ventriloquist, Jochelson famously asserted. When asked to sing into a phonograph the shaman had become powerless in front of the unfamiliar technology. Only upon subsequently consuming two fungi was he able to sing (Jochelson [1905] 1908). If the sacred agency of mushrooms empowered the shaman to ventriloquize the spirits, what was it that enabled the Party and the latter-day Soviet reformers to ventriloquize Lenin? As per Yurchak, it was the essential “political sacredness” of Lenin, as he was both canonized and banished, a homo sacer and the sovereign, the voice of truth and an empty voice. If Lenin was not himself a mushroom, his agency was uncannily mushroom-like: his sacredness enabling his ventriloquists to vocalize the truth “before any linguistic articulation was added to it.” It took an artist-provocateur, a trip to Mexico, and a hoax on Soviet television to reveal the foundational truth of the Soviet project as empty, producing a rupture in the symbolic fabric of the seemingly eternal state, which was soon to be “no more.”[203]


Alexei Yurchak:
I am grateful to Anya Bernstein for providing this subtle commentary on my essay. Both critical interventions that she proposes are generative and allow me to elaborate on some points further. First, she suggests complicating my analysis of the nature of political sacredness by considering contexts in which the sacred is undermined through blasphemy. Second, she suggests comparing the “ventriloquism” of Lenin’s voice as it was practiced by the Party, with ventriloquist techniques used in shamanic séances in some parts of the world. This parallel appeared particularly striking in relation to the ironic provocation by artist Sergei Kurekhin, who compared the Soviet construct, “Lenin,” to a hallucinogenic mushroom. I will follow both these suggestions to push my arguments further.
As Bernstein pointed out, analyzing the duality of the concept of blasphemy in Russian—that is rendered by two distinct terms koshchunstvo and bogokhul’stvo—may allow one to better focus on the meaning of Lenin’s political sacredness and its sudden undoing in the end of Soviet history. She seems to be using these terms almost synonymously, arguing that they differed only according to the context in which they were used—bogokhul’stvo points to religious contexts, while koshchunstvo is more readily used in secular contexts. While I mostly agree with this assessment I would like to problematize it by elaborating on these two concepts and their various manifestation further. We may start with etymology. Both terms have old Slavic roots. Bogokhul’stvo is a compound noun that originates from the verb hulit’ (to slur, to abuse) and noun bog (God). Traditionally, bogokhul’stvo was a term used against detractors within the church, someone who is committing heresy. From the point of view of an established church, it is sectarians who are engaged in bogokhul’stvo. For the Orthodox Christians it is the Catholics who do so (e.g., with their claim that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as opposed to the Father only). The important point is that in this original sense, still retained today, one did not practice bogokhul’stvo with an intention to abuse a sacred object or person.
The other term, koshchunstvo, originates from the noun koshchun (mockery, ridicule). Unlike bogokhul’stvo, koshchunstvo is an attack with the intention to humiliate, ridicule, or destroy sacred objects, with this attack coming from outside the space of the sacred. It is manifested, for example, in the attacks on sacred religious objects from the position of an atheist who claims that religion is unscientific. When the Bolsheviks used scientific means to demonstrate that Orthodox relics were “fake,” they engaged in koshchunstvo (Murav’ev 2012).
While this topology of the two concepts may not account for all nuances of these terms, for all the changes that occurred to them during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and for all contextual ambiguities these terms may acquire in everyday speech, it still seems to be largely accurate and helpful for our purposes. Bernstein pointed out that her informants tended not to use the term bogokhul’stvo when referring to the acts that ridiculed Lenin, using koshchunstvo instead. The reason for this, she suggests, was that most Soviet people did not experience Lenin’s sacredness as a religious phenomenon, which the term bogokhul’stvo more readily implies. This point fits well with the argument in my essay that the sacredness of Lenin cannot be described in quasi-religious terms. Still, I would like to problematize [204]Bernstein’s discussion by suggesting that bogokhul’stvo, just like koshchunstvo, also should not be reduced only to religious contexts. Both terms are defined in relation to “the sacred” more broadly, beyond its religious connotations. Perhaps it is true that the term bogokhul’stvo is rarely used in secular contexts and to some speakers has stronger religious echoes than koshchunstvo. However, its use is not limited to religion, and, furthermore, the phenomena that bogokhul’stvo describes, and koshchunstvo does not, certainly do exist outside of religion. Indeed, Leninism was routinely subjected to treatments comparable to bogokhul’stvo. One example is rivalry and factionalism within and between Communist parties. In the infamous “Marxist-Leninist polemic” between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties in the 1960s, each party argued that it represented true Marxism-Leninism and accused the other of “revisionism.” The accusation of revisionism was synonymous with that of bogokhul’stvo—the other side was seen as a deviationist, a heretic, someone who did not understand Marxist-Leninist philosophy and method of analysis, who practiced wrong Marxism-Leninism.
During the Soviet period, even in mundane contexts the sacred image of “Lenin” was routinely subjected to a kind of blasphemous treatment that was equivalent to bogokhul’stvo, and not koshchunstvo, although again the term would be rarely used. In my previous research I explored a complex set of rules and understandings that controlled representations of Lenin during the Soviet period. Some of these rules were explicit, while others were commonly understood but never explicitly formulated. Reading diaries of the late Soviet period and talking to the former Soviet people who went to schools in the 1960s and 1970s, I learned how they first came to this understanding. In schools, children often drew pictures for various Soviet holidays. Occasionally a child would draw a portrait of Lenin among red flags and other Soviet symbols. Clearly these portraits looked amateurish and teachers invariably explained to the child that one should not draw Lenin in this way. In the early 1970s, when a student from a school in Leningrad drew a portrait of Lenin for the day of the Soviet pioneers, she was told by her teacher: “I am going to give you a good grade, but you shouldn’t display this picture at the exhibition. And don’t show it to anyone. Only the best artists can draw Lenin; he should be drawn well.” Another student from the city of Kaliningrad was told by her teacher a decade later: “If you are not sure that you can draw faces, you should not touch Lenin. You may experiment with others’ portraits, but not with Lenin’s” (Yurchak 2006: 89). Other political images and faces in the Soviet world did not produce this kind of reaction. There was something unique about Lenin.
These cases were clearly different from drawing horns on Lenin’s portrait, which is an act of intentional blasphemy—a koshchunstvo. To the children, the teachers’ reaction came as a surprise. Children had thought that their drawings of Lenin demonstrated their sincere communist devotion and Soviet patriotism. Teachers also realized that the drawings were made quite earnestly, with no intended ridicule, but the obvious imperfections of these images made them uneasy. Teachers experienced them as an unintentional blasphemy performed by a naïve child who drew Lenin earnestly—a blasphemy that originated inside the space of the sacred. In other words, they saw it as bogokhul’stvo.
A person who was not a professional artist was not supposed to draw Lenin, and among professional artists, very few were authorized to draw or sculpt him. To earn [205]a license to do so, artists not only had to demonstrate the high quality of their work but also had to have in their studio a copy of Lenin’s death mask. A death mask is more than just a representation of the face—it also bears traces of the actual physical body itself. Using death masks in artistic work was supposed to guarantee that all images of Lenin were not just artistic renderings of his face but also direct extensions of his actual material body (which lay on display in the mausoleum). In other words, these images had to function like photographs. Photographs and drawings are indexical signs, but what kind of indexes they are differs. Jean-Luc Nancy famously argued that a photograph is more than an index of reality (contrary to what was suggested by André Bazin [1960]; Susan Sontag [1977]; and others)—it rather works as a death mask of what it represents, as a kind of a physical layer that has been “peeled off” the reality in the act of photographing it (Nancy 2005; Kaplan 2010). This difference between photographs and drawings is captured in the rule that prohibits newspapers from publishing photographs taken during a court trial, but allows them to publish artistic renderings of it. The former are direct physical traces of what is actually shown in the proceedings and as such they can affect the outcome. For the same reason, a photograph or footage of a crime scene, but not its drawing, can serve as incriminating evidence for the court. If a legitimate portrait of Lenin had to function as an extension of his physical body, as an “imprint” from his death mask, then children’s naïve portraits of him clearly violated this principle. It was this fact that the teachers experienced as unintentional blasphemy—a bogokhul’stvo.
Drawing on her informants’ opinions and dictionary definitions, Bernstein argues—quite convincingly—that the term bogokhul’stvo, unlike koshchunstvo, is rarely if at all used in secular contexts. However, as my examples seem to demonstrate, the actual experience of blasphemy, which is similar to bogokhul’stvo and different from koshchunstvo, does exists in modern secular contexts, even if the Russian term to describe them is not often used. Of course, our distinction between these terms is preliminary. A more exhaustive exploration of the sacred through the dual figures of blasphemy is needed.
A ubiquitous example of koshchunstvo today, from the point of view of some people, is when Lenin’s statues are violently destroyed (e.g., in the “de-communization campaign” in Ukraine, known as “Leninopad,” Leninfall). As with koshchunstvo more generally, such attacks intend to desecrate and destroy, and they come from outside of the communist political space, where Lenin’s sacredness is located. When horns were drawn on Lenin’s portrait during the Soviet period this was a similar, though smaller, act of koshchunstvo—intentional ridicule performed from outside the sacred space of Leninism. It would be also useful to draw on the analysis of different forms and politics of blasphemy in other contexts—for example, the Danish and Charlie Hebdo’s cartoons of the prophet Mohammed, the attacks on sacred images of other religions by ISIS, et cetera (see, for example, Mitchel 1987, 2005; Asad et al. 2009; Mahmood 2009).
However, even this preliminary discussion of the distinction between koshchunstvo and bogokhul’stvo helps us to elucidate the phenomenon of Lenin’s sacredness. Both these types of blasphemy appear to be built into the very nature of sacredness, revealing its intrinsic duality. The sacred is the source of grace and the object of reverence but also the source of fear and the object of revulsion, [206]which has been well documented in anthropology.5 While one no longer senses this duality in the English word sacred, it is still retained in the French sacré—for example, la musique sacré (sacred or holy music) and un sacré menteur (damned liar) (Kurakin 2011).
The duality is clearly manifested in the attitudes to Lenin, Lenin’s monuments, and Lenin’s body. The endless lines of people on the Red Square waiting to see the embalmed body of Lenin in the mausoleum during the Soviet period have been replaced in the post–Soviet period with ubiquitous calls to “throw the repulsive mummy into the gutter” and to “burn the criminal corpse.” What was once an almost-universal reverence for Lenin has been replaced with almost-universal revulsion. This inversion has little to do with the resurgence of “real feelings” about Lenin that had been allegedly suppressed during the Soviet period. In fact, reverence for Lenin during the Soviet times was real and hardly depended on whether one actively believed in communism or did not think much about it. And the revulsion inspired by this figure among many people today is equally real. A quick succession of these feelings, following the change in the political system, in fact seems to reflect the very duality at the basis of Lenin’s political sacredness.
As I argue in the essay, that figure was constructed through the process of doubling, when some aspects of real Lenin were canonized within the Soviet political space, while others were banished from it. The canonized and banished parts were equally important and constitutive of Lenin’s sacredness. This duality was also related to the opposition between two figures that the ancient Roman law designated as politically sacred—the sovereign who was above the law and homo sacer who was below it. An analysis of how Lenin’s political sacredness was composed during the Soviet period, and how it was undone during perestroika, makes it visible that the “sovereign” and the “homo sacer” are not necessarily two distinct figures but can be seen as two sides of the same phenomenon of sacredness. The sovereign stands out among common people by his/her ability to act extra-legally—for example, not only to suspend law and declare the state of exception (Schmitt 2006) but also to pardon those who have been convicted by the judge. When all legal appeals have failed, the only hope left for a person on death row (the figure that is parallel to the ancient homo sacer) is presidential pardon or pardon by the governor of a US state. The “sacred Lenin” that the Party constructed and ventriloquized embodied both these figures: the sovereign and the homo sacer. A quick transition from reverence to revulsion in relation to Lenin was enabled by this duality at the basis of his sacredness and amounted to the inversion of this two-sided construct (see the final part of my essay, above).
Bernstein also helpfully pushed my metaphor of ventriloquism, linking it to the work of Waldemar Jochelson on Siberian shamanism. Anthropologists have written about ventriloquism as a technique in shamanic rituals in many parts of the world, including Siberia and Amazonia. In these areas, indigenous groups that “do not believe spirits can occupy human bodies” practice a different shamanic technique of “bring[ing] the spirits down alongside the shaman and hav[ing] them speak through ventriloquism” (Van Valen 2013: 118). On the one hand, we should [207]be careful not to overstate the parallel with shamanic ventriloquism if we want to avoid falling into a stereotypical interpretation of Leninism as a kind of religious or supernatural phenomenon. On the other hand, this parallel is indeed helpful in elucidating the nature of Lenin’s sacredness still further. Indeed, some of the Party’s actions toward Lenin, which I describe in the essay, were remarkably shaman-like.
In this sense, Kurekhin’s televised provocation was spot on: the infallible “Lenin” that the Communist Party constructed during the Soviet period played a curious role within the Soviet political discourse. The Party treated Lenin as the voice of Truth that was coming from outside of the Soviet time and space, history and politics. This voice spoke the Truth by definition, even before it said anything concrete. By ventriloquizing that voice (by “letting Lenin speak,” as a poster discussed in the essay proclaimed) the Party became the enunciator of Truth that was coming from elsewhere. Lenin was a “mushroom,” as Kurekhin proclaimed,6 not because he himself degenerated into less-than-human condition by the end of his life but because the “Lenin” that the Party created functioned as a substance—hallucinogenic substance—that infused the Party discourse with unconditional Truth regardless of what it said in any concrete historical period.


Anya Bernstein:
I enjoyed Alexei Yurchak’s thoughtful reply to my initial comments as much as his original article; I am rewarded to see his already illuminating and innovative analysis being pushed in new directions. My point in the previous reply was that Yurchak’s original observation about Lenin’s “sacredness” transcending the domain that is conventionally understood as “religious” is supported by the distinction between koshchunstvo and bogokhul’stvo, reinforcing this key point in his overall analysis, which goes beyond tired comparisons between the Lenin “cult” and religion. In his follow-up, Yurchak suggests an important clarification on my very preliminary distinctions between the two different Russian concepts of blasphemy by raising the issue of intention. Bogokhul’stvo, he argues, need not be intentional, whereas koshchunstvo is an attack on the sacred with the intention to ridicule. Therefore, he concludes, although the term bogokhul’stvo is not usually used in reference to Lenin, certain blasphemous acts toward his person that are committed without the intention to insult—such as a child unknowingly drawing Lenin in a way that is not appropriate—might be experienced as a bogokhul’stvo, even though the term is not applied.
At the risk of intruding on yet another voluminous and unwieldy field of study—as intentionality has been investigated for centuries from various theoretical [208]perspectives, from phenomenology to speech act theory to linguistic anthropology—I will make one brief point on this matter. In his response, Yurchak mentions the case of the cartoons ridiculing the Prophet Mohammed published by a right-wing Danish paper in 2006, in which the publishers defended themselves by saying they did not intend to offend Muslims, laying the blame on the receivers of the message and their “inappropriate” and “archaic” reading of signs. Yet, as many anthropologists subsequently pointed out, the modern liberal focus on intention often obscures the social relations that can be involved in acts such as blasphemy. Remarkably, not only did the Danish publishers insist that their action was self-contained in the absence of any intention to hurt—so that everything else, such as the effects of their action and Muslim reaction to it, was completely extraneous—but the explanation also seemed convincing to Western publics (Asad 2008; Keane 2009; Mahmood 2009).
If bogokhul’stvo would reference an unintentional offense from within the sacred space of Leninism and not from outside of it, as in the dismantling of Lenin’s monuments, what can be said about the act of embalming? Did Lenin’s embalmers commit a certain kind of bogokhul’stvo by preserving his body? Moreover, what does one make of the persistent myth revolving around a plan for Lenin’s eventual reanimation? Since the moment of Lenin’s embalmment, the myth of his intended “resurrection” has been a tenacious one in the popular imaginary and academic analyses alike. Yurchak convincingly deconstructed the notion by quoting scientists working in the Mausoleum Lab saying they find the “occasional speculations in the media” of Lenin’s “revival” preposterous, as his body is missing many organs, including the brain (Yurchak 2015a: 152). An interesting question then arises with the switch in focus from the intentions of Lenin’s embalmers to the social contexts and effects of the embalmment.
A certain constellation of religious, scientific, and social imaginaries became particularly prominent in Russia around the time of Lenin’s death. First, the Bolshevik revolution was accompanied by a biomedical revolution that made many believe science would soon make death obsolete (Krementsov 2013). Second, despite the state’s overt antireligious rhetoric, many believed that the goals of religion and science were no longer in contradiction, assuming that science would be devoted to enabling eternal life. Finally, yet others argued that the Revolution, far from resting content with the overcoming of human tyranny, should now take as its goal overcoming the tyranny of time and space themselves. These imaginaries existed independently of the lasting popularity of the nineteenth-century Orthodox philosopher Nikolai Fedorov, but they fed into his ideas about using science to resurrect the dead as an ethical goal of filial duty. Fedorov’s ideas have meanwhile reemerged in Russia and more globally, as futurist biotechnologies have captured the imaginations of tech entrepreneurs and general public alike (Bernstein, unpublished).
As early as 1928, one of Fedorov’s followers, economist and philosopher Nikolai Setnitskii, argued that the only possible explanation for Lenin’s embalmment could be the unconscious hope for his resurrection. Venturing into anthropology and psychoanalysis, Setnitskii hypothesized two types of burials—what he considered more “ancient” anastatic burial (from the Greek anástasis, resurrection) concerned with preservation and the more “recent” assenisatory burial (from the French [209]assainissement, sanitation) concerned with the destruction of the body. In this binary, cremation would be a “sanitation”-type development subsequent to various older types of burials and embalmment.7 Pointing out that Lenin’s embalmment ran counter to Lenin’s own famous dictum that [believing in] “any little god is necrophilia,”8 Setnitskii interpreted the fact that Lenin’s body was kept within the Kremlin walls and not thrown outside city limits as an “unexpected manifestation of the deepest and probably hidden and unconscious tradition of anastatic burial—an act that resists all political explanations and interpretations currently being advanced.” Not only did he imply that the architects of Lenin’s embalmment might have committed something like an unintended bogokhul’stvo from the point of view of Leninism, he went on to suggest that aside from official intentions, the act of Lenin’s preservation went beyond the conscious intentions of his embalmers (Setnitskii [1934] 2008: 395–96).9
Setnitskii would ultimately suggest that the dead should be buried in the permafrost regions of Siberia to ensure better preservation. Now almost a century later, this persistent line of thought has been continued; a current informant of mine (in the business of cryonics) has expressed his regret that Lenin was embalmed instead of frozen. Freezing Lenin’s body had indeed been one of the options discussed by the Communist Party’s Central Committee (Yurchak 2015a: 10–11). “Had Lenin been frozen,” my interlocutor ventured, “Russia would have been the world leader in cryobiology.” Cryobiology, in this view, is a promising cutting-edge science, whereas from the point of view of advancing immortality, embalming (pardon the pun) is a dead-end.
The existence of such beliefs about Lenin is but one of the social effects of his embalmment, deflecting attention from what might have been the actual intentions of his embalmers. Another social effect includes the heated debates regarding his body and its subsequent fate. Just as the act of blasphemy depends not only on the intentions of its perpetrators, Lenin’s embalmment took place in a complex context of ongoing social relations in which any question of original intention has long since been transcended, having become part and parcel of the Soviet, post-Soviet, and, no doubt, future imaginaries on life, death, and the political.[210]


Alexei Yurchak:
Bernstein’s remarks once again are extremely helpful and challenging. She takes up two important issues: first, whether the category of the author’s intention may help us understand the injury associated with blasphemy, or whether it obscures the actual social realities that are productive of that injury; and, second, whether an implicit intention to “resurrect” Lenin played a role in the decision to preserve his body. The ultimate question is this: What might be the implications of both these problems for our understanding of the role that Lenin and Lenin’s body played in Soviet political history and its unexpected demise?
As Bernstein points out, in response to my attempt to provide some preliminary distinction between two types of blasphemy (bogokhul’stvo and koshchunstvo), the rhetoric of intentionality vis-à-vis the charges of blasphemy has been profoundly problematized in anthropology and other disciplines. When the publishers of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammed in the conservative Danish newspaper argued that they did not intend to afflict injury on anyone, this did not make the real injury that many people felt because of the cartoons any less painful. Whether the publishers intended to or not, their actions had profound effects. The liberal focus on individual intention, Bernstein reminds us—not only among the newspaper publishers but also in much of Western media and public discourse—in fact contributed to obscuring the real social relations that were involved in producing the act of blasphemy. This point is well taken. But of course, we cannot conclude from this critique that the intentions of the authors of these cartoons played no role in creating the experience of blasphemy. And I do not think Bernstein would suggest that either. Much depends on what we, and they, mean by intention.
John Austin’s work on performatives discussed intention as one element in the “conditions of felicity” under which performatives operate. If a speech act is performed insincerely but appropriately in all other respects, it can be successful but abused. For example, if one takes an oath in a court of law to say only the truth, but at the same time privately intends to withhold some important facts, the oath will be successfully performed. This means that from the moment of the oath-taking ritual everything the person says will have the status of being said under oath, with all legal consequences that it implies, including possible persecution if the lie is exposed. There are two types of intention here: the person intends to take an oath about being sincere, but does not intend in fact to be sincere.
When the authors of Danish cartoons argued that they did not intend to abuse anyone, they nevertheless quite intentionally framed their images of the Prophet as cartoons (drawing them in a particular style, on a particular topic, with a particular message, placing them in the cartoon section of a newspaper, etc.). Many people felt the performative effect of this framing as abuse. Young Soviet schoolchildren who drew portraits of Lenin that the teachers deemed inappropriately amateurish (in examples above) sincerely intended their pictures to demonstrate their devotion to Lenin. The teachers recognized this sincerity. But they also recognized that a public display of these pictures—a different act organized with the teacher’s participation—could produce the experience of blasphemy vis-à-vis the “sacred” figure. The teachers did not punish the students, and in one case gave a student a good grade, but they also asked the students not to show their pictures publicly. A picture [211]intended as reverence for the sacred figure, and seen as such by others, could be also experienced as disrespect for that figure if displayed in a particular way. Both interpretations were possible and depended on how the picture was drawn and how it was framed, in what context it was encountered, what its audience was, et cetera. But neither interpretation was devoid of the author’s intention and responsibility.
Stanley Cavell (1987) discussed this in his commentary on the famous debate between Jacques Derrida and John Searle about Austin’s theory of performatives. The debate focused on Derrida’s critique of intentionality. Derrida started by acknowledging that Austin demonstrated well that the success of a performative depends on the observation of conventions in which the ritualized speech act is performed, and not on the intention of the speaker (Derrida 1977). The above example of an oath that is successfully performed in court, even if one’s private intention is to hide the truth, illustrates this point. However, continued Derrida, having disconnected intention from his explanation of how the performative force of language works, Austin later made a mistake of brining intention back into his theory. He did so by bracketing out intentionally fake “parasitic cases” (e.g., when an oath is taken by an actor in a theater play) as not real performatives.
With this unfortunate decision, continued Derrida, Austin linked his analysis of performative force with the speaker’s internal intention. However, the nature of language, according to Derrida, allows for a complete disconnect between what the author intends by his/her words and what they might mean in a given context. In fact, according to Derrida, the performative force of language is based precisely in the ability of language to be radically cut off from the original intentions of the author. He called it force de rupture of language. For example, an ancient text can be deciphered even when all knowledge of its authors and what they intended to say have been lost. What the authors mean and how the text is in fact interpreted may have nothing in common. The author may be radically absent from the text.
Derrida’s argument is powerful and his critique of Austin’s exclusion of “parasitic” cases is important. However, this argument is strongly overstated, as Stanley Cavell demonstrated. Cavell agrees with Derrida that we can never predict what a concrete interpretation of a text by someone else will be, but disagrees that there is a radical disconnect between what the author meant, or thought that he/she meant, and how the text is interpreted. According to Cavell, every utterance and written word is forever linked to its source, however illusive this link may be. If they are radically cut off from it, the text will cease to be intelligible. An ancient text whose origins have been long lost can be understood today only if there is enough semiotic organization in it (particular lexical, grammatical, stylistic, and narrative structures, contextual clues, etc.) that would make it decipherable. This semiotic organization is one of the author’s traces in the text. While it is true that the authorial intentions are never equal to all the unexpected meanings a text can take, these intentions are never fully absent from the meanings the text might take either. The author is forever present in what he/she once said and continues to be partially responsible for how it might be interpreted.
As Cavell puts it, echoing Mikhail Bakhtin, “the price for having once spoken, or remarked, taken something as remarkable . . . is to have spoken forever, to have entered the arena of the inexcusable, to have taken on the responsibility of responsiveness, of answerability, to make yourself intelligible. It is in recognizing this [212]abandonment to my words . . . that I know my voice, recognize my words (no different from yours) as mine” (Cavell 1987: 65). In a different essay, aptly titled “Must we mean what we say?” Cavell reiterated this point: “we are . . . as responsible for the specific implications of our utterances as we are for their explicit factual claims.” We must take responsibility for all the meanings our words might ever take, including meanings that are completely different from what we might take to be our intentions (Cavell 2015: 12). The publishers of the Danish cartoons failed to take this responsibility and to think seriously of the implications of their words and images outside of their own liberal assumptions about human nature, the experience of the sacred, the nature of free speech, et cetera.
But what about the intentions—explicit and implicit—behind the preservation and public display of Lenin’s body? Does the act of embalming constitute a kind of political koshchunstvo? Is it linked to implicit hopes for Lenin’s resurrection?
It is true that at the time of Lenin’s death, the idea of preserving his body for the future circulated in popular media and discourse. The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party (CC) started receiving letters outlining different methods of preservation immediately after Lenin’s death. Sometimes these proposals were justified with the idea that they might enable the revival of Lenin in the future. On January 22, 1924, the day after Lenin’s death, two rank-and-file party members wrote to the CC with their own proposed method. The body would have to be “gradually frozen with regular cold, and after that immersed in water in a bath or another vessel and frozen as transparent mass of ice, with the body located in the middle.” The uniqueness of the Communist project called for unique measures: “there is nothing rare about burying [the body] in the ground,” they argued. “But to preserve it for thousands of years—this can be achieved only by the Communist party, which will later be able even to revive it.”10
In fact, in the summer 1924 Lenin’s body was embalmed, not frozen. If we considered how exactly this was done and how this body has been maintained ever since, all talk about “resurrection” as an implicit rationale behind this project would appear highly improbable. The scientists of the Mausoleum Lab that has maintained Lenin’s body since 1924, who fully re-embalm it every eighteen months, sneer at the suggestions (not uncommon in the media and popular discourse today) that Lenin might have been preserved in hope of future revival. These scientists know that Lenin’s body is missing the brain, which was taken out immediately after death, conserved in formaldehyde, and dissected into thirty-one thousand extra-thin slices, with each slice preserved between two plates of glass for microscopic study.11 They also know that all other internal organs had been taken out during autopsy, and that for decades most of the body’s remaining tissues (muscles, fats, tendons, layers of skin) have been so thoroughly augmented [213]with artificial inorganic materials, and in some cases completely supplemented by them, that talking about this body in purely biological terms is hardly possible (Yurchak 2015a).
Of course, that the scientists think in this way today does not necessarily mean that the party leadership did not entertain the idea of resurrection at the initial stages of this project, in 1924. To understand how the Party leaders thought about Lenin’s body then, we may eavesdrop on the meetings of the Commission for the Preservation of Lenin’s Memory, where the fate of this body was discussed in 1924 and later. In fact, many high-ranking members of this Commission and of the Party leadership, including Trotsky, Bukharin, Voroshilov, and Lenin’s widow Krupskaya were adamantly opposed to the idea of preservation, calling it anti-Marxist (Yurchak 2015a). And even though the plan to preserve Lenin’s body for display finally won after several months of debates, this plan was discussed in terms that were hardly compatible with the idea of “revival.” For example, from the beginning preserving a dynamic form of this body—its outward look, weight, flexibility, suppleness, water balance, et cetera—took precedence over the preservation of its actual biomatter. Constitutive biomaterials could be changed as long as the dynamic form remained preserved. The method of freezing the body, which was proposed initially (in early 1924), was rather quickly rejected with the similar rationale in mind: a frozen body would maintain all of its postmortem physical defects, would become stiff, and could not be resculpted and improved with supplementary materials. Special commissions consisting of Party leaders and scientists continued to inspect the body regularly throughout the Soviet history. It appears from their reports that maintaining a dynamic form of this body had been always more important than preserving its biomateriality. Lenin’s body has increasingly become not a preserved corpse but a constructed sculpture, or at least a combination of the two (Yurchak 2015a, 2015b). Indeed, one of the leading scientists in the lab, and one of my key informants, often describes Lenin’s body as a live sculpture (Yurchak 2015a).
It is true that these efforts to maintain a particular kind of body can be interpreted today as attempts to keep it as forever undead or neither dead nor alive (the term live sculpture also points to this ambiguity). However, this condition of the body has little to do with literal biological life or resurrection. In fact, any talk of resurrecting Lenin had been seen by the Party as dangerous—it implicitly referred to the real person called Lenin, as opposed to the artificially constructed “Leninism” and its embodiment lying in the mausoleum that the Party created after Lenin’s death. Real Lenin was a politician who sometimes made mistakes and changed his opinions. Like any politician he was ambiguous and contradictory, which was dangerous for the “Lenin” of the unquestionable Truth that the Party had created. Indeed, it was precisely the attempts of the reformers in the Party leadership to return to “real” Lenin during perestroika, and to revive Lenin’s “real” voice, that spelled the end of the Soviet project (see my essay above). When the old Soviet metaphor that Lenin was “more alive than all the living” was finally taken literally, the Soviet Union disintegrated.
***
I am grateful to Anya Bernstein, and to the editors of HAU, for making this discussion possible and letting me articulate some new idea and challenge me to develop [214]old ones. As Bernstein points out in the end of her comments, the initial project of the party and its scientists for the preservation of Lenin’s body has been long transcended by social realities that followed Lenin’s death and more recently, the end of the Soviet Union. Today, Lenin continues to be the subject of heated debates in many parts of the former Soviet world, Lenin’s monuments continue to be toppled, or defended, and the future fate of Lenin’s body and the Lab that maintains it continue to be anyone’s guess.
Some of Bernstein’s comments and questions in this exchange are connected to her deep engagement with the topics of transhumanism, immortality, cryonic preservation, and resurrection, which are all central issues in the book that she is currently completing (and that I am looking forward to reading in the near future). I am planning to complete my own book on Lenin’s body and the science that developed around it, at about the same time, and expect many new exchanges between us, next time with both books in hand.


References
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Asad, Talal. 2008. “Reflections on blasphemy and secular criticism.” in Religion: Beyond a concept, edited by Hent de Vries, 580–609. New York: Fordham University Press.
Asad, Talal, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. 2009. Is critique secular? Blasphemy, injury, and free speech. Townsend Papers in the Humanities. Berkeley: University of California. http://escholarship.org/uc/item/84q9c6ft.
Bazin, André. 1960. “The ontology of the photographic image.” Film Quarterly 13 (4): 4–9.
Bernstein, Anya. 2013. “An inadvertent sacrifice: Body politics and sovereign power in the Pussy Riot affair.” Critical Inquiry 40 (1): 220–41.
———. 2014. “Caution, religion! Iconoclasm, secularism, and ways of seeing in post-Soviet art wars.” Public Culture 26 (3): 419–48.
———. unpublished. The future of immortality: Remaking life and death in contemporary Russia.
Cavell, Stanley. 1987. “What did Derrida want of Austin?” In Philosophical passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida, 42–65. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
———. 2015. “Must we mean what we say?” In Must we mean what we say? A book of essays, 1–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Derrida, Jacques. 1977. “Signature event context.” Glyph no. 1: 172–97. Reprinted in Jacques Derrida. 1988. Limited, Inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
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Mahmood, Saba. 2009. “Religious reason and secular affect: An incommensurable divide?” In Is critique secular? Blasphemy, injury, and free speech. Berkeley: University of California Press, 64–101. http://escholarship.org/uc/item/84q9c6ft.
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Une nécropolitique sacrée: Discussion sur l’essai d’Alexei Yurchak “Le Canon et le champignon: Lénine, le Sacré et l’effondrement soviétique”
Résumé : Dans cette réflexion Anya Bernstein et Alexei Yurchak parlent de l’essai de Yurchak  “Le Canon et le champignon: Lénine, le Sacré et l’effondrement soviétique,” également publié dans ce volume. Ils y évoquent certains passages de l’essai qui sont centraux pour comprendre le personnage de Lénine et son rôle dans l’histoire Soviétique, envisagent les perspectives ouvertes par l’essai et établissent des liens avec d’autres thèmes importants en anthropologie. Ces thèmes incluent notamment le sacré et le blasphème; la mort, la résurrection et l’immortalité; le langage, l’intentionnalité, et la responsabilité; la notion de voix, de ventriloquie et de vérité; et bien plus encore.
Anya BernsteinDepartment of Anthropology and Committee on Degrees in Social StudiesHarvard UniversityTozzer Anthropology Building 21821 Divinity AvenueCambridge, MA 02138USAabernstein@fas.harvard.edu
Alexei YurchakDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of California, Berkeley232 Kroeber HallBerkeley, CA 94720USAyurchak@berkeley.edu


___________________
1. Contrary to reports in the Euro-American press, which decried the decline of secularism in Russia, there are no official blasphemy laws in the Russian Criminal Code. Instead, these issues are covered by hate speech laws, which can involve the “offense of religious feelings.” See Anya Bernstein (2013) and (2014).
2. “Bogokhul’stvovat’.” Tolkovyi slovar’ Ozhegova (1949–92), cited from http://www.ozhegov.org/words/1964.shtml. Accessed September 2017.
3. “Koshchunstvo.” Tolkovyi slovar’ Ozhegova (1949–92), cited from http://www.ozhegov.org/words/13485.shtml. Accessed September 2017. While more in-depth etymology research on the origins of koshchunstvo might reveal different origins, here I refer only to contemporary usages. There is some evidence that koshchunstvo had a very different meaning, going back to pre-Christian Slavic folklore.
4. See Steven Lee Myers, “Novoi Rossii—novye ostanki,” Inosmi, October 10, 2005 (Russian translation of Myers’ article “For a new Russia, new relics”), http://inosmi.ru/inrussia/20051010/222868.html; “Nationalisty vozmushcheny slovami Putina o mavzolee Lenina,” Russkaia sluzhba BBC, December 11, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/12/121211_nationalists_putin_lenin_debate; see also commentaries to the article by Andrei Zaitsev, “Putin, Lenin i moshchi” which appeared on an Orthodox website, December 13, 2012. http://www.pravoslavie.ru/58115.html, accessed September 11, 2017.
5. Starting with the famous nineteenth-century lectures by William Robertson Smith on “the religion of Semites” (Smith 1894).
6. Bernstein’s parallel between Kurekhin’s provocative claim that “Lenin was a mushroom” and the discussion by anthropologists of the use of hallucinogenic mushrooms in Siberian shamanic practices is precise in more ways than one. In fact, when Kurekhin was preparing for this televised hoax in the early 1990s, he was reading Russian translations of the books by anthropologist Carlos Castaneda, which, although discredited since, referred to the use of hallucinogenic mushrooms in shamanic practices. Kurekhin based his ideas for the hoax partially on this reading (Yurchak 2011).
7. Anthropological evidence, of course, includes counterexamples, where the destruction of the body—for example, through endocannibalism—is as much an act of love and compassion for ancestors as the Fedorovian resurrection.
8. Setnitskii quotes Lenin’s famous phrase Vsiakii bozhen’ka est’ trupolozhstvo from his 1913 letter to Maksim Gor’kii.
9. The piece was written in 1928. One could argue that if Lenin’s embalmers indeed unconsciously wanted to preserve him for future resurrection, they had committed another blasphemy, as resurrection is a divine business and not a human one. Yet Setnitskii, following Fedorov, believes that active human involvement in bringing about the resurrection of the dead promised by Christianity—with the difference that Fedorov included all of the dead and not only the righteous or chosen ones—is part of the original divine plan. For lack of space, I cannot address the details of his argument (see Bernstein, unpublished).
10. RGASPI (Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History): ed. khr. 54, f. 16, op. 2c, papka 5, str. 45.
11. It took Russian and German scientists almost two years, between 1925 and 1927, to complete the cutting of Lenin’s brain into so many slices. See the story in Der Spiegel, in Russian translation: Marc von Lüpke. “Issledovania sovetskoi elity. Mozg Lenina v razreze.” December 5, 2014 (German original published on November 23, 2014), available at: http://inosmi.ru/world/20141205/224635979.html.
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>This has a name: Witchcraft, suspicion, and circumlocution in Central Angola</article-title>
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				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Dulley</surname>
						<given-names>Iracema</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
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					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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				<day>08</day>
				<month>08</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="103">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.2</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The literature on witchcraft has focused predominantly on the accusation of witches, the procedures for establishing guilt, and the effects thereof. However, during my fieldwork in Central Angola, I did not encounter processes of accusation but rather a prevailing mood of unresolved suspicion. Drawing on ethnographic research conducted between 2014 and 2019, this paper theorizes the relationship between witchcraft and suspicion by examining the micro level of social interactions in which witchcraft narratives emerge. It explores how suspicion operates through circumlocution and tautology, arguing that it thrives on indeterminacy, doubt, and suspended indication—elements that structure the dialectic between the general and the particular in witchcraft. This tension allows the relationship between witchcraft and witches to remain open, conditioned not only by social conventions of plausibility and hierarchical relations that position witches and sorcerers but also by the contingencies of how these conventions are enacted in specific interactions.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1273</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-12-22T11:55:22Z</datestamp>
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			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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				<article-title>Do Germans smell like a rose? Phagia, philia, phobia</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Do Germans smell like a rose? Phagia, philia, phobia</trans-title>
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					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Borneman</surname>
						<given-names>John</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Princeton University</aff>
					<email>borneman@princeton.edu</email>
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				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Ghassem-Fachandi</surname>
						<given-names>Parvis</given-names>
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					<aff>Rutgers University</aff>
					<email>parvis@anthropology.rutgers.edu</email>
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					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>22</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2017</year>
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			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date>
			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="405">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 John Borneman, Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2017</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to comments on Borneman, John, and Parvis Ghassem- Fachandi. 2017. “The concept of Stimmung: From indifference to xenophobia in Germany’s refugee crisis.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (3): 105–135.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to comments on Borneman, John, and Parvis Ghassem- Fachandi. 2017. “The concept of Stimmung: From indifference to xenophobia in Germany’s refugee crisis.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (3): 105–135.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<datestamp>2023-06-18T20:32:29Z</datestamp>
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				<article-title>The logic of magic: Reading Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer’s The golden bough</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article centers on a close reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s The golden bough, showing how Wittgenstein’s Remarks offer a prescient view of anthropology. More than a critique of Frazerian evolutionism, the Remarks sit on the vertiginous edge of anthropological and philosophical interest, opening onto questions like: “what are the limits of thought?” and “how do we learn something new?” This article deepens an understanding of the Remarks by examining moments at which they reconsider Wittgenstein’s own prior work, namely the Tractatus logico-philosophicus. By contextualizing the Remarks in a broader movement of thought—one that spans, fissures, and connects what are conventionally isolated as Wittgenstein’s “early” and “late” work—it explores an isomorphism suggested by the Remarks between what Wittgenstein calls “philosophical” and anthropological “problems.” In doing so this article presents, and enacts, a version of Wittgenstein’s thought that might serve as a compelling, albeit mercurial, exemplar for anthropological inquiry.</p></abstract>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this account of interspecies intimacy in the enclaved institution of the Nepali elephant stable, I explore not-just-human figurations of personhood and argue for the methodological inclusion of nonhuman informants as subjective actors and contributing participants in ethnographic research. I explain how my experience forming a trusting, working relationship with a female elephant in a hybrid community of humans and elephants revealed the conceptual limitations of a human-focused tradition of ethnography ill-equipped for the generative sociality of interspecies encounters. I discuss questions of nonhuman personhood and I consider developments in the animal behavioral sciences, while also investigating the cultural logic by which Nepali mahouts attribute personhood to their elephants. This exploration of apprenticeship, personhood, and affective encounter is situated in a distinctly interspecies strand of multispecies studies, and is a contribution to ethnoelephantology as an interdisciplinary approach to the social, historical, and ecological relations between humans and elephants.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In this account of interspecies intimacy in the enclaved institution of the Nepali elephant stable, I explore not-just-human figurations of personhood and argue for the methodological inclusion of nonhuman informants as subjective actors and contributing participants in ethnographic research. I explain how my experience forming a trusting, working relationship with a female elephant in a hybrid community of humans and elephants revealed the conceptual limitations of a human-focused tradition of ethnography ill-equipped for the generative sociality of interspecies encounters. I discuss questions of nonhuman personhood and I consider developments in the animal behavioral sciences, while also investigating the cultural logic by which Nepali mahouts attribute personhood to their elephants. This exploration of apprenticeship, personhood, and affective encounter is situated in a distinctly interspecies strand of multispecies studies, and is a contribution to ethnoelephantology as an interdisciplinary approach to the social, historical, and ecological relations between humans and elephants.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Elephants as persons, affective apprenticeship, and fieldwork with nonhuman informants in Nepal






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Piers Locke. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.1.024
Elephants as persons, affective apprenticeship, and fieldwork with nonhuman informants in Nepal
Piers LOCKE, University of Canterbury


In this account of interspecies intimacy in the enclaved institution of the Nepali elephant stable, I explore not-just-human figurations of personhood and argue for the methodological inclusion of nonhuman informants as subjective actors and contributing participants in ethnographic research. I explain how my experience forming a trusting, working relationship with a female elephant in a hybrid community of humans and elephants revealed the conceptual limitations of a human-focused tradition of ethnography ill-equipped for the generative sociality of interspecies encounters. I discuss questions of nonhuman personhood and I consider developments in the animal behavioral sciences, while also investigating the cultural logic by which Nepali mahouts attribute personhood to their elephants. This exploration of apprenticeship, personhood, and affective encounter is situated in a distinctly interspecies strand of multispecies studies, and is a contribution to ethnoelephantology as an interdisciplinary approach to the social, historical, and ecological relations between humans and elephants.
Keywords: apprenticeship learning, human-elephant relations, nonhuman personhood, multispecies studies, ethnoelephantology, mahouts, Nepal


It is 5 a.m. and as I open the door of my hut I see Sitasma Kali and Kha Prasad silhouetted in the wintry mist. Mother and baby are waiting as usual, tethered to their post, ready for the first duty of the day: grass cutting. Barefoot, armed with a stick and a sickle, and carrying a sack to sit on, I approach my elephant companion. As usual, she extends her trunk, curling it around me for an olfactory probing in what has become a communicative ritual of loving trust. Her warm breath caresses my skin as my hand [354]strokes the delightful grooves of her many-muscled trunk. She is the only elephant I submit myself to in this way. Another could easily respond with violent animosity.
I give the command “baith!” and Sitasma descends delicately, crouching on her knees. I remove the sikri (tethering chain) that connects her right foot to the kambha (post), and put a kasni (neck chain) around her large, wrinkled neck. I use the sack to gently beat the dust off her, and then I make the gesture of supplication that connects my head and my heart to her divine body. Now I am ready to mount her. I am sitting on a sack on her neck, positioned between the hairy crown of her head and her bony shoulders. I insert my feet into the atargal (braided stirrups) that connect to the kasni. Now I am ready to apply my toes to the soft skin behind her ears, establishing a kinesthetic union of human and elephant. I shout “maiel!” Sitasma stands, and I depress my toes to communicate a request to move forward. Accompanied by her infant son Kha, we plod off toward the river, beyond which lie the grasslands where we will cut fodder for the day.
***
The human-elephant relationship intimated here is not just a peak experience from the ethnographic odyssey of an anthropologist in a culturally foreign space. It also represents a privileged form of intimate, interspecies relations rarely subject to ethnographic inquiry. By thinking about human-elephant relations in terms of intersubjective interactions, considering elephants as persons or near-persons with whom one produces social relations, my ethnography raises questions about human exceptionalism in ethnographic methodology. This exceptionalism is evident in humanist scholarship that suggests humans alone can be disregarded from the webs of interspecies dependency by which we understand other life (Haraway 2008: 11). Posthumanist critiques of the ways in which humanity has been conceptually segregated from other life forms are relevant here (Castree et al. 2004), as are the biocultural sciences of sentient and socially complex mammals that suggest culture, in the qualified sense of socially acquired and transmitted knowledge and behavior, is not unique to humans (Byrne et al. 2004).
These challenges to the conceptual binary of the cultural human and the natural animal inform many ethnographies of shared life that are emerging in response to both the ontological insularity of humanism and the ecological de-contextualization that it encourages (Latour 1998: 16). Unlike previous work in the socio-cultural anthropology of human-animal relations (see Mullin 1999), this work seeks to overcome the compartmentalizing limitations of the “two cultures” of the sciences and the humanities by attending to disciplinary knowledge from both domains. This posthumanist “multispecies turn” also exceeds an exclusively zoological concern, recognizing that even primarily dyadic interactions between human and nonhuman animals involve other kinds of living agents, as Celia Lowe and Ursula Münster (2016) demonstrate with regard to humans, elephants, and the herpes virus, for instance.
Applying insights from the sciences and the humanities, theorists have been arguing that not only humans engage in semiosis (Kohn 2013), that not only humans exercise meaningful agency (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010), that we should recognize that human life is constituted not in opposition to but through relations with animal others (Lestel and Taylor 2013: 183), that humans construct their social and [355]ecological niches in consort with companion species (Fuentes and Kohn 2012), and therefore that there can and should be an “anthropology beyond humanity” (Ingold 2013). These are just a few key assertions from a more-than-human approach gaining traction in the humanities and social sciences, perhaps most evident in anthropology, geography, and science and technology studies (Locke and Münster 2015). Indeed, the concerns and perspectives shared by such discipline-specific developments as “multispecies ethnography” (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Ogden, Hall, and Tanita 2013), “more-than-human geography” (Whatmore 2006; Panelli 2010), and even “transspecies history” (Nance 2013; Baker 2016) warrant recognition of a more inclusive discursive space. This has now been advanced with the proposal for “multispecies studies” recenty made by Thom van Dooren, Eben Kirksey, and Ursula Münster (2016). The authors argue that we should “cultivate arts of attentiveness” by embracing a range of approaches for knowing and understanding others, by unsettling given notions, by considering modes of classifying and categorizing, and by considering the ways in which forms of life constitute worlds in consort, an agenda that informs the concerns of this article.
Informed by a conceptual tool kit that emphasizes mutuality, becoming, and entanglement, multispecies studies represents a site for a diverse array of work that helps to reframe knowledge and redirect understanding through explorations of multispecies networks and interspecies interactions. Anna Tsing and colleagues, for instance, collaboratively elucidate the connections between humans, pine forests, and matsutake mushrooms in economic and ecological processes involving knowledge, livelihood, and commodification at multiple sites (e.g., Choy et al. 2009; Tsing 2015). Marcus Baynes-Rock, by contrast, explores a particular dyadic relation between humans and hyenas at the singular site of Harar, Ethiopia, where these bone-eating scavengers uniquely share urban space with human city dwellers (2015). These cases, the first focusing on multiple, networked agency, the second on intimate interspecies relations, indicate the divergent possibilities of multispecies studies in terms of scope, focus, and method, while sharing a concern with the ways in which humans advance their projects and make their worlds with nonhuman others that are conceived as more than merely passive biotic and semiotic matter. Perhaps the crucial distinction here is between the presence or absence of interactive subjectivities, at least as our zoocentric perspective inclines us to recognize. Indeed, it is now possible to recognize a particular strand of multispecies studies that focuses on interspecies intimacies, often through productive engagements with the animal behavioral sciences (for a literature review of multispecies ethnography, its allied approaches, its particular trajectories, and formative theoretical resources, see Locke and Münster 2015).
This article pursues this focus on specifically interspecies ethnography, and argues that we need to reconsider the cross-species continuities between humans and similarly sentient companion species while also considering how their lives have been jointly configured through their social, historical, and ecological intersections (Locke 2013, 2016a). It does so by attending to the affective aspects of an ethnographic apprenticeship as a mahout in the government stables of the Chitwan National Park, Nepal, an occasionally dangerous form of skilled custodial labor. Through focus on empathetic and embodied engagement with an elephant (hatti in Nepali) named Sitasma Kali, it concerns life in a community of humans and [356]elephants so morally and practically entangled that it may be described as hybrid (Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006). It also considers the multiple, malleable, and culturally variable character of ideas about personhood, not always restricted to anthropic figurations. In so doing, I acknowledge that conceptions of personhood rooted in Western thought are deployed by the animal sciences to make moral and legal arguments for nonhuman personhood, that local understanding produces a figuration of personhood based on a logic of permeability between animals, persons, and gods, while also interrogating my intersubjective experience apprenticing as a mahout. I therefore explain how I was compelled to reconceive my research as an ethnographic study with two types of person—only one of which is human—by presenting an experiential account of a relationship forged across species boundaries. This represents a methodological disruption to the typically humanist constraints of ethnography, in that elephants not only came to represent subjective actors but also participating research informants.
The site for this interspecies relationship is the enclaved institution of the government elephant stable or sarkari hattisar, a regimented space where human and elephant lives are bound together in service to the imperatives of protected area management (Locke 2011a). The human occupational community that constitutes this institution draws on a long history in Nepal of capturing and managing elephants for trade, tribute, hunting, and ceremony (Locke 2011b). Physically enclosed and socially segregated, and with its own distinctive Hindu ritual practices, the hattisar represents a total institution since virtually all aspects of life are conducted together, under a single authority and according to a systematic schedule, deriving from a rational plan (Goffman 1961). However, comprising a hybrid occupational community of humans and elephants, whose handlers variously treat elephants as animals, as persons, and as gods, this may be better conceived as a multispecies total institution (Locke 2011a, 2013, 2016b). The particular hattisar at which I apprenticed—with the original objective of documenting the skilled practice and expert knowledge of a human occupational community—was the Khorsor Elephant Breeding Center. At this stable, pregnant females are brought to give birth, and their offspring are trained for working life in the National Parks and protected areas of Nepal’s lowland Tarai (see the documentary film “Servants of Ganesh,” Dugas and Locke 2010). This enables the government, as a signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to maintain its population of working elephants now that it is no longer able to legally purchase elephants across national borders.
It is from this location among a community of breeding elephants and their handlers that I explore ideas of nonhuman personhood in relation to fieldwork experience, locally configured understandings, and the cognitive and behavioral animal sciences, three different but intersecting sites for figuring the significance of the subjective agency of elephants. This exploration of human-elephant companionship is also conceptually situated in relation to ethnoelephantology, an emerging framework for understanding multiple aspects of the human-elephant nexus through time and across space (Locke 2013). Inspired by ethnoprimatology, the interdisciplinary study of human-primate interactions (Fuentes 2010, 2012), it argues for recognition of the shared subjective agency of human and elephant, the generative sociality of their imbricated lives and landscapes, and the [357]applicability of methodological perspectives from the social and natural sciences to better understand this kind of interspecies intersection (Locke 2013; Locke and Buckingham 2016). This partly involves recognition of the common concerns and practices of ethology and ethnography as ultimately similar forms of social and environmental research (Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006; Lestel, Bussolini, and Chrulew 2014), and hence an attempt to integrate multiple forms of disciplinary knowledge.

Empathy, experience, and apprenticeship
Ethnoelephantology also represents an attempt at theorizing an integrated framework for investigating the myriad interconnections that bind humans to free roaming, captive, and symbolic elephants through enterprises of power, wealth, worship, pleasure, and preservation. The use of the “ethno-” prefix then refers not to the constructed understandings of particular human groups, as with ethnobiology and its cognates, but to the consideration of anthropogenic influences that configure the ecological, physiological, and social aspects of nonhuman life (Fuentes 2010: 601). This approach to human-elephant relations contributes then to an interspecies strand of multispecies studies as an attempt at articulating “more-than-human” and sometimes also “not-just-animal” approaches to shared life. This work challenges the ontological binaries of humanism, with its polarities of nature and culture, human and animal, subject and object, that have served to sequester humanity in what many posthumanist and multispecies thinkers consider an epistemologically impoverished space of ecological segregation. However, it is crucial to appreciate that my personal, in situ conviction regarding nonhuman personhood that I discuss here preceded anthropological theorization, the emergence of multispecies ethnography, and my familiarity with posthumanist thinking, arising instead from the transformative intensity of fieldwork with more than one social species capable of expressing intentional agency and interspecies empathy.
In my experience of participant observation the sarkari hattisar elephants as well as humans came to fulfill the role of informant, leading me to question the Western idea that implicitly equates humanity with personhood. In Western modernity, the latter has been considered an exclusive attribute of the former as self-knowing, self-directing agents in social worlds (Taylor 1985). This had the effect of precluding the possibility of nonhuman individuals as decisive agents. Indeed, we can locate this Western conception of personhood in Enlightenment social contract theory, from which developed legal theories of moral responsibility concerned with the capacities by which individuals make informed decisions about the conditions of their existence (Collier, Maurer, and Suárez-Navaz 1997). At this time, too, I was unaware of the extent to which the animal behavioral and cognitive sciences blur the boundaries implied by this exceptionalist view, confirming elephants also as self-conscious, intentional, and social beings (Poole and Moss 2008). Philosopher Gary Varner, for instance, reviews evidence for autonoetic consciousness in elephants (which basically refers to a reflexive awareness of one’s own life in the past, present, and future), which he uses as a proxy with which to infer and argue for the personhood of elephants (2008). Indeed, these criteria of self-consciousness [358]from the animal sciences converge with these legal traditions of the sovereign individual in arguments for nonhuman personhood made by ethical theorists (Mitchell 1993). Such arguments are increasingly coming to court in order to secure legal rights for nonhuman animals, although they raise further questions for humans as the moral agents granting the status of personhood (Riddle 2014).
It is crucial, however, that in questioning the parameters of personhood, I did so without concern for authoritative legal judgment or scientific opinion, and that I did so through my ethnographic willingness to surrender my being and open myself to new modes of experience (Benedict 1948 in Rubenstein 2004: 1048). Indeed, Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world depends on the claim that our practical involvement with a world that cannot be separated from the perceiving self comes prior to the actions of a cogitating ego (Willerslev 2007: 21). Only later did I focus my attention on local logics of personhood, and furnish my direct experience of engaging with elephants as persons with theoretical justifications. It was the primacy of experience that enabled me to initiate a process of mutual becoming (Haraway 2008) through which Sitasma and I attuned our bodies and our selves, only possible because I was granted the privilege of apprenticing as a mahout, or [359]hattisare as they are known in Chitwan.
From the outset, my hosts expressed the conviction that I could never truly understand their working life unless I too became a hattisare. This not only coincided with my methodological convictions about fieldwork as a form of apprenticeship, and the limitations of verbal exposition in learning and acculturation (Bloch 1991: 194; Ingold 1993: 222), but also with my personal hopes for a project inspired by Mark Shand’s account of the relationship he developed with an elephant named Tara that he rode across India (Shand 1991). However, I had to wait for access to the participatory experience that would admit me to the exclusive world of the hattisare. When the adikrit subba, the chief mahout, designated me to apprentice with Sitasma Kali, a 20-year-old female of good temperament who was always accompanied by her two-year-old son, Kha Prasad, I experienced a moment of ecstatic joy and excited anticipation. Sporting a finely waxed moustache and exuding confident authority, the adikrit subba, whom we all respectfully addressed as “section sahib” (since he is chief of the government’s elephant section), granted me permission like any other edict a commanding officer might issue. Rather than merely tolerated, I now felt my presence in the hattisar was accepted, by the humans if not yet by the elephants.
I understood his authorization as an endorsement of the experiential aspirations I held for my research, realizing that with this momentous decision he had consolidated his position as patron of my research. No longer just a foreign researcher, I had now been admitted to the ranks as a novice handler, an honorary mahut, obliged to diligently participate in the corporeal practices of elephant care, and to obey the members of Sitasma’s care team. This comprised Dipendra, her mahut, the lowest rank primarily responsible for keeping an elephant’s stable space clean; Tej Narayan, her patchuwa or grass-cutter; and Ram Ekval, her phanet or driver/trainer, as well as Ram Lotan, the phanet for Kha, who would have the responsibility of accompanying him through the transformative initiation of training when he reached the age of three. With my new status as something of a “privileged idiot,” I was able to engage in the daily routines and interspecies encounters of life in the hattisar, to experience otherwise unobtainable camaraderie, and most crucially, to develop my own physical and emotional relationship with an elephant.
The exertions of hattisare labor in the stable, in the forests, grasslands, and rivers as well as on elephant back, not only enabled me to appreciate the rigors of the elephant handling profession but also to attempt to master new skills, including the sensual, embodied communication with nonhuman companions that only develops through sustained interaction between human and elephant selves. Few dispensations were made just because I was the foreign researcher. Thus, from the outset I had to ride Sitasma bareback; there would be no gada for me (a padded cushion made of sackcloth filled with dried grass) and certainly no hauda (a balustraded seat secured on top of a gada to provide passengers a safe and comfortable ride). Riding astride Sitasma’s bony spine as she ambled along jungle trails and forded rivers was at first far from comfortable (better when loaded with bundles of cut grass), but it did allow me to learn the feel of her moving body and adapt my comportment to it. Indeed, the acquisition of a mutually attuned bodily proficiency represented one of the most crucial and foundational aspects of my apprenticeship with Sitasma. Later I would theorize this empathetic and embodied apprenticeship by drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-schema (1962), Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of the habitus as a system of acquired dispositions (1977, 1990; Acciaioli 1981; Crossley 2001), and Thorstein Gieser’s argument for the role of empathy in apprenticeship learning (2008).
My forays into the forests on elephant back represented more than just participation in authentic forms of hattisare practice: it was also about the sensuality of touch in communicating with, caring for, and being cared for by Sitasma. When I sat in the more comfortable and more intimate driving position, her warm ears flapping on my bare legs, I would be drawn to the alluring divot between the hemispheres of her gently bobbing head. I would stroke the curiously coarse hairs there, and I would enjoy the warm breath from her occasionally probing trunk that seemed to signify affection. I also demonstrated attentive care by swatting the flies whose bites draw blood (elephants, as I learned, are not thick-skinned as commonly asserted, and as suggested by the obsolete taxonomic order pachydermata). In so doing, I appreciated that she was sacrificing the opportunity to cover herself with protective soil by carrying a rider. If I dropped my stick (kocha), which I carried to discipline her should the need arise (the ankus, or spiked hook is not used by Nepali hattisare), she would pick it up and hand it to me with her trunk. Such were the visceral delights and habits of affectionate care that characterized our kinesthetic union.
Vinciane Despret’s examination of how scientists use their bodies when engaging the animals they observe is helpful here (2013). Discussing a range of cases, including the primatological fieldwork of Barbara Smuts and Shirley Strum among baboons, she argues that forms of embodied communication are crucial for establishing empathetic relations, which in turn are crucial for the understandings ethologists develop. Despret develops the notion of “embodied empathy,” which is particularly useful for thinking about the affective relations I consider between Sitasma and me. Of course, for much of the twentieth century, techniques of “embodied empathy” were downplayed in the accounts of animal ethologists, since that would imply reciprocal interactions at variance with the purely observational ethos [360]of the discipline. As Despret notes, these were transgressions for which Strum and Smuts attracted harsh critique, since they adopted the stance of an ethnographer as Strum herself admits, allowing themselves to be educated by their subjects through embodied interactions, just as I did as an anthropologist with Sitasma (albeit in a rather more tactile way, and in a context of shared dwelling with elephant individuals already acculturated to humans).
Even if it was not widely accepted at first, these primatologists’ attempts to use their own bodies in order to participate with their subjects, particularly regarding learning and mimicking baboon body language, were not without precedent. For instance, Konrad Lorenz, a foundational figure in ethology, famously allowed geese and jackdaws to imprint on him. Precedent can similarly be found for the attempts of Smuts and Strum to make sense of animal perspectives rather than just behavior, as the “phenomenological biology” of Jakob von Uexküll testifies. Most significant is his umwelt theory of the perceptual worlds of meaningful dwelling that species construct and inhabit by virtue of the sensory apparatus, bodily capacities, and environmental affordances particular to them in their habitats (see von Uexküll 1957).
All of this has significant implications for multispecies ethnography, ethnoelephantology, and my interspecies apprenticeship. The case of Smuts and Strum indicates a blurring of the disciplinary practices of ethnography and ethology, the productive possibilities of which are explored by Dominique Lestel and his colleagues (Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006). More recently, Lestel and colleagues argue, rather provocatively, that ethology ought to be incorporated into the social sciences, or at least a version no longer exclusive to humans (Lestel, Bussolini, and Chrulew 2014). Setting aside this bold proposal of appropriation and disciplinary reconfiguration, this work helps establish a mandate for no longer restricting ethnography to human life, especially important for those works of multispecies ethnography that focus on intersubjective relations, and that seek to integrate traditionally divergent forms of disciplinary expertise. For myself, of course, I only belatedly realized the need to attend more closely to expertise concerning a species my anthropological training had not prepared me for. This contrasts with Baynes-Rock’s work on humans and hyenas in Harar (2013, 2015), which was simultaneously informed by animal ethology and human ethnography from the outset. In addition to Lestel’s arguments regarding “etho-ethnology” and “ethno-ethology” (2006), aspects of von Uexküll’s approach seem similarly significant, resonating in the multispecies work of anthropologists like Eduardo Kohn, concerned with more-than-human semiosis in ecological systems (2013), and Tim Ingold, concerned with the perceptual interpenetrations and behavioral adjustments of shared dwelling, demonstrated with regard to humans and reindeer (2013).
Returning to my companionship with Sitasma, our intimate interactions revealed to me personal recognition, intentionality, playfulness, attentive concern, and an ability to convey preferences and desires. As I would learn, these are constituents of what animal behavioral scientists identify as empathic consciousness (Bates et al. 2008). And following Despret’s argument, it was by virtue of the embodied relationship that developed between us that I was alerted to this. As a result of our tactile communication and the trusting bond it produced, even before investigating the discursive genealogy of Western personhood and the possibility [361]of its extension beyond the human, I experienced Sitasma not just as an individual but also as a person, at least in operational terms. In this sense, I did so in a pretheorized way since my direct, affective experience was produced by immersion in joint, intersubjective action (see Ingold 1992). What had been originally conceived as an ethnographic study of human expertise in captive animal management could no longer be sustained in such constraining terms. An ethological impulse to attend to animal behavior intruded upon my research project, as did an urge to ethnographically incorporate my relationship with a nonhuman companion. Sitasma and the other elephants had not only become subjective actors but also informing participants with whom I developed the social relations necessary for communicative understanding. This challenged the humanist basis of ethnography that makes it ontologically ill equipped to treat nonhuman beings as ultimately anything but animate objects.


Reverence, gift-giving, and identity
Nutritional gifts for elephants were another aspect of my affective apprenticeship that warrants attention. Not only relevant to building rapport with and facilitating obedience from Sitasma, these gifts also provide insight into the reverential attitudes that inflect human relations with elephants in the hattisar. Every day we would make dana with the grass we had cut and transported from the interior of the National Park. These are bite-sized grass packages filled with unhusked rice, salt, and molasses. In the interests of nutritional prudence and a ritual acknowledgment of elephant divinity however, the salt and molasses would be left out on Tuesdays, the day of Mars, the planet associated with the elephant-headed god Ganesh, while at the nearby Sauraha hattisar these ingredients were also left out on Sundays, when posts commemorating dead elephants were ritually venerated. These packages represent a crucial part of the elephants’ supplementary diet, which help mitigate the time captive elephants spend working rather than grazing, as they would in their free roaming state. However, they are also important as an item of exchange with which a handler mediates his relationship with his elephant. My initially clumsy attempts at making dana provoked laughter from my new human colleagues. I felt duty bound to invest my effort in perfecting their production though, since Ram Ekval, the phanet and chief of Sitasma’s care team made it clear that these nutritional packages would be crucial for me to foster an effective relationship with Sitasma.
In India these grass packages are commonly called kuchi, but it is highly significant that in Nepal they are called dana. Although dana means gift, it is different from a merely mundane gift or upavar. Rather, dana denotes a religious offering. This became acutely meaningful to me when a phanet named Satya Narayan made the following statement of apology during the training of a juvenile elephant called Paras Gaj: “We ride you as an inferior servant, but we know that you are a superior god” (Dugas and Locke 2010). It is understood that every elephant is imbued with the divine substance of Ganesh, a theriomorphic deity represented as a four-armed being with an elephant head. Combining the anthropoid with the elephantine, for hattisare the symbol of Ganesh might be seen to reflect the parallel and paradoxical [362]identities of devotee and god, servant and master in relations between handlers and elephants.
Thus, the giving of dana as a “meal” in the afternoon after daytime grazing, and at other times as a “snack” to secure cooperation, should not merely be seen instrumentally as a “bribe” but also as an act of reverence for acknowledging the divinity inherent within the elephant, while also signifying your commitment to the companion upon whom your livelihood depends. Rather than representing an ideology that mystifies a purely transactional relationship, I found the meaning of dana for handlers was indicative of a relationship that binds human and elephant together in a condition of reciprocal mutuality. This gift is most certainly not the tainted “Indian gift” that transfers the sins of the giver, the gift that pays for ritual services (Parry 1986; Raheja 1988). Instead, this is the sacrificial gift presented to the gods, who are immune to the transfer of impurity. This gift literally and symbolically feeds one of their living embodiments, a contrast to typical Hindu worship (puja) in which digestible gifts are presented to images of gods (devako murti), and then consumed as consecrated leftovers (prasad) (Fuller 1979).
Hattisare do not merely receive loyalty and obedience in exchange for preparing and giving dana (the production of which also depends on the elephant’s labor in collecting the grass for their production); it is also one of many practices that engenders a loving commitment, part of that process of mutual becoming to which I earlier referred. A young mahut named Birendra explained: “Being without your elephant would be like chopping off your hand—it’s because of our elephants that we can survive, and that’s why we must love them.” Birendra may be acknowledging his material dependence on his elephant for his livelihood, but he is also acknowledging how integral that relationship is to his social identity as a hattisare, and reciprocally, how important it is to discharge his duty to his elephant. The captive elephant is thus revealed as an icon of both livelihood and occupational identity, for which hattisare avoid distinguishing the sentimental from the instrumental.


Autonomy, consciousness, and mutuality
The profound mutuality of this interspecies relationship became increasingly evident as I learned other core duties of elephant care, the most important of which are taking your elephant to graze and to bathe. After early morning grass cutting, and the preparation of dana, hattisare would take the first of their two daily meals of rice and lentils (dal bhat). Then it would be time to head out into the forests, savannas, and rivers of the park in the heat of the day, returning mid-afternoon. During grazing we usually chose to team up with other elephant-handler teams, determined by intersecting networks of interpersonal relationships among elephants and among handlers. This was the primary situation for Sitasma and me to develop and sustain the embodied empathy of our interspecies relationship.
As in the vignette with which I began this article, upon mounting my elephant companion, I would reverentially touch Sitasma’s flank with the first two fingers of my right hand before touching my forehead and my chest (signifying the heart), just as when one anoints oneself with tika powder as prasad (the consecrated leftovers from performing a devotional act of sacrificial worship). Ram Ekval explained to [363]me that this was the hattisare way of acknowledging our elephant’s divinity, and requesting the goodwill of Ganesh while riding his incarnation. Upon reflection, I came to realize that acts like these were not merely an aspect of the etiquette of human-elephant relations—they were also an implicit recognition of the elephant’s autonomy, of their being-in-the-world, their capability to make their own decisions rather than just follow our commands.
Just as no interpersonal relationship among humans can be truly considered unconditional, so it is between elephants and mahouts. The elephant’s commitment is conditional, but not just according to conventional understandings of Pavlovian positive reinforcement and other approaches to the behavioral processes and economic utilities of animal learning theory (Schultz 2006). There is more at stake than the fulfillment of an elephant’s needs and appetites in exchange for obedience and cooperation. Such a purely instrumental view would only perpetuate the human exceptionalism arising from the human/animal dualism that has animated both humanist scholarship and the animal sciences. In such models of domination there is little conceptual space to accommodate the dynamic mutuality of the human-elephant relationship integral to Nepali hattisare practice and the interspecies community it produces.
Like the hattisare, I came to understand “my” elephant as a conscious person with desires not entirely dissimilar to my own, with whom I could develop a relationship involving meaningful, two-way communication, and crucially, as a being who could reject her human companion if she wished. Indeed, the unwritten social contract between human and elephant is typically severed as old age approaches, when the elephant chooses to retire itself through increasing absences from the stable. This is the time in their life when their final set of molars wear down, after which they will no longer be capable of digesting food. I saw this myself with an elephant named Chanchal Kali, an aging, almost blind elephant at the hattisar of the Biodiversity Conservation Center in nearby Sauraha, a hub for Chitwan ecotourism. Her absences were accepted with a degree of sadness, since their significance as a harbinger of her impending death were understood.
Just as it took me time to appreciate the implication of autonomy in the act of reverence when mounting your elephant, so too the language of driving initially misled me. Although we spoke in terms that seemed to imply a perspective of handler-directed control and domination, it was only later that I realized this linguistic framing served to obfuscate what was also understood in terms of dynamic mutuality. Again, it was my affective and corporeal experience apprenticing with Sitasma that clarified the status of such commentaries. As I began my driving training, the patient Ram Ekval showed me how to give instructions by applying pressure with my toes behind Sitasma’s ears, that intimate space of sensual contact only experienced by an elephant’s driver. With his broad, welcoming grin he explained the various vocal commands handlers also use, and how to discipline Sitasma with a strike of the stick on her forehead. This instruction seemed to confirm a relationship of domination, albeit one tempered by the sensual engagement of human and elephant bodies familiar with each other. However, we both knew that verbal instruction alone would be as sufficient as expecting someone to master riding a bicycle without first falling off. Thus, Ram Ekval was bound to let me try for myself. More than merely the mechanics of an animate machine to master though, [364]mahouting with Sitasma represented an intersubjective relationship to be engendered. With such an affable temperament, she willingly let herself be driven by an inexperienced foreigner whom she had only known for a short time. It was within her power not to tolerate me if she did not want to, but gladly, she did. Instruction was then but a prelude to embodied and empathetic learning, which not only defies verbal exposition but also requires development of an interpersonal relationship between handler and elephant (see Gieser 2008).
Sitasma was teaching me, even elephantizing me a little. A wiggle of her head would inform me I was misapplying my toes, her insistence on turning left when I was trying to turn right during grazing would be revealed not as disobedience on her part but rather her way of directing me toward the plant matter she liked for food or medicine (on self-medicating practices among elephants see Piyadasa 1994: 472). I needed to know such things if we were to understand each other. By learning to be together we began operating with knowing synergy. The handlers confirmed this: of course your elephant teaches you, of course you have to develop an empathetic understanding of each other, because “elephants are just like people too.” This was a sentiment I heard many handlers express on many occasions, and the treatment of elephants as merely servile, animate machines (cf. Ingold 1994: 8) was a trope of cautionary tales in which bad handlers get what they deserve. My revelations were old news to my human colleagues, but my excited commentaries evoked a recognition of shared experience resistant to verbal articulation, of someone just beginning to acquire aspects of their hattisare habitus, and hence someone who was beginning to experience their lifeworld as members of a shared, interspecies moral community.
This was a lifeworld characterized by the intensive practices of interspecies encounter within a multispecies total institution housing a hybrid community of humans and elephants, similarly conceived as persons. The patchuwa Bukh Lal, who worked with the mighty tusker Birendra Prasad (named after the Nepali King killed by his son in the royal palace massacre of 2001, see Baral 2002), revealed the totalizing character of life spent with an elephant companion: “I know my own elephant better than I know my own family.” This was no surprise since he came from a once-forested district in the eastern Tarai, which has traditionally supplied recruits to the sarkari hattisar, even though the forests have dwindled and the local stables are long gone. His family home was more than a day’s journey away. Bukh Lal was with Birendra every day, able to read his moods in ways I could not discern, and only reunited with his family a few times a year, during annual leave (bida). He could approach Birendra in ways that would be foolish for me to do, as I would dramatically learn for myself with a female elephant named Puja Kali, even when he was not in musth (mada). This is a periodic state of hormonal excitation that can last a few months, during which a male becomes dangerous and unpredictable, his urge to procreate visibly evident, negating usual relational bonds of trust between handler and elephant. As Bukh Lal said, “At these times, he’s out of control, he’s not himself; he can’t be held responsible for his behavior.”
These situations notwithstanding, I was beginning to truly appreciate the possibilities of knowing intimacy between handler and elephant. The ritualized greeting I described in the vignette that began this article is instructive. Sitasma’s act of “hugging” me with her trunk was regular, it was mutually meaningful, and unlike [365]the supplicatory gesture of reverence I have also described, it was a practice she herself initiated. Besides the strictly ethological interpretation of this pleasing embrace that would suggest Sitasma was recognizing my smell, I was well aware that making sense of this encounter raised questions about anthropomorphic interpretation and the challenges of understanding interspecies sociality and communication. At this time, preceding the emergence of multispecies ethnography, and concerned as I was with expert knowledge and practice, I was most interested in how the other handlers understood this practice. They claimed they could read their elephant’s body language and recognize acts of affection in their behavior toward us. For me, it was an affective act of trusting surrender that signified the empathetic connection we had developed.
The hattisare confirmed my interpretation of these regular and distinctive trunk probings as a greeting ritual: this was how some elephants were known to engage with human companions with whom they have a sustained, intimate, and dependent relationship. As my human colleagues pointed out, this was also a way for Sitasma to mark me as “her human” (usko manche). It confirmed the attainment of a trusting relationship, since I would be a fool to come into such close proximity unless I was confident of her benevolent attitude toward me. After all, an elephant can violently discard us like an unwanted toy if they wish. Indeed, I was told of a case in which this had happened. Five years before my arrival, Puja Kali, who resided next to Sitasma, had squashed her handler. Just as Bukh Lal excused Birendra’s behavior during musth as “temporary insanity,” this event was not blamed on Puja Kali’s temperament but rather on the disrespectful behavior of her handler, who had fallen off her back in a drunken state. Significantly, this consensual defense of Puja Kali, either irritated or confused by her handler’s irregular behavior, demonstrated that hattisare were willing to defend an elephant companion against a human colleague. This was perhaps indicative not only of the abhorrence of irreverence toward these gods in animal form but also of the commensurable valuation of human and elephant forms of life in the hybrid moral community of the hattisar.
The entangled loyalties of human and elephant social life were also evident in the way that networks of human-elephant relations were determined both by human-to-human and elephant-to-elephant relations. I catalogued my knowledge of the hattisare with respect to the human-elephant teams of which they were a part. This influenced the pattern of my interaction with the handlers. Who your elephant was at least partially determined which of your human colleagues you would mix with most. If your elephants were grazing friends, you would have greater reason to maintain friendly relations with each other. I was beginning to realize that me being “Sitasma’s human” (sitasmako manche) raised more interesting questions than Sitasma being “my elephant” (mero hatti).
That greeting ritual between Sitasma and me did not merely confirm that trusting rapport had developed between us, it also signified my acquisition of a particular identity for her, and also more generally for the whole community of Khorsor elephants. Their own patterns of conspecific interactions, inflected by personal preferences not entirely dissimilar to those among humans, had great significance for their human companions. Understanding how inter-elephant relations articulate with inter-human relations through the coupling patterns that connect particular elephants to particular humans was another important aspect [366]of my apprenticeship. This was dramatically illustrated for me one morning when I walked close to Sitasma’s neighbor, Puja Kali, known to be an occasionally moody elephant. With a rapidity that surprised me, she came out from her tethering post and gave me a swift, reprimanding slap with her trunk. I was shocked by her speed, power, and accuracy. Wielded by Sitasma, the trunk had come to represent an instrument of loving connection, but wielded by Puja Kali, an elephant with whom I was not intimate, it represented a weapon of hostility.
Convinced of the potency of the lesson I had learned, an amused colleague remarked that in every future elephant encounter I should remember that I was marked as Sitasma’s human (and again, this was the fault of my ignorance rather than cause to blame Puja Kali’s temperament). It was my responsibility to learn that there was a history of hostility between Sitasma and Puja Kali, which would make me an enemy of Puja Kali by extension. Similarly, I was warned never to take Sitasma close to another female called Lakshmi Kali, since they too had a history of antagonism (with Sitasma bearing a scar on her haunch to prove it). The animosity between Sitasma and other elephants had an influence on my interaction with members of those elephants’ human care teams. Since our interests diverged, we found ourselves likely to interact less.
Thus, through my own intimate, interspecies relationship I came to realize the importance of elephant life histories in relation to each other and in relation to hattisare. The career biography of a hattisare is intimately bound to that of his elephant, and these histories play a constitutive role in their interwoven social worlds, sometimes discrete, sometimes overlapping. In terms of the concerns of ethnoelephantology and multispecies studies, this illustrates the humanist problem in promoting a purely human history that denies the constitutive role of other species, to which Susan Nance responds with a call for a transspecies history (2013). However, the issue here is not just the agency of elephants but also their agency as intentional social beings. My basic familiarity with the philosophical problem of animal minds (e.g., Griffin 1984, 2001) meant that I knew I had to be cautious about making the apparently anthropomorphic attribution of personhood, unless of course I challenged the ontological assumptions upon which it relies (see Ingold 1994). In the field, though, circumspection seemed irrelevant, and I was yet to encounter Varner’s argument for elephant personhood from the identification of elephants’ temporal self-awareness (2008). I cared less about the propriety of scientific thinking and the politics of moral reasoning than I did the affective experience of an interspecies relationship with a captive elephant. At this time, it seemed more useful to understand the cultural logic by which the hattisare understood their elephants as persons of another kind.


Hattisare conceptions of personhood
This then, is what I set about investigating. By considering hattisare conceptions of nature, authority, and the logic of caste, their extended attribution of personhood beyond the human became intelligible, articulated in a way that emphasizes human-animal continuities without denying human-animal differences. Nature, as a domain exterior to inhabited dwellings and not ostensibly transformed by [367]human activity (Ellen 1996), was not understood according to the dualistic modality of Western thought with its tradition of humanist scholarship. Following Philippe Descola (1996) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1996), rather than a clear separation of the domains of human culture and nonhuman nature, I discerned a sociocentric understanding in which nature and society are subject to the same organizing logic. The logic in this case was articulated through the idiom of substance, considered by some as typical of Hindu and South Asian thought (Marriott 1976; Marriott and Inden 1977).
In a world in which all life shares substance that varies according to the ratio of its component qualities, the three humoral guna of satvas, rajas, and tamas, which can be transmuted as a result of the effect of action or karma, and which determine rebirth in the cycle of life, or samsara, it follows that the ontological boundaries between animality, humanity, and divinity are permeable. In previous existences we may have lived in animal form, but with the potential for godhood within us all, in a future existence we may be able to realize our intrinsically divine nature and ascend the hierarchy of being, just as a change of dietary and ritual practice has enabled social groups to redefine their place within caste hierarchies based on the idiom of ritual purity (Srinivas 1962). As Lawrence Babb remarks, the greeting of namaste (like the gesture of supplication upon mounting an elephant) may be translated as saluting that portion of god that dwells within you (1975: 52).
In this sociocentric and hierarchic world, the jungle, savannas, and rivers to which we daily drove with our elephants are conceived as potentially dangerous and unpredictable places, subject however to the rule of deities, most significant of which is Ban Devi, the goddess of the forest. By conducting sacrificial rituals, we acknowledged her sovereign authority, and appeased her potential wrath through the giving of gifts pleasing to her humoral “substance-nature” (alcohol, meat, money, feminine items of beautification), and thereby militated against the misfortunes she might cause us, such as attack by dangerous animals. Similarly, we performed rituals to petition the goodwill of Ganesh, whose “substance-nature” inhabits our elephants. Elephant training is a time when such practices are most essential, since it is imperative to acknowledge that the elephants we drive are also gods we worship (by giving sweets appropriate to Ganesh’s “substance-nature,” evident in myths about his appetite and his representation with a fat belly). It was understood that we had to request his forgiveness as a superior god in animal form being subordinated to the purposes of inferior humans.
This simultaneity of animality and divinity in elephants implies both low and high status in a hierarchic continuum of beings. Puzzling upon this led me to consider how integral the logic of caste was to the handlers’ hierarchic and sociocentric conception of nature and being. The Nepali word for caste, a group of beings sharing the same substance-nature—i.e., guna composition—whose interactions with other groups traditionally had to be strategically and ritually mediated according to a rationale of purity, is jat, or in Hindi, jati. This word means type, kind, or even species (Marriott and Inden 1977; Burghart 1984: 116–18). Thus, I realized that for the handlers there was no problem in extending the logic of caste to elephants, it being as much an essentialist theory of kinds as a social theory of discrete, ranked groups (see Burghart 1978). Indeed, the Sanskrit genre of texts on elephantology, known as gaja sastra, which has parallels with oral traditions of practical elephant [368]knowledge, recognizes eight ranked castes of elephant, understood in terms of guna composition (Edgerton 1931; Wakankar and Mhaiskar 2006; Locke 2008).
While nonhuman animals without sacred associations provide little incentive to transpose the idiom of natural kinds for figuring relations between social groups to relations between species, I realized that in the hybrid community of the hattisar, elephants provide particular incentive. As the recognized repository of both animal and divine substance, the elephant confounds the typical cosmic hierarchy of gods, humans, and animals. Hindu gods are understood and represented in anthropomorphic terms, and since the elephant is a god in animal form, it discloses a cultural logic by which handlers may think of their elephants as persons. However, these kinds of person—gods, humans, or otherwise—conceptually diverge from that of the Western tradition of the individual, a difference McKim Marriott attempted to convey with his concept of the “dividual” (Sharma 1990: 252). This consideration of nonbiotic entities recalls the cosmo-ecological approach of Vinciane Despret and Michel Meuret (2016) that includes gods, ancestors, and spirits in multispecies accounts of the forms of life that constitute worlds.


Practical experience and animal ethology
Even as my reflections and my inquiries brought this interpretation into focus, I knew it was crucial that neither the handlers nor I needed either set of ideas to understand the relationships with our elephant companions in terms of intersubjective relations. It seemed that irrespective of our culturally conditioned thinking, one could not resist recognizing elephant personalities. Practical experience taught us they have memories of prior experiences that influence their behavior and dispositions, that they can effectively communicate preferences to nonelephants, that they possess reasoning and problem-solving ability, and that they demonstrate loyalty and affection. To deny this would be a betrayal of the lifeworld of the hattisare as persons involved in a process of becoming with their elephant companions (see Haraway 2008).
As such, the ascription of personhood not only suggests an idiom of engagement, but also reflects a mode of highly personalized interspecies encounter. I was unconcerned, excited even, that it might seem that I was transgressing the injunction against anthropomorphism characteristic of most twentieth-century animal ethology. After all, one of the primary implications of Darwinian evolutionary biology has been to subvert the Cartesian segregation of humanity from animality, as Darwin controversially acknowledged in his 1871 work “The Descent of Man” (Willerslev 2007: 114). It is interesting, though, that the need remains to reaffirm the ontological insight regarding the evolutionary continuity of life. For example, Barbara Noske reminds us that ethological studies of primates, cetaceans, elephants, and wolves have proven that qualities usually considered uniquely human, such as sociality, intentionality, self-awareness, tool use, and even language, can also be found to varying degrees in our nonhuman relatives (1996). In response to the call to rethink the prejudice that insists on drawing a definitive line between us and them, cultural primatologist Frans de Waal has advanced the notion of “anthropodenial” (2000). If anthropomorphism is the overestimation of commonalities [369]between human and nonhuman animals, then “anthropodenial” is the underestimation of such commonalities (Daston and Mitman 2005: 9).


Conclusion
The experience of interspecies apprenticeship I have documented here contributes to the ethnographic study of skilled learning while also raising significant ontological and methodological questions for anthropology. As a result of the empathetic and embodied relationship I developed with Sitasma Kali, I had to adapt my notions of apprenticeship learning, which at that time largely derived from a literature concerned with acquiring skills in communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Lave 1993; Wenger 1998). Rather than understanding mastery of a craft, such as Yemeni minaret building (Marchand 2001), Malian masonry (Marchand 2009), British furniture making (Marchand 2010), Gujarati ship-building (Simpson 2006), or Liberian Tailoring (Lave 1997), my challenge not only included the mastery of practical skills but also the development of an intimate working relationship with a sentient nonhuman being.
This intensely affective experience was so profoundly transformative that I was compelled to extend personhood itself: my apprenticeship became an endeavor in learning how to interact with a nonhuman intersubjectively, and to do so with communicative and empathetic efficacy. In embracing for myself the notion that elephants are like people too, through lived experience rather than philosophically reasoned conviction, as well as encountering hattisare make the same assertion, the question arises how to make anthropological sense of a challenge to key ontological assumptions about human uniqueness. Here, recent developments in the animal cognitive and behavioral sciences became theoretically relevant for analyzing the data of my field experience, providing support for insights gained from experiences of living and traveling with captive elephants in the streets, stables, jungles, and rivers of Chitwan. However, unlike the indigenous traditions of South Asian elephant knowledge and their literary codifications (Olivelle 2016), these were scientific traditions that had been initially configured to downplay continuities with humans.
On the other side of the divide between the natural and social sciences, by challenging the typical isomorphism of humanity and personhood, this account also reveals the epistemological limitations of Enlightenment Humanism to which modern ethnographic practice is intellectually indebted. As a methodology within the social sciences, ethnography has developed as a way to study human social life that, until recently, critics have found inadequate for incorporating nonhuman life. However, posthumanist scholarship critiques the ontological dualisms that oppose cultural humans to natural animals, posing key questions about the knowledge practices that constitute the disciplinary configuration of Western thought responsible for the divergence of the social and natural sciences. As a consequence, new syntheses are emerging that reveal the intersecting relevance of ethnology and ethology (Lestel 2006), friction between the domains of the social and the natural sciences (Lestel, Bussolini, and Chrulew 2014), and that extend anthropology by insisting that the entanglement of other life forms with human lives, landscapes, [370]and technologies must be theoretically integrated into accounts of human existence (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Ingold 2013).
These new syntheses, the critical interrogation of ontological dualisms, the complementary analytic role of cultural ethology, and my transformative experience becoming a hattisare with Sitasma Kali, have all contributed to the development of ethnoelephantology: a new, interdisciplinary framework for studying human-elephant intersections. In anthropology, geography, and history, research is emerging that explores “the intersecting lifeworlds and environmental mutualities of human and elephant” (Locke 2013: 90). This includes, for example, elephants as agents in the constitution of transnational environmentalist networks, and in the shaping of local landscapes of wildlife conflict in Yunnan (Hathaway 2013: 152–84); the ambivalent intimacies of human-elephant collaboration in South Indian forest management (Münster 2016); elephants, alcohol, psychosocial suffering, and bureaucracy in Assam (Jadhav and Barua 2012); and elephant agency in the nineteenth-century American circus (Nance 2013). By demonstrating the shared, interspecies moral community that emerges from humans and elephants living and working together, this article suggests a need to rethink human-elephant relations in a way that recognizes their mutual agency as social actors as well as the possibility of treating nonhumans as research informants.


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La personne de l’éléphant; apprentissage affectif et terrain avec des informateurs non-humains au Népal
Résumé : Dans ce rapport sur l’intimité inter-espèces dans une étable pour éléphants au Népal, j’explore non seulement les figurations humaines de la personne mais soutient l’idée d’une inclusion méthodologique des informateurs non-humains, en tant qu’acteurs dotés d’une subjectivité et en tant que participants dans la recherche ethnographique. J’explique comment mon expérience d’une relation de confiance avec une éléphante dans une communauté hybride d’humains et d’éléphants éclaira pour moi les limites conceptuelles de la focale humano-centrique de l’ethnographie et de son inadaptation pour étudier la socialité des rencontres inter-espèces. Afin de discuter la question de personne non-humaine, je présente les [376]développements des études du comportement animal, tout en étudiant les logiques culturelles de l’attribution de personnalité aux éléphants par les mahouts népalais. Cette exploration de l’apprentissage, de la personne, de la rencontre affective, se situe dans la veine inter-espèces des études multi-espèces; il s’agit d’une contribution à l’ethno-éléphantologie, une approche interdisciplinaire des relations sociales, historiques et écologiques entre les hommes et les éléphants.
Piers LOCKE is senior lecturer in anthropology at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, where he teaches Multispecies Studies and the Anthropocene. He has conducted ethnographic research on human-elephant relations in Nepal and Sri Lanka, and developed ethnoelephantology as an integrated framework for studying the social, historical, and ecological intersections of humans, elephants, and environments. He is the lead editor of Conflict, negotiation, and coexistence: Rethinking human-elephant relations in South Asia and is currently completing a monograph based on fieldwork with humans and elephants in The Chitwan National Park, Nepal.
Piers LockeDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of CanterburyPrivate Bag 4800ChristchurchNew Zealandpiers.locke@canterbury.ac.nz
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The ethnography of human-object relations in native Amazonia can help to illuminate the role of technological artifacts in modern society. Rather than abandon the categories of &quot;subject&quot; and &quot;object&quot; and of &quot;Society&quot; and &quot;Nature,&quot; as suggested by proponents of the &quot;ontological turn,&quot; anthropologists can compare subject-object transformations and the naturalization of social power relations in the two contexts. In native Amazonian animism the attribution of subjectivity and agency to artifacts often includes personhood and intentionality, while in modernity technological objects tend to be perceived merely as autonomous agents, but both these kinds of perceptions can be understood as statements about fetishized social relations. In the former case an external observer can conclude that the delegation of agency to artefacts is dependent on human consciousness, while it is generally believed that technology operates independently of human perceptions. However, in acknowledging the ultimate dependence of modern technology on exchange rates and financial strategies in a globalized economy, we realize that the agency of modern artifacts is also dependent on human subjectivity. In shifting the focus of comparative anthropology from ontology to political economy, we can detect that modern technology is a globalized form of magic.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>The ethnography of human-object relations in native Amazonia can help to illuminate the role of technological artifacts in modern society. Rather than abandon the categories of &quot;subject&quot; and &quot;object&quot; and of &quot;Society&quot; and &quot;Nature,&quot; as suggested by proponents of the &quot;ontological turn,&quot; anthropologists can compare subject-object transformations and the naturalization of social power relations in the two contexts. In native Amazonian animism the attribution of subjectivity and agency to artifacts often includes personhood and intentionality, while in modernity technological objects tend to be perceived merely as autonomous agents, but both these kinds of perceptions can be understood as statements about fetishized social relations. In the former case an external observer can conclude that the delegation of agency to artefacts is dependent on human consciousness, while it is generally believed that technology operates independently of human perceptions. However, in acknowledging the ultimate dependence of modern technology on exchange rates and financial strategies in a globalized economy, we realize that the agency of modern artifacts is also dependent on human subjectivity. In shifting the focus of comparative anthropology from ontology to political economy, we can detect that modern technology is a globalized form of magic.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>The political economy of technofetishism






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Alf Hornborg.   ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.1.003
The political economy of technofetishism
Agency, Amazonian ontologies, and global magic
Alf HORNBORG, Lund University


The ethnography of human–object relations in native Amazonia can help to illuminate the role of technological artifacts in modern society. Rather than abandon the categories of “subject” and “object” and of “Society” and “Nature,” as suggested by proponents of “the ontological turn,” anthropologists can compare subject–object transformations and the naturalization of social power relations in the two contexts. In native Amazonian animism the attribution of subjectivity and agency to artifacts often includes personhood and intentionality, while in modernity technological objects tend to be perceived merely as autonomous agents, but both these kinds of perceptions can be understood as statements about fetishized social relations. In the former case an external observer can conclude that the delegation of agency to artifacts is dependent on human consciousness, while it is generally believed that technology operates independently of human perceptions. However, in acknowledging the ultimate dependence of modern technology on exchange rates and financial strategies in a globalized economy, we realize that the agency of modern artifacts is also dependent on human subjectivity. In shifting the focus of comparative anthropology from ontology to political economy, we can detect that modern technology is a globalized form of magic.
Keywords: Amazonia, human–object relations, fetishism, ontological turn, technology, political economy, global magic


It has often been asserted that anthropology should be not only about understanding the lifeworlds and mindsets of other people, but ultimately about using such understandings to better grasp the cultural specificity of the familiar.1 George Marcus [36]and Michael Fischer (1986) have called such a U-turn of the anthropological gaze “defamiliarization by cross-cultural juxtaposition.” Since long before Bruno Latour (1993) launched the notion of a “symmetric anthropology,” the ethnography of indigenous Amazonia has in many ways provided capitalist modernity with a mirror in which to discover its own idiosyncrasies and blind spots. In this paper I will reflect on what it can teach us about our relations to things (Santos-Granero 2009a). As Karl Marx realized through his own brand of “symmetric anthropology” in the midnineteenth century, human relations to things are always about relations to other humans. Applying a concept originally employed by Portuguese merchants to describe the “primitive” religious practices of West Africans, he referred to this as “fetishism.”2 Based on such a definition of “magic”—as the attribution of autonomous agency to artifacts, obscuring the role of human perceptions and strategies—I shall propose that modern, globalized technologies qualify as an example of this phenomenon.
To unravel how humans deal with artifacts is to unravel the specifics of social relations. I will argue that an analytical distinction should be recognized between two very different ways of delegating agency to artifacts, depending on whether such agency is contingent on subjective human perceptions or merely on the physical properties of the artifacts themselves, as in the case of simple tools. Following Marx’s insight that artifacts perceived to have intrinsic or magical agency (i.e., fetishes) are pivotal components of political economy in both premodern and modern economies, I aim to show that the agency of modern technological objects is not intrinsic to those objects—and independent of human perceptions and deliberations—but that our belief that this is indeed the case is our way of distinguishing the modern from the nonmodern.
Although this may sound much like what Bruno Latour and other proponents of “the ontological turn” have been saying, my argument is in fact quite different, grounded as it is in political economy. Rather than take ontological differences as a point of departure, I propose that we investigate the political economic conditions that produce particular ontologies. This applies no less to ontological diversity among nonmodern societies—e.g., between indigenous Amazonia and the pre-Hispanic Andes—than it does to differences between the modern and the nonmodern. Political economy fundamentally concerns the social organization of human–object relationships, and thus ultimately how social agency is delegated to artifacts. Such a definition of political economy inevitably implicates our own cultural constructions of “technology” (cf. Pfaffenberger 1992; Hornborg 2001a, 2014a). In unraveling the difference between two kinds of artifactual agency—i.e., whether or not it is contingent on human subjectivity—we discover that the distinction between “subject” and “object” is much too significant to discard, if we want to understand how relations of social power are embodied in technologies. Paradoxically, although Latour’s focus on artifactual agency is supremely valid, his aspiration to abandon subject–object distinctions presents an obstacle to analyzing the historical transformations of such agency. To unravel this paradox, I will need to discuss differences between some of the main protagonists of “the ontological turn” in anthropology (Bruno Latour, Philippe Descola, Eduardo Viveiros [37]de Castro, and Eduardo Kohn). Whereas Latour’s rejection of subject–object distinctions is contradicted by his fellow “ontologists,” Descola’s structural analysis of ontologies is less concerned with the role of artifacts. These omissions mean that neither Latour’s nor Descola’s framework can in itself adequately account for historical transformations of political economies and their associated ontologies. Moreover, it will be evident that “the ontological turn,” although an ambitious attempt to challenge the hegemony of mainstream Western science and technology, does not represent a coherent or unitary theoretical framework.
I offer these suggestions against the background of more than twenty years of deliberations on technological fetishism (Hornborg 1992, 2001a, 2001c, 2011, 2014a, 2014c), ecosemiotics (1996, 2001b), and the political economy of indigenous Amazonia and the Andes (2005, 2014b). Although these wide-ranging concerns are seemingly disparate, I hope to show how they converge in an alternative—and potentially more critical—understanding of human–object relations than that offered by proponents of “the ontological turn.”

Animism, perspectivism, and “the ontological turn”
To trace the emergence of the contemporary preoccupation with ontology, I will begin by going back some twenty years to June 1994, when, according to Signe Howell, the organizers of the third meeting of the European Association of Social Anthropologists, in Oslo, were taken by surprise by the unexpected interest in the “outmoded” theme of ecology. Two years later, Philippe Descola and Gísli Pálsson (1996a) gathered several of the papers presented in Oslo in a Routledge volume called Nature and society: Anthropological perspectives. The prominence of Amazonia in these deliberations was very obvious, represented by classical papers by Philippe Descola, Laura Rival, and Kaj Århem. What most of the papers in the volume had in common was an understanding that the conventional nature–society or nature–culture dichotomy so prominent in European thought can generally not be identified ethnographically among indigenous, nonmodern populations in, for example, Amazonia, Southeast Asia, or Oceania. Some papers, frequently citing Latour, also addressed recent trends toward blurring the nature– culture opposition in contemporary science, prompting the editors to ask whether this will “imply a redefinition of traditional western cosmological and ontological categories” (Descola and Pálsson 1996b: 2). No longer simply relegating concerns with a modernist concept of ecology to the margins, constructionist and culturalist approaches in anthropology were now prepared to apply their perspectives to human–environmental relations and to “nature” itself.
The papers assembled by Descola and Pálsson in 1996 were foundational to the wide-ranging discussions on animism, perspectivism, and human–environmental relations that have preoccupied so many anthropologists since then. Descola’s (1996) structural analyses of what he calls “the social objectivation of non-humans” as “a finite group of transformations” have developed into canonical volumes such as his Beyond nature and culture (2013), characterized in the foreword by Marshall Sahlins (2013) as “a comparative anthropology of ontology” and nothing less than “a paradigm shift.” Descola’s quadripartite typology of ontologies— naturalism, animism, [38]totemism, and analogism—is elegantly generated by the logical intersection of two parameters: here, continuity versus discontinuity in the representations of “interior” versus “physical” aspects of existence. However, Sahlins (2014) has suggested that Descola’s categories totemism and analogism ultimately are merely two varieties of animism, with all three categories founded on a general inclination toward anthropomorphism. This conclusion is congenial with my proposal, further on, that Amazonian animism and Andean analogism should be more closely related than Descola’s analysis suggests. It also confirms that the crucial ontological distinction is that between animism and naturalism (cf. Descola 2013: 172), a matter to which I will also return. While Descola’s empirically rich and theoretically sophisticated analysis is a magnificent account of global variation in humans’ conceptualizations of their nonhuman environments, I shall suggest, in very general terms, how it might be complemented with perspectives linking such conceptualizations to political economy.
Århem’s (1996) chapter in Nature and society, “The cosmic food web,” which elucidates the ecocosmology of the Makuna, was a significant source of inspiration for the model presented by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1998) in his celebrated article on Amerindian perspectivism in the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Judging from the extent to which the perspectivist model has been adopted and endorsed by other anthropologists, it has had an irresistible appeal to our profession. I suspect that this appeal reflects not only how impressed we are by the elegant cognitive twists of structuralist methods, but even more so the way the model enlists indigenous cosmologies to challenge the mindsets of capitalist modernity. To find, in the indigenous Other, the diametrical inversion of the civilization that many of us deplore is arguably a hallmark of much anthropology. The perspectivist model continues to haunt us, perhaps because it recognizes the possibility of acknowledging, in general terms, the subjectivity of all living things, which has been so bluntly repressed in modern society (cf. Kohn 2013).3 It illuminates how Cartesian objectification of human and nonhuman Others is ultimately an act of moral dissociation (Hornborg 2014a).
Although closely related to Descola’s understanding of animism, perspectivism was contrasted against the latter in a debate in Paris chaired by Bruno Latour in January 2009. Latour’s (2009) brief review of the debate presents Descola’s approach as the more traditional, preoccupied with ordering typological categories in a “cabinet of curiosities,” whereas perspectivism to Latour represents a “bomb” aiming to explode the philosophical typologies ultimately deriving from Western colonialism. Even if Descola’s (2013) classification of human ways of relating to nature includes scientific objectivism—he calls it “naturalism”—as merely one of four ontological options, Viveiros de Castro proposes an even more radical departure from the nature–culture dualism of conventional Western science: the complete dissolution of the notion of an objective, universal nature. Instead of assuming that [39]there is only one nature, but many cultures, he argues, indigenous Amazonians hold—and he obviously thinks that we should take this assertion seriously—that there is only one “culture” (or spirit, or soul), but many natures—many different material, bodily forms united by a single and shared form of subjectivity.
Descola’s and Viveiros de Castro’s challenges to Western science are enthusiastically endorsed by Latour. Latour’s own work has addressed topics generally classified as Science and Technology Studies (STS), but he often presents his influential deliberations on the philosophy and sociology of science as anthropology. Alongside Descola and Viveiros de Castro, he personifies what is now being called “the ontological turn” in anthropology. Although considerable efforts are being made to persuade the anthropological profession that this “turn” indeed represents a significant shift away from whatever anthropology used to be, it is not altogether easy to grasp what the professed shift is all about (cf. Vigh and Sausdal 2014). Part of the confusion derives from Latour’s contradictory notion of “assemblage,” which suggests that the very material, nonhuman phenomena whose agency he wants us to acknowledge can only be said to exist in terms of how humans perceive them (Elder-Vass 2015).4 But much of the confusion regarding “the ontological turn” stems from significant differences between the main protagonists. For instance, whereas Latour completely rejects the subject–object distinction, it has been explicitly fundamental to Viveiros de Castro’s (1999) concerns, and implicitly also to Descola’s (2013) focus on “interiorities” versus “physicalities.” The issue has important implications for our capacity to distinguish between the agency of living organisms and that of abiotic things (cf. Kohn 2013), more specifically between the agency of humans and that of artifacts.5
[40]If, as Latour (2005, 2010) has suggested, we are mistaken to think that there is such a thing as “society,” “capitalism,” or “fetishism,” how could his approach help us theorize power? The answer should no doubt be sought in his general approach to artifacts. In a paper coauthored with primatologist Shirley Strum in 1984 (Strum and Latour 1987), Latour observes that the key difference between the sociality of baboons and that of humans is that human relations can be anchored to partially independent and fixed points of reference beyond the body, such as language, symbols, and—importantly—material objects. Although this is hardly a new observation (i.e., that humans distinguish themselves by the extent to which they use language, symbols, and artifacts), Latour’s perspective on the agency of artifacts—apparently emerging from his early studies in primatology—encourages us to reconsider the role of specific properties of artifactual assemblages in generating specific varieties of human social organization. An implication of such a stance should be that the power asymmetries addressed in studies of political economy should be possible to trace to specific kinds of human–object relations.


Artifacts, ontology, and political economy in indigenous South America
If, to a large extent, artifacts (including technologies) are indeed the substance of increasingly complicated human social relations, Latour’s preoccupation with their agency within hybrid networks or assemblages is incisive. It raises questions that are central to Amazonian ethnography and the mirror it provides for capitalist modernity. What is the relation between materiality, sociality, and imagination? Or, differently phrased, what is the relation between political economy, magic, and myth? As Santos-Granero (2009b: 19) has implied, the role of artifacts conceived of as powerful agents would no doubt be a key to understanding sociopolitical organization in the more hierarchical societies—or, to use an expression from Stephen Hugh-Jones (2009), more “opulent object regimes”—known to have existed in precolonial Amazonia. Archaeologists speak of “prestige-good systems.” Prestige goods such as green-stone amulets (Boomert 1987), shell beads (Gassón 2000), snuff trays (Torres 1987), and feather headdresses (Basso 2011) appear to have been widely circulated in precolonial Amazonia, and their significance for regional social organization, hierarchy, and power should not be underestimated (cf. Hornborg 2005).
The precolonial transformations of Amerindian societies into chiefdoms, states, and empires, like those encountered by Spaniards in the Andean highlands, hinged on the political economy of prestigious and fetishized artifacts such as the Spondylus shells imported from coastal Ecuador (Salomon 1986; Hornborg 2014b). The Thorny Oyster or Spondylus generally occurs naturally not much further south than the Gulf of Guayaquil, but was in high demand throughout the Andean area for millennia before the Spanish conquest. Whether in the form of intact shells or fashioned into ornaments, beads, or powder, it has been discovered in a number of archaeological sites, ranging from coastal Peru around 2500 bc to Inca-period sacrifices on high peaks in the southern highlands (Paulsen 1974; Pillsbury 1996; Carter 2011). Ethnohistorical sources indicate that Spondylus symbolized fertility and water and that one of its primary uses was as offerings to the gods to ensure [41]good harvests (Salomon and Urioste 1991; Blower 2000). Access to items derived from Spondylus provided the lords of pre-Hispanic Andean theocracies with a means of claiming prestige and honor in proportion to harvests, and thus to establish claims on the labor of their dependant peasants. The social and political agency of these small but highly valued fetishes was thus formidable. Much like money in our contemporary world, they integrated vast imperial hierarchies ultimately because most people believed in their magic.
The cultural continuities linking Amazonian and Andean societies have intrigued a number of anthropologists working on both sides of the montaña, including Lévi-Strauss. The difference between Amazonian animism and Andean analogism identified by Descola (2013) can no doubt be illuminated by focusing on historical transformations in the political economy of human–object relations in the two regions. We may begin by asking what the relationship is between ontology and political economy. The fifteenth-century capacity of Spondylus shells to mobilize thousands of Andean peasants was contingent on how they were subjectively perceived; their (symbolic) agency was thus distinctly different from the technical impact of other Inca artifacts such as the foot-plow or backstrap loom. In making this difference invisible, a dissolution of the subject–object distinction would also conceal the huge potential for intensification and centralization inherent in what we might call ritual or symbolic technologies. The amount of work that can be accomplished with a foot-plow or backstrap loom per unit of time is limited by the energy and skill of the laborer, but the amount of work that can be mobilized by a gift or sacrifice of Spondylus is limited only by human credulousness. The pre-Hispanic ontology of Spondylus was thus inextricably intertwined with political economy.
Descola (2013: 268–80) uses Nathan Wachtel’s ethnography of the Chipaya in highland Bolivia as representative of the analogism he identifies as prevalent throughout the Andes at least since the Inca Empire. Their dual organizations and quadripartitions are repeated at every level of inclusiveness, organizing society and the cosmos as a consistent, fractal hierarchy that pervades both human and nonhuman domains. As Descola (2013: 202) suggests, the obsession with resemblances in such stratified societies is a way of making a world of “infinitely multiplied” differences intelligible and meaningful, but we also need to ask how those differences were generated that needed to be made meaningful. In the current context, this means asking how the social organization of artifacts and human–object relations in the precolonial Andes could generate vast imperial hierarchies among populations who adhered to a fundamentally egalitarian and reciprocal cosmology. The archaeological reconstruction of the emergence of so-called “prestige-good systems” addresses precisely this issue: how the expanded circulation of subjectivized artifacts generated new and more hierarchical forms of social organization in prehistory. The political economy of fetishized valuables was a crucial foundation of Andean civilizations (Hornborg 2014b). It is reasonable to hypothesize that such human–object relations have emerged from relations similar to those that are currently being investigated in the less hierarchical indigenous societies of contemporary Amazonia (Santos-Granero 2009a). Rather than understand the difference between Amazonian animism and Andean analogism as an essentialized contrast in worldview or ontology, the challenge for anthropology should be to account for the difference in terms of historical transformations of social organization.
[42]Indigenous Andean and Amazonian societies have experienced quite divergent postconquest trajectories: while Andean communities have remained integrated in the large-scale colonial hierarchies that replaced the Inca Empire, Amazonian groups have been more thoroughly victimized by depopulation and societal fragmentation. However, archaeological investigations in various parts of Amazonia indicate that, prior to exposure to European colonialism, the region was home to densely settled and hierarchical polities that were no doubt comparable to those of the Andes (for an overview, see Hornborg 2005). Extensive areas of raised fields, anthropogenic soils, and earthworks testify to the precolonial existence of complex sedentary societies in various parts of the tropical lowlands (Balée and Erickson 2006; Schaan 2012). Although most of the prestige goods that circulated in and between these polities would have been perishable, there are archaeological indications of long-distance trade in items such as green-stone amulets, shell beads, and snuff trays (Boomert 1987; Gassón 2000; Torres 1987). As Santos-Granero (2009b:19) has implied, the contemporary uses of “subjectivized” artifacts among indigenous groups in Amazonia may represent fragmented echoes of precolonial political economy. The agency of such subjectivized artifacts (or fetishes, in Marxian parlance) was no doubt as significant for ancient Amazonian social organization as Spondylus shells were for polities in the pre-Hispanic Andes. If, as Descola (2013) proposes, “analogist” ontologies have emerged to reconcile the myriad differences of stratified premodern societies, the distinction between Amazonian animism and Andean analogism cannot be a timeless, essentialized one, but is no doubt a postconquest divergence of societies that once belonged to the same continuum. It reflects a difference in degree of hierarchization, but not a difference in the fundamental character of human–object relations.
In considering what “the ontological turn” might have to contribute to our understanding of such historical transformations, we are struck by two conspicuous omissions in the respective frameworks of Latour and Descola. Latour rejects a distinction between the agency of living subjects and that of abiotic artifacts (cf. Kohn 2013: 91–92), and he would thus no doubt also reject a distinction between forms of artifactual agency based on whether or not they are contingent on human subjectivity. Descola, on the other hand, appears to accept subject–object distinctions, but demonstrates little concern for the role of artifacts and human–object relations in generating different ontologies. In offering an alternative perspective on the political economy of globalized technologies, I shall (selectively) retain Latour’s observations on the pivotal role of artifacts in human social organization and Descola’s acknowledgment of subject–object distinctions.
If Sahlins (2014) is correct in suggesting that the essential distinction between divergent ontologies can be reduced to that between naturalism and animism, I will next try to show that naturalism is closely related to the emergence of new forms of fetishism that were fundamental to the Industrial Revolution in eighteenthcentury Europe. Although naturalism has been represented as a transcendence of premodern, local magic, its approach to the agency of technological artifacts is associated with a different, globalized form of magic. Its ontological foundation is the abandonment of relationism, as illustrated by the assumption that objects (e.g., organisms, machines) can be fully understood through analysis of their bounded, material forms, detached from the relations that generate them.[43]


Keys and coins: Technology, magic, and the significance of human subjectivity
I propose that the distinction between premodern and modern hierarchical societies hinges on the different roles of human subjectivity in the kinds of human–object relations that characterize the two contexts. If material objects are mobilized as agents in systems of socioecological relations, I suggest that we reflect on the difference between their capacity to operate without the mediation of subjective human perceptions, on the one hand, and their capacity to operate by means of such mediation, on the other. This difference is fundamental to the way we conventionally distinguish between technology and magic.
I hope to show that technology is our own version of magic. In this sense, I agree with Latour (1993) that “modernity” is not a decisive break with premodern ontologies. The Enlightenment demystification of premodern magic and “superstition” was not a final purge of reliable knowledge, but a provisional and politically positioned one. Its understanding of the nature of economic growth and technological progress has been a successful instrument of predatory expansion for core regions of the world-system for over three centuries, but the multiple crises currently faced by global society are an indication of the approaching bankruptcy of this worldview. The components of this failing ontology that seem most imminently in line for collapse are its understandings of money and technology—two kinds of fetishized artifacts widely imagined to have autonomous agency.
A prominent role of science is to represent technological progress as “natural,” as if capitalist expansion was founded exclusively on innovative discoveries of the “nature” of things, and as if the social organization of exchange had nothing to do with it. Constrained by our Cartesian categories, we are prompted by the materiality of technology to classify it as belonging to “nature” rather than to “society.” The post-Cartesian solution to this predicament, advocated by proponents of “the ontological turn,” would be to abandon the categories of “nature” and “society” altogether (cf. Latour 1993). Descola (2013: 82), for instance, rhetorically asks, “where does nature stop and culture begin” in an increasingly anthropogenic biosphere. But, I would caution, to acknowledge that nature and society are inextricably intertwined all around us—in our bodies, our landscapes, our technologies—does not give us reason to abandon an analytical distinction between aspects or factors deriving from the organization of human society, on the one hand, and those deriving from principles and regularities intrinsic to the prehuman universe, on the other. For example, the future of fossil-fueled capitalism hinges on the relation between the market price of oil and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, but I cannot imagine that we have anything to gain from dissolving the analytical distinction between the logic of the world market and the laws of thermodynamics.
How can the ethnography of native Amazonia help us to expose and transcend modernist illusions? I believe that to understand Amazonian ontologies in terms of how artifacts are incorporated into the social organization of subject–object transformations can shed light on the specific way in which modern people tend to perceive the agency of their technology. Descola (2013: 405) concludes his book Beyond nature and culture with the assertion that “it would be mistaken to think that the Indians of Amazonia, the Australian Aboriginals, or the monks of Tibet [44]can bring us a deeper wisdom for the present time than the shaky naturalism of late modernity.” I agree, of course, that their ontologies cannot be transferred and applied to the predicaments of modern life, but I am convinced that a familiarity with the different ways in which humans can relate to material artifacts increases our capacity to critically scrutinize our own constructions of technology. In fact, I suspect that crosscultural variation in the way humans relate to artifacts could also be analyzed structurally and typologically as “a finite group of transformations,” much as Descola has done regarding what he calls “the social objectivation” of nonhuman nature. One parameter to investigate might be various modes of understanding the relations between objects and the metabolic flows which generate them. Other parameters might include modes of understanding artifactual agency: whether it requires human delegation, whether it presupposes human beliefs, and whether it implies personhood and intentionality or merely posits soulless causation.
A tenacious illusion of Enlightenment thought is that a boundary can be drawn between material forms and the relations which generate them, and that it is only the latter that can be contested, negotiated, and transformed. I think this kind of distinction—the reification of things—is more problematic than the distinction between “natural” and “societal” aspects. It is the essence of fetishism. The “moderns” generally perceive tangible objects as given, and as separate from the invisible networks of relations in which they are embedded. Such distinctions alienate humans from nonhuman nature as well as from the products of their labor, because both are perceived as categories of autonomous objects rather than as manifestations of relations. What our technological fetishism obscures from view is that it is as misleading to imagine machines as independent of global price relations and resource flows as it is to imagine organisms as independent of their environments.
How do we deal with the role of human perceptions in granting agency to “things”? To illustrate the second set of parameters I mentioned, it will suffice to acknowledge that both keys and coins have been delegated agency, but of different kinds. Such little pieces of metal can be crucial in providing access to resources, whether by physically opening doors, or by social persuasion. The way these metal objects are shaped—whether as keys or coins—has for centuries determined whether they operate as technology or through magic.6 Coins and keys illustrate how social relations of power are delegated in different ways to material artifacts. They exemplify how such delegation can either be dependent on, or independent of, subjective human perceptions. They thus make very tangible the distinction that John Maynard Keynes long ago made between “organic” and “atomic” propositions, the truth of the former depending on “the beliefs of agents,” whereas the truth of the latter is independent of any such beliefs (Marglin 1990: 15). It is with this distinction in mind that I would now like to compare the operation of modern technologies with native Amazonian uses of artifacts, as elucidated in Fernando Santos-Granero’s (2009a) edited volume on The occult life of things.[45]


Objectification and subjectification: Human–object relations in Amazonia
First, some general observations on human–object relations that are made in that useful volume. Stephen Hugh-Jones (2009) observes that although native Amazonia has generally been characterized as “object poor,” there is considerable variation in time and space, and different peoples have quite different “object regimes.” For example, the Barasana recognize an important category of valuables that signal group identity and social rank, and the northwest Amazon as a whole, like the upper Xingú, is known for “the intense circulation of ritual objects and ordinary possessions” (ibid.: 35). Joana Miller (2009: 76) similarly observes that, in “regions where they are involved in wider trade and exchange networks,” objects produce distinctions within or between social groups, and Terry Turner (2009: 162) shows how traditional Kayapó valuables are passed on over the generations as tokens of social identity. These observations contrast, for example, with those of Philippe Erikson (2009: 177) among the Panoan-speaking Matis, for whom “all artifacts are conceived of as an extension of their maker, and as such, as ‘inalienable’ extensions of their person.” As several of the chapters suggest, the extent to which possessions are alienable from their owner can be expected to be reflected, in related ways, in separate contexts such as the propensity to exchange them and their disposal in connection with funerals.7
Erikson (2009: 183–88) suggests, like Luiz Costa and Carlos Fausto (2010), that the widespread Amazonian concern with “mastership” or “control” over humans, animals, and plants also applies to artifacts. This Amerindian “idiom of power” evoking master-ownership, engendering, and protection organizes relations between hunters and their game, warriors and their enemies, chiefs and their followers, shamans and spirits, humans and pets, and parents and children, as well as between persons and things. It is in fact as evident in the relation between the Inca emperor and his yanacona servants as in the relation between captors and captives in Santos-Granero’s (2009c) fascinating survey of Amerindian slavery. A central component of this pervasive notion of mastership is the capacity to dispose of persons and things. Much as when David Graeber (2011b) argues that the sovereignty of the modern consumer over his or her commodified objects is modeled on the sovereignty of the medieval monarch over his or her subjects—as both represent an urge to destroy in order to gain recognition and identity—we find once again that human relations to things are about relations to other human (or nonhuman) beings. Graeber’s reflections on the modern concept of “consumption” as based on the metaphor of eating—the perfect idiom for destroying something while literally incorporating it—are strangely familiar to Amazonianists routinely discussing native concepts of “predation” as incorporation. In both modern and native Amazonian cosmologies, it seems, incorporation is fundamental to identity.
Another reflection stimulated by these illustrations of how power over objects is in fact power over other subjects concerns the very widespread Amerindian myth about the “revolt of the objects” (Santos-Granero 2009b: 3). While reading Jeffrey [46]Quilter’s (1990) article in the first issue of Latin American Antiquity on the identification of this myth in iconography from the ancient Moche culture (AD 200–700) on the north coast of Peru, and looking at the detailed depictions of animated artifacts battling with their human makers, I couldn’t help thinking of Hollywood productions like Terminator. The attribution of agency and subjectivity to artifacts obviously has the potential to rouse fears that the objects will assume power over their makers. Common to the mythological “revolt of the objects” and Terminator is the fear of an inversion of the social relations of power. The latter case seems to reflect the highly ambivalent fascination with technology on which capitalist modernity is built, but the way it deals with subject–object transformations can be viewed in a new light when illuminated by the social life of artifacts in native South America. Moche iconography from the middle of the first millennium AD clearly illustrates that subject–object distinctions were far from insignificant for precolonial Amerindians.
The main theme running through The occult life of things is how objects are attributed with subjectivity. The concepts “subject” and “object” are of course highly contested modern categories, but any attempt at crosscultural comparison will require an explicit baseline of such fundamental categories through which particular lifeworlds can be compared. Without the cognate terms “interior” versus “physical” as baseline, for instance, Descola’s (2013) comparative analyses would have been impossible. It is one thing to observe the psychological, social, and indeed quite material consequences of perceiving certain objects as subjects, and another to account for such perceptions in terms of the observer’s own assumptions about what subjects and objects actually are.8 Beyond human perceptions, there are objectively biotic versus abiotic entities, and any attribution of agency or personhood to abiotic objects—whether by Amazonians or by Science-and-Technology scholars— should be understood as a statement about fetishized social relations.9
Much as Viveiros de Castro’s (1999) seminal analysis of indigenous Amazonian ontology, Santos-Granero’s (2009a) collection of perceptive ethnographies is couched in the inescapable, naturalist language of “subjects” and “objects.” The “animist” perception of all living things as subjects is perfectly compatible with the perspective of ecosemiotics (Hornborg 1996, 2001b; Kohn 2013), but I would argue that the attribution of subjective agency to abiotic artifacts is more correctly classified as fetishism (cf. Gregory 2014). Whether we are confronted with the nonmodern “subjectivation” (Santos-Granero 2009b) of objects, or the claims of Actor-Network theorists, we need to retain the capacity to distinguish between sentient actors pursuing their purposes, on the one hand, and objects that simply have consequences, on the other. Kohn (2013: 91–92) thus pertinently criticizes STS for [47]not distinguishing between the agency of sentient “selves” and the mere material “resistance” of abiotic things such as rocks or artifacts. The assertions of Actor-Network Theory about the agency of artifacts, combined with its dismissal of subject–object distinctions, are tantamount to fetishism (cf. Gregory 2014; Hornborg 2014a; Martin 2014).
It is symptomatic of “the ontological turn,” however, that no one any longer seems to want to talk about fetishism (Goldman 2009; Latour 2010). The implicit assumption is that if objects are perceived as subjects, then who are we to suggest that it is an illusion? We are all fetishists, says Latour (2010). Yes, Marx said the same thing 150 years ago, but the crucial difference is that he wanted to expose fetishism in order ultimately to reject it. He observed that fetishism—the attribution of properties of living things to inanimate objects—could be a means of maintaining social relations of power and inequality. This does not seem to concern most Actor-Network theorists, whose arguments instead tend to amount to an endorsement of fetishism. It may be politically correct not to impute fetishism to others, but what is the bottom line of this argument if it simultaneously means denying us the chance of exposing our own fetishism?10 It should be evident that I disagree with the general approach, expressed, for example, by Goldman (2009), of denying anthropology any other function than to communicate (and endorse?) non-Western ontologies.
In his lucid introductory chapter to The occult life of things, Santos-Granero (2009b) distinguishes various ways and contexts in which objects are attributed with subjectivity in Amazonian societies. He notes that some objects are conceived of as persons because they are attributed with a soul and a measure of agency, but agrees with María Guzmán-Gallegos (2009) that objects can be perceived as subjects even when they are not believed to have a soul, and that their agency does not necessarily imply intentionality. As we shall see, it is significant that these qualifications about soul-less subjectivity and nonintentional agency appear in a context where indigenous people are being engaged in the operation of capitalist modernity, quite reminiscent of Michael Taussig’s (1980) account of the baptism of money.11
[48]A recurrent phenomenon in native Amazonia is the notion that the subjectivity of objects is an extension of the people who made them, which of course recalls Marcel Mauss’ ([1925] 1990) classic observations on “the spirit of the gift.” As illuminated by Joanna Overing, Cecilia McCallum, Els Lagrou, and other ethnographers of Amazonia, artifacts and children are often viewed as analogous fabrications, both embodying the extended subjectivity of their makers. But objects can also become gradually “ensouled” through contact with their owners, whether or not the owner was also the manufacturer.12 Some objects need the intervention of humans to activate their agency. The only objects that are recognized as completely inanimate are those with which no communication is possible. As Santos-Granero (2009b: 11) observes, “Some objects are just plain objects.”
Viewed from within a particular human lifeworld, objects can be turned into subjects, and vice versa. Rather than discussing the conditions of subjects and objects as nouns, it is thus apt to consider them as verbs—as processes of “subjectivation” and “objectivation” that must be continuously attended to, through a myriad of practices, including shamanism, ritual, dieting, and daily routines. Such recurrent practices involve acts of subjectivation as well as desubjectivation, exemplified by the neutralization of potentially dangerous food, or the destruction of a dead person’s possessions. As Harry Walker (2009) shows, even where potentially dangerous objects are allowed to maintain a measure of agency, they need to be “tamed” or “subjected.”13


Technology as magic: Fetishism in capitalist modernity
Whereas modern people would generally consider the treatment of objects as personified subjects an illusion or fallacy (likely to be dismissed as superstition), while perhaps conversely challenging the objectification of subjects (such as animals or workers) as indicating a lack of empathy, native Amazonians take seriously the risks inherent in such subject–object transformations.14 They are, in short, concerned with managing relations. Such a “relational epistemology,” as Nurit Bird-David (1999) has called it, is indeed very different from the rigid subject–object dualism of modernity.
A fundamental paradox of capitalist modernity, which we can detect in this crosscultural mirror, is that its “naturalist” categories of subject and object are so [49]irrelevant to the systems of relations that it organizes—that is, in terms of how subjects are treated and objects understood. Not only does it objectify both human and nonhuman subjects, and treat humans and nature accordingly; it is equally founded on an unprecedented subjectification of objects. I am not suggesting that objects are generally attributed with personhood, but some objects are attributed with an autonomous agency, which serves to mystify unequal social relations of exchange. As Marx observed, money is thus believed to generate more of its own kind, when deposited in bank accounts. Machines are believed to “produce” on their own account, regardless of the global price relations which make them possible, and which should prompt us to understand them as accumulations of embodied human labor and natural resources where the money is. Money and machines may not be “ensouled” persons in modernity, but they are certainly believed to have autonomous agency. We pride ourselves on having abandoned animism, but have organized a global society founded on fetishism. It is a fetishism which differs from preand nonmodern forms by restricting the subjectification of objects to imputing agency to them, rather than full personhood and intentionality, but it is fetishism all the same.
We are now in a position to draw more precise conclusions on the difference between capitalist modernity and native Amazonia in terms of how humans tend to subjectivize artifacts. The distinction between “magic” and “technology” that I have suggested corresponds to a distinction between societies founded on the energy of human labor, on the one hand, and societies founded on the use of so-called “exosomatic” energy (e.g. fossil fuels), on the other. Where political economy is about the social organization of human muscle power, people have to be persuaded to exert themselves for the benefit of those in power. “Magic” could be defined as the category of social strategies by which such persuasion is achieved.15 For example, when the Inca emperor offered Ecuadorian Spondylus shell to the gods to ensure rain and agricultural fertility, it was incumbent on his many subjects to labor on his terraces and irrigation canals. We can now conclude that the efficacy of such ritual sacrifices was dependent on human perceptions. The pre-Hispanic agency of Spondylus, like that of modern money, was contingent on human subjectivity. But when modern farmers in an increasingly desiccated California resort to high-power water pumps to irrigate their fields, the efficacy of such practices is not perceived as dependent on human perceptions. The difference between “magic” and “technology,” we tend to believe, is that the latter is a matter of increasingly sophisticated inventions based on discoveries about nonsocial nature, which grant our economies the capacity to grow on their own account.
But then, of course, neither did the peasants of sixteenth-century Peru believe that the efficacy of ritual sacrifices was dependent on human perceptions. The efficacy of all magic hinges on it being perceived as independent of human [50]consciousness. Like magic, power over other people is universally mediated by human perceptions, but this is never conceded, except in retrospect. Would it be possible to argue that modernists are as deluded by the magic of their artifacts as any premodern people ever were? Can we manage to expose the magic of our technology?
I have elsewhere argued that the “Industrial Revolution” is not exhaustively explained by reference to technological breakthroughs such as the harnessing of fossil fuels as a source of mechanical energy (Hornborg 1992, 2001a, 2011). The very conditions of technological innovation were radically transformed in the late eighteenth century. We usually think that the decisive factors were engineering science and the adoption of fossil fuels, but none of this would have been possible without the global social processes which made the relative prices of labor and resources on the world market prerequisite to “technological progress” in Europe.16 If slaves would have been paid standard British wages, and depopulated American fields had fetched standard British land rent, it is not self-evident that there would have been an Industrial Revolution. Up until that historical point, technology was founded on local ingenuity, and understood as such. Beyond that point, and for over two hundred years now, the understanding of technology as founded on mere ingenuity has persisted, but become highly inadequate. Ingenuity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for modern technological progress. Global price relations are systematically excluded from our definition of technology, even though, by organizing asymmetric resource flows, they are crucial for its very existence. Without a doubt, “Cartesian dualism” is at the root of the difficulties we are having in perceiving our technological fetishism.17
When the Inca emperor imported Spondylus shells from Ecuador to persuade his subjects to labor in his fields, the “productive potential” of Spondylus was symbolic—it was dependent on human perceptions. When the California farmer imports oil to run his water pumps, the productive potential of oil appears to be objective, like turning a key in a lock, independent of perceptions. But here is the illusion of modern technology: his access to oil, and to the machinery it animates, is ultimately contingent on the socially constructed rates by which oil is exchanged for American exports on the world market. And whatever economists will tell us, we should never doubt that those rates are dependent on human perceptions.18 Locally, our technology mystifies us by pretending to be productive independently [51]of exchange rates, but viewed from a global perspective, it is indeed dependent on human perceptions.
A conclusion from these deliberations would be that we should distinguish between three fundamental categories of artifacts, defined by the specific ways in which they are delegated agency. The first is local, nonindustrial technology, which operates without the mediation of either human perceptions or exchange rates. It can be exemplified by keys or by locally produced implements such as the Andean foot-plow. The second is “local magic,” which operates by means of human perceptions, exemplified by coins or Spondylus shells. The third is globalized technology, which locally appears to operate without the mediation of human perceptions, but globally relies on exchange rates continuously shaped by the strategies of market actors.19 It could also be called “global magic,” and can be exemplified by machines such as water pumps that run on fossil fuels or electricity. If we do not retain our capacity to distinguish between the subjective and the objective, the crucial differences between these three categories of artifacts will remain invisible for us.
I will thus conclude by proposing that, from a global perspective, modern technology is magic. It is a specific way of exerting power over other people while concealing the extent to which it is mediated by human perceptions. In addition to sketching this argument for a radical revision of our Western worldview, I hope to have shown that some tenets of the so-called “ontological turn” in anthropology are not necessarily very helpful in constructing such an argument. Ultimately, the confrontation between Amazonian animism and Euro-American naturalism is a political issue, where the claim of modern science and technology to be objectively superior has proven difficult to deconstruct. Unfortunately, appeals to the virtues of animism are not likely to turn the tables on capitalism. But if Amazonian anthropology can provide us with the analytical tools to demonstrate that the Euro-American technology which is now devastating the Amazon Basin is itself a kind of magic, it would be an irony that I think many anthropologists—and many Amazonians—would appreciate.
More ominously, it suggests that the pervasive assumption of technological progress as the salvation of industrial civilization is no less naïve than other cultural illusions that have sustained premodern empires facing collapse. As our anxieties about the future prospects of this civilization become increasingly difficult to suppress, there emerges the contrary, neoromantic sentiment that indigenous, animist ontologies could provide us with clues on how to achieve sustainability and resilience. But rather than championing a magical ontology that most of us have irrevocably lost, an anthropological approach is more usefully applied to exposing the unacknowledged magic of our own ontology. Although [52]the project of defamiliarizing and deconstructing our presumptively modernist categories is very much facilitated by juxtaposition with nonmodern ontologies, this is not necessarily tantamount to advocacy of the nonmodern, but may well amount to an acknowledgment that our categories have not been modern enough.


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L’économie politique du technofétichisme: Agency, ontologies amazoniennes et magie mondialisée
Résumé : L’ethnographie des relations entre humains et objets en Amazonie révèle, en creux, le rôle des objets technologiques dans la société contemporaine. Plutôt que d’abandonner les catégories de “sujet” et d’”objet”, de “société” et de “nature”, comme le proposent les partisans d’un tournant ontologique, une autre approche possible consiste à comparer les transformations de sujets à objets, et la naturalisation de relations de pouvoir dans ces deux contextes. L’attribution d’une capacité d’agir et d’une subjectivité a des objets par l’animisme amazonien engage souvent des notions de personne et d’intention, alors qu’en Occident, les objets technologiques sont essentiellement perçus comme des agents autonomes; dans les deux cas, ce type de perception peut être interprété comme des affirmations au sujet de relations sociales fétichisées. Dans le cas amazonien, un observateur étranger peut établir que la délégation d’une capacité d’agir à des objets dépend d’une conscience humaine, tandis qu’il est souvent supposé que la technologie agit indépendamment des perceptions humaines. Cependant, si l’on reconnait la dépendance de la technologie moderne envers les taux de change et les strategies financières de l’économie mondialisée, on s’aperçoit que la capacité d’agir des objets est également dépendante de la subjectivité humaine. En changeant de focale, d’une approche ontologique de l’économie politique à une anthropologie comparative, on voit plus clairement que la technologie moderne est une forme de magie mondialisée.
Alf HORNBORG is an anthropologist (Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala University, 1986) and has been Professor of Human Ecology at Lund University since 1993. His books include Dualism and hierarchy in lowland South America (1988); The power of the machine (2001); Rethinking environmental history (2007); [57]The world system and the earth system (2007); International trade and environmental justice (2010); Global ecology and unequal exchange (2011); Ethnicity in ancient Amazonia (2011); and Ecology and power (2012).
Alf HornborgHuman Ecology DivisionLund UniversitySölvegatan 12, 223 62 Lund, Swedenalf.hornborg@hek.lu.se


___________________
1. An earlier version of this text was presented as the keynote lecture at the IX Sesquiannual Conference of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America, Gothenburg, June 28, 2014.
2. For discussions of the Marxian theory of fetishism, see Hornborg (2001c, 2014a).
3. A fundamental constraint of the perspectivist approach, however, is that it will always remain confined to human representations of nonhuman perspectives. It will never be able to say anything specific about how nonhumans actually experience the world (cf. Descola 2014: 272).
4. Elder-Vass’ (2015) critique of Actor-Network Theory exposes its self-contradictions with regards to anthropocentrism and the existence of phenomena beyond human discourse. Condemned by his own propositions to continuous self-reference, Latour’s deliberations can make no claim to account for the specific ways in which nonhuman physical forms assume the role of “actants” that is not constrained by his own particular vantage-point. But to be compelled to include the human observer-participant in every attempt to represent something (whether human or nonhuman) is unfeasible. To posit, where applicable, a recursive (i.e., mutually constitutive) relation between reference and referent—“the knower and the known” (cf. Hornborg 1996: 52)—is not equivalent to positing their conflation.
5. In a rejoinder, Latour (2014) clearly does not agree. There is a widespread failure in anthropology to distinguish between human claims that abiotic things—such as sacred mountains or mummified ancestors—are animate, on the one hand, and the issue of whether they are actually alive, on the other. To respect such claims as statements about human sentiments and relations should not be confused with skepticism vis-à-vis biological (or semiotic) definitions of life (cf. Kohn 2013, 2014). Assertions that a mountain is animate may be understood as an appropriate counterbalance to the equally fetishistic claim that a corporation is a person with autonomous intentions and interests (Martin 2014: 107), but we should be aware that we are talking about human sentiments and relations rather than actually attributing personhood to geological formations. It will require profoundly humanist (rather than “posthumanist”) convictions in order to establish sensitive and sustainable relations to the remainder of the biosphere. This will entail enhancing our extraordinary human capacity for subjectivity, rather than regressively reducing ourselves to equivalents of rocks and tools.
6. Significantly, the invention of the slot machine enabled even coins to assume technological functions, alongside the magic that Marx called “money fetishism”: when we buy a Coke or enter a public bathroom, we might reflect over the fact that magical objects can be converted into technology.
7. Among the Matis, the reluctance to engage with artifacts manufactured by others is clearly related to their historical experience of epidemics introduced by outsiders (Erikson 2009: 179).
8. Whether we are prepared to acknowledge them or not, we probably all do have such assumptions. For a convincing argument in this direction, see Heywood (2012: 146).
9. Chris Gregory (2014: 48, 62) notes that posthumanist attributions of agency or even intentionality to things are, “from a Marxist perspective, a classic example of fetishistic thought of an animistic kind,” and “quite literally a form of spiritualism” that no humanist can accept. “For the humanist,” he continues, such “assumptions are part of the problem to be explained in the current era of hypercommodity fetishism, not a solution to it.”
10. This does seem an appropriate ideology for neoliberal social science (cf. Gregory 2014). The ideological bottom line of ANT is to shift political responsibility from humans to things (Martin 2014:105–7). Although offered as a joke, it is perhaps no coincidence that Latour (2005: 5) quotes Mrs. Thatcher’s slogan, “There is no such thing as a society.” A refreshing contrast is Kim Fortun’s (2014) criticism of Latour’s conceptual framework for disregarding the various environmental and medical externalizations that are inherent in “industrial logic.” Although Michael Fischer (2014) largely follows Latour into esoteric language games, he similarly challenges him to address “the widening inequalities and devastations of our current cannibal economies, consuming the lives of some for the luxury of others” (ibid.: 349). The widely recognized inability of “ontological anthropology” to deliver political critique (Bessire and Bond 2014; Vigh and Sausdal 2014: 63) raises concerns over its official prominence at recent meetings of the American Anthropological Association.
11. Note that capitalist violence can also be represented as highly intentional, as illustrated by Santos-Granero and Frederica Barclay (2011) in their article “Bundles, stampers, and flying gringos.”
12. In a more recent paper, Santos-Granero (2013) shows that such notions of “ensoulment” are widespread also in Euro-American societies.
13. The potential dangers of eating insufficiently desubjectivized food are clarified in the distinction made by Carlos Fausto (2007)—building on the observations of Beth Conklin, Aparecida Vilaça, and others—between “cannibalism,” defined as the appropriation of subjective aspects of other humans, and eating “familiarized” human remains.
14. Rather than dismiss all subject–object distinctions as symptoms of a false consciousness foundational to modernity, we need to understand them as statements about relations of power (cf. Martin 2014: 111). Fetishism can be understood as the attribution of power—the displacement of responsibility—to objects within networks of social relations where the political agency of humans is not apparent.
15. This was convincingly argued by Alfred Gell, not least in his chapter on “The technology of enchantment and the enchantment of technology” (Gell 1992). I thank Denise Schaan for directing me to this text. Particularly interesting in this context is Gell’s (1992: 62, n. 3) observation that modern technologies are cognate to magic in the sense that they tend to create illusions of “costless” production while displacing social and environmental “costs” elsewhere (cf. Fortun 2014).
16. For elaboration and substantiation of this argument, see Hornborg (2011, 2014c).
17. Even in as “holistic” a field as anthropology, it is striking how discourses on political economy, economic anthropology, and cultural aspects of human exchange (e.g. Graeber 2011a) generally have so little to say on the material substance of exchange, and how even discourses on “materiality” tend to avoid questions of materially asymmetric global resource flows (cf. Hornborg 2014c).
18. Gregory’s (2014: 57–60) review of the approach of so-called “cultural economy” reveals how homo economicus has been reborn as the market’s “calculative agencies,” largely embodied in financial traders as “thinking subjects” pitting hope against uncertainty in their struggle to exploit differences in time, space, and human knowledge. A price, in this harmonious view of the market, is an “acceptable compromise” (ibid.).
19. Although the concept of “globalization” is indispensable in communicating this aspect of modern technology, we should keep in mind that it was introduced to replace the neo-Marxist concept of “imperialism” (Gregory 2014: 56–58). Rather than immersing ourselves in alternative ontologies and denying the reality of “a common world” (Goldman 2009: 113), anthropologists would do well to contemplate the incontrovertible material inequalities evident in global statistics on purchasing-power and physically visible even in nightly satellite images of the world.
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The confusions, intimacies, and distress of war are common to the experience of journalists reporting from war zones, yet the professional conventions of war reportage erase these experiences from the commodity journalists produce. Journalists are left struggling with a twinned burden: the violence that saturates journalistic life, and the demands of an authoritative narrative genre. Based on two years of fieldwork in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, this article tracks what the news must expel, assessing a tension between journalist and journalism as the pressures of war and its commodification bear down. Contrary to scholarship emphasizing the separation of experience from output, I show how the production of war news is precipitated by what is occluded from that news, finding in journalists’ dreams, jokes, and traumas an archive that both transgresses and perpetuates the reality represented in journalism. Experience and output, I argue, form a relationship essential to the practice of war reportage, and to the production of a social fantasy of what war is. What disturbs this dominant fantasy is displaced by war reportage but never disappeared.</p></abstract>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1915</article-id>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Self-formation in precarious conditions: Women among former refugees from Lebanon in Berlin</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Schwiete</surname>
						<given-names>Lena</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>29</day>
				<month>04</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="203">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
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			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1915" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1915/4424" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1915/4425" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Drawing on ethnographic research with women among former refugees from Lebanon in Berlin, this article reflects on the concept of ethical self-formation as a tool for ethnographic analysis in contexts beyond closely delineated religious or pedagogical ones, and in economically precarious conditions. I revisit James Laidlaw’s approach to ethics and freedom as an example of an approach that emphasizes self-formation as the most fundamental dimension of ethics. If applied to actors in their everyday relational and larger political contexts, self-formation is always closely intertwined with other forms of ethical striving, and can only be one among a variety of dimensions of ethics instead of its most fundamental one. Focusing on ethics as self-formation is useful because it reveals how it is distinctions between situated selves and particular others, which are shaped by political contexts, actor positions, and individual trajectories, that form the basis of people’s ethical reflections, evaluations, and actions.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/651</identifier>
				<datestamp>2016-11-03T03:19:12Z</datestamp>
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			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
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				<article-title>How “clean gold” came to matter: Metal detectors, infrastructure, and valuation</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">How “clean gold” came to matter: Metal detectors, infrastructure, and valuation</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Calkins</surname>
						<given-names>Sandra</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology</aff>
					<email>calkins@eth.mpg.de</email>
					<uri>http://www.eth.mpg.de/calkins</uri>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>31</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2016</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date>
			<volume>6</volume>
			<issue seq="305">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau6.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2016 Sandra Calkins</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2016</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau6.2.013" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Recently an ancient resource—gold—gained new importance in Sudan. To inquire into the making of values and their negotiation at a time of national economic reorientation, I explore the emergence of a resource category, so-called clean gold, and link this to the introduction of a new prospecting technology—metal detectors. I follow the translation of metal detectors to Sudan and explore them in relation to a broader techno-economic infrastructure of artisanal gold mining that enables the extractive practice and circulates new forms of moral reasoning. Not only has a new resource category emerged but I argue that these devices and the moral worlds they have coconstituted have also enabled younger men to test and challenge the economic and moral authority of an older generation of men.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Recently an ancient resource—gold—gained new importance in Sudan. To inquire into the making of values and their negotiation at a time of national economic reorientation, I explore the emergence of a resource category, so-called clean gold, and link this to the introduction of a new prospecting technology—metal detectors. I follow the translation of metal detectors to Sudan and explore them in relation to a broader techno-economic infrastructure of artisanal gold mining that enables the extractive practice and circulates new forms of moral reasoning. Not only has a new resource category emerged but I argue that these devices and the moral worlds they have coconstituted have also enabled younger men to test and challenge the economic and moral authority of an older generation of men.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>metal detector</kwd>
				<kwd>gold mining</kwd>
				<kwd>infrastructure</kwd>
				<kwd>technology</kwd>
				<kwd>resources</kwd>
				<kwd>Sudan</kwd>
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	<body><p>How “clean gold” came to matter






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Gustav Peebles. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.2.013
How “clean gold” came to matter
Metal detectors, infrastructure, and valuation
Sandra CALKINS, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology


Recently an ancient resource—gold—gained new importance in Sudan. To inquire into the making of values and their negotiation at a time of national economic reorientation, I explore the emergence of a resource category, so-called clean gold, and link this to the introduction of a new prospecting technology—metal detectors. I follow the translation of metal detectors to Sudan and explore them in relation to a broader techno-economic infrastructure of artisanal gold mining that enables the extractive practice and circulates new forms of moral reasoning. Not only has a new resource category emerged but I argue that these devices and the moral worlds they have coconstituted have also enabled younger men to test and challenge the economic and moral authority of an older generation of men.
Keywords: metal detector, gold mining, infrastructure, technology, resources, Sudan, valuation


An incident that occurred in a rural settlement in the Lower Atbara area of northeastern Sudan in 2010 exposed ambivalences about values of the past and uncertainties about what is presently of worth and can serve as moral guidance for imagined futures. More than two hundred people inhabited the settlement, most of them Rashaida, who largely still grew up as nomadic camel herders but had recently started to work in gold mining. I was sitting with Hussein, the schoolteacher and one of the few literate people in the settlement, to chat about his past trip to prospect for gold with a metal detector. It was the third time that Hussein had [174]closed the school for a number of days. People had begun to worry he might give up teaching to chase after gold like so many of his peers.
Nested in the larger social world of gold mining, working with metal detectors emerged as a new activity that elicited much excitement during my stay (2009–10). Men used these devices to prospect the terrain through electromagnetic induction. Moved over the ground, the detector’s magnetic field interacts with subterranean metals, such as gold, producing signals that tell the miner where to start digging. Hussein, a young man of twenty years, was among the first in the settlement to have access to such a device. His family was established in a larger town along the Nile, where he was also educated, and his father and two of his cousins on labor migration in the Gulf pooled money and invested in a metal detector. The costs for this contraband good were enormous—even for a wealthy family—equaling nearly EUR 8,000 at the time. Hussein told me that his prospecting team had found a small amount of gold in a nearby wadi. They sold the gold nugget at the market that had emerged near the most productive artisanal gold mines in the vicinity. The money they received was enough to cover his costs and those of the workers on his team, but Hussein dreamed of greater riches. Curious to learn how prospectors figure out where to prospect, I retold a story that I had heard in the village about men who found three kilos of “clean gold,” as my interlocutors called it. They stopped their car, where nobody searched, and suddenly by intuition got the idea to prospect there on a nearby dirt road leading to the gold mines. Abruptly, Hussein got up, mumbling “it’s true” and that maybe God had hidden something for him too.
He got a long cardboard package out from beneath his bed: the metal detector. Hussein sloppily strapped the battery to his back in the supplied harness, designed to avoid interferences with the coil. He then put the headphones on his ears and turned the device on. Holding the detector’s shaft and putting his arm on the armrest, he moved the coil close to the ground several times, listened with concentration and observed the display. Looking satisfied, he then started walking, moving his arm rhythmically, sweeping the coil close to the ground from left to right, every new swing of the arms slightly overlapping with the previous. Disregarding the afternoon heat, he prospected the entire area inside the walled compound around his house, walking steadily in straight lines, while I was waiting in the shade of the house, hoping he would return to our interview.
Hussein reached the compound’s wall but didn’t stop prospecting there. Without looking back, he moved on frantically. Village children gathered around Hussein to watch what he was doing. Neighboring women peered out of their houses. By the time he was near the settlement’s center, a large group of observers had congregated. He later claimed to have been too absorbed to notice the crowd as he prospected the open market spaces. Older men hurried out of the mosque and cafeteria, talking to him, shouting angrily, stopping him. After a short while he returned to his house. They did not let him continue to test his luck, he complained, although he must have been aware of potentially different ways of evaluating his act.[175]


Figure 1: Hussein prospecting his compound with the metal detector

This article adds to anthropological appreciations of valuation as a social practice and the negotiation of normative orders. The above situation in a marginal area of northeastern Sudan draws attention to value transformations and to an intergenerational conflict over value; it raises question about the validity of social orders and the gap between “what is” and what different people think should be instead. I take uncertainty about what counts in any situation as starting point (along the lines of Boltanski 2011) and examine the practices through which so-called clean gold is constituted as a resource in northeastern Sudan. “Clean gold” (dahab sāfī) refers to grains, nuggets, or flakes of gold in the soil’s top layer, denoting a difference in purity to gold ore. Unlike gold that has to be mined and separated from ore, clean gold does not involve such laborious processing and can be sold immediately after it was dug out. Following how this specific subcategory—clean gold—emerged in [176]the region alongside the longer-established gold extraction from hard-rock ores (gold mixed with stones) can deepen the understanding of the seemingly arbitrary processes through which values are made and unmade and reworked at specific historical conjunctures.
I track the translation of the metal detector to Sudan and explore how this contributes to the constitution of a new resource category. I argue that this is a productive route to explore the constitution and negotiation of moral worlds, of values that are made pertinent in situations. Yet, to avoid ascribing too much agency in provoking social change to the technology, I take the broader techno-economic infrastructures of artisanal gold mining on which these devices rely into view. This infrastructure enabled the extractive practice, and its expansion in northeastern Sudan went along with the circulation of narratives, songs, and poems about gold mining that promoted other forms of moral evaluation. I show that the technology of metal detectors and the social worlds that they coconstituted have become a tool of a younger generation in a longer conflict with their elders over value. This lets me reflect on how the old and the new are interwoven in different orders of evaluation—one oriented toward the traditionally eminent roles of fathers and chiefs, the other rather oriented toward economic profit and divine grace. Clean gold (dahab sāfī) then is not only a possibility or resource in the conventional sense but it is an appealing signification that offers young men a way of challenging their elders’ acclaimed moral and economic authority.

Theoretical deployments: Valuation, technologies, and infrastructures
I follow the translation of mobile metal-detecting devices and the moral worlds they constitute and are constituted by to contribute to debates in anthropology about valuation and technology. For a number of years a revitalized body of scholarship in the social sciences—including issues in this journal (see HAU 2013: vol. 3, no. 1 and 2)—has revisited the classic anthropological insight that values do not inhere in objects but result from collective processes of meaning and has sought to move the debate in new directions. Such work has paid more attention to the role of materialities in valuation as well as the multiplicity of evaluative logics and ontologies at play.1
Pragmatic and moral sociology of critique in particular fleshed out a new approach to valuation since the 1980s that investigates the various ways in which persons, objects, and actions are evaluated—how their worth is assessed according to different criteria—in public situations. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006) inductively established six so-called “orders of worth” for contemporary France that operate with different criteria of evaluation: a civic order that prizes equality, an order of inspiration where passion, creativeness, and grace are prioritized, a domestic order where reputation and seniority come first, fame where the main worth is renown, industrial order with the main worth of efficiency, and a market [177]order of worth where price is the ordering principle. This is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of theoretical possibilities—in practice all orders enter compromises with each other—but to show that the number of arguments through which people can legitimately justify their own actions and positions as well as how they evaluate those of others is always multiple but not infinitely so. Below, I disentangle the main “orders of worth” that were referenced in the situation and that point to an intergenerational conflict about what counts.
With this piece on resource making, I contribute to a strand of scholarship that investigates how natural entities come into being or are pushed out of existence. Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985) examined the historical processes through which science was given the authority to represent nature (whereas politics was made to speak for humans). Many other STS scholars argued along these lines that natural entities are neither simply found in nature nor are they socially constructed from nothing (for instance, Latour 1987, 1993; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Hacking 1999). Some research focused on “ontological politics” and “ontological conflicts” through which understandings of reality and of natural resources are being shaped and transformed (Mol 1999; Blaser 2009; Cadena 2010).
Anthropological and other approaches since the 1980s have cautioned against taking the specific “resourceness” of what is called a “resource” for granted (for instance, Latour 1987; Mitchell 2009; Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014: 6; Davidov 2014). Rather than conceiving “natural resources” as raw substances in nature, materials with fixed physical and chemical make-up, primordially useful and inherently valuable, such work highlighted the ontological multiplicity of resources and the disputability of what kind of materials with what kinds of properties they are (for instance, Blaser 2009; Behrends 2011; Barry 2013). In this connection, I am also addressing a tendency within Sudan Studies to write about resources as given and unambiguously identifiable entities (i.e., water, land, oil). There is little attention to the mutability and instability of what people conceive as a natural resource and the broader processes through which they come to value it. Rather, sometimes resources are seen as main causes of conflicts, although they are usually not seen as the sole causes (cf. Suliman 1999; Ahmed 2001; Assal 2006).
While natural entities have at least since the 1980s been conceived as products of techno-scientific framings in the field of STS (for instance, Pinch 1986), Martin Heidegger made an earlier contribution that—to my knowledge—was not explicitly referenced in this literature, perhaps both due to his appaling support for nazi ideology and his extreme view of the essence of technology and its politically uncontrollable evolution (Feenberg 2005: 45). For the limited purposes of my argument, I deploy two simple aspects of Heidegger’s take on the relation between technology and its enframing of nature without buying into his whole argument: First, in Being and time ([1927] 2009) he coined the concept “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) of tools, to underscore that we cannot understand equipment (Zeug) as mere objects toward which cognition is directed. Rather, to comprehend their values and relations they are charged with, we have to consider them in their pragmatic embeddedness in practices. Second, in his late phase marked by his turn (Kehre), Heidegger developed the idea further that the use of modern technology is part of an instrumental enframing (Gestell) with a specific form of valuation: it conceives phenomena such as nature, plants, humans, and animals as mere resources, waiting [178]to be exploited (in this sense technology denotes the concealing [Verbergen] of being) (Heidegger [1962] 2010). Accordingly, technology is not merely a tool, device, or equipment but part of a mode of ordering that orients all striving toward achieving ends and that transforms how people evaluate objects and relations, as well as present and future circumstances.
I deploy the notion of infrastructure to emphasize that metal detectors with their inscriptions2 are of course no standalone technologies able to determine sociality and morality but rather hinge on supporting structures that enable prospecting with these devices.3 Older scholarship on infrastructure established the stability and tenacity of complex arrangements, and their ability to connect and circulate things across large distances as defining marks (Hughes 1983). Whatever arrangement of technologies, procedures, and people was solid enough to facilitate a set of organized practices was called infrastructure in relation to that very practice (Star and Ruhleder 1996: 113; Star 1999). Newer work rather stresses the fluidity, instability, and affectivity of infrastructures and in general tends to focus more on the practice of infrastructuring (for example, Anand 2011; Harvey and Knox 2012; Von Schnitzler 2013; Jensen and Morita 2015). Artisanal gold mining is an interesting and an observable case of infrastructuring: The hard extractive work relies on technologies, knowledge, and specific sites, a certain material-semiotic firmness, to make and move gold. Yet, due to its simultaneous openness and fluidity, this infrastructure of hard-rock gold mining could quickly accommodate a new extractive technology along with emerging forms of moral evaluation. Before I discuss the translation of metal detectors to Sudan, I provide a brief history of the most recent surge of artisanal gold mining in Sudan and sketch my interlocutors’ involvement in it.


Mining for gold in northeastern Sudan
Rural populations in Sudan who became involved in artisanal gold mining were not the only ones to rediscover gold. In the midst of economic turmoil due to the loss of oil revenues to South Sudan, the Sudanese government’s urgent need for foreign currency revived its interest in gold. It not only signed dozens of concession agreements with foreign investors but also bought gold for export from artisanal miners and prospectors, partially even paying prices in Sudanese currency above the world gold price (Bullion Street 2015; Reuters 2012). The Sudanese government reckons it will be Africa’s largest gold exporter by 2018, while acknowledging that [179]90 percent of the gold exported stems from artisanal mining (Reuters 2013). These politics are ambivalent in that they set narrow confines upon artisanal gold mining, declaring much of the sector as illegal, while simultaneously promoting its growth by buying artisanal gold at high prices (Calkins and Ille 2014).


Figure 2: Main areas of gold occurence in Sudan

While there is a long history of gold exploration in present-day northern Sudan dating back to the ancient pharaohs (Klemm, Klemm, and Murr 2001),4 the renewed interest in gold is quite recent. In 2008 only a few thousand participated [180]in gold mining, in early 2015 it was estimated to involve up to 750,000 people.5 In 2009, most of the male interlocutors from a small poverty-stricken settlement in northeastern Sudan, where I had done research intermittently between 2007 and 2010, had given up pastoralism and small farming to become artisanal gold miners. The settlement’s growth is related to the expansion of artisanal gold mining in the vicinity. It is a place where miners left their families behind and travelled to and fro to the mines, the latter being a purely male space in northeastern Sudan, where gold-bearing ores are cut out of the underground rock. The by far largest number of men in the settlement was working underground in mines or was involved in the artisanal gold processing industries. However, since late 2009 more became involved in prospecting the surface with metal detectors for another type of resource—clean gold.
Anthropological studies have frequently pointed out how local economies resisted or limited the integration of money that had to be ritually purified to become part of established normative and symbolic orders. Also, gold money is often considered illicit and suggests the uncanny involvement of spirit creatures because it was not gained by hard and honest labor. It is associated with such notions as “bitterness” in Kenya and Burkina Faso (Shipton 1989: 37; Werthmann 2009: 159ff), or “heat” and has to be spent as quickly as it was gained on Sumatra (Znoj 1998). In Sierra Leone, money from diamond mining is similarly called “fast money” and it tends to be connected with greed, a lack of solidarity, and raises the suspicion of having generated it through demonic help (D’Angelo 2014). Sapphire mining in Madagascar similarly yields “hot money” that young men spend quickly and lavishly without foresight in an act of resistance against their socioeconomic marginalization (Walsh 2003: 291). In view of this literature that documents the tension between new mining-related forms of wealth and existing moral orders, it is noteworthy that among my interlocutors “clean gold” was clean in a spiritual sense too: Finding it was connected to an Islamic God and an innocent piece of mining technology; it did not bear negative connotations but could be used freely and was invested in all sorts of business. Some bought livestock, others built houses, walls around their property, again others invested in cars or pooled their money to invest in another metal detector.
But is clean gold really a new resource category? Did people not find it before the detectors proliferated in Sudan? Alluvial deposits—the same matter that emerged as clean gold in northeastern Sudan—in sand, clay, and silt are historically exploited through panning or using sluices (Launay 1908: 8–55). My interlocutors, however, who mostly started to search for gold in 2009, were not familiar with more conventional extractive procedures. Before the introduction of metal detectors, they only knew gold that was laboriously mined from hard-rock ores. Thus, in view of this hybrid nature of gold mixed into rocks, they referred to detector-found gold as clean gold, denoting its purity, without ever mentioning or, to my knowledge, applying other techniques.6 Therefore, clean gold as a resource and the soil as [181]its deposit recently came to matter in the flow of this technological activity. With this case study of a piece of mining technology, I also add to recent anthropological scholarship that has sought to transcend what Ricardo Godoy (1985) criticized as the anthropological self-restriction to the social context of gold mining7 that implied leaving the technological-geological infrastructures for other disciplines to study.
In the settlement where I did fieldwork everyone was talking about gold, dreaming of new wealth and prosperity. Even before the onset of mining, gold had a high value among the Rashaida I met. Gold signified divine blessing, prosperity, and fertility.8 Yet, in view of rapid socioeconomic changes, there was much uncertainty in this part of Sudan concerning which established values were still able to offer orientation in these new circumstances; normativities seemed in flux and were constantly overhauled. Young miners I talked to often dreamed about a lucky strike, that God-willing they would find cars, stone houses, or new wives in the soil; their wives would then often add that they would rather get gold jewelry or a herd of goats than a cowife. What marked these dreams was that they aspired to distinctively individualistic futures, even if actual extractive practices enacted new forms of cooperation, as I will explain below.


Translating the technology
Detectors were developed in connection with radiotelephony beginning in the late nineteenth century, but soon the technology was adapted to different fields of activity, such as mineral prospection and archeology. Importantly for its rapid development, it was used in military operations to detect land and antitank mines; later it was also applied industrially to detect metal supports in building and flaws in underground pipes (Collins 1902; Henney and Markus 1946; Connor and Scott 1998). The favorite model used by my Sudanese interlocutors in 2009 and 2010 was the GPX 4500. According to its Australian manufacturer, Minelab, this metal detector was developed for hobby gold prospectors. One established scientific hypothesis about seismic activity in the earth’s history contends that fluid metal was formed at great heat underground and then was dispersed through tectonic events, in part ending as gold flakes, grains, or nuggets in the top soil layers (Launay 1908). The detector is designed to find such gold lumps in the near surface layer of the soil. But we need not assume that the specificity of these materials can be grasped [182]solely in the terms of earth science. Rather, the properties and values of clean gold are locally made in interaction with other materials, such as the metal detector, and significations specific to the mining sector in northeastern Sudan.
The metal detector’s coil is connected to a check box and a battery, which electrically induces a magnetic field. When the coil is moved across the ground and encounters a metal, such as gold, it reacts. An electromagnetic current emerges between the metal and detector’s magnetic field, changing the detector’s field. This change is signaled acoustically. The pitch and volume of sounds that the detector emits varies, allowing one to distinguish metal objects from ground noise or electromagnetic inferences. Experienced prospectors begin to “hear the gold,” it is said among the prospectors in the Lower Atbara area. More abstractly, the detector translates complex underground composites according to a metal/nonmetal code into sounds (and graphics on the LCD display).
Perceptions of the metal detector’s properties and its correct usage have to be adapted to Sudanese specificities, which shape both the use of this technology and what “clean gold” is taken to be (see Beck 2004 on the adaptation of Bedford trucks to Sudan). The metal detector was designed with three different modes of search adjusted to different soil types, which demand different bodily movements. Prospectors I met conceived the detector as being endowed with a stable property of detecting metals at a depth of about one meter and their movements across the ground incorporated imaginations of the form, structure, and location of the objects sought after—clean gold. While reading manuals of technical devices is probably not done thoroughly anywhere in the world, the limited reading skills of most of my interlocutors restricted them to learning by participating with and observing other prospectors.
The GPX 4500 not only anticipates a literate user but also one that can work on his own. The ideal range for operating the battery, for instance, lies between 5 and 25°C. To limit the risk of electronic damage through overheating in Sudan, where temperatures regularly exceed 40°C, prospectors from the settlement worked mainly at night, demanding at least two prospectors—one to hold the flash light (and carry the shovel), one to hold the detector. The need to recharge the battery every few hours via an adapter in the car fostered a high nocturnal mobility of detector teams, which move unseen and unheard from site to site.
In northeastern Sudan, artisanal detector prospection is not recognized as a merely technically mediated activity, rather, the idea of clean gold in the Sudanese artisanal mining sector takes recourse to an imaginary of divine ordination. This perhaps most consequential translation of the detector concerns the kind of properties the resource in question is endowed with. Many I talked to like Hussein imagined a divine being, an Islamic God, who was held with planting the nuggets in the ground for certain ordained prospectors. Prospectors reasoned that certainly the detector was needed to find gold, but without a provisioning God the device could not lead to any profits. The technology was interpreted as a tool to pursue “what God had written down” for a person, to claim one’s divinely apportioned share. Yet, doing so, claiming one’s proper share and one’s destiny was seen as everyone’s own responsibility, a responsibility fulfilled by testing one’s luck (hazz). Therefore, clean gold is not an isolated precious metal out there in the ground nor is it what miners created in their imagination. It is made in and through material-semantic [183]work, involving skilled bodily performances, technologies, their scripts, and their translation in terms of an ordaining God.


Reconfiguring moral orders
The making of clean gold provides a glimpse into the ongoing negotiation of normative orders in Sudan. I identify two conflicting moral orders—an emerging order that prizes individual profit and luck while forming new kinds of social bonds between prospecting teams, and an established moral order that prioritizes hierarchical relationships between senior men and their dependents.
Let’s return to unlucky Hussein. Moved by the recalled story of sensational finds in places taken-for-granted and thus far unexplored, he got the idea to prospect in his immediate neighborhood. Not only did he hold the idea of finding much clean gold in his mind but he also enacted it bodily. The metal detector he was using tempted him to frame the soil in the settlement as resource reservoir waiting for exploitation, something he had not conceived before. This resonates with Heidegger’s point that the use of modern technology with its instrumental logic conceives phenomena such as nature, plants, humans, and animals as mere resources, as “standing reserve” (Bestand) waiting to be exploited (Heidegger 2009: 100).9 This observation of the enframing of everything in terms of economic use was part of Heidegger’s technology critical turn in 1960 (Kehre) and his main point was that it conceals being (Sein) (Heidegger 2010: 103–5).10 The use of metal detectors converted the soil into a “standing reserve,” a mineral deposit for prospectors, while concealing other ways of imagining and using gold and the soil that contains it, in effect orienting all doing to a restricted sense of economic utility.
Prospecting for clean gold with metal detectors is a case in point for this economic enframing. This economic valuation is also apparent in the fact that artisanal gold prospectors I met talked about clean gold in terms of the monetary equivalent this fetched them. While not being aware of the exact world price per gram of gold, miners were aware of the increasing prices that middlemen and traders were willing to pay for gold, mirroring the rise of the world gold price from roughly US$250 per ounce in the early 2000s to $US1,000 in 2008, peaking at $US1,900 in 2011.11 But the monetary equivalent of gold is of course not the only value at play.
Rather, a compromise was formed between this economic order of worth and an “inspired order of worth” that prized qualities such as creativity, grace, and uniqueness (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 159–64). Successful prospectors referred to [184]intuition or divine inspiration as the causal force that made them search in specific locations. Ideas of luck, fate, and divine predestination were used to make sense of why some found such gold lumps or come across an underground gold vein, while others failed to. Explorers like Hussein conceived their personal entitlement to extract clean gold as emanating from this understanding of divine ordination, even if nuggets were found on spaces owned by other people, spaces formerly used collectively for herding or rain-fed cultivation, or contracted according to a governmental concession. Importantly, clean gold came to be interpreted as a resource divinely bestowed upon an individual, who nonetheless had to exert himself to pursue it.
Yet, the organization of extractive work in Sudan demanded subjecting what God has prepared for a deserving individual to other considerations, such as safety, trust, and new expressions of reciprocity. The introduction of metal detectors not only brought about a new resource subcategory and associated valuations but also led to the growth of a segment of artisanal gold mining with its own forms of social organization and normativities that among Rashaida challenged the previous patriarchal authority that was associated with pastoral livestock production. Men engaged in gold prospecting were called “’ahl al-jihāz” (the detector’s people). Owners of detectors—or, those representing a group of owners like Hussein—have emerged as a new group of entrepreneurs, set apart from mere workers on detecting teams. Almost all owners among Rashaida I met were young and respected men, usually former labor migrants to the Gulf with some money at their disposal. They were crucial in instigating prospection: they mobilized the money to buy these expensive devices, which in 2009 and early 2010 could cost up to EUR 10,000 on the Sudanese black market; they took a risk in buying these contraband goods; they acquired specific know-how to operate the device, transmitted it, and monitored the use of the device; they organized the extractive enterprise, that is, the duration of shifts, the composition of the team, its mobility, and they calculated and accounted for who got which share of the revenues.
Since prospecting mainly happened at night and involved traveling to isolated deserts and mountainous areas, work was done in teams. Returns were shared according to clear distributive rules: owners of the detector received a third, owners of the car another third, and the group of workers received the last third. This clear distributive arrangement thus contradicts the imaginary that a preordaining God would prepare gold nuggets in the ground for certain deserving individuals because a worker’s divine gift had to be shared with the prospecting team and even unequally with the group of owners. The individual’s divinely ordained luck was thus celebrated but in reality translated into the team’s luck. I noticed that every member of the mining team was well informed about the grams of gold found, the price this fetched, and the different shares of the money earned. On returning from a mining trip, miners usually first reported on exact figures and these figures circulated in the settlement when neighbors visited each other or women chatted over coffee. There is some tension between keeping track of the exact figures and the emphasis prospectors placed on trust and loyalty founded in kinship.
The explicit logic guiding the composition of detector teams was to promote the welfare of kin and at the same time to employ people who could be trusted, creating another sociality than hard-rock mining, where teams were composed of [185]people from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds (Calkins 2016: 138). With the authority to decide on the composition of detector teams and the schedules of extraction, owners had become nodal points in their social networks that individual workers had to pass to join the work. By taking different people along in successive rounds, these new entrepreneurs were able to create more long-term relationships, creating networks of indebted kin. Owners were held responsible for being inclusive, fair, treating all paternal kin equally, and for being generous during the mining trips, while workers were expected to reciprocate in terms of loyalty. The emerging sociality in prospecting took the shape of patron-client relationships, whereby a new and younger group of men emerged as patrons in their kin networks.


Challenging seniority
A new quality of these ties lies in their exclusion of the older generation, the patriarchs, who formerly commanded livestock and meanwhile often had become dependent upon their sons for their livelihoods. This process had already started in the late 1980s when young men began to migrate to the Gulf States and earned incomes that made them independent from their fathers. Yet, some older men complained to me that their sons kept the money from gold mining to themselves; I never heard this complaint about labor migrants in the Gulf who also saved money for their own investments (while distributing some of it among their kin in times of need). The money from gold mining was special in that it was nearby in their sons’ pockets, was spent on tangible material items, and they knew how much they had earned since everyone memorized the exact figures. While older men at times overlooked the new redistributive mechanisms that emerged in detector prospection, they expressed a feeling of being sidelined by this intergenerational shift of control over an important equipment. As in many Muslim societies, I noted that seniority still has a high value among Rashaida: senior men were addressed respectfully, received food first and the best pieces, and they were also offered the most eminent places to sit.
This underlying intergenerational value conflict may explain older men’s’ outrage at Hussein’s act. Hussein was the only one who to my knowledge had tried to prospect in the settlement. It was a random, renegade act that expressed uncertainty about what counts in the situation. His act can be interpreted not only as a test of his luck, as he noted, but as a test of normative orders: could the economic enframing of detector prospecting—clean gold and land as reservoir of subterranean matter—also be pertinent in the settlement?
He received a clear answer. “That this is not right,” some of the neighboring women commented on Hussein’s prospecting. Older men I talked to objected to Hussein’s act as brazen and disrespectful, lacking the proper modesty (hišma). hišma means propriety, humility, modesty, and shame. In an ethnographic study of Rashaida marriages in the 1980s, William Young found that hišma referred to hierarchical relationships between a nomadic camp’s senior man and camp members and was the defining norm of camp sociality—not kinship, descent, or affinity. Camp members were expected to be respectful of the senior man and to avoid [186]harming his reputation; he reciprocated for hišma by providing to camp members benefits, such as security, access to jointly used water and pasture resources, and labor power through herding collectives (Young 1988: 128–32, 136). Older men still entertain the expectation that younger men display hišma, while due to new economic circumstances often are unable to reciprocate accordingly (Calkins 2016: 99).
hišma coincides with what Boltanski and Thévenot (2006: 164ff) refer to as a “domestic order of worth,” an orientation toward tradition and seniority, where entities are being ranked and organized based on their position in personal relationships to senior men. It is this order of worth of the past that is being challenged by the compromise between moral horizons of divine ordination and profit seeking articulated in gold mining, even though many of these younger men have become new patrons themselves. Hussein, however, was neither the independent and wealthy labor migrant nor detector owner but a respected schoolteacher and someone who only through his father gained access to such a preeminent position as so-called wakīl (trustee) over a detector; still, his act was seen as reflecting the attitudes of a younger generation that tried to use this new equipment inappropriately to renegotiate the balance of generations. While feeling challenged and even disempowered by a younger generation of men who with money control an even more fugacious capital than livestock, they successfully thwarted this young man’s prospection and confirmed moral authority of older men over doings—at least in the settlement.
Outside of the settlement in the steppes of northeastern Sudan, there were also tensions about land use for gold mining:12 Official frameworks for resource governance, resident groups, hard-rock miners, detector prospectors, and environmental conservationists claimed contradictory but overlapping versions of reality. These different versions of reality acknowledged different causalities for the occurrence of gold—divine intervention or seismic folding—and prioritized different normativities that mainly confirmed the economic value of gold but also unearthed incommensurabilities with further value ideas. For example, artisanal hard-rock mining spread across vast areas, devaluating the landscape for farming or herding through hundreds of mines, pits, and mounds of dirt; resident groups claimed an attachment to land as ancestral home and longstanding farming and pastureland, demanding compensation from miners; artisanal hard-rock miners mostly cooperated with customary land owners, though still seeing their revenues as divinely foreordained; mobile detector groups—moving unseen at night—tended to disregard land ownership, seeing land as a resource-base and access to it justified by divine ordination; governmental planners often mapped the same spaces as unused governmental land in official geophysical surveys or as part of concession agreements with investors; enterprises in mining valued only land with reserves that merit industrial extraction, ignoring scattered clean gold.[187]


Figure 3: Open pit mining near Wadi al-cUshar



Infrastructuring clean gold
Clean gold (dahab sāfī) does not emerge merely from the interplay of individual gold prospectors, metal detectors, the physical environment, and a social imaginary of divine ordination. Rather, resource making occurs in larger arrangements, I call them infrastructures here, which allow the circulation of values and at the same time are remade by those values.13 Clean gold in particular relied on the infrastructure that had emerged around hard-rock mining.
Classic scholarship has mainly attended to the recalcitrance of infrastructures, the stability of their standards and classifications, the ways in which their materiality exerts a largely invisible constraint upon certain human practices and precisely thereby also enables them. To some, the term infrastructure implied prioritizing the material world over the social, suggesting that infrastructures form the stable material base that shapes significations and moral worlds, yet they certainly were [188]aware of the bidirectionality of this process. Bruno Latour (1996: 235), for instance, explained that he mobilized the term network instead of infrastructure to shift attention from the firmness to the fluidity of infrastructures. Recent scholarship uses the term infrastructure in a way that is very similar to Latour’s network and focuses more on the doing of infrastructure (see Larkin 2013 for an overview). The conceptual shift from infrastructure to infrastructuring highlights the always incomplete process of making infrastructure and the continuous work at integrating, cutting, and maintaining relations between heterogeneous elements; infrastructuring means organizing social practices (Niewöhner 2015: 123). In this sense my case study deploys the concept of infrastructuring to concentrate specifically on the integration of a new extractive technology and situate it into a longer established practice of gold extraction from hard-rock ores that in turn implies gold processing facilities, the emergence of markets near the gold mines, and a heterogeneous lot of gold miners and moral ideas.
In Sudan, some infrastructural projects such as road construction, the large hydro-dam projects along the Nile, or the opening of a gold refinery in Khartoum in 2012, have a high public visibility and are celebrated by the government as portents of progress and modernity (Verhoeven 2011; cf. Harvey and Knox 2012; Mains 2012). Unlike public infrastructures, such as sewers, roads, or dams for electrification, which are developed to serve citizens, the arrangements that facilitate artisanal gold mining are largely unobserved and this turns them into a productive case. They are principally illegal, though in practice many activities are condoned. Governmental planning and stipulations do not explicitly promote them; rather, they grow from below through people seeking their luck and wanting to do business. While some elements like mines and market stalls materialize on fixed and bounded physical locations, infrastructuring is ongoing. The technologies, people, and things are constantly in flux, emerging somewhere else, moving with the most productive mining sites. They are neither very stable nor entirely sunk into the background of human doing, as power or telecommunication infrastructures might be. Rather, most elements are visible and visibly unstable, shifting from high productivity to the typical abandoned ghost towns.
The infrastructure that expanded with the emergence of clean gold and the integration of metal detectors is the arrangement that grew to enable hard-rock mining. No one knew of gold when I first visited the area in 2007. When I returned in 2008, a few men from the settlement where I stayed had become gold miners extracting hard-rock ores. Between late 2008 and early 2009, pits and mounds of dirt proliferated in the vicinity as mines were being dug. Heavy machinery was soon brought to the artisanal mining sites to extract rocks from gold-bearing ores; tractors, bulldozers, pumps, diesel-generators to operate pumps, and diesel-run grinding machines to pulverize gold ore. In the course of 2009, thousands of people, often the rural poor, streamed to the gold mines in Wadi al-cUshar. Thus, when I returned to the area in autumn 2009 for more fieldwork, nearly all of the men from the settlement were engaged in gold mining.
Unlike the extraction of clean gold with metal detectors, hard-rock mining depends upon labor-intensive facilities to process the gold from the stones, that is, cutting it out from underground rocks, breaking it to pieces, grinding it to powder, washing it with [189]mercury to form an amalgam, burning the amalgam to release the mercury and end up with a gold lump of variant purity. A large and busy settlement of makeshift tents and huts organized around the facilities had developed in Wadi al-cUshar, where miners were busy processing their ores, which I visited a number of times in late 2009 and early 2010. The market had also turned into a new center for supply, amusement, and consumption, stocked with goods otherwise unavailable in the impoverished hinterlands of the Lower Atbara area. All detector people I met visited such gold markets to assess and sell their pure gold nuggets, to stock up their supplies and to find spare parts for their cars. Furthermore, some electricians and mechanics had specialized in repairing metal detectors and had opened shops at the main gold markets. On the fringes, there was a service industry, selling tires, gasoline, and mining gear, such as headlight, pickaxes, shovels, hammers, clothing, and much more. While the size of the settlement in the middle of nowhere was surprising, it did not emerge to stay. In early 2010, a second smaller settlement grew 20km further north, and, in March 2010, I witnessed an intermediate decline when many relocated to another new mining site farther south.


Figure 4: Abandoned market stall in Wadi al-cUshar

Whereas prospecting with metal detectors reconfigured artisanal gold mining by creating a new substance—clean gold—new sites, valuations, and social categories in Sudan, it hinged on something that was already there. This was an archive of regional expertise to know, identify, detect, process, sell, and market gold from hard-rock ores. There also was an established Islamic understanding of rizq as the God-given entitlement to livelihood and, importantly, ideas about luck, fate, and divine predestination were at hand in northeastern Sudan that could be used [190]to make sense of the haphazard nature of gold mining. These understandings of divine purpose and ordination together with this archive of expertise were part of the infrastructure of artisanal gold mining that reconfigured with the introduction of metal detectors and the new political economy of formerly oil-dependent Sudan. This ongoing infrastructuring enabled clean gold to emerge as something valuable in the eyes of artisanal miners, who had to invest much money in buying metal detectors and would not have done so without the promise of rich returns.


Conclusions
What is gained by a detailed examination of how clean gold came to matter as a resource in Sudan? The presented case sensitizes to processes of translation beyond the ethnographic specificities, to how what is of value is situationally reconfigured. The subterranean matter in question, clean gold, cannot be disassociated from the technology developed to find it, from theories concerning where such gold may be scattered, from conjecturing infrastructures that enable the extractive practice and the movement of gold, and are reconfigured by it, and also not from ideas concerning what it is about the substance that is of interest. These established infrastructures make the mining endeavor—or, in this case, the operation of the metal detectors—sensible, realizable, and worthwhile and participates in bringing this resource (sub)category into being.
The prospector does not find mineral resources in a subterranean, pristine form, detached from a number of underpinnings. Rather, they are related to an environment that is invested or equipped with specific features. For example, containing gold along riverbeds, in the top layers of the soil, or in variant associations with rocks, such as quartz, granite, or barite, an environment that is surveyed and mapped by governmental authorities.14 Or that is parceled into concession for international investors, where global markets for gold exists and stipulate high prices in hard currency, and where travelling detectors can function properly only if God has planted nuggets for adventurers, and when human bodies move in the right rhythm to “hear the gold.”
The expansion of the extractive practices to prospecting with metal detectors is an ongoing case of infrastructuring. The metal detecting devices as innovations hinged on the established infrastructure of artisanal hard-rock gold mining with its technologies, sites, expertise, and moral ideas, and reconfigured it at the same time. This infrastructuring enabled the circulation of religious significations that were assembled by a younger generation of men into new forms of moral evaluation. These devices and the emerging social relationships around clean gold have become a useful tool for a younger generation of men, who formerly were disenfranchised from economic resources and depended on their fathers, to challenge the paternal authority and the moral orders they promote. Clean gold is not only an economic resource that gives more agency to the mostly young prospectors. I suggest that it may also be seen as “clean” in a sense beyond its extraction: It enabled young men with access to metal detectors to increase their range of agency in relation to their [191]fathers without directly confronting their authority. This is part of another order of evaluation that challenges the prioritizing of tradition and relations to seniors and rather prizes an individual’s industriousness and making money but combines this with ideas of divine grace and ordination. Contradictions between these incommensurable “orders of worth” have not been worked out, although tradition beat individual gain in the discussed situation.
I sought to draw attention to social ordering in a situation of transformation, where competing normativities relate to gold and its extraction. The metal detector in Sudanese artisanal gold mining is inscribed with certain properties and values, such as a notion of independent personhood, which affects how gold prospecting is organized and performed. The technology enables enframing the environment so that new values can be produced, but it is more of a subaltern technology, smuggled into the country and used to resist a discriminatory resource politics of the center. Furthermore, value is made through a continuously expanding infrastructure. It is not stable but constantly moving, not public but informally emerging; it is tolerated not legalized. Yet, it is through this ongoing infrastructuring that materials and values are made and marketed. The value circulating in these infrastructures may be “enchanting” in ways that differ from suggestions made by Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox (2012): dreams of prospectors in Sudan do not connect to a nation’s progress through modernization and civic participation but are fed by individual desires for wealth and prosperity. Empowered by the imaginary of a divine casting out of lots, it encourages a sort of image of the entrepreneurial figure of the prospector, who appears to be freed from normative constraints that normally weigh upon his engagements with land owned by others. Subterranean matter in this view is open to private exploration, a view that Hussein promoted. Yet, he was corrected. It was not only this young man’s enframing of land as a resource for his own gain that appalled people but also his taking the imaginary of divine ordination too literal in a setting where private gain of a younger generation of men still has to be connected to wider distributive mechanisms among kin.
A pragmatist approach to a particular resource inquires into the making of resources, the mutability of how value is attached, and how this affects how claims can be made, maintained, or refuted. This can help to move away from dramatized perceptions of natural resources as being “essential” for human existence and “scarce” and to question what makes them interesting. It opens up a space for investigating how people test whether something is of worth as well as how they align or revise different values.


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De l’importance prise par l’or “propre”: Détecteurs de métaux, infrastructure et évaluation
Résumé : Récemment, une ancienne ressource, l’or, a acquis une importance nouvelle au Soudan. Afin de comprendre l’émergence des valeurs d’échange et leur négociation en période de réorientation de l’économie nationale, je m’intéresse a l’émergence d’une nouvelle catégorie de ressource, ce qu’on appelle l’or propre, et je suggère que ce développement est lié à l’introduction d’une nouvelle technologie de recherche: les détecteurs de métaux. Je rapporte l’importance prise par les détecteurs de métaux au Soudan et leur rapport à l’infrastructure techno-économique de l’exploitation minière artisanale de l’or, qui donne lieu à l’exploitation de l’or en elle-même mais aussi à la circulation de nouveaux raisonnements moraux. Non seulement une nouvelle catégorie de ressource s’est développée, mais ces technologies et les mondes moraux qu’elles ont constitué ont permis à de jeunes hommes de tester et d’interroger l’autorité morale et économique des générations d’hommes plus âgées.
Sandra CALKINS is a postdoctoral research fellow at the MPI for Social Anthropology and a member of the Law, Organization, Science and Technology group at the University of Halle. Her previous work drew on pragmatism and STS to explore connections between indeterminacy, reflexivity, and ordering in northeastern Sudan. She is author of Who knows tomorrow? Uncertainty in northeastern Sudan (Berghahn, 2016), winner of the junior scholar award of the German Association of African Studies. Her current project, inspired by STS, more-than-human anthropologies, and medical anthropology, examines the production of evidence about biofortification, an agricultural public health strategy to enrich food crops with micronutrients.
Sandra CalkinsMax Planck Institute for Social AnthropologyIntegration and ConflictAdvokatenweg 3606114 Halle/SaaleGermanycalkins@eth.mpg.de


___________________
1. See, for instance, the open-access journal Valuation Studies founded in 2013, which promotes a transdisciplinary debate about valuation. http://valuationstudies.liu.se/default.asp.
2. Recent work has also often focused on “techno-politics”—the attempt to govern behaviors seemingly apolitically by inscribing normativities, plans, and predictions into technologies (Winner 1986; Akrich 1992: 208). Such inscriptions were also problematized in scholarship dealing with the translation of technologies to different contexts (for instance, Rottenburg 2002; Latour 2005: 223–27; Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg 2014).
3. Instead of deploying the notion of infrastructure, I could have also followed the lead of other authors and could have conceived of these larger arrangements on which technologies depend as large technical systems, assemblages, or networks (for example, Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 399; Latour 2005).
4. This area was famed among Arab adventures in the ninth century as “the land of the mines”; colonial powers likewise sought to set up mining industries (Holt and Daly 2000: 14), but until very recently there was only one producing industrial mine in Sudan.
5. See Bullion Street (2015), which quotes the Sudanese Ministry of Minerals.
6. See footnote 3 also. Most mining operations employ hard-rock mining to extract gold from ores. Officials of the Geological Research Authority of Sudan (GRAS) showed me maps, locating alluvial deposits in Blue Nile State and South Sudan—not in northeastern Sudan. Enrico Ille (2011) indicates that panning was employed in South Kordofan.
7. Tilo Grätz (2010), for instance, described not only norms and social organization of gold mining in Benin but also analyzed mining technologies, tools, and the bodily performance of extraction.
8. There was an expectation that a groom presents gold jewelry to his bride at marriage; women washed themselves over gold jewelry to treat infertility; and older women said they formerly used it to store wealth but meanwhile often had to sell it. Women who were seldom able to read or write could recount exact prices not only for their own jewelry but also for that of an astounding number of neighbors and relatives.
9. This observation was already made in Being and time (Heidegger 2009), originally published in 1927 as Sein und Zeit in Tübingen (Max Niemeyer Verlag) that appeared in 2006 in its 19th edition.
10. The essay The question concerning technology was originally published in 1962 as Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Neske).
11. It has since decreased to $US1,600 in 2014; see the interactive price chart on the World Gold Council 2015. Accessed March 5, 2015. http://www.gold.org/investment/interactive-gold-price-chart.
12. See Calkins and Ille (2014). Land use in Sudan is subject to various overlapping institutions, such as customary law, state law, or pasture agreements between farmers and herders. Mineral resources, as in most countries, are again subject to other legislation and other governmental competences.
13. For example, I could have also focused on how practices of gold extraction in rural Sudan are linked to infrastructures of international trade and financial institutions as well as national governmental bodies. Extracted, processed, and partially refined in Sudan, regulated and marketed by the government of Sudan, by investors, international-standard setting bodes and gold industry groups the substance becomes a globally-esteemed commodity, whose quality and worth can be measured in line with the world gold price. Or I could have explored how the exchange rates of three currencies (US dollar, Pound Sterling, Euro) are involved in establishing the gold price for the global market. See The London Bullion Market. Pricing and Statistics at http://www.lbma.org.uk/pricing-and-statistics, accessed February 18, 2015.
14. According to maps and officials I interviewed at GRAS, gold can be found mainly in quartz veins, located in four main gold belts.
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This is a personal account of a recent criminal trial in the United Kingdom that the author was involved in as an expert witness, involving a young Zimbabwean woman who attacked her mother with a knife, when she (as she, her mother, and relatives claimed) was possessed by an evil spirit as the result of another family member’s witchcraft. Evidence for her abnormal state of consciousness was corroborated by police evidence that described her as “in a trance” on the night in question, and despite a wide range of medical and psychiatric assessments, no clear neurological, medical, psychiatric, or sleep-disorder causes for her “possession” were ever established. The article describes the difficulties encountered in producing anthropological evidence for the criminal court that sought to go beyond the limitations of conventional forms of “cultural defense” to argue for the limits of knowledge and the “possibility of other possibilities.” With a nod to Harry West’s notion of “ethnographic sorcery,” this unusual court case illustrates how anthropological expert evidence can be constrained by courts constructing their own kinds of certainty, and yet still have efficacy in unintended ways.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This is a personal account of a recent criminal trial in the United Kingdom that the author was involved in as an expert witness, involving a young Zimbabwean woman who attacked her mother with a knife, when she (as she, her mother, and relatives claimed) was possessed by an evil spirit as the result of another family member’s witchcraft. Evidence for her abnormal state of consciousness was corroborated by police evidence that described her as “in a trance” on the night in question, and despite a wide range of medical and psychiatric assessments, no clear neurological, medical, psychiatric, or sleep-disorder causes for her “possession” were ever established. The article describes the difficulties encountered in producing anthropological evidence for the criminal court that sought to go beyond the limitations of conventional forms of “cultural defense” to argue for the limits of knowledge and the “possibility of other possibilities.” With a nod to Harry West’s notion of “ethnographic sorcery,” this unusual court case illustrates how anthropological expert evidence can be constrained by courts constructing their own kinds of certainty, and yet still have efficacy in unintended ways.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>witchcraft, possession, courts, cultural defense, uncertainty, anthropology and the law</kwd>
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		</article-meta>
	</front>
	<body><p>“She appeared to be in some kind of trance”






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Joost Fontein. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau4.1.003
“She appeared to be in some kind of trance”
Anthropology and the question of unknowability in a criminal trial
Joost FONTEIN, University of Edinburgh


This is a personal account of a recent criminal trial in the United Kingdom that the author was involved in as an expert witness, involving a young Zimbabwean woman who attacked her mother with a knife, when she (as she, her mother, and relatives claimed) was possessed by an evil spirit as the result of another family member’s witchcraft. Evidence for her abnormal state of consciousness was corroborated by police evidence that described her as “in a trance” on the night in question, and despite a wide range of medical and psychiatric assessments, no clear neurological, medical, psychiatric, or sleep-disorder causes for her “possession” were ever established. The article describes the difficulties encountered in producing anthropological evidence for the criminal court that sought to go beyond the limitations of conventional forms of “cultural defense” to argue for the limits of knowledge and the “possibility of other possibilities.” With a nod to Harry West’s notion of “ethnographic sorcery,” this unusual court case illustrates how anthropological expert evidence can be constrained by courts constructing their own kinds of certainty, and yet still have efficacy in unintended ways.
Keywords: witchcraft, possession, courts, cultural defense, uncertainty, anthropology and the law


It was only moments after I entered the courtroom on day two of the trial that she said it. Despite the knife attack she had suffered almost two years earlier, and her long separation from her only daughter, not to mention the uncomfortable formalities of the crown court trial in which she and other relatives were prosecution witnesses, she emanated a remarkably calm and dignified presence in the witness box. The defense solicitor later described her as an excellent witness. But now under cross-examination by the defense barrister about the state her daughter (the defendant) had been in when she was attacking her mother, this dignified middle-aged Zimbabwean woman’s frustration seemed evident. The judge was seeking clarification. “When you say, ‘she didn’t look like Rachel’ what do you mean? Are you talking about her expression, mannerisms, or her movements? What was it, that wasn’t like Rachel?” insisted the judge. “It is hard to describe …” she responded, unable to find words that might explain for the judge, the jury, and the cross-examining barrister, how her daughter appeared that night: recognizable but different, known but unknown, present yet absent. Then turning to face the whole courtroom, the tremor of frustration reverberating in her voice, she demanded: “Is there anyone here in the court who has experienced spirit possession, who might understand this?” Sitting in the back row of the public gallery, I resisted the strongest urge to put up my hand. Later, as the trial unfolded over the next ten days, and even after the trial had concluded, part of me wished I had.
The barrister paused; “OK,” he said gently. Then he continued step-by-step through the minutia of the events of that evening two years before, “not to be rude, but I’m trying to establish a history.” The barrister drew on her previous witness statements and led her through what happened after the witness woke to find herself being attacked by her daughter, dressed in dark clothing, gloves, and an improvised mask, “engulfed by this thing” as she put it. “She felt stiff in my arms” followed by “moments of being very scared,” the woman explained. “Rachel said, ‘they are going to kill us both…. I want to go to my dad,’” and then “she tried to hide in the small space behind the wardrobe … like she was trying to get away from something.” There was some lengthy discussion between the barrister, the witness, and judge about the exact size of the space Rachel had been trying to hide in. About a foot, the judge suggested. “Would she fit in that space?” the barrister asked. “No, she wouldn’t,” the woman replied.
The detailed examination continued. Photographs of the house and the woman’s stab wounds were discussed. A cut on her cheek needed four stitches and she had three or four stitches for each of the four cuts on her arm. The woman kept her composure until the barrister asked about her relationship with her daughter. “You described these events as totally out of character, that Rachel was never aggressive … despite being a teenager.” Then when the barrister continued, “So when the police arrived Rachel was in your arms …” the woman started to cry and the judge suggested a short break. Later the woman described the deep distress she experienced being separated from her daughter since the event, “other than in [remand] prison, I have had no time alone with her, from then until now.”
A short while later the defense barrister asked the woman if she had any view of what was behind the knife attack she suffered from her daughter. “I do have a view,” she replied, but the judge immediately intervened, querying whether this was a fair question. The prosecution barrister confirmed that he was “concerned where we are going, given the opening statements.” As the two barristers spoke to each other in hushed whispers, the judge explained to the jury: “we have rather precise rules about what a witness can be asked about in court. A witness, except for expert witnesses, cannot be asked their opinion about things.” The conferring barristers agreed that the defense would ask another, second, much more indirect question.
Slowly, even laboriously, the defense barrister asked Rachel’s mother about her Christian beliefs, about prayers being said in her church for Rachel, and about the services of a Botswana muprofiti (a prophet)—he articulated the word very carefully—engaged for “Rachel’s spiritual welfare.” Already chastised by the judge, and on unfamiliar ground (or “in Indian territory,” as he put it), his questions were imprecise and vague. Rachel’s mother answered the awkward questions as best she could. “The muprofiti has been there … to pray for her two times. I was concerned because her actions were so out of character, so I asked the muprofiti to pray for her.” “For what purpose?” the barrister asked. “A muprofiti cleanses evil spirits,” she replied. “So it was to cleanse a spirit?” the barrister pressed on. “Yes, because in my view she was …” but she was interrupted again. “I cannot ask you about this, your view is not relevant to the court.” He changed tack, asking about the stature and authority of the muprofiti from Botswana. “Did you discuss what had happened with this senior religious figure?” he asked. “I told him I had a problem, but as a muprofiti you don’t really need to tell him anything,” she replied. Seeking clarity the judge interceded again: “You told him, ‘I had a problem with my daughter.’ Did you tell him your daughter had attacked you?” “Yes,” was the reply, repeating, “but you don’t really need to tell a muprofiti many things.” Still seeking clarity, the barrister continued, “So you told him your daughter attacked you but not any of the details?” “I asked him to pray for Rachel, but it was not necessary to go into the details,” she responded. Trying to make sense of this the barrister suggested that the muprofiti “was dealing with spiritual matters, but not what materially happened …” But before he could finish, and almost as if the muprofiti was listening, the fire alarm went off, and with orderly haste people left the courtroom, as the building emptied onto the street outside.
The story I tell here is about what happens when different ways of knowing, of ordering the world, of making sense of the unusual and the uncertain, confront each other within the disciplined, highly structured world of UK courts. But it is a story less about cultural difference than about the social (cf. Mosse 2006) and legal means—practical, performative, and discursive—through which certainty is constructed, and uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the possibility of other possibilities are encountered and vanquished through the courts. In his account of sorcery on the Mueda plateau in northern Mozambique, Harry West (2005) suggests that both sorcerers and countersorcerers (and a host of others: villagers, local leaders, but also anthropologists, missionaries, colonial authorities, FRELIMO, and most recently neoliberal reformists) are drawn into a never-ending game of kupilikula, through which they temporarily transcend the material, everyday world, in order to envisage, articulate, and remold it “in accordance with their own visions of a world reordered” (West 2007: x, 2005).1 West argues that anthropologists too make “transcendent manoeuvres” that “reorder the world,” and hence ethnography is a kind of sorcery, albeit (one hopes) without the malevolence normally associated with witchcraft.2 Here in this story, which can be read as a decidedly “postcolonial,” “multicultural,” and “diasporic” encounter3 between different epistemologies, and perhaps even ontologies (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007)—between commonplace but diverse and inevitably contested Zimbabwean understandings and practices of spirit possession, and Western knowledge/epistemology filtered through the determining space of legal practice—courts of law too can appear like arenas for sorcery in West’s sense, constructing a transcendental position in order to enforce certainty upon an otherwise “inescapably inchoate world” (West 2007: 69).
But more than simply an account of how a court asserts its kind of certainty upon events lying at the edges of its epistemological reach, this is also a story about the difficulties anthropologists can face in making their evidence commensurable and useful for courts of law. For those providing evidence on spirit possession and witchcraft, the consequential nature of the circumstances throws into sharp relief our normal handwringing about the political imbrications of anthropological representations of the “others” we study. If such self-conscious handwringing normally turns on problematics inherent to the textual distancing and objectification of social worlds encountered/generated by fieldwork—in the movement from field to desk and toward what David Mosse calls “anti-social anthropology,” akin to West’s ethnographic sorcery, if you will—then as Mosse discovered (2006), such anxieties can be deeply amplified when our own “sorcery” is in turn constrained and transcended in socio-political contexts in which we feel ourselves more pawns than players. Yet three years in the wake of Rachel’s attempted murder trial, I am less convinced now about the extent to which anthropological evidence was marginalized and ineffectual in the courtroom than I was in the immediate wake of the trial. The story I tell here therefore raises complex questions both about the difficulties anthropologists can face as expert witnesses in criminal trials, and about the ways in which anthropological “evidence” can have unexpected efficacy in courtroom contexts.
To protect those involved, in what follows, the names, places, and contexts have been deliberately (and quite extensively) anonymized and obscured. The events described are filtered through my (necessarily imperfect) notes and recollections, an interview I conducted with Rachel as an expert witness for the defense, as well as various witness statements and other court documents. So to some extent this account does amount, in West’s sense, to a final sorcery of my own. Much of what I describe here, about the way particular regimes of expertise and knowledge are reproduced in legal settings, reflects well-rehearsed arguments made in legal anthropology (cf. Conley and O’Barr 1990, 1993, and 1998; Good 2006, 2008). There are also important resonances with ongoing debates about cultural and legal pluralism, political liberalism, and the law (cf. Shweder 2010a; Webber 2006; Inksater 2010; Merry 1988), provoked particularly by the work of Clifford Geertz (e.g., 1983); as well as with earlier anthropological accounts in African contexts (such as by mid-twentieth century scholars working from the Rhodes-Livingston Institute—see Gluckman 1963, 1965, 1967), examining the social and cultural constitution of law, and how in legal contexts “reasonable behavior” is usually defined with reference to social, cultural, and political factors not contained by the law.4 Unfortunately, lack of space means I cannot do justice to these other works, considered and relevant though they are, and therefore I restrain myself to a reflexive account of Rachel’s trial, and my involvement with it, as one of two anthropologists called as expert witnesses by the defense.5

Background: “In some kind of trance”
Let me provide a basic account of the case, and the “agreed facts.” In late spring 2009, Rachel’s mother (who we shall call Mrs. Moyo), a practicing nurse living with her daughter in the Midlands, awoke around midnight one evening to find herself being attacked in her bedroom by what she initially thought was an intruder armed with a knife. In wrestling the knife off her attacker, she realized it was her teenage daughter Rachel. But Rachel did not appear herself: “It didn’t look like Rachel but it was her,” she told police in a witness statement. “Rachel’s voice was very strange,” the “expression on her face was so weird—terrified, so scared.” Rachel was “saying that she was hearing voices,” “telling her they were going to come to kill us,” and she “kept screaming ‘I want to go to my daddy.’” Bleeding from her stab wounds, and restraining her daughter, Mrs. Moyo managed to call her brother, whom we shall call Toby Ndlovu. He called the police and went straight around to the house. Hearing him knocking on the front door, it took her fifteen minutes to struggle herself and her daughter downstairs to open the door. Toby found his sister “drenched in blood,” with an improvised bandage around her upper arm. Rachel “was just sobbing” and “petrified, I could not describe it, she was not herself…. I saw fear in her eyes.” She “was still shouting” when the police arrived. His wounded sister was calm and holding onto her daughter like she was “cradling someone.” Toby explained to the court how Mrs. Moyo described to him what had happened as she was treated at the scene by paramedics; how Rachel had said to her mother that “voices had told her to kill her mum as someone else was coming to kill both of them anyway…. She thought it would be better that she kills her mum and herself … so that they could go and be with her dad.” “It was like Rachel was possessed,” Mrs. Moyo had told her brother, adding that “during the struggle for the knife Rachel had been so strong … it had taken all her strength to get the knife off her.” “Everybody who knows her is just so stunned and shocked,” Toby told the police in his witness statement, “this is completely out of character. Rachel is never aggressive.”
Mrs. Moyo’s and her brother’s descriptions of Rachel’s “altered state of consciousness” on the night of the event were corroborated by police statements. Various officers described her as “extremely distressed,” “hyperventilating,” and “sobbing uncontrollably … rocking backwards and forward,” despite their efforts “to calm this female down,” which were “having little effect.” The most vivid description came from the arresting officer, who arrived on the scene only moments after Toby, and described how Rachel was shaking, crying, and “kept saying ‘my dad, my dad…. My Nan told me my mum had killed my dad, she wants me to do it, she will kill me.’” “I asked her where her Nan was,” the officer told the court, “she said ‘she’s here to get me,’” describing how Rachel had been looking over her shoulder towards the front door. “I was expecting that her Nan lived with her or visited the address,” the police officer explained under cross-examination. She had not known that Rachel’s grandmother passed away almost a decade before in Bulawayo, about a year after her father had died in April 2000. Once arrested on suspicion of attempted murder and cautioned without any response, it was only en route to the police station, that Rachel “quieted down,” and “upon being booked she appeared calm and composed” according to another officer. In the arresting officer’s words, “she was as if she was another person, calm and collected, but when I first arrived she appeared to be in some kind of trance.” “In the van, she seemed to have changed into a different person,” the officer told the court. When told she had been arrested for attempting to murder her mother, it was with “astonishment” that Rachel had then asked, “Why would I do that?”
Before and throughout her trial, Rachel Moyo was consistent in her claims that she did not remember the events of that evening after she had gone to bed, nor changing into other clothes, gloves, and an improvised balaclava, going downstairs to collect a kitchen knife, or attacking her mother with it in her bedroom. She did remember an unusually vivid dream, “this weird dream that seemed real” (police interview), in which she saw her dead grandmother, her “gogo,” and her paternal aunt, talking to her in Sindebele “telling me that my mum is responsible for my father’s death and that I should do the honorable thing by my father and … kill her just like she did my dad.” “It’s as though she was guiding me,” she added during her police interview, “and then the only thing I remember after that is when my mum was actually fighting back.” “Okay, so the obvious question is,” the police interviewer asked the day after the events, “are you awake?” “That’s the thing I can’t explain because to me it seemed like a dream … where I was going to wake up. Its like, in the dream, I could see myself actually stabbing my mum, but … in reality when I think about it, I just don’t remember my actions except when she was fighting back,” Rachel replied. “My first conscious recollection where I was knowing where I was and what I was doing was when the police were actually here.” “So when you’re attacking your mum and she’s fighting back, you’ve no conscious recollection of that? That’s what you’re saying?” the police interviewer pressed. “Yeah to me it was just like a dream,” she replied. “So you can see it happening and you can see you doing it … but you are not consciously aware of you doing it. Does that make sense … ? I think I know what I’m saying,” the policeman hesitated. “Yeah,” Rachel replied, “that makes perfect sense.” “So,” the policeman continued, “you come to your senses when the police arrive, and do you remember any conversations with the police officers?” “The woman taking care of me, she just kept trying to tell me to calm down, but I couldn’t calm down because it’s like at that point I was still sort of seeing my Nan and at the time she didn’t look very happy …”
Noting how other police statements “tie up with what you’re trying to say,” the police interviewer suggested that “at that point, we accept that you are, in reality, back with the rest of (pause) reality really”; illustrating something of the difficulty everyone at the interview, and later in the courtroom (where Rachel’s police interview was rehearsed in fine detail), had understanding the events of that evening. In fact, the arresting officer’s evidence and that of Toby Ndlovu, as well as Rachel’s claim in court that she only recognized the officer from when she had been booked into custody at the police station, suggests that she was only “back with the rest of reality really” much later that night. Before and throughout the trial Rachel remained adamant she had no reason to attack her mother and did not remember doing it. As she tearfully told the court from the witness box, at the climatic end of the fourth day of the trial: “They were my hands, my body, that did that to my mum, but not me. I love my mother; she is the only person I have. I don’t even talk back to my mother. Why would I do that to my mother?”


No ordinary “cultural defense”
Over the past decade, there has been a proliferation of cases in the United Kingdom and elsewhere that involve beliefs and practices to do with possession and witchcraft.6 Where such cases have gone to court, they have sometimes resulted in verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, but where there is a lack of medical or psychiatric evidence or where other beliefs are perceived to be involved, a cultural defense has occasionally been mounted. Something like a cultural defense was involved in Rachel’s case, but this was by no means straightforward.
In cases involving Africans living in the United Kingdom and Europe, so-called child witch exorcisms and “muti murders” have gained the highest media profile, and have been the subject of a number of investigations and television documentaries.7 Coverage of such cases has sometimes left scholars profoundly disconcerted, provoking acrimonious debate about the reification of sensationalized, exoticized, and primitivizing images of an aggregated “African occult.”8 Not withstanding that such cases are without doubt profoundly disturbing, it has scarcely been acknowledged beyond academic circles that trade and use of body parts for ritual purposes has a long and complex history across Africa and beyond (cf. Fontein and Harries 2013; Bernault 2013; Espirito Santo, Keretetzi, and Panagiotopoulos 2013), and that discourses and practices of spirit possession are as common as they are culturally diverse, contested, contemporary, and historically emergent; and therefore decidedly not erroneous (or necessarily dangerous) “hang-overs” from a “primitive” past. Indeed, extended scholarly debates about the “modernity of witchcraft” (Geschiere 1997) illustrate how, more often than not, discourses and practices to do with spirit possession (in all their complexity and diversity) can not only perform “positive” social “healing” functions but also reflect the messy contemporary politics of postcolonial states in an often alienating, globalizing world. In this respect, the alarmist sensationalism with which such (relatively rare) cases of child witch exorcisms and muti murders have been met in Western media, speaks volumes more about the dilemmas of inclusion and exclusion facing contemporary European societies—what Geschiere calls “the perils of belonging” (2009)—than about the salience of such beliefs and practices in particular African contexts. Scholars (e.g., Ranger 2007) have therefore often responded by emphasizing the immense diversity of African religious beliefs and practices, and the need for detailed empirical historical and ethnographic research situated in particular historical, cultural, social, and political contexts.
These debates are part of the broader context within which Rachel Moyo’s case was inevitably entwined; yet her situation was somewhat different. In the absence of any clear medical, psychiatric, or sleep-disorder related cause for Rachel’s actions, despite a cacophony of tests by experts, “guilty by reason of insanity” was never an option the defense or the prosecution was likely to entertain, even if the judge held it up as a possibility for the jury to consider. At the same time, however, no ordinary cultural defense could be mounted because Rachel was, by all accounts, not conscious of what she was doing. If by “cultural defense” it is meant that someone tries to justify their conscious and deliberate actions in terms of responding rationally to a deeply held cultural belief—in Rachel’s case perhaps that her dead grandmother or aunt wanted her to avenge her father’s death—then it simply did not apply here because the accused, her mother, and other family members all believed it was not Rachel who intentionally did this, but an evil spirit possessing her. Having interviewed Rachel herself a year before the trial, my conclusion was that she and her relatives had come to the belief that it was another, maternal aunt (not the paternal aunt in her dream) who used witchcraft to attack Rachel’s mother using her body, for an entirely different malicious purpose unrelated to her father’s untimely death in 2000. Yet because an ordinary “witness cannot be asked their opinion about things,” but also because even the oral evidence of expert witnesses is heavily constrained in court (especially by the cross-examination of barristers), Rachel and her mother’s (the “victim”) views were never, in the end, discussed in court in any detail. For most of the trial—but perhaps not the sentencing (to which I return below)—their beliefs in the existence of malicious spirits, witchcraft, and the possibility of possession were only briefly acknowledged and then set aside as irrelevant to the business of the court.
Of course the way cultural defense (Renteln 2005) has been deployed in legal contexts has often made anthropologists feel distinctly uncomfortable.9 As Good (2008: 51, 53–54) explains, one of the problems of cultural defense in court cases similar to this one, particularly in the United States, is that it is often based on rather outmoded and simplistic notions of “cultures” as separate entities with distinct and separate belief systems that determine people’s thought and actions. Few anthropologists today adhere to such deterministic and bounded notions of culture because of the overwhelming evidence that cultural boundaries are in no way static or fixed, nor does culture in any straightforward way determine people’s thoughts, actions, and motivations. Rather, “culture” and its “boundaries” are fluid, processual, and emergent, and importantly, always subject to people’s creative, scrutinizing, conscious, and continuing construction and indeed contestation. As Good (2008:51) describes, “most contemporary anthropologists would I imagine agree with Zygmunt Bauman that culture ‘does not cause behaviour, but summarises and abstracts from it, and is thus neither normative nor predictive’” (1996: 11). Therefore, belief in the possibility and prevalence of witchcraft and spirit possession may in part determine or structure how a strange event can subsequently be interpreted, understood, or deciphered, but could not simply, or in any deterministic or mechanical way, cause someone to do or experience something unintentionally or unconsciously.
Due to these reservations, as well as Rachel’s insistence that she could not remember her attack upon her mother, the defense case to which I envisaged contributing as an expert witness (in my consultations with the barrister before and during the trial, and in my formal written report), was rather different. Indeed my report tried to do several slightly different things, some of which might have fitted a more conventional cultural defense even as I attempted to reach beyond that. These turned out harder to reconcile than I initially imagined. Let me discuss these briefly, to show how I approached my difficult task (and why), before returning to the trial itself to explore what traction (if any) this anthropological “evidence” actually had.
The first aspect of the report drew specifically on my country expertise, and did reflect the kind of material that might be drawn upon for a conventional cultural defense. Outlining the different witchcraft and spirit possession explanations that might arise in Zimbabwean contexts, I tried to show the cultural consistency and coherence of Rachel and her family’s beliefs about what had happened.10 I drew heavily on my own experience and the wider literature, but also my interview with Rachel in Edinburgh in early 2010, which had focused on how she (and her family) understood the events, and how these explanations were arrived at, in relation to other possible explanations.11 For example, aware that witchcraft accusations frequently occur between extended, affinal kin around the death of a senior family member, we discussed whether Rachel’s paternal aunt (who appeared in her “dream”) might have been responsible for the attack her body carried out on her mother. This aunt had in the past indirectly accused her mother of being responsible for Rachel’s father’s death, an accusation that itself implied earlier witchcraft by her mother. Rachel had discounted this idea following communications with her family, and in consultation with the muprofiti, concluding that her maternal aunt, umama omdala (mother’s older sister), was responsible for the attack, motivated by jealousy and a desire to acquire Rachel’s mother’s property in Bulawayo. In my report I linked this to a common belief among some Zimbabweans that the threat of witchcraft can be most severe from much closer (i.e., “blood”) relatives. Emphasizing the uncertainties often provoking, and provoked by (Niehaus 1997), witchcraft events/accusations,12 I discussed how Rachel’s deference to others’ explanations (her relatives and the muprofiti) reflected structures of authority related to age, kinship, and status that continue to have salience among Zimbabwe’s UK diaspora, particularly in family matters; and that in some ways mirrors the “hierarchicalization” of knowledge in UK courtrooms.13 My purpose of presenting this kind of material was to show how Rachel and her family’s explanations made sense in a Zimbabwean context, which of course would have been vital for any ordinary cultural defense.
The second part of the report drew more on my anthropological rather than my specific “country” expertise, and was primarily targeted at ensuring the court could (if it wanted) engage in an informed discussion of the efficacy of witchcraft and possession beliefs and practices. This material too could fall within the requirements of building a conventional cultural defense, however my intention was particularly to try to reduce distance between Rachel and her family’s understanding of what had happened, and what the court might find reasonable and commensurable. I therefore discussed how the anthropology of witchcraft had built upon three important points made by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1937): First, that beliefs about “witchcraft” and magic are not evidence of illogical, prelogical, or “primitive” thought, and indicate not a lack of but rather “an excess of rationality,”14 even if Evans-Pritchard himself stated the Azande were wrong to believe in oracles. Second, witchcraft accusations closely reflect social tensions and can therefore be seen as a “social strain gauge” (Marwick 1965). And third, that the distinction between “witchcraft” and “sorcery” Evans-Pritchard observed, remains of huge analytical significance because it reflects how questions of individual agency, responsibility, and intentionality are often key for how any “witchcraft event” is judged, and for any measures taken in response.15
This last point, I argued, suggested that questions of intent and consciousness that are often of central concern in legal settings such as Rachel’s trial, might be mirrored in the inevitable concerns that arise from the uncertainties of agency, consciousness, and intention provoked by witchcraft situations, in Zimbabwe or elsewhere. In this particular sense, I suggested, there might be little difference between how a case like Rachel’s is handled in a UK courtroom and how it is handled in Zimbabwe, even if the 2006 repeal of colonial-era legislation criminalizing witchcraft allegations means that the possibility of witchcraft and spirit possession are now given due hearing in that country.16 To illustrate this, I discussed a widely publicized case (the “winnowing basket” case) that appeared before Harare magistrates in May/June 2009, to show how questions about responsibility, consciousness, and intention can lie at the very core of responses to alleged witchcraft, as indeed one expects they might in any serious criminal trial. This involved a woman found naked in Harare’s Highfield suburb, who claimed she was flown there on a winnowing basket by her father-in-law and aunt, intent on using her to kill another family member. After hearing “expert evidence” from Zimbabwe’s National Association of Traditional Healers (ZINATHA), the Harare court recognized “the accused is also a victim who was being used by a relative,” gave her a suspended sentence and ordered her “to seek help to recover from the spell apparently cast on her by her father-in-law.”17
This example related to the third, most ambitious (and controversial) aspect of the report, where I considered the importance of anthropology’s long engagement with the difficult epistemological and ontological problems—or “uncomfortable questions” (Niehaus 2013: 210)—raised by experiences of witchcraft and possession, to do with ways of knowing, their relationship to the nature of the world, and ultimately about the limits of knowledge. Here I sought to suggest that (and why) a contemporary anthropological stance to such events might emphasize profound uncertainty; what I framed as the “possibility of other possibilities.” This, I felt, could be key to an unconventional kind of cultural defense for Rachel’s case because it implied that the possibility that Rachel and her family’s understanding of what had happened might be correct—to put it crudely, that spirit possession/witchcraft might actually “work”—be left deliberately open, as such things are not empirically provable either way without recourse to very particular and deep-founded cultural, philosophical, or ontological assumptions about how the world really operates. This argument built on a notion (which some might question) that an anthropological approach involves seeking to uncover how the world might work according to the often profoundly different cultural, philosophical, or ontological assumptions of differing peoples. This open-ended or even agnostic stance suggests, I argued, that we leave open and indeterminate the possibility that there are possibilities that lie outside the limits of our knowledge.
In making this assertion, I suggested anthropology has moved on from Evans-Pritchard’s notion that Azande beliefs about oracles and sorcery were “rational but wrong,” and that it is now well-recognized that all “truths,” including “scientific knowledge” are necessarily socially, culturally, historically, and politically constructed and therefore contingent (Bloor 1976; Shapin 1996). With hindsight, and in response this article’s various reviewers, perhaps this assertion about anthropology’s common cause were exaggerated.18 Certainly many anthropologists remain wary of the kind of cultural or even “cognitive” relativism long ago propounded by scholars like Peter Winch (1958, 1964), which posited that “rationality” itself was culturally constructed, and if taken to extreme, denies the possibility of “cross-cultural comparison,” undermining the very usefulness or even possibility of a cross-cultural discipline like anthropology itself.19 Yet in the context of anthropology’s so-called post-modern (Willis 1996, 1999) and more recently “ontological” turns (e.g., Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007), some anthropologists have argued that “magical” phenomena are or can be “objectively real,” even if they are necessarily inexplicable in terms of “western scientific rationality” (cf. Stoller and Olkes 1987). While more extreme versions of such approaches have insisted upon the existence of “separate realities” or “other worlds,” based on very different fundamental (ontological/metaphysical) assumptions about the nature of reality, others continue to be concerned about notions of “radical difference” such analyses imply (cf. Fontein 2011; Carrithers et al. 2010). Reservations have also been expressed about how such approaches exacerbate the “long history of exceedingly ‘generous’ or ‘charitable’ anthropological treatment of witchcraft and of divination” (Niehaus 2013: 211), and the serious consequences that can result. Beyond fears about a proliferation of “absurdity” (cf. Lett 1991: 318), some argue that anthropologists can “ill afford to adopt an uncritical, purely interpretive, stance towards witchcraft and divination” because too often such beliefs can enhance very real “fears, anxieties and spiritual insecurities” with sometimes devastating consequences; particularly, for example (but by no means exclusively), in the context of South Africa’s AIDS pandemic (Niehaus 2013: 212; Ashforth 2005: 69).
In writing about these debates and trying to remain relevant for the court, I therefore argued that a more moderate approach, based on a compromise between these positions, probably represents the moral and analytical position adopted by many (but clearly not all) anthropologists today. This involves leaving open the possibility that magic, witchcraft, and similar occult forces might operate in any particular context, in order to avoid making judgments on the basis of necessarily contingent assumptions about the nature of reality, while at the same time not essentializing cultural difference, or championing simplistic notions of cultural determinism that deny agency, change, and historicity. Importantly, such an approach is based less on “radical cultural relativism,”20 and more on a recognition of the limits of knowledge and the prevalence of uncertainty. Similarly, in contrast to some “interpretative” approaches (cf. Jackson 1989) criticized for treating questions about the reality of witchcraft, possession, and divination as irrelevant as well as unknowable (Niehaus 2013: 211; Lett 1991: 313), the stance I was advocating might treat such questions as potentially significant exactly because of their profound “unknowability.”
It was my contention that in Rachel’s case a similar stance could be adopted by the court. That is, leaving open as undecided and unanswerable the possibility of people doing things outside of their own consciousness and intentionality, without clear medical or psychiatric cause and for whatever reason—including the explanation Rachel and her family had come to—yet without relying on a vague cultural determinism positing causal links between beliefs in the existence of witchcraft or spirit possession and the difficult-to-explain events of that day. Emphasizing the diversity of cases of people in altered states of consciousness anthropologists have encountered, I suggested focusing attention on Rachel’s intentionality might be the only way to allow the unanswerable and ultimately unknowable questions (to do with the possibility of “demonic possession,” malevolent “witchcraft” by a “witch,” “sorcerer,” relative, or a unhappy spirit, or of “other cultural explanations” as the defense psychiatrist later glossed it) to be set aside and left open-ended. The case might then ultimately depend upon how the court judged the credibility of the key witnesses and the accused, and again this would make it much less “strange,” “exotic,” or “different” than any other “normal” criminal trial.21 In this way the kind of cultural defense I envisaged contributing to involved what anthropologists are often said to do—“making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar”—unlike more conventional, glib kinds of cultural defense, which tend to reinforce outmoded, simplistic, bounded, and overdeterministic notions of “cultural difference.” In other words, I argued more for the recognition of profound uncertainties for everyone concerned rather than for the existence of profound alterity.


Dissociative states, other possibilities, and “noninsane automatism”
But as it happened, none or few of these arguments, what I envisaged as my anthropological contribution to the trial, was made much use of. The sorcery of the court, as I later came to think of it, meant that neither the detailed account of the complex nuances of Zimbabwean beliefs and practices, nor of anthropology’s long critically engagement with witchcraft and spirit possession, let alone the more ambitious (but perhaps naïve) attempt to encourage the court to recognize the limits of knowledge, made much of an impact, at least directly. The real courtroom drama occurred in the exchanges among barristers, witnesses, and the judge, and most of all, between the two psychiatrists called as expert witnesses by the prosecution and the defense.
The prosecution’s case was simple: Rachel Moyo was lying. She had deliberately tried to kill her mother, and then tried to cover up her actions by pretending to be unaware of what she had done. They built their case by seeking to discredit the accused, focusing on a series of lies and inconsistencies to do with events in the months before the night she attacked her mother, when her attendance at school had become patchy, and some months afterward when she broke her bail conditions and lied to cover it up. Central to the prosecution’s case was the argument that the lack of any known medical, psychiatric, or sleep-related disorder, and the complexity of the actions she undertook before the attack—getting dressed, preparing a mask, collecting a knife, and so on—discredited her account of not being aware of what she had been doing. Therefore the only possible explanation was “criminogenic”; Rachel was simply guilty.
The problem the prosecution had was establishing a motive, and the barrister’s attempt to suggest Rachel harbored resentment against her mother to do with her father’s death almost ten years before was not very convincing. Both Rachel and her mother were clearly as distraught from their long forced separation as from the events that had led to it. The defense barrister was able to effectively cast doubt on the prosecution’s attempts to portray Rachel as a compulsive liar, by thoroughly and convincingly explaining the context of each inconsistency and untruth. For her part, Rachel explained her “terrible lies” after she had broken her bail conditions, by referring to the lack of efficacy her earlier truths had had. As she put it, when asked in the witness box why she had lied to police after breaking her curfew, “I had given the truth [before], and that truth had not helped anything, so why tell the truth?” “It was so unfair,” she explained to the court, “in May I was just a normal person, [then] my whole life turned upside down for something I can’t remember … now I can’t see my mum or my friends, that’s what I mean by unfair.”
The argument the defense barrister was aiming at was that Rachel was both “not guilty” and “not insane,” and that she had been in a once off (thereby unlikely to be repeated) “dissociative” state, probably triggered by her “dream” or “nightmare,” and therefore her actions amounted to a form of “noninsane automatism.”22 This was a very thin target to aim for, yet I felt that in this possibility of “noninsane automatism” there might be room for the open-ended stance and the recognition of “other possibilities” and profound uncertainty my report had advocated. However it became clear early on that the barristers and the judge had problems making sense or use of the anthropological evidence in the report. My report was too complex, too detailed, and probably too ambitious; perhaps it spoke the wrong language. In fact by day four of the trial, when the defense barrister requested the normal sequence of witnesses be changed to allow the anthropologists to give evidence immediately after the psychiatrists, it became clear the judge had not yet read the full report but only its brief summary.23 In our discussions the defense barrister seemed open to the suggestion to “suspend his disbelief,” and tried to build his defense around the possibility of “other possibilities,” but had difficulties expressing this in a way that the prosecution barrister and judge would not object to.
The anthropological evidence seemed to have more impact on the two opposing psychiatrists called by the prosecution and defense. This became apparent to me both by talking to them informally, but also when the oral evidence each presented to the court differed in varying degrees from the reports they submitted in advance. In the courtroom, cultural “factors,” “aspects,” “context,” “influence,” and even “contamination” took on far more significance than in their written reports. There was real drama in the psychiatrists’ exchanges as they battled in the front of the jury on the Wednesday and Thursday of the first week of the trial.24 The two psychiatrists cut very different figures in the witness box. The prosecution psychiatrist was softly spoken, hesitant, and often inaudible and unclear. In contrast the defense psychiatrist filled the entire witness box with his presence, his outstretched arms leaning on its sides with a confidence that substantiated his professorial authority, his voice dominating the whole courtroom. His eyes never leaving the jury, his was an impressive performance even as that of his “opponent” appeared weak and fey. Both the defense barrister’s cross-examination and the defense psychiatrist’s performance amounted to such a robust rebuttal of the prosecution psychiatrist’s oral evidence, that the prosecution recalled him to give further evidence on the Thursday morning in an effort to respond.
Yet both psychiatrists agreed that the cacophony of medical, psychiatric, and sleep-disorder tests carried out on Rachel indicated no obvious psychological, neurological, medical, drug, stress, or sleep-related issues that could have caused her to go into an abnormal state of consciousness. The prosecution psychiatrist argued this probably meant the accused was simply lying, and indeed their entire case built on this. His conflation between the lack of clear medical or psychiatric causes and his statements about the reliability of the defendant was effectively exploited by the defense barrister. But his strongest argument was that Rachel could not have been afflicted by so-called trance/possession disorder because the complexity of her acts before her mother was attacked were not “ordinary or everyday learned behavior.” It was hard, he said, “to see that as anything other than consciously driven.” If some kind of “dissociative state” was involved, he conceded, it could only have occurred after she was interrupted by her mother waking up during the attack. He did, albeit briefly, acknowledge that psychiatric assessments were usually based to some degree on “subjective interpretation,” and later under cross-examination, that there were “other possibilities” to do with “culture,” which lay outside his expertise.
The defense psychiatrist argued that despite the lack of obvious psychiatric or medical causes, all the evidence nevertheless pointed strongly to the accused having been in a “dissociative state.” He mentioned known cases of people doing very complex actions in dissociative states, and argued that Rachel’s dissociative state probably had something to do with the transient period between sleep and wakefulness, the “twilight state,” he suggested she was in at the time. Importantly, he argued that in the absence of clear medical or psychiatric explanation, cultural factors were probably highly significant to the case, and could come into play in two ways. First, known psychiatric disorders might manifest in “peculiar” or unexpected ways according to cultural context (or even “contamination”); a point I suspect few anthropologists would (in principle) disagree with. As he put it, Rachel’s description indicated a “dissociative state that is consistent with her culture.” Second, more interestingly, he suggested that there may be “states of abnormal consciousness,” which are not explainable in conventional medical or psychiatric terms but do find explanation in other “cultural narratives.” This was a point of agreement that he and I had established during a brief recess just before he went into the witness box. This, I sensed at the time, might have given me a window to express the argument in my report about allowing for the “possibility of other possibilities”; that Rachel and her mother’s explanation for her dissociative state might be true, or at least provided explanation where other known explanations fell short.
Under cross-examination, the defense psychiatrist explained that a dissociative state would be considered a “disease of the mind” if caused by something “inherent” or “internal”; unless “triggered from the outside” by an “external” factor. In the absence of an “external blow” or “trigger,” any automatism must be legally an “insane automatism.” But, he added, if there is “a cultural explanation” for the dissociative state, it would be “for the judge to decide” whether such “other,” “cultural” factors amounted to an “internal” or “external” cause, and therefore whether it was “still a disease of the mind.” This became the issue upon which the whole case turned. If cultural factors were to be understood as external, this would mean the court accepted the possibility that Rachel’s actions were the result of “noninsane automatism,” and therefore that she might be found not guilty. If, however, such cultural factors were deemed an internal cause for a dissociative state then her actions would legally be defined as “insane automatism,” and she could only be found not guilty by reason of insanity. As a point of law it could only be up to the judge to rule on this, the defense psychiatrist stated, warning at the same time that “of course culture is not a disease.”
Any anthropological audience would likely have been aghast at the crude use being made of its still hallowed (and much debated—see Carrithers et al. 2010) notion of “culture,” but the fact these questions were raised at all seemed to indicate that the anthropological evidence in my written report had had some indirect effect on the psychiatrists’ expert evidence in court. Of course, the question of whether cultural factors are external or internal not only manifests the kind of Cartesian distinctions anthropologists have become hypersensitive to, but also echoed the concerns of anthropologists about the way cultural defense has often been invoked in courts of law. But listening from the back of the court, these were not concerns preoccupying me at that moment, when I was preparing myself to take the stand. Rather, I was thinking about how to construct a point of convergence with the defense psychiatrist’s evidence. In particular, how to suggest to the court that the cultural narratives through which Rachel, her mother, and the muprofiti explained the events of two years earlier—that she had been the unwitting tool (and victim) of a third party’s witchcraft causing her to be possessed by an evil spirit and attack her mother—did exactly the opposite to what psychiatric or medical evidence was expected to offer the court, and had manifestly failed to do here (i.e., offer an internal cause), by providing an external explanation for Rachel’s abnormal state of consciousness.
The defense barrister, however, tried to exploit the psychiatrist’s evocation of other cultural possibilities in a different way. Perhaps recognizing that the “possibility of other possibilities” would never gain traction with the jury or the judge, he focused upon the first of the defense psychiatrist’s explanations for how cultural factors could be relevant for the case; that the way known “abnormal states of consciousness” manifest could be culturally dependent. Reexamining the defense psychiatrist he asked whether it was possible Rachel’s dissociative state had been caused by her “random nightmare.” “I can’t rule it out,” the psychiatrist acknowledged, adding, however, that in his opinion Rachel had not experienced a nightmare but a “dream-like event” common to “twilight states between sleep and wakefulness.” “It’s possible, but a bit unlikely,” he concluded. “So it is possible,” the barrister pushed on, “that a random nightmare with particular cultural sources or context could have caused Rachel to go into a dissociative state?” “The cultural origin of such a dream does seem evident,” the psychiatrist hesitated. “And it remains possible that a nightmare could have caused her dissociative state?” the barrister pressed. “Yes,” the psychiatrist conceded uncomfortably, “this was a possibility.” The defense barrister had maneuvered him into a difficult position, and after the trial closed for the day, he warned the barrister that a nightmare could only be interpreted as an internal event.
This idea that a nightmare triggered a dissociative state did not really tally with anyone else’s ideas in the courtroom—not Rachel and her family, not the two psychiatrists, not the anthropologists, and ultimately not the judge.25 By the end of the following Monday, after a day of legal argument, it became clear that, as the defense psychiatrist had warned, it was impossible for the judge to consider a dream or nightmare an external cause of any dissociative state, however consistent with Rachel’s “culture.” This would have profound implications for the whole case. It seems very doubtful, however, that the vague gloss of “other cultural narratives” offering explanation for Rachel’s abnormal state of consciousness where medicine and psychiatry had failed, would have fared any better, or been more easily accepted as offering an external cause for a dissociative state by the judge.
As it was, though, the opportunity never arose. In contrast to the multiple appearances of psychiatrists, it was much harder for the barristers and judge to agree upon the admissibility of anthropological evidence at all, let alone the “possibility of other possibilities” my report had advocated. After the two psychiatrists had given their evidence, and the prosecution closed its case, the defense requested to call the two anthropological “experts” (myself and my colleague) ahead of the accused who was the main defense witness. In the face of the prosecution’s objection to any anthropological expert being required at all, this provoked a very long discussion about the nature of anthropological evidence and what might be admissible. This culminated in the judge requesting the defense barrister and I refine the oral evidence I would give from my written report into a short document to be circulated by email to the judge and prosecution that evening, and decided upon the next day. In the meantime the defense called the accused to the witness box, and Rachel began her examination in the witness stand on the Thursday afternoon.
I had been in court for three days waiting to give evidence, but that night I was up through the early hours with the defense barrister and his assistant rewriting questions for him to ask me, which might allow me to suggest that Rachel and her mother’s witchcraft beliefs offered an explanation for her nonconscious actions in a way that medicine/psychiatry could not, and that this should be taken seriously. But I never gave oral evidence in the witness box. The next day, after Rachel’s grueling cross-examination, the prosecution and defense barristers continued to argue with each other and the judge about what admissible evidence an anthropologist could offer that the prosecution had not already acknowledged. The prosecution barrister stated that he did not understand what an anthropologist could contribute beyond confirming what he was already happy to agree with, that beliefs about witchcraft and spirit possession are “deeply held” across Sub-Saharan Africa. In this view anthropology was limited to a kind of ethnology—the study of “other” peoples’ “cultural” beliefs, and had nothing to contribute to a discussion of dissociative states or the possibility of noninsane automatism. The defense barrister argued there was much more an anthropologist could offer, but could not articulate this in way the prosecution did not object to. Perhaps the prosecution was employing a delaying tactic, knowing I had to leave that afternoon having spent the week in court. Eventually I ran for my train while the court went for lunch, but my anthropological colleague did give evidence later that day, holding her own under cross-examination.26 But beyond stating that “the beliefs held by Rachel and her mother seemed characteristic of people in Zimbabwe,” she was not asked any questions “that needed detailed ethnographic information” from my report or elsewhere (pers. comm.). Like all witnesses, the oral evidence of experts is limited by the questions they are asked in court. Therefore it is very unlikely that had I taken the stand an opportunity would have arisen to offer much detailed ethnographic and historical context to Rachel’s beliefs about witchcraft and spirit possession, or contribute to the debate about noninsane automatism, let alone to argue for the possibility of other possibilities.27


The verdict: “A fudge”
Nevertheless my colleague must have done well because that evening the defense barrister phoned to say the judge was considering allowing the jury to weigh up the possibility of noninsane automatism and therefore a not guilty verdict. This was a positive moment to end the first week on. But by the end of the following Monday, the judge decided that “a nightmare would in law, be an internal cause of a dissociative state” (Defense solicitor, pers. comm.). This “had a major consequence on how best to proceed with the defense” as it “removed the option of a not guilty verdict (which would be ‘non-insane automatism’) meaning an external cause of any dissociative state could not be a decision open” to the jury (Defense solicitor, pers. comm.). In effect, the jury’s options were now limited to a guilty or a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, neither of which the defense had advocated for. “The rug was pulled from under my feet,” the defense barrister later told me, and this required a change of tactic. The barristers and judge agreed that two lesser counts of “wounding with intent to cause serious harm” and “malicious wounding (intent to cause some harm)” be added to the indictment, to which Rachel pleaded not guilty. The judge “felt this course was fair to both sides” (Defense solicitor, pers. comm.).
With all the evidence already submitted, the barristers delivered their closing speeches on the Tuesday of week two, and the judge began his summing up, finishing on the Wednesday when the jury retired around midday to consider their verdict. I was not in court for the second week of the trial, but the defense barrister told me later that because his defense of noninsane automatism had been denied, he spent his two-and-half-hour closing speech trying to persuade the jury to disagree and produce a hung jury. By any reckoning this was an unusual thing for a defense barrister to advocate, but this was an unusual trial. That the jury spent nearly three days considering their verdict, and then it was a 10-2 majority decision, and not unanimous, suggests he may have come close to succeeding. On Friday, the tenth day of the trial, the jury reached a verdict of not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of wounding with intent to cause serious harm, but guilty of malicious wounding (intent to cause some harm). Rachel was bailed pending further “presentencing reports,” and allowed to have contact with her mother in the presence of other family members. Rachel was very upset. Her reaction, the defense barrister later told me, was “to collapse into her mother’s arms repeating for twenty minutes that she couldn’t remember.” It was first time they had direct contact for almost two years.
The defense barrister later described the verdict as a “total fudge.” Rachel was convicted on the least serious charge the jury had to choose from. It was a charge neither the defense nor prosecution had argued for. Yet the final result of malicious wounding was perhaps the best possible result. This became clearer with the sentencing. Four months after the verdict, following further psychiatric tests and various risk assessments, Rachel Moyo was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment in a Young Offenders Institution, suspended for eighteen months, with an eighteen-month supervision order and 120 hours of community work. She therefore avoided a custodial sentence, and was able to return to live with her mother and family after almost two years. Despite his direction to them that disallowed a defense of noninsane automatism, in passing sentence, the judge stated that the jury had rejected the argument that Rachel had been in a dissociative state by convicting her of malicious wounding.28 Yet it seems the anthropological evidence so marginalized during the trial itself, did have some efficacy in the judge’s deliberations. Echoing the more conventional kind of cultural defense I have discussed, which was never actually made by the defense team during the trial, the judge stated that the probability was that Rachel had “attacked her mother because she believed that was what the spirits were telling her to do” or because her beliefs made her “think she was possessed.” For the judge then, Rachel had acted consciously but in the belief that she was possessed, or that her grandmother’s spirit wanted her to do it. In ordering Rachel to attend supervisory sessions, he further pressed her to try to “understand her beliefs so she could fight any urges that tell her to commit any crimes in the future.” Therefore, in the final count, the judge revealed himself as sympathetic both to Rachel and her mother’s plight—hoping they “can come to terms with what has happened” and wishing them well for the future—and to the cultural context of the case, acknowledging that “in large parts of Africa, including Zimbabwe” beliefs about spirit possession “are taken for granted” and “regarded as no more irrational than the belief in the existence of god.” Yet he had also discounted the possibility of other possibilities and the limits of knowledge, and his comments ultimately rehearsed Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) assertion that Azande beliefs about sorcery are “rational but wrong.”


Conclusions
It was my first experience in a criminal trial, and I was surprised how much the proceedings matched my expectations. There was a real sense of drama, of barristers performing to the court, especially the jury, within constraints of its hierarchies and rules, closely disciplined by an attentive judge. The judge remonstrated with the barristers but also witnesses, asking them for clarifications, or to speak up, even chastising one police officer for interrupting him. There were stronger and weaker performers, and as the barristers questioned witnesses, they established personas not only for the witnesses but also for themselves. The prosecuting barrister was demure, serious, with an organized air about him. The defense barrister by contrast was charming, witty, even maverick, playing to the emotions of the witnesses and the jury. There was plenty of legal argument, the barristers and judge playing a complex, invisible game of chess with each other by rules opaque to the rest of the court, despite the judge’s frequent legal explanations to the jury as they were escorted in and out of the court. Each day the court finished fifteen minutes early to enable one member of the jury to attend afternoon prayers. Timing was important for the barristers too, who might spend hours going through tedious minutia of details with witnesses, to ensure the right words and emotions filled the court at the right moment, such as when Rachel burst into tears at the very end of the fourth day, subduing the room with an affective scene that everyone took home with them.
There were moments of misapprehension too, when questions did not provoke the right answers and emotional responses, such as Rachel’s mother’s efforts to describe how Rachel appeared that night.29 Or when Rachel was asked about the daily relevance of her cultural beliefs about spirits and witchcraft, to which she had answered “they don’t impact on my life,” confounding the defense barrister’s line of questioning and giving opportunity for the prosecution’s grueling cross-examination. Some witnesses withstand the verbal manipulations of barristers, others less so. Rachel was confident and affective, her mother dignified, but her uncle emanated a less sure figure. Expert witnesses too can feel the pressure of inquisition; some command the court with authoritative presence (such as the defense psychiatrist), others less so (like the prosecution psychiatrist). Even the most accomplished can be maneuvered into saying something not anticipated, such as when the defense psychiatrist conceded a nightmare may have triggered a dissociative state. With this insight I was later grateful I did not take the stand, doubting I would have been very good under the prosecution’s cross-examination.
All of this points to the social, cultural, and performative aspects of how courts construct particular kinds of certainty, which have frequently been discussed in the wider (and older) anthropological literature on juridical processes and legal contests, which I have not had room to engage with here (see, for example, Benda-Beckmann 1981; Canter 1978; Colson 1974; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Moore 1973; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 2009; Werbner 1977, 1982). Yet during the trial, and immediately afterwards, I was most struck by how both the defendant and her mothers’ explanations for what had happened, and the evidence of the anthropologists appeared so marginal to the proceedings. Not only the prosecution (who were always likely to object) but also the judge and the sympathetic defense barrister struggled to know what to do with the anthropological evidence in my report, just I had struggled in writing it. While I worried about the exoticization of the so-called African occult and the problematic assumptions embedded in conventional forms of cultural defense, and felt compelled to engage with anthropology’s long discussion of the epistemological/ontological problems raised by witchcraft and spirit possession, the trial really turned on the debates among the psychiatrists, barristers, and judge about internal and external “triggers” for dissociative states and the legal possibility of noninsane automatism. Rachel’s mother’s plea to the court on the second day of the trial for someone “who has experienced spirit possession, who might understand this” was similarly irrelevant to the proceedings. Rachel and her mother’s views never seemed to be taken very seriously. The jury never heard a very full account of their explanations, or the complex process by which these were arrived at, nor of what anthropology might make of their accounts. They were acknowledged and then sidelined; relegated to the irrelevant. This marginalization of their “cultural narratives” (as the defense psychiatrist put it) seemed to resonate sharply with anthropology’s struggle to be taken seriously in the court.30
This case therefore illustrates the difficulties anthropologists can face as expert witnesses, particularly (and surprisingly so) in cases revolving around the kind of phenomena—like witchcraft, magic, and spirit possession—that our discipline has long debated and obsessed about. It is a problem of making anthropological knowledge production commensurable and useful to the functions and expectations of the court, without falling back on analytical or theoretical assumptions that no longer hold disciplinary sway. We could say, following West (2007:69), that the “sorcery” of the court means that in the effort to construct a “transcendental position” in order to enforce certainty upon an otherwise “inescapably inchoate world,” certain forms of expertise and knowledge, like medicine and psychiatry, are given a credence that anthropology is not. And of course when anthropologists find their own “transcendental maneuvers” to “reorder the world” (our own kind of sorcery) constrained and transcended in socio-political contexts in which our contribution is at best ambiguous, this can be very disconcerting.
Yet however much our discipline’s ethical and analytical stance might sometimes appear an anathema to how UK courts function, the dynamics I have been describing were also a result of the particular peculiarities of this case. It is interesting to speculate, for example, whether if a more conventional cultural defence had been presented—perhaps with the defendent admitting conscious intentionality in attacking her mother but appealing to some cultural imperative that motivated her—then Rachel and her mothers’ explanations, and what anthropologists had to say about them, would have got a better hearing during the trial. Rachel Moyo’s case was different and unusual exactly because there was such considerable evidence that she was not in control of her own actions during the events in question. It was the lack of any known medical, psychiatric, or sleep-disorder related causes for her abnormal state of consciousness, that raised the very possibility of noninsane automatism, or in my framing, the “other possibilities” that might be involved. Although some anthropologists are likely to disagree, I maintain that recognizing the limits of knowledge, the prevalence of a profound uncertainty, and acknowledging the possibility of other possibilities does not have to equate with the reification of a radical alterity or relativism that might threaten to undermine the very function and legitimacy of any court or other mechanism for establishing “truth” or “justice,” however contingent. I think we can allow for the “ontological self-determination of the world’s peoples” (Viveiros de Castro 2003:18), and still have legitimate mechanisms for establishing individual responsibility and accountability (as indeed Geertz might have argued, see Shweder 2010a, 2010b). The difficulty lies in how to make such arguments commensurable, useful, and relevant for a criminal court. How can (if indeed they should) anthropology’s theoretical debates, particularly those to do with its much contested “ontological turn” (Killick 2014; Pedersen 2012; Laidlaw 2012; Fontein 2011; Course 2010; Carrithers et al. 2010), be usefully applied in work we do as expert witnesses in legal contexts?
Three years on I am less convinced about the extent to which anthropology was ineffectual in the courtroom than I was in the immediate wake of the trial. This is partly due to the verdict and particularly the sentencing, which were, as Terence Ranger commented soon afterward—mindful no doubt of the dangers of reified, aggregated images of the so-called African occult—“as merciful as could have been expected and better really than a verdict which implied that if you were possessed by a witch spirit you could kill!” (pers. comm.). Maybe the fudge of the verdict was the best of all alternatives. Certainly the sentencing was very sympathetic to Rachel and her mother. She was allowed home, her custodial sentence was suspended, and she could begin to rebuild her life, her relationship with her family, and most of all with her mother. My arguments about profound uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the possibility of other possibilities may have gained little traction, and often courtroom discussions did fall back on essentialized notions of culture that would make any anthropologist squirm. Yet the psychiatrists did engage, to some degree, with the anthropological evidence in their oral testimonies, which did seem to influence their courtroom discussions, if only in a small way. It also had an effect on the (ultimately flawed) defense case. In the end the anthropological evidence presented to the court may also have had efficacy in the judge’s deliberations, even if his statements did fudge something akin to the kind of cultural defense anthropologists are often at pains to avoid. In acknowledging that “in large parts of Africa” beliefs about spirit possession “are regarded as no more irrational than the belief in the existence of god,” and in suggesting that Rachel attacked her mother because she thought she was possessed, he inadvertently invoked a legacy that continues to loom large in anthropology, even if more recent debates have moved decidedly on. Evans-Pritchard might have been pleased, and perhaps, in the end, so should we.


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“Elle semblait être dans une espèce de transe”: l’anthropologie et l’inconnaissable dans un procès criminel
Résumé : Ceci est un récit personnel d’un récent procès criminel au Royaume-Uni auquel a participé l’auteur en tant qu’expert. Le procès impliquait une jeune femme du Zimbabwe qui avait agressé sa mère au couteau pendant qu’elle était (de l’aveu de sa mère, de sa famille et de la femme elle même) possédée par un esprit maléfique, après avoir été ensorcelée par un autre membre de la famille. Une preuve supplémentaire de son état d’aliénation était apportée par le rapport de la police, qui précisait qu’elle était « en état de transe » lors de son arrestation. Bien qu’elle fût soumise à une série d’examens médicaux et psychiatriques, on ne trouva aucune explication neurologique, médicale, psychiatrique ou reliée à des troubles de sommeil pour l’épisode de possession. L’article détaille les difficultés qu’a rencontrées l’auteur lors de cette expertise anthropologique, qui visait à dépasser les formes habituelles d’une « défense par la culture » pour mettre en avant les limites de la connaissance et la possibilité d’autres possibilités. L’article s’appuie sur l’idée de « sorcellerie ethnographique » proposée par Harry West pour montrer comment l’expertise anthropologique, tout en étant sujette aux contraintes de tribunaux qui cherchent à construire leur propre certitude, garde des formes d’efficacité non intentionnelle.
Joost FONTEIN teaches social anthropology at Edinburgh. In August 2014 he is taking up an appointment as Director of the British Institute in Eastern Africa. He has done field work in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s, and is editor of the Journal of Southern African Studies, cofounder of Critical African Studies, and a founding member of the “Bones Collective” research group.
Joost FonteinSocial AnthropologyUniversity of EdinburghCmb, 15a George SquareEdinburgh EH8 9LDj.fontein@ed.ac.uk


___________________
1. According to West, Kupilikula literally means “to invert,” “to overturn,” “to negate,” “to annul,” and “to undo.” He describes how Muedan sorcerors transcend the everyday by “rendering themselves invisible,” “producing and inhabiting an invisible realm from which they gain powerful perspective on the visible” enabling them to reorder it in such way as to “feed their insatiable appetites.” But they “do not go unchallenged,” and different figures of authority, as “sorcerors of construction,” “transcend not only the world inhabited by ordinary Muedans but also that of “sorcerors of ruin,” fixing the latter in their gaze … unmaking sorcerors’” acts, and remaking the world in accordance with their own visions of a world re-ordered” (2007: x).
2. As one reviewer noted, for some anthropologists “West’s insistence on seeing ethnography as sorcery is unwise” because while anthropologists do “re-order the world,” they “do not cause misfortune” or “kill as sorcerers are said to do.”
3. This case was discussed in detail on Zimbabwean websites, where a range of opinions were expressed, some hostile and some sympathetic to either or both Rachel and her mother. I cannot cite them because of the need to ensure anonymity. Apart from illustrating the stigma often associated with witchcraft afflictions, one resounding theme of many comments was that this case involved aspects of “African culture,” chivanhu (loosely “tradition” in Shona), ngemadlozi/masvikiro (ancestors/spirit mediums in Sindebele/Shona) or mhepo (“wind” or spirits in Shona) that “white people,” British courts, and psychiatrists cannot understand.
4. See also Canter 1978; Colson 1974; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Moore 1973; Von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann 2009; Werbner 1977, 1982. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for pointing me to this useful wider literature, and regret I do not have more space to do justice to it.
5. I was first approached by the defense team during the summer of 2009 on the basis of my country expertise and anthropological knowledge of Zimbabwe. This was the first time I have acted in this capacity for a criminal trial, having previously been a country expert for Zimbabwean asylum cases. In early 2010 I held an informal interview with Rachel Moyo in Edinburgh. I then drafted my report, which I revised later that year and submitted to the court as part of the “bundle of papers” making up the defense case. Both barristers, their expert witnesses, and the judge had access to it before and throughout the trial. During the long period before the trial, a more senior barrister was drawn into the defense team, who subsequently sought, a few weeks before the trial in early 2011, an additonal, second anthropological expert witness, who I cannot name because that would jeopardize the anonymity of the case. This senior colleague was drawn into the case because of her public standing, seniority, and previous experience in similar trials, but she, although an Africanist, has no particular knowledge of Zimbabwe, and was therefore requested to provide evidence in a short report to supplement my much more detailed fifty-page report. Her report was based on a brief meeting with Rachel some weeks before the trial, and we communicated about each other’s reports before, during, and after the trial. She also commented closely on early drafts of this paper and I remain grateful for the useful and critical comments she provided.
6. Such cases are hard to quantify, and yet it is clear new public concerns have been raised in recent years, that differ from earlier “satanic abuse” cases (La Fontaine 1994, 1998). Current concerns are focused on the risks of child abuse linked to accusations of “possession” and “witchcraft” (La Fontaine 2009). After some high profile cases, these concerns have reached such proportions that government reports have been commissioned (Stobart 2006; DfE 2007), a National Action Plan developed (DfE 2012), and various police task forces (London Metropolitan Police’s Project Violet, see http://content.met.police.uk/%20Article/Abuse-linked-with-spirit-possession/1400010000897/%201400010000897, accessed January 28, 2014) and nongovernment organizations established to focus on the problem (African Unite Against Child Abuse [AFRUCA—see http://www.afruca.org, accessed January 28, 2014] and the Churches Child Protection Advisory Service [CCPAS—see http://www.ccpas.co.uk, accessed January 28, 2014]). Partly as a result of what I discuss in this article, in April 2013 I cohosted a closed workshop at the LSE entitled “Witchcraft, spirit possession, and anthropological expertise in legal contexts” bringing togther anthropologists, lawyers, social workers, and police to begin a conversation to promote greater mutual understanding and better use of anthropological evidence in such cases.
7. The “Torso in the Thames” case is perhaps the most well known UK example of a suspected “muti murder,” although the investigation never proceeded to trial (Kuper 2005; Ranger 2007). So-called child witch exorcisms have recived more coverage recently, particularly after the horrific killing of Kristy Bamu (“Witchcraft murder: Couple guilty of Kristy Bamu killing” BBC News March 1, 2012).
8. Of particular concern has been the emergence of dubious “expert witnesses” who police have sometimes relied upon. Richard Hoskins is one example who has appeared in documentaries (e.g., Witch Child, a 60-minute documentary by October Films, broadcast on BBC 2 on April 6, 2006, http://www.octoberfilms.co.uk/recentproductions.php?production=184, accessed January 21, 2014) and recently wrote a book on the “Torso in the Thames” case (Hoskins 2012). Some academics too have stood accused of reinforcing such simplistic and alarmist impulses by implying that there is something peculiarly “occult” and dangerous about “African societies” (see Ranger 2007; Meyer 2009; Ter Haar &amp; Ellis 2009).
9. I experienced this when I initially encountered the questions I was asked to address in the report requested by the defense team. These included: “Is there any empirical or anecdotal evidence that belief in witchcraft or black magic has caused people to awaken having carried out an act that they do not remember?”
10. So I outlined how beliefs about witchcraft and possession are not only widespread across Zimbabwe, but are also diverse, contested, and can vary according to regional, cultural, and religious factors and affiliations. The precise content of a person’s, a family’s, or a group’s beliefs may vary locally and regionally, and according to religious affiliation, church membership, education, and even class, and so on. Often such beliefs appear under a generic term such as “muti,” as Rachel herself named it, although this word itself has many connotations ranging from medicine to poison, and from “magic” to witchcraft “substance.”
11. During the interview we talked about a range of possible cultural explanations for the events, including posession by a benevolent ancestral spirit, or by a malevolent one, or by animal or other nonhuman spirit, a “demon,” or as the result of a deliberate act of witchcraft by someone.
12. Which mean that determining the presence of witchcraft, and identifying those responsible can involve a multiplicity of factors and contested processes, in which anthropologists too can be implicated (Rutherford 1999).
13. I am grateful to the comments of two anonymous reviewers that helped me to articulate this point, even as its rendering here reflects my interpretation.
14. I have borrowed this apt expression from Anthony Good.
15. So that if a person is identified as being guilty of being a witch or doing witchcraft, but it is recognized that this is an involuntary/unintentional act (through being possessed or bewitched), then this usually provokes a very different response than where someone has deliberately sought to acquire/use witchcraft for their own (usually malicious) purposes.
16. “Witchcraft recognised, laws tightened” April 22, 2006 Andnetwork.com, cited from http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr23_2006.html#Z4.
17. This shows how there was a recognition by the court that at the root of the issue were family disputes/tensions, which threatened to worsen dramatically. This led to the conclusion that the matter should be dealt with by those local (traditional) authorities who normally deal with such family disputes. So the accused was given a suspended sentence by the Harare magistrate and ordered to get herself “cleansed” and her family disputes resolved. See “Woman ‘flew’ in basket on witchcraft mission,” Newzimbabwe. com May 28, 2009; “Naked basket flight woman a witch—expert,” Newzimbabwe.com, May 29, 2009; “Witchcraft case takes new twist,” The Herald May 29, 2009; “Witchcraft case—Woman gets suspended sentence,” The Herald, June 5, 2009.
18. Although I was careful to circulate my draft report to colleagues for informal review before I submitted it, mainly because I was concerned about overstating this point, and wanted to ensure that my account of anthropology’s long critical engagement with “magic,” “spirit possession,” and “witchcraft” was representative.
19. As Jean La Fontaine indeed commented (pers. comm.).
20. As one reviewer commented; but I would argue ultimately turns on a problematic distinction between “subjective” and “objective” truth that needs to be avoided.
21. Or indeed any immigration tribunal that, as Thomas (2011) has argued, often depend on the perceived credibility of the claimant.
22. There is a legal concept of “noninsane automatism,” which has sometimes gained traction in court cases where, for example, sleepwalking is involved. See R v. Burgess 93 Cr.App.R.41, CAM cited on the Crown Prosecution Service website: www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/defences_-_sleepwalking_as_a_defence_in_sexual_offence_cases/
23. At that stage he was not even aware I had interviewed Rachel.
24. This was heightened by the agreement between the barristers and judge that their two experts’ evidence be heard “back to back,” at the end of the prosecution case, rather than according to the normal sequence whereby defense witnesses are heard after the prosecution has closed its case. There was no such straightforward agreement about when and what anthropological evidence would be admissible.
25. A “cultural explanation” that might have had traction among some Zimbabweans would be that the dream itself was a manifestation of witchcraft, as it is commonly held that spirits and witches do communicate and act through dreams (Reynolds 1992). In our interview Rachel suggested the appearance of her grandmother and her paternal aunt in her dream was a deliberate effort by her maternal aunt to disguise the true source of the sorcery. But Rachel and her mother’s cultural explanations were never discussed in such great detail in the courtroom.
26. See note 3 above for a discussion of our roles as expert witnesses in this case. Although my involvement was deeper and longer than hers, with hindsight I soon felt that it was probably better only she ended up taking the stand, with her far greater experience of giving oral evidence and especially cross-examination. She later told me that in cross-examination, the prosecuting barrister tried to suggest that because she herself had spent many of her early years in Africa, she perhaps was partly “African” (which she denied); a line of questioning that she felt suggested the prosecution might have intended to argue by analogy that because Rachel had spent nearly a decade in the United Kingdom, she was acculturated to British society, and thereby to imply that any cultural defence could not apply. But this argument was never actually made by the prosecution barrister.
27. As Anthony Good commented (pers. comm.), this marginalization of anthropological evidence may have had something to do with the fact that this was a jury trial. As he discusses in relation to the case of R v. Turner (Good 2006: 144–45), when judges are the decision makers, rather than juries, anthropological evidence is often given a greater hearing.
28. After the sentencing the defense barrister told me an appeal was being considered, based on the judge’s decision to disallow noninsane automatism and therefore a not guilty verdict, but this was never pursued. Later he told me he was worried “the Court of Appeal may have clipped the anthropologist’s wings even further” and “an anticipated ruling that an ancestral spirit is no more than an internal demon at work, i.e., a behavioral deficiency arising from within the ‘perpetrator’ would hardly help the Rachels of this world” (pers. comm., April 2013).
29. Or the confusion that surrounded the muprofiti, who of course should not need to be told the reason for their consultation, they should already know it, as Rachel’s mother was trying explain before the fire alarm went off.
30. Perhaps the two were connected because, as one reviewer suggested, the “marginality of anthropological testimony” may reflect an assumption that anthropologists “deal with ‘primitives’”; or alternatively, that “we deal with the relativity of practices, whereas legal bureaucracies deal with absolutes.” It may also, however, reflect that this was a jury trial, because, as Good suggests (see footnote 27), in trials where judges make verdicts anthropologists are sometimes taken more seriously.
 </p></body>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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				<article-title>Contemporary Shuar beliefs: The indigenous use of a vexed anthropological concept in post-conversion Amazonia</article-title>
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					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Tym</surname>
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					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
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					<name>
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					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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				<day>26</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2022</year>
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			<issue seq="204">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.1</issue-id>
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				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
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			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1667/3929" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The critique of belief as an analytical tool in anthropology has overshadowed belief as an ethnographic reality. This article short-circuits these debates over the politics of belief by elaborating ethnographically the indigenous use of the concept—literally the Spanish “creer” and “creencia”—in Shuar territory in post-conversion Amazonia. It shows that contemporary Shuar “belief” supersedes assumptions about belief as an epistemic commitment. The Shuar concept combines the Christian emphasis on conversion with a relatively stable ancestral notion about the meaning and social significance of knowledge, one that emphasizes its instrumentality, as opposed to the ideology of the truth-seeking cogito striving to make accurate representations of the world. These arguments are advanced by presenting ethnographic material from two distinct sites in Shuar territory in southeastern Ecuador: one in which most people claim to “believe” in shamanic healing and ancestral visionary practices, and one in which they do not.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/2033</identifier>
				<datestamp>2026-05-02T14:10:34Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">2033</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/740622</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Thinking through bloody handprints on saints’ graves: The political ontology of ritual artifacts in the Negev Bedouin ziyāra</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Zohar</surname>
						<given-names>Daniel</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>02</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2026</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date>
			<volume>16</volume>
			<issue seq="305">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau16.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2026 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2033" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2033/4658" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2033/4659" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This essay explores ritual artifacts from ontological, material, and processual perspectives by applying an “operational sequence” (chaîne opératoire) approach and tracing their “conceptual affordances.” Based on ethnographic fieldwork among Bedouin people and their artifacts in the conflictual landscapes of the Negev/Naqab, this study challenges previous works that have conceptualized sacrificial blood rituals as symbolic ways to commune with the divine. It draws on the ontological and material turns in anthropology and related disciplines to show how handprints made with animal blood on ancestral saints’ graves, despite their prominent visibility, do not represent communion but embody it. Inspired by scholarship on the anthropology of blood, I explore how its material properties afford a process of becoming-with the sacrificial animal and the saint. I also discuss how the handprints can be channeled more broadly for (onto-)political purposes and territorial claims.</p></abstract>
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				<datestamp>2020-07-04T08:12:21Z</datestamp>
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1418</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/708748</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>The alienating inalienable: Rethinking Annette Weiner’s concept of inalienable wealth through Japan’s “sleeping kimono”</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Valk</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>j.valk@ucl.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="302">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1418" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1418/3442" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1418/3443" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Based on twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork in Japan, this article focuses on collections of gifted kimono that have accumulated in the home, which are usually intended to be passed from mother to daughter and thus enable the perpetuation of family history. I argue that the kimono, as an inalienable possession, is now not as often passed down as it was intended to be, and that this causes a sense of alienation to occur: alienation from the kimono itself, but also alienation from the family and the self within the family. Further, this article scrutinizes elements of Annette Weiner’s theory, which has not been examined in depth—such as the context in which inalienable wealth occurs—and explores the workings of inalienability in a large-scale, capitalist society such as Japan. I argue that inalienable wealth in these societies is particularly vulnerable to sociocultural, economic, and generational change, and that this has an important impact on the inalienability of an object—in other words, an object cannot be fully inalienable without the social context at least in part supporting its inalienability. I pay particular attention to the emotional labor needed to care for and transmit inalienable wealth and what happens when inalienable wealth is not successfully transmitted.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/642</identifier>
				<datestamp>2016-07-29T02:03:57Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau6.1.013</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Chaosmology: Shamanism and personhood among the Bugkalot</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Chaosmology: Shamanism and personhood among the Bugkalot</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Mikkelsen</surname>
						<given-names>Henrik Hvenegaard</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Copenhagen</aff>
					<email>hvenegaard@anthro.ku.dk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>16</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2016</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date>
			<volume>6</volume>
			<issue seq="310">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau6.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2016 Henrik Hvengaard Mikkelsen</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2016</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article examines personhood as contracted from a field of chaos. By analyzing the discourses on shamanism, spirits, and the wilderness among the Bugkalot of Northern Philippines, I seek to formulate a hypothesis about the properties of personhood in relation to the Bugkalot cosmology at large. This approach to cosmology is not one that asserts a coherent system of knowledge but rather portrays the Bugkalot cosmology as contingent, fragmentary, perpetually assuming a coherence and stability that swiftly dissolves. In order to lay out how this cosmology in motion—or “chaosmology”—is temporarily stabilized the article explores the role of shamanism among the Bugkalot.  </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article examines personhood as contracted from a field of chaos. By analyzing the discourses on shamanism, spirits, and the wilderness among the Bugkalot of Northern Philippines, I seek to formulate a hypothesis about the properties of personhood in relation to the Bugkalot cosmology at large. This approach to cosmology is not one that asserts a coherent system of knowledge but rather portrays the Bugkalot cosmology as contingent, fragmentary, perpetually assuming a coherence and stability that swiftly dissolves. In order to lay out how this cosmology in motion—or “chaosmology”—is temporarily stabilized the article explores the role of shamanism among the Bugkalot.  </p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>cosmology, personhood, storytelling, masculinity, Ilongot, Bugkalot, Philippines</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
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	<body><p>Chaosmology






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Henrik Hvenegaard Mikkelsen. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.1.013
Chaosmology
Shamanism and personhood among the Bugkalot
Henrik Hvenegaard MIKKELSEN, University of Copenhagen

This article examines personhood as contracted from a field of chaos. By analyzing the discourses on shamanism, spirits, and the wilderness among the Bugkalot of Northern Philippines, I seek to formulate a hypothesis about the properties of personhood in relation to the Bugkalot cosmology at large. This approach to cosmology is not one that asserts a coherent system of knowledge but rather portrays the Bugkalot cosmology as contingent, fragmentary, perpetually assuming a coherence and stability that swiftly dissolves. In order to lay out how this cosmology in motion—or “chaosmology”—is temporarily stabilized the article explores the role of shamanism among the Bugkalot.
Keywords: cosmology, personhood, storytelling, masculinity, Ilongot, Bugkalot, Philippines


Anthropological depictions of “wilderness” often conjure up images of a domain of disorder where “un-making” occurs; that is, where things are taken apart in strange ways before being reconstituted (Turner 1970). Not surprisingly, such assumptions regarding a wild realm of unknown potentialities (often associated with spirits and other nonhuman agencies) opposed to an ordered human realm have been criticized for being overly simplified. For instance, Marshall Sahlins (1996; see also Scott 2005) asserts that anthropology has been marked by a Judeo-Christian worldview in which primordial states of chaos give way to order through human sociality. Similar to the Hobbesian idea of an original chaos that becomes ordered as humans come together in cooperative organization, the anthropological study of cosmology assumes a development from a messy state of atomistic privation to social solidarity.[190]
Within recent years, however, several anthropologists have drawn an image of cosmology that implicitly contradicts the observation made by Sahlins. Most recently Morten Axel Pedersen wrote about what appeared to him as a “broken cosmos” in Northern Mongolia: with the transition to market economy that followed the collapsed of state socialism, the Mongolians experienced an “ontological breakdown.” Pedersen openly expresses his initial grief upon encountering “a tragic sense of a form of life that had been radically and irreversibly jolted out of shape” (Pedersen 2014: 165). Thus, rather than leading from a mythic mash-up to a higher level of cosmological order, as reflected in the metanarrative of modernity (Ferguson 1999), a reversed progression seems to take place.
The question I raise is the following: might it be possible to approach these two views on cosmology in a way that does not render them mutually exclusive? Through a discussion of Bugkalot cosmology, in which the oscillation between stability and chaos is the core cosmological dynamic, the article attempts to offer such a third cosmological alternative in which the chaotic movements of the cosmos become momentarily “stabilized” through human, shamanic forms of engagement.
In the ethnographic literature, the people who dwell in the Sierra Madre Mountains of Northern Philippines have commonly gone under the name Ilongot (e.g., M. Rosaldo 1980, R. Rosaldo 1980). However, the traditional inhabitants of this area make use of the endonym “Bugkalot.” They consider the wilderness, the gongot, to be a chaotic space of transformation, opposed to the ordered human space. That is, outside the human sphere of the village, one encounters a domain characterized by movement and transmutation—the quintessence of which is the shape-shifting spirit, the be’tang. Yet, the cosmological spectrum is not primarily topographically constituted. Transformation and chaos are just as much part of the person. In this article, I will explore the role of gongot, chaos, within Bugkalot cosmology. By focusing on how spirits are evoked through storytelling, I will first show that Bugkalot cosmology does not rely on an idea of the cosmos as a coherent edifice; rather than presenting mythical tales that reveal a detailed and perpetual cosmological order, the storytelling focuses on the individual storyteller’s personal experiences with spirits. Through these stories, spirits are presented as inherently unintelligible in their motives and actions. Thereby, I argue, the stories in fact depict an erratic cosmos, which the Bugkalot seek to capture and apprehend in knowable form.
How can we generate an anthropological approach to cosmology in such (ethnographic) cases where there is no underlying mythology to prop it up (Pedersen 2007: 311)? This question has been raised as a response to the ways in which recent cosmological studies have diverted from conventional studies on the subject. In the area of indigenous cosmology, anthropologists have tended to extract systems of classification and map out, in elaborate detail, the different constituent parts of the cosmologies. Thus, the anthropological exegesis of native cosmologies has often been based on the in many cases well-founded assumption that a given cosmology is inhabited by ascertainable gods, spirits, and ancestors (Holbraad 2007: 209). As these agencies are related to one another and to the human world in relatively fixed ways over time, they reflect a cultural notion of a certain order in the world (Herzfeld 2001: 194). But what if such constituent cosmic parts are lacking? Rane Willerslev (2004) observes how previous attempts to convey the “religious ideas” of indigenous peoples have involved taking the “various disconnected statements [191]of shamans and weaving them together so as to produce ideal models of the native peoples’ pantheons of spirits, with all the rough edges and contradictions edited out” (399). In an attempt to generate a more flexible approach to the study of cosmology—and to avoid the errors committed by his predecessors—Willerslev states that in order to understand the cosmology among the Siberian Yukaghir, one should look beyond their theoretical knowledge, since, in fact, such knowledge is completely lacking. The reason for this is that spirits are exclusively applied as utensils in the practical tasks of everyday life. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s (1996) “tool-analysis,” Willerslev develops the argument that for the Yukaghir, spirits are “ready-to-hand”: like the carpenter who does not require detailed theoretical knowledge of the way a hammer works when hammering a nail into a piece of wood, the Yukaghir do not need theoretical knowledge about a large, holistic, all-encompassing cosmology when they seek the aid of spirits, for instance for hunting activities.
As among the Yukaghir, the Bugkalot have little agreed-upon cosmological knowledge. Yet, while Willerslev’s analysis undoubtedly has much explanatory power in relation to the use of spirits in general, it is of little use in relation to the traditional Bugkalot belief-“system”; the Bugkalot cosmology does not gain its intangible character due to a indigenous pragmatism, which, as Willerslev contends, renders a detailed and widely shared set of cosmological knowledge superfluous. Something else is at stake. Though the cosmology indeed appears radically fragmented and incoherent, this does not imply that the Bugkalot do not hold any cosmological theories. In fact, they willingly present an abundance of theories; only these theories change over time. I will refer to this as a particular form of shamanic engagement. Rather than stating that the theoretical practice of the Bugkalot is incoherent, I venture to suggest that their theories reflect a world that is itself subjected to perpetual change. In fact, whereas Willerslev argues that shamanism “is not about an abiding question of belief (or non-belief)” and is thereby “not metaphysically significant” (2013: 52), I will advance the argument that the exact opposite is the case for the Bugkalot: Shamanism operates explicitly with a metaphysical template that may be termed chaosmology.

The spiritness of children
Recently, attempts have been made by anthropologists to bridge the divide between the sciences and the humanities through the employment of chaos theory (Mosko and Damon 2005). This theoretical engagement aims to grasp how systems of apparent incoherence and randomness may in fact contain an order—though an order of high, dynamic complexity. In this article, however, I do not intent to depict the “order of chaos.” Rather, I take my cue from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari who define chaos “by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (1994: 118). Thereby, chaos draws out “all possible forms, which spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference, without consequence” (118). What makes this approach to chaos particularly relevant in relation to Bugkalot cosmology is that it suggests an oppositional pair not between chaos and order but between chaos and stability. This reflects the relationship that I [192]attempt to describe between the world of chaos and the forms of shamanic engagement by which the Bugkalot confront chaos.
However, while chaos is most frequently seen as a property pertaining to the forest, it may also be located as a human facet. While visiting an elderly woman, May, in the village Ki-tegen in the Sierra Madre Mountains, we ended up in a conversation on the subject of childrearing (peseséken). She gesturing toward her two infant grandchildren who were sitting on the dirt floor of her kitchen: “Look. These children are dirty and noisy. I wash them and then they are dirty again. And I wash them again. . . . Look, they sit on the ground—it is the same place as where the dogs sleep. Children can even sleep in their own filth! This is hard to understand.” As if to underline what May had just told me, the youngest of the children laughed blissfully as he grabbed some dirt and flung it into the fireplace. May nodded toward him. “This child,” she said,

will build a house or he will go to work in the city. But it takes a long, long time before this happens. It is like everything else. I say, it is like this: we burn away the trees to make gardens. All those trees must be burned first. It is like that. I say, when the men go hunting they can bring back meat; but they will have to find the meat; they have to shoot the wild animal; they have to carry it home all that long way through the forest, over the mountains. And even then you cannot eat that animal. You have to cut it into pieces and then give us [the women] the meat and we cook it. Everything takes a long time. Nothing happens on its own.
May links childhood to the chaotic forces of the forest. She suggests that nature becomes of use through a violent and structuring transformation—being burned and being butchered. Children, she believes, are still like the wild animal: embedded in the nonhuman world of whirling, unpredictable movement of forces. The Bugkalot understand this embedding to be epitomized by the incessant oscillation between fear and joy, crying and laughter. Such whimsical and capricious moods are expected in a child though looked down upon in men; and among the elders such affects are considered nonexistent. During the life course humans move from such states of chaos to gradually growing “firm”—both physically and mentally.1 The homology between the person and cosmology at large can thereby be pictured through the image of stability, which is achieved by means of human engagements on various cosmic levels. While this stability stands out most clearly in the relation between the transmutability of the wilderness and the order of the village, chaos and stability are dynamics that operate across a swarm of areas within Bugkalot cosmology. Such chaos is epitomized by the image of the shape-shifting spirit, be’tang. The Bugkalot see spirits as infantile—and similarly the human child is seen as spirit-like. These analogies between spirits and children were made by my informants when referring to the seemingly nonsensical action of spirits and children alike.[193]
As Mary Douglas (1973) has argued, the body should be seen as a microcosm of the categorical distinctions relevant to a particular cosmology; the wider cosmology is inscribed within the body, the social world, and the surrounding territorial world. Like the paths away from the village into the forest, the motion toward the spirits was a continuum toward entropy, a gradual decline into impenetrable disorder. Spirits were the embodiments of subversive, contingent forces that existed beyond any discernable rules. The course from childhood to adulthood and to becoming an elder (begangat) was thereby a trajectory from the chaos of uncontrollable affect to order, a higher level of stability. This motion found its analogies on other cosmological levels—most notably in the relationship between the world of humans and the forest.


Playing with spirits
The Bugkalot have no widely shared knowledge of a pantheon of gods, spirits, and other features associated with a complex mythological universe. This does not mean that there are no gods or spirits. Rather, it means that there is a striking diversity of—often conflicting—cosmological ideas among the Bugkalot. They do not even agree to view their ancestors as objects of worship, which, in fact, makes the Bugkalot conspicuously different from other indigenous groups in the Northern Philippines.2 Still, various forms of nonhuman agencies play important roles in Bugkalot cosmology. These spirit-creatures, generically known as be’tang, live in the forests outside the human domain associated with the village. Identifying the different principles through which the Bugkalot organize their society of human as well as nonhuman agencies will simultaneously be a way to show how the disjointedness of the Bugkalot cosmology is related to personhood. While aspects of humans are chaotic and though particular areas of the world are areas of chaos, the term “chaos” in this context does not imply a fundamental lack of order. Rather, certain domains of the cosmos are governed by forces that seem fundamentally unpredictable to humans. Thus, alteration, paradox, and inconsistency take up an important role within the Bugkalot cosmos.
My Bugkalot interlocutors—except the few who identified themselves as shamans (ayog’en)—actively placed as much distance between themselves and spirits as possible. Especially, they often communicated to each other, in direct and indirect ways, that they did not make use of magic to enlist the help of spirits. A typical example is the following: before a fishing trip, To’o, a young man who was known as a skilled spear fisher, challenged some of the younger relatives by claiming that they used ga’ek—remedies associated with spirit magic—to increase their catch. Even though they denied this and seemed slightly insulted by To’o’s accusation, To’o continued: “But it’s okay, cousins! But now listen: if you just stop using ga’ek, we will see who will catch most fish in the river today!” Again his companions protested loudly. One of the young men even threw his hands into the air and shouted that he [194]had no idea where to find ga’ek. This did not appear to convince To’o, who theatrically concluded the exchange by asserting that in his view using ga’ek was the same as cheating. He then whispered loud enough so all the men could hear: “A man is only a man if he can do things himself!”
Of course, this statement was based on a witty double entendre: it was an oblique reference to the other men who were made to look as if they in fact used magic in secret. Such remedies were exposed as an immoral—and perhaps effeminate (and certainly infantile)—contrast to maleness. Through this play with spirits, To’o showed his relatives that though spirit magic was within his grasp, it was not an option that he would turn to. This was all carried out in a humorous way, which made his accusations less harsh. Men such as To’o, who are inordinately successful when fishing, run the risk of being suspected of using magic remedies. The skillful fishers therefore attempt to preempt such suspicions by actively distancing themselves from magical remedies and spirits. The indirect challenges are constantly thrown out among the young men and have to do with showing oneself as a person of autonomy and knowledge (beya), for whom success only depends on one’s own, individual proficiency.
The topic of spirits enters into conversations on different scales of formality—from everyday conversations to nearly ritualized forms of storytelling. I will propose that these stories should be considered a particular form of engagement that attempts to momentarily stabilize a disordered, anarchic cosmological domain while also establishing this domain as a contrast to the ordered world of humans. As I have previously argued, spirit-ness is tied to the intangible, to the chaotic; for instance talking about someone as being “misty” is a moral commentary on how men should, ideally, be constituted as “firm” (Mikkelsen 2011; Mikkelsen and Søgaard 2015). Terms reminiscent of ethereal, intangible states—for instance fog and smoke—permeated the various accounts provided by my informants when they discussed the dispositions of the young men in the village who tended to end up in drunken brawls. And while the hardening of the body is a positively valued process that happens throughout a man’s life (see also R. Rosaldo 1986: 314), the youth were still “soft,” that is, unstable and inconsistent. This softness and elusiveness was in fact also the key property of the spirit, the be’tang.
While instability was most commonly ascribed to the youth, the motion toward higher levels of stability was not a unidirectional process. Especially experiences of “bereavement” could cause even adults to regress into the chaotic states. As Renato Rosaldo (2004) has famously argued, the “grief” that follows, for instance, the loss of a child generates an unfocused, chaotic energy, ligét, which threatens to erupt in uncontrollable acts of violence. Renato Rosaldo argued, that the institution of traditional headhunting was structured around a continuous effort to transform people’s unruly emotional states into controlled energy. The purpose of headhunting, then, was not to capture a trophy, but to dispel of one’s ligét by throwing away “a body part, which by a principle of sympathetic magic represents the cathartic throwing away of certain burdens of life—the grudge an insult has created, or the grief over a death in the family” (R. Rosaldo 1980: 140). In this sense, headhunting was a therapeutic instrument that was applied to give an outlet to the chaotic states caused by grief.[195]
The chaos in Bugkalot cosmology can thereby be traced beyond the spirit and the wilderness where the spirits are said to dwell. The wilderness, gongot, is also an aspect of the person. It is out of this state of unstable translucence that the adult male evolves.


Gongot—The wilderness
It seems ironic that the Bugkalot have been known as the Ilongot within the ethnographic literature. This exonym comes from the word e’gongot, which means “from the wilderness.” The name is considered inappropriate and incorrect by many of the people to whom the term is ascribed: rather than seeing themselves as people of the forest, which is regarded as a chaotic space and thereby not a realm for humans,3 they see themselves as belonging within the ordered space of the village. This opposition between village and forest is not without parallels among forest dwellers in other parts of Southeast Asia (see Valeri 2000, 1994). And like elsewhere in Southeast Asia it is known that though humans could organize this space and render it habitable through their labor, from the outset, before this transformation takes place, the forest is fundamentally different from the domain of humans.
During my time in Ki-tegen, I was frequently puzzled by my informants’ unsentimental attitude toward the extensive deforestation in the mountains. Only ten years previously the village had been enveloped by dense vegetation to all sides. But when I arrived in the mountains in 2009, one could gaze over a valley where limestone and red clay had been exposed. The mountains had changed due to the influx of migrant farmers from the overpopulated, neighboring provinces and the introduction of new logging technologies. And as the remaining, ill-fated patches of forest were cleared, views suddenly opened up to denuded mountaintops and distant horizons of newly prepared farmland—or already exhausted stretches of barren land—as far as the eye could see.
This, however, had other consequences. During the evenings the villagers in Ki-tegen could now see the fires from three other villages in the distant expanses of the valley floor. Though some of the communities had existed for centuries, their recent visual emergence was shaping a new sense of relatedness among the inhabitants of the valley. While the deforestation made hunting more difficult and had started to cause mudslides in recent years, it was widely considered a positive development since it opened up and structured the land in new ways: what had previously been almost impenetrable vegetation was turned into patios, gardens, and traversable landscape that represented the prospect for further development of the area. The villagers were particularly looking forward to the establishment of a paved road that could be used even during the rainy season.[196]
Though the landscape had undergone immense change, the Bugkalot still had a strong sense of a particular relationship between the wild and the village. From the outer edge of the village where the water buffalos were tethered, and on the slopes that surrounded the village, one encountered the gardens. After passing the gardens, on the other side of the valley, one entered the remaining wilderness, gongot. Following the numerous trails that connected Ki-tegen with other villages across the mountains, space became progressively less organized. A few hours hike east of the village were some of the remaining stretches of trackless forest in the area. My informants warned me that the spirits that dwelled in this forest would sometimes swallow up the hunters who came there. In fact, the first couple of times that I encountered the word be’tang were when someone warned me against entering into the gongot on my own. “The spirits will surely trick you,” I was told. When I asked what the spirits were to gain from their trickery, I was met by an abundance of different answers: the spirits would eat me, would abduct me, would take various parts of my body, or as one of the village pastors argued, they would steal my soul. Many Bugkalot believe, however, that though spirits are bestowed with intentionality like humans, it is impossible for humans to tell what the spirits desire. And this inaccessibility of the spirits’ intentions differentiates them normatively from adult men: while men are composed and autonomous, the spirits are, like the gongot in which they dwell, unpredictable and enigmatic. This view is reflected in the following account.


Shape-shifting
During a rainstorm in 2010, a crashing noise could be heard close to Ki-tegen from where the main path curves down a steep hill. It sounded slightly different from the thunder that rolled through the valley. The burning of all the undergrowth in previous years had rendered the entire hillside susceptible to mudslides during the heavy rains. A few hours later the rain stopped and the word began to spread among the villagers that the last tree on the slope had fallen and was now blocking the path. Yet, the fallen tree did not pose an acute problem. Due to the rain the path was unsafe for the trucks anyway and motorcycles could still get around the tree trunk. But, needless to say, the tree would eventually have to be moved.
The next day I encountered my friend Tebdey. With wide eyes he was telling a group of villagers of a strange experience he had had that morning while returning from hunting. As he had walked down the path toward the village just before sunrise, he witnessed a peculiar display through the rain: While approaching the fallen tree he had realized that a pale, naked “beast” was standing on the trunk. In spite of having arms and legs the creature looked nothing like a human being. It stared at Tebdey for a while and then, all of a sudden, it “made itself very small” and disappeared into a hole in the trunk. What he had witnessed, Tebdey said, was a be’tang. He thought it to be a particularly powerful be’tang, since from the time he saw the spirit until he reached the village many hours had passed: the be’tang had altered his sense of time. Tebdey believed that the fallen tree was the house (abong) of the spirit for which reason he advised the villagers to leave the tree alone—that is, unless they wanted to be struck by the anger of the spirit.[197]
After a few weeks the noise of chainsaws could be distinguished from the area on the hillside where the tree had fallen. From a distance, as I made my way up the muddy path, I was able to recognize the men who were cutting up the fallen tree. Tebdey and his cousin Rafael were turning the tree into long boards. And in the next few days the timber was brought down to the southern slopes of Ki-tegen where Rafael had recently begun to build a house.
Rather than discarding Tebdey’s story about the spirit and the fallen tree as revealing little more than a lucrative scheme for personal profit, I venture to suggest that the spirit in his story is a quintessential example of the transformative character of spirits in Kabugkalotan. While it appears that the story was used strategically by Tebdey to keep the other villagers away from the fallen tree until he was able to turn it into building materials, one could argue that limiting the analysis in such a way leaves one question unanswered: why, then, did the other villagers accept that Tebdey and Rafael made use of the tree afterward? And in what way might this tell us something about the phenomenon around which the story revolves, that is, the spirit? What is conveyed here, I argue, is that the spirit is part of a cosmic continuum marked by contingency. In other words, among the Bugkalot there appears to be no contradiction between a spirit posing a threat one moment and this threat being all but nonexistent the other.
Numerous other forms of contingency were expressed in other stories about spirits: spirits appeared in various shapes and would, in some cases, show themselves as a white dog, a large deer, or a naked woman; my informants would tell me about having encountered spirits with grotesque shapes: long arms and legs, small heads, and oversized feet; sometimes they were covered in fur and at other times they had completely hairless bodies. Where did the spirits come from? How did they relate to humans? What powers did they possess? Such questions were often answered in radically different ways. For instance, some claimed that there were an unlimited number of spirits and others claimed there were only two: one who lived in the forest and one who lived in the river. The be’tang often changed physical shape at one or at several instances in the accounts. And the transformation not only involved its outward form, it also involved the way the spirit was assessed: harmless and undisruptive at first, the spirit soon proved to be guided by malicious, yet unfathomable, motives. In other stories this development was reversed. There were also many cases, as in Tebdey’s story, where a spirit one moment was considered of extreme importance but, shortly after, appeared to have been completely forgotten. As transformative beings through and through, the spirits always, ultimately, revealed their nature as shape-shifters. In fact, this was so predictable and anticipated that shape-shifting in relation to spirits assumed a form of disordered order, a bridge between order and chaos. My informants frequently stressed this character of the spirit both to me and when talking among themselves. For instance, during a conversation with my host, Wagsal, about whether I should escort a shaman to look up a particular spirit in the forest, he warned me: “The only thing you can be sure of is that the be’tang is never what it seems to be. You think it will do you good but you do not see its true nature.” Through such statements it was made clear that the shape-shifting unpredictability of spirits made them “others” (Descola 1992: 111), that is, agencies fundamentally different from men.[198]


Ayog’en: Shamanic engagement
While the term gongot under most circumstances refers to a treacherous and unpredictable part of the wilderness, it may also signify, more broadly, a certain chaotic disposition. Though this disposition is epitomized by the be’tang who live in the forest, gongot is also an aspect of magic, called ayog, which one can access through the help of spirits. The men who make use of ayog and who have a direct shamanic engagement with spirits are known under the title ayog’en. What sets an ayog’en apart from ordinary men is not that the ayog’en has insights into some corpus of esoteric knowledge; nor does he harness some unique capacity that enables him to maintain a contact to spirits. Since it is believed that many people—men and women—can easily get access to spirits, the ayog’en differentiates himself from such people by admitting that he is in contact with spirits and by openly making use of magic. For this reason, an ayog’en is marked as qualitatively different from other people. In other words, gongot is a perpetual presence in the life of an ayog’en, an “embodied otherness” (Csordas in Elisha 2008), which makes the ayog’en an agent of unknown potentialities. My informants seemed apprehensive around them, and rather than being part of a religious elite with special privileges the ayog’en were largely considered marginal characters in the Bugkalot communities.
This marginalization of the ayog’en, which became especially manifest by the fact that they were never invited to participate when the other men met during the evenings, was a sign of the various forms of distance that people maintained to the ayog’en. Also, instead of consulting a local ayog’en my interlocutors would sometimes hike for more than a full day to visit a shaman in a remote village. This distance was important as it enables the client to physically remove himself from the ayog’en after whatever shamanic task has been performed.
However, this distance also exists on other levels. When the villagers talked about a particular visit to an ayog’en, they make sure to emphasize repeatedly that they do not understand the techniques that were applied by the ayog’en. Thus, geography is combined with epistemology in order to maintain a critical distance. By explaining to me all the various aspects of the incident that they were unable to comprehend, they expressed that by visiting an ayog’en they had ventured into a sphere where they did not belong, where things did not make sense to them, and where, to them, contingency reigned.
Most informants had at some point made use of the ayog’en’s spirit-magic—most often to cure a child who had fallen ill or to locate a person who had gone missing in the forest. Yet, seeking the help of an ayog’en was considered a last resort and people clearly felt uneasy in their company. For this reason, all of the three ayog’en that I came to know had on different occasions made attempts to distance themselves from their public image as ayog’en. For instance, during my stay in the village, Tó-paw, a mild middle-aged man, who was known as a powerful ayog’en, made clear attempts to abandon this role by joining a Pentecostal Church. Yet, he explained to me, it had made no difference. He had realized that stories continued to be told about him in hushed voices and that the other villagers kept a distance to him by not inviting him to the informal—but socially important—drinking sessions that took place on most evenings. Though he made sincere attempts [199]to distance himself from the spirits, he continued to represent an uneasy domain where the world of humans and the world of gongot intersected.
Throughout my fieldwork I looked up Tó-paw and the other two ayog’en in the area in order to learn about the “Bugkalot cosmology”: ancient myths, traditional beliefs, et cetera. The conversations often left me dispirited. Assuming that one had provided me with a reliable depiction of how the Bugkalot cosmology was constituted—how the worlds of spirits and human intersected—I was repeatedly presented with radically different and contradicting notions by the others. Furthermore, when returning to one of the men to discuss the views presented to me by other ayog’en, he would be entirely willing to change his initial account: questions such as where the spirits lived, how you communicated with spirits, how you protected yourself from them, how you became an ayog’en, whether a woman could become an ayog’en, et cetera, were answered in a multitude of ways—and each time with an adamant sincerity. This, however, was a part of Bugkalot storytelling that they shared with the rest of my informants. As I will unfold in the second half of this article, talking about spirits—and the cosmos at large—is a way that establishes a momentary stability within a domain of the world that is otherwise marked by flux, by placing chaos within a narrative frame.


Stability through storytelling
During our conversations my informants often reflected on what would induce a person to engage with the spirits, given the social sidelining that followed such behavior. Yet, while spirits, for the most part, were something to which people maintained a distance, spirits continued to play a conspicuous role by constantly becoming the topic of stories. Telling stories was a way of both conjuring up spirits while simultaneously maintaining distance. Shamanism among the Bugkalot can thereby be located on a spectrum at varying degrees of distance, which in all its forms has to do with rendering the unknowable knowable, giving form to gongot; that is, temporarily stabilizing chaos.
Rather than being formally ritualized, the storytelling sessions that I refer to here were spontaneous events that took place during drinking sessions when men were gathered in the evenings in Ki-tegen. The stories were brief, precise, and were delivered forcefully, and revolved around the people’s personal encounters with spirits. After a storyteller had finished his story he would lean back, allowing someone else to talk. Another man would then take over and tell a story about a similar experience. The speakers were never asked to elaborate on their stories, and only on rare occasions did someone subsequently refer to a story that had been told. What was important in these storytelling sessions was that, for the duration of its telling, the story was given the undivided attention of the group.
The following three stories were told among a group of elderly men gathered in the middle of the village one late afternoon. The men were discussing the well-liked subject of young hunters not having the skills to track down wounded animals. Then a middle-aged man said:[200]

Not long ago, I shot a deer near Kakidugen. That was just before Tony’s wedding [the narrator was going to his nephew’s wedding in a village, Kakidugen, and wanted to offer meat to the host]. But it did not die and I never managed to find it. I looked and looked. I could see some blood. The tracks became more and more difficult to see since it was getting dark. So at night I fell asleep in the forest and I had a dream. I saw a large human figure in my dream. But when it came closer I realized that it was now a black beast with hair all over its body. I was still lying on the ground and it walked around me in a circle. I decided to take out my knife, ready to strike if it came near me. When it was within reach, I swiftly cut it in the chest. But it was only a dream. So at that moment I awoke. I could see that I had actually taken my knife and stabbed it deep into the ground next to me. I felt relieved that I had not brought a companion with me, since surely he would have been killed if he had been asleep next to me. I did not sleep for the rest of the night. And in the morning I went to look for the deer again. I tell you this: maybe the deer I had shot was really a be’tang [a spirit] and it had appeared in my dream? Maybe it wanted to speak to me and it was a mistake to attack it? Who knows such things? In any case, I did not find the deer. Then I went to Kakidugen [to the wedding]. I had to go there empty-handed, as you might recall.
The man leaned back and a brief silence fell upon the group. Then a younger man next to the first speaker started talking:

Only last year, I fell asleep one night and I had a vivid dream. I was in the forest and it was dark except for a small fire. Then a big deer appeared in front of me and I picked up my gun, ready to shoot. But when I looked up again I saw that instead of a deer a young woman was standing in front of me. She signaled to me to follow her into the forest. So I went with her. After a while she stopped and showed me a plant on the ground. This was the ga’ek [a magic plant, used in relation to hunting and fishing]. I did the naw-naw. That is an old prayer to the spirit that lives inside the ga’ek. And I awoke. But later, as I was hunting with a group of men from the village of Matmat, I realized that I was in the same place that the be’tang had shown me. And I found the ga’ek right there in front of me. Tó-paw was with us on the hunt. He told me to leave it alone. He said it was only the be’tang that wanted to control me. So I left it. I have never gone back to that part of the forest.
This time there was no transitional silence before another man took over:

Last year during the rainy season, I walked to the village of Bayanihan with A’met and along the way we stopped to rest in the forests of the Nangitoy clan. It was evening. And as we lay down to rest we suddenly saw a large human figure in the forest. It had a white color and was walking towards us. I was thinking that maybe it would come and eat us. We could not move. That is the magic of the be’tang. We could only stare at the be’tang, since I had never seen anything like it before. But when it approached us it started to change in the moonlight and then we saw that it was now a horse with its tongue hanging out. I thought to myself: “If it comes after us it will surely be the end of us.” But then the horse ran away. A’met and I made a big fire. And I tell you this: we sat with our knives [201]in our hands for the rest of the night. Only those old men with special powers can fight a be’tang, but we did not care. We would strike it with our knives if it came near us!
The men in the circle listened intensively, nodding empathically whenever the brief accounts took a turn, while keeping their attention on the speaker. Besides occasional laughter, the other men did not interrupt or make comments.
Such stories are based on the form of knowledge called peneewa, which is knowledge unambiguously anchored in personal experience. Under normal circumstances this is regarded as the most reliable forms of knowledge (cf. Wagner 2012: 57). That is, a story achieved a higher degree of truthfulness over time if a person had “seen it with his own eyes” (R. Rosaldo 1980: 38). Yet, when this form of knowledge was obtained in relation to gongot—that is, if it involved certain areas of the wilderness or included encounters with spirits—the truthfulness assumed a paradoxical temporary character.
The stories, when listened to successively, conjured up images of a forest inhabited by potentially harmful spirit-creatures that constantly change their outward form. And rather than respecting the confinements of the person, the spirits trespass all boundaries by penetrating into the very minds of people, for instance in dreams. This radical unpredictability and enigmatic behavior is what, ultimately, sets the be’tang apart from humans. For instance, the men often indicated during the stories that they could not see what took place in the spirit’s mind (nem-nem). Never revealing their true motives, the spirits are seen as creatures of “false behavior” (nagiat non be-tág).
It is important to reiterate at this point that words do more than refer to a world “out there.” As Annemarie Mol writes, words “may also participate in a reality here and now” (2014: 95). Words, she notices, may, for instance, resemble caressing. Following her insight, I see the stories told by the Bugkalot as events of key importance in relation to Bugkalot cosmology: just as much as the stories depict various strange encounters with spirits, the storytelling should also be seen as a cosmic “cut,” a way of stabilizing a world in motion.


Conclusion: Cosmic cuts
Through storytelling, Bugkalot men seek to momentarily establish an order of their own within chaos. The association between stabilizing—or “fixing” (in the sense of holding something steady)—and the “cut” appears in the writings of Marilyn Strathern (1996: 522) as she proposes that fixing could be imagined as “stopping a flow” by “cutting into an expanse.” In the Bugkalot context this “expanse” is the cosmos itself. The cut is thereby a “totalizing act” (Rio 2005: 411), that is, an instance whereby form is applied to chaos.
By attending to the human-nonhuman relationships in which the Bugkalot have to maneuver, I have suggested that the shape-shifting spirit, the be’tang, could be seen as a key cosmological being. Though the be’tang is understood by my interlocutors as an other, this does not mean that it is always paired in contrast to the category “human”; children, especially, contain a degree of “spirit-ness,” epitomized [202]by the child’s capricious moods and its soft body that undergoes a rapid transformation in the child’s early years.
It may be useful to apply the distinction between cosmology and cosmogony in this regard. While the scientific cosmology, as an ideal type, explains the order of the world by tying together parts and wholes through eternally operating valid laws, the mythical cosmogony is concerned with the serial relation between “before and after” (Valeri 2014: 264). Thus, while cosmological order is eternal (and thereby atemporal), cosmogonies are contingent and processual. In the Bugkalot case, we find a conflation of the two, that is, a “chaosmology.” In order to understand how, for instance, children and spirits are cosmologically classified we must imagine a contingent form that is closely tied to the topographic landscape and, temporally, to the maturation of the person. The topographic motion from village to forest is homologous to an internal relation within human beings. This was exemplified by the temporal dimension of personhood in which childhood is seen as a state of chaos out of which the mature person evolves. Rather than seeing chaos as that which exists outside of the ordered cosmos,4 chaos is a central part of the human world as an intrinsic potentiality. The purpose of this analysis of chaos and stability, then, has been to take inconsistency seriously as a cosmological dynamic. Knowledge of the cosmos among the Bugkalot reflects a cosmos, which is in itself marked by inconsistency and transmutation. Thus, such knowledge is not about “truthfulness” according to some fixed cosmological order but about effective invocation of metaphysics derived from a common cosmos in flux. From the direct use of spirit-magic by the ayog’en, to the distancing tactics that were applied by ordinary people, I have suggested that these forms of “shamanism” may be viewed as reports on a cosmos in motion.
Rather than a “transitional cosmology” (Pedersen 2014)—a cosmology being continuously more deluded and fragmented in its encounter with modernity—fragmentation, I suggest, is the cosmic pattern. This insight may encourage anthropologists to look beyond the stories of loss associated with (post)modernity in order to discover how indigenous cosmologies may in fact absorb such historical trends rather than the other way around.


Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Morten Nielsen for commenting on an early draft of the manuscript. Also, I would like to thank the editors of HAU and the three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions and comments.


References
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———. 2013. “Defacing: Becoming by killing.” In Death, materiality and the origin of time, vol. 1, edited by Rane Willerslev and Dorthe Refslund, 231–46. London: Ashgate.
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———. 2014. “Cosmologies of transition: Shamanism and postsocialism in Northern Mongolia.” In Framing cosmologies: The anthropology of worlds, edited by Allen Abrahamson and Martin Holbraad, 164–81. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
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Chaosmologie: Le chamanisme et l’identité parmi les Bugkalot
Résumé : Cet article prend comme point de départ l’idée que la personne peut être considéré comme le produit d’une contraction d’un champ chaotique. A partir d’une analyse des discours sur le chamanisme, les esprits et la nature sauvage chez les Bugkalots des Philippines du nord, l’article cherche à formuler une hypothèse au sujet des propriétés de la personne dans le contexte plus large de la cosmologie Bugkalotte. Cette vision de la cosmologie ne l’aborde pas comme un système de savoir cohérent, mais la dépeint plutôt comme quelque chose de contingent ou de fragmentaire, qui ne cesse d’assumer une cohérence et une stabilité qu’elle perd aussitôt. L’article s’intéresse au rôle joué par le chamanisme dans les processus de stabilisation temporaire de cette cosmologie fluide, ou “chaosmologie.”
Henrik Hvenegaard MIKKELSEN received his PhD from the University of Aarhus, Denmark, in 2013. He has carried out long-term fieldwork among the Bugkalot-speaking people in the highlands of Central Luzon and is currently employing the ethnographic insights obtained in the Philippines in postdoctoral research on aging and social isolation at Center for Healthy Aging at the University of Copenhagen.
Henrik Hvenegaard MikkelsenUniversity of CopenhagenDepartment of AnthropologyChristianshavns Voldgade 9b, 31424 Copenhagen KDenmarkhvenegaard@anthro.ku.dk


___________________
1. Several of my elderly informants recalled that during the days of customary headhunting (magon ma pa’momotog) that ended in the late 1970s, the elders who were “truly knowledgeable” would not die from illness; rather, in the passing of time, their bodies turned increasingly hard, rigid, and motionless and became like wood (Mikkelsen 2013).
2. The earlier literature on the Bugkalot (see R. Rosaldo 1980) confirms that this should not be seen as a recent turn following the emergence of Christian movements in the area.
3. It should be noted that alternative narratives are encountered in some areas of Kabugkalotan, most notably in communities who have been involved in forest conservation projects. Various NGOs promote the image of the forest as a fragile domain of pristine order that should be protected, while human society is a place of chaos due to, for instance, corruption and uncontrolled population growth.
4. In the Greek Hesiodic model, kosmos is imagined as the world of order, which is surrounded by chaos. In this sense, kosmos is inherently opposed to chaos.
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Among the figures of animality evoked in narratives of violence are the &quot;beast&quot; who perpetrates acts of brutality and the debased creature who is subjected to captivity, forced labor, or slaughter. Yet a third figure of animality appears in the stories of animistically inclined emigrants who survived war and terror in Laos or Cambodia: the wild animal as transmigrated ancestor or capriciously sympathetic spirit who offers a powerful if unpredictable source of protection. Encounters with fantastic animals implicitly question the relationship between humanity and animality that often prevails in accounts of violence, opening possibilities for a zoopolitics of morality and animality. </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Among the figures of animality evoked in narratives of violence are the &quot;beast&quot; who perpetrates acts of brutality and the debased creature who is subjected to captivity, forced labor, or slaughter. Yet a third figure of animality appears in the stories of animistically inclined emigrants who survived war and terror in Laos or Cambodia: the wild animal as transmigrated ancestor or capriciously sympathetic spirit who offers a powerful if unpredictable source of protection. Encounters with fantastic animals implicitly question the relationship between humanity and animality that often prevails in accounts of violence, opening possibilities for a zoopolitics of morality and animality. </p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Wilder powers






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Jean M. Langford. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau3.3.009
Wilder powers
Morality and animality in tales of war and terror
Jean M. LANGFORD, University of Minnesota


Among the figures of animality evoked in narratives of violence are the “beast” who perpetrates acts of brutality and the debased creature who is subjected to captivity, forced labor, or slaughter. Yet a third figure of animality appears in the stories of animistically inclined emigrants who survived war and terror in Laos or Cambodia: the wild animal as transmigrated ancestor or capriciously sympathetic spirit who offers a powerful if unpredictable source of protection. Encounters with fantastic animals implicitly question the relationship between humanity and animality that often prevails in accounts of violence, opening possibilities for a zoopolitics of morality and animality.
Keywords: animality, zoopolitics, Southeast Asia, violence, magic, biopolitics




Work, work—hacking at trees, uprooting them,clearing bushes,transplanting rice, no time to rest.At noon, alone, as I cleared the canebrake,a beautiful black cobra
opened his hood before me, displaying his power.He thought I was his foe.“He’s beautiful, just like in the Indian movies!”I exclaimed to myself while my knees knocked.
“O cobra! Your flesh and blood are trulyBuddha’s flesh and blood.I am just a prisoner of war,but I am not your food.
You, cobra, are free,and if my flesh is truly your blood,plead my case with the spirits of this swampto lead me to Buddham, Dhammam, and Sangham.”

So writes the Cambodian poet U Sam Oeur in his poem entitled “Water buffalo cobra and the prisoner of war” (Oeur and McCullough 2004).1 The cobra in this poem strikes a familiar motif. Like other (nonhuman) animals who appear in Southeast Asian literature, folktales, and memoirs about life at times of crisis, Oeur’s cobra is a figure of imagined rescue, as much as danger. The interspecies encounter recorded here is not simply an ethnographic reference to a rural lifestyle, where the land along with its creatures might be animated by intelligence, sentience, and intention. For the cosmopolitan prisoner of the poem, who was forced at gunpoint into a rural work camp by the Khmer Rouge—as was Oeur himself (Oeur and McCullough 2005)—the cobra borrows some of its magical luster from Bollywood movies. Indeed, the mimetic iterations of this poetic animal span several registers: the multitude of cobras living in the Cambodian countryside, who were a potentially fatal threat, and perhaps an unfamiliar terror for Khmer displaced from urban habitats by the coerced relocations of Pol Pot’s regime; the protocobra as media icon disseminated around the globe, bearing traces of locally specific extraordinary powers; and not least, a singular cobra appearing to one human in a radiant instant, a cobra that is independent, resplendent, and fiercely itself. Such competing imagery hardly inhibits the prisoner, and may even inspire him, in addressing a fervent prayer to this magnificent—we could even say sovereign—beast, who might possibly intervene in the prisoner’s fate.
The image of redemptive animality in Oeur’s poem seems paradoxical, given not only that cobras were among many perils of the forest encountered by Khmer Rouge work teams, but also that in Theravada Buddhism, according to my conversations with Lao and Cambodian elders, the realm of nonhuman animals is one level up from the realm of hungry ghosts, and reincarnation as an animal is a fate reserved for people with an accumulation of very bad karma (cf. Robinson, Johnson, and Bhikku 2005: 12; Crosby 2013: 16, 115, 132). Moreover, in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, associations of humans with certain species of animals can be considered extremely offensive.2 In stories of war and terror, in particular, two decidedly uncharismatic figures of animality are often invoked: inhuman brutes, whether bandits or soldiers, who kill indiscriminately like wild predators on a rampage; and debased subhuman creatures who are subjected like livestock to captivity, forced labor, and slaughter. “They treated us like animals,” one Kmhmu man told me of his time in a Thai refugee camp. “They did whatever they felt like.”3 This figure of animality as subhumanity, incidentally, also appears in accounts of North American medicine. One Lao man repeated to me the warning of a friend who worked in a hospital in the United States: “Man, if you don’t have friends or relatives, you’re going to be miserable if you’re dead in this hospital, because they put you in [the morgue] like a pig, like an animal.” As such medical sites serve to remind us, both these figures of animality, the vicious predator and the abject livestock, fit comfortably into a prevalent biopolitical narrative whereby animals (like the sovereign) are understood to exist outside the moral and political order (cf. Derrida 2009: 39, 60). For Giorgio Agamben, for instance, the wolf-man “is not a piece of animal nature without any relation to law and the city” (1998: 105); rather his precise relation to law is that of being neither protected by it nor bound by it. These two figures of beastliness—brute power and absolute lack of power—are aptly united in this lycological motif for the animality in humanity: the werewolf is simultaneously the figure of one who is killable by everyone and one who can kill anyone (Agamben 1998: 109–111).
But how then do we understand the figure of magical animality appearing in Oeur’s poem, and in the tales told by Buddhist and animistically inclined emigrants who survived the covert war in Laos or the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia? This third figure is the wild animal as transmigrated ancestor or possibly sympathetic spirit or deity who offers a forceful if unpredictable source of protection when the civil order itself has undergone a terrifying metamorphosis. The appearance of such magical animals in stark contrast to more expected figures of savagery or abjection, is the conundrum that sparked this essay. What might such animals offer to those who are threatened with a social violence unrestrained by law and professedly humanitarian ethics? Furthermore, what possibilities do such fabulous animals offer for rewriting the biopolitical story about humanity and animality that predominates in much popular discourse and even social analysis of violence and incarceration? To contemplate these questions I turn first to Oeur’s poem and then to other texts from Laos and Cambodia of varied provenance— folktales, oral accounts from conversations with Lao and Cambodian emigrants, memoirs, regional ethnographies, and accounts of ritual—which have the potential to offer insight about the figures of fantastic animality that appear in narratives of political violence. These accounts are derived from both Hmong and Kmhmu ani-mists and Theravada Buddhists—Lao Loum (lowland Lao) and Khmer who are eclectically engaged with a pantheon of spirits of the landscape.
Scholars have long discussed the entanglements of Theravada Buddhism with animism in this region (e.g., Tambiah 1970; Choulean 1988; Zucker 2006; Ladwig and Williams 2012; Davis 2009; Holt 2012). Lao Loum and Khmer commonly engage in scripturally supported practices such as giving alms, taking temporary vows of austerity, or participating in rituals at Buddhist wats (temples), while also maintaining relationships with tutelary and agricultural spirits, seeking out magical spells from lay practitioners, and most germane to this article, telling tales of encounters with fabulous animals. Meanwhile, Hmong and Kmhmu, even when converted to Christianity, continue to have dealings with a variety of spirits associated with places, plants, and animals. While the stories recounted below may seem a random collection of texts, emerging within unique political, social, and cultural milieus, they share two common spheres of reference beyond their regional affiliation. First, many of them refer to recent linked histories and memories of political violence during and following the American wars in southeast Asia—a kind of violence (characterized by war, state terror, and refugee, reeducation, or prison camps) that has often been taken to exemplify the biopolitical bestiary of brute and dominated beast noted above. second, they draw on certain common idioms of magical animality rooted in overlapping repertoires of animistic philosophy and practice.
Behind the specificity of histories that is glossed over here lies an even more complicated specificity of narrative versions, personal histories, political affiliations, animal species, particular blends of animism and Buddhism, or animism and Christianity, and unique instants of human-animal interchange. The recounted stories in this article are chosen not for their exemplariness but rather for their capacity to enable the imagination of morality and animality. My intention in assembling these stories is to elaborate an image of animality as both critique and alternative to the vision of animality that predominates in biopolitical accounts of violence (often as articulated by and following from the work of Giorgio Agam-ben).4 I suggest that the collected stories strike a common chord: an invocation of animal subjectivities that undermines the distinction between bios and zoe on which Agambenian theories of biopolitics rest. Furthermore, I suggest that the figures of animality emerging from these stories complicate the narrative of the inclusion/exclusion of animal life from the polis by introducing a plurality of bestial powers accessed through encounters with nonhumans that magically exceed the power of the biopolitical.
I will provisionally refer to these powers as zoopolitics. This term has been most often used to refer either to a politics (especially Nazism) that posits certain humans as no different from nonhuman animals, more specifically vermin (Esposito 2008: 117; Winthrop-Young 2010: 227). My own usage aligns more closely with that of Nicole Shukin, for whom zoopolitics denotes not simply the exercise of power over the animality within the human but the power exercised over nonhuman animals (2009: 9). Here, however, I expand the term to include an imagination of animal powers and animal morality that is indebted to animistic cosmologies. This usage of zoopolitics would ascribe moral character and power not merely to humans but to nonhuman animals, imagining a field of multilaterally moral interspecies relationships.5
To begin, I first consider more closely Oeur’s imagination of the cobra’s subjectivity, and then suggest how war and state terror—by driving humans into unfamiliar landscapes—might set the scene for encounters with magical (and ultimately moral) animality.


Between creaturely worlds
Borrowing on Jakob Von Uexküll’s idea of tone, which roughly designates the present, practical significance of a particular creature for the another creature (typically from a different species) who perceives it (2010: 93–98), the cobra takes on many tones for Oeur: danger, marvel, and divine intermediary. Put another way, the poet perceives the cobra through several intermingled moods—fear, admiration, kinship, and worship (Von Uexkull 2010: 93). Moreover, the poet imagines that the cobra has the capacity to adopt various moods as well—defensiveness, cocreatureliness, divine mediation—that enable the snake to perceive the human in tones of enemy, blood relation, or supplicant. Where Oeur’s poem enlarges on Von Uexkull’s science, however, is in supposing that the two creatures might negotiate the mood and tone for their meeting. It is as if the umwelt, the subjective worlds of these creatures, are not self-enclosed as Von Uexkull imagined, but overlap, potentially transforming one another, allowing for creative plays and counterplays.
One Khmer story of a human umwelt that succumbs to radical transformation has been famously recounted and interpreted by David Chandler (2008). In this folktale, two girls who have been abandoned by their mother in the forest are defended from predatory animals by a sympathetic arak thevada (a local guardian spirit) and manage to survive by embracing wildness, eating raw snails, fish, and grain. By increments, the girls become birds; their clothing turns to feathers, their fingers curl into claws, their lips harden to beaks, and their arms unfold into wings. Having lost their ability to speak human language, they communicate with one another in bird song (Edwards 2008: 145), while still knowing that they are both human and bird (Chandler 2008: 34). In his analysis of this tale, Chandler (2008) notes that the Khmer categories of srok (domesticity or civil order) and prei (wildness) are susceptible to risky yet creative inversions that are sometimes provoked by social violence and chaos. The manuscript in which this tale is found dates from the mid-nineteenth century, toward the end of a period when Cambodia was repeatedly invaded by Thai and Vietnamese armies, a time that, as Chandler observes, resembled the 1970s in its extremes of violence (2008: 31). Chandler notes that the girls’ experience in the forest resonates with the fate of many Khmer of that time: driven from their home by the Vietnamese, fleeing into the forest where they lived on lizards dug from the earth and soup made from roots.
For Chandler, the tale suggests that in a time of social upheaval there was “no explanation for suffering that would allow any but the magically endowed to overcome it” (2008: 45). Survival was possible only by trafficking with nonhuman entities or becoming them, through a willingness to engage in parahuman magic that alone had a chance of prevailing against human violence. As one survivor of the Khmer Rouge regime, Sodoeung, put it to me: “When we go to the temple we pray to the Buddha. But when we go to the jungle and see the big trees, we pray to these people, these spirits. I sometimes prayed to the trees too during the communist time…. You talk to the tree and then when the wind blows you feel like, ‘Oh, they answered. I got the answer!’”6
Like the girls in the folktale, Sodoeung and many others living in Cambodia and Laos during the US sponsored wars and their aftermath, were forced from their villages into the forest. In Cambodia (then Kampuchea) the Khmer Rouge relocated thousands of people from villages into communal farms, forcibly recruited young men sixteen or older into the armed forces, and, in April 1975 evacuated Phnom Penh, the principal city, separating families into work teams organized by age group that often worked in remote areas far from their homes.7 Even after 1979 when the Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime, displaced Khmer were often unable to return to homes that were now in the possession of other families or had been commandeered by the Vietnamese army. Similarly, in Laos, many Hmong and Kmhmu, particularly those whose villages had been caught up in conflicts between the Pathet Lao, on the one hand, and the CIA sponsored forces and Royal Lao Army on the other, were driven from their villages by bomb raids or military skirmishes.8 Those who fled or were recruited from their villages either engaged directly in guerilla warfare or lived precariously at its edges in landscapes that were remapped by war operations. With the destruction of farms and fields, many subsisted on food supplied by USAID until the rapid departure of US forces in 1975, when a few thousand were airlifted to relative safety, while the vast majority were left behind to continue fighting or to make their way through the forest and across the Mekong River to Thailand. Meanwhile, Lao Loum whose family members had fought against the Pathet Lao risked being rounded up into reeducation camps. Thousands chose instead to make their way to Thai refugee camps across the border.
People who were dislocated in these ways subsisted in landscapes subject to unpredictable episodes of violence, but also to wild animals, weather, and unknown terrain that might hinder, or unexpectedly assist, their survival. They were constrained to develop new bodily habits incorporating trees, sky, stars, as well as animals. Lt. Somsy, an elderly Lao soldier living in the United States described the weeks he spent in the forest after escaping a prison camp.

I walked about sixty kilometers a day. I walked in mud. The mud collected on my shoes and I cut it off with a knife and continued to walk. Sometimes I had to swim across a river. Sometimes I found bananas in the forest; that was good food. Most of the time I ate leaves. Some of them smelled bad, but I didn’t get poisoned. I was hungry and I ate more. I never got lost in the jungle because when you’re in the jungle at night and you want to know the direction you look at the star. There’s one star called a diamond star. It’s always in the north.

The diamond star and the edible leaves were not, I suggest, merely technical means of subsistence for Lt. Somsy, any more than the muddy earth and the river were merely obstacles. They were shifting foes and allies in a densely tangled intimacy among human, earth, plant, and sky. They were forcefully interceding, not passive but active, not simply the background scenery of history but historical agents themselves, compelling him into new bodily practice.
When she was in her mid-teens Sodoeung spent time on a Khmer Rouge work crew, digging and hauling dirt for a dam. She described sleeping under trees on the bare ground, where scorpions and centipedes found their way into clothing and backpacks, and cobra hunted nearby. She and the others on her team carried dirt in baskets suspended on bamboo stalks across their shoulders, climbing in and out of a six-meter deep pit on a log ladder slick with rain and sap. Given only a small portion of rice each day, she learned to find other food such as frogs or a particular species of mushroom that grew underground. “When you open them on the top, the inside comes out all over, just like hair,” she recalled. “You can eat it raw, or you can make soup, but too bad, we could not boil anything!” The baskets of dirt were tied to the bamboo with cowhide. “When it rained the skin got soggy, and became just like meat,” she said. “It smelled. Flies would follow you everywhere you walked. You smelled like death. Sometimes when we didn’t have food to eat, we used those ropes. We just put them in the fire. Or sometimes it was not cooked.” Water was scarce. Once every two months the laborers were taken two or three miles to a place where they could bathe. They walked barefoot over sharp bamboo stalks. “They stuck our feet,” she recalled. “You could not just walk. You ran. One of the [Khmer Rouge] would ride on a horse wagon in front, and two of them would ride horses behind. It was just like, I don’t know, maybe a dog. Maybe they were just guarding a dog, taking the dog to have a bath. We ran to take a bath, and after that we ran back again.”
After the Vietnamese invaded, Sodoeung managed to escape her work unit. “I ran fast,” she said.

Ten times faster than anyone. No one can run the way I did. I don’t know how…. I ran, and they shot at me, and I didn’t get hurt. It only went through the side of my clothing…. I ran and ran and ran and they shot at me until they used up all their bullets…. I had to cross a creek, and at that time I didn’t know how to swim very well. I remembered that my brother had said that you could use a long bamboo to flip. So I flipped. But my legs were still in the water. By the creek there was a lot of bushy grass. I hung onto that so the water would not take me. It was deep. All the time I kept flipping.

Eventually she made it back to her family.
Sodoeung’s senses, like Lt. Somsy’s, became differently attuned to life in the forest. She developed new bodily relationships with wildlife: catching frogs for food, digging up hairy mushrooms, catapulting herself across a stream with a bamboo stalk, grasping onto tufts of grass, sleeping under the trees among scorpions and cobra. As she became alert to the pulling strength of river water and the stickiness of resinous logs, she also learned to speak to trees and to listen for their windy answers. In this world she was treated like a dog, but also perhaps developed the acute senses, hungers, and skills of one: running uncannily fast, chewing on rawhide rope for food.
Khmer Rouge terror threatened to drive humans into a nonhuman realm of existence, but this realm also offered unique and unexpected opportunities of survival. This survival is something quite different from the “bare life” imagined by Agamben (1998) and deployed by social scientists to speak of the situations of refugees and prisoners. Here humanity, rather than being stripped of its political existence and reduced to animality, bares itself to the metamorphic possibilities of animal existence. When villages, farms, and temples are transformed into war zones and torture sites, the forest offers a countertransformation of human sociality into a world where the ontological barrier between humans and nonhumans partially dissolves. The destruction of and displacement from domestic life appears to strengthen animistic sensibilities, prompting sodoeung’s prayers to the trees, and her attention to their windy answers, and Oeur’s prayer to the cobra. such then is the physical submersion into a nonhuman realm during times of war or state terror that sets the scene for encounters with powerful and morally responsive animals.


Magical animality
While Oeur’s cobra is represented as an actual snake rising out of the cane fields, it (or rather, as Oeur specifies, he) simultaneously takes on the aura of a supernatural creature, one who can understand human language and intervene in human fate. The appearance of such animals as figures of miraculous intervention in times of political violence depends on and draws from a broader conceptual repertoire of supernatural animality evoked in oral texts and materialized in ritual practice. Within this repertoire certain animals may be known for issuing warnings or offering assistance; other animals may possess souls that can be substituted for human souls in specific situations; some domestic animals may be treated as members of human families, while certain wild animals may marry into human families; humans may take on animal form, while still alive or after death. The accounts of this larger repertoire that I offer here call forth a complex bestiary of animal figures, all of whom are characterized by subjectivity, thought, sociality, moral sense, and capacity for choice. Arguably it is the storied existence of such beasts that makes it possible to imagine wild animals as magical allies for humans in times of social turmoil.
In southeast Asian lore, for instance, potentially helpful creatures often take the form of small, wild animals who may be embodiments or ambassadors of the spirit world. In Cambodia, birds who enter a house are said to carry messages from ancestors, while in Kmhmu tales, humans are often assisted by animals such as ant-eaters or insects (Lindell, swahn, and Tayanin 1989: 17).9 According to Kmhmu folklorist Kam Raw, when birds, squirrels, or rats enter a domestic environment acting drowsy and allowing themselves to be caught, they are possessed by the soul of a living friend or relative who is close to death. In such a situation, one should tie a string around the animal’s legs, urging the soul of the relative to stay with his or her family. When the animal is set free, it will also release the captive soul to its human body, allowing the dying person to recover (Lindell, swahn, and Tayanin 1989: 17). Kam Raw also references ancestors who appear as barking deer to alert their descendants to danger, cautioning them not to cut lumber or work in the field that day.
Among non-Christian Hmong, the exchangeability of human and animal souls is ceremonially enacted in animal sacrifices when, for instance, the soul of a pig is offered to the spirits as replacement for the soul of an ill human (Symonds 2004). Exchange of animal and human souls may unfold in less scripted ways as well. One Hmong emigrant, pheng, recalled to me that as a child in Thailand, he once spontaneously pointed at a bird flying overhead and said, “drop dead.” When the bird fell to the ground, he took it home to his father who roasted it and gave it to Pheng to eat. Three months later when his father fell ill, a txiv neeb (shaman) told them that his father’s soul was being requested in “trade” for the bird. When you touch or injure a wild creature, Pheng told me, it can injure your spirit. Hmong hunters in Southeast Asia have been known to smear blood on their crossbows after a kill in order to placate the spirits of their prey (Livo and Cha 1991: 3).
Richard Davis describes sukhwan (soul-calling ceremonies) performed for water buffalo in Northern Thailand, in which the animal’s soul is asked to forgive the hard labor and beatings to which it has been subjected, praised for its patience, and asked not to wander out of its body and consort with wild animals but rather to stay on the farm and enjoy the sweet grass. As in sukhwan for humans, the buffalo are offered cigarettes, betel nut, rice, bananas, and cooked chicken (1984: 167). Guido Sprenger (2005) relates that the Rmeet of Northern Laos practice a similar ritual for their buffalo when they roam too far from the village. In a ceremony modeled after the “wrist-tying” ceremonies that fasten human souls more closely to their body among many Southeast Asian peoples, the Rmeet tie strings to the horns of the buffalo (2005: 295).10 Even as these agricultural animals are dominated in everyday life, such rituals imagine them as creatures with choices, longings, and loyalties.
Certain tales emphasize the risks of interspecies socialities, which are subject to shifting rules, the violation of which may have devastating consequences. Cheuang, an emigrant Kmhmu healer, told me the story of two sisters who were brushing their hair. After they finished they decided to brush the dog’s fur as well. That night it rained so hard that by midnight the village was flooded and everyone drowned. Only seven people, away hunting at the time, survived. “I could go now and still look at that hole,” he said. “It’s as big as this room.” Prayong rooy, a dragon spirit who sometimes appears as a snake, had punished them for treating the dog as a human, he explained.
If small herbivores are often benevolent and helpful, traffic with carnivores can be dangerous. Kmhmu stories refer to humans who are possessed by tiger spirits and become fierce and aggressive, killing and eating their neighbors’ water buffalo. In one Hmong tale a tiger abducts a woman from her family’s field and makes her his wife (Johnson 1992). She gives birth to a tailless tiger cub. When her visiting sister admires and cuddles the baby, the father grows angry. He stalks the sister, killing and eating her. Her parents then curse their feline son-in-law, as much for his disrespect as for his savagery. Despite the tiger’s attempts to conciliate them by offering gifts of money and paying a friendly visit dressed in human clothes, he and the cub are eventually killed by his father-in-law, who then soaks his daughter in a bath of cow dung to restore her to more domestic human-animal transactions.
In Laos, Lt. Somsy told me, an animal spirit was sometimes known to fall in love with a human woman and marry her. At certain phases of the moon she would leave her husband’s bed to sleep in another room with the animal spirit. He had heard of one woman in southern Laos who married a paya nak, a sea serpent, and gave birth to five human children. “Some curious people wanted to know if she was really married to the paya nak,” he recalled, “so they followed her, and saw her walking down to the river by herself. She would walk under the water, disappear for a few days and then emerge. After her children were born, she put the children on her back and walked down to the river, disappearing and reappearing in the same way. It’s unbelievable to me too!” Lt. Somsy exclaimed. “If the husband was paya nak, an animal, then why were the children human?” For Lt. Somsy, as for other storytellers, such stories are told with a mix of fascination and skepticism. The conspecific instability of these interspecies intimacies makes them especially marvelous.
In a Khmer story recounted by Anne Hansen (2003: 827), a young girl’s mother is murdered by her husband and his minor wife. The mother takes successive rebirths as plant, animal, and spirit, in order to help her daughter, who suffers from the cruelty of her stepmother. Eventually the girl is murdered by her stepmother and reborn as a bird. While such transmigratory figures might simply be taken as humans in animal (and in this case, plant and spirit) guise, they might better be understood as unstable becomings, metamorphic beings (or moments in the lives of beings) unsettling the borders of human and nonhuman.
Such is the pantheon of magical animality that then becomes available to stories of life under conditions of war and state terror. Miraculous human-animal interactions and metamorphoses are powerful means for envisioning rescue or survival. In his memoir of escaping from the Khmer Rouge, Daran Kravanh describes the assistance he received from his maternal grandfather as a reptile. When his grandfather died his family buried him near a rice field. At the hundredth day mourning feast they offered him food at the grave. As they prayed a lizard crawled out from a fruit tree and ate some of the food. Kravanh’s mother cried, “Father you’ve come back to life.” Thereafter whenever they visited the grave they called to grandfather and the lizard appeared. Kravanh describes spending many hours alone at the gravesite, lying against the trunk of the fruit tree, listening for his grandfather’s advice. “The voice I heard from him,” he said, “was not a human voice but one of nature—of that place where my grandfather had returned” (LaFreniere 2000: 10). Much later when Kravanh was living in the forest, hungry and wounded from a fight with Khmer Rouge soldiers, he saw a lizard and reassured his companions, “It is my grandfather come to help us” (LaFreniere 2000: 68).
The animal-human encounters within these stories are reminiscent of what Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, in the context of Amazonian animism, has termed “perspectivism” (2012). Like Von Uexkull’s biology, perspectivism posits that each creature possesses its own point of view, and essentially, its own world. Amazonian cosmologies, like the Southeast Asian stories cited here, recognize a potential for humans and nonhumans to metamorphose into one another, whether inadvertently, or in the case of shamans or others with special powers, deliberately for the purpose of borrowing or stealing one another’s perspective or power. Where the Southeast Asian stories, in my reading of them, diverge from perspectivism, is in the possibility (or impossibility) of simultaneous cosubjectivity. In perspectivism, as Viveiros de Castro states, “each species or type of being is endowed with a proso-pomorphic or anthropomorphic apperception, seeing itself as a ‘person’ while it sees the other components of its own eco-system as non-persons or non-humans” (2012: 33). He continues, “Two species” in this system “cannot see each other simultaneously as people” (2012: 34). This impossibility in the Amazonian cosmos seems to be due, at least in part, to the way that interspecies relationships are largely organized around predator and prey. As Viveiros de Castro puts it, “per-spectival multiplicity is the correlate of the generalized cannibalism that defines the indigenous cosmopolitical economy” (2012: 33). In other words, “In a cosmos totally impregnated with subjecthood, the dominant supposition-fear is that what we eat are always, in the final analysis, souls” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 37). Ultimately, therefore, Amazonian animism “takes the form of … enemism” (2012: 41).
By contrast, the Southeast Asian stories retold here seem to sustain the possibility of a mutual creaturely awareness of cosubjectivity, which we could also call copersonhood.11 This copersonhood is similar to what Lucien Levy-Bruhl has described as “homogeneity of essence” among humans and other beings (1971: 36–55), which also allows for creatures to dually exist as both human and beast (1971: 158–84). For an animistic mentality, he writes “the transit from animal to man and from man to animal is accomplished in the most natural way…. It is agreed, too, as self-evident, that the faculties of animals are no whit behind those of human beings” (1966: 36).
Certainly the Southeast Asian stories recognize the risk that Viveiros de Castro identifies for Amazonian shamans (2012) or Rane Willerslev for Siberian hunters (2007), of becoming irretrievably lost in an animal world—the human girls who turn into birds, the tiger’s human wife who is narrowly restored to her former self through cow excrement. But even then, the birds, we are told, knew in their hearts that they were human, the tiger’s wife never herself became a tiger, despite cohabiting with one, the cub was both tiger and human, while the husband remained a tiger, only awkwardly attempting at times to mimic humanity as when he donned human clothes. Nor do the tiger or Oeur’s cobra seem to embody the “antithesis of kinship” as does, for instance, the Amazonian jaguar, in Viveiros de Castro’s discussion (2012: 38). Rather, they are available for incorporation, however temporary and ambivalent, into human kinship networks (cf. Levy-Bruhl 1971).
The Southeast Asian stories may in part reflect a different character to interspecies interactions in largely agricultural communities, where hunting is secondary. They may also reflect the entanglement of Southeast Asian animism with a Buddhist ethos of compassion. As in the Amazon, “divinity is distributed under the form of a potential infinity of nonhuman subjects” (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 40), but the prototypical relationship of these subjects to humans does not appear to be enmity. The antagonism of nonhuman beings is no more assumed than the amity. That said, it is clear from these stories that different species and kinds of animals enact sociality and subjectivity in different ways. While the tracing of such difference is beyond the scope of this article, it is crucial to note that many variables—wild or domestic, carnivore or herbivore, beast of labor or food source, bird, fish, mammal, or amphibian—influence the specific ways that animal subjectivities are imagined. Certain animals, such as the naga, are associated with water and integral to agricultural cycles.12 Others, like water buffalo, play specific roles in relation to economic structures of labor and exchange. For the Rmeet, for instance, as noted by Sprenger, buffalo appear to be the only animal that possesses a kplu or personal “soul” (2005: 296). Despite such heterogeneity in the scope of action and awareness ascribed to various species and situations, the narratives of fantastic animality cited here all conjure the possibility of animals as social and subjective beings who think and feel, give and take, form friendships and enmities. Underlying this repertoire of magical animality runs a vein of ontological possibility for imagining otherwise the relationship between animality and violence.
Arguably, stories of animals as magical or spiritual beings are uniquely capable of illuminating forms of animal consciousness that otherwise would remain opaque. A turn to fabulous animals or fabulous aspects of “actual” animals facilitates the imagination of animal desires, emotions, and communications with humans that are largely inaccessible. Nonetheless, we should be wary of presuming any firm distinction between actual and fabulous animality. For one thing, it would likely be impossible to establish universal criteria for actuality. Borges’ imaginary Chinese encyclopedia, which prompted Foucault’s laughter at the start of The order of things (1970), comes to mind here, with its lack of classificatory divisions between real and represented animals, or between zoological specimens and mythical creatures. In Southeast Asian literature and ritual, actual and fabulous animality may be merged, as in Oeur’s cobra. At stake in the distinction between the fabulous and the actual are not only historically and culturally contingent organizations of categories, but also historically and culturally contingent measures for reality. Finally, what is critical is not to identify these animal entities as actual or fabulous, part-human or wholly animal, but rather, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest, to focus on the blurred and potent movement of “becoming-animal”—or, for the animal, becoming-human—a process of alliance or symbiosis, rather than the production of a stable hybrid, a rhizomatic transformation rather than a classificatory one (1987: 238–39). As Willerslev writes of human-animal becomings among the Yukaghir, “There are no fixed entities here, only continuous transformations” (2007: 6).


Zoopower
How different the tigers and sea serpents in the stories retold above are from the werewolf in Homo sacer, the animalized figure for one who is reduced to bare life, exiled from the polis, at the threshold of the law. The werewolf, for Agamben, represents the figure of a man under a medieval ban, killable with impunity, like the Roman homo sacer, but also, paradoxically, gestures toward the figure of the sovereign who kills with impunity (1998). In either configuration, the werewolf is emblematic of extralegal existence. Yet wolves, Derrida notes in The beast and the sovereign, are stealthy (Derrida 2009: 21), too stealthy perhaps to accede to the structural role assigned to them in Agamben’s text. What is missing from Agamben’s metaphorical werewolf is not only subjectivity, longing, and will, but also (and these are not unrelated, as I suggest above) miraculousness and magic. More importantly perhaps, Agamben seems to have overlooked how a werewolf (or weretiger) might smuggle alien powers not simply into the city but into the intimate space of kinship networks, sparking expectations of reciprocity and hospitality, invoking less biopolitics than zoopolitesse. The Hmong tiger husband, for instance, is not reducible to an allegory for a banished savagery within the human. As a jealous family member who loses his temper, forgets his manners, seeks forgiveness, feigns humanity, and offers gifts, he exemplifies the difficulties of finding one’s way in the moral thicket of injurious love and comfortable captivity. Similarly, the Lao sea serpent is not only a figure of predation but also a lover and father, seductively attractive to his human wife, commanding her loyalty, and demanding to know his human children. These are moral and contradictory creatures who make choices and mistakes, never entirely caught in a structuralist maze with only one ending, meaning, or message.
Bang fai, the rocket festival that occurs in Laos at the beginning of the rainy season, is a signal for the nak, the phallic bringers of rain, to awaken. The festival is celebrated partly by boat races in which the vessels themselves are crafted to resemble sea serpents. These boats are said to drive the nak out of the river so that they can fertilize the fields, returning to the river again at the end of the rains (Davis 1984: 217). Nak move stealthily, we might say, between domesticity and wildness, benevolence and aggression. A Times magazine reporter visiting Thailand for a bang fai festival in 2002 was shown a postcard sporting a photo of a group of American soldiers, supposedly stationed in Laos during the 1970s, holding an eight-meter-long, silvery, eel-like fish. Locals told him that the nak later escaped these soldiers who were carting it to the United States for “scientific study.” In fact, this photo, which also widely circulated in Laos, was apparently taken in 1996 by the US Navy to show off a giant oarfish found off the west coast of the Americas. Yet that doesn’t prevent the postcard from drawing on the power of the nak to comment on both US military prowess and laboratory science. At the time of the 2002 rocket festival locals assured the US journalist that “all of the men in the photo met with messy ends” (Gagliardi 2002).
Animals like Oeur’s cobra, Kravanh’s reptilian grandfather, and the sea serpent who outmaneuvered the US military, oppose the image of bestialization as violation with a more emancipatory beastliness, gesturing toward a subjectivity that is neither debased nor simply savage. In these stories, the human predation of war, terror, and military or paramilitary violence is answered by a counteranimalization whereby escape, protection, defiance, or rescue is sought from or embodied by fantastic creatures. Those who are threatened with dehumanization, vulnerable to being abused like livestock or killed as subhuman prey, conjure alternative subjectivities through collaborations and fusions with nonhuman creatures. They abandon a seemingly futile insistence on rehumanization, turning instead toward a productive merging of human and other-than-human. Rather than hold out for the restoration of a peacetime morality or become resigned to the end of morality altogether, they gamble on temporary assistance involving moral beasts. Faced with the nonhumaneness of human society, they turn to a broader realm of sociality in which humans and animals form risky alliances, speaking, sympathizing, and bargaining with one another, exchanging souls and substance.
In these stories the lawlessness of a society at war is displaced by the lawlessness of animals, who do not so much disobey human law, as supersede it with their own moral judgments. Unlike the animality in many accounts of violence, which signifies a flattened savagery or abjectness without moral shading, the animals here take responsibility for their actions, and hold humans responsible for theirs. It is as if extraordinary animals talk back to human violence from an interspecies ethos that sidesteps human pretensions to justice, while sporadically practicing and rewarding reciprocity, hospitality, mercy, and courage, but often with a capricious-ness and spontaneity that mock human moral logic. Such beasts enter the realm of social relations not as symbols of violence or abjection, but as moral arbiters and consubstantial possibilities.
Stories of magical beasts might be taken, of course, as allegories for more purely human politics and morality. Caroline Humphrey, for instance, recounts a story told by Buddhist Buryat about Stalin as the reincarnation of a blue elephant who was destined to destroy Buddhism three times (2003). Through these stories, she argues, Buryat simultaneously signal and disavow both Stalin’s and their own personal accountability for Stalin-era violence. Here, however, I consider the fantastical animals in Southeast Asian stories not for what they suggest about human ethics but rather for what they imply about a vision of social and moral ani-mality. Nonetheless, at least three insights in Humphrey’s essay are relevant here: her suggestion that a recourse to the fabulous in times of crisis gestures toward a tragic dimension of politics unaddressed by rational accounts (2003: 179); her perception that the story of the blue elephant places Stalin within a metahistory (2003: 189); and her observation that the story permits an understanding of actions as “ethical but also as caught up in skeins of relations beyond individual control or even comprehension” (2003: 195). All three insights turn attention to the way that stories of magical animality, including the Southeast Asian stories I have recounted here, have the potential to push against the limits of political theory, toward an imagination of political and moral life that exceeds rational explanation, historical causality, and individual control. In contrast to Humphrey, however, I am concerned not with how animal figures might enable a displacement of human moral accountability but rather with how they allow an imagination of animality as itself entangled in networks of moral accountability. Such an imagination necessarily alters the framing of animality within accounts of biopolitics.
In his discussion of interactions with domestic buffalo in a South India village, Anand Pandian (2008) traces what he identifies as a locally specific biopolitics whereby thieving or violent humans are compared to disobedient buffalo not only in their lack of self-conduct but also in their determination to remain unyoked. In that setting, the bullish traits of social rebels who may be either animal or human, are alternately governed, excused, and celebrated. What I suggest here is that the animal-human interactions in Southeast Asian narratives of violence might be thought of less as an alternative biopolitics than as a zoopolitics newly understood as a politics grounded in animal existence. Zoopolitics in this sense might be taken as a branch of the cosmopolitics evoked by Marisol de la Cadena (2010) following Isabelle Stengers (2005), in which nonhumans are not simply the province of scientific investigation or management; rather they enter agentially into political struggles and questions. Zoopolitics might encompass cross-species interactions that are governed by specific rites, customs, contracts, hierarchies, rules, and codes. Zoopolitics, in this usage, invokes a relationship between humans and animals that is based neither in analogy nor in an implicit election of humans as spokespersons for nonhumans. Rather zoopolitics suggests multiple worlds of “reciprocal capture” (Stengers 2010) and interspecies interaction.
The term zoopolitics then, as I am envisioning it, is not intended to designate a politics of “bare life” in submission to an Agambenian schema; rather it questions the conflation of animality with bare (biological) life (cf. Sinclair 2011). Conceived in this way, zoopolitics allows the imagination of an animality that is a figure not just for brutality or abjectness but for an animal subjectivity that chases questions of power into cosmological terrains. The fabulousness of the animals, their magical powers, enacts a dramatization of interspecies reciprocity, negotiation, and indebtedness. The positing through fables and uncanny encounters of animal desires and animal morality—however anarchic or randomly manifest—gesture toward an interspecies polis. David Graeber notes that stories of Malagasy love medicine “were not just a medium through which people could think about the nature of power: even more they were a medium through which they could argue about its rights and wrongs” (2007: 246). Similarly, stories of magical animality might be understood as a medium for contemplating political morality. But in this case, the morality is not limited to human beings but is extended to nonhuman or inconsistently human creatures as well. Such a move redirects the line of inquiry from the ways that stories of magical power reflect conceptions of political power to the ways that conceptions of political power are transformed as they are extrapolated into animal kingdoms. Such a move prompts us to consider the opportunities that specific animistic imaginations of zoopolis offer for retheorizing politics and morality to incorporate nonhumans not merely as victims but as moral beings.


Another snake, by way of conclusion
This morality and animality can be brought into sharper focus through a juxtaposition of Oeur’s poem with the poem “Snake” by D. H. Lawrence, which received sustained attention in Derrida’s ninth session on “the beast and the sovereign” (2009: 236–49). In “Snake” the poet comes upon a golden snake drinking at his water trough in Sicily. Like the cobra in Oeur’s poem, this snake is splendid, godlike, and venomous. The European poet passes through several moods resembling those of the Cambodian poet—fear, humility, admiration—but also one other that arises, as he writes, from his “education” and his particular masculinity: a mood of human mastery. “And voices in me said, If you were a man / You would take a stick and break him now, and finish him off…. If you were not afraid, you would kill him!” The poet vacillates, but eventually throws a log at the snake, who “convulsed in undignified haste, / Writhed like lightning, and was gone” (Lawrence quoted in Derrida 2009: 240–41). Immediately the European poet regrets his action as mean and petty.
The ethics that is awakened in him, Derrida suggests, is an ethics of hospitality toward one who “had come like a guest in quiet” (Lawrence quoted in Derrida 2009: 241, 247) to share his world, his water. Yet the snake both resembles and does not resemble the structural guest described in certain anthropologies of hospitality. On the one hand the interaction epitomizes the long noted ambivalence of the relationship of host and guest (Candea and da Col 2012: S5; Pitt-Rivers [1977] 2012: 513). Faced with the snake, the poet vacillates between sensations of admiration and fear, and between postures of honor and hostility. The poet’s imagination of the snake as royalty, more specifically a “king in exile” (Lawrence quoted in Derrida 2009: 246, 248), might logically exempt the snake from the usual obeisance expected of a guest (Pitt-Rivers [1977] 2012: 513). On the other hand, as Julian Pitt-Rivers noted, “A host is host only on the territory over which on a particular occasion he claims authority” ([1977] 2012: 514), and it is not at all certain that the snake acknowledges the water trough as the human’s domain. In this poem, territories are implicitly contested, trumped by a deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987) that disrupts the domesticity of the water trough. Who is whose guest on this Sicilian terrace (as in the greater biosphere) is far from clear. By contrast, in Oeur’s poem the guest, if there is one, is the human, who feels an interloper in a field of cane that is more home to the cobra than to the prisoner.
Both poets recognize a subjectivity in the snakes they encounter: the snakes think and muse and gaze; Lawrence “longed to talk to” the golden snake, while Oeur addressed half his poem directly to the cobra. In Oeur’s poem, however, moral choice (to strike or not) belongs to the snake (as well as the human), while in Lawrence’s poem moral choice belongs only to the man. For Oeur, the cobra might be said to be “rich in world” rather than “poor” (Heidegger 1995; cf. Agamben 2004: 49–62); he does not just behave, he acts; or in Derrida’s terms, he does not just react, he responds (2003). He is not limited to apprehending water, or a dim mammalian scent, or the shadow and crashing blow of a log; he is capable of recognizing other subjectivities, whether spirits, or the human trembling before him. For Lawrence, on the other hand, the golden snake is imagined to be unaware of the waiting human, rapt and captivated within his own reptilian world, a glorious creature, whom the poet belatedly wishes he had honored and not only churlishly chased away. Despite these differences, if, in both poems the animal possesses a certain dignified sovereignty, it is the sovereignty of the stranger (Derrida 2009: 244), who makes claims on the poet’s kindness. This animal other is simultaneously the one to whom a certain reverence is owed, and the one whose presence is a forceful reminder of this debt.
Finally, like the weretiger and the sea serpent, like the grandfather lizard or the small animals bearing messages and assistance, both snakes force an imagination of nonhuman subjectivity and interspecies commerce. Similar to the animals appearing in the Hindu texts explored by Veena Das, these serpents seem to encourage a recognition that humans owe their lives to the “generosity” of animals (2014). To complete the trio of snakes, recall the Thai nak who guarantees the rains and yet defies the zoological project of the American soldiers, repaying them with “messy ends.” Such fantastic beasts draw attention to heterogeneous powers that are beyond human governance yet participate in human history. They are political in their engagement with sociality, morality, and domination; metaphysical in their capacity to shed and take on forms like skin; and nonhumanist in their mockery of human agendas. One might argue that it is human imagination that ascribes moral and political subjectivity to such animals. Yet, as Graeber astutely suggests in his discussion of fetishism, the magical entities that humans imagine, inevitably have power over the humans who imagine them (2007: 143–45). The imagination of magical animality demands paradoxically that animal subjectivity be autonomous of human imagination. These animals do not simply offer a striking alternative to the twin figures of cruelty and abjection within accounts of the animality in human violence. They also suggest possibilities for conceptualizing interspecies moralities and politics that pivot less around rights, justice, or the management of life than around kinship, generosity, hospitality, reciprocity, and alliance.


Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Sharon Kaylen, Hoon Song, Stuart McLean, Todd Ochoa, Margaret Wiener, Matei Candea, Rane Willerslev, Stephen Gudeman, David Lipset, Veena Das, Naveeda Khan for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions. Thanks also to participants in the Sociocultural Roundtable at the University of Minnesota, the session “Crises, Crossings, and Other Worlds” at the 2010 meeting of the European Association of Social Anthropologists and the session “Animal Excess” at the 2011 meeting of the Society for the Anthropology of Religion. Fieldwork was supported by the Cross-Cultural Health Care Program, Salus Mundi Foundation, School for Advanced Research in the Human Experience, and University of Minnesota. I am indebted to the generous assistance of Sompasong Keohavong, Linda Chulaparn, Rouen Sam, Paularita Seng, and Yakobo Xiong, and to the incisive comments of anonymous reviewers and Giovanni da Col. The idea for this article was sparked at the Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Minnesota. Some preliminary thoughts related to this article appear in Consoling ghosts.


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Pouvoirs sauvages. Moralité et animalité dans les récits de guerre et terreur
Résumé : Parmi les figures de l’animalité évoquées dans les récits de violence figurent les « bêtes » qui commettent des actes de brutalité, et la créature avilie qui est soumise à la captivité, le travail forcé, ou est abattue. Pourtant, une troisième figure de l’animalité apparaît dans les histoires d‘émigrants animistes qui ont survécu à la guerre et à la terreur au Laos ou au Cambodge : l’animal sauvage comme ancêtre transmigré ou esprit capricieusement compatissant qui offre une puissante, mais imprévisible, source de protection. Les rencontres avec des animaux fantastiques questionnent implicitement la relation entre l’humanité et l’animalité qui prévaut souvent dans les récits de violence, ouvrant sur une possible zoopolitique de la moralité et de l’animalité.
Jean M. LANGFORD is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota. She is the author of Fluent bodies: Ayurvedic remedies for post-colonial imbalance (Duke University, 2002) and Consoling ghosts: Stories of medicine and mourning from Southeast Asians in exile (University of Minnesota, 2013).
Jean M. LangfordUniversity of MinnesotaDepartment of AnthropologyHHH 395, 301 19th Ave. S.University of MinnesotaMinneapolis, MN 55406, USA 612-625-4092langf001@umn.edu


___________________
1. Reprinted with permission from Coffee House Press via The Permissions Company.
2. A recent example is the anti-Thai riot in Phnom Penh sparked by a Thai actress’ alleged comment that she would rather be reincarnated as a dog than a Khmer (Hinton 2006).
3. The conversations referenced in this article took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s in a city in the United States, as part of research on death, ghosts, and biopolitics as elucidated by the stories of survivors of the covert war in Laos and the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia.
4. I assume that Laos and Cambodia compose simply one region of many from which a similar critique might be launched.
5. To some extent, this usage resonates with Derrida’s reference to zoopolitics in his discussion of fabled animals (such as the dove or the wolf) who take on a political character in European thought (2009: 4). Elsewhere, however, Derrida suggests zoopolitics as simply another term for biopolitics and the term that Agamben surely would (or should) have preferred (Derrida 2009: 325, 349).
6. The names of emigrants who shared their stories with me are pseudonyms.
7. For accounts of Cambodia in the 1970s and beyond see Chandler (2000, 1999); Kiernan (2002, 1993); Boua (1993); Ebihara (1993, 2002); Frieson (1993); Stanton (1993); Thion (1993); Marston (2002); Ledgerwood and Vijghen (2002); and Hinton (2002, 2005), among others.
8. For accounts of the wars and political regimes of late-twentieth-century Laos see Stuart-Fox (1997); Hamilton-Merritt (1992); and Evans (1998, 1990), among others.
9. See also Robert Wessing’s discussion of lizards in East Java (2006: 206).
10. For accounts of soul-callings involving tying a string on the wrist to fasten the soul more closely to the body see Thompson on Khmer rites (1996) and Davis (1984: 145) on Lao rites. See also Klima (2004).
11. Such cosubjectivity does not necessarily imply equality or a relationship of peers. See also Willerslev’s discussion of animal personhood in Yukaghir cosmology (2007).
12. See Wessing’s discussion on the naga within a range of Southeast Asian folklore (2006).
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1594</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/717106</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>“I like you being here”: To understand and be understood through illustration</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Sutton</surname>
						<given-names>Beth</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>09</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2021</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue seq="208">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau11.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1594" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1594/3782" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1594/3783" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, I establish some reasons why neurodivergent (ND) people are unlocatable in anthropology and examine a fundamental crisis of mis/under-representing being-ND-in-the-world. I begin with a critique of anthropological ethics at large, disentangling some ableist assumptions about informed consent with “vulnerable” groups. I go on to present “The Theory of ConSENt”: a SEN-based approach that can enable ND people to understand the research process with regards to ethics. SEN is a commonly used acronym for Special Educational Needs. I then argue there is untapped potential within Sensory Anthropology, as it offers a capacious opening to the research of ND people. I highlight a place for SENsory praxis, as a way of neurodiversifying existing methods to enable a full range of abilities to flourish in ethnography. This article makes a well overdue case against anthropological ableism, contributing to the ongoing work of decolonisation.</p></abstract>
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				<datestamp>2025-10-27T03:25:41Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">2001</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/737760</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
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				<article-title>To speak as another: Hacking, ghost-writing and the dark side of kinship on Indian social media</article-title>
			</title-group>
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				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Awal</surname>
						<given-names>Akanksha</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>27</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="204">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.3</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This paper investigates the use of digital impersonations on Facebook and WhatsApp among young people in Ghaziabad, India. It conceptualizes these borrowed identities as “avatars” that allow people to use digital media without claiming authorship. This paper shows how people seamlessly operate multiple digital IDs—their own, their siblings’, parents’, and girlfriends’—masking behind the IDs of their kin and friends by hacking into their accounts or ghost-writing chats with them. These forms of social media use go beyond self-presentation and digital identity formation to show how people misidentify themselves to excavate the feelings and thoughts of intimate others. Such discoveries enable them to register and calibrate their own responses to their intimates’ lives at a time of immense anxiety about growing estrangements from families. The paper shows how digital impersonations help people overcome the anxieties of doubleness and loss sparked by social media.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1370</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:07:20Z</datestamp>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1370</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/705430</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Valueless value: The question of production in Cofán shamanism</article-title>
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				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>CEPEK</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>michael.cepek@utsa.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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						<surname>Lambek</surname>
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						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>13</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2019</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date>
			<volume>9</volume>
			<issue seq="505">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau9.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2019 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2019</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1370" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1370/3343" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1370/3344" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this essay, I analyze the production of value in the shamanic complex of the indigenous Cofán people of eastern Ecuador. While acknowledging the ethical nature of human existence and the generative power of human action, I describe the shaman as a paradoxical figure with regard to the efforts that produce him and the criteria that orient his actions. The shaman occupies a central social position, but he profits from little Cofán labor and receives mixed Cofán praise. Consequently, it is arguable that he represents no value at all. If anything, I suggest, he embodies valueless value, a concept I articulate in relation to Pierre Clastres’s notion of “powerless power.” In dialogue with the anthropology of ethics, morality, and productive action, I use my analysis of Cofán shamanism to demonstrate the utility of a value-based approach in any ethnographic investigation that takes human practice as its primary object.</p></abstract>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>ethnography, shamanism, Amazonia, value, Ecuador, Clastres</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
</article>			</metadata>
		</record>
		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1804</identifier>
				<datestamp>2024-05-25T11:39:56Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	xml:lang="EN">
	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1804</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/728727</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Two ways of being the Body of Christ: Toward an anthropology of church forms, with reference to Baptist and Roman Catholic polities in Italy</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Benussi</surname>
						<given-names>Matteo (Teo)</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Manzon</surname>
						<given-names>Tommaso</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>25</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2024</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="501">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1804" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1804/4202" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1804/4203" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, an anthropologist and a theologian explore an analytical framework for the comparative study of Christian churches, focusing in particular on ritual life among Roman Catholics and Baptist Protestants in Italy. Catholics and Baptists have different ways of articulating what it means to be “the Body of Christ”—that is, the ecclesia. If ecclesiology is a theme well explored by theologians, social scientists have hesitated to pronounce themselves on this topic. This contribution proposes a way to look at ecclesiology from an anthropological angle through the analysis of the liturgical orders of two different ecclesiastical bodies. By mapping foundational rituals and rites of passage, we aspire to isolate the different “ecclesiological axioms” that underpin liturgy and church form in these two polities. We hope that our reflection will stimulate discussion on a hitherto little-developed topic in the anthropology of Christianity, and strengthen interdisciplinary conversations between anthropologists and theologians.</p></abstract>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd></kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
</article>			</metadata>
		</record>
		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/893</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-11-09T16:49:15Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
	xmlns="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3"
	xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
	xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"
	xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
	xsi:schemaLocation="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3
	http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3/xsd/journalpublishing.xsd"
	xml:lang="EN">
	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.2.030</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.2.030</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Failing well: Accommodating vices in an ideal Vedic city</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Failing well: Accommodating vices in an ideal Vedic city</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Fahy</surname>
						<given-names>John</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>The Woolf Institute, Cambridge

Georgetown University, Qatar</aff>
					<email>jef96@georgetown.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
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				<day>07</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2017</year>
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			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="310">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.2</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 John Fahy</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2017</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Since the early 1970s, the small town of Mayapur in West Bengal has been home to a multinational Gaudiya Vaishnava community of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) devotees, popularly known as the Hare Krishnas. Although the land of Mayapur is understood to be sacred and therefore conducive to spiritual life, devotees often struggle with the practices and prohibitions that are deemed indispensable for their salvation. They are also, however, both prone to and adept at articulating their inability to live up to the ideals of Krishna consciousness, so much so that narrating failure itself becomes a privileged mode of moral self-cultivation. Devotees inhabit the moral system not simply by conforming to a set of Vaishnava ideals but by articulating their failure to do so consistently within Vaishnava moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice. In other words, they inhabit the moral system by failing well. This article contributes to recent debates in the ethical turn that center on the twin problems of identifying and locating ethics. I suggest that beyond a focus on virtue, the anthropology of ethics must also account for how people relate to vices, and how moral systems accommodate the problem of moral failure. </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Since the early 1970s, the small town of Mayapur in West Bengal has been home to a multinational Gaudiya Vaishnava community of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) devotees, popularly known as the Hare Krishnas. Although the land of Mayapur is understood to be sacred and therefore conducive to spiritual life, devotees often struggle with the practices and prohibitions that are deemed indispensable for their salvation. They are also, however, both prone to and adept at articulating their inability to live up to the ideals of Krishna consciousness, so much so that narrating failure itself becomes a privileged mode of moral self-cultivation. Devotees inhabit the moral system not simply by conforming to a set of Vaishnava ideals but by articulating their failure to do so consistently within Vaishnava moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice. In other words, they inhabit the moral system by failing well. This article contributes to recent debates in the ethical turn that center on the twin problems of identifying and locating ethics. I suggest that beyond a focus on virtue, the anthropology of ethics must also account for how people relate to vices, and how moral systems accommodate the problem of moral failure. </p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>anthropology of ethics, moral failure, Hinduism, ISKCON, India</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
	<body><p>Failing well






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © John Fahy. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.030
Failing well
Accommodating vices in an ideal Vedic City
John FAHY, Georgetown University


Since the early 1970s, the small town of Mayapur in West Bengal has been home to a multinational Gaudiya Vaishnava community of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) devotees, popularly known as the Hare Krishnas. Although the land of Mayapur is understood to be sacred and therefore conducive to spiritual life, devotees often struggle with the practices and prohibitions that are deemed indispensable for their salvation. They are also, however, both prone to and adept at articulating their inability to live up to the ideals of Krishna consciousness, so much so that narrating failure itself becomes a privileged mode of moral self-cultivation. Devotees inhabit the moral system not simply by conforming to a set of Vaishnava ideals but by articulating their failure to do so consistently within Vaishnava moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice. In other words, they inhabit the moral system by failing well. This article contributes to recent debates in the ethical turn that center on the twin problems of identifying and locating ethics. I suggest that beyond a focus on virtue, the anthropology of ethics must also account for how people relate to vices, and how moral systems accommodate the problem of moral failure.
Keywords: anthropology of ethics, moral failure, Hinduism, ISKCON, India


Despite my struggle over the course of fourteen months in Mayapur to follow ISKCON’s (International Society for Krishna Consciousness) philosophy, devotees themselves regularly insisted that I was a devotee. I had certainly never felt I was a devotee, nor had I claimed to be, although based as it was on my regular attendance at the temple, my fieldwork could certainly have given that impression. While I considered attending the temple simply to be part of my job as an anthropologist (and at times explained as much), devotees seemed to see things differently. Vallabhi, a middle-aged woman from New Zealand, who had lived in Mayapur for around eight years, complimented me during an interview: “You are a devotee. You have an ideal temperament, you’re genuine, you’re authentic, you have very sattvic [332][pure] qualities. . . . There’s something there between you and Krishna. . . . We can see it, we can all see it because we’ve all been through it.” Of course, according to ISKCON’s philosophy we are all devotees, aspects, and emanations of Krishna’s divine energy. As Vallabhi attested, there was no question that I indeed was a devotee; my realizing it was another matter.
My informants’ insistence that I was a devotee was in one sense simply an affirmation of the universal truth of Krishna consciousness, but there was more to these assertions than I had understood in my first few months in the field. On almost all occasions where my being a devotee was discussed, my interlocutor would insist that they, on the other hand, were “trying to be a devotee” or sometimes they would describe themselves as an “aspiring devotee.” On occasion, they were, “definitely not a devotee.” Despite taking the dramatic step to move to India to pursue Krishna consciousness, nobody, it seemed, was a Vaishnava.1 Rather, in one way or another, everyone in Mayapur saw themselves as perpetually in the process of becoming Vaishnava. Vallabhi’s account was typical:

I can only do what I can do. . . . I have a weak heart, I struggle with my spiritual practices and I’m aware of my weaknesses, so I’m just trying really hard to strengthen myself. . . . I’m full of material desires, I’m full of sensual desires . . . but in spite of that I’m trying to be a good human being, a good devotee . . .

Despite following a strict schedule, rising at 3 a.m., attending the temple, and meditatively chanting for hours every day, Vallabhi only ever seemed capable, or willing, to identify weaknesses in her spiritual life. I had become familiar with such confessional sentiments. This tendency to articulate one’s weaknesses (and highlight others’ strengths) speaks to the metavirtue of humility in Gaudiya Vaishnavism, upon which all other ideals of piety are predicated. While devotees often identify in others Vaishnava virtues such as temperance, as above, the same Vaishnava moral narratives enjoin devotees to recognize only vices in themselves. In order to be a devotee, one must recognize oneself as “fallen” (quite literally, as “spirit-souls” we have fallen from the spiritual world into the material world). One should be, in ISKCON parlance, “more humble than a blade of grass.” Indeed, one of the marks of a good devotee is to understand oneself to be not quite a devotee.
In ISKCON, as with the Catholic nuns in Mexico that Rebecca Lester worked with, “the first stage in the process of religious formation . . . is acknowledging a broken self and articulating that sense of brokenness within a religious framework” (Lester 2005: 95). For ISKCON devotees, however, humility is not a stage they pass through but an affective disposition that they must cultivate over the course of a lifetime. One must be constantly vigilant, and always monitoring one’s own actions, thoughts, and desires lest vices such as pride or envy creep in, detrimental as they are to spiritual life. The pervasiveness of this ideal of humility spurs devotees toward “relentless introspection” (Lester 2005), which in turn gives way to incessant self-abnegation, rendering the otherwise straightforward self-identification as [333]a “devotee” somewhat problematic—insofar as considering oneself to be a devotee at all is to consider oneself in some sense to be virtuous. The insistence that one is an “aspiring devotee” is at the same time a precondition for, and a product of, the cultivation of humility. Always careful to avoid positive self-assessments, devotees in Mayapur prefer to couch their commitment to Krishna consciousness in self-effacing narratives of becoming.
Although moving one’s life to Mayapur involves dedication—and in most cases, sacrifice—there are many in Mayapur who struggle not only with the highest ideals of Krishna consciousness but also with the basic spiritual practices and prohibitions. There are those, for example, who very rarely attend the temple for morning arati (worship). There are many who struggle with meditative chanting on a daily basis. And there are a smaller number who seem incapable of following the most basic prohibitions, as I found out when a devotee joined me for a coffee and a cigarette across the road from the ISKCON complex. While certainly informed by the pervasive ideal of humility, these narratives of becoming were not simply instances of feigned modesty, as I had at first taken them to be, but reflected both the very real difficulties and strict self-assessments that characterize the path of Krishna consciousness. They also point toward an interesting relationship between devotees and the moral system they are striving to inhabit.2
Over the course of my fieldwork in Mayapur, I came to understand that failing to adhere consistently to the ascetic practices and prohibitions of Krishna consciousness does not constitute an aberration of the moral system.3 Rather, given the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of spiritual life, failure is at the very heart of what it means to be a devotee. It is an integral feature of the spiritual journey. Indeed, devotees are both prone to and adept at articulating their failure to live up to the expectations of Krishna consciousness. They are well equipped, both practically and theologically, to deal with the fact that in this material world the spiritual journey back to Krishna is not easy, and many of the ideals of Krishna consciousness are essentially unrealizable (in this lifetime, in this physical body). They still, however, find ways to inhabit the moral system. They do so, not simply by conforming to a set of Vaishnava ideals or prohibitions but by articulating their failure to do so within Vaishnava moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice. In other words, they inhabit the moral system by failing well.[334]
In this article, I describe how devotees’ inability to adhere consistently to the precepts of Krishna consciousness does not lead them to abandon the spiritual path. On the contrary, insofar as Vaishnava ethics subsumes the likelihood—if not inevitability—of failure, narratives of becoming and articulations of weakness come to constitute a particular mode of moral self-cultivation. In becoming Vaishnava, devotees must learn to not only aspire to the virtues but also identify with the vices that Krishna consciousness presents. This article speaks to a debate between two anthropological perspectives on the problem of identifying and locating ethics. I suggest that beyond a focus on virtue (Pandian 2009; Laidlaw 2014a) and “the good” (Robbins 2013), the anthropology of ethics must also account for how people relate to vices, and how moral systems accommodate the problem of moral failure.

From cult to congregation
In 1970, buoyed by ISKCON’s unprecedented success in “counterculture” America, and leaving behind forty centers and several thousand disciples in major cities all over the world, ISKCON founder Srila Prabhupada (henceforth Prabhupad) brought his fledgling spiritual movement back home to India. Among his top priorities was to build a temple in Mayapur, as it was here that the ascetic saint (and avatar of Krishna) Caitanya Mahaprabhu was born in 1486, and it was from here that Caitanya began his mission of spreading Krishna consciousness.
Mayapur, located in the Nadia district of West Bengal, 130km north of Kolkata, is a small but bustling pilgrimage town, home to various Gaudiya Vaishnava sects, including, most visibly, ISKCON. Mayapur is not far from the Bangladeshi border, and is situated on the bank of the Ganges, 25km from the district capital city of Krishnanagar and just a short ferry ride to the urban center of Nabadwip across the river. Devotees today continue to come to Mayapur from all over the world to live by what they call, following Prabhupad, “Vedic culture.” They are also committed to realizing Prabhupad’s prophetic vision for the development of what is sometimes referred to as an “ideal Vedic city,” a sprawling spiritual metropolis within which 50,000 devotees can pursue a life in Krishna consciousness. Prabhupad’s vision for Mayapur has been the catalyst for dramatic social, economic, and infrastructural development over the last forty years, which has accelerated markedly since 2009 with the beginning of construction work on what will be one of the largest Hindu temples in the world, the Temple of Vedic Planetarium (TOVP). The town of Mayapur—previously no more than a handful of small temples amid expansive agricultural lands—is today dominated by the ISKCON complex within which can be found several temples, schools, restaurants, and guesthouses.
International residents make up a small percentage of the overall population, estimated to be 4,000 (approximately 1,200 of whom are international residents). Numbers, however, fluctuate quite dramatically throughout the year. Around the month of March, when the major Gaura-Purnima festival (Caitanya’s birthday) takes place, thousands of devotees visit Mayapur from all over the world, some for weeks or months at a time, while during the hot summer months, many international devotees return to their home countries. With rare exception, international devotees live either within the walls of or within a short distance from the ISKCON [335]complex. Typically, international devotees tend only to stay for fewer than five years, although there are some who have been here since the early 1970s. Reasons for this include lingering commitments back home, visa restraints, or in rare cases, disillusionment. The biggest factor, however, is economics. While some international devotees work for ISKCON, and receive a small stipend, many (predominately men) leave on a regular basis to work back home and support their family in Mayapur. This makes the spiritual path even more difficult than it already is.
The explicit purpose of the ISKCON complex in Mayapur is to allow devotees to immerse themselves in the philosophy of Krishna consciousness. ISKCON’s philosophy starts from the basic axiom, “you are not this body.” Rather, we are spirit-souls (jīvas) who have “fallen” from the spiritual world as a result of our envy of Krishna, the Supreme Lord. Trapped in the material world of illusion (māyā), we have forgotten our eternal identity as loving servants of Krishna, and have become entangled in repeated cycles of death and rebirth (samsara). It is only by taking up Krishna consciousness, and following the path to “self-realization” (where one identifies as a jīva and not with the temporary physical body), that we can hope to escape the cycle and be reunited with Krishna in the next lifetime.
Krishna consciousness involves a range of both prescriptive and prohibitive spiritual practices that include worshipping deities in the temple, meditative chanting, and following the “four regulative principles” (more on which below), all of which are geared toward overcoming māyā, transcending the material world and putting Krishna at the center of one’s life. Taken together, these practices and prohibitions constitute a strict moral code. How devotees relate to this moral code (what Foucault calls the “mode of subjectivation”), or more broadly, how they inhabit the moral system, have changed significantly over the course of ISKCON’s short history.4 This is the result of, and has in turn accelerated, ISKCON’s institutional transformation over the last forty years.
While Prabhupad’s presentation of Krishna consciousness—remaining faithful to its Gaudiya Vaishnava roots—moves within a recognizably Hindu constellation of concepts, the transmission of the philosophy to a Western audience of neophytes (and back again to India), along with ISKCON’s subsequent institutional development, has profoundly shaped the moral system that devotees today strive to inhabit. Prabhupad’s pedagogical approach to Vaishnava philosophy was developed in the 1960s in the context of a world-rejecting monastic movement that was for the most part grown around young American brahmacharis (male celibate monks).5 ISKCON, however, has changed dramatically in the last forty years, evolving into a “world-accommodating” (Wallis 1984) congregational movement of lay practitioners. This shift from “cult to congregation” (Rochford 2007) is a direct consequence of an economic downturn in the late 1970s, since when ISKCON has not been able to financially sustain its communalist social structure. With no other choice, devotees were forced to move outside of the walls of the short-lived temple communes [336]and find employment in the outside world. Although Prabhupad did not exclusively cater his mission for brahmacharis, he did strongly emphasize the virtues of celibate life. He could not, however, have predicted ISKCON’s transformation in the years after his death (in 1977).
In the early days of ISKCON, the definition of a devotee was relatively unproblematic. ISKCON presented a strict moral code that had to be followed. Devotees had to adhere to the four regulative principles, chant on a daily basis, and attend the temple at various times throughout the day for arati, beginning at 4:30 a.m. Rituals or ritualized settings were the lifeblood of spiritual life. Devotees also busied themselves throughout the day with seva (devotional service), such as distributing Prabhupad’s translations, of the Bhagavad Gita, for example. This was all quite straightforward, as ISKCON operated for the most part through the “total institutional” setting of an ashram (Daner 1976). If a devotee could not adhere to the moral code, they would inevitably be asked to leave.
Whereas in these early days the overwhelming majority of devotees were brahmacharis, ISKCON today is almost completely comprised of grihasthas (lay devotees) who typically live and work independently of the institution. This demographic shift, a direct result of ISKCON’s economic fortunes, has had significant consequences not only for the institution ISKCON has become but also for the ideals of self-cultivation by which devotees today understand and practice Krishna consciousness. In Weberian terms, today’s devotees have exchanged “world-rejecting asceticism” for “inner-worldly asceticism” (Weber 1978). Where renunciation was the defining ethic of the early institution, the goal for today’s lay devotees is not so much to renounce the world; it is to engage in it in a certain (Krishna conscious) way. No longer sheltered from māyā, lay devotees today have no choice but to pursue spiritual life in the world, in all its messiness. This, of course, leads to new obstacles, but also new opportunities.
In order to pursue spiritual life in a lay setting, devotees must learn to experience themselves (as jīvas) and the world around them (as māyā) as evidence of the truth of Krishna consciousness. As Joanna Cook notes in the case of Buddhist monasticism, devotees must “reinterpret subjective experiences and responses in ways that are consonant with religious principles” (2010: 7). While Cook’s ethnography looks particularly at ascetic self-discipline in a monastic setting, in the case of a lay community the mundane flow of everyday life becomes what Cheryl Mattingly (2014) describes as a “moral laboratory,” wherein moral selves are worked on, and moral frameworks made meaningful. In Mayapur, this involves learning to detect the spiritual significance of anything and everything one does, however mundane. It requires that devotees cultivate the capacity to mine latent pedagogical potential in everyday activities, be it raising a family, relating with others, or performing routine daily chores. To be Krishna conscious in the world is to be constantly vigilant, always attuned to opportunities for spiritual advancement, and ever mindful of the detrimental influence of māyā.
Today, Krishna consciousness is in this sense a kind of Aristotelian phronesis.6 It is both an ontological perspective and a moral disposition, similar to what the Jains [337]refer to as samyak darshan, the “right view” (Laidlaw 2010), or what Theravada Buddhists call satisampajanna, “mindfulness and awareness of the way things are.”7 It is a way of perceiving and being in the world. To be so attuned is a virtue that is both moral and epistemic. To be able to find the meaningful in the mundane is central to what it means to be a devotee today.
Given the recalibration over the last several decades of what it means to be a devotee, Prabhupad’s teachings, while still foundational, do not determine how one should understand and practice Krishna consciousness in a lay setting. Outside of the shelter of the ashram, as an institution and as individuals, ISKCON and its devotees are coming up against challenges, and Prabhupad’s monastic-leaning pedagogy can only partially inform recourse to those challenges. Simply put, devotees must find new ways of becoming Vaishnava. For lay devotees’ relationship with the ideals of Krishna consciousness, this involves both conformity and compromise.


Little compromises with māyā
Devotees come to Mayapur to work on their spiritual life (sādhana), to cultivate Vaishnava virtues, and to rid themselves of vices (anarthas). Krishna consciousness offers devotees a series of highly systematic frameworks around which, in a lay setting, one assembles one’s sādhana. Although frameworks such as “the nine stages of bhakti-yoga” (that includes faith, steadiness, attachment, and love, as outlined by Caitanya) represent an archetypal spiritual trajectory, in practice they do not delineate a clear linear progression as much as they offer devotees a vocabulary with which to evaluate the trials and tribulations of their own spiritual journey. Devotees are also presented with the “nine processes of devotional service,” which include, for example, chanting, worshipping the deities, and praying. Depending on a range of factors including one’s professional life or family situation, lay devotees typically assemble their sādhana according to their own self-assessment, focusing on some processes of devotional service, at times at the expense of others. While there are innumerable ways one can be a devotee, the basic foundation of sādhana is the “four regulative principles.”
The four regulative principles are as follows: no meat eating, no gambling, no intoxication, and no illicit sex. Although widely adhered to, the regulative principles are malleable at times in the context of a lay community. Devotees often find the first two rules quite easy to follow. Many had been vegetarian or vegan before becoming involved with ISKCON. The prohibition against gambling seemed the least challenging for devotees and was rarely the subject of conversation. The other two rules tend to be treated a little more idiosyncratically. “No illicit sex” refers to any sexual activity that is not within marriage and for procreative purposes, but as I soon understood, there are a variety of ways to interpret this rule and some are more liberal than others.
The rule most often broken (that people could admit to at least) is the prohibition of intoxicants of any kind. While drugs or alcohol did not seem to represent a problem, there are some who struggled with less potent substances like caffeine. At [338]a Muslim wedding down the road from the ISKCON complex, I accidentally came across a friend of mine, Adideva, enjoying a quick coffee from a Nescafé machine for guests. Somewhat startled and shaking off his embarrassment, he assured me with a cheeky smile that this was his “little compromise with māyā.” To drink tea or coffee was not common but certainly not shocking, and behind closed doors such a minor infraction would be considered to be a personal choice. There were some, however, whose “little compromises with māyā” might be a little harder to justify. Another friend, Balrama, who was fond of an occasional cigarette, and had difficulty containing his sexual desires, used to tell me how he and other friends, when back home in Australia, would toast to Krishna before every round of tequila. “Krishna is my best friend times ten million. . . . He wants me to be happy,” he would tell me, while regaling me with tales of sexual conquest. This was certainly an exceptional case, and some of Balrama’s close friends commented to me that they did not understand how he could dovetail his spiritual and hedonistic pursuits in this way.
Although foundational to spiritual life, the four regulative principles are interpreted, negotiated, or at times simply disregarded. How devotees interpret their spiritual path, starting with the four regulative principles, can be very particular to the individual, and is based significantly on their own ongoing self-assessment and capacity for spiritual commitment. How one pursues the path of Krishna consciousness today does not necessarily depend on strict adherence to a moral code, as was more so the case in the early days of the movement. Devotees do not always conform to Krishna conscious ideals, and in some cases they depart from them quite strikingly. In a lay setting, Krishna consciousness appears as an ethics by which devotees assemble their own sādhana, and cultivate themselves in multifarious ways as ethical subjects.
This bricoleur approach to sādhana does not pertain just to the four regulative principles but also to the basic practices that are deemed indispensable for one’s salvation. Chanting the Hare Krishna mahamantra is one of—if not the most—central practice of Krishna consciousness. An initiated devotee must chant a minimum of sixteen rounds every day; 108 mahamantras comprise a “round”: Hare Krishna Hare Krishna Krishna Krishna Hare Hare Hare Rama Hare Rama Rama Rama Hare Hare. Chanting focuses the mind on Krishna and helps the devotee transcend the world of māyā. Chanting “good rounds” requires that the devotee focus intensely on the sound of the sacred syllables. To “hear attentively,” as devotees describe it, is not only to listen intently but also to cultivate the moral capacity to be affected by the mahamantra, as Joanna Cook (2010) describes in the case of Theravada Buddhist meditative practices (see also Hirschkind 2006). Alongside the four regulative principles and other core ascetic practices, devotees understand chanting to be the most effective means of overcoming māyā and attaining salvation. In the context of a lay community, however, it is practiced in numerous ways.
For an experienced devotee, chanting the prescribed minimum of sixteen rounds takes around two hours. When possible, devotees prefer to chant their rounds in the early morning, as it is felt to be an auspicious start to the day. During the morning program in the temple, a couple of hours are set aside for devotees to chant in front of the deities. Some sit still, while others pace, with their [339]right hand in a bead bag, mouthing the sacred syllables.8 As not everyone makes it to the early morning program at the temple, it is not uncommon for devotees to chant throughout the day. At any given time one finds devotees catching up on their rounds, whether sitting under a tree or pacing around the grounds. Even in social settings, devotees will often have their hand in their bead bag, muttering the mahamantra between pleasantries. Although central to the path of Krishna consciousness, chanting what are referred to as “good” or “attentive” rounds is often spoken of as a constant battle.9
Devotees commit to and struggle with chanting in various ways. At times, sitting in the temple during the morning program, devotees looked to be completely absorbed, with eyes closed, smiling, and head tilted toward the sky. At other times, devotees appeared to be completely distracted, and seemed to be merely going through the motions (particularly when trying to chant in social situations). This was reflected in conversations I had with devotees. While at times devotees described their experiences of chanting in terms of revelation or transcendence, for the most part they conveyed sentiments of frustration, and on occasion, failure. For some, chanting is their favorite part of the day. For others, it is a chore. And for very few, chanting is almost impossible. Vaibhava, an otherwise deeply committed French devotee in his fifties—over thirty years in the movement—was deeply skeptical of how devotees practice chanting and had himself given up on chanting the daily prescribed minimum:

I refuse to chant sixteen rounds . . . because I find myself incapable of doing it to the standard that is expected. To chant sixteen rounds means to hear a fair number of them. . . . OK not sixteen, maybe you hear let’s say half . . . even ISKCON devotees will admit not near that . . . and the truth is that they will hear one round maybe. . . . So if I hear one round out of the sixteen, then the rest of the time is mental exercise . . . then I have no part in this nonsense. . . . I don’t have two hours to waste every day . . . not enough is actually meditation . . . I have failed in the performance of meditation. . . . Instead of lamenting and being depressed about it, I find out of the processes of devotional life [something] that really suits me.10 That is serving! I really can put my teeth into this . . . so I do it eight hours a day!

Devotees often reflect on both the quality and the quantity of their rounds. While it is rare to consider oneself, at least this damningly, to have “failed in the performance of meditation,” Vaibhava was confident that reading Prabhupad’s books, worshipping deities at home, and performing seva (devotional service) would more than [340]compensate for his failure in this regard. In other words, there were plenty of other paths to piety. Although Vaibhava’s outright refusal to chant sixteen rounds daily (he still tries to do some chanting when he can) would have constituted grounds for eviction from the ashram in the early years, in the context of a lay community, it is up to him to assess his own capacity, and assemble his sādhana accordingly. And while he was very much aware that he had rejected what Prabhupad had taught is the universal process by which anyone can go back to Krishna, he was relatively untroubled by his failure to master meditative chanting. That he had routinely failed to the point where he has now seemingly given up did not seem a cause for despair. Rather, it was an opportunity for him to demonstrate to me the truth of the oft-quoted maxim, “Prabhupad built a house the whole world could live in” (in other words, there is more than one way of being a devotee). Rather than chanting consistently, then, he worships deities at home, and busies himself in seva, in his case producing and editing short documentaries on devotional topics.
Vaibhava had concluded that chanting sixteen rounds was not working for him, but this did not mean he could not subscribe to ISKCON’s philosophy. It did not mean he could not be a devotee. It just meant he had to do it his way. His inability to chant properly did not shake his faith in the philosophy of Krishna consciousness, nor did it lead him to abandon his spiritual journey. Rather, and somewhat counterintuitively, it served as evidence of the truth of Krishna consciousness. The spiritual path is not meant to be easy, and devotees should expect to be in a constant battle with māyā, one they will not always be winning. And significantly, as I will describe below, it is often in such instances of failure that the truth of Krishna consciousness seems to resonate with devotees most profoundly.
Not only did Vaibhava find in Prabhupad’s teachings more than one way of being a devotee (that allowed him to disregard others), but he also found a framework within which he could make sense of his inability to chant the mahamantra to the standard that is expected. As is the case when devotees pick and choose their little compromises with māyā, failure to consistently live up to the dictates of Krishna consciousness is somewhat expected. Moreover, insofar as such failures are subsumed within wider moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice, devotees are well equipped to manage their inability to always conform to the expectations of spiritual life. Krishna consciousness as it appears today, in other words, does not just present devotees with a range of ideals to strive for, but equips devotees with moral narratives that account for failure along the way. Such narratives do not only frame ritual or ritualized practices like chanting or deity worship, but in the context of a lay community, they are appropriated to interpret everyday experience.


The everydayness of intense ethical reflection
During my time in Mayapur, I spent countless hours with devotees discussing their (and my own) struggles with spiritual life. Common themes were the difficulty of getting up early in the morning to attend the temple program or being unable to consistently chant “attentive rounds,” for example. For many in Mayapur, and particularly those that come and go for work, balancing spiritual life with family or [341]other commitments was spoken of as a difficult balancing act. Such struggles are central to what it means to be Krishna conscious today, while living “in the world.” Although the spiritual path is highly individual insofar as it is based to a large extent on one’s own ongoing self-examination, devotees do not embark on the spiritual journey alone. Aside from an often close relationship with a guru (who may or may not live in Mayapur) or more senior devotees, devotees share their struggles and self-assessments in classroom or group contexts as well as in casual conversation. They ask for and offer each other advice and share scriptural resources, exchanging slokas (verses) from the Bhagavad Gita, for example. And they do so by mobilizing a particular Vaishnava moral vocabulary that allows them to manage the inevitability of failing consistently to live up to the ideals of Krishna consciousness.
One evening, I accompanied two friends, Sabuj and Acintya, to Gauranga Pizzeria, a rooftop restaurant that opens for three months every year during the busy Gaura Purnima festival period. I had met Sabuj and Acintya (both in their late twenties) at a course in the Mayapur Academy that ran for several weeks, catering for the most part to nonresident devotees. Sabuj is of South Asian descent from London. By profession he is an IT specialist, but when I met him in Mayapur, he had taken five months out of his career to come to explore his spiritual life and in his words, “improve his sādhana.” Four years after joining ISKCON, Sabuj considered himself a strict devotee. While in Mayapur, he followed a strict schedule, rising for morning arati almost every day at 3:30 a.m. Acintya, from Florida, had been a devotee a little longer than Sabuj, and although serious about his sādhana, took a more light-hearted approach to Krishna consciousness. Occasions like dinner at the pizzeria were a welcome break from the intensity of the temple or classroom settings that I often found myself in during fieldwork. While topics of conversation often included spiritual life, this was one of a few spaces where sādhana might be briefly set aside for more mundane chat, about football or politics, for example. The topic of Krishna consciousness, however, was never far away.
Before ordering food, Acintya had a brief but friendly exchange with the waitress, who was also from America. “How are you?” she asked. With a big smile, Acintya replied, “Much better now that you’re here!” He continued, “You’re my favorite waitress.” As she turned and left after some more pleasantries, Sabuj immediately whispered loudly to his friend, “Acintya! You can’t say that! You can’t flirt with a devotee like that!” He continued, “maybe she really likes you and you have disturbed her [from her Krishna consciousness]!” Unsure of his tone, Acintya laughed it off and insisted that he was not flirting but just being friendly. Sabuj, however, was quite serious and continued to point out how Acintya had just acted in a way that was “not very Vaishnava.” (One should not distract another devotee from remembering Krishna at all times). Although Sabuj and Acintya were close friends, this incident made for a tense evening, and led to several days of estrangement, leaving me somewhere awkwardly in the middle.
It was not until a few days later that the three of us met up again at the pizzeria, at which point Sabuj had changed his mind. After some reflection, Sabuj had what he called a “realization” (a theologically loaded concept in ISKCON). First, he explained, even if it had been the case that Acintya had ulterior motives, it was not Sabuj’s role to judge him. Acintya was a couple of years longer in ISKCON, and so was to be offered respect as a senior, even though they were close friends and more [342]like equals. In any case, while rigorous self-assessment is the norm, judging others is to be cautiously avoided. Sabuj conceded that maybe he had failed to grasp the cultural difference (often perceived between American and British ISKCON) and assumed Acintya was flirting, whereas he was likely just being friendly. Sabuj concluded that he was in the wrong as he had failed to see the Vaishnava in Acintya, and read the situation from a “material perspective,” assuming the worst of his friend and fellow devotee. For his part, Acintya remained relatively untroubled by what he did not consider to be a major incident.
For Sabuj, the tone had shifted from condemnation to self-abnegation. He insisted that it was his own pride and ignorance that had led to his criticism of Acintya. The problem was now not whether or not Acintya had indeed acted in a “not very Vaishnava” way but how Sabuj had responded. In his own behavior, Sabuj identified the vices of someone who was proud and judgmental, not the virtues of someone who was humble and tolerant. He had committed, in his words, “Vaishnava aparadh” (an offence against a Vaishnava) and regardless of Acintya’s guilt, it was not his role to criticize another devotee. Sabuj’s apology and analysis of this event lasted for the hour or so we were at the restaurant, and was the topic of many conversations we would have afterward. These conversations always came back to the idea of having to “get rid of anarthas” (vices).
Everybody has anarthas. Everybody is imperfect, as I was often told. If nothing else, this is the most degraded age of Kali Yuga and we should not expect to find “pure devotees” on this “hellish” planet.11 The question then is not whether or not one has anarthas (we all do), but how you go about identifying and ridding yourself of them. When confronted with anarthas, devotees would often critically assess their weaknesses. (And in doing so they were, of course, also enacting the virtuous ideal of humility, insisting in one way or another that they were “fallen.”) What I was yet to understand was that these narratives—that included the identification and overt explication of one’s understanding of the practical applicability of Krishna consciousness—are themselves a mode of moral self-cultivation. In other words, narrating one’s experience of and struggles with Krishna consciousness is itself a moral imperative that has pedagogical import for both the speaker and listener. And importantly, it was in instances of failure that such narratives appeared particularly salient.
Sabuj’s original condemnation of Acintya was just one aspect of this episode. More significant was Sabuj’s response to realizing his mistake and his subsequent articulation of his understanding of the incident. In couching his reinterpretation of events in terms of anarthas and Vaishnava aparadh, Sabuj effectively restaged the scene within a moral narrative that borrowed from Vaishnava theology an evaluative vocabulary with which he could make sense of his mistake. In one sense, Sabuj was simply doing what devotees are supposed to do: trying to understand the world and his actions through a Krishna conscious lens. He was bringing a particular ontological perspective to bear on an everyday event. At the same time, insofar as [343]Krishna consciousness is also a moral disposition, in evoking Vaishnava theological categories, Sabuj was also being a good devotee, albeit not in the conventional sense of “being good.”
In taking the opportunity to reframe the incident as evidence of the truth of Krishna consciousness (we all have anarthas), Sabuj was able to cast himself in the role of the “fallen” devotee. And he was able to do so in this case not because he had adhered to the virtues of Krishna consciousness but because he could articulate his inability to do so within a moral narrative that accommodated the inevitability of failure. In his reinterpretation of events, Sabuj could cast himself in the role of a devotee by identifying in his behavior vices such as pride and arrogance, rather than by identifying in himself virtues such as humility or tolerance (although they were implicit in his reinterpretation). Simply put, it was through failing well that Sabuj was able to inhabit the moral system.
Such intense ethical reflection speaks directly to a central debate in the ethical turn that coheres around the twin problems of identifying and locating ethics. That we have until recently had little to call upon in the social sciences to begin to address these problems is often traced back to émile Durkheim’s treatment of morality as a social fact, which, it has been argued, rendered dormant the themes of ethics and morality for the best part of a century. It has by now been widely acknowledged that Durkheim’s fundamental mistake was to conflate morality with society (Zigon 2007; Laidlaw 2002; Robbins 2004). In doing so, rather than explaining anything about morality, he essentially explained it away. Anthropologists today are left to contend with these basic questions: what counts as ethics and where is it to be found?
There are broadly speaking two prominent approaches. First, the “ordinary ethics” approach locates ethics in the everyday (Lambek 2010; Das 2007). Ethics, thus conceived, need not necessitate distanced reflective judgment (that is not to say it necessarily precludes it), but pervades the mundane, sometimes in unconscious ways. In Michael Lambek’s words, “the ‘ordinary’ implies an ethics that is relatively tacit, grounded in agreement rather than rule, in practice rather than knowledge or belief, and happening without calling undue attention to itself” (2010: 2). He continues, “the ordinary is intrinsically ethical and ethics intrinsically ordinary” (Lambek 2010: 2).
However, not everyone is in agreement with the ordinary ethics approach (see Lempert 2013, 2015). Jarrett Zigon (2008) in particular has been a staunch critic, arguing that insofar as ordinary ethics (as he understands it) rests on the claim that ethics is everywhere, it essentially does away with the problems of either identifying what counts as ethics or locating where ethics might be found. Ordinary ethics, then—or what Zigon labels “Aristotelian Kantianism”—in “dissolving the ethical into the social” (Lambek 2010), makes the mistake of reproducing the very Durkheimian misassumptions that it claims to resolve (Zigon 2007). In its place, Zigon has proposed his own framework.
For the most part, anthropologists have followed a basic distinction between ethics and morality, as put forward by Bernard Williams. Ethics, for Williams (1985), is what falls under the broad question of “how one ought to live?” or in Foucault’s terms, ethics denotes one’s “relation to oneself” (1994: 266). In this formulation, ethics subsumes morality, which more narrowly refers to the following (or [344]disregarding) of rules and regulations (that can be understood broadly speaking as Kantian ethics). Zigon (2008), however, understands ethics to constitute a rupture of morality, which itself is conceived as a mundane unreflective disposition. While the goal of ethics in Zigon’s formulation is to return to the comfort of the unreflective disposition (that he calls morality), ethics is to be found in moments of “moral breakdown” where people are forced to reflect explicitly on the rightness or wrongness of their actions. Insofar as ethics is located in temporal instances of explicit reflection, and therefore requires a certain distance from everyday experience, the “ordinary” for Zigon is where ethics is not.
While Zigon’s “moral breakdown” has proven generative, it becomes problematic when mobilized as a prescriptive framework. At first glance, it seems to provide a structural narrative within which instances of ethical reflection, like Sabuj’s above, can be accommodated. Zigon’s approach, however, is founded on the false premise that the goal of ethics is to return to the comfort of an unreflective disposition (morality). As James Laidlaw (2014a: 125) has argued, and as this article attests, that the goal of ethics is to return to an unreflective disposition cannot be a premise of the anthropology of ethics; rather, it is an open ethnographic question. Indeed, such an unreflective disposition, by definition, is the very opposite of Krishna consciousness, the goal of which is to make devotees vigilant subjects, always and everywhere attuned to opportunities for spiritual progress. Ethics in Mayapur, in this sense, is rather “ordinary” insofar as Krishna consciousness is a moral disposition that one must cultivate in everything one does, however mundane. Alongside everyday practice, this also includes a more explicit performative dimension (see Lambek 2010) whereby the articulation of one’s moral assessment is itself an important moral imperative. Where Lambek’s formulation posits that “the ordinary is intrinsically ethical and ethics intrinsically ordinary,” the aim of Krishna consciousness is to render the ordinary explicitly ethical, and the ethical explicitly ordinary.
For devotees in Mayapur, the questions of what counts as ethics or where ethics might be found are fundamentally familiar questions of how one should go about trying to be Krishna conscious in a changing world, beyond the confines of the ashram. In order to be Krishna conscious in the world, devotees, as we have seen, must recognize themselves as always and everywhere being surrounded by opportunities for spiritual advancement, or in Webb Keane’s (2015) terminology “ethical affordances.”12 They must learn to detect the ethical potentiality in everything they do. And insofar as Krishna consciousness is at once an ontological perspective and a moral disposition, there is nothing that cannot potentially count as ethical. In other words, ethical potentiality inheres in everything and is everywhere. This is not to simply suggest that ethics is everywhere. As Zigon (2014) points out, such a claim (that he mistakenly attributes to the ordinary ethics approach) would only serve to undermine the important contributions that have allowed the anthropology of ethics to escape the Durkheimian paradigm. This should not, however, [345]preclude the distinct claim that everything is potentially ethical or that ethics is potentially everywhere.
Beyond the structural challenge of identifying what counts as ethics or locating where ethics might be found, devotees’ efforts to follow the path of Krishna consciousness also shed light on two related, but often overlooked, dimensions of ethical life: how people relate to vices, and how moral systems accommodate the problem of moral failure.


Failing well
Paulo Heywood (2015) has noted that it has become somewhat of a truism within the anthropology of ethics to suggest that “people are not always faithful to the moral codes they espouse.”13 Rather, strict adherence is just one of the many relationships one can have with a moral code. This observation can be traced back to Laidlaw’s work on Jain merchants in Jaipur. In Riches and renunciation, Laidlaw (1995) looks at how affluent lay Jains aspire to the strict and effectively unrealizable religious values of renunciation. As a lot of these Jains are wealthy gem traders, such values are strikingly discordant with the lives they actually live. Based on the ethnographic puzzle of how people pursue apparently antagonistic ethical imperatives, Laidlaw sets out to describe “how people can live by, without in an obvious sense conforming to, ethical and religious values; and how they can live by contradictory and conflicting values” (1995: 12). He gives an account of what he calls “ethical complexity” (see also Faubion 2011), within which ideals—however unrealizable—nevertheless retain motivational force. Conformity (to a moral code), Laidlaw argues, is just one of many ways one can inhabit a moral system, as I describe here. As Laidlaw insists, this is not particular to Jainism.
Where Riches and renunciation gives an account of one ethical tradition, Joel Robbins’ Becoming sinners (2004), based on fieldwork with the Papua New Guinean Urapmin, describes how people live with two “contradictory cultural logics” at the same time. Framed as a process of “cultural adoption,” Robbins demonstrates how in abandoning one moral system and striving to live by another, the Urapmin are caught between two sets of moral imperatives that often come into conflict. He details how in the context of rapid cultural change the Urapmin enthusiastically adopted millennial Christianity (curiously, despite a lack of direct missionary contact). Although they still live what he terms “largely traditional lives in material terms,” they have almost completely abandoned previously held conceptions of personhood and virtue in the pursuit of conversion to Christianity. Such a dramatic shift, however, has not been as smooth as it has been quick.
Robbins focuses on the Christian notion of the will, explaining that while the suppression of the will is understood to be a fundamental Christian virtue, imposing the will remains central to the creation and maintenance of traditional social [346]relations (as in when a woman must choose a man to be her husband, for example). In order to live within the traditional Urapmin social structure, it is understood (and at times celebrated) that one must be a willful agent. However, in order to be a good Christian one must renounce the will entirely. In Christian ethics, the individual alone is the unit of salvation, an “essentially non-social moral being” Robbins notes (2004: 293), citing Louis Dumont—an essentially non-social moral being that is nevertheless embedded in social relations.
Insofar as the Christian life is impossible to live for the Urapmin, Robbins argues, one way or another they must contend with the inevitability of failure, resulting in what he describes as “moral torment.” Although the very notion of moral torment might seem to suggest dysfunction, Robbins’ ethnography is not an account of how a moral system has failed. Rather, it is a description of how people fail within a moral system. Even though Urapmin efforts are indeed destined to fail, they remain determinedly committed to Christian moral precepts. And despite the apparent contradictions at the heart of their endeavors, they can still inhabit the moral system. In part, this is because moral weakness itself is integral to what it means to be a Christian. As Robbins notes, it is one of the “ingenious design features” of Christianity “that they make the ever-renewed conviction of sinfulness an important condition of salvational success” (2004: 252). The Urapmin do not inhabit the moral system by being “good Christians” but instead by failing to be good Christians within particular Christian moral narratives of sinfulness. It is not through virtue or moral success that the Urapmin inhabit the moral system but through sinfulness and moral weakness.
Both Becoming sinners and Riches and renunciation draw our attention to the fact that beyond normative accounts of ethics that cohere around ideals, virtues, and exemplars, moral systems also comprise conflict, contradiction, and failure. Similar accounts of inconsistency have emerged from the anthropology of Islam (Marsden 2005; Simon 2009; Schielke 2009). From both a systematic as well as a subjective perspective, such features as conflict, contradiction, or failure are not to be understood as deviations from an otherwise coherent moral system—indeed as Laidlaw (1995) points out, logical coherence is not always there to be found.
While such accounts challenge the “illusion of wholeness” (Ewing 1990), I want to go further here to suggest that in Mayapur not only is failure not an aberration of the moral system but insofar as it is constitutive of what it means to be a devotee, if responded to appropriately, it becomes a privileged mode of moral self-cultivation. In other words, in Mayapur, failing well represents an expedient means of inhabiting the moral system.
Beyond the confines of the ashram, lay devotees find themselves in a precarious ethical situation of having to strive for essentially unrealizable ideals. This is particularly the case in Mayapur where devotees are presented with two antagonistic ideals: one soteriological and the other social. While Krishna consciousness enjoins devotees to transcend the material world, they must at the same time engage in an ambitious project of social and urban development, in contributing to, or simply living in this fledgling “spiritual city.” As a result, consistent failure to live up to the ideals of Krishna consciousness is inevitable. It is not, then, a question of whether or not one fails, but how one fails.[347]
Devotees often frame their commitment to Krishna consciousness in self-effacing narratives of becoming. As is required by Vaishnava ethics, in order to be a devotee, devotees must learn to view themselves as “aspiring devotees” or in some cases “definitely not devotees.” Indeed, understanding oneself to be fallen is the first step on the spiritual path. (It is only by understanding oneself to be underserving of Krishna’s divine grace that one can hope one day to become deserving of Krishna’s divine grace.) While magnanimous in their praise for others, devotees in Mayapur only ever seemed capable of identifying weaknesses in themselves. I was never left with the impression, however, that devotees experienced what could be described as “moral torment,” as Robbins describes in the case of the Urapmin. While devotees’ efforts are, like those of the Urapmin, “destined to fail” (in this lifetime), narratives of moral failure are almost always accompanied by articulations of hope rather than despair, and resilience rather than remorse. Once Sabuj had realized that he was in the wrong, for example, once he had unearthed his anarthas, he seemed if anything quite upbeat, almost excited even. Consistent failure to live up to ideals of Krishna consciousness was rarely met with dejection but rather, as Laidlaw describes of Jains in Jaipur, an “acceptance of [devotees’] own imperfectability” (2014b: 498). Such resilience is largely attributable to the fact that the likelihood of failure itself is subsumed within Vaishnava moral narratives that account for the aperture between precept and practice. Everybody has anarthas, but what is important is how one goes about identifying and ridding oneself of them. For devotees, articulating one’s own weaknesses is not simply a lamentation of the inability to be a good devotee but is itself a means of becoming a good devotee.
Of course, there are different kinds of failure, not all of which constitute “failing well.” Vaibhava was able to confidently present his practical failure to adhere to the demands of Krishna consciousness (and chanting in particular) as evidence of the truth of the maxim that “Prabhupad built a house the whole world could live in.” He found in devotional service another path to piety. Adideva’s sneaky coffee was not so serious an offense. His framing of the incident as a “little compromise with māyā,” although more playful than apologetic, nevertheless served to justify his lapse (to himself as much as to me). Balrama’s tequila shots and sexual conquests, however, were understood to simply constitute failure on his part. His logic that Krishna was his best friend and wanted him to be happy found little support in Vaishnava philosophy, and was met with little understanding among even his closest friends. He rarely attempted to present his indiscretions within a Vaishnava moral vocabulary, such as anarthas or aparadh, for example. He was not, like Sabuj, identifying and articulating his weaknesses so as to address them, nor was he striving to inhabit the moral system. Rather, he was simply disregarding it.


Conclusion
Krishna consciousness is a strategy, not a solution. Its strength is not just that it presents devotees with a range of ideals in pursuit of which they can live a good life. Of equal importance, it provides devotees with robust moral narratives that accommodate the inevitability of failure along the way. Devotees’ becoming Vaishnava does not depend exclusively on their capacity to conform consistently to the [348]strict ascetic practices and prohibitions of Krishna consciousness; it also depends on their ability to manage their failure and to do so within the moral narratives that ISKCON presents them with.
This article has sought to demonstrate that the extent to which people can inhabit a moral system is not simply a measure of their success in imbibing its virtues, nor is it a measure of their ability to consistently conform to its moral code. Rather, the extent to which people are able to inhabit a moral system is a measure of how successful they are in mobilizing its resources in evaluative appraisals of their own striving. Simply put, one can inhabit a moral system by recognizing in oneself not just the virtues but also the vices it presents.
Given its embeddedness in the Western philosophical tradition, it may not be surprising that the anthropology of ethics has inherited an orientation that privileges virtue. Within the ethical turn, in other words, anthropologists have most typically set out to describe the various ways people strive for virtue in their attempt to live a good life. In focusing on how people relate to virtues, however, the anthropology of ethics has paid less attention to how people relate to vices. Insofar as virtues are but one aspect of a moral system, in failing to account for the complex role that vices play in ethical life, the anthropology of ethics has developed a critical blind spot. If, as Heywood has noted, it is a truism to suggest that people are not always faithful to the moral codes they espouse, it becomes a task of the anthropology of ethics to describe the various ways people inhabit a moral system beyond simply being, or striving to be, virtuous.


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Bien échouer: Devenir Vaishnava dans une ville védique idéale
Résumé : Depuis les années 70, la petite ville de Mayapur au Bengale occidental est le siège d’une communauté multinationale Gaudiya Vaishnava, fidèles à l’ “International Society for Krishna Consciousness” (ISKCON), aussi connue sous le nom d’Hare Krishna. Bien que le territoire de Mayapur soit considéré comme sacré et donc propice à la vie spirituelle, les fidèles ont souvent du mal à suivre toutes les pratiques et prohibitions qui sont indispensables à leur salut. Mais ils sont aussi compétents et adeptes de la tâche consistant à exprimer leur incapacité à atteindre les idéaux de la conscience de Krishna, si bien que raconter l’échec devient en soi un mode privilégié d’auto-cultivation morale. Les fidèles évoluent dans un système moral non seulement en suivant un ensemble d’idéaux Vaishnava, mais aussi en exprimant leur échec à les suivre en permanence, à l’aide de récits moraux Vaishnava qui tiennent compte de l’écart entre précepte et pratique. En d’autres termes, ils demeurent dans un système moral en échouant convenablement. Cet article veut contribuer à des débats récents liés au tournant éthique, qui ont trait aux problèmes jumeaux de l’identification et de la localisation des enjeux éthiques. Je suggère qu’au-delà de son intérêt pour la notion de vertu, l’anthropologie de l’éthique doit également prendre en compte comment les individus conçoivent les vices, et comment les systèmes moraux s’accommodent des problèmes d’échec moral.
John FAHY is a research fellow at Georgetown University, Qatar, and the Woolf Institute, Cambridge. He completed his PhD at the University of Cambridge in 2016, and is currently leading a research project that looks comparatively at interfaith initiatives in Doha, Delhi, and London.
John FahyGeorgetown University, Qatar &amp; Woolf Institute, CambridgeEducation CityAl Luqta Street, DohaQatarjef96@georgetown.edu


___________________
1. Vaishnavism is one of the four major Hindu traditions and although it generally centers on Vishnu, in the case of Gaudiya Vaishnavism (or Bengal Vaishnavism) Krishna is held to be the Supreme Lord.
2. I follow here Joel Robbins’ (2004) use of the term moral system to refer to the combination of a moral code (the rules and regulations) with Michel Foucault’s “ethical system” (how one relates to the moral code). Foucault’s “ethical system” (1994: 263–65) revolves around four basic questions or “components.” First, there is the “ethical substance” or the part of the self or one’s behavior that is concerned with moral conduct. Second, there is the “mode of subjectification” or “the way in which people are invited to recognize their moral obligations” (how people relate to a moral code). Third, there are “self-forming activities” (or “technologies of the self”), “the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects.” Fourth, is the telos, “the kind of being to which we aspire,” or in other words, the goal of all of this ethical work.
3. Asceticism should be understood here in the broad Foucauldian sense of “self-forming activity” (see Laidlaw 1995; Cook 2010).
4. As Foucault (1990) argued, ethics and moral codes can, and often do, develop independently of one another (see Robbins 2004: 217).
5. Some ISKCON temples also housed brahmacharinis (female monks), although the majority of the monks were men.
6. Phronesis is often glossed as “practical wisdom” or “reason” but is translated by Michael Lambek (2000: 309) as “moral practice or judgment”).
7. This is Charles Hallisey’s (2010: 144) translation, which also connotes moral prudence.
8. A bead bag is a small cloth bag within which devotees keep their personal chanting beads. Similar to rosary beads, these are 108 tulasi beads that devotees use to keep count of the number of mahamantras they have chanted.
9. Gregory Simon (2009) describes a similar situation in the context of Islamic prayer practices in West Sumatra. Khusuak (or “total, sincere concentration on God”), though necessary for prayer to be effective, is desired but often felt to be lacking.
10. Vaibhava is referring here to the “nine processes of devotional service, which include, for example, deity worship, praying, chanting, and seva (devotional service).
11. Kali Yuga is the last of the four stages of the cosmic cycle (after Satya Yuga, Treta Yuga, and Dvapara Yuga). This concept often arises in ethical discourse in South Asia, as this yuga is characterized by moral depravity and a lack of piety and thus potentially serves as an explanatory framework for all that is wrong with the world (Parish 1994).
12. Webb Keane uses the term “ethical affordance” to make a case for the potentiality of ethics, defining it as “any aspect of people’s experience and perceptions that they might they might draw on in the process of making ethical evaluations and decisions, whether consciously or not” (2015: 27).
13. In an article on LGBT activism in Bologna that centers on the relationship between freedom and moral codes, with reference to the Italian concept of doppia morale (double morality), Paulo Heywood (2015: 201) shows that people can relate to a moral code “in such a way as to allow for the possibility of its betrayal under certain circumstances.”
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				<article-title>The selfie speaks a thousand words: Negotiating masculinity, intimacy, and sameness through the photograph in Pune</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>While the selfie has come to symbolize notions of selfhood in the age of social media, the photograph that has become a visual trope across the Facebook accounts of lower-middle-class young men in the western Indian city of Pune offers a different reading of online selfhood. In this article, I discuss the creation of a localized selfie—the “professional selfie”—in which young men stage their masculinity by engaging in a mimetic economy of exchanging characteristics with film heroes. In contrast to Susan Sontag’s () theorization of the intimate photograph, the professional selfie is devoid of interiority. Far from unaware of the camera in the manner described by Sontag, young men in Pune utilize the services of photographers to capture them at a distance and conceal their surroundings, thereby creating relations of social distance and distinction with their peers on Facebook.</p></abstract>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Indian artists are increasingly incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into their creative works. While their output shows the potential uses of AI for art, it also underscores its limitations and engages with common assumptions about what AI is. Drawing attention to the implications of AI for daily lives and its reliance on vast amounts of energy, their works point to the presence of AI as part of people’s lifeworlds and the way we share a planet with it. Taking a multispecies approach, this paper builds on extensive research among Indian artists and data scientists to propose a possible anthropological approach that centers on notions of cocreation and cohabitation with AI.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1182</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:36:36Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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			<metadata>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">698431</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/698431</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Beyond ethics: Conscience, pacifism, and the political in wartime Britain</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Beyond ethics: Conscience, pacifism, and the political in wartime Britain</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Kelly</surname>
						<given-names>Tobias</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Edinburgh</aff>
					<email>tkelly@exseed.ed.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>21</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2018</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date>
			<volume>8</volume>
			<issue seq="408">1-2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau8.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2018 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2018</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698431" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/pdf" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/698431/3125" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The central intervention of this article concerns the contingency of the relationship between ethics and politics. The empirical focus is Second World War Britain, where the refusal to fight was often framed as a conscientious objection. More broadly, one of the central propositions in the anthropology of ethics has been that ethics is ubiquitous. However, ethical practices—such as conscience—are not always prioritized in public life. It is not simply, for example, that we might have different ways of answering “how ought I to live?”, but that the question itself is not always thought to be socially significant. We therefore need to pay attention to how and why the question is posed, and what this means for who can speak and about what issues. As such, the paper argues that the valorization of conscience can reproduce forms of privilege.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>The central intervention of this article concerns the contingency of the relationship between ethics and politics. The empirical focus is Second World War Britain, where the refusal to fight was often framed as a conscientious objection. More broadly, one of the central propositions in the anthropology of ethics has been that ethics is ubiquitous. However, ethical practices—such as conscience—are not always prioritized in public life. It is not simply, for example, that we might have different ways of answering “how ought I to live?”, but that the question itself is not always thought to be socially significant. We therefore need to pay attention to how and why the question is posed, and what this means for who can speak and about what issues. As such, the paper argues that the valorization of conscience can reproduce forms of privilege.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>conscience, ethics, politics, dissent, liberalism, pacifism, war, Britain</kwd>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1758</identifier>
				<datestamp>2023-06-18T20:32:29Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1758</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/725341</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
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				<article-title>Ethnography as creative improvisation: Exploring methods in (post) pandemic times</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Svašek</surname>
						<given-names>Maruška</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>18</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2023</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="206">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1758" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1758/4112" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1758/4113" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article discusses the possibilities and limitations of digital creative methods developed by the author in response to lockdown and social distancing regulations. Building on prepandemic research, the analysis focuses on remote fieldwork in 2020 and 2021 with a small number of migrant women who live in Northern Ireland. It zooms in on three interlocutors and shows how long-distance painting, online walking interviews, and photo diaries have not only offered the opportunity for virtual “hanging out” and the development of long-term field relations, but have also been crucial to the visualization and discussion of emerging research themes. The main argument is that the three exploratory methods, used in this case to investigate the embodied experiences and aspirations of migrants during the ongoing pandemic, are potentially relevant to a wide range of pandemic and postpandemic research projects.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1229</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-11-09T16:49:15Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.2.024</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.2.024</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Recombiant analogism and naturalism</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Recombiant analogism and naturalism</trans-title>
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			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Feuchtwang</surname>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Comment on Kipnis, Andrew. “Governing the souls of Chinese modernity” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 217–238.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Comment on Kipnis, Andrew. “Governing the souls of Chinese modernity” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 217–238.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Recombinant analogism and naturalism






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Stephan Feuchtwang. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.024
MEDITATION
Recombinant analogism and naturalism
Stephan FEUCHTWANG, London School of Economics


Comment on Kipnis, Andrew. “Governing the souls of Chinese modernity” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (2): 217–238.


In his book on how the towns and villages of Zouping, in the eastern province of Shandong in China, became a small city, Andrew Kipnis (2016) describes the process of additive change and alteration as “recombinant,” a term he repeats here. He takes it from genetics and he means to keep from that analogy the idea that a new genetic chain, made out of elements old and new, or modified, becomes a program of reproduction of the present, from which further reproduction can of course also add and modify. The evolutionary analogy is reinforced in his argument with and inspiration by Philippe Descola’s distinction between analogism and naturalism, because analogism stands in the place of premodernity and naturalism in the place of modernity.
Descola’s scheme is evolutionary although without analogy to genetic modification, because in his universal scheme animist and totemic modes of identification come before but never precede the naturalist, only analogist modes do. So, not only is Andrew Kipnis still prone to the assumptions of the nature/culture divide, as he disarmingly avows despite having been convinced that he had got over it in his thinking, he is also prone to what Descola drives him and us to conclude: that human modes of identification present to us a universal history that ends with naturalism and modernity. Chinese modernity is just one case, with its own peculiarities, and if Kipnis is right, then any or all other transitions to modernity could combine analogical with naturalist modes of identification. That is the species being. The recombinant program he finds in China is a subspecies.[240]
Thinking ourselves into animist modes of identification, be they through the Achua via Descola or the Runa via Kohn, may rid us of universalizing the nature/culture divide. Via Kohn and the Avila Runa, we can think of nonhuman lives as selves with souls. But to do so doesn’t rid us of nature/culture becoming the telos of a universal history, whether or not you specify it as capitalism, imperialism, and postcolonialism, or as urbanization and industrialization, or the result of the scientific revolution.
Kipnis’ focus is on death rituals and in particular on the subject matter of souls, necessarily and helpfully distinguished from the more transient “spirits” of living humans. What are the souls of modernized humans, he asks, and answers that they are both analogical and naturalist. Yes, we can distinguish naturalist from analogical souls, but not definitively, since both ancestors and the Communist Party have souls.
Transformation from agrarian to industrial and urban living and settlement involves, everywhere, less land for burial, less face-to-face living with neighbors, more geographical mobility, smaller family households, greater individual income and aspirations and therefore some further individuation of our souls and their fate. But in the Chinese urban world it involves a continued but modified and diminished cult of ancestors, and in the People’s Republic of China it also involves the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party seeking to guide the processes of change and having its own soul. Just as it sought to control a demographic transition that might anyway have occurred, it tries to control the shortening and the changes in the nature of death rituals that might anyway have occurred. Those controls are, on Kipnis’ evidence, both prevalent and inadequate even in cities where state-registered “one-stop dragons” (as the providers of funeral arrangements call themselves) undertake nearly all funerals and disposal of ashes. As Kipnis puts it in this article, “Although these writings [by advocates of Party policy] suggest that modernity will bring about ritual change in itself, they also demand that the Party take the lead in guiding society through this modernization.” With reason. The way the market takes over and accedes to demands that might otherwise be condemned as unscientific and superstitious, the accommodation of forms of superstitious funerals, increasing signs of Mao’s deification, the elaborate funerals of the highest ranked, the way grief is politicized into grievance, all these exceed political control and have to be accommodated in those controls. Kipnis’ article describes all this wonderfully.
The Party is the source of ideological inspiration and then response to the hierarchies of status in urban dwelling, both for living residents and for the dead, in ranks of housing and burial class, placed in the hands of property developers and graveyard and funeral firms. They are equally wonderful demonstrations of how hegemonic ideology has worked through the market. But we must come back to the basic anthropological question.
What, for Kipnis, is the soul of naturalist or modern humans? It seems to be the human desire for the dead to have continuity as a fulfillment for their own wishes for continuity, as family or as fame, or status, however limited in its social scope. Soul is the name for that which lasts, bearing the aspiration for immortality. “Bodies are natural so they are mortal; but the souls of culture may be immortal. For the souls of culture to live on, they must be embodied by other humans,” writes [241]Kipnis. They have to be made immortal, just as they did in premodern times. What is modern is the element of choice and the substance of immortalization, a career (although that is close to the mastery of a trade or craft in the premodern), self-sacrifice for a family (ditto the premodern but its greater precarity in the modern context), or a belonging to a tradition (premodern), now a religion or a nation or an ethnicity.
In what way is this naturalist rather than just ontological in every mode of identification, including analogical? I think it is modern in the attenuated conditions of urban, mobile life, in which we live with strangers indifferent to our presence. Otherwise, the aspiration to ensure immortality of self, through an image created in ritual and in other practices of self-cultivation, individuated as a member of a category (such as a totemic group or just a human “us”) or a group (such as a family), seems to me to be a human universal. Only if you equate modernity with naturalism is it naturalist. In addition, to Kipnis via Descola, the immortalization of a human soul is analogical in China because offerings to the dead are like sacrifice and sacrifice is peculiar to analogical modes of identification, creating links between what Kipnis calls “singularities.”
At this point I have further difficulty accepting both Kipnis and Descola, as Kipnis registers in footnote 3. Death rituals in China have for millennia been the means of creating ancestors out of ghosts. The ritual offerings are not a way of connecting or ordering singularities, which is the premise of Descola’s claim that sacrifice is peculiar to analogism. Sacrificial offerings create what is then separated, connect to the separated (the rite is a form of identification), and then perform a separation from them, in this case ancestors but also ghosts, gods, and demons.
Missing from Kipnis’ investigations of death rituals is the condition of being forgotten, a ghost, which in every exposition I have heard and read is the primary condition, in the sense of the “already” effect of death. The prime importance of the death ritual is that it transforms not only the biography of a remembered person into a standardized eulogy but into a remembered, which is to say named, ancestor. Even the curtailed versions of death ritual offered by one-stop dragons do this. They create what is a blessing, an ancestor with descendants. The ancestor does not only have an effect, she or he is the effect—unlike a god, who is a past human who in death does affect the living, or a ghost who also affects the living and their effectivity is respectively petitioned or exorcised by ritual means. I fail to see how this is analogical, since the rites create what is then separated, or they petition or propitiate what has been separated, for a moment creating recognition by and with a deity or a ghost and then separating again. The rites do the identification, the creation, and the separation. They are neither naturalist nor analogical.
What might be thought to be typically analogical are the correlative schemes by which the day for a funeral is selected. In rural towns and villages, Daoist ritual experts or geomancers provide this service. Kipnis doesn’t say whether it is provided by the one-stop dragons or by someone they employ. In any case, urban life does not exclude this cosmology of correlation because it is still the means of fate calculation in consultations by, for instance, business people. Nor does it exclude ghosts. Robert Weller and Wu Keping (2017) have described diagnoses of illness as the work of ghosts in cities near Nanjing where Kipnis conducted fieldwork.[242]
The correlative schemata, systematically used in Hangzhou, near the Nanjing site of Kipnis’ investigations, have been described as homologism by William Matthews (2017), who points out that they are combined with theories of the universe in physics, meteorology, and other results of the scientific revolution as well as with the looser, less systematic references to parts of the same cosmology in traditional Chinese medicine or in deity worship. We might as well call them “analogism” but without the assumption of singularities as I have argued. But what the case of China’s accession to modernity and scientific naturalism undoubtedly shows us is a combination of more than one mode of identification with that of naturalism, as Kipnis points out.
On this at least we agree.

References
Feuchtwang, Stephan 2014. “Too Ontological, too rigid, too ahistorical but magnificent.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (3): 383–87.
Kipnis, Andrew. 2016. From village to city: Social transformation in a Chinese county seat. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Matthews, William. 2017. “Ontology with Chinese characteristics: Homology as a mode of identification.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 7 (1): 265–85.
Weller, Robert, and Wu Keping. 2017. “Overnight urbanization and religious change: Non-equilibrium ecosystems in southern Jiangsu.” Paper presented Enigma of Change and Continuity in China Conference, University of Cologne, July 2017.
 
Stephan FeuchtwangDepartment of AnthropologyLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceHoughton StreetLondon WC2A 2AEUnited KingdomS.Feuchtwang@lse.ac.uk
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2015 Nadia Fadil, Mayanthi Fernando</copyright-statement>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article critically examines recent calls by anthropologists to focus on what they call “everyday Islam.” We locate this new literature within two tensions central to anthropology: first, its dual commitment to humanity’s heterogeneity and commonality, and second, its dual imperative to account for dominant social structures and individual resistance. We argue that the concept of everyday Islam emphasizes one side of these paradigmatic debates, highlighting the universality of humans and emphasizing opposition to norms. We then take up the distinction this literature makes between everyday Muslims and Salafi Muslims. We suggest that a reinvestment in everyday Islam ends up discounting the validity, reality, and ontology of those framed as Salafi Muslims and invalidates ethnographic inquiry into ultra-orthodox Muslim life. Even as scholarship on everyday Islam attempts to expand the anthropology of Islam, then, it restricts the field instead by demarcating anthropology’s proper object of study in a very narrow way.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article critically examines recent calls by anthropologists to focus on what they call “everyday Islam.” We locate this new literature within two tensions central to anthropology: first, its dual commitment to humanity’s heterogeneity and commonality, and second, its dual imperative to account for dominant social structures and individual resistance. We argue that the concept of everyday Islam emphasizes one side of these paradigmatic debates, highlighting the universality of humans and emphasizing opposition to norms. We then take up the distinction this literature makes between everyday Muslims and Salafi Muslims. We suggest that a reinvestment in everyday Islam ends up discounting the validity, reality, and ontology of those framed as Salafi Muslims and invalidates ethnographic inquiry into ultra-orthodox Muslim life. Even as scholarship on everyday Islam attempts to expand the anthropology of Islam, then, it restricts the field instead by demarcating anthropology’s proper object of study in a very narrow way.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>Everyday Islam, anthropology of religion, ethics, alterity, Salafism</kwd>
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	<body><p>Rediscovering the “everyday” Muslim






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Nadia Fadil and Mayanthi Fernando. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.2.005
Rediscovering the “everyday” Muslim
Notes on an anthropological divide
Nadia FADIL, KU Leuven
Mayanthi FERNANDO, University of California, Santa Cruz


This article critically examines recent calls by anthropologists to focus on what they call “everyday Islam.” We locate this new literature within two tensions central to anthropology: first, its dual commitment to humanity’s heterogeneity and commonality, and second, its dual imperative to account for dominant social structures and individual resistance. We argue that the concept of everyday Islam emphasizes one side of these paradigmatic debates, highlighting the universality of humans and emphasizing opposition to norms. We then take up the distinction this literature makes between everyday Muslims and Salafi Muslims. We suggest that a reinvestment in everyday Islam ends up discounting the validity, reality, and ontology of those framed as Salafi Muslims and invalidates ethnographic inquiry into ultra-orthodox Muslim life. Even as scholarship on everyday Islam attempts to expand the anthropology of Islam, then, it restricts the field instead by demarcating anthropology’s proper object of study in a very narrow way.
Keywords: Everyday Islam, anthropology of religion, ethics, alterity, Salafism


Two central tensions lie at the heart of the anthropological endeavor. The first is between the desire, on the one hand, to delineate the multiple and heterogeneous ways in which human beings live and make sense of their lives, and, on the other hand, to underscore the commonalities and shared conditions of seemingly different life-worlds in order to define the human. The second tension is between, on the one hand, the imperative to identify powerful social structures and norms that mediate individuals and, on the other, the attempt to account for individual creativity, agency, and resistance. While these two underlying tensions have played out in [60]various ways throughout the modern history of the discipline,1 they seem to have found a new site of articulation in the contemporary anthropology of Islam.
Over the past two decades, Islamic revivalism, defined as the unprecedented worldwide engagement with exegetical texts and theological reasoning by Muslims untrained in traditional Islamic institutions, has become a major field within the anthropology of Islam. Dispensing with earlier modernist accounts that predicted the secularization of non-Western societies and pathologized the supposed Islamic exception,2 much of this literature has sought to make sense of the discourses and practices of revivalist Muslims from within the network of concepts on which these Muslims draw. In so doing, it has equally sought to dismantle a common set of binary oppositions—modernity and tradition, politics and religion, rational deliberation and religious discipline, autonomy and authority—that have long informed studies of the Muslim world. Recently, however, a growing number of scholars have begun to criticize this apparent overinvestment in Islamic revivalism and especially the focus on ethical self-cultivation through the inhabitation of Islamic norms, which, they argue, presents two major problems. First, these scholars hold, the focus on piety and Islamic norms constitutes a reductionist account that privileges religion at the expense of political, economic, and other structures mediating Muslim life. The second, related critique is that the focus on piety lacks complexity; what critics mean is that ethical self-cultivation is never a totalizing project, nor are its outcomes easily predictable. Rather, “struggle, ambivalence, incoherence, and failure must also receive attention in the study of everyday religiosity” (Osella and Soares 2010: 11). This call for complexity entails emphasizing the internal contradictions, ambiguities, and incoherences that inform the discourses and practices of ordinary Muslims, an approach framed as attending to “everyday religiosity” or “everyday Islam.”
Our essay is an attempt to think through this new investment in the “everyday” and grows out of our own experience as anthropologists of the Muslim world. We have noticed over the past few years a remarkable uptick in panels, conferences, articles, and edited collections in Europe and the United States that bear the title of “everyday Islam,” such as a 2014 online curated collection with that very title by Cultural Anthropology,3 a forthcoming issue of Ethnologie Française on “everyday aspects” of Muslim life, the edited volume Ordinary lives and grand schemes: An anthropology of everyday religion (Schielke and Debevec 2012b), and the already cited Islam, politics, anthropology by Filippo Osella and Benjamin Soares (2010), [61]which emerged from a 2009 special issue of the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Rather than simply dismiss this framing, we wish to take it as the starting point for a deeper conversation about a number of important questions raised by this literature on the everyday, questions we believe are central not only to the anthropology of Islam but to anthropology itself. Indeed, the global Islamic revival and the growing public visibility of Islam in the West has generated a great deal of debate in academia and beyond, with significant analytical, epistemological, and methodological implications for the discipline of anthropology, and especially for the study of religion and ethics. “Ordinary” or “everyday” ethics4 has become a site of anthropological attention (including within this journal) and much of that work engages with the seminal contributions from anthropologists of Islam like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad, even if to refute them.5 Michael Lambek (2012), for instance, has insisted on the need to locate ethics outside the religious domain; James Laidlaw (2014) has called for highlighting the complexities and contradictions intrinsic to ethical deliberation; and Michael Lempert (2013, 2014) has cautioned against any easy locatability or immanence of ethics, including in the everyday.
This turn to ordinary ethics has found its translation in the anthropology of Islam through the idea of everyday Islam. Our essay is therefore an implicit engagement with the aforementioned literature on everyday ethics, although we are less interested here in the second term of this pairing (“ethics”) than in the first (“everyday”). Our aim is not to theorize what ordinary or everyday ethics mean to us, but rather to interrogate the underlying assumptions and resulting effects of framing certain phenomena as “everyday.” We will argue throughout this article that the concept of the everyday, and the way in which it has been recuperated within the anthropology of Islam, seems to emphasize one side of the paradigmatic agency/power and unity/diversity debates within anthropology, reiterating human creativity against the weight of norms and highlighting the universally shared conditions of the human subject. We suggest, moreover, that beyond merely rearticulating a commitment to agency and human unity, the turn to everyday Islam has (sometimes unintended) conceptually, methodologically, and politically problematic effects. Calls for a reinvestment in the “everyday” or “actual” lives of Muslims explicitly or implicitly mark revivalist or pious Muslims as exceptional and, more insidiously, not “real.” As a consequence, this new scholarship discounts certain forms of Muslim life, invalidates anthropological inquiry into those ways of being Muslim, and redefines anthropology’s proper object of study in a very particular way. In other words, even as this scholarship attempts to expand the anthropology of Islam, it significantly narrows the field instead. In pursuing this line of analysis, we seek not only to understand how a tacit attachment to a set of secular-liberal sensibilities and norms underpins a profound political and affective discomfort [62]with (certain tendencies within) Islamic revivalism but also how social-scientific narratives—in this case a commitment to the everyday—can play a crucial role in adjudicating the ontological truthfulness, authenticity, and, ultimately, humanness, of various life-worlds.

Islamic piety and everyday ethics
Starting in the 1980s, the anthropology of Islam began to focus on revivalist tendencies in various parts of the Muslim world. Much of this research initially emerged to account for why Muslim societies were not fulfilling modernist expectations of increasing secularization and decreasing religiosity. For some analysts, Islamic revivalism indicated Islam’s theological incommensurability with secular modernity (Gellner 1992). Others insisted on the failed promise of modernity and the limited capacities of newly established nation states in the Arab world for economic and political integration after independence (Kepel 2012). These studies were soon replaced by works that problematized such a one-dimensional understanding of the routes modernization might take, and especially the notion that modernization would necessarily entail secularization. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori’s influential Muslim politics (1996), for example, argued that revivalist tendencies do not signal a rupture with modernization so much as represent an instantiation of it, and that what often passes as a return to tradition is, in fact, a complex articulation of modernization. Rejecting the well-established polarity between modernity and religion, this scholarship found that postcolonial, modernist transformations, including mass media and mass education, facilitated rather than prevented various forms of Islamic revivalism.6
Taking a somewhat different approach to the relationship between tradition and modernity, but with a similar commitment to make sense of Muslim subjectivities from an emic perspective, and drawing on Talal Asad’s (1986b) framework of Islam as an always evolving discursive tradition, other studies began to demonstrate how processes of modernization enabled the renewed cultivation of older, “traditional” ethical sensibilities and authoritative practices (Agrama 2012; Hirschkind 2006; Mahmood 2005; Salvatore 2007).7 It is against this approach that much of the new literature on everyday Islam positions itself, so it seems worthwhile to sketch some of the former’s core interventions using two exemplary texts: Saba Mahmood’s Politics of piety (2005) and Charles Hirschkind’s The ethical soundscape (2006). Both [63]are ethnographic studies of the ethical engagements and daily struggles of ordinary pious Muslims in Cairo. While Mahmood’s work concerns pious women who participate in mosque study groups, Hirschkind’s looks at male city dwellers who rely on audio cassette sermons in their projects of ethical self-reform. Mahmood and Hirschkind argue that through various practices of ethical self-cultivation—which they understand as bodily practices of self-discipline aimed at restructuring a set of moral, sensorial, and affective dispositions in accordance with authoritative Islamic norms—their interlocutors remake themselves into virtuous Muslim subjects. Although Mahmood and Hirschkind do not use the everyday as an analytical frame, they detail the daily ruminations, conversations, and difficulties these women and men encounter in their ethical journeys and demonstrate how these are informed by a constant engagement with the Islamic tradition. Indeed, everyday life presents a series of challenges that require ethical decision-making: should one meet a colleague in a café that serves alcohol? Should a woman alone ride in a taxi with a male driver? Should one got to a mosque study group one’s husband is firmly against it? These are all questions that pertain to piety as much as they do to the domain of the everyday. They are also all questions that are usually answered through some reference to Islamic authority, to the exegetical tradition and, ultimately, to the Quran and the Sunna.8 This does not mean that these kinds of ethical questions are easily answerable via a “literalist” reading of the sources and without debate, or that ethical action is simply a question of following the rules. Rather, it means that the opposition between piety and the everyday—and the concomitant opposition between textual norm and individual practice—is untenable.
Consequently, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s monographs engage with the broader anthropological study of ethics and religion. Recent work has defined ethics as an essential condition of everyday life and of the human (Das 2010, 2012; Lambek 2010b). This scholarship has tried to reconfigure older debates on ethics by showing how ethical considerations are an intrinsic part of everyday life and do not necessarily rely on moral (or religious) frameworks. While Mahmood and Hirschkind similarly problematize any differentiation or temporal suspension between ethics and everyday life by showing how ethical commitment is at once deeply political, societal, and individual, they also refute the notion of an immanent ethical realm, and therefore any stark distinction between the domain of “religion” and that of the “everyday.”9 This remains a crucial point of differentiation within the scholarship on ordinary ethics. In contrast to those scholars—including scholars [64]of the Muslim world—who posit a strong distinction between ethics and religion and seem invested in emphasizing that people behave ethically outside the domain of religion and without reference to explicit moral norms (e.g., Al-Mohammad 2012; Al-Mohammad and Peluso 2012; George 2009), Mahmood and Hirschkind argue that conduct becomes ethical to the extent that it is situated—by the implicit or explicit intentions of the actors themselves—within a broader moral horizon such that ethical practice is constantly self-transformative.10 This latter approach has been influential in shaping new directions in the anthropology of religion in general, and of Islam in particular. A number of recent studies have attended to the way individuals constantly make and remake themselves into what they consider good Muslims through ordinary actions (Deeb and Harb 2013; Fernando 2014; Jacobsen 2011; Jouili 2015). While these actions (like not getting angry at a sibling or being kind to one’s neighbors) are not immediately recognizable as “religious” (unlike, say, wearing a headscarf or praying five times a day) they are nonetheless fundamental to the kind of ethical subjectivity many Muslims attempt to cultivate in themselves.
Finally, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s work on ethics, in conjunction with their de-naturalization of the conventions of secular thought and praxis, paved the way for new scholarship that has sought to unravel how liberalism and secularism—and not just Islam—operate as moral fields enacted through everyday practices. For instance, our own scholarship has turned to the secular as a site of specific norms with attendant forms of ethical self-cultivation. We have argued that, like various forms of religiosity, secularity too includes a range of ethical, social, physical, and sexual dispositions, hence the need to apprehend the secular via its sensorial, aesthetic, and embodied dispositions and not only its political ones.11 In other words, by radically provincializing secular concepts, categories, [65]and attachments, Mahmood’s and Hirschkind’s work—and that of Asad (1993, 2003) before them—enabled scholars to make secularism and secularity not just the background condition of their intellectual work but instead an object of observation and analysis.
Such epistemological volte-faces have a long history in anthropology. Yet this ethnographic attention to pious self-cultivation, the critical analysis of the relationship between morality and ethics, and the provincialization of secular norms and values have provoked an antagonistic reaction—sometimes quite vociferous— among a number of scholars within and outside the discipline of anthropology.12 The turn to everyday Islam is part of this reaction. The following sections therefore attend to key texts and key claims in this turn. Our aim is not necessarily to invalidate this work or even its critiques of the (over) focus on Islamic piety.13 Rather, we seek to understand the scholarly as well as the moral-political purchase of this explicit turn to the everyday. In sum, we are interested in why “everyday Islam” has become such a popular analytical framework for so many anthropologists of Islam.14 We are particularly puzzled by the opposition between piety and the everyday posited by much of this literature since, as we made clear above, everyday practice and ordinary Muslims are a central part of the earlier scholarship on Islamic piety and ethics. We want to suggest that the everyday acts here less as an empirical site of observation than a normative frame that enables the restoration of a conceptualization of agency primarily understood as creative resistance to (religious) norms. It is to that argument we now turn.


Practices of everyday resistance
The notion of the everyday has long been central to anthropology as one of the most privileged sites of analysis to examine the “imponderabilia of actual life,” to [66]cite Bronislaw Malinowski’s well-known phrasing (1922: 18).15 This concept, together with its twin “the ordinary” (Lambek 2010a; Stewart 2007), have anchored attempts to understand the vicissitudes of large-scale structures by examining their enactments in daily speech and practice.16 Ranging from Irving Goffman’s seminal Presentation of the self in everyday life (1959), which examines the different frames individuals use to locate and construct themselves as social subjects, to Henri Lefebvre’s Critique de la vie quotidienne (1958), which calls for a de-familiarization of the everyday, the everyday has been understood as a space of contradictions that help us unravel the ways in which social structures or systems are materialized or contested (or both). A structural tension therefore animates the analytical focus on micropractices: while the concept of the everyday seeks to understand the operation of power, it does so by accounting for its mutability through daily iterations.
Michel de Certeau’s The practice of everyday life (2011) remains one of the most popular and influential illustrations of such an approach. There, de Certeau attends to the creative poetics of the “common man” in his patterns of consumption, offering a microanalysis of the operation of power in its daily enactments and renegotiations. At the same time, for de Certeau, strategies of everyday resistance to power rely on existing (though nondominant) repertoires of action, such as folktales, myths, epic legends, and games. De Certeau’s account of the everyday thereby foregrounds creativity and resistance while simultaneously inscribing them within, rather than dislocating them from, existing norms and values. Rather than opposing agency to power, de Certeau reconceptualizes agency as a tactical deployment of power. Lila Abu-Lughod’s Veiled sentiments (2000), a powerful ethnography of everyday Bedouin life in Egypt, is another example of this approach. Abu-Lughod traces how Bedouins use poems to articulate sentiments of vulnerability otherwise impermissible within the honor-driven moral framework of ordinary social life. Rather than posit moral discourse as the site of powerful social rules and Bedouin poetic expression as the site of agentive, creative resistance to them, Abu-Lughod underscores how poetry is also a social convention, a “cultural repertoire” of sentiments and actions (180). She thereby reads the situation as one in which moral discourse and poetry constitute two competing social conventions within which Bedouins are produced as subjects, rather than as one convention (morality) constraining the human spirit (expressed in poetry). And, importantly, Abu-Lughod does not portray Bedouins as contradictory or incoherent subjects. Instead, through [67]careful attention to the networks of concepts that underpin the honor code and poetry, she tries “to explain the logic of the system [as a whole]” (xxi). In a more recent ethnography that follows Abu-Lughod’s lead, Lara Deeb and Mona Harb examine how Shi’ite Muslims in southern Beirut draw on multiple moral rubrics to create new modes of pious leisure. They describe a “complex moral landscape” (2013: 10) within which young people “who don’t view their lives as necessarily bifurcated [between religious norms and everyday leisure] . . . are striving to bring fun and faith together in ways they feel are more compatible—striving for a greater level of consistency in their lives across these dimensions” (32).
Although Deeb and Harb do not explicitly foreground the everyday as an analytic, other recent anthropological works have been more explicit in invoking the everyday. Samuli Schielke stands out as an influential proponent of this turn to everyday Islam, and his essay “Being good in Ramadan” (2009), on the experiences and daily practices of “ordinary Muslims” in a northern Egyptian fishing village during the month of Ramadan, is often cited by other scholars as an analytical touchstone.17 While Schielke has since published a more expansive monograph (Schielke 2015), we mostly focus on the essay here because it concisely represents both the major claims and attendant pitfalls of the turn to everyday Islam. In his essay, Schielke describes Ramadan as a time not only for fasting and praying but also for festive forms of sociality and fun, like football. Although “there is a general sense of increased social, moral, and pious commitment during Ramadan,” he writes, such a “focus on reward and piety” is temporally exceptional (2009: S26–27). Daily fasting is followed by nightly entertainment and conspicuous consumption. Moreover, the month itself stands apart from the rest of the year: Ramadan is a “time of exceptional morality that, by its nature, will last only as long as Ramadan lasts . . . and this exceptional nature indirectly legitimizes less consistent approaches to religion and morality for the rest of the year” (2015: 50). As Schielke explains, “This is a highly utilitarian understanding of religion that implicitly allows Ramadan to be established as a moral and pious exception from not so perfect everyday life. If Ramadan is a time of exceptional reward when God forgives one’s previous sins, one may commit some sins and slip a little from one’s obligations during the rest of the year” (2009: S28).18 Thus, Schielke concludes, “The ways in which most people [68]practice Ramadan do not require an ethical subjectivity that aims at the perfection of a purified, God-fearing self capable of keeping right and wrong clearly apart” (2009: S28). Indeed, Schielke takes explicit issue with the recent focus on Muslim piety and what he considers the “problematic tendency to privilege the aim of ethical perfection” (2009: S35). Rather than aiming for ethical perfection, he contends, his Muslim interlocutors usually contradicted or evaded strict moral norms: when the holy month ends with the feast of ’id al-fitr, the same young men who pray and fast during Ramadan go back to smoking hashish, watching porn, and sexually harassing women in public parks and promenades (2009: S29). He therefore argues that ethnographic focus should be redirected toward the “ambivalent nature of most moral subjectivities,” and to “conflicts, ambiguities, double standards, fractures and shifts” (2009: S38). Doing so enables the analyst to understand better how religious norms operate on a day-to-day basis, an approach Schielke frames as attending to the distinction between “grand schemes” and “the actual paths people take” (2015: 127).
Schielke’s emphasis on ambivalence, ambiguity, and contradiction echoes other scholarship that similarly seeks to underline the complexities of Muslims’ everyday religiosity. Liza Debevec, for example, writes on “moderate” Muslims in Burkina Faso who, although they recognize the importance of salat (daily prayer) for their religious practice, nonetheless postpone these salat until a later stage of their lives. Like Schielke, Debevec wants to complicate prevailing accounts of piety by taking into account not only moments in which explicit moral aims are realized but also those in which they fail to take hold: “The demand that Muslims must pray regularly, and the discussion about how to do it properly, is part of everyday religious life just as much as the claim to postponing piety until a more appropriate moment is” (2012: 35). Other scholars write in similar terms of the “critical engagement” Muslims have with the norms by which they seek to abide (de Jorio 2010: 92), of the moments of doubt that are as integral as moments of faith to Muslims’ lives (Aishima and Salvatore 2010), of “internecine tensions and ambivalences” that underpin pious discourse (Huq 2010: 165), or the “experience of uncertainty, tension, and anxiety” that accompany the ritual performance of prayer (Simon 2009: 270). In so doing, they underscore how Muslims’ ethical and moral lives are marked by fracture and failure, inconsistency and incoherence. And attention to these “everyday experiences” remains essential, these scholars argue, for a comprehensive understanding of the complex relationship Muslims hold to religious norms and the contradictory desires that persistently animate Muslim subjects.
Part of showing that Muslims are not saturated by normative religious requirements entails highlighting the agency of ordinary Muslims. Consider, for instance, Magnus Marsden’s (2005, 2010) ethnography of Chitrali Muslims in northern Pakistan. In an article on the touring practices of young Chitrali men who traverse the local countryside, Marsden regards these tours as an escape from or resistance to doxic social norms: “Chitrali tours are an everyday social practice that are often purposefully deployed by people—albeit temporarily—to distance themselves from the concerns of sectarian difference and status distinction that permeate everyday village life” (2010: 66). Moreover, in contradistinction to village life, these tours offer Chitralis a space for creativity and critical reflection:

Chitrali touring . . . cultivates a modality of understanding and perceiving the wider world founded not on the active cultivation of embodied ethical dispositions but in the appreciation of a mindful, if often sceptical, curiosity about heterogeneity. . . . In spite of the pressures placed upon Chitrali Muslims to conform to Islamic doctrinal standards, during the course of their tours Chitralis expect one another to question, to reflect upon, and interrogate the conditions of their everyday lives. (68)

Touring is a temporary tactic against social convention. Marsden’s article draws on his monograph Living Islam (2005), which is driven by an explicit desire to show that Chitrali Muslims lead “intellectually vibrant and emotionally significant lives” (1), and there he expands on the critical engagements his interlocutors have with revivalist tendencies in the region. They do so not only through intellectual arguments but also through poetry, dance, and musical performances, as well as through esoteric customs like amulet-wearing, all of which reformist trends consider illegitimate. Practices like touring, poetry, music, and dance, Marsden argues, are based on an appreciation of skepticism, self-reflection, heterogeneity, wit, irony, and humor, all values that he posits against social convention and the homogeneity cultivated by revivalist Islam.
The different contributions sketched above present the everyday as a site of creativity, individuality, and transgression, a space in which Muslims negotiate and, importantly, contest the normative requirements to which they are subjected by enacting a set of alternative desires. Everyday practices thereby appear as moments of disruption, of not conforming to religious norms. But this invocation of the everyday as only a site of contingency or resistance can lead to an oppositional distinction between domains that are saturated by power and social conventions (Islamic doctrine and morality) and those that are not (everyday practices). Consider, again, Marsden’s ethnography of Chitrali touring. “Chitral’s landscape,” he writes, “is injected with abstract religious concepts that posit the possibility of experiences of moral, selfless, and devotional-like feelings of love to one’s beloved—human or divine” (2010: 61). He continues: “Abstract and Sufi-derived conceptions of other-worldly love sit jaggedly alongside feelings of lust, desire, and love that are widely considered as being illicit” (62). For Marsden, religion (as a moral discourse) occupies the space of conceptual abstraction, while the everyday is constituted by sensibility and affect, by experience and feeling unmediated by discourse. Such an understanding posits the individual as separate from power and processes of socialization, bifurcating discourses and norms from the raw experiences of the subject. This approach neglects the ways in which individual experiences and actions, even those that transgress dominant norms, are always produced within and mediated by discursive norms and power relations. After all, rather than only an escape from custom or village tradition, touring could equally be viewed as a social convention, a tradition of sorts, especially given that “Chitralis talk about tours as providing complex opportunities to hone their capacity to enact and cultivate diverse modes of sociality and moral, aesthetic, and intellectual sensibilities” (55). Indeed, touring, like musical performance and poetry, seem to be standard practices of subjectivation, central to learning how to be a proper Chitrali male. Instead of a temporary escape from norms, [70]then, as Marsden argues, touring, music, and poetry seem to be as integral to normative Chitrali social structure as Islamist morality and village social conventions.
The opposition between social/moral norm and individual agent upheld here parallels an opposition between religion and other societal domains assimilated to the everyday (like love or family). Islamic traditions and normative discourses are posited as an abstract, otherworldly moral system, in contradistinction to everyday practices that often contradict or do not live up to the values of that system. Recall Marsden’s description of Chitral’s landscape as “injected with abstract religious concepts” that “sit jaggedly alongside feelings of lust, desire, and love” (2010: 61). Marsden never explains why these concepts are abstract rather than real, especially since Chitralis clearly seek to live and experience them. Regardless, religion here occupies the space of the abstract and otherworldly, while lust, desire, and love exist in the real, the everyday. Debevec understands her interlocutors’ continual deferral of salat in similar terms: “The conflict which people try to postpone could also be understood as a conflict between the real and the ideal world of the people of Bobo Dioulasso” (2012: 45). The distinction between the ideal and the real, the abstract and the everyday is an attempt to “account for the complex duality of religion as an everyday practice and a normative doctrine” (Schielke and Debevec 2012a: 1) and to correct the emphasis on “normative doctrines as the primary field of religion” by attending to how people “actually live religious lives” (2). Marsden, Debevec, and other like-minded scholars therefore foreground what they see as a tension between what people say (their ostensible commitment to moral rules or “grand schemes”) and what they “actually” do. As a result, they are critical of anthropologists of ethics who “focus on the declared aim of pious discipline rather than its actual outcome” (Schielke 2009: S24). Schielke’s reference to “actual outcome” is telling in that it reveals a broader approach: any gap between moral rules and “actual” practices is seen as evidence of the inefficacy, failure, or rejection of Islamic norms, rather than as an indication of the complex ways in which those norms are lived and enacted, a view that only confirms the distinction between a moral system and individual agents who exist outside that system. While it is certainly important to attend to the everyday practice of religious life, the scholars examined here end up simply inverting what Schielke and Debevec call the “hierarchy of a primary and secondary field of religion” (Schielke and Debevec 2012a: 2). By privileging “everyday practice” over “normative doctrine,” a strict distinction between those two domains is reiterated, reproducing Robert Redfield’s (1956) distinction between great and little traditions and Ernest Gellner’s (1981) differentiation between high and folk Islam. In fact, these scholars do more than reiterate these classical distinctions: they also conceptualize normative doctrine and everyday practice as unconnected and, indeed, as opposed. Yet the fact that a commitment to a particular norm is often imperfectly achieved does not refute the importance attached to that norm. The need to work with, through, or against other inclinations remains central to any ethical commitment. The efficacy of norms is not only determined by their realization but also by conscious and unconscious discursive and affective attachments to them, irrespective of one’s “actual” practices. The fact that Schielke’s interlocutors watch porn does not imply that they do not define such conduct as morally wrong. It is by considering the complex discursive and affective attachments one holds to religious prescriptions and practices, and not only the extent to which they [71]are being realized, that one can have a full grasp of their weight and impact on an individual.19
In the aforementioned articulations of everyday Islam, however, religion emerges as a set of abstract rules that are lived very differently “on the ground,” that is, within the realm of the real, the human, the everyday. This split produces contradictory conceptual and methodological effects for the study of religion: on the one hand, religion stands outside individual conduct as a set of abstract doctrinal rules demarcated in texts and by religious authorities; on the other, “real” religion is found precisely in individual, everyday conduct recorded by the ethnographer. The analyst’s role consequently becomes one of accounting for the ambiguities and contradictions of Muslims’ ethical journeys, and of giving voice and legitimacy to these seemingly repressed realities resulting from the impossible demands made by religion. One finds such an approach in the work of Debevec (2012), who offers an otherwise compelling account of the practice of postponing prayer until later in life. Her essay traces the different reasons her interlocutors give to account for this “failure” to practice correctly, which range from demonic temptations to the absence of a stable and settled life. However, while her own interlocutors understand the practice of postponing prayer as an effect of their spiritual or social weaknesses, Debevec appears reluctant to accept her interlocutors’ own explanation—one might even call it resolution—of this “contradiction.” She prefers, rather, to regard it as a tactical move—an act of conscious or unconscious agency—that helps her interlocutors negotiate “the very strict and detailed prescriptions of a proper life as a Muslim” (2012: 44).20 Postponing prayer, she writes, is “a successful solution to the potential conflict of pious ideals and a complex life” (2012: 45). Debevec seems analytically committed to restoring the agency of her Muslim interlocutors, whose religiosity might be seen as questionable in the eyes of preachers and purists (see also Debevec 2013: 231).
In the case of Schielke’s article on Ramadan, we witness little effort to account for the ways his interlocutors conceive of their ambivalent relationship to, and nonfulfillment of, moral norms. The reader gets little sense of how, for example, the young men who fast during Ramadan and watch porn during the rest of the year explain this seemingly discrepancy. How do these men negotiate their competing desires? How do they make sense of or resolve for themselves what Schielke sees as contradictory behavior? Even when his interlocutors do try to explain their comportment, Schielke seems to reject their explanations. He gives us the example of Mustafa, a former Salafi who “now regularly shaves, has returned to smoking, prays irregularly, and maintains contact with female friends in a way in which Salafis would consider unacceptable” (2009: S33). Mustafa himself sees his behavior as a temporary suspension of piety and hopes to return to a more pious lifestyle eventually. He is not ambivalent about or uncommitted to the ideal of piety; rather, he has a sense of past, present, and future, and he understands his comportment in the present in orientation to a more perfect but deferred future of more rigorous practice. Schielke, however, reads Mustafa’s trajectory as a transition from “commitment to ambivalence,” an example of “everyday lives loaded with ambiguities and contradictions” (S33).21 The absence of an emic accounting makes the framework of contradiction and ambivalence seem external, unrecognized as such by “everyday Muslims” themselves.
This positions the analyst as someone who not only records tensions and conflicts that might arise from conflicting demands but also resolves some of these tensions by turning any discrepancy between norm and practice into either a tactic demarcating human agency (in the case of Debevec) or a sign of the consistent opposition between moral norm and individual behavior (in the case of Schielke). Either way, religious norms and everyday practices emerge as distinct realms, one a space of abstract rules that are impossible to realize fully and the other a space of complexity and “actual” human conduct, where agency and choice are enacted in opposition to (religious) norms. Within this binary, the analyst emerges as the voice of authority who can in some cases even objectively determine the truth of her interlocutors better than they can. Schielke’s claim that Ramadan is objectively a time of exceptional morality, for example, relies on ignoring “religious authorities and ordinary citizens” who “argue that Ramadan should be a time of spirituality and moral cultivation that helps create a committed Muslim personality and [73]society free of vices and unnecessary spending, oriented toward individual and collective self-improvement” (2015: 50). In other words, he mentions only in passing a very different Muslim understanding of Ramadan, then dismisses this perspective in the very next sentence. At the same time, part of the reason there seems no need to explore ethnographically how one’s interlocutors might make sense of the discrepancy between moral ideal and actual practice—what many of these anthropologists understand as contradiction, ambivalence, and ambiguity—is that this discrepancy seems natural (a point we will elaborate in the next section). If fasting, praying, and sexual abstinence are forms of exceptional behavior that occupy the realm of religion, then playing football, watching porn, smoking, and praying irregularly are forms of “everyday” practice that do not need to be explained or theorized beyond marking, first, their empirical facticity and, second, their status as conduct that implicitly and explicitly resists doctrinal norms and thereby signals the creativity, critical spirit, and agency of the human being.
Our disagreement with this approach, one that posits a distinction between norms and individual agents and between religion and the everyday, replays an older debate in anthropology between proponents of practice theory and poststructuralist critics. In an essay representative of the former group, Sherry Ortner calls on anthropologists to “see people not simply as passive reactors to and enactors of some ’system,’ but as active agents and subjects in their own history” (1984: 143), and to focus not on “the hidden hand of structure” but rather on “real people doing real things” (144). In response, Jane F. Collier and Sylvia J. Yanagisako point out that “an emphasis on agency, strategy, and the interest of individuals in practice approaches can easily lead to an implicit opposition between the ’practical’ and the ’symbolic.’ Such a scheme overlooks the fact that people’s ’practical’ concerns and strategies are as culturally constructed as so-called ’symbolic’ ones” (1989: 30). Moreover, they argue, the distinction between the “symbolic” (or structural/normative) and “practical” makes nonsymbolic practices ostensibly transparent: “They are simply what they are” (31). This has a number of effects: “when we define certain actions as symbolic, we risk setting ourselves the task of ferreting out the ’true’ meaning of these actions,” with the concomitant presumption that “actions not labeled as symbolic have obvious—i.e., pragmatic and equally familiar—aims” (31). As Michelle Rosaldo once observed, by “’separating out the symbolic from the everyday, anthropologists quickly come upon such ’universal’ facts as correspond to their assumptions’” (quoted in Collier and Yanagisako 1989: 31). Rosaldo’s and Collier and Yanagisako’s critiques apply, we find, to much of the anthropology of everyday Islam and its understanding of what constitutes the real and the universal. Although this anthropology explicitly aims to counterbalance scholarship it finds overdetermined by a focus on norms, it draws on a set of universalizing claims about what constitutes the everyday by relying on a tacit distinction between, on the one hand, exceptional or extra-ordinary subjects who have a strong commitment to religious norms (usually labeled “Salafis”) and, on the other, “ordinary” or “everyday” Muslims who do not.
The everyday Muslim thus emerges as a familiar figure, one whose behavior does not need to be explained and who, in her ambivalent, critical, and even contestatory relationship to Islamic norms, seems very much like the mostly secularhumanist analysts who study the Muslim world. Even those anthropologists not [74]invested in liberal-humanist conceptions of religion as a set of abstract norms, or of agency as the active resistance to norms,22 or even of the everyday as the site of the “real,” seem to invoke this figure when they deploy the everyday as an analytical frame. Naveeda Khan (2006, 2012), for example, posits the everyday as a paradigmatic site of skepticism, ambiguity, and uncertainty; Veena Das (2010) sees it as a site of encounter and unexpected possibility; Amira Mittermaier, for her part, writes of the “experience of contingency and vulnerability that marks much of everyday life” (2012: 260). The everyday thereby emerges as a space in which norms fail to take hold rather than are (also) reiterated. In these different accounts, then, the everyday becomes not only an analytical frame but also a normative one: as a space characterized by friction, contestation, uncertainty, and subversion, the everyday stands as a recuperative site of humanist possibility. Concomitantly, the everyday Muslim emerges as a familiar humanist subject who looks very much like her anthropologist interlocutor.
In the particular geopolitical context in which we write, it may make sense to insist on such similitude, one that incorporates Muslims “others” into the realm of the human. Yet this insistence on sameness via the paradigm of the everyday comes at a cost, namely, the banishment of the exceptional or extra-ordinary Muslim—the pious Salafi—not just from the realm of the everyday but also, concomitantly, from the realm of the human. It is to this process that we now turn.


The impossibility of the “Salafi” Muslim
In the previous section, we attended to the opposition between social/moral norm and individual agent at the heart of this turn to everyday Islam. We did so not simply because we have a number of theoretical disagreements with this approach but more importantly because we see in this differentiation a tendency to naturalize certain comportments as both valuable and fundamentally human, and, as a result, to determine the ontological status of different forms of Muslim life.23 Put another way, the paradigm of the everyday operates here as a normative modality of ontological differentiation, distinguishing between real and unreal (or impossible) ways of being.
As part of their critique of the ostensible overfocus on pious self-cultivation, Osella and Soares offer the concept of islam mondain, which they translate as “Islam in the present world.” As they note, “Islam mondain does not privilege Islam over anything else, emphasizing instead the actual world in which Muslims find themselves” (2010: 12). It is not clear how Islam could be anything but lived in the [75]actual world. Nevertheless, Islamic traditions—the focus of scholarship on piety against which they propose islam mondain—do not, it would seem, constitute the actual world in which Muslims live. For Osella and Soares, there is little sense that actively cultivated piety might be a response to, and therefore part of, the “actual world in which Muslims find themselves.” This framework is dangerously close to the common secular critique that ultraorthodox or “Salafi”24 Muslims are, as is often put, “living in the Middle Ages,” that is, mistaking one epoch for another. It is also related to the conception of religion at work in the anthropology of everyday Islam discussed earlier, whereby religion (in this case Islam) exists outside real space and time as otherworldly and abstract, to use Marsden’s terminology.
What, then, constitutes the real, actual world, the space and time of the everyday? Osella and Soares lay out a series of revealing oppositions in articulating the difference between what they call the “’piety’ turn” (2010: 10) and the kind of anthropological analysis (captured by the term islam mondain) found in their coedited volume. Referring to Schielke’s essay on Ramadan, they write that in contrast to “some studies [that] over-privilege the coherence and disciplinary power of Islam . . . we learn here about the ambiguities in young Egyptian men’s lives and everyday practice, with all its contradictions and imperfections” (12). If the earlier studies emphasize certainty, they continue, their volume’s contributors focus on doubt. Where the piety turn focuses on “the active cultivation of embodied ethical dispositions,” the anthropology of everyday Islam attends to practices that foster “the appreciation of a mindful, if often sceptical, curiosity about heterogeneity,” and to Muslims who are “reflexive and outspoken on religious matters” (13). Thus certain sensibilities and attitudes—curiosity, self-reflection, ambiguity, contradiction, imperfection, doubt, skepticism—constitute the domain of the everyday, of the real or actual world. Osella and Soares (2010) and Marsden (2010) explicitly state that they are not grafting “liberal secular standards onto unsuspecting nonliberal subjects” (Marsden 2010: 68), and that these values emerge from and are just as germane to non-Western cultural traditions. We do not disagree. We are nonetheless struck by how the sensibilities and attitudes that comprise the everyday— the domain of the real—are precisely those sensibilities and attitudes most valued by the secular-humanist tradition. If one of the goals of these anthropologists is to dismantle the ontological exceptionalism often ascribed to Muslims by the secular West (an exceptionalism they believe is reiterated by scholars of Islamic piety), the reincorporation of Muslims into the realm of the ordinary hinges on showing how Muslims—or at least “everyday Muslims”—cultivate and celebrate values that are deeply familiar to secular sensibilities.
Those values, sensibilities, and attitudes are not just universalized but also naturalized as the normal state of human nature—a naturalization that contradicts these anthropologists’ explicit calls to account for the diversity of Muslim life and results in an ontological differentiation between what counts as real and what is [76]unreal or exceptional. Consider, once again, Schielke’s article on Ramadan, which, he argues, is an exceptional period of reinforced ethical commitment that enables a more flexible relationship to religious norms during the rest of the year. Ramadan, he writes

is a time of exceptional morality [that] demonstrates and enforces the supremacy of God’s commands by constituting a time in which morality is not situational but strict and in which religious obligations must be fulfilled. But in the end it is precisely the temporary rigor of the holy month that establishes and legitimizes the flexible nature of norms and ethics for the rest of the year. (Schielke 2009: S28)

Schielke here opposes the exceptional time of Ramadan, when moral rules are obeyed, to the time of everyday religiosity or everyday practice—the rest of the year—when morality is not strict but situational, religious obligations are not fulfilled, and individuals’ relationships to norms and ethics are flexible in nature. But the conceptual/methodological contradiction elaborated earlier—i.e., that religion is defined as, on the one hand, abstract moral rules and, on the other, individual practice unrelated to and even resistant to those rules—remains. After all, the rest of the year, which is not exceptional but rather normal, is precisely not the time and space of religion, but of the everyday. For the other element of Schielke’s argument (one echoed in his longer monograph and by many of his colleagues) is that playing football, having fun during Ramadan, getting bored, traveling abroad, falling in love, striving for material success, being good to one’s parents, or watching porn are all illustrations of everyday conduct, and that Muslims are not solely guided by religion. Consequently, these practices represent a nonreligious realm (“the everyday”), whereas other types of practices (such as sexual restraint, praying, or fasting) are framed as religious. Within the anthropology of everyday Islam, an ontological distinction becomes established between the domain of religion (of Islam) that, paradoxically, becomes restricted to those types of conduct that are recognized and framed as disciplinary and understood as exceptional to social life. In contrast, the everyday becomes the site of flexibility, spontaneity, ambiguity, and ultimately secularity.
We see this ontological differentiation and naturalization equally occurring in the differentiation between types of Muslims. Recall that the focus on everyday Islam has emerged as a corrective to what this scholarship regards as an overemphasis on piety and ethical self-cultivation, seeking ways “to account for views that are neither clearly nor consistently in line with any grand ideology, and lives that are full of ambivalence” (Schielke 2009: S24). It ostensibly seeks to broaden the picture, to account for Muslims whose lives are not dedicated to ethical self-cultivation and self-perfection. And, beyond the simple fact that there are diverse ways of being Muslim, another justification for broadening anthropologists’ analytical frameworks concerns representativity: part of the problem with the piety turn, according to its critics, is that even though “actual activists in Islamist or piety movements are relatively few” (Schielke 2012: 318), scholars of the piety turn take these “committed religious activists as paradigmatic representatives of religiosity” (Schielke 2009: S35; see also Bangstad 2011). In other words, anthropologists of everyday Islam seek to reorient the focus from the demographically minoritarian pious subject and [77]to bring into view ordinary Muslims, understood as the overwhelming majority in Egypt and elsewhere. As Schielke writes, “we must be careful, not to take the way from ambivalence and imperfection to clarity and commitment as the regular and typical one. . . . People always live complex lives: a person’s identity is in practice dialogical, made up of different voices and experiences. . . . In consequence, people commonly shift between different roles and identities” (2009: S33).
Schielke’s is a particularly interesting passage because it shows how a stated desire to expand effectively results in the exclusion of certain life forms. Schielke begins by noting that an orientation toward clarity and pious commitment is not a regular or typical one—a claim about representativity (the pious subject is a minority one)—but then quickly moves into a different kind of argument, namely, a universalist claim about the human subject or, as he puts it, “people”—not some people or many people, but rather people. He continues: “Salafis, just like everybody else, live everyday lives loaded with ambiguities and contradictions” (S33, emphasis added). Later he writes: “Piety does not proceed along a unilinear path. It is an ambivalent practice that is often related to specific periods in life, especially those marked by crises. . . . This is, of course, common knowledge in Egypt, as it is probably everywhere. . . . I posit that it is precisely the fragmented nature of people’s biographies which, together with the ambivalent nature of most moral subjectivities, should be taken as the starting point when setting out to study moral discourse and ethical practice” (S36). Schielke has gone from a call to attend to the varied dimensions of Muslim life (which would call for varied analytical frameworks) to a series of normative claims: anthropologists should study Islam and Muslims in a very specific way because all forms of piety proceed in the same way and Muslims (like all people) are the same everywhere. The methodology proposed by Schielke and others—studying religious life as an ambivalent and contradictory endeavor— relies on stronger normative claim about human nature (“people”).
That normative claim about human nature produces, in turn, a normative claim about natural (that is, proper) attitudes toward religion and, concomitantly, about the exceptionality of the Salafi Muslim. As we argued earlier, scholars like Marsden, Schielke, and Debevec seem to understand religion as a set of moral rules and as temporally exceptional—that is to say, under normal circumstances, a strong commitment to fulfilling these moral rules is restricted to exceptional ritual circumstances (for example, Ramadan). The natural attitude toward religious rules is one of ambivalence and contestation, hence the discrepancy between moral rules and actual behavior. This conceptualization of religion results in the normalization of forms of conduct that are characterized by a loose and flexible relationship to Islamic traditions and an exceptionalization of conduct that strictly adheres to, or attempts to adhere to, Islamic norms. And the term “Salafi”—a term whose analytical usage has been contested25—plays a central role in this delineation of Muslim [78]life. The term “Salafi” functions as a mark of exceptionality, not merely with regard to demography—i.e., as a religious minority—but also to ontology—i.e., as a human aberration. It is used to refer to forms of religiosity seen to stand outside the domain of the everyday, that is, forms of religiosity that are extra-ordinary. More than simply an analytical or explanatory term, therefore, “Salafi” operates as a normative category to qualify which kind of actions, habits, and conduct are to be considered spontaneous and thereby natural, and which are, in contrast, the product of a strict regime of selfor other-imposed discipline and therefore the product of ideology, not “real” religion but rather politics.26
Indeed, Schielke’s article on Ramadan and portions of his subsequent book on youth in post-2011 Egypt are as much a critique of Salafism as they are an analysis of everyday Muslim life. Schielke takes the figure of the Salafi as the paradigmatic revivalist, despite the hermeneutical and political diversity of the Islamic revival. According to Schielke, Salafism entails a commitment to absolute perfection: “To be ’committed’ (multazim), in the dictionary of revivalist Islam, is not just to obey God’s commands. It is to develop a character completely devoted to God’s commands in every respect and in every moment. It is to overcome all ambivalence and to form a comprehensive and consistent God-fearing personality” (2015: 63).27 Yet if “complexity is the normal way morality works” (53), the ostensible coherence demanded by Salafism is an impossible demand. As Schielke puts in the earlier article, the demand for moral perfection “does not mean that people would actually live this way, and therein lies both the power and the fundamental trouble of the Salafi ideal of religiosity” (2009: S32). Thus Salafism “is inherently unstable because it includes the attempt to impose on oneself a way of being that stands in contradiction with the way human personality and subjectivity actually work” (2015: 147). What is striking here is how Schielke’s normative critique of Salafism relies on the universalist-naturalist understandings of both religiosity and human nature discussed earlier. Salafis, according to Schielke, make the mistake of thinking that one’s life should and can be lived such that “moral rules” and “actual practice” might be aligned as much as possible. But, Schielke argues, “people” do not and cannot live this way. The “fundamental trouble” with Salafism is that it is an unnatural way to live; Salafis not only misunderstand the place of religion—as an abstract and other-worldly phenomenon, it should remain outside the real and [79]actual world of everyday life—but they also fundamentally contravene human nature itself. Their advocacy of coherence, certainty, and the active commitment to a pious and virtuous life impinges on everyday Muslims’ inclinations—that is, natural, human inclinations—toward contradiction, doubt, curiosity, self-reflection, ambiguity, imperfection, and skepticism.
Moreover, the unnaturalness—the inhumanity—of Salafism makes it dangerous not only to non-Salafis but also to Salafis themselves. Schielke writes,

the Salafi discourse of piety with its tremendous emphasis on purity makes it very difficult to find a balance with different desires. . . . There is neither a return to the relative comfort of the negotiated ambiguity of living for God in Ramadan and for oneself for the rest of the year, nor comfort in the rigid understanding of religion. Since religion stands totally beyond critique, people can only search for faults in themselves. . . .As a consequence the wave of Salafi religiosity with its insistence on purity and perfection actually intensifies the fragmentation and contradictions in young people’s lives. (Schielke 2009: S34)

Thus a central danger of Salafism—other than posing a problem to everyday Muslims—is that it is auto-destructive, both psychically damaging and, ultimately, ontologically unsustainable. Despite Schielke’s earlier claims that ambiguity is an essential part of life itself, it is now Salafis who become responsible for fragmenting the everyday subject. Salafism, Schielke contends, puts considerable pressure on an individual’s psyche by proffering an unattainable model of ethical perfection: “On the one hand, people can hold to it without having to fully realize it, and its being unrealized allows it to remain pure and simple while life is messy and complex. On the other hand, however, it can become a serious obstacle in people’s lives, a debatekilling argument that can lead people into serious crisis and dead end” (2009: S32). The ostensible escape Salafism offers from the messy reality of life ends up causing the practitioner serious psychic harm. And in so doing, Salafism reveals itself to be an unsustainable ideological project: “Salafis, just like everybody else, live everyday lives loaded with ambiguities and contradictions. . . . The rigour of Salafi piety that makes it so attractive in the mess of the everyday also makes it difficult to maintain in the face of ambivalent feelings” (Schielke 2009: S33). Salafism, it turns out, is not only unnatural; it is also difficult to sustain precisely because it is unnatural. Over the long term, Salafism and the pious Muslim subject aiming at ethical perfection are ontological impossibilities.
Let us reiterate that we have no interest in a defense of Salafism. Nor is our critique of the scholarship we have discussed prompted by a desire to dismiss the ethnographic quality of many of these studies or to do away with the concept of the everyday. As noted earlier, the concept has long had an important and critically vital place within anthropology. Our disagreement lies in how this concept has come to be used to differentiate empirically between practices seen as representative of everyday life and those that are not in some of this literature. We are disturbed by the way in which such use of the everyday reproduces a series of cascading normative distinctions between everyday and exceptional, real and not real, natural and unhealthy, human and ontologically impossible. Rather than shedding light on the various ways in which religious—as well as other—constraints and [80]commitments inform and structure human conduct, and how these are continuously negotiated, the concept of the everyday here assumes that some practices are more natural—more human—than others. In so doing, it delegitimizes—renders unnatural—particular modes of conduct and forms of life, which are regarded as psychically damaging, ontologically impossible, and an effect of political ideology rather than proper ethics or religion.


Conclusion
Scholars have long argued that the subjective commitments of anthropologists play a central role not simply in analyzing their objects of study but also in determining and defining them in the first place. Several authors have focused, for instance, on the way authoritative discourses construct the distinct social phenomena—religion, rationality, the economy, village life—under ethnographic study (Asad 1973, 1993; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Hymes 1972; Scott 1991; Trouillot 2003). Others have addressed the problem of cultural translation—i.e., the difficulty of rendering particular concepts, life-worlds, and imaginaries intelligible in the language of the social sciences (Asad 1986a; Chakrabarty 2000; Evans-Pritchard 1976; Leenhardt 1979; Strathern 1990). These critiques have enabled much-needed reflection about anthropology’s particular epistemological and semiotic commitments (or lack thereof). They have led to the understanding that various social phenomena do not merely exist in the world as first-order empirical realities but are, rather, always already mediated—for the “native” and the anthropologist. Finally, these critiques have prompted an ongoing conversation about the discursive and structural conditions under which social phenomena are turned into discrete objects of observation and analysis. Discussion of anthropology’s epistemological, semiotic, and political conditions of possibility is far from exhausted, of course, and new scholarship continues to contribute to our critical awareness about the ethnographer’s role in determining her object of study, about the epistemological and semiotic relevance of “native” concepts and categories, and about the vocabularies and scripts through which we understand and frame particular phenomena.
This essay is part of that broader conversation, and it has sought to examine the conceptual and epistemological contours of recent calls to study “everyday Islam.” As we observed, this scholarship emerged as a critique of what it sees as a scholarly overemphasis on piety and ethical norms. It seeks to show that the pious Muslim is neither paradigmatic nor representative, hence its investment in demonstrating the moments of discontinuity, fracture, ambivalence, and incoherence in Muslims’ lives. Yet these scholars’ insistence on ambiguity and their concomitant critique of norms rely, we suggested, on a particular understanding of agency that posits the self as external to and independent of structure of powers (i.e., religion). Moreover, we argued, subjects, practices, and ethical orientations not characterized by celebratory incoherence and ambiguity are relegated outside the everyday and become, as a consequence, unworthy of ethnographic attention. As we demonstrated in the latter part of the paper, the language of the everyday results in the ontological disqualification of a strong commitment to religious norms. Terms such as Salafi or activist have a normative rather than analytical function: they serve to dislocate [81]such commitment from the realm of everyday life, framing it as the outcome of political or ideological manipulations. The language of the everyday, we concluded, does not merely operate as a descriptive account that unravels the imponderabilities of life; it is also a normative vocabulary that serves to disqualify the ontological validity of particular life-worlds by delineating them as not-everyday, and, ultimately, as unreal.
It is worth noting how much that normative vocabulary retrenches a series of secular-modern ethical-political commitments. As Hirschkind (2014) writes in a short commentary for the curated collection on “Everyday Islam” by Cultural Anthropology, the space of the everyday “bears a strong affinity to what has conventionally been called the secular; namely, a domain of ambiguity, contingency, skepticism, and pragmatic concern, one relatively immune to the powers of religious discipline and normativity.” Hirschkind also perceptively points to the ongoing significance of Edward Said’s (1979) critique of Orientalism in the study of Islam and Muslim societies. Writing against a tradition of Orientalist scholarship that conjured Muslims as intractably attached to an ossified, text-based set of religious norms, many contemporary anthropologists insist on attending to practice instead of text, doubt instead of certainty, resistance instead of submission to norms. But there is a certain irony to Said’s long intellectual shadow over this work, for the anti-Orientalizing gesture of much of the scholarship under discussion produces not only the familiar everyday Muslim but also the Salafi or activist Muslim—secular modernity’s radical Other. Indeed, as Susan Harding (1991) argues in her important essay “Representing fundamentalism,” the secular-modern subject is secured through the “fundamentalist” and an accompanying series of polarities: belief versus doubt, literal versus critical, backward versus modern. Although Harding was writing about Christian fundamentalists in the United States, her analysis applies equally well to the figure of the Salafi. Harding writes that certain “repugnant” groups do not come in for the same anti-Orientalizing gesture of progressive social scientists, whose “tools of cultural criticism are better suited for some ’others’ and not other ’others’—specifically, for cultural ’others’ constituted by discourses of race/sex/class/ethnicity/colonialism but not religion.” In other words, “many modernist presuppositions still operate uncritically within contemporary studies of politics and culture . . . generating a radically parochial imaginary of the margins in which only sanctioned cultural ’others’ survive.” Moreover, given the secularity of the social sciences’ epistemological commitments, disrupting “academic representations of fundamentalists . . . may provoke charges of consorting with ’them,’ the opponents of [secular] modernity, progress, enlightenment, truth, and reason” (Harding 1991: 375–76). Unsurprisingly, anthropologists of ultra-conservative Muslims have been accused of, at best, downplaying the deleterious effects of Salafism or, at worst, being apologists for Salafism (see, e.g., Abbas 2013; Bangstad 2011; Gourgouris 2013; Robbins 2013).
Yet the piety turn, as it has been called, and the more general turn to ethics within the discipline of anthropology, have opened up avenues of inquiry that we as scholars continue to find productive, not only for better understanding the nature of certain forms of religiosity but also for critically interrogating the secularliberal presuppositions that underpin much of our lives and, as a result, for better understanding the nature of certain forms of secularity. We therefore find some [82]anthropologists’ dismissal of Salafis as incoherent and even inhuman subjects particularly troubling for its refusal to engage with and be engaged by “the systematicity and reason of the unfamiliar, the strange, or the intransigent” (Mahmood 2005: 199). That dismissal recalls anthropology’s fraught relationship with so-called local knowledge and what Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2003) called “the epistemological status of the native voice.” Trouillot contended that “anthropologists never give the people they study the right to be as knowledgeable or, more precisely, to have the same kind of knowledge about their own societies as ethnographers” (2003: 129). At the same time, according to the discipline’s own laudatory self-narrative, much of what distinguishes anthropology from its sister social sciences is precisely its commitment to taking native voices seriously. That commitment, we want to argue, must remain even when faced with interlocutors we might initially find abhorrent. Moreover, taking our interlocutors seriously means accepting them as sources of knowledge and as theorists in their own right, whose visions can critically interrogate, unsettle, and remake—and not only confirm—our own understandings and theorizations of the world. As Tim Ingold argues, the distinction between subjective participation and objective observation is untenable: participant observation is an ontological commitment to learning from and with others, and “to practice anthropology is to undergo an education, as much within as beyond the academy” (2014: 392). Participant observation is therefore an “unnerving” enterprise and one that “entail[s] considerable existential risk” (389).
We recognize that at a time in which the “Muslim question” (Norton 2013) has emerged as a civilizational fault-line, accounts that underscore Muslim alterity in order to de-familiarize dominant secular-liberal assumptions can sometimes be recuperated as evidence of a clash of civilizations. In fact, many of the anthropologists of everyday Islam we have discussed see themselves as working against the unrelenting de-humanization of Muslims by highlighting similarity rather than radical difference and offering an account of the ordinariness of Muslims the world over. Yet, as we have argued, attempts to emphasize (most) Muslims’ sameness in order to undermine a clash of civilizations framework can end up producing certain Muslims as aberrational, unnatural, and even inhuman. Ben Highmore reminds us in the introductory notes to The everyday life reader that reiterating sameness comes at a double cost: the first is that of normalizing and universalizing one’s own values and worldviews; the second is that of creating what he calls “implicit ’others,’” or those “who supposedly live outside the ordinary, the everyday” (2002: 1). The anthropology of Islam, it would seem, faces an impasse in which Muslims only serve as evidence in a conversation between Western interlocutors about the unity or diversity of humankind. One way forward, we want to suggest, might entail finding analytical language that does not reproduce the sameness/difference paradigm seemingly endemic to anthropology. Another might be an analytical and methodological volte-face, one that inquires into why certain phenomena become problems or questions (the Muslim question, the Jewish question) in the first place. In conclusion, then, we want to reiterate that our critical engagement with anthropologists of everyday Islam is meant to be just that: critical engagement. Although we may disagree on certain analytical and methodological approaches, we nonetheless share a sense of dismay about the neo-imperialist nature of EuroAmerican engagement with the Muslim world. Indeed, the everyday might be the [83]proper starting place for any ethnography committed to critical de-familiarization precisely by making legible and viable the imaginaries, hopes, and aspirations that guide the everyday conduct of people considered odd, exceptional, or extraordinary, without simply rendering them as similar to “us.” That commitment has long been the lynchpin of the discipline of anthropology; it remains vital to any serious consideration of the Muslim world.


Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Alexandre Caeiro and four anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of and cogent comments on earlier versions of the manuscript, Giovanni da Col for his productive editorial suggestions, and Lara Deeb and Samuli Schielke for their collegial engagement with our essay.


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Redécouvrir le musulman « ordinaire » : notes sur une scission anthropologique
Résumé : Cet article examine de manière critique les incitations récentes, formulées par des anthropologues, à étudier ce qu’ils appellent « l’islam ordinaire ». Nous situons cette littérature récente au carrefour de deux tensions centrales de l’anthropologie : d’une part, ses engagements avec à la fois les similarités et les différences au sein de l’humanité dans son ensemble, et d’autre part, sa volonté de témoigner simultanément des structures sociales dominantes et des formes de résistance individuelle. Nous suggérons que le concept d’islam ordinaire souligne un aspect de ces débats paradigmatiques, en mettant en avant l’universel et en insistant sur l’opposition aux normes. Nous étudions alors la différence faite dans cette littérature entre les musulmans ordinaires et les musulmans salafistes. Nous mettons en avant le fait que l’investissement actuel dans la notion d’islam ordinaire discrédite la validité, la réalité et l’ontologie de ceux qui sont présentés comme des musulmans salafistes, et met à mal les ethnographies de la vie musulmane ultra-orthodoxe. Alors même que les études de l’islam ordinaire tentent de développer l’anthropologie de l’islam, elles limitent son expansion en définissant très étroitement son objet légitime.
Nadia FADIL is Assistant Professor in the Interculturalism, Migration, and Minorities Research Centre (IMMRC) at the Anthropology Department of the KU Leuven. Her research interests revolve around questions of secularism, religion, and Islam.
Nadia FadilAnthropology DepartmentInterculturalism, Migration, and Minorities Research CentreKU LeuvenParkstraat 45—Box 36153000 Leuven, BelgiumNadia.Fadil@soc.kuleuven.be
Mayanthi L. FERNANDO is Associate Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Her first book, The republic unsettled: Muslim French and the contradictions of secularism (Duke University Press, 2014), addresses the intersection of religion and politics in contemporary France. She has recently begun to work on law, embodiment, and the sex/gender norms of secularity.
Mayanthi L. FernandoAnthropology Department361 Social Science 1University of California, Santa Cruz1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USAmfernan3@ucsc.edu


___________________
1. Perhaps the most familiar instantiations of the diversity/unity question are the debates between Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1976) and then between Marshall Sahlins (1987, 1996) and Gananath Obeyesekere (1992), about “native” rationality. Debates between poststructuralist anthropologists inspired by Foucault and Bourdieu and anthropologists of “practice theory” remain a prime example of the power/agency problem (cf. infra).
2. Early examples include Max Weber’s examination of Islam’s theological difference from Christianity; for a fuller account, see Turner (1978) and Huff and Schluchter (1999).
3. The collection includes essays published previously in the journal by Al-Mohammad (2012), Osanloo (2006), Rouse and Hoskins (2004), Khan (2006), and George (2009), as well as interviews with the authors.
4. As Michael Lempert observes, the terms “ordinary” and “everyday” are largely interchangeable in this literature (2013: 387n1).
5. James Laidlaw’s The subject of virtue (2014) nicely illustrates how the current “ethical turn” in anthropology has been directly influenced by ongoing debates within the anthropology of Islam, and a large part of his book is devoted to recent developments in that field. For example, his chapter “The ’question of freedom’ in anthropology” (138–78) is largely a critical engagement with the work of Saba Mahmood.
6. See Deeb (2006); Salvatore (2007); Starrett (1998). Gregory Starrett, for instance, argues that mass education in postcolonial Egypt led to the “objectification” of the Islamic tradition, i.e., its construction as a separate and clearly demarcated entity to be harnessed for economic, political, and social development. The resulting ability of ordinary Muslims to participate in debates about Islam and its role in social and political life led, in turn, to the Islamic revival in Egypt.
7. Armando Salvatore (2007), for instance, analyzes how notions of islah or maslaha are recuperated in postcolonial Egypt and connected to notions of public interest. Hussein Ali Agrama (2012) likewise examines how the concept of hisba is assimilated into modern conceptions of state sovereignty.
8. John Bowen (2009) examines similar kinds of questions that emerge for Muslims in France. These debates, Bowen shows, occur on two levels. On the first, more mundane level, French Muslims have to determine how to live, work, marry, and sacrifice according to Islamic norms in a non-Muslim environment. The second level—what Bowen calls metareasoning—concerns how best to think about the questions posed at the first level, that is, how best to determine which tools and traditions Muslims should draw upon to figure out how to live, work, marry, and sacrifice in a non-Muslim context. Lara Deeb and Mona Harb (2013) consider a similar process among Shi’ite Muslims with regard to pious forms of leisure in Beirut.
9. Lempert makes a similar critique of much of the work on ordinary ethics, arguing that it can often harden “dichotomies of small and large, micro and macro, implicit and explicit” and that we should take care “not to sever the entanglements that make [ordinary ethics] seem quotidian in the first place” (2013: 386).
10. In her account of ethics, Mahmood relies on the distinct Aristotelian tradition drawn on by her interlocutors, for whom everyday behavior is connected to a process of ethical self-transformation. Although she distinguishes between morality and ethics, she sees them as interlinked, deploying Foucault’s differentiation between ethical substance and modes of subjectivation or techniques of the self. Mahmood does not see morality as a set of abstract rules to which the subject acquiesces; “Rather, Foucault’s framework assumes that there are many different ways of forming a relationship with a moral code, each of which establishes a particular relationship between capacities of the self (will, reason, desire, action, etc.) and a given norm” (2012: 234). Thus “the piety movement has a strong individualizing impetus that requires each person to adopt a set of ascetic practices for shaping moral conduct” (235).
11. By examining secular criticism of and punitive action against veiling, Mayanthi Fernando (2014; see also Selby and Fernando 2014) analyzes secularity’s underlying sex/gender norms and secular power’s investment in and interpellation of female bodies. Similarly, Nadia Fadil (2011) considers not veiling as an aesthetic of the self intimately tied to a moral subjectivity grounded in liberal ethical norms. By understanding not veiling as an everyday practice of ethical self-cultivation, Fadil challenges a hegemonic secular-liberal viewpoint of the non-veil as a natural way of being.
12. See Abbas (2013); Bangstad (2011); Gourgouris (2013); Mufti (2013); Robbins (2013).
13. In fact, we are sympathetic to this critique: as Fadil argues, the idea of “veiling as an idiosyncrasy that needs to be explained or accounted for” is inadvertently confirmed by even sympathetic research on the veil. As she notes, “Restricting the analysts’ lens to orthodox Muslim conduct like veiling, and leaving other forms of (pious) conduct unexplored, results indeed in a situation wherein only practices that fail to correspond with ’secular ways of life’ are turned into the object of research” (2011: 85).
14. Although we focus on the work of Samuli Schielke and Magnus Marsden as the oftcited proponents of this turn to everyday Islam, our interest also extends to scholarship as diverse as Al-Mohammad (2012); Al-Mohammad and Peluso (2012); Das (2012); Debevec (2012); Khan (2006, 2012); Mittermaier (2012); and Simon (2009). We do not suggest any homogeneity to this literature and recognize the very different orientations and analytic attachments that animate these studies. We are nonetheless interested in how all these works frame the everyday as a site of complexity, ambiguity, or encounter (in contrast to religious institutions and norms), what effects this framing has for the anthropology of religion, and what normative sensibilities might underlie—even inadvertently—this framing.
15. In the introductory passages to Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski uses this expression to insist that analysts should attend to the “routine of a man’s working day, the details of his care of the body, of the manner of taking food and preparing it; the tone of conversational and social life around the village fires, the existence of strong friendships or hostilities, and of passing sympathies and dislikes between people” (1922: 19). These details, he explains, are crucial to understand the way structures work and are maintained.
16. Michael Sheringham (2009) argues that the focus on the everyday as a distinct scholarly perspective emerged as part of the postwar French intellectual movement that relied on Surrealism and sought to decenter and reimagine political life. For a further overview of the theoretical deployment of the everyday in cultural theory, see Highmore (2002) and Kaplan and Ross (1987).
17. Samuli Schielke is cited as such by, among others, Debevec (2013: 211); Deeb and Harb (2013: 16-17; Laidlaw (2014: 173); and Mittermaier (2012: 250). We concentrate on his two essays “Being good in Ramadan” (2009) and “Being a nonbeliever in a time of Islamic revival” (2012), which distill the central claims made in his longer monographs and edited collections. While Schielke’s monograph is certainly ethnographically richer than his articles, it retains the main problems we identify here, namely, the notion of religion as a set of abstract rules in opposition to everyday life, and the understanding of Salafism as an impossible and unnatural way of being.
18. Schielke’s discussion of Ramadan in Egypt in the future tense (2015) is more nuanced than the earlier article version, emphasizing the complexity of non-Ramadan morality. As he writes, “the power of the moral shift of the feast lies not simply in the falling back to bad habits. More important, it marks the shift from a period of observance during which the sins of the previous year are erased to a more complex order of morality” (51). Nonetheless, a dual structure that opposes a time of exceptional morality (Ramadan) to “everyday temporality” (outside of Ramadan) continues to inform his analysis. It is to this dual structure that our critique attends.
19. Our argument here draws on Talal Asad’s seminal critiques of Ernest Gellner, developed in The idea of an anthropology of Islam (Asad 1986b) and “The concept of cultural translation in British social anthropology” (Asad 1986a). In both works, Asad takes issue with the authority of the analyst to decipher and decode subjects’ behavior while disregarding the meaning and signification attributed to it by the subjects themselves. The first essay problematizes a Gellnerian perspective that represents actors as involved in a dramatic struggle without any consideration of the meaning and discourses that orient their conduct (1986b: 8). The second essay critically explores Gellner’s work in relation to the privileged position the anthropologist accords himself to decipher and decode the “real meaning of what Berbers say (regardless of what they think they say)” (Asad 1986a: 155).
20. Maria Louw provides a different account of similar declarations by ordinary Muslims in Uzbekistan that they hold little knowledge about Islam. Louw takes these declarations as a starting point to understand “what it means to be Muslim in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and to understand and conceptualize which experiential realities people are actually referring to when they talk about ignorance and oblivion” (2009: 19). Deeb and Harb (2013) also take a different approach by trying to understand how seeming contradictions are resolved by those who experience them, usually by inquiring into the emic reasoning of their interlocutors and in so doing foregoing the framework of contradiction.
21. Schielke significantly expands on Mustafa’s reasoning in his later monograph, though he still does not accept Mustafa’s declaration of his Salafi path as a choice, arguing, “this choice was extremely limited from the start. None of the many other currents of Islamic piety and practice was on his list of options. More important, all the options were explicitly Islamic” (2015: 142). Schielke’s understanding of choice as action unconstrained by norms appears again in a discussion of Mustafa’s refusal to go against the wishes of his mother, who does not want him to marry a divorced woman. Schielke does not understand Mustafa’s refusal as an ethical commitment to family but rather as a lack of “real choice” (101). As he writes, “Mustafa repeatedly sought a space of freedom in his marriage plans, but he faced powers too great to overcome” (101). There is no sense that that “power”—i.e., his mother’s will—is part of a broader ethical paradigm that marks a particular commitment to family, and that Mustafa’s decision to obey his mother is also a choice, albeit one made in relation to ethical or moral obligations.
22. Naveeda Khan (2012), for instance, understands the skepticism and striving present in everyday life as inherently social phenomena, produced through social relations and philosophical-cultural traditions rather than emanating naturally from the individual self; importantly, she also does not see skepticism as opposed to religious belief but as internal to Islamic practices and traditions. Mittermaier’s (2012) meditation on divinely inspired dreams presents a Muslim subject-agent integral to Sufi strands of the Islamic tradition who does not act but is rather acted upon by dreams and the divine.
23. By ontology and ontological we mean a mode of being or existing (see Fanon 1952).
24. Though “Salafi” now circulates in academic, political, and media discourse as a catchall term for ultra-orthodox and/or Wahhabi-inspired Muslims, we use the term with caution, and usually to refer to other scholars’ terminology. For aesthetic reasons we do not continually use scare quotes around the term, but they are always implied. See note 25 for more on the term and our reasons for caution.
25. The recent edited collection Global Salafism (Meijer 2009) represents the clearest and most explicit attempt to grasp the phenomenon of Salafism and determine its precise characteristics as a distinct tendency within Islamic revivalism. In a recent paper, however, Henri Lauzière radically historicizes the term, arguing that salafiyya emerged as an analytical category in the first half of the twentieth century within French Orientalist academic literature. While the term did have medieval antecedents, it was not used to determine and qualify distinct religious tendencies but rather to point to certain theological disagreements. It is through the work of Louis Massignon that the term emerged as a distinct category that would come to be adopted within and outside the Arab world (2010: 384).
26. Sindre Bangstad (2011) criticizes Mahmood for not calling her interlocutors by their proper name—Salafis—and thereby occluding their true (and dangerous) political orientations.
27. It should be noted that despite the ethnographic richness of Egypt in the future tense, Schielke’s ethnography of Salafism is quite thin. Schielke’s account of Salafism seems to rely almost entirely on three former Salafi activists, and even though he notes that “not all experiments with Salafi (or other) commitment are transient” and that “[many people join the movement and stay for the rest of their life” (2015: 146), we get no sense of these people.
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				<article-title>Embodying and fashioning headship: A day in the life of a village headman in the center of Myanmar</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article proposes an analysis of local politics through an ethnographic exploration of headship. It approaches the experience and enactment of politics by describing a day in the life of a headman in rural lowland Myanmar to show how an individual embodies and fashions headship through successive social settings. More specifically, this ethnographic device is a way to analyze what a headman, as a situated figure and a political institution embedded in a local society, mediates in context. The paper discusses how a headman composes with multiple layers of responsibilities and chains of relationships, delineating uncertain boundaries between the personal, the political, and the government domains that partly organize local politics. While updating the literature on Bamar lowland society after more than half a century of dictatorship, the paper suggests a position from which we might reconsider the village headman as an ethnographic starting point for an anthropology concerned with history.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>The place and space of emptiness: An experiment in collaborative ethnographic comparison</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Emptiness is a term used by residents of eastern Latvia to describe life in places that are losing their constitutive elements, such as people, jobs, schools, shops, and transport connections. In this article, we transform the emic term “emptiness” into a portable analytic and undertake ethnographic comparison of resonant processes and experiences in eastern Latvia, eastern Ukraine, and the Russian Far East. We argue that emptiness is both a historical formation and a novel and increasingly common spatial coordinate in the shifting landscape of political and economic power. It is also a possibility for theory-building from the postsocialist periphery about the contemporary spatial configurations of power and forms of life and politics that emerge in response to them.</p></abstract>
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				<article-title>Fuambai’s strength</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Despite Fuambai Ahmadu’s upbringing in the United States, she accepted at the age of twenty-two her mother’s invitation to return to her Kono people in Sierra Leone to undergo their secretive initiation ritual to transform her into an unambiguously female, marriageable adult and a member of the women’s secret Bondo society. The most dramatic part of the ritual involved having the external part of her clitoris and her labia minora excised by a sowei, a woman in charge of such ceremonies. This ritual, known as Bondo, was the feminine counterpart of the Poro initiation for boys, in which these were circumcised and given instructions on how to be men. Proud of her initiated status, she has struggled over the past two decades to correct and contest Western anti–Female Genital Mutilation (henceforth, anti-FGM) critics’ overwhelming, indignant imaginary of African initiation rituals as torture and mutilation, and of initiated African women as sexual cripples and weak victims of cruel patriarchal traditions. This essay draws a moral portrait of her; in the process, it engages with the anthropological study of moralities and advocates for a liberal pluralism with relativistic entailments.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Despite Fuambai Ahmadu’s upbringing in the United States, she accepted at the age of twenty-two her mother’s invitation to return to her Kono people in Sierra Leone to undergo their secretive initiation ritual to transform her into an unambiguously female, marriageable adult and a member of the women’s secret Bondo society. The most dramatic part of the ritual involved having the external part of her clitoris and her labia minora excised by a sowei, a woman in charge of such ceremonies. This ritual, known as Bondo, was the feminine counterpart of the Poro initiation for boys, in which these were circumcised and given instructions on how to be men. Proud of her initiated status, she has struggled over the past two decades to correct and contest Western anti–Female Genital Mutilation (henceforth, anti-FGM) critics’ overwhelming, indignant imaginary of African initiation rituals as torture and mutilation, and of initiated African women as sexual cripples and weak victims of cruel patriarchal traditions. This essay draws a moral portrait of her; in the process, it engages with the anthropological study of moralities and advocates for a liberal pluralism with relativistic entailments.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>morality, ethics, liberalism, female genital surgeries, FGM, Africa, ethnography, biography</kwd>
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	<body><p>Fuambai’s strength






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Carlos David Londoño Sulkin. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.3.011
SPECIAL SECTION
Fuambai’s strength
Carlos David LONDOÑO SULKIN, University of Regina


Despite Fuambai Ahmadu’s upbringing in the United States, she accepted at the age of twenty-two her mother’s invitation to return to her Kono people in Sierra Leone to undergo their secretive initiation ritual to transform her into an unambiguously female, marriageable adult and a member of the women’s secret Bondo society. The most dramatic part of the ritual involved having the external part of her clitoris and her labia minora1 excised by a sowei, a woman in charge of such ceremonies. This ritual, known as Bondo,2 was the feminine counterpart of the Poro initiation for boys, in which these were circumcised and given instructions on how to be men. Proud of her initiated status, she has struggled over the past two decades to correct and contest Western anti–Female Genital Mutilation (henceforth, anti-FGM) critics’ overwhelming, indignant imaginary of African initiation rituals as torture and mutilation, and of initiated African women as sexual cripples and weak victims of cruel patriarchal traditions. This essay draws a moral portrait of her; in the process, it engages with the anthropological study of moralities and advocates for a liberal pluralism with relativistic entailments.
Keywords: morality, ethics, liberalism, female genital surgeries, FGM, Africa, ethnography, biography


I met Fuambai very briefly in 2006, at an American Anthropological Association meeting. I was charmed, finding her charismatic, stylish to the point that I suspected my criteria for judging this were insufficiently sophisticated to do her justice, and beautiful. Her professional credentials also impressed me: a PhD from the London School of Economics, consultancies with UNICEF and the British Medical Research Council, and an ongoing postdoctoral fellowship at the University of [108]Chicago. Our meeting was brief, and as she left, another friend who was there said, “That Fuambai . . . she’s a strong woman.”
Intrigued, I followed up on her name and read her compelling ethnographic account of traditional African female genital surgeries (henceforth FGS3), including the intense and very personal story of her own initiation process (F. Ahmadu 2000). At the first opportunity, in 2009, I invited Fuambai to the University of Regina to give a lecture, and then again in 2015 for a weeklong one-on-one open interview on her life story. Between her visits, we kept an email conversation going, and I followed up on her reading recommendations, namely ethnographic and medical research that sought to paint a more nuanced picture of the contexts, meanings, and entailments of FGS practices, independently of authors’ interest in the continuation or disappearance of the practices in question (e.g., Shell-Duncan and Hernlund 2000; Hernlund and Shell-Duncan 2007; Shweder (2000, 2009, 2012, 2016; and Obermeyer 1999).
Since the mid-1990s, Fuambai made it a defining life project to contest the (mis) representation of FGS in Africa by media and by organizations such as the WHO and the UN, which tended to be informed mostly by anti-FGM activists. She explicitly claimed that there lay her greatest aspirations, and that her academic interests were subordinate to and served these. In publications, conferences, and interviews, she and a small but growing group of scholars (a number of whom came to constitute The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa (2012)4 have called for more rigor and evenhandedness in cultural representations of non-Western others and in public policy debates about their practices. Many of their arguments were nicely summarized in their 2012 public policy advisory, where they contested mainstream portrayals and explained that men and women in societies that practiced genital surgeries overwhelmingly found these to be aesthetic enhancements, and definitely not “mutilations”; they also published data to show that the great majority of women who had undergone such surgeries had rich sexual lives that included desire, arousal, orgasm, and satisfaction. Medical and reproductive complications as a result of FGS were infrequent exceptions but were nevertheless much sensationalized by critics (The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa 2012: 22). Finally, they showed that these practices did not have a single, shared, patriarchal purpose wherever they took place but rather had diverse and multiple meanings, just as they had diverse forms (The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa 2012: 23). Fuambai’s and her colleague’s efforts were an uphill climb, with a heavy onus of proof on them, against widespread, deeply felt social understandings in the West.
Broaching the topic of FGS—more the traditional versions than the medical ones—seems to require from speakers an explicit normative ethical declaration, at least in Euro-American milieus. It’s a topic to which many people react viscerally [109]with indignation or heartrending pity, and too often with claims to know what “FGM” is all about that would sound intolerably presumptuous and dogmatic if they pertained to a less loaded topic. Even Charles Taylor, a champion of tolerant, critical multiculturalism, subscribes to the claim that includes “FGM” among “clearly reprehensible practices” (Bouchard and Taylor 2008: 68, my emphasis). These attitudes extend to the social contexts of academic disciplinary endeavors, where critical research on the topic is difficult and sometimes impossible (see, for example, Boddy 2007: 55; Johnsdotter 2012: 92, 108), and of the courts, where legislation is often based on mono-dimensional, poorly researched representations of the practices (Rogers 2016: 235–37). As Carla Obermeyer put it, “the harmful effects of female genital surgeries are so often assumed to be indisputably true that they are rarely posed as questions to be investigated” (1999: 24).
Fuambai’s arguments and bibliographic suggestions made me realize early on that I had bought casually into—and reproduced—simplistic, harrowing anti-FGM portrayals of FGS, without bothering to study the matter more carefully by way of doing or reading ethnography. After engaging with Fuambai, my response was to embrace more pointedly than before what Richard Shweder calls “liberal pluralism”: a “taste” for ways of life that allow and indeed encourage persons to live in accordance with their own evaluative understanding of how they ought to live and what kinds of persons they should be, tied to the recognition that others’ preferences and convictions may be underwritten by diverse, worthwhile values that may nonetheless conflict with the liberal value of unimpeded choice (2009: 250).
With most anthropologists today, I dismiss a dated cultural relativism premised on isolable cultures that mold people’s subjectivities, and the kind of ethical relativism that stems from that. Perhaps James Faubion is right to further question the sheer extent of human ethical diversity that some relativists might posit exists. As he notes, there are “striking similarities among persons of similar class and status everywhere, and the basic schematics [of the ethical imagination] are considerably fewer than the relativist allows” (2011: 9, 10). Many anthropologists champion their disciplinary practice of providing thick descriptions that suggest what sense practices that we may find foreign or immoral might make to the people who indulge in them, thereby helping temper the more immediate, condemnatory gut reactions of outsiders to these practices.5 Their sense is that this is compelling not because it relativistically underscores cultural differences but rather because it reveals the commonalities among human beings that underlie diverse, apparently alien forms.
While I agree, I would highlight that the moral differences between groups and between persons are not radically reducible to an ultimate sameness, and that the concept of relativism, taken with self-conscious irony, can still do useful work to gainsay claims undergirded by any theological or metaphysical order purporting to function as an absolute measure for truth or for the good (pace Laidlaw 2014: 224). Our evaluative understandings of responsibility, the estimable, and the despicable involve meaning-generating semiotic associations, which like all semiotic processes have an intrinsic, unavoidable proclivity to differ between persons, groups, and generations, and furthermore to change. They are causally, even if not univocally, [110]interrelated with our biographies in the context of our relational networks, practices, and institutions. Evaluative criteria and practices are thus historically contingent, and our moral judgments, to the extent that they depend on such contingent products, are thus relative. I think of anthropologists’ thick descriptions as historical gestures that create commensurability between moralities (Overing 1987). I must say that what I find most intriguing about such an endeavor is the reminder of the possibility of innovation, new kinds of footings of relationships, new kinds of subjects, and new moralities resulting from new or transformed vocabularies and symbolic practices.6
Unlike Fuambai herself, I have no driving interest in seeing FGS (or for the matter, male circumcision, tattooing, or piercing) thrive. But then again, neither am I keen to see it change or disappear. I am keen to nudge fellow freedom-and-equality-loving consociates, and beyond them, others, to adopt liberal pluralist attitudes. I also hope to erode the appeal of a sclerotic liberalism that disavows the contingent character of its own historical development, and makes universalizing assumptions to the effect that liberal ways of life are in some objective sense more valuable than illiberal ways of life. I hasten to add that such a stance does not preclude defending one’s own views fiercely, even if one is ironically aware of their contingent character.

A case study for an anthropology of morality
My work with Fuambai was motivated by my longstanding interest in studying morality anthropologically. Reading Fuambai’s (F. Ahmadu 2000) story immediately made me zoom in, surprised, on the kinds of social world within which FGS featured as necessary, respectable, or estimable procedures, and how these surgeries featured in the distinctions of worth that Fuambai and other actors in such social worlds made regarding themselves and others. Furthermore, I felt deep curiosity regarding such a colorful, charismatic, controversial character.
What were her aspirations? What stood out in her horizons of concern, such that it would demand her evaluative attention when it swam into view? How had she become the woman that she was? What had happened during her childhood and later that could account for what she esteemed, cared about, or despised? Who had influenced her ways of thinking and feeling, and how? Had her evaluations changed over the years? And if so, how and why?
This is one of three moral bioethnographic case studies that deploy a framework I propose for the anthropological study of morality. I am paraphrasing Faubion’s (2011: 210) term “ethical bioethnographies” here; like him, I pursue life histories and contextualize them socioculturally, with particular attention to semiotic fields he calls “ethical” and I call “moral.” Though bioethnographic accounts are not the only application of this framework, at the core of each of my case studies is an extended interview, interpreted in the light of ethnographic accounts of the person’s contexts. In Fuambai’s case, I sustained email conversations with her over several [111]years, interviewed her for eight days in October of 2015 about her childhood, family, loves, education, and struggles and dilemmas, and was in regular contact with her through social media until the very moment I signed off on this article for publication. In contrast with the other cases (that of an indigenous Amazonian man, and that of a Colombian science writer7), for which I had many years’ worth of ethnographic familiarity, I had no experience with Fuambai’s African and diasporic social networks that would allow me to contextualize with thick description many of her expressions as citations of shared symbolic forms from those milieus. For that, I depended on her own ethnographic account of Sierra Leone and The Gambia, and to some extent on other literature on peoples among whom there are traditional female genital surgeries (e.g., Boddy 2007; Boone 1986; Gruenbaum 1982; Hardin 1993). Then again, I converged much more in intellectual background with Fuambai than I did with my other interlocutors; it could be said that a significant part of my research with her was an animated conversation between British-trained anthropologists. She certainly had a much more thorough grasp of my overall research project than did the others, and my analysis was more shaped by explicit feedback from her.
In my framework, much inspired by philosopher Charles Taylor (1985, 1989), moralities are persons’ understandings and sensibilities that involve their making strong distinctions of worth concerning the qualities of actions, thoughts, emotions, relationships, ways of life, embodiments, persons, human groupings, and sundry other aspects of personhood and sociality. They feature centrally a motivating sense or picture of the kinds of being persons themselves and others around them are, can be, and should be, of the footings of the relationships they have, can have, and should have with others, and of the world within which this all takes place. Moralities are semiotic and historical: persons develop and maintain them in the very processes of picking up and citing—redeploying in their thoughts, emotions, and interactions—the symbolic forms and their dynamic systems or webs of associations, most centrally language, made available to them by their interactions with members of their social networks, from earliest childhood and over their lifetimes.
Symbols are material forms—perceptible things such as images, sounds, sensations, feelings, places, and objects—that “mean something” because people associate them in various ways with other forms. Persons acquire and redeploy linguistic and other symbolic forms in the processes of living their lives in society. These redeployments are very much like Judith Butler’s (1993) cited interpellations that, throughout people’s lives, performatively constitute them as subjects and make symbolic forms available anew for others to pick up and redeploy.8 Biographies in overlapping social contexts where similar forms are reiteratively deployed account for why people tend to speak, make moral evaluations, recognize and enact certain characterological types (Agha, via Keane 2016: 144), and establish interpersonal [112]relations that are more similar to those of our consociates than to those of foreigners. Nevertheless, biographies are always historically unique, and so the associations between symbolic forms will, unavoidably, differ somewhat between persons, between social groups, and between generations. This entails that moralities, like their partly constitutive webs of symbols, are somewhat shared within social groups or networks, and yet experienced intimately in unique ways by individuals. In other terms, and pace Taylor (1985: 10) and Keane (2003: 412), I embrace Jacques Derrida’s concept of slippage or indeterminacy of meaning, finding it a limit to the human capacity for mutual understanding and to the mind-structuring and consequent group-homogenizing efficacy of symbolic deployments. It is also a source of the noise, movement, and opaqueness to reflexivity that renders semiotic systems mutable.
Scholars on the topic have paid a great deal of attention to the contrast or range between tacit, inarticulate, or habitus-like aspects of morality and more self-aware and explicit aspects of it (e.g., Zigon 2008). Some consider some form of freedom, tied to reflexivity, a diacritical aspect of it (e.g., Faubion 2011; Laidlaw 2014). Webb Keane (2016) has made amply clear that innate propensities that are not fully in our ken play a fundamental part in “ethical life,” and that everyday interactions, which he makes the case are intrinsically part of ethical life, flow smoothly precisely because the actions involved are habitual and beneath actors’ awareness. I would add that nobody has a thorough, clairvoyant grasp of the webs of associations that feature in their constitutive self-interpretations, or of the biographical processes by which these come to be. Despite this opacity of aspects of the self to reflexive awareness, however, my own bias is that when it comes to human beings, even tacit, inarticulate experiences are the experiences of subjects whose self-interpretations are constitutive and involve language; more or less articulated distinctions of worth will play a role in shaping even habitual human interaction (see Taylor 1985: 74, 272).
I am called to address reflexivity and freedom in Fuambai’s case precisely because her explicit accounts of herself were the object of so much second-guessing and doubt by members of the public and media, and by people with whom I discussed her. Could she have been brainwashed? Did she really have clear insights into her own values and life? Was she lying? Did my own account not accept at face value too much of what she said? Could she not have been particularly successful at strategic impression management?9
I have no doubt that Fuambai evaluated herself, others, and her interactions with intelligence, and planned her gestures with some strategic, reflexive intent. In fact, she valued this as an ability and a resource of people generally, and of the African women she admired particularly. But by my account, she was not a free, utilitarian agent with a clairvoyant, controlling grasp of her own innermost workings and constitution, because nobody can be. What it was that truly, deeply mattered to her, that which stood out in her horizon of concerns, was not her choice, and could not be a choice; the symbolic forms that articulated her fundamental distinctions of worth and constituted her self-interpretations were not the choices [113]of a preexistent, willful subject. They were constitutive. And her constitution was such that she simply saw that these things mattered.10 There is room for self-interpretations to be questioned reflexively and critically, but again, the new and critical distinctions of worth for doing so are themselves not a matter of radical choice.
I could still be suspected of being a subject of “ethnographic seduction,” that is, of having been influenced by Fuambai in ways I could not recognize, and such that they impacted on my understandings and research results (Robben 2007: 160). For instance, my friendship and emotional alignment with her could have made me unwilling to ask incisive, uncomfortable questions or otherwise probe critically into her discourse, which I trust sincerely expressed her thoughts much of the time, but equally certainly, at times invited my collusion in the construction of her own self-image, as interlocutors do (see Keane 2016: 275). I cannot remember such discomfort or unwillingness, except perhaps when we broached the topics of income and wealth, but then she seemed quite pragmatic and straightforward when speaking about these matters. Late in the writing process, I concluded that I perhaps too readily dampened my curiosity and avoided inquiring into other secrets of Bondo, in the name of respect for what the women in question wanted to keep secret and private. Fuambai may have helped me do that, keeping my interest riveted to other matters. But against an image of seduction, I believe that my own more secular and pragmatic understandings of the cosmos and of knowledge, and my aesthetic preferences regarding gender relations, differed sufficiently from Fuambai’s that I could remain capable of engaging critically, if sympathetically, with her.
Fuambai’s case offered the interesting complexity of migrants and other people in diaspora, who cite in their speech, actions, and very emotions a dazzling diversity of symbolic forms from their geographically dispersed and culturally diverse social networks’ members’ interactions. I recognized from her self-portraits and evaluations of others that she valued qualities of persons and of ways of life that most readers would likely find familiar: class, prestige, wealth, intelligence and education, political power, family loyalty and love, unselfish maternality, femininity, and beauty and sexiness. In these regards she was self-assured, a person with a clear sense that she was of high standing in the public eye. Less familiar, but expressed in much of her talk and demeanor, was her deep investment in a picture of “strong” or “powerful” womanhood that seemed to be eclectically tied to her African background, to her American upbringing, and to a complex religious understanding of the cosmos. Her struggle against anti-FGM misrepresentations in particular put on the line for her whether she was indeed the kind of strong African woman she aspired to be.


Growing up African in America
Fuambai’s Africanness, her Kono ancestry, the prestige of her parents’ clans and of her immediate family, and the virtues of cosmopolitanism, education, intelligence, and beauty were foci of concern for her, and came up in her telling of her childhood [114]and early adulthood. She spoke very highly of her parents, and in accounting for herself she often portrayed them, their lives, their treatment of her, and her sense of how they thought of her. She painted a broad-brush picture of their privileged standings in the Kono district of Sierra Leone, manifest among other ways in their elite high school education in Krio11 schools in Freetown. Fuambai’s parents, Komba and Finda (Janet, in English), moved to the United States in 1963 or 1964; Komba had a USAID scholarship and support from Tamba Songu-Mbriwa, the paramount chief of the chiefdom of Sandoh, to pursue his education further. This was a time when many African nations were gaining their independence and when many of the children of the elite were being sent to Europe and the United States to prepare themselves for leadership, and the expectation, Komba told Fuambai, was that he would return one day to be a leader.
Fuambai was born in the United States in 1967. When she was almost one year old, Janet moved back to Sierra Leone for a few years with Fuambai and her older brother. The family returned permanently to Washington, DC, in 1973, when Komba received his master’s degree. Over the next decades, according to Fuambai, the Ahmadus rallied a community of expatriate Sierra Leoneans around themselves, beginning with Janet’s family but expanding much beyond. Komba and a friend also founded the Kono Union in DC, Maryland, and Virginia (henceforth, DMV), of which Fuambai would become president in 2014. This involved some struggle, and in her public statements at the time, and later to me, she made frequent references to her parents’ historical importance in establishing a Sierra Leonean presence in the DMV.
Fuambai variously described Komba as handsome, wise, humble, and unpretentious. She adored the man, and expressed no doubts that the feeling was reciprocated: “I was his favorite! . . . I think he projected his love for his mother on me. He always expressed ambitions for me. He wanted me to go to Stanford, and to become a broadcaster. There could be no barrier to me, professionally. He didn’t want me working in the kitchen, and would fight with my mom when she made me work. He never saw me as eventually to be somebody’s wife.”
Fuambai portrayed her mother as the more determining parent regarding the state and direction of their household. Janet, according to Fuambai, was not as concerned with Komba’s ambitions as she was with her children’s interests and those of her own family of birth, and she imposed those interests on Komba. She had insisted on bringing some of her siblings with her when they moved back to the United States in 1973, and brought more over the years; in fact, Janet’s mother, Gbessay, lived with them as well. This sounded to me like a household that was closer to matrilocal ideals (where couples move in with the woman’s family) than to the ideals of the Kono, who conceive themselves as made up of clans in which membership is passed on by male line, and where couples supposedly live with the man’s family. She made sure her husband helped her family, for which, as Fuambai put it, “he really had to hustle,” working at different times as a cab driver, as a professional statistician, and by running his own investment company. Janet also [115]went to great lengths to ensure her children went to private schools; with time, her siblings contributed to her children’s education as well.12 Just as Fuambai admired her mother’s strength and impositions, she valued her own feisty assertiveness. She explained that she was a rebellious and disobedient teenager, willing to incur punishment as long as she got to do what she wanted. She would go to the movies against her mother’s prohibitions, question the latter’s arbitrariness, and stand up to her mother’s lashings when her father was not there to intercede indulgingly on her behalf. When there was collective punishment for her and her siblings—and it was always her mother who dealt it—Fuambai would demand to go first; she also figured out that she could threaten her mother with American laws against child abuse, which reduced the physical punishments.
In a related vein, Fuambai also seemed to identify with her father’s mother, though they never met. They were namesakes: Fuambai’s name was an Americanized version of the old woman’s name, which was pronounced “Fwambeh.” Fuambai explained their name came from “fande,” a Kono term for a type of resistant cotton thread for country cloth (see also Schön 1884). As a name, it honored the capacity to keep the family together and close knit. According to her granddaughter, Fwambeh had been light-skinned and beautiful (“everybody thought she had to be a Fula, because of that”), stubborn, hyperactive, and argumentative. At some point or another in our conversation, Fuambai described herself, or spoke about having been described, with each of these expressions. “[Fuambai] is a good name for me because I am rebellious, stubborn, don’t conform, and do keep family together.”
Fuambai recalled as a child wanting to eat like the kids on American TV rather than on the floor, and being mortified when her parents revealed too much of their African background in public, with their heavy accents in English and with her mother’s head ties. Still, she underscored that she grew up thinking of herself much more as an expatriate African and a Kono than as a black American. “My dad was an intellectual, sensitive to ideals of African identity . . . he hoped to return to Sierra Leone. He did not allow us to identify as Americans.” Komba told Fuambai that Chief Songu-Mbriwa used to speak of the Kono district as an Israel or a Zion, a place with an important destiny, and that he imagined Komba to be important for that; Fuambai was sure this had greatly influenced her father, for he never abandoned his strong sense of being Kono rather than American. She too professed great attachment to Kono, and considered her ties to it to define who she was. Her school, populated by a cosmopolitan mix of children of diplomatic, aristocratic, and otherwise wealthy families from all over the world, likewise served to make her identify more as an African than as a black American.
By the time Fuambai was a young adult, studying International Affairs at George Washington University, she did have a sense of herself as black. However, she pointed out that she did not feel at home in the Black Student Union, feeling that some of her peers there thought she was fake because she wasn’t “hood” enough and did not feature their own accent. (She and her siblings could switch at will to [116]African American Vernacular English; it sounded to me like this was something they used with some humor to mark intimacy.) She felt more at home with the African and Caribbean students, and ambitious as she clearly was, she soon became president of the African Students Association.
Another important aspect of Fuambai’s moral constitution that I can tie to her childhood was her deep religiosity. She had a strong, reflective sense of the intimately manifest presence of God in her life, and reported a history of eclectic comfort in Methodist, Muslim, and Pentecostal liturgies and of engagement in theological discussions with practitioners of these religions. Doubtless her attitudes were related to the fact that at home, she witnessed or participated in a diversity of religious rituals. Her mother had converted to Christianity in her childhood, and had joined a Methodist church upon arrival in DC. Some of Komba’s folks were practicing Muslims, and Fuambai and her siblings became comfortably familiar with their practices.


The power of women
Fuambai expressed a deep admiration for certain aspects of women among the Kono and other West African groups she grew up with or studied as an anthropologist. She reiterated to me, as she had in publications and talks (e.g., F. Ahmadu 2000: 301, S. Ahmadu n.d.), that she had sought to undergo the Bondo ritual because she wanted to be powerful, like her mother, aunts, and other initiated women. But it was Fuambai’s account of how her mother garnered scholarships for Fuambai’s siblings that carried home for me the gist of the power or strength that Fuambai saw in the African women she admired so much. Fuambai had been, her mother told her, a precocious child who had walked at nine months and from very early on had been clean, quiet, and thoughtful. A teacher at the prestigious and expensive Washington International School in DC caught on to Fuambai’s intelligence, and had her tested. She passed with flying colors and was awarded a full scholarship. Janet made the case to the school authority that Fuambai had three siblings who couldn’t go to a different school than Fuambai, and that she was a poor immigrant who could not afford a proper education for her children. The school considered this, and gave all the children scholarships.
Fuambai saw in this a manifestation of African women’s power to get what they needed and wanted from the world—often something for the good of their children or families—by dint of eliciting others’ friendliness, desire, pity, respect, fear, or whichever attitude was necessary. To achieve this, they had to be adaptable and resourceful, deploying, as needed, drama, argumentative acumen, charisma, sex appeal and amatory competence, trickery, and when necessary, violence. I see in this notion a transformation of traditional Kono understanding of power (gbaseia) as the ability to “harness knowledge, medicines, witchcraft, and other supernatural means in socially appropriate ways” (Hardin 1993: 192), to the extent that it is not only the supernatural that is harnessed instrumentally. As with her stubborn, argumentative, and beautiful grandmother, Fuambai likely identified a great deal with her purpose-driven, resourceful mother. Like Janet, Fuambai had gone to great lengths to ensure that her son received an elite education.[117]
Another story that I found revelatory of Fuambai’s admiration for what I would call the “savvy resourcefulness” of African women concerned her Auntie S.13 In 1998, in yet another turn in the 11-year civil war that rocked Sierra Leone from the early 1990s, the Nigerian army had wrested Freetown from the rebels, and Sierra Leonean citizens in exile were being repatriated. Auntie S. traveled from Washington to visit Fuambai, who was doing anthropological research in The Gambia. Auntie S. wanted to hitch a free ride on the repatriation buses, to check on two houses she owned in Freetown. Fuambai marveled at her aunt’s ability to slip back into African modes of interrelating with people, and her sheer ability to blend in and get what she wanted. “You would never imagine that she had ever left. She was in her element. I wanted to see the village through her lenses. She would go to people’s houses and they would put out food on the floor for her . . . she blended with people wherever she was . . . she was charismatic [and . . .] could connect. . . . I let her talk and put us on the bus.” Her aunt’s presence and attitude garnered for Fuambai the possibility of listening to the talk of women in exile, in different camps. Auntie S. would solicit their stories, ask about missing relatives, and generally spark conversations. From such conversations, she learned the secret that these women had performed initiation rituals even when on the run.
It was clear that Fuambai had had to think and speak often in her life about gender inequality; in TV interviews she reacted against popular images in the West of African women as pitiable victims of patriarchal family and religious systems. In our conversations, she acknowledged that sometimes African women would strategically deploy such images themselves, and stressed that she sympathized with their needs when they did so—but in the context of anti-FGM activism, she resented them. To counteract them she underscored her own memories of growing up in a large expatriate family, surrounded by women who seemed to her to be running the household and making all the important decisions. I loved an image she used, of women “tying up their lappas” in the face of a challenge. Lappas are wrap-around skirt cloths, and Kono women foreseeing a physical scuffle would tie them up firmly lest they be easily ripped off. The image was used in demands for loyalty, as in “I tied my lappa up for you!” (I fought for you!). Her mother and her aunts— like initiated women in Kono—were fully willing literally to tie up their lappas to tackle any man who would threaten them with violence but also metaphorically to address conflicts of different kinds. Fuambai stressed that women who had undergone Bondo—and even more so if they had undergone it together—were expected to rally to each other’s aid against men, outsiders, and others who might infringe on their interests.


(Feigning) subordination to men
Fuambai described herself as an African feminist, but also as in some ways conservative and traditionalist, to the point that she often sympathized with the values of religious Republicans in the United States, though she voted Democrat and loved [118]the Obamas. She knew that some aspects of her picture of sex and male-female relationships were such that feminists and many Westerners would reject them. For instance, she expressed in a televised interview her articulate support for polygyny (Badawi 2015). Earlier, she told me she would have been willing to be part of a polygynous marriage herself, with the understanding that it would have to be with a man with the wherewithal to make such an arrangement a dignified, politically and economically advantageous arrangement. She was unapologetic and frank about what she called her philosophy: “I will respect you, worship you, take your shoes, cook for you, do your laundry. . . . Your house is clean. . . . [An African woman] is in a man’s house. . . . She goes into her man’s house. . . . I do think a man should be paying the rent, sustaining me. . . . My choosing a man means I am giving up on other men who are economic possibilities. Tradition says ‘This is your wife—you have to provide housing for her, provide for her.’”
Kono and surrounding groups Fuambai was familiar with treated marriage as a pragmatic arrangement, a matter of people finding a complementary gender counterpart that would allow them to achieve sustenance and reproduce patrilines and clans. This did not preclude emotional closeness, but there was actually some condemnation of women who “loved their husbands too much” and therefore ceased to demand that men provide for them and for their own families (Hardin 1993: 64). Delicious sex and infatuated love were in some cases reserved for lovers rather than spouses, though there was supposed to be an expectation of appropriate reciprocity from lovers as well.
Fuambai loved the idea of powerful women manipulating men, pretending to be dutiful wives, but wresting sexual pleasure, affection, and fecundity from lovers. She used this image to contest the picture of African women as spineless, ignorant, or brainwashed victims of patriarchy that anti-FGM seemed to her to promulgate. Nevertheless, she did not enact this feminine ideal all the way herself, expressing personal ambivalence about the instrumental attitude to marriage, noting that she had been raised in the United States and that this had also shaped how she loved and engaged in relationships. She noted that among Krio in Freetown, and certainly among Kono and other Sierra Leonean expatriates in the United States and London, there was an increasing preference for the model of monogamous “true love,” associated with status, education, and Westernization. Monogamous “true love” had considerable appeal for her as well. She brought up a female cousin’s good-natured contempt for her in this regard, and her laughing injunction to Fuambai to stick to American men, because she didn’t have what it took to deal with African men. We delved into this in conversation, and concluded that for her, a man could be her main source of companionship and emotional support, something less likely in Kono itself, with the stronger separation of the sexes.
But my sense is that the footings of male-female relationships in government and academic institutions in North America, where men and women were supposed to downplay or disarticulate many previously established differences between them, simply didn’t fulfill Fuambai. She certainly participated in such milieus competently, and indeed benefited from them, but at another level, more intimate yet self-aware because much more problematized, she bought into the beauty and the desirability of a social life in which there was a more marked differentiation of genders, to some extent along traditional Kono lines. She spoke enthusiastically about [119]how Kono understood the sexes to be different, exclusive, and complementary; each was its own milieu, with its responsibilities and privileges, and with its own hierarchy (see also F. Ahmadu 200: 298, 299). She underscored that the Kono female initiation ritual taught subordination of young women to female elders, and the art of feigning subservience to men in their verbal communication, body language and gestures, and the performance of domestic duties.14 Kono women would consistently seek to maintain a myth of male dominance that ultimately enabled them to protect their female prerogatives (especially against increasingly masculinized religion and culture in Africa) (F. Ahmadu 2000: 306).
But even as she respected and defended traditional gender roles, Fuambai made space for changes. She spoke with admiration about expatriate women in the DMV who worked hard and bought their own houses. More to the point, in March of 2014, she was elected president of the Kono Union of the DMV. She was the first woman and the first American-born Sierra Leonean to occupy that office. Media-savvy and competent with accounting, she worked hard to inject vigor and optimism into the ailing association. As she portrayed it, running the Union entailed much dealing with coups, betrayals, retaliations, bad press, working alliances, triumphs, and blunders. She ferociously demanded that some much-loved kin show their loyalty to her and to her father and mother as community creators and philanthropists, and whenever it was not forthcoming, she was willing to burn bridges in defense of her family and what she felt was best for Kono and Kono women. At one point, an elderly, politically active auntie of hers remarked that Fuambai’s contenders were Fuambai’s seniors, and were furthermore men, and that therefore Fuambai should capitulate to them. The auntie stated that there was or should be no difference between Kono Union and Kono life, and that a woman must be under a man. Fuambai did not yield: “I would argue that the Kono Union is not a traditional Kono organization, and in this setting, if a woman is in charge, let her be in charge.”


On Bondo and becoming a woman
In 1991, while she was still an undergraduate at university, Fuambai’s mother, aunts, and grandmother invited her, her sister, and other girls in her family to “join Bondo.” She was twenty-one years old at the time. I think she was ambivalent about avowing the extent to which she had consented to the ritual. Perhaps this stemmed from valuing both the principle of consent and the courage to consent, and yet deeming the value of consent not to trump other values that the ritual enacted. “I did give consent to join Bondo. . . . Some would argue I didn’t give consent because I didn’t quite know what would happen.” Still, Fuambai did know that it involved some cutting “down there,” because a young aunt had described to her the secret goings-on and the cutting that she’d witnessed when she’d spied on a Bondo ritual. The young aunt had backed down from travelling to Sierra Leone to be initiated, but Fuambai’s own response, in her own words, was one of “Show me this thing I’m supposed to be afraid of.” She was unsure of her memories, regarding whether [120]prior to undergoing Bondo she had “read something” or not by the Nigerian physician Olayinka Koso-Thomas, who had worked in Sierra Leone and condemned FGM fiercely; she had no knowledge, however, of the careful ethnographic analyses of the cultural significance of these practices published by Ellen Gruenbaum (1982), Janice Boddy (1982), and others, or of the more explosive, activist-minded denunciation by Fran Hosken ([1980] 1982). For local Kono girls back then, there certainly was no “full and informed consent” to the ritual; in fact, there was an attitude on the part of some of the older women to the effect that the ritual involved intentionally tricking girls. Kono girls nowadays, Fuambai noted, did tend to know that the ritual involved cutting and pain.15
Fuambai’s account of her decision to undergo Bondo pointed to her childhood. She had memories from her early years in Sierra Leone of frequent wonder and delicious tingling fear and fascination with the dancing, the masquerades, and the secrecy surrounding the Poro and Bondo initiation rituals for adolescent boys and girls respectively. She remembered growing up in the United States surrounded by a set of strong women—her mother, aunts, older cousins, and her friends—who seemed vigorous and knowledgeable, and who clearly spoke about secret matters of import among themselves, but would change the subject when Fuambai arrived. She had very much wanted to be a part of it all, informed, strong, and decisive. She took for granted from early on that to achieve that, she would one day have to join Bondo. Her aunts and grandmother sang Bondo songs around her and spoke about it as a wonderful celebration. “For me the awesomeness of Bondo was the lure. Not being part of it was a problem. I’d heard women arguing in terms of the right to open your mouth that Bondo gave you. . . . You came into a conversation on sex, and they stopped talking. . . . And I wanted IN.”16 She yearned for access to the secrets of these women, and for the right to speak and be hearkened to as a full-fledged woman. As if preempting imagined critics, she added that for her it was never a matter of [ethnic] identity, of being “truly African” or gaining a sense of belonging. Neither was she buying into the Kono sense that there was something childishly unappealing or androgynous about her genitals, nor that she needed initiation to truly become a woman. “No, what attracted me was the power.”
Again, I must note that I was struck by the sheer frequency with which Fuambai’s claims in this regard were subject of disbelief or second-guessing by people reading her work or hearing her stories. Her explanation of why she sought initiation, and of its importance to her, was a focus of such doubt. In a TV interview (Sackur 2016), for instance, anti-FGM activist Nimco Ali suggested that Fuambai had been traumatized by the initiation, and had come up with a legitimating story [121]when the time came to pick a cultural identity. Several people to whom I told Fuambai’s story were similarly persuaded that she displayed false consciousness or something like a Stockholm syndrome. Skeptics’ premise was that unquestionably, something horrible and irredeemable had happened to Fuambai and to every initiated woman; Fuambai has often protested that most of those women would argue that it had not (F. Ahmadu 2000: 284; Sackur 2016). It’s as if, for skeptics, genuine choice for Fuambai could only have led to her rejection of practices that skeptics disapproved of. Her choosing otherwise—even if Fuambai felt that she was making a thoughtful choice for her own edification—could not be considered autonomous or free.
As Fuambai told the story, the initiates and several of the older women flew to Freetown in December of 1991; one young aunt who was afraid to undergo the initiation opted out. Fuambai’s oldest aunt determined that the main house for the initiation of Fuambai, her sister Sunju, and a cousin should be in Koidu, the capital of the chiefdom; Fuambai’s other cousin would undergo it in her father’s village. The women had Fuambai’s uncles clear a bush behind the house in preparation for the event. The sowei, who was charged with protecting the initiates from witchcraft and other dangers during this physically and spiritually vulnerable time, would have chosen an auspicious site and “fortified” the space spiritually. Before being secluded, Fuambai and the three younger girls were taken to Fuambai’s maternal grandfather’s village, her father’s village, and others, to seek blessings.
The ritual started, and Fuambai knew it was too late to turn back when she found herself naked with other girls, by a river, their clothing out of sight. She heard the women talking about their bodies. They were fascinated with Fuambai, because she was fully physically an adult by then, and because she had come back from the United States to undergo the ritual. “She looks like Finda!” one woman said. The women bathed and shaved them, and the fact that it would definitely involve her genitals became absolutely clear. Fuambai figured out later that the medicinal leaves they had been given for analgesic effect were making her high, because everything seemed great.
That night they were all sitting in a hut, lit with a couple of candles. Everybody was being quiet, though there were lots of women. Fuambai was miffed that all the women were checking out her vulva; a few times that the sowei came and opened her legs, all would peer, curious about an adult, uncircumcised clitoris. “They looked like ‘Oof! This needs to be cut’. . . but also surprised that it wasn’t as ghastly . . . they probably expected a little dick.” At that point, a woman whom Fuambai knew as Auntie J. came. She worked as a nurse in the United States, and Fuambai’s mom, very worried about her daughters’ pain, had arranged for Auntie J. to give them some anesthetic. Auntie J. told Fuambai that because she was an adult, she should know that what would happen was that some of the flesh of her vulva17 would be cut off, but that Auntie J. would anesthetize her first. Fuambai recalled wondering whether she would enjoy sex as she had in the past, and thinking “Well, if I don’t enjoy sex and orgasms again, I’ll just study more.” She added, “The idea that a woman won’t enjoy sex is Western . . . very improbable.”.[122]

I opened my legs. Sunju opened her eyes wide. They were holding me, but I had to appear calm. Auntie J. injected me. Sunju cried. They held her down and injected her. Then at the break of dawn they hoisted me up and bolted through the door and rushed to the clearing. There was drumming. I knew pain was coming, but thought the anesthesia might help. These women had me lifted with my legs spread. I felt this kgggg [Fuambai made a noise to represent the sensation] on one side, and I screamed bloody murder. Then there was another cut on the other side. Then they went for the labia, both sides. I felt blood gushing, and threw up. The women were horrified at this. “This is not bad! [Not disgusting],” they protested. I fainted. Just before fainting, I saw them bringing my sister out. . . . I was saying, “No!” and thinking, “These savages!”

When Fuambai came to, she was lying on the floor with her head cradled on her mom’s lap. Her mom was wiping away her tears. She was in great pain. She looked around for Sunju, and saw her and her little cousin walking around and laughing. The cousin was only seven years old, tiny and beautiful. Some of the women had found her too small, but Fuambai’s aunt, the girl’s grandmother and primary caretaker, had not wanted to miss the opportunity to have her go through Bondo. The child had been inordinately proud of this, and Fuambai later heard that she hadn’t flinched when she was cut. Then a sowei instructed Fuambai to get up and go pee. The pain throbbed when she stood up. Sunju accompanied her. Urination stung brutally, and Fuambai cried. She remembered that Sunju (“She was so cute!”) thought she was crying because the toilet was a mere hole in the ground, and tried to console her: “Don’t cry! It’s because they’re poor that they don’t have toilets!”
Fuambai described how the local girls felt sorry for her, and how some who had already been initiated left school early to come and look at her. Many of them referred to her as “the white girl,” because she came from the United States. The attitudes of the women present varied, something Fuambai later saw in other initiations she witnessed. Some were very empathetic with the girls’ pain; Fuambai imagined that they were reliving their own. Others’ attitudes seemed to her to be more along the tough-love lines of “Come on! Get over it!” Some of the women took on the attitude that they’d successfully tricked the girls, “kind of like telling them you were taking them for ice cream but actually got them vaccinated instead.” Adding to her thick description, she noted that the message to the girls was that as a result of the ritual, they were now real women.
As she admitted that the pain had been excruciating, Fuambai added that Kono people think of it as instructional. “You are introduced to the beauty but also to the harshness of womanhood. You learn to cooperate with other women, and to bear the pain of pregnancy and birth. The sowei will also be your midwife and your supporters [in initiation] will be your supporters [when giving birth]. . . . You are dead when cut, and then you are born again. It’s a liminal space of supernatural transformation. One anthropologist wrote that the cut puts senses in disarray, and that you become very vulnerable, and in that state you can learn ancestral values.” The Bondo ritual enacted, as it purported to instill, key virtues of women—virtues that reflected the strength that Fuambai so admired. Soweis themselves were exemplars in this regard: wise, unyielding, and unsentimental, and responsible for inculcating novices with “stoicism, which must be displayed during excision; tenacity [123]and endurance, which are achieved through the many other ordeals a novice must undergo; and, most important, “dry-eye,” that is, daring, bravery, fearlessness, and audacity, qualities that will enable young women to stand their ground as adults in their households and within the greater community” (F. Ahmadu 2000: 299).
The most dramatic part of the initiation was the cutting, of course, but there was more to it. For one thing, as Fuambai said she would realize later when doing research on similar rituals in The Gambia, there was much chance for the adult women to indulge in sexual liaisons and to break certain everyday rules of propriety during the public part of the ceremony. Initiates, once cut, were taught songs with layers of meaning, and somehow it all involved lessons on how to be good lovers, and to control men’s penises and sexual actions for their own pleasure and eventual fertility. It was a time to learn about that, and about much else.18 After pointing this out, she expressed clearly her ambitions for the practice: “We need to bring back the sexual education aspect, the separation of men and women.” In an earlier publication, she had stated that she would describe herself as “neutral” with respect to the continuation of the practice (F. Ahmadu 2000: 305); by 2015, her position was less neutral. She explained in an email that her position had changed because of the sudden popularity of labiaplasty and other forms of FGS in Western countries.19 She wanted to see the whole package return with its tradition and meaning, and for it not to become like current, secular male circumcision, which she found too clinical, or like much female genital cutting in The Gambia, which took place in people’s homes, with little or no ritual. To her—and here I underscore that these are the views of a woman who both underwent initiation as a native and who carried out participant observations as a trained anthropologist—the old rituals, with long periods of seclusion and an intense learning process, seemed most worthwhile.
Fuambai did not benefit fully from that aspect of her own ritual. Her mother had arranged for them to recover in a friend’s big, beautiful house, where they were luxuriously taken care of. Fuambai remembers beginning to smile again when the pain subsided somewhat, and receiving more visits from schoolgirls. The sowei and her entourage would come every so often, ensure the wound was closing properly, change their bandages, and comment on how it all looked good. Another auntie, a Mende woman, commented on what a great job the sowei had done on Fuambai. Fuambai’s mom said she’d gotten the best one, likely to produce the best-looking surgery with the least bleeding and the shortest healing period. A cousin later told Fuambai that that sowei’s reputation increased hundredfold after Fuambai’s operation, for having cut a “white” woman and doing a good job. Several years later, Fuambai met a woman in the bush in The Gambia who told her she had heard of [124]the Gandhorun children who had been brought from the United States, and of the sowei who had cut them. “If you’ve got money, you get her.”
Fuambai’s mother did not wish to wait for the “coming-out” aspect of the ritual, so they unceremoniously left for Freetown. There, they stayed at another aunt’s place, and got more painkillers and antibiotics. Fuambai told me she had felt worried and sad at the prospect of never enjoying sex again. In Freetown, she met a young, beautiful, flirtatious Mandingo man who persuaded her to sneak out and go to the movies with him; her desires came back and she knew it was going to be ok. She returned to the United States three weeks after her surgery. “I got up courage not long after, I looked with a mirror, and I could say ‘wow, this is pretty!’ I liked how it looked. I wanted to show it off. I had thought I’d never have sex again. . . . But then it was gorgeous.” She reported that her American boyfriend found her beautiful all the way, and thought that the rope with amulets and leaves tied around her waist was very sexy. When they had sex, she felt some numbness in the site of the cut, but she could still achieve orgasm. The numbness soon went away.


Talking about initiations and sex
Initiates were strongly enjoined to protect the secrecy of the Bondo ritual. In an email elaborating on this, she wrote, “I knew initiates were made to take an oath of secrecy—but I don’t recall that I was made to take any oath. I was also told that the herbal medicines they gave me would make my mouth ‘heavy’ whenever I wanted to talk about what happened in Bondo.” The injunction to secrecy eventually created a dilemma for Fuambai: she could continue to respect the secrets of Bondo as she had for years, at the cost of letting only negative accounts of it make it to public light, or she could seek to correct the overwhelmingly negative popular account of female genital cutting, at the cost of breaking the vows of secrecy. It seemed to me that she did not depend for economic and emotional purposes on the set of companions who underwent Bondo with her quite in the same way they depended on each other, and that for this reason she could afford to break with tradition in order to defend it. And she did. She claimed that for this she was at times questioned in public by men who knew she wasn’t supposed to speak about Bondo. Her response was that she had spoken to several soweis and to many women who had undergone the rituals, and that they had blessed her for defending them while protecting their own secrecy as a cultural right.20
In several of her public lectures, and much more intimately when I interviewed her, Fuambai spoke about her sexual experiences and about her own body with considerable candor, revealing more about these than most people usually do outside close relations. But she did not appear at all confessional or affected, or moved by some drive to make public an image of herself as somebody totally comfortable with her own sexuality. To me it seemed something she did instrumentally, to participate effectively in a struggle that mattered deeply to her, over African women’s personal and cultural rights; she framed her own sexuality, presenting [125]certain aspects of it in a certain light, in order to reframe the initiation rituals for a hostile public.
One explicit message was that she had sufficient practical and theoretical knowledge of sex and orgasms prior to undergoing Bondo to have a point of comparison with her experiences afterward. She could thus begin to shed suspicion on strong anti-FGM claims that cutting damaged women’s genitals’ functionality and rendered orgasms difficult or impossible (e.g., Gele, Johansen, and Sundby 2012; Reyes and Thuy Seelinger 2013; and Thabet and Thabet 2003). She explained to me that she had grown up in the 1980s and, in her own words, had “had no hang-ups about sex.” As a teenager she had had ample opportunities to read about sexuality, had talked about it a great deal with cousins—some of them initiated, and for the most part cheerfully vulgar and detailed in their accounts of their vigorous sexual exploits— and so had good theoretical knowledge of intercourse, oral sex, and orgasms (see F. Ahmadu 2007: 281). By her sophomore year at university, she also had a boyfriend— a very tall, handsome (and white) former varsity athlete. “I got the hot guy . . .” Summarizing the relationship, she wrote to me that with time and mutual trust, the relationship became sexual, and he introduced her to foreplay, oral sex, and so on.
Of course, she was also explicit about her continued ability to achieve orgasms through oral or manual stimulation, or heterosexual sex, after undergoing Bondo. She was interested in underscoring that orgasms for her were most intense and pleasurable when achieved with heterosexual intercourse, and that this was as Kono thought it should be. She argued that this was because of the famed G-spot. She took it to be something that’s situated differently in different women, and stated that hers was deep-set, almost cervical, and hence the superiority, for her, of orgasms achieved through skillful vaginal penetration.21
This was yet another matter concerning which Fuambai’s accounts and those of initiated women who approved of FGS were disbelieved (e.g., 2007: 280–84). In her sister Sunju’s documentary (S. Ahmadu n.d.), a skeptical, uncircumcised Sierra Leonean woman expressed doubt about whether a circumcised woman who claimed to have experienced orgasms really had: how could she know that what they experienced really was an orgasm? The circumcised woman’s eye rolling in response said it all. Of course she had. Along these lines, Fuambai wrote that “unlike these ‘mutilated’ African women, no one seems to question the credibility of Western women with surgical ‘designer vaginas’ who report increased psychological and physical satisfaction after drastic genital operations” (2007: 284).


Fighting the good fight
As a young woman, Fuambai had aspired and fully expected one day to become, as she put it, “a hotshot international lawyer or banker” at the International Monetary [126]Fund (IMF) or World Bank. She was still on that path from 1992 to 1994, during which time she got a master’s in African Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS/University of London). Early on during her stay in London, however, Fuambai attended several meetings of the still young anti-FGM movement, read Alice Walker’s (1992) book, and watched Walker’s and Parmar’s film, Warrior Marks (1993). Book and film both represented female genital cutting as culturally endorsed, mutilating torture, a brutal betrayal of women by their mothers, and a practice likely to cause deadly hemorrhages and difficult births. “I felt outed, humiliated, disappointed, angry with that book. It made us look like our mothers were crazy . . . psychologically damaged.” She changed direction, and in 1995 started her MSc/PhD program in Social Anthropology at the London School of Economics, under the supervision of famed Africanist and feminist professor Henrietta Moore. She went on to do six years of doctoral fieldwork on male and female initiation rites among Mandinka peoples in The Gambia, time during which she also consulted for UNICEF and the British Medical Research Council. She received her doctorate in 2005.
In 1995, Fuambai published an article in Pride magazine that described Kono female initiation rites and contested Walker’s picture of brutalized African women, their traitorous mothers, and the deadliness of FGM. Expanding on this later, she explained that contrary to most Europeans and Americans, who understand being a male or a female to be an innate given and a matter of nature, Kono thought about this differently (F. Ahmadu 2000). They saw young children as somewhat androgynous beings in need of transformation or completion through social practices that made them fully, properly male or female. The prepuce in boys was held to be a feminine remnant, vagina-like and unseemly, and similarly the external part of the clitoris and the labia in girls were deemed ugly and masculine. Only with the appropriate rituals that included the physical removal of these tissues that made children androgynous, would they be able to become fully sexed, to reproduce properly, and to become part of the world of “culture” (F. Ahmadu 2000: 295, 296).
In our interview, Fuambai told me that as an activist, speaker, and occasional consultant for Sierra Leonean government offices, she was privileging arguments about equality and universal human rights, rather than the more relativizing arguments I was prone to want to discuss, to defend her people’s practices and to question anti-FGM rhetoric. She protested, for instance, that it was intolerably discriminatory that a white woman in London or Los Angeles could request a surgical transformation of her vulva for cultural, aesthetic reasons, but an African woman was not free to do the same. She could not legally find someone from her own society who was a recognized expert at such surgeries, to transform her vulva according to the aesthetic values of her society (see F. Ahmadu 2007: 284). In fact, she could not get one with a Western doctor if she argued that she was doing it for her own traditional cultural reasons. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that her interest in defending FGS and initiation rituals against zero-tolerance legislation was only in the interest of equal rights to individual freedom. As I interpret her, she respected and appreciated the collectives of initiated women, found these to contribute to the beauty, quality, and fairness of social life for both women and [127]men among Kono, and very much wanted to maintain the conditions that allowed those collectives to be reproduced.22
In 2006, Fuambai spearheaded the creation of the Miss Sierra Leone USA pageant; then in 2009, she founded the magazine SiA. Both engaged with culture, fashion, and the lifestyle of Afropolitan women, and Fuambai intended them to carry a positive message about admirable African womanhood. She explained that in the years that followed she was hurt by attacks from younger Sierra Leonean expatriate women who were willing to be insultingly critical of their circumcised mothers (F. Ahmadu 2014: 18). Concerned over these women’s reproduction of anti-FGM rhetoric, she rehashed the magazine completely in February of 2014, to be more pointedly the voice of empowered, circumcised women, and to educate internal critics. She furthermore ran successfully in 2014 for the presidency of the Kono Union in DMV, on a platform that called for respect for Kono women.
Despite the harshness, the stereotypes, and the misrepresentations of anti-FGM rhetoric and of direct critics, Fuambai’s public demeanor and speech seemed always to remain calm and well informed. This was in stark contrast to the often-insulting indignation of critics and opponents.23 When I commented on this, Fuambai responded that she knew that she represented a large number of women who would never get a chance to appear on TV and to be hearkened to, and that even in her case, opportunities seemed to be one-shot deals. “So I have to be very careful. In North America there’s this stereotype of the ‘angry black woman’ that is used to exclude some voices. . . . You’re not going to get anywhere being angry.”
My perception is that Fuambai has been relatively successful at undermining, at least among the public who have heard her speak, the more simplistic misrepresentations of FGS, and at urging caution when judging the unfamiliar. Yet she confided that her struggle had been at a cost to her career, her finances, and her emotional tranquility. She had turned down an offer of a well-paid, secure, tenure-track job at a university, in part because it came with friendly but pointed advice from the prospective employer that she put her activist work aside and focus on academic publications instead. I remembered that she had also had to be exhaustingly careful in her public lectures while employed by the National Institutes of Health in the United States. The question came up as we discussed this: why keep struggling? “I don’t feel I have a choice. I have to engage, to defend [FGS]. . . . If I could stop and do something else, I would.” Her motivation was religious, at least in part. She spoke about her faith in similar terms, as involving no choice: at one crucial moment in her adult life, she had suddenly felt the presence of God with absolute immediacy, awe, and relief. As she portrayed it, His obviousness to her rendered questions of choice about belief irrelevant.
In another episode that Fuambai deemed critical, she discovered an ancient Egyptian creation story according to which the first androgynous being was created through the blood of circumcision. She was struck by this being’s names, Sia and Saa, because these were also the names given respectively to the first girl and boy born to a Kono woman. “Sia” was in fact part of Fuambai’s own name, as her [128]mother’s firstborn daughter. She took this spirit, who in Mande peoples’ accounts was also generated in an original act of circumcision (e.g., see Boone 1986: 8, 9), to be somewhat akin to the Holy Spirit of the Christian Trinity. For her, these connections were no coincidence but rather a strong suggestion of the historical precedence, and perhaps founding originality, of Kono and neighboring people’s circumcision rituals, which she considered could have been the foundation for circumcision in Abrahamic religions like Judaism and Islam. She also took her discoveries to be an intimate affirmation of her purpose to be a voice for Sia and for her female ancestors. Hence her protests when she felt that certain dramatic anti-FGM gestures disrespected that spirit egregiously (F. Ahmadu 2014: 30–32).
Fuambai’s picture of a universe characterized by the immediate presence of a (mostly) benevolent God, and in which gendered personhood, identities, divisions, and virtues stemmed from, were modeled on, and were prescribed by that God, was what philosopher Charles Taylor would call a “moral source”: something the love, respect, or contemplation of which empowers [persons] to do and be good (1989: 83, 94). Fuambai identified as a child of such a God, and this provided some of the frames within which she determined what was good, valuable, ought to be done, or ought to be endorsed or opposed (Taylor 1989: 27). Engaging in her struggle was, in the context of such a frame, inseparable from being the strong, resourceful, African woman she aspired to be.


On ethnography, commonalities, and difference
Engaging with Fuambai opened windows for me into her unique, cosmopolitan, richly evaluative understandings of the kinds of persons and relationships there are in the world, of sexed bodies and proclivities, and of the footings of relationships among women and between spouses. Through her ethnographic and personal accounts, I grasped the diversity of ways in which FGS could fit, reasonably and with positive moral valence, into Kono and surrounding people’s lives. Getting there depended on our exchanges leading me to recognize certain commonalities between us, such as for instance, aspirations to physical courage, admiration for the competencies that lead to the achievement of valued results, including, at times, the willingness and ability to break rules, deploy drama, or otherwise skillfully manipulate relations; a loving interest in shaping children well and a desire that they share at least some of our values; clear and motivating (if different) preferences regarding the looks of genitals and bodies generally, and feelings and memories of sexual enjoyment; and a comparable sense that at least some conventional hierarchies, some of the time, are justified. We both could recognize critical moments in our history in which we felt that our eyes had been opened, that we had achieved insights that not everybody had access to, and we both had sufficient experiences with diverse groups’ footings of gendered relationships to have a comparative sense of which we preferred.24
Nevertheless, working with Fuambai also underscored for me that people’s understandings of the kinds of beings and persons they can possibly be (e.g., a child [129]of God, an androgynous woman in need of ritual perfection, or a diasporic citizen), the kinds of relations they can be part of (e.g., fellow initiates in rituals, matriarchs and underlings, opponents in public debates), what stands out in their horizons of concern (e.g., elegance in demeanor, fear of God, or equal treatment) differ and have differed in important, motivating ways between social groups and between persons. So have the considerations and criteria regarding what a good life would be. Fuambai’s own grasp of and dynamic redeployments of Kono, North American, and academic anthropological values or distinctions of worth are an example of how people reproduce, mix, and transform moralities. So it still makes sense to me to claim, pace James Faubion (2011: 9), Webb Keane (2016: 4), and James Laidlaw (2014: 224), that persons live in different moral worlds, and that their criteria for judging persons and actions are relative to those worlds. Living with other people sometimes requires us to establish commensurabilities between different worlds, but this is always a creative act of translation.25 So are ethnographic thick descriptions.
Much (but not all) anti-FGM legislation and action now seems to me a somewhat violent, morally absolutist imposition in the face of incommensurable moral worlds. My pluralist preference has been to engage instead in ethnography or similar efforts to come up with new, creative formulations that render such worlds mutually commensurable and intelligible. Fuambai and fellow scholars have engaged in such efforts effectively. The parties can then take stock, decide whether the differences are still unlivable, and reconsider their options—be they further attempts at creative mutual understanding, compromise, or violence. In a recent email, Fuambai reported from the front lines to her friends on a recent compromise along those lines: that the Government of Sierra Leone and leading soweis had signed MOUs “to prohibit under-18 female initiation and circumcision,” but allowing the “Bondo society and other [soweis] to self-regulate, create awareness and implement this policy nationwide.”


Acknowledgments
My research was funded by a Dean’s Research Award (Arts) and a Humanities Research Institute fellowship at the University of Regina. Christie Hubbs assisted in reviewing the anti-FGM literature, and I thank Marcia Calkowski, Philip Charrier, Michael Lambek, Rick Shweder, Eldon Soifer, and participants in the University of Regina’s Department of English OMAD lecture for comments and suggestions. I thank Fuambai herself for her generosity in engaging with me in this project.


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La force de Fuambai
Résumé : Bien qu’elle a grandi aux Etats-Unis, Fuambai Ahmadu accepta à l’âge de vingt-deux ans l’invitation de sa mère à rendre visite à ses proches du peuple Kono en Sierra Leone, pour recevoir les rites d’initiation secrets qui marquent la transition vers un statut de femme en âge de se marier et d’être un membre de la société secrète Bondo. La partie la plus notable du rite implique l’excision de la partie externe du clitoris et de la labia minora par une sowei, une femme en charge de ces cérémonies. Ce rituel, que l’on appelle Bondo, est le pendant féminin de l’initiation Poro pour les garçons, dans lequel ils sont circoncis et instruit comment être un homme. Fière de son statut d’initiée, elle s’est battue durant les vingt dernières années pour corriger et contester l’imaginaire des critiques occidentaux de la Mutilation Génitale Féminine représentant le rituel d’initiation comme un acte de torture et de mutilation, et les femmes Africaines comme des femmes mutilées et victimes de traditions patriarcales cruelles. Cet essai dresse le portrait moral de Fuambai et ce faisant, il aborde l’étude anthropologique des morales et défend un pluralisme libéral, ainsi que ses implications relativistes.
Carlos David LONDOÑO SULKIN is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Regina and the incoming President of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America (2017–2020). Since 1993, he has carried out ethnographic fieldwork among People of the Center (Colombian Amazon), mainly with Muinane-speaking clans. He is the author of People of substance: An ethnography of morality in the Colombian Amazon (University of Toronto Press, 2012).
Carlos David Londoño SulkinDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of ReginaClassroom Building, CL 306.33737 Wascana ParkwayRegina, SK S4S 0A2Canadacarlos.londono@uregina.ca


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1. This would be classified as Type 2 FGM in the World Health Organization’s typology (WHO 2016).
2. Bondo, Bundu, or Sande are equivalent terms in Mende and other Sierra Leonean languages that connote secrecy and privacy; they also refer to women’s secret initiation society. Other terms are Suna, Susu, and Serere (Hardin 1993: 35; Boone 1986: xxiin6).
3. “Female Genital Surgeries” is the preferred term of the Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa (2012). The term “mutilation” presupposes that the practices in question are harmful, contrary to the judgment of the majority of the women who undergo these.
4. Though a relative newcomer to the topic, I was invited to be a signatory to the 2012 document.
5. See Keane (2016: 121, 122); Laidlaw (2014: 32); Lambek (2010: 13); Robbins (2012); and Shweder (2012) for discussions.
6. For discussions of such changes, see Keane (2016); Rorty (1989: 9); Kulick (1992); and Robbins (2012), among many others.
7. For my purposely “lite” report on him, see Londoño Sulkin (2015); on my deeper Amazonian work, see Londoño Sulkin (2012).
8. With this, I begin to address Faubion’s requirement that analytical frameworks accounting for enduring systems of ethics must reveal how these systems engender their own reproduction in time (2011).
9. See Boddy (2016: 41, 42), on uninformed and patronizing attributions of false consciousness to cut Hofriyati women in Sudan.
10. For a thorough argument along these lines, see Taylor’s critical case against Sartre’s concept of radical choice (1985: 28–30).
11. The Krio (or Creole) are people descended from slaves in the British colonies who were freed and resettled in Sierra Leone in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
12. Hardin notes that matrifilial ties are less apparent than patrilineal ones but are equally important facets of Kono identity (1993: 57). Kono women marry into their husband’s households but nonetheless maintain allegiances to their own patrilineages (1993: 59).
13. Fuambai called most African women of her aunt’s generation “aunties”; her mother’s sisters, however, she addressed as “mom.”
14. Fuambai was not persuaded that women’s having to feign subordination was evidence of a real power differential between men and women.
15. In recent years, Fuambai came to see ethical sense in the call to change cutting practices so that they take place later in life, and with full and informed consent. What compelled her was a discussion of cases of children whose reproductive or sexual anatomy did not fit typical definitions of female or male, were surgically “disambiguated,” and later resented caregivers’ choice of sex for them.
16. See Boone’s (1986: xi–xv) clarifying account of the institutional significance of secrecy among Mende peoples, and the series of distinctions of worth between the initiated, who possess an informed intellect, a widened vision, and deepened discernment, and the incomprehension and dumbness of the uninitiated.
17. Fuambai did not remember the exact terms Auntie J. used.
18. Shweder (2016: 146) reports on a Kenyan man’s similar account of his month-long recovery from a painful circumcision as a time during which he learned the history of his people, what it meant to be a man, and how to treat women, have sex, care for cattle, face up to painful ordeals in life, and be fearless.
19. See Boddy (2016) on this specific topic. On inconsistencies in Australian legal treatment of cosmetic genital surgeries, religious male circumcision, and FGM, see Rogers (2016: 236).
20. In 2016, a set of (Shia Muslim) Bohra people from Gujarat, India, thanked her for these very reasons.
21. The part of the clitoris that is cut in so-called Type 2 and some Type 3 FGM is the external, visible part; a much larger proportion of the organ, made of erectile, potentially orgasm-triggering tissue, is hidden under the labia majora, and is untouched by FGS. For a discussion on the extent of knowledge and ignorance about female genital anatomy in debates about FGS, see Shweder (2013: 216, 217).
22. See Taylor (1994: 52–61), on a “politics of recognition” that can protect the interests of a collective in creating the conditions for its own reproduction.
23. See, for instance, Brockie (2013).
24. For convergent discussions on shared feeling being fundamental to mutual understanding, see Laidlaw (2014: 224) and Taylor (1985: 61, 62).
25. Rorty’s treatment of “passing theories” (1989: 14) converges with this account of commensurability.
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article is an ethnographic account of one place during an unpromising moment in an epoch some have begun to call the Anthropocene. In the Murik Lakes, at the mouth of the Sepik River in Papua New Guinea, the Anthropocene calls logocentric and political views of &quot;place&quot; into question. Instead of being a site where the world is endowed with moral personhood, or where dialogue takes place with the global, &quot;place&quot; has now taken on a dark, conditional mood. In the Anthropocene, &quot;place&quot; is a site of pending tragedy, pervaded by the loss, rather than the creation, of meaning.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article is an ethnographic account of one place during an unpromising moment in an epoch some have begun to call the Anthropocene. In the Murik Lakes, at the mouth of the Sepik River in Papua New Guinea, the Anthropocene calls logocentric and political views of &quot;place&quot; into question. Instead of being a site where the world is endowed with moral personhood, or where dialogue takes place with the global, &quot;place&quot; has now taken on a dark, conditional mood. In the Anthropocene, &quot;place&quot; is a site of pending tragedy, pervaded by the loss, rather than the creation, of meaning.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Place in the Anthropocene






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © David Lipset. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau4.3.014
Place in the Anthropocene
A mangrove lagoon in Papua New Guinea in the time of rising sea-levels
David LIPSET, University of Minnesota


This article is an ethnographic account of one place during an unpromising moment in an epoch some have begun to call the Anthropocene. In the Murik Lakes, at the mouth of the Sepik River in Papua New Guinea, the Anthropocene calls logocentric and political views of “place” into question. Instead of being a site where the world is endowed with moral personhood, or where dialogue takes place with the global, “place” has now taken on a dark, conditional mood. In the Anthropocene, “place” is a site of pending tragedy, pervaded by the loss, rather than the creation, of meaning.
Keywords: Anthropocene, rising sea-levels, place, tragedy, mangrove lagoons, Sepik, Murik Lakes, Papua New Guinea



Moralities of place
Attributes of “places,” such as houses and trees, appear all over twentieth-century ethnography. They are often taken to refer to how people express what belonging to a community in a particular environment is like. In the course of everyday life, for example, Western Apache allude to “place-worlds” on the landscape, such as a tree where an owl-spirit lived, by way of making indirect appeals to social norms (Basso 1996: 6). Features of “place,” that is to say, are logocentric sites in which a moral “inside” can be discriminated from an immoral “outside.” On the one hand, “places” consist of signs of collective belonging. On the other, they are defined by moral boundaries (van Gennep [1912] 1960: 15–25).
In the New Guinea Highlands, to cite another example, the inclusiveness and exclusiveness of “place” were made clear when Tsembaga men planted little rumbim bushes. On these property markers they all laid hands. By doing so, they asserted “connection to the land and … membership in the group” that claimed it (Rappaport 1968: 19). The Berber house offers another useful example of the contradictory value of “place.” One’s spatial disposition toward the house, so Bourdieu explains, depends on gender.

Whereas for the man the house is not so much a place he goes into as a place he comes out of, the woman is bound to give the opposite importance and meaning… . For her, movement outwards consists above all in acts of expulsion, movement inwards, that is, from the threshold towards the hearth, is her proper concern. (1982: 280)
In other words, the Berber house is a moral site that simultaneously excludes and includes.
Perhaps some of the sheen has worn off the conceptual brilliance of Bourdieu’s structuralism amid the hurly burly of the globalized moment. Boundaries, in my terms, have become dialogized, polyphonic in a multiple and multileveled way that confound moral binaries. The encounter of inner and outer voices, of cosmopolitan and parochial interests, now signifies not belonging and property, but contested belonging and contested property. Attributed specific values and subjected to specific practices, places are now subject to a dialogue among parochial interests and a dialogue, or argument, between local and interests representing the state as well as other, universalized, globalized concerns. Donald S. Moore has called this dialogue “a cultural politics of place” (1998: 346).
Similarly, Rodman also construed “place” in Vanuatu and Fiji as “politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and multiple” in construction, or, in her terms, as “multilocal” and “multivocal” (1992: 641; see also Escobar 2001, 2008). In French Tahiti, Kahn could not have encountered this kind of “politics of place” in any more flagrant circumstances. “Always present … were conflicts between Tahitian ideas about land as nurturing mother and Western ideas about land as expendable resource. These tensions were greatly exacerbated by the arrival of the nuclear testing program” (2011: 69). In this equivocal view, “place,” qua property, is subject to legal pluralism (see von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Griffiths 2008). It is claimed in terms of local discourse, through tropes, genealogy, and ethnohistory, as well as through the state and the marketplace. If “place” is an argument, sovereignty over places must be viewed as political, polyphonic, and the site of inconclusive dialogue. No longer does “place” refer to a monologue in which its “wisdom” or “the senses” prevail and have the last word (cf. Feld and Basso 1996).
Recent ethnography has also seen the emergence of a related perspective of “place” which Viveiros de Castro has called “perspectivism” (1998; see also Kohn 2013). According to this radical relativist view, animals, persons, and places are imbued with their own autonomous personhood. For example, in Athapaskan and Tlingit accounts of the Saint Elias Mountains in the Yukon, glaciers are “willful, sometimes capricious, easily excited by human intemperance but equally placated by quick-witted human responses” (Cruikshank 2005: 8). Being sentient, they are “offended” by the smell of grease used in cooking and “resent” being watched by people wearing sunglasses (ibid.: 229). Animate places may be seen as possessing ontological moral agency. But, as in the glacier example, they declare that they are also caught up in fraught political contexts where they are subjected to modern forces of dispossession that seek to define them as “unmarked, abstract entit[ies], emptied of any social and cultural content” (Braun 2002: 42). As perspectivism privileges precapitalist “voices” of “places” themselves over modern ones, at least implicitly, it brings to bear a thoroughgoing commitment to value pluralism (Weber 1946). Regardless of its claims about particular realities, I think that perspectivism necessarily culminates the more explicitly equivocal, plural view of place that has been emerging in the past twenty-five or so years.
Now in this article, I want to think about these concepts of belonging, sovereignty, and territory—that is, of “place”—during a historical moment when it is coming under threat not from the state and capitalist interests but from their noxious side-effects, the anthropogenic environmental forces (rising sea-levels) for which institutions neither take responsibility nor guarantee the future against potential loss. In the present epoch, which has begun to be known (at least in come corners) as the Anthropocene, human–nature relations have not only come to be viewed as a unity rather than a binary, but have also been put at risk by the damage people have done (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Sayre 2012; cf. Crist 2013; Malm and Hornborg 2014). What impact does the Anthropocene, both as concept and as phenomenon, have on the concept of “place”?
Here, I analyze the dialogics of one place during an unpromising moment in the Anthropocene. The vulnerability of my ethnographic exemplar could hardly be greater. The Murik Lakes are the world of the littoral. In this tide-dominated estuary, narrow, barrier beaches divide a large system of mangrove lagoons from the Pacific Ocean (see Figure 1). There is some ambiguity, it is true, about the impact of sea-level rise on mangroves in deltas of major rivers, because the rate of sediment discharge may be able to keep pace with erosion (Hogarth 2007: 232). This much is clear, however. Since the beginning of the new millennium, rising sea-levels have annually knocked down coconut palms, left shoreline trees for dead, and breached the beaches on which the Murik villages stand. Their place-consciousness aroused by these warnings, the Murik have been left to ponder the future (and past) of and in their lakescape—and I've been listening.1
I begin by introducing the Murik environment, its ethnohistory as a commons, and the signifiers of moral personhood in terms of which boundaries are intelligible and locally disputed. Arguing that the contemporary lakescape continues to be construed in ethnohistoric and cultural terms, I next analyze the property regime in the postcolonial era. A survey of damage caused by rising sea-levels and resettlement initiatives ensues. The last section focuses on property rights amid the prospect of carbon payments for the Murik mangroves. To conclude, I argue that the Anthropocene calls views of “place,” in each and every register, into question. Now a dark, conditional mood is pending, where tragedy, that is to say, the loss, rather than the creation, of meaning, may be foreseen.


Figure 1. Murik Lakes and North Coast of Papua New Guinea.



A disputed commons
Some 6000 years BP, sediment from a vast inland sea flowed out into the ocean through two openings located close to where contemporary Murik people place an ancient shoreline. Prograding plains began to form by 4500 years bp that featured beach ridges, sand barriers, and mangrove-fringed coastal lakes, as well as sago swamps near higher ground. By a thousand years ago, all that was left of the inland sea were two river systems, the Sepik and the Ramu, and an estuary made up of the Murik Lakes, to the west of the Sepik mouth, and the Watam Lakes, to the east (Swadling 1997: 5). The two lake systems are basically inshore marine ecosystems in which the boundaries between land and water not only shift but do so regularly.
At some point in the past, perhaps as recently as two hundred and fifty years or so ago, ancestors of contemporary Murik speakers resettled in this dynamic environment from two unrelated parts of the region (Lipset 1997). The two migrant groups did not speak the same language or even share the same adaptive strategy. One was a group of fishing people who had fled a previous settlement 50 miles up the Sepik, while the other was an inland, land-based group from “Mwarik,” a hilly region about 40 miles up the coast, where they presumably specialized in yam gardening, hunting, and animal husbandry, like other horticultural peoples in the region. The Sepik River group say they settled on the eastern side of the channel called Bok, while the land-based group settled on its western side. Rivals and enemies, they both encountered indigenous, lake-dwelling property-owners. Some Murik still refer to this era as a “civil war.” Initiatory male cults not only sponsored war parties against the indigenous villages, thereby taking rights to their property, but also attacked their fellow immigrants. That is to say, the lakes region was no less subject to pre-state violence than was the inland region surrounding it.
The Murik Lakes, or at least their prodigious fish stocks, became a common-pool resource. They are subject to joint ownership by these two communities of resource users and cannot be appropriated or alienated by any individual or individual group of fishermen. However it may be viewed as a commons, use of the lakes must nevertheless be understood as restricted. Social structure, consisting of names and lineage relationships and community membership, provides the bona fides from which “a bundle of rights” to the commons may be asserted and negotiated (Schlager and Ostrom 1992: 249).
Ownership and use-rights of the vast, becalmed lagoons (about 120 square miles of lakes and mangroves) are disputed. On the one hand, fishing rights are said to be unrestricted to all “Murik,” defined residentially and genealogically. On the other, fishing rights are more or less divided between the two ethnohistorically derived communities, each of which is subdivided into three villages. The central boundary between eastern and western communities lies at Bok, the aforementioned entry to the lakes (Figure 2). Rights to fish west of this channel are held by each of three villages, collectively called Big Murik (Jangaimot, Wokumot, and Aramot). Rights to fish the half east of Bok are claimed by the three Karau villages (Darapap, Karau itself, and Mendam). The central boundary more or less divides the lakes into two equal fishing zones, but the mangroves are clearly asymmetrical. As an eastern stakeholder flatly avowed about Aramot, the westernmost of the three Big Murik communities: “They do not own any mangroves.” Meanwhile, Aramot villagers assert claims through use. They fish and harvest shellfish on a daily basis, and have built “mangrove shacks” many miles east of the boundary. This long-simmering conflict, exposed and aggravated by the social mapping component of my research, added tension to it. I now discuss two sites along the disputed boundary.


Figure 2. The contested boundary of the Murik Lakes.

I boated with some western villagers along the edges of their mangroves, marking GPS waypoints and jotting down place-names of channels, bays, islands, and so on, in the lakescape. We came to the northern shore of the central boundary (Figure 2). Here, my informants said, a spirit lived underwater at a channel they called Brag Yangan, a brag being a warrior-ancestor-spirit in Murik cosmology. The channel, they added, was the property of one of the lineages domiciled in one of the western villages. We boated along the landward shore, perhaps a half-mile further, until we arrived at another channel, which they called Aran'taum. Down its middle, the men alleged, was “the border.” But this channel was not the border with the eastern Muriks. Rather, it was a border with other lower Sepik River and inland villages. Our warriors, the informants said, “used to stop here, check for [men armed with] spears.” Should they spot no evidence of the enemy, “they would rest and go back to the village.”
Immediately after returning these informants home, exasperated, astonished men from the eastern villages, who were helping me with logistics, stopped biting their tongues, or, as Murik would say, stopped “swallowing their saliva.” One of them asserted that

the border was Brag Channel [not Aran'taum]. The name of the spirit-man underwater there is Yamerap'ase. We call it Yamerap Channel, not Brag Channel. One side of it belongs to [the western Murik village of] Wokumot. The other side belongs to [the eastern village of Karau]. Before [e.g., prior to the colonial state], if you crossed this border, you would die.
Many locales in the lakescape are said to be haunted by spirits, spirits who are attributed differing moral predispositions, some dangerous, others benevolent, or at least nonthreatening. I registered no disagreement that an underwater spirit dwelled at the first of the two channels in question or that he was reckoned benign. And, it is the case that such spirits usually inhabit places of ecological or social distinction in the lakescape, such as whirlpools or ethnohistorical events (Lipset 2011a: 29). Furthermore, both sides agreed that the spirit-man was not a creator-spirit, merely a watchful presence. Still, what they differed about had both cosmological and territorial implications. Their dialogue was about (1) the location of the boundary, (2) the name of one of the eponymous spirits and one of the channels in question, and (3) whom the border divided.
The dispute evoked an egalitarian, autonomous era during which rival male cults possessed more or less equal power and resources (Kuper 1988) and place was bounded by the cosmological threat of unmediated violence, or warre, in Hobbes’ famous term ([1651] 1944). In pre-state times, honor was a commonplace value that ought to be defended, but unavenged murder was also a commonplace outcome. This era, and its unfulfilled obligations, continues to haunt the Murik Lakes, giving rise to contemporary fears and resentments that people prefer to, but cannot quite, forget. The ethos of warre, in which the whole lakescape was and to a certain extent remains contested, also had important descent-based and gendered dimensions that called and still call into question signifiers of order that proliferate throughout it. Rather than a seamless symbolic integration with the moral community, the lakes-cape was a place of irreducible risk, a liminal kind of terrritory, not quite domesticated yet not quite other, that gave rise to an anxious sense of vulnerability. This anxiety is clear in the iconography men still carve on the prows of Murik lagoon canoes, the prows where society encounters the water (Lipset 2005b, 2014; see Figure 3).
Contending voices, unstructured by any non-participating third party, met and go on meeting at the central boundary of the lakes. In order to elaborate on the pre-state sentiments and tropes in their dialogue that persist to divide the lakescape today, I now turn to two other channels that were part of this same boundary dispute. The channels in question were located several miles to the east of the boundary drawn in Figure 2.
Both sides called them Sapak and Moka’s Sapak channels. They also agreed that they were “very old.” And they agreed about what they were used for. But who built them? And who owned them? A western villager held that “a man called Munding cut both channels for his wife, Mwangama, so she could harvest shellfish from them. Munding belonged to a descent group called Aruk.” When I asked him who Moka was, he shrugged his shoulders.
The point is that ownership of the two channels, and implicitly the location of the central boundary dividing the lakes, was claimed and counterclaimed through rival narratives about their construction and history. Eastern informants alleged that “the two channels had belonged to the Kanian people; the Kanian were living along the lakes when our [Sepik River] ancestors first arrived. They fought the Kanian who fled inland, but marriages also took place with Kanian women.” The claim that Munding made the Sapak channel for his wife, Mwangama, was also challenged by an eastern Murik man. “Kemat cut the channel for his grandson, my ancestor. His girlfriend harvested sandcrab from it. I gave the channel to my sister, Nancy, and now she is its ‘mother.’” Names of, and genealogical connections to, the channel builder and his female recipient were nominated as part of the contentions (see also Harrison 1990). Ethnohistory and descent group names were also cited. But it would be wrong to assume from these accounts that the lakescape was solely a human construction.
Autochthonous creator-spirits, it is true, do not enter into these or other stories, as they do in middle Sepik River cosmologies, where it is crocodile-spirits all the way down (see Moutu 2013). As a place, the Murik lakescape rather bears the mark of human and totemic origins. The “great other,” whose absence might otherwise constitute and guarantee meaning, is imagined in terms that are less differentiated from the self at the mouth of the great river. Spirits dwell underwater here and there (as above), but their agency is viewed as more or less equivalent to that of men and women. Spirits are seen as more like human beings than not. One major similarity between them is that both must resort to vehicles to supplement a lack, which is not just of mobility, but also moral. Both possess multiple, totemic “canoe-bodies” in which they travel through the space, air, and water of the other. One sees this common agency and exposure inscribed on canoe prows (see Figure 3). In pre-state cosmology, both human and ancestral “canoe-bodies” traversed the lakescape and left their mark upon it.
Let me return to the other Sapak channel. A senior, eastern villager disclosed a startling chain of events associated with Moka’s Sapak channel. To support the authority of his account, as well as his title to the channel, my informant claimed descent from Kombiit, one of his story’s antagonists.

When the [eastern Murik] reached the lakes, they fought with the [property owners] they found living there, among whom were the people of Gaut village… . Moka was a Gaut woman. She was killed in revenge for a previous murder [by the Gaut] of a Murik man called Kombiit… . After killing Kombiit, the Gaut warriors seated his body on the roots of a mangrove at the mouth of Sapak channel and put a betelnut in his mouth. His son became enraged and retaliated by killing Moka, the wife of his father’s killer. He cut her genitals and draped them over a branch of the mangrove tree that had grown over the mouth of her channel. They [finally] … dried out and dropped into the water.



Figure 3. Lagoon canoe prow. (All photos by the author.)

These redolent images, the original murder of Kombiit, his pose, seated on the roots of a mangrove with a betelnut in his mouth, and Moka’s genitals draped above her channel, could hardly express the absent other to whom I have just alluded in any more intimate, as well as altogether perverse, terms.
I would therefore like to ask a Lacanian kind of question. Recall that for Lacan, the psychoanalyst and semiotician, signifiers substitute for “the lack.” What is missing behind symbolic order is that which has been irretrievably and irredeemably lost, which is the other, or what Lacan (1977) calls the phallus. Beyond the spectacle of male violence, who is or what was “the other” that would, but cannot, guarantee the unity of prestate space within this commons? What is the hidden “element which represents within it its own impossibility” (Žižek 1989: 127), but at the same time may fix or suture place into a structure of meaning?
To get a grip on such a paradoxical view of place, I turn to betelnuts. Murik people chew betelnuts for the mild pleasure they arouse. Betelnuts are an object of sensory desire here as everywhere else in Papua New Guinea (PNG). But in Murik, they are an object of exchange, bartered for or purchased, but never grown. Betelnuts are not only dissociated from labor, they are also dissociated from human reproductive capacities. For Murik joking partners, whose mockery of desire lends an ever-present, ever-adapting comic tone to daily and ritual discourse (Lipset 2004), betelnuts denote “testicles,” of course, and the stringbean-like peppers chewed with them stand for the phallus. While betelnuts are associated with male genitalia, they do not refer to organic fertility. They rather connote another form of agency, the capacity to coordinate kin to produce seafood to sell or barter for them. Which kin, in particular? Female kin.
In staging the victim, how was Kombiit posed? He was posed as a man “eating his own balls.” At this moment, he was both a man who had met his fate and one whose kin had failed him. “What is it that the subject is deprived of? The phallus: and it is from the phallus that … desire is constituted” (Lacan 1977: 15). Both Kombiit and his kin have been deprived of the phallus: they have been symbolically “castrated.” This interpretation is supported by the schismogenic reply (Bateson [1936] 1958) it provoked in Kombiit’s son: an image of female castration, the genital dismemberment of the wife of his murderer, displayed at the entrance of her channel. What irreducible gap, or fragment of it, guaranteed the meaning of the lakescape? Indigenous, property-owning groups and Murik warriors were not just violent men; they were castrators, bearers of deprivation of a particular sort. “If you crossed the border,” so one informant recalled, “you would die.”
The lakescape was said to be surveilled by vigilante warriors ready to attack anyone who trespassed boundaries. The lakes were “a system” of signifiers of the absent other, whose absence could be identified by property markers that would “castrate” the phallus and deny its penetration. Boundaries, I suggest, evoked signifiers of symbolic displacement from the other rather than simply from material places. In other words, as elsewhere in PNG, property is constituted by relations among persons with reference to place, rather than between people and places (Leach 2004: 43).
The story of Moka’s death was first and foremost narrated for rhetorical purposes: it was part of a strong, political claim to channel tenure that was also meant to discredit (castrate?) a rival claim to the position of the central boundary in the lakescape. This kind of revelation, together with the recitation of the names of the kinsmen and kinswomen involved in making the channel, suspends the lakescape in a web of signifiers, not only of the other from whom the phallus is deprived but also “the name of the father,” for example, the eponymous selves who created the lakescape.
Another episode in this controversy perhaps occurred sometime during the early 1960s. Although I have been unable to find reference to it in patrol reports filed by colonial officials, Murik accounts nonetheless reveal the reach of legal pluralism in the colonial, postwar era. To what extent was the state viewed as an administrative resource in support of a lawful recognition of property rights in the lakescape? The case seems to illustrate that the bundle of de facto rights originating in and organized in situ by the resource users went on defining it; rights that remained contested in terms of Murik social structure and ethnohistory and that authorized de jure rights contributed little by way of enforcement or regulation.
I do not know what events prompted which parties to take their dispute to the district seat. For whatever reasons, patrol officers apparently boated downriver from Angoram and heard arguments about the contested boundary. Along with speeches, a weapon and a prestate valuable were revealed. These objects, which signified the presence of a high-status, male warrior, were said to have won the day for the eastern villagers who displayed them. The authenticity of the objects, a timeworn spear and an old boar’s tusk, substantiated the claim that they had been handed down to contemporary claimants from two ancestors who lived on and walked the beaches on the eastern side of the channel. The western villagers, I was told, could not deny their evidential weight in support of their rivals’ claim. The case was decided in favor of the eastern Muriks; and the border was affirmed to extend northward from Bok Channel to the landward edge of the lakes (see Figure 2). The patrol officers erected boundary markers, signage that had long since vanished.
As I say, I know little more about this incident other than what I have reported. Still, I think the eastern Murik version of its result and the subsequent disappearance of the markers illustrate several useful points. First, the state’s adjudication of de facto rights in and claims to ownership of the Murik Lakes was determined from the ground, or in this case the water, up. Second, the outcome did not incorporate the Murik very thoroughly within the colonial, legal order. And thirdly, from a Lacanian viewpoint, foreclosure of the lakescape remains slippery, if not altogether impossible. Boundaries do not hold.
Having introduced the prestate and symbolic background of the property regime of the lakescape, and having just suggested that colonial institutions (1880– 1975) left only a trace on it, I now turn to the postcolonial lakescape (1975–2014).


The gender of customary marine tenure
The state of PNG granted legal recognition of customary land tenure in 1974, the year before independence (see Fingleton 2007). It manages land titles, particularly in disputes between landowners and extractive industries, such as mines and oil companies (Kalinoe and Leach 2005). At the local level, contemporary community political order is overseen by a series of democratically elected officials, a councilor, assistants, and a magistrate. These officers link communities with the postcolonial state and will intervene to mediate domestic conflict, but rarely, if ever, attempt to resolve property disputes.
Use-rights to harvest from the commons are asserted or operationalized in canoes by kinsmen and kinswomen. While such rights are subject to norms that broadly correlate lake access to village-based zones, they are, at the same time, possessed by every family living in the lakeshore Murik communities. That is, eastern villagers are free to fish anywhere on their side of the lakes, just as western villages may do so on their side. Fishing spots are not assigned, for example, to individual kin groups. No license is required. Fishing is limited by proximity and convenience. The lakes being huge, men and women can only paddle so far from home and still return before nightfall.
As sporadic government and Murik efforts to start cooperative, commercial fishing ventures have repeatedly failed, the primary unit of production remains the household, with specific tasks being assigned through a sexual division of labor. Travel to the provincial market town has become progressively more expensive in recent years, with one outcome being that attendance at regional markets has increased. In short, the articulation of the Murik fishery to petty capitalism should be read as slouching along, but without teleology. Such a relationship, one could call it poverty, is not at all unique in PNG, where the commitment of rural folk to exchange-value is halfhearted at the best of times (see Akin and Robbins 1999).
If anything is distinctive about the Murik environment, which is essentially a lagoon-based, marine ecosystem, it is that what little land there is—e.g., mud-flats and beaches—is not arable. While most Pacific Islanders depend on marine and terrestrial resources, the integration of the Murik Lakes with adjacent land is mediated by trade relations, rather than by direct cultivation. Unlike most fishing people in the South Pacific, the Murik are not “part-timers” (Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes 1992: 251) who combine fishing with gardening. Other than crafts and folk dances, they produce nothing but fish and shellfish, coconuts, and a few pigs. Everything else they acquire through trade and commerce of one sort or another. Nevertheless, their concept of a corporate estate does include territorially based resource zones and dwelling sites. Thus one term for descent group, at least among western Murik, is “land-place” (aji'pwap) and a term for boundary is “land border mark” (aji'aurosan).
At the same time, tenure, management, and exclusionary rights in the Murik marine lakescape, as well as to intravillage property, are authorized through ceremonial exchange within lineages. Status is symbolized and allocated by the rights of persons to sumon, the ornamental paraphernalia that signify authority over the material and social estate of the lineage. The sumon are transacted by senior men and women in the context of mortuary ritual.
Now property regimes of this sort, which delegate exclusive rights to (subdivisions of) lagoons, reefs, and seas, and derive these rights from local jural institutions that may or not may involve the state, have been called systems of “customary marine tenure” (CMT) by Hviding (1989, 1991) and others (see also Johannes 1978; Ruddle and Akimichi 1984).2 The characteristic feature of CMT systems in the Pacific Basin is that “the local community is often the sole owner that controls the local spectrum of marine habitats” (Ruddle, Hviding, and Johannes 1992: 250). More concretely, however, rights to these habitats vary from “sole quasi-ownership of specific localized sites by individuals, families, clans, or other small social groups to the complex … legal system of Japan” (Ruddle 1988: 353). In other words, by privileging local constructions of sovereignty, CMT systems assert a strong voice in marine legal pluralism.
Anthropologists have documented the extent to which rules limiting fishing access are part of larger jural systems consisting of relationships, inheritance, and obligation (Ravuvu 1983; Carrier 1987). Throughout Oceania, marine resources, no less than land, are subject to various degrees of exclusiveness that limit use-rights to specific fishing grounds during particular seasons, as well as to specific species, even to a specific type of gear (Carrier 1982). In addition, Pacific Basin CMT regimes have been lauded for their resiliency. They persist in spite of external pressures from colonial as well as postcolonial administrations, industrial fishing, tourism, and, not least, an accelerating market economy (Baines 1985; Hviding 1998).
The Murik rarely fish in the ocean but for a week or so every year in early June when the tides completely subside. My point is that other than as a route to market and overseas trading partners, the Murik make little use of the ocean. But the Murik Lakes may nevertheless be viewed as an inshore, marine environment governed by CMT. In the botanical literature, mangrove lagoons are known for the richness and diversity of their marine fish populations, which use them as nurseries, and which may range from fifty to two hundred species (Hogarth 2007: 182). Despite the penetration of petty capitalism in rural life, the pre-state roots of Murik small-scale fishery remain perfectly evident in its ongoing basis in household production and the sexual division of labor. Women regularly paddle into the lakes (Figure 4). On a daily basis, kinswomen take dugout canoes and go fishing, using nylon droplines and store-bought hooks. Kinsmen, and occasionally married couples, use nylon drift nets for the same purposes. Kinswomen also go to harvest shellfish, either by diving and collecting them from shallow lakebeds, or by paddling to private “meat channels” (garap yangan; Figure 5).


Figure 4. Murik women paddle off to fish and harvest shellfish, 2012.

Yangan is one key vernacular term, not only for appreciating Murik CMT, but also for appreciating how the lakescape is valued by the community. The lakes (nemar) are shallow, and flats become exposed at low tide. Their size ranges from great swathes of water that reach as far as the eye can see to little ponds. They are divided up into bays, islands, and large areas of dense Rhizophora mangrove forests (bar), with their legendary aerial or stilt root systems that loop off to adapt to brackish, saltwater and anoxic, waterlogged soils. The gnarled roots and lush green foliage of these amphibian forests form dense, impenetrable tangles. Completely lacking in understory vegetation, this is “a universe until itself, utterly unlike other woodlands or jungles” (Ghosh 2005: 7). In addition to the lakes, the mangroves are divided up by channels, large and small, as well as by long, narrow creeks that snake through them. Meanwhile, along the edges of the mangroves, man-made inlets prod the mud. All of these sandy waterways the Murik call yangan(Tokpisin: baret).
There are several classes of yangan. The Murik distinguish between “meat” yangan, from which women harvest clams and sandcrabs and men hunt crocodiles, and “water” and “sago” yangan. They differentiate “old” from “new” yangan, “public” from “lineage” yangan, “male” from “female” yangan, and, evoking sibling birth order, “big” from “small” yangan. Both men and women may and do hold exclusionary, alienation, and management rights to yangan. According to the sexual division of labor, only men build channels—normally for kinswomen.
Channels should be built on lineage property in the lakes. Place-making in the mangroves, I have heard it said, requires work, but “cutting a channel is not hard,” allowed Tom Sauma, a middle-aged father. He recalled a project undertaken on behalf of an elder daughter, the right to do so having been granted by the elder sister of his deceased father, the father’s sister being a lineage headwoman. Evoking the division of labor in swidden horticulture, he went on to catalogue the steps: “You cut [down] the mangroves. You wait a month or so. You collect the dead wood for firewood and then [it] is ready” for kinswomen, his daughter, the “mother” of the inlet, her sisters, and their daughters, to begin to harvest shellfish from the new inlet (Figure 6). That is to say, in addition to the degree of effort it may or may not require, place-making is here conceived as a moral activity structured by age and gender. It fulfills and creates obligations between men and women through which the labor of the former may reproduce kinship, a female child, the new inlet. The “father” creates a new channel, a “daughter,” with a new “mother.” It is referred to by the “name of the father.”


Figure 5. Young woman having just returned from harvesting clams, 2010.



Figure 6. A new inlet (woman) in the making, 2011.

Channel use is jealously guarded, and this vigilant attitude is expressed in resentment, angry disagreement, and, not least, magically empowered boundary markers (Figure 7). “No Trespassing” signs, made from palm fronds, are erected in the mud at low tide at the mouths of channels. Knots are tied in palm leaves, knots that are said to bind “phalluses.” The message to intruders, which cannot but (analytically) evoke the image of Moka’s mutilated genitals hanging over the entrance of her channel, might thus be rendered as something like this: “Do not fuck this [daughter/sister/wife/woman], or face the consequences.” The inference associating “meat channel” as a signifier of the Lacanian signified, the lost other, becomes difficult not to draw. If so, channels become metaphorical objects of desire, women who must be protected not just from material trespass but also from vulnerability to a form of symbolic rape. We might thus speak of the gender of the Murik CMT.


Figure 7. Property marker with knotted phalluses. Credit: David Lipset

As a system of signifiers, meat channels “inscribe” (Low and Lawrence-Zuniga 2003: 13) the edges of the mangroves with metaphors of kinship and women, but also they inscribe them not as pristine countryside but only as slightly remote lineage property that also includes its residential plots and coconut groves located within and/or adjacent to the community. The lakescape is not a natural environment, just a useful one. Use-rights to channels (conjugal or parental rights?) are held by their “mothers” and “fathers” and a network of cognatically related actors (and affines) who bear personal names given them by mutual kin. The channels are named and gendered, some even have siblings, and as such are afforded attributes of “persons” in these collectivities.
The extension of this metaphor of personhood onto yanganchannels is perhaps epitomized by the “mangrove shacks” (bar iran) erected on their shores (Figure 8). These are alternative work-residences to which people go from time to time. Although terminologically differentiated from their village homes, these encampments, built by kinsmen, and named for the builder, resemble domestic houses, but are smaller, and are frequently left cobbled together, walls unfinished, draped with plastic tarpaulins and the like. I once saw the house ladder of a mangrove shack cut out of the diagonal trunk of a living mangrove tree against which the front side of the building had been built. Murik people opine that mangrove shacks are “quiet” places where all there is to do is work. They do not liken this ethos to pre-modernity. But there are no nonkin, and the social scale is miniscule, to say the least. Community they leave behind, community with its “noise,” the steady appeals for goods and services, children at play, as well as rows, in return for the precapitalist virtues of the kin group.


Figure 8. Mangrove shacks, 2012.

Shack-dwellers usually return to the village to attend church and visit kin on weekends. But for weeks, months, and even, for complicated political reasons, for years in a few cases, they live secluded, amid the mangrove ecology. There are, I think, about seventy-five such places in the lakes, some occupied, many vacant. The “quiet” quality of life extolled at the mangrove shacks does not distinguish them as superior, morally authentic, natural utopias, à la Walden Pond (Thoreau [1854] 2008), from which spiritual awakening might be found. If not about self-fashioning, the ethos of the mangrove shacks consists in the reproduction of the kin group through (partly) unalienated labor.
If the lakescape and Murik CMT are uniformly understood in terms of moral personhood, it is important to emphasize that channels are not evenly distributed. While headmen and headwomen of Murik lineages serve as ritual actors who may manage their patrimony independently of the rest of community, lineage ownership of the commons is not equally distributed. Some lineages and even whole communities claim large mangrove zones, some claim smaller zones, while others, to put it frankly, are said to possess no claims at all. Perhaps this inequality, embellished by the association of mangroves with women, is the ultimate cause of the ongoing boundary dispute between eastern and western Muriks discussed above.
Thus far, I have presented the Murik Lakes as a kind of restricted-use commons, and a CMT property regime that has largely remained semi-autonomous of the legal bureaucracy of the state (S. F. Moore 1973). Now, the division of labor, the channels, and the mangrove shacks have been introduced as part of a system of signification through which Murik moral personhood is inscribed onto the lakescape. But the signification of order is a semblance, rather than a substance, that fills out a void opened up by the breakdown of representation, like the suspension of Moka’s genitals over the entrance of the Sapok channel that bears her name. Before concluding this section, I want to mention two other kinds of inscription that I think support this Lacanian interpretation.


Figure 9. Mangrove graffiti at low tide, 2012.

Mangrove trees along the lakeshores are “tagged,” as urban youth in North America say. Young men carve names, initials, or numbers onto tree trunks (Figure 9). Another occasion when graffiti were drawn on tree trunks—in this case, imported logs—comes to mind. During a latter moment in the launching rites for new outrigger canoes, boys were allowed to draw rudimentary motifs, such as stars, zoomorphic and humanoid figures, on the sides of the new vessel, as if perhaps to lend their vitality and potential to the ritual transformation of the log into a person that was underway (Barlow and Lipset 1997: 15). In the past, instead of using numerals and the English alphabet as they do today, young men etched mask motifs of war-spirits (brag) onto the trunks of mangrove trees. But I haven't seen the latter for some time. So I suppose that this shift in their graffiti may reflect a familiar trajectory of modern identity—toward individual identity, and decentered from local forms of agency (Giddens 1991)—that is ongoing in Murik culture and the nation as a whole (see Lipset 2005a, 2011b, 2013). But in the West, while graffiti pieces are also eponymous, they are meant to defy the boundaries of bourgeois space. They are a medium of illicit communication for dislocated, disenfranchised, urban male youth, that is, for youth who are to all intents and purposes ur-modern (Ferrell 1998; Austin 2001; Snyder 2006). By contrast, the meaning and intent of contemporary mangrove graffiti in the Murik Lakes are rooted in, rather than alienated from, prior forms of signification, and it occurs within their commons. If it is not an expression of delinquent art, what are Murik young men trying to do or say? If their mangrove graffiti conveys membership in a sociosymbolic field, what is that field? What kind of a legible presence is it? The mangrove graffiti might be seen as a reply to “a lack in the Other” that enables an author to “avoid the total alienation in the signifier not by filling out his lack, but by allowing him to identify … his own lack … with the lack in the Other” (Žižek 1989: 122). In other words, amid a commons that remains embedded in the phallus, Murik graffiti, now inscribed in arbitrary signs that are separate from the iconic figurations that preceded them, signifies a place, a relationship to the Murik Lakes, that has become doubly empty (Lipset 2011b).
A related representation inscribed across the lakescape supports this Lacanian reading of Murik graffiti. Coastal environments, like the Murik Lakes, have been called “landscapes of protection, providing hiding places … for pirates, smugglers, poachers, illegal immigrants and refugees” (Griffith 1999: 5). Murik youth also see the lakes as a site of privacy for another kind of defiance: desire for the other and the pleasure of sexual fulfillment (Lipset 2009). Protruding erect above the canopy, appearing quite distinctly against the sky, the uppermost branches of the occasional tree have been hacked off, exposing a thin, vertical trunk rising up to a bushy, rounded-off cluster of leaves left revealed at the top. These tailored trees (asimen), visible from great distances, are most often said to memorialize gratification occasioned by this privacy. They may commemorate any sort of event and experience, but in particular they commemorate pseudoanonymous sites where a young, unmarried couple has had sexual intercourse, the secret trysting-place being a canoe or a small platform a man has built (cf. Gregor 1985: 32). What is the location of the rendezvous and the asimentree? Is it on lineage property of either of the lovers? The relationship of the signifier to property may be elusive, but the explicit reference of these trees is not. The yangan channels have “mothers.”


Figure 10. Twin asimen, 2010.

When tabooed, they become kinswomen, but generically so. The asimen trees, meanwhile, may stand for specific women. A young man may name a tree after a girlfriend. In one story I collected, a youth cut a pair of asimen trees and named them for twin girls, Clara and Lydia, his lovers, who observed the project, which is simultaneously an act of machismo.3The lakescape is manfully decorated with signifiers of the desire of the other.
In which case, perhaps it is not surprising to find that these trees are also associated with an impulse to reciprocity. In addition to cutting the asimen tree, a man may decide to build a new “meat channel” for his girlfriend—in return for having received sexual access to her. Thereafter, should their intercourse yield a baby, he may donate use- and transfer-rights in the channel to the child. While such a response connects meat channels to marriage and reproduction, that is, to the fulfillment of conjugal obligation for female fertility (indeed, Murik practice brideservice), the asimen are signifiers of a memorable deed. They are what William Blake ([1791] 1994) called “lineaments of gratified desire.” The trees represent neither biological nor social reproduction. They lend the illicit ethos of dalliance, rather than alliance, to the lakescape, dalliances displaced from the community. Again, in a Lacanian sense, the asimen trees become signifiers, not only of male agency—of the young, virile id—but also of masculine lack, the phallus. The asimen, I argue, are both signs of gratification and a cri de coeur. They momentualize an object of desire, at once possessed, yet lost.
If nothing else, the channels, the story of Moka’s murder, the “No Tresspassing” signs, the mangrove shacks, as well as the boundary dispute, the young men’s graffiti, and their asimen trees dispersed throughout the mangroves, depict a lakescape that was and remains distinctively Murik. Taken all together, they seem to combine to make a claim to sovereignty over place by conceding that the desire of the other fails to annul or complete the absences, material and social, that otherwise saturate its meaning.


The time of rising sea-levels (2007–2014)
In the Pacific, there are two seasons. During the “dry season,” from May to October, the winds blow from east to west, the tides contract, and shorelines expand. During the “wet season,” from November to April, the winds blow from west to east, the tides expand, and shorelines erode. From 2007, the range and height of the “wet season” tides eroded the Murik coast. The barrier beaches were breached, cutting innumerable channels through to the lakes. Sand poured through them. Tidal surges tore across villages, leaving behind a spectacle of severed trunks of coconut palms and dead shoreline trees, drifting canoes, trenches, and gullies (Figure 11). Entire villages had to be evacuated, once in the middle of the night, when people of all ages were forced into their canoes to seek the shelter of their mangrove shacks. From the lake side, the range and depth of the tides, which rose twice a day, also expanded, and the mudflats on which the villages were built could not dry out, as they did in the past. People either poled canoes between the houses at high tide, walked along the beaches, or had to trudge through squishy, sucky, grasping paths along the mudflats, which they detested.


Figure 11. Stumps of coconut palms along the beach at Big Murik, 2010.

The government, whose prime minister at that time was none other than a Murik native son, Sir Michael Somare, took action. The 2008 budget gazetted funds to the Murik Lakes Resettlement Project (MLRP) to purchase land to relocate three Murik communities to higher ground on the landward side of the lakes. A sparsely populated venue was selected, one that was located inland from the lakes in the vicinity of Marienburg, the site of a big Catholic Mission. Negotiations were undertaken with landowners there. In other words, the tides rolled in the promise of a new and expanded era of modernity in its most classic sense, territorially based governmentality.
By August, 2010, however, the MRLP had fallen apart. Property around the Marienberg Mission, which had been marked off, had not been purchased, much less transferred. The senior bureaucrat in charge had been suspended by the provincial administrator, amid charges of corruption, misappropriation of funds, and so forth. In the national government accounting for the 2010 budget, the Department of Treasury listed the money for the MLRP in the “spent as allocated” category. Both in town and in the villages, people were angry about the missing funds.
A substate initiative, arising from Murik ethnohistory, subsequently developed, but came to naught. A tsunami, triggered by the earthquake in northern Japan in March 2011 (measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale), drove Murik people off the beach yet again to find safety in the mangroves. The storm broke open more new channels into the lakes from the sea. Beach sand poured through, disrupting the biodiversity of one of the lakes and making it too shallow to navigate at low tide. The leaves of the coconut palms were yellowish in color. They bore no fruit, having evidently been poisoned by the salinity of the tidal waves, which also tossed logs about the villages and dug out huge depressions beneath some houses. Buildings had been damaged. Villagers were suffering.
A community-based adaptation then began to emerge (Lipset 2013). In 2012, villagers were starting to discuss establishing new communities in various locales on the landward shores of the lakes, a plan that was rumored to be supported by funds from the national government. There was no question that the property already belonged to them, not as tribal “Murik,” but rather in terms of CMT, as descendants of their particular and named, migrant ancestors. From a practical perspective, this adaptation was viewed as eminently feasible, particularly should the government construct a road to link the area up with current roads to the provincial capital and regional markets. What happened? Amid an ethos of criticism and suspicion of the postcolonial state, the prospect of resettlement basically came to a suspended ending. People went on trudging through the mud, although many of them decamped to peri-urban settlements in the provincial capital.


Carbon trade, carbon cowboys
In the aftermath of the 2002 national elections, the Murik native son Sir Michael Somare formed a coalition and returned for a third term as prime minister of PNG after a hiatus of fifteen years. Not surprisingly, given that he had been raised in the Murik villages (Somare 1975), Somare began to play a conspicuous role in international climate negotiations during this period (2002–10). At the Global Roundtable on Climate Change held at Columbia University in 2005, he called for the creation of a Coalition for Rainforest Nations that would lobby for compensation to developing countries that reduced greenhouse emissions. Representatives from PNG and Costa Rica then proposed a program called “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation” (REDD) to the Conference of Parties to the 2007 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on behalf of the Coalition. At their subsequent Bali meeting, a process was initiated to include conservation and sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks, or REDD+. The goal of this initiative was to develop policies and financial incentives to do so. Since REDD+ was first proposed, its focus has expanded to include a wider range of issues, including the provision of support to help countries prepare for implementing REDD+ and assessing social safeguards and environmental benefits. By the 2010 meeting in Oslo, seventy-five partner countries had registered as stakeholders to support and finance REDD+ as well as other programs and partnerships.
While the initial target of REDD+, or carbon trade, was to financially compensate property owners for not degrading rainforests, the UN eventually recognized the value of “Blue Carbon.” The capacity of ocean and coastal ecosystems, like mangroves, salt marshes, and sea grasses, to store, or sequester, carbon in the biomass in which they grow was twice, or possibly three times, that of tropical rainforests. Worrying that one-half of the world’s original mangrove forests had already been destroyed, in 2009, a UN REDD representative resolved that for developing countries it was “critically important to include mangrove forests in their strategies. Few other forest systems offer as many benefits for climate, conservation and development. It is thus strongly recommended that national governments consider the incorporation of mangroves in their REDD+ readiness plans.”4
Having sponsored a market-based mechanism to reduce carbon emissions, the Somare government found itself immediately embroiled in a humiliating scandal in connection with the issuance of REDD credits to carbon brokers and traders, in the absence of any policy or regulation. Meanwhile, hucksters, so-called “carbon cowboys,” were roaming about the countryside hawking bogus deals and promising huge returns. Rural folk were handing over money to register as stakeholders in carbon trading companies, after which the con men would cut and run, never to be seen again. Of the misconceptions about what was being purchased, an exasperated World Wildlife Fund official declared that “people in the bush … [were] calling it ‘sky money,’ or ‘selling the air,’ or ‘selling the gas above.’”5 A new government office responsible for climate change and development was established in 2010, partly in response to the critical media attention that the “carbon cowboys” had attracted to PNG. At the same time, the UNREDD Program approved a budget for PNG of US$6.4 million in 2011 to develop a national program. However, a USAID report concluded that the momentum in PNG had “slowed … regarding REDD+” despite the country’s initial leadership (Leggett and Lovell 2012: 118). Undeterred, government officials began consulting with rural leaders about REDD+ in order to raise community awareness about climate change and carbon payments and begin to recruit local-level participation in sustainable mitigation and adaptation initiatives.6
As a result of these global interventions, I found discussion of “carbon” going on in Murik villages during an August 2012 fieldtrip. At his weekly meeting, a village councilor announced that people had better start “licensing families” before carbon investors arrived. “A lot of money will be coming,” he predicted, “but we will only get very little of it” unless kin registered themselves as Incorporated Land Groups (ILGs). A university graduate who was on leave from work in Port Moresby at the time added that he knew many companies were competing to represent carbon trade in PNG. “Donors,” and here he included himself in the carbon rush, “were emailing” him. The Murik Lakes “have no rival in PNG as far as the size of our mangroves. We will make big money.” In the ethnographic record, of course, Melanesians are famous for a great many things, sacred and profane, but their hopeful optimism and huge expectations about what modernity might offer is certainly one of them (Schwartz 1962).
What did villagers understand about carbon payments? One man told me that carbon trade was for “wind…. It is dirty smoke that comes from machines or engines that is destroying everything. They will be paying us for [our] air.” He, as well as others, advised me to go talk to a Murik man called Erik Komang, who was then living in town. A university graduate, and a sister’s son of the PM, Komang headed a company called Pacific Carbon Trade Ltd. that was intending to register kin groups and represent them to foreign investors it was enlisting. However, to the very same extent that villagers held up Erik Komang as knowledgeable about carbon trade, he was no less regarded with wariness and suspicion. That is to say, many people did not view him as a neutral entrepreneur who could be trusted. Rather than an opportunity to make money, they saw him as a kinsman who only had lineage interests at heart.
I found Erik Komang in one of the peri-urban encampments where Murik live in the provincial capital. Pacific Carbon Trade Ltd. was one of fourteen such companies in PNG, he said, but it was the only one registered in the East Sepik Province. “In the East Sepik,” he boasted, “it is me alone.” What, I asked, would stakeholders be obliged to do in return for carbon payments? Not fish, harvest shellfish, or collect firewood from a demarked area? Not cut new meat channels, new asimen, or tag particular trees? In response, Komang talked about hectares of rainforest, which seemed irrelevant to a mangrove ecology. He left his answer to my question vague, in other words. Instead, he went on to list the several stages by which the size and value of the Murik mangroves would be measured. The first step was to register stakeholders into ILGs, a process well known for its cost and for the frustration it inevitably created (Jorgensen 2007: 67). Identifying property and proprietary units from an overlapping jumble of rival lineages was not going to be an easy project, I allowed, and went on to mention the boundary dispute between eastern and western Muriks by way of illustrating this challenge. Komang conceded that aligning customary marine estates with corresponding statutory declarations might well turn out to be impossible. His preference was to duck the problem. “I would like to distribute the money village by village. The clan system [is] … too complicated.” In any case, he went on, the whole process was not yet ready to move forward. Villagers were not yet registered and the government had not yet issued regulations for a carbon market.
Elsewhere in PNG, descent-based units have been pressured to register themselves into legal associations (Weiner and Glaskin 2007). As in the Murik case, the problem they have faced is having to create an exclusive list, for example a legible group, not only because of indefinite lineage boundaries, but also because of adoption, outmigration, and intertribal marriage in contemporary society. What is more, I have argued that the lakescape is subject to cathexis, to an investment not just of esoteric claims and jural rights, but of libido, or emotional attachment and desire. The tense boundary, the hundreds upon hundreds of named channels, many blocked off by the knotted phallus, “No Trespassing,” signs, and the asimentrees all inscribe the lakescape not as a unified field of signification, but one rent by “the trauma” that defies or resists jural and symbolic authority. Thus it is associated with intimate attachments and desire and arouses deep-seated, irresolvable jealousies.
The volatile promise of compensation payments in return for “looking after” a plot of mangrove forest exposed the main fissure in the commons. Potential beneficiaries feared that they might not profit equally (or at all) from “carbon.” Their anxiety did not arise from the invention of new social categories that never existed in the past (see Ernst 1999: 88). It rather derived from the continued absenceof supra-community interests and identity in Murik culture, an absence that I have traced back to precolonial times, and which today continues to inspire little by way of fair-mindedness. In the contexts that rural Murik think about the tangible boundaries of corporate groups—that own estates—they think of family, lineage-based ceremonial exchanges, and community ethnohistory, but not tribe, much less the nation-state and its legal bureaucracy. Eric Komang, equipped with Memorandas of Agreement, is not understood or expected to advocate for the whole society in an evenhanded way, only for a subset of relationships within it. Like an asimen, he signifies desire, parochial as it must be.


Ethnography of place in the Anthropocene
At the outset of this article, I suggested that before it became a dialogic or political site that pitted local against global interests, “place” was a narrative site of moral belonging in modern ethnography. What lessons does the ethnography of a coastal setting like the Murik Lakes, whose vulnerable environment will no doubt become more commonplace as time goes on in the Anthropocene, have to offer the anthropologies of place, in addition to the anthropologies CMT and legal pluralism?
Anthropocene ethnography certainly calls the logocentrism of place into question. It calls into question the optimistic view that privileges place as a timeless medium through which people sense and understand nothing less than who they are as moral persons. Anthropocene ethnography also interrogates value pluralism according to which property and resources are claimed and controlled. Instead of essentially celebrating the articulation of customary and state-based concepts of property, instead of dialogue between cultural and legal rights, Anthropocene ethnography must first and foremost acknowledge the prospect, if not the fact, of place loss, the loss of sovereignty, loss of property, and loss of identity (Redfearn 2010; see also Oliver-Smith 2009; Lazrus 2012).
Must the ethnography of place in the Anthropocene be a tragic genre (Shearer 2011)? Must it only focus on dislocation, displacement, and poverty to the exclusion of logocentrism, for example the ways that people express belonging or the way that places themselves do so? The acultural positivism to which environmental anthropologists cleave, the one that rehearses the hoary triptych of vulnerability, adaptation, and resiliency, would seem to suggest otherwise (Crate and Nuttall 2009; Crate 2011). Some bittersweet confection, I think, combining both loss and resiliency, must be expected, perhaps not of place, but of people.
Nearly empty villages, schools shut down, and internal migration to overpopulated, peri-urban, squatter settlements with the consequence of intertribal marriage, acculturation, and language loss are indeed a conspicuous “adaptation” to rising sea-levels. At the same time, as a result of the irremediable damage to place, people like the Murik, drawing from all they have left, which is their social and cultural capital, have no choice but to go on and try to make a living for their families, reinvent their communities elsewhere, and devise a new nation—all in the shameless and disgraceful shadow of a new, empty phallus, institutions near and far which provide them with nothing at all.


Acknowledgments
Financial support for the fieldwork on which this article is based was supplied by the Firebird Foundation of Maine, USA, as well as the Wilford Fund in the Department of Anthropology and the Global Alliance, both at the University of Minnesota. Versions were presented at the Department of Anthropology and the Institute on the Environment, both at the University of Minnesota, and at the Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago.


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Le lieu de l’Anthropocène: Un lagon de la mangrove de Nouvelle-Guinée à l’ère de l’élévation du niveau de la mer
Résumé : Cet article est un travail ethnographique portant sur un lieu, a une période peu prometteuse que certains ont commencé à appeler l’Anthropocène. Aux environs des lacs Murik, à l'embouchure de la rivière Sepik en Papouasie Nouvelle Guinée, l’Anthropocène interroge les conceptions logocentriques et politiques du “lieu”. Le “lieu”, qui n'est plus conçu comme le site où le monde se trouve doté d'une personnalité morale, et où prend place un dialogue avec le global, a maintenant pris une tonalité sombre et conditionnelle. A l’Anthropocène, le “lieu” est le site d'une tragédie imminente, caractérisé par la perte, plutôt que par le gain de sens.
David LIPSET is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. He has conducted longitudinal research since 1981 on masculinity and modernity among the Murik Lakes people in rural Papua New Guinea. Lipset has written two books, Gregory Bateson: The legacy of a scientist (1982) and Mangrove man: Dialogics of culture in the Sepik Estuary (1997). He is the coeditor of two collections and the author of articles on a variety of topics.
David LipsetDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of Minnesota395 Humphrey Center301 19th AveS. Minneapolis, MN 55455USAlipse001@umn.edu 


___________________
1. I draw from long-term research among the Murik, but in particular from a project I undertook on the meaning of the Murik Lakes in the time of rising sea-levels (2010–14). Following Boas’ model ([1888] 1964), the main goal of my project was to elicit the ethno-geography of the Murik Lakes. However, instead of having informants draw maps, I used participatory geographic information systems (PGIS; see Rambaldi et al. 2006) to co-construct a social map of their lakescape.
2. Marine tenure systems in PNG have been documented in several locations (see Malinowski 1935; Gaigo 1982; Olewale and Sedu 1982: 253; Carrier and Carrier 1983; and Pomponio 1992).
3. However, a young woman may climb up a mangrove and fabricate an asimen in honor of a boyfriend with whom she has had sex.
4. http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter16/Mangrove_Forests_and_REDD/tabid/51394/Default.aspx. Accessed on December 4, 2014.
5. http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/07/02/png-update-yasause-suspended-dodgycarbon-credits-and-carbon-ripoffs/. Accessed December 4, 2014.
6. http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2013/PNG%20R-PP_Formal%20Doc%2025%20Feb%20Final_0.pdf. Accessed December 4, 2014.
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1672</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/718933</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Religion in action: How Marian apparitions may become true</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Konopásek</surname>
						<given-names>Zdeněk</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>26</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2022</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date>
			<volume>12</volume>
			<issue seq="209">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2022 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1672" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1672/3938" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1672/3939" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>According to Latour, religion and science have nothing in common. The two are successful (or failing) in quite different ways. Religiousness is not aimed at fact-making, but at presence-making, he says. To critically reconsider these ideas, I discuss the case study of Marian apparitions in Litmanová, Slovakia. The study suggests a more complicated picture by not focusing on pure and ready-made religion, but rather on religion in the making, a kind of “almost-religion.” It shows how the reality of apparitions, initially of quite unclear status, was becoming more and more religious. Fact-making and fact-checking clearly belonged to this trajectory and have never stopped being relevant. Nonetheless, together with how the apparition was progressively becoming truly religious (or religiously true), Latourian presence-making was gaining in importance.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1423</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-07-04T08:12:21Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
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<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1423</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/707928</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Situating time: New technologies at work, a perspective from Alfred Gell’s oeuvre</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Kjaerulff</surname>
						<given-names>Jens</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>jk@socant.net</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="307">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1423" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1423/3452" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1423/3453" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>A scholarship on “time” has emerged that pays attention to the ways contemporary economic life and information technology affect temporal perception and practice. A critique of this scholarship, along with a joint reading and reinterpretation of Alfred Gell’s two books The anthropology of time and Art and agency, provides this article’s point of departure for “situating time” in the theoretical sense of setting out an explicit temporal ontology—a kind of reflection that I argue is often missing in scholarship on time. This temporal ontology is in turn substantiated and developed through an ethnographic exploration of time’s performative dimensions, brought to bear through practices of situating time, here in an ethnographic sense. The empirical material is from fieldwork among people working via the internet from their homes in rural Denmark.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/886</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-12-22T11:55:22Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3.014</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.3.014</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>“Catch the word”: Violated contracts and prophetic confirmation in African American Pentecostalism</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">“Catch the word”: Violated contracts and prophetic confirmation in African American Pentecostalism</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Klaits</surname>
						<given-names>Frederick</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>State University of New York at Buffalo</aff>
					<email>fklaits@buffalo.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>22</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2017</year>
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			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="409">3</issue>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 Frederick Klaits</copyright-statement>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The image of a violated social contract has long held a distinctive place in African American Christian thought about injustice. This essay discusses the efforts made by members of Pentecostal churches in Buffalo, New York, to enter into forms of contract with God that supersede the broken social contracts they see as devaluing their lives. These believers listen to God’s words as expressed in prophetic utterances for “confirmation” of the significance of events. In their view, “catching the word” through faithful listening enables them to create social commitments on their own terms, whereas their creative capacities are liable to be alienated from them if they listen improperly. Applying David Graeber’s revisionist treatment of “fetishism” as a form of social creativity, this essay explores how believers create their blessings within a dialogic space involving themselves, God, the devil, and pastor- prophets with exceptional abilities to listen to and convey the terms of the divine contract.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>The image of a violated social contract has long held a distinctive place in African American Christian thought about injustice. This essay discusses the efforts made by members of Pentecostal churches in Buffalo, New York, to enter into forms of contract with God that supersede the broken social contracts they see as devaluing their lives. These believers listen to God’s words as expressed in prophetic utterances for “confirmation” of the significance of events. In their view, “catching the word” through faithful listening enables them to create social commitments on their own terms, whereas their creative capacities are liable to be alienated from them if they listen improperly. Applying David Graeber’s revisionist treatment of “fetishism” as a form of social creativity, this essay explores how believers create their blessings within a dialogic space involving themselves, God, the devil, and pastor- prophets with exceptional abilities to listen to and convey the terms of the divine contract.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>urban United States, African American Pentecostalism, creativity, contract, fetish, events, ethics of listening</kwd>
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				<article-title>No wonder! Kingship and the everyday at the Max Planck Society</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Comment on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Comment on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>No wonder!






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Julie Billaud. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.1.007
MEDITATION
No wonder!
Kingship and the everyday at the Max Planck Society
Julie BILLAUD, University of Sussex

Comment on “Academic precarity as hierarchical dependence in the Max Planck Society” by Vita Peacock, HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, Volume 6, Issue 1, Summer 2016.


Despite anthropologists’ interest in labor and the dearth of research on the complex forms of exploitation produced by late capitalism, there has been a marked reluctance to turn our gaze upon our own working conditions.
Perhaps because of academics’ passionate attachment to their work and the continued perception of their privileged position in the scholarly ivory tower, very few studies have dared considering them as a group worth of anthropological inquiry.1 Vita Peacock’s sophisticated analysis of hierarchy, precarity, and dependence at the Max Planck Society (MPS) provides some crucial insights on the complex relations of knowledge production in one of the most prestigious research institutions in Germany.
By contrast with studies that seek to trace local receptions of neoliberalism (Ong 2006), the originality of Peacock’s argument is to locate precarity at the MPS in a historically specific trajectory in the German academia—i.e., in an older tradition of intellectual leadership embodied in its century-old “director-led” model. In my view, the notion of “kingship” on which Peacock builds her argument convincingly captures the power dynamics at stake within the Max Planck system. While [122]producing multilayered forms of dependence, the MPS director-led model greatly differs from the liberal ethos of innovation guiding contemporary research initiatives in the rest of Europe. If the neoliberal ideology tends to shape specific subjectivities (self-driven, competitive, and even egocentric at times) as a result of the casualization of labor, the hegemony of the MPS director triggers different kinds of aporia with almost diametrically opposite consequences.
In Peacock’s perspective, the condition of absolute dependence to the “Director-King” in which researchers are maintained is produced dialectically. Embedded within a culturally specific state of hierarchical solidarity, dependence is part of a moral universe whereby the life of the community is equated with the life of the academic sovereign. Hence, the real social effect of the arbitrary belief in somebody’s power is what creates power as a moral reality in the first place. The belief in the sovereign’s divine power, as Valerio Valeri (1985) suggests, prompts many people to become his vassals in order to benefit from his power and this, in return, reinforces the king’s capacity to deliver what his reputation promises.
Trained in the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition where personal pursuit is encouraged, my discovery of this monarchic form of hierarchy through my two-year-long post-PhD involvement with the Institute for Social Anthropology was rapidly marked by an acute awareness of the necessity to manage my relationship with the sovereign Director. In this sense, Peacock is right to conceive dependence in the MPS system as a hierarchical relation allowing a specific “mode of action.” The three examples of tactics developed by researchers to navigate the system illustrate her point particularly well. However, her account leaves the affective dimension of hierarchical dependence somewhat in the background. To me, what this situation of dependence provoked was an overwhelming feeling of boredom triggered by the necessity to follow the motions of the machine without any possibility to expand the horizon of imagination delineated by the director. “Subsumed within the [director’s] broad vision” (this issue, pg. 98), researchers had to constantly wait for the king’s green light before initiating any project. In spite of the director’s alleged desire to remain accessible—leaving her office door visibly open when she was present at the Institute—meetings were regularly postponed and rescheduled to accommodate her own agenda, forcing researchers and visitors to wait for long hours in the corridors. Ironically, many of us found ourselves in the same position as the character waiting in front of the “Gate of Law” in Kafka’s novel The Trial: the director’s door was foreclosed by its—illusionary, and allegedly academically egalitarian—openness.
An emblematic feature of the monarchical community form constructed around the position of the sovereign director, this permanent state of “waithood” could also be interpreted as an instrument of conservative governmentality (Hage 2009). Instead of attempting to resist the various forces that had cast them aside in the knowledge factory, researchers’ capacity to endure the wait was indirectly celebrated as the “heroism of the stuck,” almost as a “sign of nobility of spirit” (Hage 2009: 101). The direct effect of this structure of feeling was to renew a sense of the collective among those maintained in this ambivalent form of passivity. The emotional glue that kept together the community of researchers was surprisingly less made of a common passion for a discipline than of a shared experience of stuckedness. In an attempt to delegitimize and tame impatience and the desire to be disruptive, what was implicitly celebrated was restraint, self-control, self-government: prescriptions [123]that colluded to accentuate boredom. Feelings of intense irritation for being required to remain “within” were slowly transformed into sentiments of inertia and inaction as researchers’ compliance was enforced by the “cruel optimism” (Berlant 2011) of a better future at the end of their long wait.
Remaining within the limits of what was expected also meant that there was no place for surprise, poetic imagination, enchantment, or puzzlement—i.e., no place for the kind of stamina that had guided my work so far. More disturbing even: an institution supposedly renowned for its scientific excellence had indirectly banned the wondrous mindset that underpins the “uncertainty principle of anthropology” (da Col 2013: xiii). If, as Jane Guyer argues, anthropology shares a disciplinary sensitivity with the ataraxia of the Skeptics—i.e., a state of inner peace and tranquility derived from the suspension of judgment and the acceptance of doubt—then the MPS was definitely not a place where the “epistemology of surprise” could be cultivated (Guyer 2013). Decisions as to who could comment on what during seminars and workshops followed a strictly hierarchical model, eliminating any possibility to dialogically discover coincidences and analogies, or to experience the “quickening of the unknown” (Guyer 2013).
By contrast, monotony, predictability, and confinement (the main ingredients of boredom) marked the everyday of MPS researchers (Toohey 2011). Discouraged to interact with researchers from other departments, forced to sit in seminars whose content had been designed without their inputs, deprived of space to engage in genuine exchanges, the everyday of researchers was punctuated by “low density events,” to borrow Edwin Ardener’s metaphor (2012). This intellectual suffocation led to researcher’s gradual disengagement. In a sense, where one would consider events or “quasi-events” (cf. da Col and Humphrey 2012) as the inaugural motor of the serendipitous and the subjunctive, fostering discovery and innovation, the temporal horizon of the Institute was not “framed” by the metacommunicative subjunctive signal “this is play”—as Gregory Bateson (1972–2006) would put it—but irremediably foreclosed by “this is the everyday,” a commitment to a sincere world of the “as is” instead than the multiple worlds of the “as if” we encounter in ritual, play, and any “agonistic” or aleatory activities.2 Some established colleagues and readers might dismiss mine as a naive and utopian vision. I should then call for a pause and reflection on the role of the “subjunctive” and the creative and agonistic element of academic gatherings. Alfred Gell’s (1999) memorable praise of the British anthropology’s seminar culture as well as Michel de Certeau’s (1978) definition of the seminar as a “chatterscape” (Fr. caquetoir), where personal ideas are articulated through vigorous intellectual frictions with the collective, must be taken seriously: academic cultures where debates and seminars participation is restricted or severely limited are likely to foster little innovation. I do not argue this lightly.
During my time at the MPS, I often wondered how such a regime had managed to maintain itself almost untouched since its creation. As Peacock rightly argues, the reforms that followed May 1968 remained cosmetic and left the hegemony of the directors largely unchallenged. The audits conducted by the Fachbeirat were a [124]formal exercise with limited consequences for the director. Researchers within my department never participated in any meeting organized by the Betriebsrat, sharing the view that voicing one’s dissatisfaction in such a forum was both useless and potentially harmful to his or her career. Accountability measures put in place to ensure “good governance” had the paradoxical effect of silencing those who were supposed to benefit from them. In a more pernicious way still, repeated assessments tended to create consensus on what counted and what did not count as “valid scientific knowledge” (Strathern 2000). Like in the monitoring mechanism, I (together with Jane Cowan) observed at the UN Human Rights Council these bureaucratic rituals that forced researchers to make an account of themselves according to a predetermined format had a capacity to reveal at least equivalent to their concealing power (Cowan and Billaud 2015).
A few years ago, when I, together with a small group of freshly recruited post-PhD researchers, sat in a meeting room of the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, none of us knew what hierarchy at the MPS meant in practice. With its finely decorated wooden ceiling, its solid parquet floor, and its view on a modern glass building attached to another nineteenth-century villa, the architecture of the place, together with its location in the former German East, seemed to embody a scientific ethos to which we all could potentially relate: deeply anchored in a classic tradition with its clock set on the contemporary moment. The aim of the meeting was to get to know the members of a team who had been selected by a newly appointed director with the objective of contributing to current scholarly debates in the small subdiscipline of legal anthropology. To start the conversation, the director had offered each of us the possibility to present his/her vision for the future of the department. One researcher, a woman in her late thirties—who had moved her entire family to this small German town to follow “her passion for anthropology”—took the floor and explained with great excitement how she envisioned her new work environment as a “laboratory.” As a place of experimentation, the department could be, in her view, a place to test some of the ideas she had derived from her long-term engagement with the anthropology of international law. She thought she had found the ideal setting to finally engage in vigorous theoretical debates about the nature of “the international,” its values, and the kind of subjectivities and work ethos it produced. She found herself overjoyed at the possibility of experimenting with various working methods with her colleagues, by visiting each other’s field sites, and developing collective publications. In that moment, the discussion turned into a lively exchange among inspired creative spirits. We all schemed for workshops, unknown horizons, and collaborations. It felt like we were on to something genuinely new, that we collectively had the potential to launch the new generation of scholars in the field of legal anthropology.
Seemingly annoyed by this overt expression of enthusiasm, a senior researcher—a man in his fifties who had spent most of his career at the Institute and whom we later understood had become increasingly cynical about the system—suddenly stopped the collective brainstorming. “Obviously, you do not know where you are,” he said with a touch of impatience. “At the Max Planck, hierarchy is like this!” He illustrated his words with his two hands reproducing the shape of a pyramid. “The director decides everything!” he concluded. In visually replicating the pyramid, the senior scholar ended up reifying the director’s position as “Director-King.” The [125]director present in the room did not object, but slightly embarrassed by this overt exposure of her supremacy, quickly moved on to another topic.
Distraught by this unexpected intervention at a moment supposed to be used for bonding, we left the room at the end of the meeting wondering what awaited us in the months to come. At the beginning, we enjoyed the luxurious library of the institute as well as the general ease of our elite scholarly existence. Bedazzled by the fantastic opportunities for fieldwork thanks to the Institute’s generous budget, for a moment we were thrilled by the prospects of our new positions. But slowly, we also started to understand our older colleague’s early intervention. At first, directorial authority manifested itself in seemingly mundane bureaucratic details: the fieldwork budget, the conference attendance request. Soon, however, we started to learn how this authority translated into substantive control over the content of our research—how a panel proposal would be questioned on the basis of the theoretical approach adopted, or how the content of a conference paper would be scrutinized so as to conform with the director’s vision.
One could see in the MPS director-led model a strange version of the ultimate, “effective” university of the future where procedures and templates dictate the content of knowledge. By turning intellectuals into a class of self-reporting bureaucrats governed by the tyranny of bibliometrics and competition for research grants, universities are gradually losing sight of their original purpose. The emptiness of this new structure of governance means that boredom at university is constantly looming. This is the reason why paying close attention to the MPS model and its derivatives is so important: for our capacity to resist and find alternatives will be enhanced by the insights we gain on the inner workings of the system.

Acknowledgments
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my colleague and friend Miia Halme-Tuomisaari for her generous comments and constant source of inspiration in the process of writing this text. I also warmly thank Giovanni Da Col for his sharp editorial eye and guidance.


References
Ardener, Edwin. 2012. “Remote areas: Some theoretical considerations.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 519–33.
Bateson, Gregory. (1972) 2006. “A theory of play and fantasy.” In The game design reader: A rules of play anthology, edited by Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman 314–28. Boston: MIT Press.
Berlant, Lauren. 2011. Cruel optimism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
da Col, Giovanni. 2013. “Strathern bottle: On topology, ethnographic theory, and the method of wonder.” HAU: Masterclass Series 2.[126]
da Col, Giovanni, and Caroline Humphrey. 2012. “Introduction: Subjects of luck—contingency, morality, and the anticipation of everyday life.” Social Analysis 56 (2): 1–18.
De Certeau, Michel. 1978. “Qu’est-ce qu’un séminaire?” Esprit 22/23 (11/12).
Cowan, Jane, and Julie Billaud. 2015. “Between learning and schooling: The politics of human rights monitoring at the universal periodic review.” Third World Quarterly 36 (3).
Gell, Alfred. 1999. “Introduction: Notes on seminar culture and some other influences.” In The art of anthropology: Essays and diagrams, edited by Eric Hirsch, 1–28. London: Bloomsbury.
Graeber, David. 2014. “Anthropology and the rise of class.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (3): 73–88.
Guyer, Jane I. 2013. “‘The quickening of the unknown’: Epistemologies of surprise in anthropology (The Munro Lecture, 2013).” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (3): 283–307.
Hage, Ghassan. 2009. “Waiting out the Crisis: On stuckedness and governmentality.” In Waiting, edited by Ghassan Hage, 97–106. Victoria: Melbourne University Publishing.
Ong, Aihwa. 2006. “Neoliberalism as exception: Mutations in citizenship and sovereignty.” Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Seligman, Adam, Robert Weller, Michael Puett, and Bennett Simon. 2008. Ritual and its consequences: An essay on the limits of sincerity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 2000. “The tyranny of transparency.” British Educational Research Journal 26 (3): 309–21.
Toohey, Peter. 2011. “Boredom: A Lively History.” New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Valeri, Valerio. 1985. Kingship and sacrifice: Ritual and society in ancient Hawaii. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 
Julie BILLAUD is Associate Researcher in Anthropology at Sussex Asia Center, University of Sussex. She is the author of Kabul carnival: Gender politics in postwar Afghanistan (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
Julie BillaudSchool of Global StudiesUniversity of SussexSussex HouseFalmer Brighton, BN1 9RHUnited Kingdomjb32@sussex.ac.uk


___________________
1. An exemplary exception may be found in David Graeber’s analysis of the professionalization of academia and what he has called “vulgar Foucauldianism” (2014: 84).
2. I am using here the crucial discussion of the work of the subjunctive and its relation to the attitude of “sincerity” by Adam Seligman, Robert Weller, Michael Puett, and Bennett Simon (2008).
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Recent writing associated with anthropology's &quot;ontological turn&quot; has worked to transform the familiar trope of ethnography as a mode of translation. In place of popular conceptions of social anthropology as the more-or-less faithful transmission of other peoples' cultural meanings, these approaches frame the ethnographer’s task as that of generating novel concepts and terminology—ones that are &quot;peculiarly ours&quot; rather than &quot;theirs&quot;—through a creative synthesis of philosophy and field experience. Within this scheme, the roles that &quot;native thinking&quot; (and indeed &quot;native thinkers&quot;) are invited to play in this burgeoning discourse remain unclear. Here I address this issue ethnographically, through an ongoing initiative on the part of Te Aitanga a Hauiti Māori people in New Zealand to build a digital repository of tribal taonga (ancestral artifacts, images, knowledge). In an account written with the purposes of their project in mind, I consider what Hauiti's efforts to translate their whakapapa (genealogies and oral histories) into digital forms might imply for an anthropology that would seek to reframe questions of difference by mobilizing such native &quot;anthropologies&quot; in the service of disciplinary self-renewal. These ethnographic insights then set the scene for a second discussion—to appear in the following issue of Hau—of how ontological approaches are seeking to transform anthropology, considered in relation to earlier debates on the difficulties of translating cultural and ontological alterity.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Recent writing associated with anthropology's &quot;ontological turn&quot; has worked to transform the familiar trope of ethnography as a mode of translation. In place of popular conceptions of social anthropology as the more-or-less faithful transmission of other peoples' cultural meanings, these approaches frame the ethnographer’s task as that of generating novel concepts and terminology—ones that are &quot;peculiarly ours&quot; rather than &quot;theirs&quot;—through a creative synthesis of philosophy and field experience. Within this scheme, the roles that &quot;native thinking&quot; (and indeed &quot;native thinkers&quot;) are invited to play in this burgeoning discourse remain unclear. Here I address this issue ethnographically, through an ongoing initiative on the part of Te Aitanga a Hauiti Māori people in New Zealand to build a digital repository of tribal taonga (ancestral artifacts, images, knowledge). In an account written with the purposes of their project in mind, I consider what Hauiti's efforts to translate their whakapapa (genealogies and oral histories) into digital forms might imply for an anthropology that would seek to reframe questions of difference by mobilizing such native &quot;anthropologies&quot; in the service of disciplinary self-renewal. These ethnographic insights then set the scene for a second discussion—to appear in the following issue of Hau—of how ontological approaches are seeking to transform anthropology, considered in relation to earlier debates on the difficulties of translating cultural and ontological alterity.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Transforming translations (part I)






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons |   Amiria J. M. Salmond. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau3.3.001
Transforming translations (part I)
“The owner of these bones”
Amiria J. M. SALMOND, University of Auckland


Recent writing associated with anthropology’s “ontological turn” has worked to transform the familiar trope of ethnography as a mode of translation. In place of popular conceptions of social anthropology as the more-or-less faithful transmission of other peoples’ cultural meanings, these approaches frame the ethnographer’s task as that of generating novel concepts and terminology—ones that are “peculiarly ours” rather than “theirs”—through a creative synthesis of philosophy and field experience. Within this scheme, the roles that “native thinking” (and indeed “native thinkers”) are invited to play in this burgeoning discourse remain unclear. Here I address this issue ethnographically, through an ongoing initiative on the part of Te Aitanga a Hauiti Māori people in New Zealand to build a digital repository of tribal taonga (ancestral artifacts, images, knowledge). In an account written with the purposes of their project in mind, I consider what Hauiti’s efforts to translate their whakapapa (genealogies and oral histories) into digital forms might imply for an anthropology that would seek to reframe questions of difference by mobilizing such native “anthropologies” in the service of disciplinary self-renewal. These ethnographic insights then set the scene for a second discussion—to appear in the following issue of HAU—of how ontological approaches are seeking to transform anthropology, considered in relation to earlier debates on the difficulties of translating cultural and ontological alterity.
Keywords: ethnographic translation, ontological turn, Māori, digital anthropology, cultural invention, incommensurability




Today it is undoubtedly commonplace to say that cultural translation is our discipline’s distinctive task. But the problem is knowing what precisely is, can, or should be a translation, and how to carry such an operation out. . . . To translate is always to betray, as the Italian saying goes. However, a good translation is one that allows alien concepts to deform and subvert the translator’s conceptual toolbox so that the intentio of the original language can be expressed within the new one.
—Eduardo Viveiros de Castro


All we have to go by are our misunderstandings of others’ views—our initial descriptions of their statements and practices. What we then produce, if we are to avoid projection, is a series of concepts that imitate those statements and practices . . . but are nevertheless peculiarly ours. . . . [A]nthropology is not about “how we think they think.” It is about how we could learn to think, given what they say and do.
—Martin Holbraad

Recent writing associated with anthropology’s “ontological turn”1 has transformed the familiar trope of ethnography as a mode of translation, while seeking to move the discipline on from its association with cultures conceived as bounded, language-like entities. Building both more and less directly on poststructuralist and postcolonial insights into the nature and politics of alterity, an appealing self-image is being crafted for social anthropologists as creative philosophers, lending their genius to the impossible (though far from futile) task of making sense of others, as a means of improving ourselves. In place of popular conceptions of ethnography as the more-or-less faithful transmission of other peoples’ cultural meanings, these approaches frame the ethnographer’s task as that of generating novel concepts and terminology—ones that are “peculiarly ours” rather than “theirs”—through a creative synthesis of philosophy and field experience. Instead of asserting the ability to accurately reproduce native habits and ideas for nonnative audiences, these writers often foreground incommensurabilities—the very practices, ideas, and things encountered in the course of fieldwork that most confound their own descriptive capabilities. In this frame, ethnographic translation appears as something of an art form, a philosophical mode that seeks to infect familiar ways of thinking with otherness, as a means of stimulating analytic creativity.
Within this potentially attractive scenario, however, a certain lack of clarity remains with regard to the roles “native thinking” (and indeed “native thinkers”) are invited to play in this burgeoning discourse. In the Italian saying traduttore, traditore—invoked by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro above—there is an enticing liberty implied by the inevitability of the translator’s betrayal. Whether it is taken to mean simply that the standard of fidelity to an original is generally set too high, or that translation inherently attempts the impossible (like carving out shared space across different scales), it seems that a degree of creative license is being sanctioned. That is alluring indeed for ethnographers, if all we have to go on are “our misunderstandings of others’ views.” Acknowledging our own limitations lets us off the hook in a number of ways. One convenient effect of this particular absolution, as mobilized in the approaches mentioned here, is that it opens up a seemingly infinite range of resources—the artifacts of recursive ethnographic analysis—to be deployed in the “game” of creative concept generation. But who else might lay claim to such resources? Whom or what do we betray in our transforming translations, and to whom or what are we no longer trying (so hard) to be faithful?
These questions might be asked by a native intellectual, someone concerned perhaps with cultural property rights and the exploitation by metropolitan scholars of self-consciously “indigenous” knowledge, but I put them for different reasons. First, because my own ethnographic relationships demand that I reflect on such matters, and second because these questions are begged, I think, by the ways in which arguments in favor of ethnography as “controlled equivocation” (Viveiros de Castro 2004) or as “inventive definition” (Holbraad 2008, 2009, 2012) foreground the importance of their ethnographic commitments. As articulated in one manifesto, the basic idea advanced by such approaches is to let things encountered in the course of fieldwork recursively “dictate the terms of their own analysis” (Henare [Salmond], Holbraad, and Wastell 2007: 4).2 Instead of involving the mere accumulation of data against which to test existing theories, fieldwork ought to encourage anthropologists to generate insights that are “novel” and “peculiarly our own” but that clearly owe something to the field experience. To rephrase the question then, what might be owed, and to whom, in a recursive anthropology? Clearly, in the first instance at least, the answer must be sought recursively.
What I propose here, then, in line with the sort of methodology prescribed above, is to address my query about recursive analysis ethnographically, in the terms of my own field experience. The aim is to see what happens when such approaches are inflected—and perhaps even “deformed and subverted”—by a different constellation of ethnographic relationships. Later, in a second article to appear in the following issue of this journal, I explore the implications of this ethnographic experiment for the ways in which ontological approaches are currently being articulated. In recalling a number of earlier discussions about the challenges of translating cultural and ontological alterity, I show how the language deployed by present-day anthropological ontologists invites critiques of a kind that have already been leveled at earlier scholars who grappled with notions such as “different worlds” and “ontological alterity.” Applying the insights generated through the ethnography presented in the present article, I suggest that the ontologists’ commitment to ethnographic engagement might inoculate their approaches against many of these charges but nonetheless begs questions about the precise nature of their ethnographic investments.
In the present article, then, I explore by way of example what might be at stake in the kinds of artifacts anthropologists produce in New Zealand, where ethnographic relationships can entail special kinds of expectations and commitments. Part of the story inevitably turns on cultural politics, but more to the point is the specificity of the ties in which one becomes enmeshed as an ethnographer, and the obligations, as well as inspiration, that may extend from them. In applying this recursive methodology, I draw on relationships with members of Te Aitanga a Hauiti, a Māori iwi (tribal kin group) based in Uawa (Tolaga Bay) on the East Coast of New Zealand’s North Island. Working through an ongoing initiative to build a digital repository of tribal taonga (ancestral artifacts, images, knowledge), I consider what Hauiti’s efforts to translate their whakapapa (genealogies and oral histories) into digital forms might imply for an anthropology that would seek to reframe questions of difference by mobilizing such native “anthropologies” (Viveiros de Castro 2004) in the service of disciplinary self-renewal.


“The owner of t hese bones”

Besides the firm outline of tribal constitution and crystallised cultural items which form the skeleton, besides the data of daily life and ordinary behaviour, which are, so to speak, its flesh and blood, there is still to be recorded the spirit—the natives’ views and opinions and utterances.
—Bronislaw Malinowski
Iwi (n.) 1. Bone. . . . 4. Nation, people.
—Herbert William Williams, A dictionary of the Maori language

Anthropological3 attempts to translate the beliefs, practices, and languages of Pacific peoples may be traced to Europe’s Age of Discovery, when voyages of exploration ventured into unfamiliar waters with a view to knowing and exploiting that vast ocean’s seemingly infinite resources (Smith 1992). When James Cook reached New Zealand in 1769, bringing with him the Tahitian priest-navigator Tupaia, part of the country’s coastline had been marked on European maps for over two centuries, yet virtually nothing was known of its inhabitants. A skilled linguist, Tupaia was able to communicate in his native language with the people they met, and played an indispensable role as the Endeavour’s chief translator, broker, and cultural advisor, mediating what appeared to many of Cook’s men as encounters with radical alterity (Salmond 2003).
In Queen Charlotte Sound, for instance, after some months spent in New Zealand waters, Cook and some sailors explored the coastline together with the Tahitian and the gentleman naturalist Joseph Banks. Rowing across the Sound, they saw the body of a woman floating in the water, and upon reaching shore, Tupaia asked some local people about her. According to Banks, they “told Tupia that the woman was a relation of theirs” (Beaglehole 1962: 455). As the Tahitian spoke with them, his companions wandered about the cove. A dog was baking in an earth oven, with provision baskets heaped beside it. Poking in one of these baskets, a member of Cook’s group saw two clean-picked bones that seemed to be human, a discovery that created immediate consternation among the Endeavour party, including Tupaia. He questioned the local people, asking

What bones are these? they answerd, The bones of a man. —And have you eat the flesh? —Yes. —Have you none of it left? —No. Why did not you eat the woman who we saw today in the water? —She was our relation. —Who is that you do eat? —Those who are killd in war. —And who is the man whose bones these are? —5 days ago a boat of our enemies came into this bay and of them we killd 7, of whom the owner of these bones was one. (Beaglehole 1962: 455)

Banks’ account of the exchange suggests that while these bones, as apparent traces of Māori cannibalism, sparked an immediate and visceral reaction in Tupaia and the Endeavour’s sailors, for others including Banks and Cook, they supplied empirical confirmation of preformed hypotheses about the scale of humanity’s differences:

The horrour that apeard in the countenances of the seamen on hearing [Tupaia’s] discourse which was immediately translated for the good of the company is better conceivd that describd. For ourselves and myself in particular we were before too well convincd of the existence of such a custom to be surprizd, tho we were pleasd at having so strong a proof of a custom which human nature holds in too great abhorrence to give easy credit to (Beaglehole 1962: 455).

Through his conduct and writing, Banks—like many later ethnographers—translated otherness into affinity by encompassing his Polynesian interlocutors within the brotherhood of Man, resolving alterity through appeal to a common humanity. In this sense, his posture of untroubled equanimity in the face of what seemed to most of the crew inhuman behavior may be read as a self-consciously Enlightened response that prefigured that of much contemporary anthropology to the problem of cultural difference. While his moral philosophy may have been generous toward “savages” when compared to that of many of his contemporaries, however, it was no less geared to an imperial agenda. The purpose of cultivating “friendship and alliance” with local people and “inviting them to Traffick,” as Cook had been instructed, was to secure the “Consent of the Natives to take Possession for His Majesty” of their lands “by setting up Proper Marks and Inscriptions, as first discoverers and possessors” (Beaglehole 1955: 514). Here, translation was an instrumental means by which a transfer of ownership could be effected; Banks’ accounts of the local people and their “Genius, Temper [and] Disposition” (Beaglehole 1955: 514) had unequivocally appropriative intentions.
Positioned in direct opposition to such imperialist aims, the modern image of anthropologists as translators of culture has been cultivated in part as a corrective to the discipline’s enduring reputation as the “handmaiden of colonialism.” Whereas ethnology in the British tradition emphasized socio-cultural differences with a view to governing diverse colonial subjects, it is claimed, anthropology as an international discipline is now dedicated to promoting equal participation in the global order for all the world’s peoples. With this in mind, the proper attitude toward difference, having defined it, would seem to be to seek its resolution, and this indeed is where many anthropologists have positioned themselves politically, working (philosophically or practically) in support of minority rights, humanitarianism, conflict resolution, and the general promotion of intercultural communication. In this instrumental register too, cultural translation is a tool with which difference may be uncovered, engaged, transcended, and resolved through appeals to common goals and shared meanings. Much ethnography has thus proceeded on the basis of a hopeful humanism that seeks to cultivate the seeds of mutual understanding in the common ground of human nature.
Yet recent (and not-so-recent) scholarship across the social sciences and humanities has pointed to the moral ambiguities—and continuities with Enlightenment thinking—entailed by such a project; issues that have acquired pertinence and moral complexity in relation to ongoing Euro-American attempts to enforce particular brands of liberal democratic humanism upon those regarded as other, at home and internationally. In philosophy and translation studies, for example, the work of cultural translators, including anthropologists, has been closely interrogated over a period of decades, and its political effects have become the focus of intense analytic scrutiny in fields like indigenous studies and postcolonial literary criticism, as well as within anthropology (Asad 1993; Buden et al. 2009). At the center of these discussions is the question of difference, and whether the aim of translation ought to be to resolve differences of the kind we are accustomed to thinking of as cultural—if this is even possible—or to take difference seriously in different ways. In its activist voice, such work has drawn explicit attention to the practical and philosophical violence executed against people(s) regarded as other in the name of projects of commensuration, as well as differentiation (Povinelli 2002). In place of a “common sense” vision of translation as the transmission of meaning across linguistic and cultural boundaries to create shared communities of understanding, it offers an alternative role for the translator as a creative agent who finds inspiration in the very impossibility of their task; in misunderstanding, impasse, and “the crisis of failing to know otherness” (Budick 1996: 10).
Many anthropologists too have become concerned by the ease with which their own discipline—among institutions that deal in culture—claims to know its other. A body of scholarship has emerged that seeks to foreground differences of the kind that may be swept aside or resolved in advance by the concept of the anthropos. Here the remedy proposed is ethnographic; by paying close attention to how others handle difference differently, it is suggested, we may be able to imagine new ways of dealing with difference ourselves. One way in which this analytic move has been articulated is as a shift from primarily epistemological concerns (comparing people’s differences as different knowledges about the world) toward ontology (comparing the ways in which people compare differences as artifacts of difference itself).4
Here some effects of these moves on the aims and practice of ethnographic translation are considered, in an attempt to draw out from the following example of translation-in-action some implications for ethnographic theory and methodology. Although in many ways the so-called ontological turn constitutes a radical and productive reworking of the task of ethnography, I suggest, the privileged role it reserves for ethnographers as interpreters of other people’s lives may put it at odds with some of the native anthropologies it identifies as resources for disciplinary self-renewal.


Te Rauata: A digital taonga repository
Titirangi mountain was shrouded in mist as we rounded the final bend in the road, driving into Uawa one winter’s morning in July 2010. In Tolaga Bay township—a scattering of shops along a wide main street—we stopped for coffee before heading in convoy to the marae to film the final stage of our haerenga, or journey.
In front of the ancestor/meeting house Ruakapanga, a crew of Te Aitanga a Hauiti rangatahi (young people) were rehearsing one of the many action-songs composed in their rohe (tribal area) last century. We women wrapped scarves around our waists for the pōwhiri or welcome, as our group was summoned with karanga (ritual calls) onto the marae proper, the grassy lawn in front of the house’s carved facade. Speeches followed in Māori, greeting the ancestors present and laying down the kaupapa or purpose of the day’s activities. Formalities over, we got to work on filming the documentary, which recalled an earlier expedition to the area by members of the Dominion Museum ethnographic team in 1923. Commissioned by the local tribal leader, national politician, and anthropologist Sir Apirana Ngata, a group of Māori and pākeha (non-Māori) ethnologists, inclu-ding my great-great grandfather James McDonald—a filmmaker and photographer for the museum—had traveled to the area to record songs, chants, and technologies that Ngata feared were in danger of being forgotten (Henare [Salmond] 2007). Now our film crew, led by two Māori directors, was retracing their steps, talking to descendants of the people the Dominion Museum team had met and filmed, photographed and recorded, using the latest technologies of their day. Inside the meeting house, Dr Wayne Ngata—Apirana’s great-nephew—intoned one of the mōteatea (chants) etched into wax cylinders during that earlier expedition. Afterward he was interviewed on camera by my mother Anne Salmond, an anthropologist with lifelong ties to the East Coast through her work with my godparents, the elders Amiria and Eruera Stirling, and through our extended family in the nearby city of Gisborne.
I had been to Uawa several times before. The first time I remember was in 2003, on a visit with my family to attend the unveiling of the gravestone of Irihapeti Walters. “Auntie Bessie,” as she was widely known, had introduced many people, including me, to Māori taonga (treasures) in her role as Kaiarahi or guide at the national museum. I met her there through a research project I was doing at university, and she was a formative influence on my decision to study anthropology. Her knowledge of the collections was unparalleled, and she told me of the unpredictable antics of certain artifacts that had been reluctant to enter the museum, but had settled down because they are “used to us now.” A staunch adherent of the Mormon faith, her black granite tombstone was etched with an image of the church’s temple in Salt Lake City.
It was through Auntie Bessie that I came to work closely with her whanaunga (relatives) Wayne Ngata and his niece Hera Ngata-Gibson, both members of Toi Hauiti, a working group of the Te Aitanga a Hauiti tribal Trust. A visit to an exhibition they had organized called Te Pou o te Kani, with a group of Māori curators from the national museum, led to further exchanges with the University of Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology where I was working as a curator. A series of reciprocal visits followed, including a delegation of Hauiti de-scendants coming to the UK, which eventually led to a formal partnership with the Museum on the Artefacts of Encounter project, launched in April 2010.
When I returned to Uawa in 2012 for a digital technology wānanga (workshop) hosted by Toi Hauiti, it was thus to maintain and strengthen these relationships. Led by the group’s Chairperson, Wayne Ngata, the Hauiti people are currently developing a repository in which to store their digital taonga—images, video footage, sound files, and documents both historical and contemporary relating to their whakapapa (genealogies and oral histories); their traditional arts of karakia (ritual incantations), haka (performing arts), and mōteatea (chants and songs); as well as tā moko (tattoo), whakairo (carving), whatu (weaving), and raranga (basketry). To be included in the digital system—named Te Rauata (“the gathering together of images”)—are visual and textual records of early encounters that took place in Uawa between their ancestors and crew on Captain James Cook’s first two Pacific voyages of discovery in 1769 and 1773 (during the first of which the Tahitian translator Tupaia played a prominent role). Oral historical accounts of these visits, too, later recorded by missionaries and others, are to be combined in the repository with film footage, sound recordings, photographs, and maps made of Hauiti landscapes, artifacts, and people, through a project named Te Ataakura for an ancestress descended from Hauiti, the iwi’s eponymous progenitor (Ngata, Ngata-Gibson, and Salmond 2012).
The purpose of the January wānanga was to discuss with Te Rauata’s technical developers (software writers) and scholarly collaborators (anthropologists and art historians) the principles that would shape the system’s formal architecture, and the kinds of data that would populate it. At the time it was not yet clear what sorts of digital entities would exist within the repository’s databases, the tabulated “objects” to which the different file-types (JPEGs, MP3s, PDFs, etc.) could be linked and made searchable through the tracing and tranching of different kinds of digital relationships. In order to establish the database schema, the developers needed Toi Hauiti to tell them what they wanted to put into the system, how these data would be related, and how they want users to access it. It emerged that Toi Hauiti not only want to include their whakapapa in the form of genealogies and oral histories within Te Rauata, they also want whakapapa to generate the structure of the database and the ontology of the system itself.5
Whakapapa (lit.: “to generate layers”) is a Māori-language term usually translated as “genealogy,” though it has migrated into everyday New Zealand English to signify distinctively Māori ways of reckoning relations of descent. In common parlance, one’s whakapapa is one’s family tree, and to have Scottish, Welsh, and Māori whakapapa is to descend from all those peoples, while using the term “wha kapapa” as opposed to, say, “lineage” or “family history” indicates familiarity with Māori notions of relatedness. In practice, and especially when used by speakers of Māori, it invokes a continuously unfolding generative complex of ideas, processes, and artifacts that may be considered both to exceed, and to be incommensurable with, genealogy. As a number of anthropologists have observed, indeed, whakapapa is a relational field—or fabric—of cosmogonic proportions (Prytz-Johansen 1954: 9; Sahlins 1985a: 195; Salmond 1991: 39–44; Tapsell 1997) encompassing everything there is: animals, plants, landscapes, and inanimate objects, as well as people. According to Marshall Sahlins, indeed, it constitutes a “veritable ontology” (1985b: 14). Whakapapa is thus much more than genealogy, narrowly conceived; from the beginning ethnographers and Māori have noted its centrality to every aspect of Māori existence, its role in shaping—if not determining—not only social relations but their very conditions of possibility.
As it arose in the workshop, though, the whakapapa that would generate Toi Hauiti’s digital repository appeared less as an aspect of Māoritanga (Māori ways) in general than as a defining characteristic of “Hauititanga,” as Toi Hauiti call it, in particular—an especially “Hauitian” approach to the task at hand. Rather than emphasizing their distinctiveness in terms of being Māori, as opposed to the pākeha (non-Māori, European) anthropologists and software developers present, Hauiti were keen to convey their whakapapa on their own terms, to their own people—especially younger generations—as well as to those who were, in different ways, accustomed to thinking about relatedness rather differently. The problem that became the focus of the workshop was how to translate Hauiti’s whakapapa into a relational database schema, which would ultimately be rendered in the binary logic of code. The developers were being asked to perform a complex feat of ontological articulation—to write software that would reproduce and extend the ontology of Hauiti’s whakapapa, allowing it to encompass and continue to generate novel (in this case, digital) forms.
This was not a new type of problem for Hauiti, who have been appropriating novel technologies and artifacts through whakapapa since long before the arrival of Cook’s first voyage at Uawa in the late eighteenth century. But it was new in the sense that this particular technology is explicitly concerned with the formalization, as well as generation, of relationships. The relational character of both whakapapa and relational databases created grounds for potential misunderstanding, since it was not yet clear whether they could be relational in the same way. Together with Toi Hauiti, the anthropologists’ role was to help translate Hauiti whakapapa for the developers and to observe and participate in the project of building the Te Rauata system as a whole.
Helpfully for us, questions of whether different ontologies may be compared and translated—and how to tackle this ethnographically—is currently a hot topic of debate in anthropology and related disciplines (Alberti and Bray 2009; Alberti et al. 2011; Jensen 2010; Henare [Salmond], Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; Holbraad 2012; Latour 2009; Lloyd 2010; Pedersen 2011; Scott 2007, 2013; Venkatesan 2010; Paleāek and Risjord 2012). Although some critics have associated these developments with a move away from the grounded realities of fieldwork toward theory of increasing degrees of abstraction (e.g., Geismar 2011: 214; Laidlaw 2012), a more engaged reading acknowledges the pivotal role accorded ethnography as the primary source of anthropologically distinctive insights into matters of ontological difference (e.g., Crook and Shaffner 2011). In the Uawa workshop, certainly, the issue arose as a practical problem posed by Toi Hauiti, which all participants (including anthropologists) were recruited to address; how to render one dynamic complex of practices, processes, and artifacts (whakapapa) in terms of another (relational databases). The conceptual and practical challenges of this task, including the potential incommensurabilities—or untranslatability—of these different relational modes were immediately clear to all concerned.
Another form of received wisdom about anthropology’s newfound interest in ontological matters is that it concerns forms of difference that bear a striking resemblance to those customarily grouped under the rubric of culture. True, those exploring the ethnographic potential of ontological approaches are interested in differences of the kind we are accustomed to thinking of as cultural, but their aim is precisely to redefine these in order to get past the culture concept’s well-rehearsed limitations—to come up with newly ethnographic ways of addressing “the difficult problem of how this difference is to be located, situated, delimited” (Candea 2010), as opposed to resolving such differences in advance—dissolving them—by invoking familiar concepts. “Ontologies” as a heuristic may not ultimately prove the best way forward, but these debates at least tackle the problems of culture head-on, instead of placing them to one side as if those earlier discussions had never happened.
At present, furthermore, there is a productive lack of consensus as to what an “ontology” might be, anthropologically speaking, beyond the view (shared at least by those who use the term) that it is not “just another word for culture” (Venkatesan 2010). In our January workshop, certainly, the ontological differences that presented themselves did not map in any straightforward way onto cultures—Toi Hauiti were at pains to assert the particularity of their whakapapa as “Hauitian” (not simply Māori), and the software developers were mobilizing highly specialized terms and practices, many of which remained quite incomprehensible to the anthropologists (who, as fellow pākeha, might have been taken as cultural allies). The challenges of translation and comparison did not appear in cultural (or even culture-like) terms.
It quickly emerged that the task of translating Hauiti whakapapa into digital form was to proceed simultaneously on a number of fronts and would involve a certain division of labor. While the schema of the database was being generated through the writing of software, work could begin on translating nondigital records—such as documents and photographic prints—into electronic files, by scanning and rephotographing them digitally. A mass of material already collated and conserved “under people’s beds” would be brought out and converted into digital formats ready for incorporation into the system. At the same time, records produced by and for Toi Hauiti and already in digital form, such as video-and sound-recordings of significant events and performances, would be prepared for uploading, while new records of present-day events were continually being created.
The software developers needed to work closely with Toi Hauiti to ensure that the system being generated in code would indeed translate their whakapapa in the manner desired, allowing it to reproduce and extend itself in the form of digital and digitized artifacts and relationships. The developers requested a list of translations of key Māori terms being used during the workshop and in Te Rauata’s development. And Toi Hauiti themselves (including a Hauitian web designer not present at the workshop) would take the lead in translating/transforming the repository’s contents into web-based applications designed to engage a broader community of users. The anthropologists’ role in all this was thus a minor one, concerned primarily with supporting Toi Hauiti’s ongoing efforts to translate their whakapapa verbally and practically into terms that would facilitate the work of the developers. The discussion presented here is both about, and part of, that continuing process.
The risks of translating their whakapapa into digital form were a major concern to Toi Hauiti, balanced with the technology’s positive potential, imagined especially in terms of its capacity to capture the interest of their young people, many of whom are enthusiastic digital citizens. Translation’s transformative effects, its capacity to “deform and subvert” the nature and significance of its object, is a factor of which the group is acutely aware. They are keen to exploit the distributed and generative character of web-based technologies to create multiple copies of digital objects in disparate locations, but are equally aware of its potential misuses. Throughout the development of Te Rauata, indeed, Toi Hauiti have been explicit about the importance of maintaining ownership, mana, and control over every aspect of the process, from the servers on which the database resides (located at a school within their tribal area), to determining who gets access to what levels of the system, to articles written about the project as a result of their collaboration with technical developers, Pacific art historians, and ethnographers.
The involvement of anthropologists in the project was at Toi Hauiti’s direct initiative. Over the past two decades, the group has conceived and delivered a series of events and projects designed to revitalize their local economy and to stimulate cultural and artistic development among their people (Ngata, Ngata-Gibson, and Salmond 2012). Far off the main transit routes, Uawa is a small and relatively isolated coastal settlement with a population of around 700, dominated by descendants of Hauiti, a fighting chief who lived there in the sixteenth century. Once a prosperous agricultural center with a renowned whare wānanga (house of learning)—Te Rāwheoro, established centuries ago by Hauiti’s father Hingangaroa—the community had fallen on hard times in the late twentieth century when coastal shipping was abandoned in favor of inland roads as the preferred means of transporting goods and people between the North Island’s main centers. In an effort to improve the lives and prospects of the local community, especially their young people, Toi Hauiti was formed in 2000 as a working group of the Te Aitanga a Hauiti Charitable Trust, and charged with promoting and capitalizing on the iwi’s history of artistic and cultural excellence. Focusing on the legacy of Te Rāwheoro in the form of traditions of carving, weaving, oratory, performing arts, and tattoo that had survived the wānanga’s official closure in the mid-nineteenth century, the group swiftly launched a series of initiatives to attract outside interest and support, to reconnect with their dispersed taonga (ancestral treasures including carved and woven artifacts now in museums around the world) and to mobilize whakapapa connections with around 5,000 of Hauiti’s descendants living away from their tribal territories, throughout New Zealand and abroad. Among the first of these projects was Te Pou o Te Kani, the temporary exhibition I had visited of tribal artifacts and contemporary artworks drawn from local private collections and loans from museums, mounted in a local house on the main street of Tolaga Bay township for three months in 2003.
While the primary aim of Te Pou o Te Kani was to build capacity within the iwi, showcasing the skills of local weavers, painters, and carvers, it also attracted national and international interest as possibly the first Māori tribal cultural center to open to the public. Among the visitors to the exhibition were anthropologists and curators from metropolitan museums and universities as far afield as the UK. Following the exhibition’s closure, Toi Hauiti resolved to expand the relationships thus established by launching a further series of initiatives in collaboration with a number of overseas institutions. These include a venture currently underway with botanists at Kew Gardens and the Natural History Museum in London to replant their riverbank with seeds that are the uri (descendants) of those collected in Uawa by Joseph Banks and by George and Reinhold Forster (naturalists on Cook’s second Pacific voyage). The Te Ataakura digital repository, being developed with the involvement of anthropologists and other staff at the University of Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (MAA), is another of these collaborative projects.


Translating Māoritanga
Anthropology’s image as a discipline specialized in cultural translation was not insignificant in Toi Hauiti’s decision to work with ethnographers. A substantial part of the group’s practical work involves attracting outside funding for their various community-based activities, and among obvious potential sources are monies earmarked for anthropological research and related “cultural” projects. Recognizing this, they approached Cambridge, activating existing ties with a view to collaborating on an initiative that would further their own continuing efforts to reconnect with the dispersed artifacts of Te Rāwheoro’s legacy in overseas museums, including taonga collected at Uawa during the Cook voyages. A formal partnership was established, and Toi Hauiti worked closely with the Museum during and after their first visit to Cambridge to draft a major grant application that expressed their aims in a form designed to appeal to UK funding bodies. This was a “successful” translation, economically speaking, as it provided funding to support travel for more Hauiti people to visit their taonga in overseas collections and attend international workshops, as well as technical equipment and expertise necessary to build the repository. It was clear, however, that for an initiative like Te Rauata to succeed, further resources would be needed to underwrite Toi Hauiti’s commitment to the project. A second grant application was submitted, this time conveying the group’s aspirations in the rather different terms required by Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga, a national body for Māori research funding in New Zealand. This award funded Te Ataakura, the research project led by Toi Hauiti, through which the group would produce their relational database in collaboration with technical developers as well as anthropologists and art historians from the universities of Auckland and Cambridge.
In terms of the “ownership” of, and mana (authority, control) over the processes and artifacts of ethnographic translation, it is important to note that— unlike in other places, perhaps—Toi Hauiti’s decision to work with anthropologists was far from obvious. In New Zealand, and especially among Māori, the discipline of anthropology has long been regarded with considerable suspicion. From the 1970s, non-Māori scholars writing about Māori society have been vigorously challenged in seminar rooms and in print to justify their right and competence to translate cultural others, and departments of Māori Studies, employing many Māori academics, were established in New Zealand’s universities via wide-ranging programs of intellectual and political self-determination. In 1975, in response to growing indigenous pressure, the Waitangi Tribunal was founded by the government to hear Māori claims about specific failures to honor the terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, a document signed by tribal leaders and representatives of the British Crown in 1840, through which New Zealand was formally accessioned as a British colony. Since 1985, when the Tribunal gained retrospective jurisdiction to consider claims about breaches as far back as the mid-nineteenth century, anthropologists have been routinely recruited alongside sociologists and historians as expert witnesses by either claimants or the Crown,6 to give evidence in the Tribunal’s adversarial setting. Research priorities shifted into activist mode, as scholars took sides, spurred on by lawyers and their own loyalties to undermine each other’s testimony, leading to a certain segregation of “academic” from “Tribunal” scholarship, and to the emergence of historiographic and anthropological critiques questioning the objectivity and evidential status of “Treaty-centered histories” (Sharp and McHugh 2001: 4; van Meijl 2009).
Today, few university-based anthropologists in New Zealand list contemporary Māori topics among their academic research interests (they work mainly on historical subjects or in Pacific islands and further afield). Further, although a significant number of distinguished Māori scholars trained as anthropologists during the twentieth century, few Māori students are following in their footsteps (Henare [Salmond] 2007), finding more direct routes to tribal advocacy and leadership—or simply better career prospects—in professional degrees such as law and commerce or the burgeoning range of iwi management qualifications offered by tertiary institutions. Although most Māori Studies departments began life as anthropological enclaves populated by (Māori and non-Māori) linguists and ethnographers, furthermore, many have since become oriented toward indigenous activism, maintaining a strong focus on the “decolonization” of scholarship. The few anthropologists who continue to publish on contemporary Māori topics tend to be based outside New Zealand, and their work is sometimes critical of these and related developments, rendering them through various brands of political-economic theory as by-products of an “ideology of traditionalism” (Webster 1998, 2002), as examples of strategic (or naïve) cultural construction (Kolig 2002), or as emblematic of “increasing hostility of Māori to foreign interest and research in Māori culture” (van Meijl 2009: 343).7
Looking at the scope of scholarly discourse about contemporary Māori culture, indeed, it is as if at least two quite separate conversations are going on that are mutually unintelligible—even untranslatable—in the sense that neither seems able to take the other’s claims seriously. One, playing out in Māori Studies departments, as well as in schools, government bodies, and other institutions charged with implementing cultural policy, takes Māoritanga (“Māoriness”) to be a range of received tenets, practices, and “spiritual” principles handed down from ancestors that remain fundamentally relevant today and that are held to define Te Ao Māori (often translated as “the Māori world view”). This version of Māori culture forms the basis of government policy with regard to Māori arts, education, healthcare, and in areas such as social welfare and the penal system. It is also implemented, by Māori and others, in a wide range of research programs and organizations (including Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga, which funded Hauiti’s digital repository project) under the influential banner of Kaupapa Māori (Māori values) research, exponents of which have been strongly critical of anthropology, advocating instead a “by Māori, for Māori” approach in which indigenous subjects maintain authority and control over the research process and its outputs (Tuhiwai-Smith 1999).
The second conversation, proceeding mainly in the pages of anthropology journals, takes Māori culture to be the contemporary predicament of New Zealand’s indigenous people as culturally marked members of a modern liberal-democratic polity, many of whom are engaged in strategic projects of identity construction for political and economic ends. This discussion sometimes takes the first as its object but with little attempt at engagement (these anthropologists write about Māoritanga but rarely address their arguments to its exponents).8 More than this, such scholarship often presents “Māori culture” in a form that participants in the first conversation could not recognize even if they wanted to, since its practical effect is to expose the foundations of Māoritanga and “the Māori world view” as fabricated and (at least implicitly) inauthentic inventions (examples in Henare [Salmond] 2007; Friedman 1992).
In this intellectual and cultural-political milieu, Toi Hauiti’s decision to work with anthropologists in translating themselves to potential supporters and technical developers was thus unconventional, an indication of their mana and self-confidence in their ability to maintain authority over their own representation. Although determined not to get caught up in cultural politics—scholarly or other-wise—they are conscious of working within socio-political fields partly dominated by these peculiarly disjointed conversations. For these debates are also manifest outside the academy, in national politics and in inter- and intra-iwi tensions. Items in broadsheet newspapers and on television in New Zealand regularly feature incidents framed as clashes between economic rationalist objectives and “the Māori world view” that invariably beg the question, more or less explicitly, of whether “traditional Māori beliefs” are being invented in order to press a Māori politico-economic advantage.
Much mileage is made out of such debates by politicians, with conservative party leaders successfully campaigning on the slogan “iwi Kiwi,” for example, in the 2007 election (we are all New Zealanders; down with cultural and tribal factionalism; up with minimizing—if not abolishing—special treatment for Māori!). Many iwi, furthermore, are themselves riven with disagreements about the degree to which their current leadership are tūturu (authentic, representative), or strategic individualists out for personal gain. Such conflicts have no doubt been going on for centuries but are now noticeably inflected by the conceptual opposition of timeless cultural integrity on one hand and strategic cultural identity construction on the other; incommensurable worlds which Māori, like all culturally marked peoples, are now routinely required to inhabit. Among my aims here is to test how a recursive approach to ethnography might help to address this impasse, arguably characteristic not only of New Zealand’s postcolonial predicament but also that of much contemporary ethnography.


Translating Hauiti whakapapa into a relational database “ontology.” 
Among the issues of translation that became a focus of discussion around the table at the January wānanga in Uawa was how to clarify the differences between whakapapa and genealogy, so that the software developers could get a handle on the kinds of digital objects (including relationships) the Te Rauata digital repository would be asked to accommodate. In identifying whakapapa as that which would define and dictate the inclusion of everything to be entered in the database, Toi Hauiti began by introducing the concept of mea as an alternative to the term “thing” (which the developers had been using deliberately because of its semantic openness) to describe the material to be entered. Mea, they explained, is an encompassing term that can be used to embrace all the digital objects that would go into Te Rauata, from people to carved ancestral objects to landscapes to the very ties that bind them together within Hauiti whakapapa.9
In attempting to devise how these observations should be translated into the database schema, the developers asked Toi Hauiti to elaborate on the different kinds of mea within their whakapapa, which at this stage were being thought of (by at least some of the workshop participants) as belonging to discrete categories. A table was drawn up as follows (the rough translations given in square brackets were not included at the time):


tangata / tipuna
whenua / moana
taonga / kōrero
kaupapa
whare
atua


[people / ancestors]
[land / sea]
[ancestral treasures / knowledge]
[projects]
[houses]
[ancestor deities]


Table 1 : First attempt to define tables for mea within Toi Hauiti whakapapa
Toi Hauiti then explained that mea of each of these kinds could be related not only to mea of other kinds but also to mea of the same kind, so that all are (potentially) connected by the same quality of (digital) relationship. Inspired by this, the developers proposed the idea of putting all the mea of every kind into the same table in the database, explaining this by the analogy of a filing cabinet: rather than having six different drawers, the system could have just one:


tangata / tipuna 1


tangata / tipuna 2


tangata / tipuna 3


whenua / moana 1


whenua / moana 2


whenua / moana 3


Taonga / kōrero 1


etc . . .

Table 2 : Alternative database table structure for mea within Toi Hauiti whakapapa
One of the developers then showed a series of different kinship diagrams as rendered by a popular genealogy software program on his laptop, in order to stimulate conversation about how relationships between different categories of data might be represented to Te Rauata users. Although his intention was to illustrate the fact that the same body of underlying data can be represented graphically in different ways, the images on screen immediately launched a discussion about whakapapa that kept circling back to the question of how it was similar or different to genealogical relatedness.
Toi Hauiti introduced their whakapapa by giving the names of the ancestors that define Te Aitanga a Hauiti as an iwi (tribal grouping), beginning with Hingangaroa, the father of Hauiti, who established the famous school of learning Te Rawheoro. They talked about important taonga (ancestral treasures) that had belonged to some of these ancestors, some of which remain in their tribal territories. Among their taonga is the patu pounamu (greenstone hand weapon) Kapuārangi, which was returned to them by the Tairāwhiti Museum in 1999; it had been taken from a grave site some years earlier, and its repatriation was a major catalyst in their efforts to revitalize Hingangaroa’s legacy (Ngata, Ngata-Gibson, and Salmond 2012). A carved poupou (wall panel) associated with the ancestress Hinematioro, possibly gifted to the Tahitian Tupaia during Cook’s visit to Uawa in 1769 and now held in a museum in Tübingen, Germany, was another of the taonga mentioned. This ancestral figure has been visited by several delegations of Hauiti people in the past few years, events that were recorded in the German media and in a documentary for Māori Television, footage from which will be incorporated into the digital repository. Each of these mea appeared in their accounts as a nexus or knot-like tie encompassing myriad constellations of events, names, relationships, and initiatives dedicated to the perpetuation and continuing renewal of Hauititanga—that is, of being Te Aitanga a Hauiti.
The anthropological participants in the workshop contributed to the discussion by drawing on their own knowledge of whakapapa, in relation to fieldwork experiences mainly among other iwi—albeit with close whakapapa ties to Te Aitanga a Hauiti—and to ethnographic and Māori scholarly literature on the subject. Recognizing, as the developers and Toi Hauiti also did, that conventional glosses of whakapapa as “kinship” or “genealogy” were of limited use in translating the kinds of connections Hauiti were invoking into the form of a relational database, they attempted together with Toi Hauiti to unpack what appeared as key points of contrast between whakapapa and genealogical relatedness. The following expands on some of the themes raised in the course of that exercise in comparative translation.


Transforming translations: Whakapapa , the “Woven Universe”10
To translate whakapapa into conventional ethnographic idioms such as “kinship” or “genealogy” is inevitably to objectify it, in the sense of imposing a certain form on a mode (or rather modes) of relational dynamism that admit of no such fixed borders in their own terms and within their own perspectives—ontologies (in the sense both of theories and ways of being) that constantly extend themselves beyond their own self-defined (and self-defining) limits as an inevitable effect of an impetus toward generative encompassment. Such resistance to ethnographic translation is not peculiar to whakapapa, of course, and it has not deterred scholarly commentators or Māori from attempting to translate it into terms other than its own.
As noted earlier, the notion of whakapapa as a relational fabric coextensive with the cosmos has been explored by a number of authorities, Māori and otherwise. Mythological accounts and whakapapa assembled by theologians, tribal experts, ethnographers, and other scholars together present a comprehensive and internally varied relational cosmology, versions of which have been laid out in detail by Māori scholars including the Reverend Māori Marsden (2003), Sir Āpirana Ngata and Pei Te Hurinui Jones ([1959] 2004), Mohi Ruatapu (in Reedy 1993), Teone Taare Tikao (in Beattie [1939] 1990), and H. T. Whatahoro (e.g., 1913), as well as being synthesized by ethnologists and anthropologists, notably Elsdon Best (e.g., 1924, 1982), J. Prytz-Johansen (1954), Te Rangi Hiroa (e.g., 1949), Anne Salmond (1991), and Gregory Schrempp (1992). This “monogenetic” cosmology, as Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962) called it, is ordered in papa or layers, linked and knotted through with descent lines extending (in its generalized form) from the origins of being in primal conception; through the stages of Te Pō (the night of cosmic potential); Te Kore (the void); the union and subsequent separation of Ranginui the sky and Papatuanuku the earth; down through their “godly” descendants to people in the present via lineages that may include whales, sweet potatoes, species of tree, and other flora and fauna.
In daily life, such lineages are routinely encountered on marae (communal gathering complexes centered on an ancestral whare or meeting house, traditionally located on tribal lands but now often sited as well within schools, army barracks, and universities). They are embodied in the whare itself, which usually carries an ancestral name, and in the carvings and photographs that may line its internal walls. During ceremonial gatherings, whakapapa are recited by speakers at the beginning of their formal orations as a means of establishing their right to speak on that land, especially vis-à-vis other Māori present, as the “living face” of their ancestors. Although such formalities are often dispensed with in meetings between people who see each other regularly, they remain a requisite feature of official occasions, including receptions for important visitors, significant hui (tribal gatherings), and tangihanga (funerals). Even for those who don’t give formal speeches, some knowledge of “who’s who” at such events is important in establishing, for example, the tikanga (protocol) to be followed in welcoming guests onto the marae, since this can vary in significant ways among different iwi (tribal kin groups).
For those who participate in marae life, then, knowledge of whakapapa (one’s own and others’) is indispensible to acting effectively and is one of several attributes that qualify one to take an active role in such proceedings.11 While this knowledge was traditionally preserved and disseminated orally, notably within whare wānanga (schools of learning) such as Te Rāwheoro at Uawa, many whakapapa were recorded after Māori took up the technology of writing in the early nineteenth century. Today it is common for Māori people to use genealogical websites to research their whakapapa, and social networking sites—on which “pages” are created for particular ancestors and marae as well as tribal groupings—have become popular loci for debating the intricacies and authenticity of specific lineages and connections (Brown and Nicholas 2012). As Toi Hauiti’s presentation of their whakapapa suggests, however, such lineages are mere threads within a thick and intricately knotted fabric comprising land- and seascapes, taonga (treasured possessions), kōrero (knowledge), kaupapa (projects), whare (houses), and atua (ancestral deities), as well as people. The whakapapa presented at the Uawa workshop, beginning with Hingangaroa, the father of Hauiti, for example, was later situated within a much longer lineage extending back through some forty papa or generations, including ancestors who had traversed the Pacific Ocean to arrive in Aotearoa (New Zealand) from homelands in Eastern Polynesia, through Tangaroa (“god” of the sea) to Papatuanuku (the earth), thus binding Hauiti’s people to every aspect of Te Ao Mārama (“the world of light” or “the natural world”). At their insistence, each of these layers came to be rendered within the database as separate rows in the table, each row containing the name of a specific ancestor.
Part of the logic of putting all the mea in the same “drawer” of the digital “filing cabinet,” indeed, was that none of these names are pure categories. “Hinematioro,” for instance, is an ancestor within Hauiti’s chiefly line as well as a carved poupou in Tübingen, and while she could thus be created and then linked as two separate digital objects within the system she is also, as a knot in the fabric of whakapapa, one and the same. In this sense, it is tempting to think of mea not as digital “entities” but as Deleuzian multiplicities, “not truly one being but an assemblage of becomings,” and “not truly one being either . . . ‘belonging to the many as such, [and having] no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system’” (Viveiros de Castro 2009: 223–24, citing Deleuze 1968: 236). For the language of whakapapa is often unmistakably rhizomatic; chants recalling the origins of life invoke the growth of tubers or the germination of seeds and the unfurling of leaves and tendrils of creeping plants across the land, putting down new radicals as they expand from the original rootstock.12 It can also be arborescent: Māori Marsden, an authority recognized by Toi Hauiti, describes how “each thing . . . had its own root foundations in the ‘cosmic tree’ which was sometimes depicted as having its roots in heaven and its crown on earth” (1998: 9–11).
Certainly, a Deleuzian reading of whakapapa would be a fascinating exercise, translating aspects of Māori relatedness in ways that would transform it, like all such evocations, in illuminating ways.13 Yet the task with which we were charged by Toi Hauiti was not to apply existing theory to their whakapapa, primarily for the benefit of other anthropologists, but to enable their whakapapa to reproduce and extend itself, allowing it to encompass and continue to generate novel (and especially digital) forms by way of novel (digital, anthropological) translations. The primary analytic purpose here is thus not to appropriate whakapapa into existing ethnographic conversations (though this is certainly an effect of these interventions), but to support Toi Hauiti’s project to allow their whakapapa to continue to speak for—and to—itself, as Wayne Ngata emphasizes:

The discussions, and products of the discussions like Te Rauata [the digital repository] and other publications, need to speak to us when speaking about us because we are the guardians of that body of knowledge. (Ngata, personal communication, June 26, 2012)

Here a fundamental aspect of whakapapa is being flagged that has not thus far arisen, namely, the responsibilities that its knowledge and belonging entails. Whakapapa lineages may be taonga in their own right; they are entrusted to certain people who act as their kaitiaki or guardians and who may place limits on their dissemination in whatever form. While many such lineages have been published either by or against the wishes of their caretakers, others remain closely guarded within families, often in the form of handwritten notebooks inherited from recent ancestors (Haami 2004: 23). Being translated into writing has impacted on the workings of whakapapa, as a number of scholars have observed, not least by making literary artifacts out of oral process. As anthropologist Joan Metge has speculated, for instance, one reason why written whakapapa are often regarded as tapu (sacred, restricted) may be because of the instrumental importance they acquired as historical documents used by colonial authorities as forms of legal evidence, especially in establishing title to land and other resources (1976: 167). Among the reasons why the kaitiaki of whakapapa wrote them down in the first place was the need to assert such rights vis-à-vis other Māori, especially rival groups but also sometimes close relatives, and in such circumstances a certain degree of discretion, even secrecy, was required.
As the East Coast leader, politician, and ethnologist Āpirana Ngata observed, furthermore, translating oral whakapapa into texts affected the ways in which Māori conceived of such relationships. “If you visualize the foundation ancestors as the first generation, the next and succeeding generations are placed on them in ordered layers,” he pointed out, but in “setting out genealogies in writing or print,” he went on, the layers “are turned upside down . . . the foundation ancestors are placed at the top and descending lines traced downwards (cited in Salmond 1991: 345). Take or “root” ancestors, however, were understood to be planted in and grow from particular places, thus binding people and land together, as manifest in the burial of iwi (ancestral bones) or whenua (placentas) in the ground to generate tangata whenua (land people), so such an inversion had profound conceptual implications.
Writing was not able to fix or reconfigure whakapapa relations altogether, however. Records show that large hui or gatherings were held in different tribal areas during the nineteenth century expressly to compare and debate different iterations of the same whakapapa lines, which were routinely contested during the same period in a profusion of Māori language newspapers. In these discussions, the mana (efficacy, authority) of particular speakers and their arguments decided which claims were authentic, and many people edited their whakapapa books in light of such exchanges. These discussions continue in tribal wānanga today, as well as on the Internet, and whakapapa thus continues to dynamically assert itself, as different groups and individuals continue to affirm the authority of their lineages over others.
As a form of knowledge then, whakapapa is relational but not relativistic; its truths, no less than those of science, are of critical importance. What such truths are measured against is not (always) objective, however—“what really happened,” which simply cannot be known as one approaches its most fundamental layers—but rather other accounts judged as more or less authoritative on the basis of a complex variety of factors, some of which are distinctively Māori (e.g., principles such as mana), and some of which are not (the authenticity of archival documents). This is indeed what lends whakapapa its distinctive relational dynamism, enabling its most learned exponents to summon up connections to anything and anyone within its prodigiously inclusive embrace. When a tie to someone far outside one’s most immediate constellation of relationships is deemed expedient, for example, there are time-honored mechanisms for initiating such encompassing (and always political) relationships. Among different kin groups, for example, taumau (arranged) marriages, in which high-born women were gifted as taonga, were used well into the twentieth century to align the interests of distant relatives, even bitter enemies. Children were also sometimes gifted in this manner, although here the aim was not always to bring two lineages closer together—such prestations could be designed to ensure the continuance of a separate line that would otherwise die out or to assuage a wrong according to the principle of utu or just return (Henare 2003).
Treasured taonga, too, named for ancestors who owned and used them, were presented by one lineage to another with similar purposes in mind. It is possible, for instance, that Hinematioro’s poupou, now in Tübingen, was presented to the Tahitian priest-navigator Tupaia following his learned exchanges with local tohunga, when he recited whakapapa from his native island of Ra‘iatea, to which Hauitian lineages were connected. Name exchanges or sexual hospitality too may have been used at Uawa, as they were by other Māori during the Cook voyages, since descent lines in the district still carry Tupaia’s name (Anne Salmond 2012). Such gifts (taonga, women, names) were commonly used by Māori kin groups to bind Europeans and other outsiders into their whakapapa. Well into colonial times, political leaders and heads of state were entrusted with ancient cloaks, adzes, pendants, and ear-ornaments, gifted in elaborate prestations in which the whakapapa of the taonga, preserved in the teachings of the whare wānanga, was sometimes recited by guardians who had kept this knowledge intact over many centuries. England’s royal family have been the recipients of many such “gifts” over the past two centuries from Māori leaders who have persistently sought to establish whakapapa ties to Britain’s senior chiefly line (Cory-Pearce 2006).
Whereas rhizomic analogies of tubers and gourd plants are used to evoke the filial aspects of whakapapa, then—descendants spreading across a landscape, putting down roots in new places—relations of alliance generated through prestation are often summoned through the more widely used vocabulary of plaiting, stitching, and weaving. Although the term whakapapa itself appears to have proto-Polynesian roots that may relate to techniques of barkcloth production (the principal traditional means of making cloth in island Polynesia, in which layers of softened bark are beaten together), in Māori its workings are typically elaborated in the terminology of plaited mats and hand-knotted textiles. In whatu, for instance— the twining technique used to make cloaks from the muka fiber of harakeke (Phormium tenax)—each line of wefts is an aho, recalling the aho tipuna, the lineages linking papa or generational layers. To kanoi is to weave the main thread of a garment, and it is also to recite one’s own whakapapa (Salmond 1997: 207). Tukutuku panels inside meeting houses are woven by two people passing strands of split kiekie root between each other, and a tuku is a transaction (such as the gift of a taonga) establishing an ongoing reciprocal relationship. In raranga (plaiting), each section of a mat is a papa. These and other linguistic parities suggest rich homologies between such processes, their artifacts, and whakapapa, such that familiarity with these techniques offers purchase in attempting to translate the nature of these ties ethnographically (Henare [Salmond] 2005b).
Te Arawa anthropologist Paul Tapsell, indeed, invokes these very analogies in describing the importance of gift-giving in establishing and maintaining whakapapa relations:

Each taonga’s ancestral pathway has woven a pattern of human interconnections upon the land for generations, forming a korowai, or cloak, of knowledge. (Tapsell 1997: 335)

When important taonga were gifted among Māori kin groups, Tapsell notes, their trajectories bound parties to the exchange into reciprocal relations sutured with threads poetically conjured in tauparapara or sayings that evoke the plunging and climbing flight of the tui bird, stitching sky and earth together. When taonga were presented in attempts to encompass outsiders, such as Europeans, however, the gift’s import was often lost in translation into other relational idioms and conceptions of ownership, with the result that many potent and precious ancestral taonga became detached from the whakapapa lineages to which they were integral. Hinematioro’s poupou, for instance, may have been appropriated by Banks following Tupaia’s death at Batavia (Jakarta) in 1770, making its way via the naturalist’s prodigious collection of natural and artificial “curiosities” to Germany.14 A similar fate met many of the precious cloaks, greenstone body adornments, and weapons presented to Cook and his men during their New Zealand sojourn by Hauiti’s people and others, most of which now reside in European museums and private collections.
Taking such prestations as a transfer of property, Europeans often failed to grasp, let alone honor, the responsibilities extending from being bound into the whakapapa lines with which they had been invested (Henare [Salmond] 2005a). Anthropologists too, in their studies of “the gift,” Tapsell argues, have struggled both to understand and convincingly translate the relationships entailed by such prestations. Often relying on secondary sources instead of first-hand ethnographic experience, he notes, they have employed familiar concepts such as “inalienability,” “possession,” and “ownership” to generalize about an “incredible diversity which continues to surround taonga prestations,” describing Māori ties to their taonga in ways that Tapsell struggles “to reconcile with [his] Te Arawa experience” (1997: 362).
Tapsell’s insistence on the specificity of his own tribal perspective, in contrast to the internally coherent “Māori culture” invoked by many other ethnographers is but one example of how being positioned within whakapapa’s fabric can inflect ethnographic translation. As in their treatments of the Māori gift, by contrast, anthropological analyses of Māori kinship have typically addressed whakapapa objectively, concerned to establish generalized definitions—notably of how various levels of relational groupings were in fact constituted within “traditional” Māori society. The mid-twentieth-century debate over whether hapū (typically glossed as subtribes) are or are not properly considered descent groups, for instance (involving Raymond Firth, Meyer Fortes, and Edmund Leach, among others), sought to refine a universally applicable terminology used to compare different kinship “systems” cross-culturally, and paid little heed to what those positioned within whakapapa themselves had to say on the matter (Schwimmer 1990). This discussion is ongoing (Sissons 2010, 2011; Webster 2011; van Meijl 2011), and its more recent iterations purport to demonstrate how far Māori ideologies and understandings of themselves and their culture depart from an empirically observable reality. These anthropologists appropriate the authority to act as cultural translators, deploying their distinctively demystifying insights to distill an objective truth out from competing (cultural, anthropological) representations.
The dynamism of whakapapa affiliations, in which hapū periodically reconfigure their relational networks, creating new hapū or iwi alliances, has thus offered intriguing puzzles to anthropologists keen to lock down universal principles behind diverse “ambilineal,” “bilateral,” and “optative” kinship practices. Whereas for a time it seemed possible to set aside the political context in which such transformations were taking place, however, and to write as if one’s generalized analyses had no direct political salience, this all changed in New Zealand when the Waitangi Tribunal gained jurisdiction over claims dating back to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. Suddenly it became critical for Māori people to be able to prove membership of historically recognized and documented kin groups, to which present-day rights to land and other resources attached. Kinship studies were catapulted from seminar rooms into court-like settings, as anthropologists’ views (alongside those of historians) on what counted as an authentic hapū or iwi were endowed with the status of impartial evidence. Māori stakeholders weighed in on debates formerly conducted in an ambience of scholarly detachment, asserting their whakapapa with a force commensurable with the degree to which their identity and well-being were at stake. It is in this irrevocably politicized context that scholars now write about whakapapa, even though some continue to attempt to assume positions of objective detachment.
While such contested settings may be seen to handicap ethnographic translation, forcing anthropologists to write with an eye to the political consequences of their work, they may also be regarded as a stimulus, impelling one to address aspects of ethnographic experience that are perhaps possible to marginalize or ignore altogether in other places. In the case of whakapapa, Māori interventions in what were once abstruse theoretical debates have raised important questions as to whether scholarly commentaries on matters such as kinship can ever be regarded as politically innocent. They ask, both explicitly and implicitly, whether it is desirable—let alone possible—to separate such questions out from politics and other aspects of existence, analytically, in the first place. Most importantly, from an ethnographic perspective, such interventions remind us that Māori themselves have made numerous attempts to translate whakapapa’s workings into a diverse range of idioms, translations that might equally be regarded as exercises in ontological articulation—creative attempts to address the incommensurabilities of whakapapa and genealogy, often from within whakapapa’s own, ever mobile, perspectives.
Aside from the work of Māori anthropologists (examples in Henare [Salmond] 2007), indeed, there are many other instances of Māori people deploying whakapapa’s generative cosmology to encompass and translate alterity. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, a series of Māori “prophet movements” sprang up around New Zealand, spearheaded by charismatic leaders who, inspired by missionary teachings, espoused messages weaving Māori cosmology and Christian theology together. While some of these movements lasted a few years before fading away or were actively repressed, others endure in the present. Whereas mainstream Christian denominations too still enjoy a strong following among Māori, furthermore, Mormonism continues to attract a disproportionate share of the Māori population. Its creed about the ancient settlement of New World territories by the Lost Tribes of Israel has been extended to Polynesia, and resonances asserted between the church’s teachings and Māori cultural practices and language (Barber 1995). Among the most significant perceived commonalities that have attracted Māori to the sect is the church’s emphasis on recording and reassembling genealogical lineages, and their family history resources are commonly used for whakapapa research.
Attempts to articulate whakapapa in the terms of other relational idioms are not confined to religious or ethnographic spheres, however; considerable institutional support and public investment is now dedicated to establishing how whakapapa, among other principles regarded as distinctively Māori, may be brought to bear on areas of activity as diverse as criminal punishment, environmental conservation, and the science of genetic modification (Henare 2003). As such bodies of research develop, a great range of “Māori” ideas about issues such as relatedness and how they should be translated into public policy and practice is brought increasingly into view. Whereas some would take this variety as evidence of the demise of an authentically coherent “Māori” cultural perspective in the face of acculturation and hybridity, it could equally be seen as proof of whakapapa’s resurgent vitality. For there are strong continuities here in the ways in which the dynamic knotwork of relations never settles. What such differences throw into relief, in this light, is how many Māori people are accustomed to moving between ontological positions in which different things are possible—for instance those of “science” and “the Māori world view”—perhaps much as they routinely shift between their (say) “Te Aitanga a Hauiti” and “Ngāti Porou” identities. Such transitions, between one’s several taha or “sides,” and the ability to smoothly negotiate them, are indeed a defining characteristic of whakapapa-in-action (Anne Salmond 2012a).
What is generally made less explicit, at least in scholarly analyses, however, is how this inherent motility allows the “worlds” whakapapa encompasses and generates to proliferate and be scaled. Switching from one position to another may involve flipping between different (and more-or-less parallel) dimensions (Hauititanga &gt; Arawatanga; Te Ao Māori &gt; science) or shifting up and down within a scale, from lesser to greater levels of encompassment (whanau &gt; hapu &gt; iwi), or the reverse. The nature of such movements are also relationally defined, so that whereas in one instance a switch from, say, a “Ngāti Porou” to a “Te Aitanga a Hauiti” identity might be framed as a movement from one iwi to another, on other occasions, and from within different positions in that whakapapa, it might appear as one from a larger, encompassing federation to a smaller, more hapu-like collective. Yet—contrary to anthropological attempts to create stable typologies out of such relations, thus locking down what is, and is not, an “authentic” iwi or hapu—these were never “objective,” fixed positions or “worlds” in the first place. Rather, such whakapapa constellations are inherently relational, in that what they are may differ in the terms of the particular lineage or nexus from which they are apprehended. Again, this does not make them relativistic: the seniority and mana of one position or line—and its ability to encompass and define others—may be defended to the death. The rub is, of course, that in practice those making such claims do not infrequently find themselves in conflict and among the main challenges faced by those operating within whakapapa’s terms, historically and in the present, has been the difficult (often impossible) task of maintaining such differences in a state of fertile and generative tension.


Conclusion
Lévi-Strauss once claimed, “it is in the last resort immaterial whether . . . the thought processes of the South American Indians take place through the medium of my thought, or whether mine take shape through the medium of theirs” ([1969] 1983: 13). Despite the power of his vision of an anthropology transformed by indigenous philosophies, then, his assumption of the role of chief translator—even author—of such thinking seems to imply a degree of hubris. Although in whakapapa’s terms, as we have seen, shared substance—or a certain pedigree—are insufficient alone to qualify an orator to speak on behalf of others, the way one locates oneself—and is located—within its matrices of relationships, certainly matters. This positioning, which is indeed the only possible source of such authority from whakapapa’s perspective, is not without limits, of course, most obviously those conferred by recognized parentage. At the same time, even these factors may be contested, their significance reconfigured, and the degree to which one lives up to the demands of mana (personal authority, efficacy) as well as principles such as utu (just return, reciprocity), and whanaungatanga (responsibility, especially to one’s closest kin), also work to determine whether one’s authority to translate others’ identity and thinking is recognized.
For anthropologists, whakapapa thus entails a commitment to building and actively maintaining ongoing relationships with one’s interlocutors, who—like Toi Hauiti—may assert their own mana over the ethnographic process and its artifacts. Such ties obviously entail restrictions, on what can be translated, for example, as well as how and by whom, but such limitations need not be negatively construed. On the contrary, they may productively refocus one’s attentions in ways that can generate insights that might not have been arrived at in other settings.
For a recursive anthropology, which would mobilize such ties in the service of disciplinary renewal, whakapapa thus begs some important questions, for example about the relationship of such writing to “indigenous” scholarship. So far, it seems, the main role allocated to anthropology’s interlocutors within ontological approaches is that of muse—a fertile and malleable resource for the scholarly work of conceptual innovation. Yet, as the ontologists acknowledge, many of anthropology’s subjects have long pursued their own projects of “controlled equivocation” and “inventive definition,” creatively articulating their differences in practice and in print. What might purported (as)symmetries between these different “anthropologies” entail? Why are these voices silent, and silenced by omission, in current anthropological discussions of ontological alterity? What is it, exactly, about selfconsciously “indigenous” voices in particular, that seem incommensurable with ontographic concerns?
The issues I am raising here are not (just) about the kinds of privileged insights “natives” may or may not have into their own culture and being (cf. Ramos 2012). Rather—to put it negatively—why should those who locate themselves selfconsciously outside a given constellation of relations be in a better position to analyze them ethnographically than those who explicitly address their own positioning within those matrices as well as—or instead of—externally? Is it only anthropologists who engage in projects of what Viveiros de Castro (2004: 4) terms “external comparisons” (as opposed to those carried out “within” a given culture)? And are not all such comparisons, anyway, internal to particular, relationally defined, perspectives? Surely ethnography, by definition, requires one precisely to negotiate one’s own transitions between such positions, drawing on different “sides.”
Those who skillfully navigate whakapapa’s dynamic matrices are experienced handlers of such apparent incommensurabilities—expert translators of alterity into affinity, and of alliance into otherness. Accustomed to shifting between worlds and to scaling their networks strategically, they are schooled in traditions geared to facilitating smooth transitions between alternative universalisms and to the creative encompassment of those who (at least initially) appear as other. Within whakapapa’s terms, indeed, “incommensurability” and “untranslatability”—and what might be termed “ontological alterity” in general—are relational states, open to generative transformation like all the nexi and threads (people, landscapes, taonga, etc.) that make up its inherently mobile fabric. How this will translate into the relational database Te Rauata remains to be seen, but it is clear that Hauiti’s whakapapa will productively transform itself, and be transformed, in the process.
That whakapapa is constantly being (re)negotiated, though, does not make it relativistic, since how one is recognized in whakapapa’s terms is of vital importance. For anthropology this means that being defined by, and living up to the demands of, certain kinds of relationships—and addressing the unavoidably political implications of that predicament—are aspects of the ethnographic project that cannot, and need not, be set aside. Rather, approaching such conditions as productive stimuli, it might be allowed that they inflect the ways in which “culture” continues to be “translated” to a greater degree than is sometimes admitted.
In the final part of this article, to appear in the next issue of HAU, I apply these insights to a broader discussion looking at the recursive methodology advocated by exponents of the “ontological turn” in relation to recent criticisms leveled at their projects. Revisiting a series of earlier debates—about linguistic relativism, incommensurable paradigms, and radical translation—I consider how terminology appropriated from those (ongoing) discussions may invite people to think of current ontological approaches within social anthropology in similar terms. Yet such associations not only obscure the debt most anthropological “ontologists” acknowledge to European (post)structuralist philosophy, as opposed to the mainly North American thinkers whose arguments I rehearse. They also elide the fact that these recent approaches gain a considerable part of their momentum from a set of issues that may be thought of as distinctively postcolonial. Seen in this light, I argue, charges such as orientalism, synchronism, and excessive relativism, when leveled at the “ontological turn,” may distract from more profound (and no less political) issues that its exponents must now address.


Acknowledgments
I am especially indebted to Giovanni da Col for his dedicated editorial guidance and encouragement—inspiring and unrelenting in equal measure—without which this paper would surely never have been completed. Also to Wayne Ngata and Hera Ngata-Gibson of Toi Hauiti, whose invitation to work on their project and ongoing advice and support helped generate much of its content. The research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and Ngā Pae o te Māramatanga (NZ). Liana Chua, Sean Dowdy, Ilana Gershon, Keith Hart, Carl Hogsden, Martin Holbraad, Charlotte Joy, Marcos Lanna, Billie Lythberg, Wayne Ngata, Maja Petrovic-Steger, Anne Salmond, Phil Swift, and Nicholas Thomas, as well as four anonymous reviewers, were kind enough to read drafts and offered many important comments and suggestions, not all of which I have been able to fully address. Finally, and most importantly, my warm thanks to Creuza Maria Lopes, who took care of my world while I was in this one.


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Transformer les traductions (partie I). « Le propriétaire de ces os »
Résumé : La contribution récente du « tournant ontologique » en anthropologie a contribué  à transformer le rôle familier de l’ethnographie en un mode de traduction. En lieu et place des conceptions populaires de l’anthropologie sociale comme la transmission plus ou moins fidèle de significations culturelles des peuples autres, ces approches assignent  à l’ethnographe la tâche de générer de nouveaux concepts et terminologies — ceux qui sont « nôtre singulièrement » plutôt que les « leur » —  à travers une synthèse créative de la philosophie et de l’expérience de terrain. Ceci étant, le rôle que la « pensée indigène » (et même les « penseurs indigènes ») est invitée  à jouer dans ce projet et ce discours en plein essor reste flou. J’aborde ici cette question par l’ethnographie d’une initiative conduite  à Te Aitanga a Hauiti Māori en Nouvelle-Zélande pour construire un référentiel numérique de taonga tribaux (artefacts ancestraux, images, connaissances). Dans ce récit, rédigé dans l’esprit des objectifs de leur projet, je considère ce que les efforts des Hauiti pour traduire leur whakapapa (généalogies et histoires orales) dans des formes numériques pourraient impliquer pour une anthropologie qui chercherait  à recadrer les questions de différence en mobilisant ces « anthropologies » indigènes au service d’un renouvellement disciplinaire. Ces connaissances ethnographiques plantent alors le décor pour une deuxième discussion —  à paraître dans le prochain numéro de HAU —  à propos de la manière dont les approches ontologiques cherchent  à transformer l’anthropologie, ce en rapport aux débats antérieurs sur les difficultés de traduire l’altérité culturelle et ontologique.
Amiria J. M. SALMOND is a Research Consultant on the ERC-funded Pacific Presences project at the University of Cambridge and a Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Auckland. A former Senior Curator and lecturer at the University of Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (MAA), she has also curated and designed exhibitions at the Tairāwhiti Museum in New Zealand. Research interests include Māori weaving (whatu and raranga), artifact-oriented ethnography, cultural and intellectual property, digital taonga, and ontological approaches to social anthropology. Her book Museums, anthropology and imperial exchange (2005) was published by Cambridge University Press and she coedited Thinking through things: Theorising artefacts ethnographically (2007).
Amiria J. M. SalmondDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of AucklandPrivate Bag 92019Auckland, New ZealandPhone: +49 175 826 7120amiriasalmond@gmail.com


___________________
1. Later in this article, and in the second part (to be published in the next issue of HAU) I consider what is meant by this term, including critiques of the very idea of thinking about current preoccupations with ontological questions as a “turn” within the discipline.
2. As Holbraad is at pains to point out, this phrasing sits uncomfortably with his more recent iterations of ontologies as emphatically “not phenomena out there to be found,” but rather “analytic artifices” (2012: 255) along the lines of Roy Wagner’s “cultural invention,” which we ethnographers posit to account for what appear to us as “conceptual divergences” between our informants and ourselves. He nonetheless remains strongly committed to the principle of analytic recursivity, which he describes in terms of allowing the “substance” or “content” of ethnography to impact on the terms of its own analysis.
3. In the sense of grounded in a concept of the anthropos.
4. For example Argyrou (1999, 2002); Henare [Salmond], Holbraad, and Wastell (2007); Holbraad (2012); Viveiros de Castro (1998).
5. In information science, “ontologies” are taxonomic hierarchies designed to enable data to be shared across diverse systems and platforms. This usage differs substantially from deployments of the term in anthropology (Amiria Salmond 2012).
6. Now represented by the New Zealand government.
7. This does not of course exhaustively describe current ethnographic scholarship on Māori subjects. Scholars based outside New Zealand whose work does not conform to this characterization include Haidy Geismar, Ilana Gershon, Daniel Rosenblatt, and Gregory Schrempp.
8. There are also some Māori critics of the “traditionalist” vision of Maoridom promulgated by Kaupapa Māori scholarship and its allies, who do address their arguments directly to their opponents. See for example Tau (2001), who attributes the “death” of matauranga Māori (Māori knowledge) among his own Ngai Tahu iwi (tribe) to the collapse of whakapapa as “the fabric that held the traditional world view together.”
9. Wayne Ngata notes that the term may be considered by some to be derogatory, but was deployed “because of its characteristic as a common denominator.”
10. The woven universe (2003) is the title of the Reverend Māori Marsden’s book on Māori cosmology.
11. Others may include fluency in the Māori language and (with regard to oratory) gender, depending on the marae (women do not generally speak formally on marae except in some tribal areas, for example that of Whanau-a-Apanui, farther up the East Coast from Uawa).
12. See also Prytz-Johansen (1954) on the concept of tupu.
13. See for example DeLoughrey (2007) who offers just such an analysis.
14. As Anne Salmond has noted, Banks made no secret of his proprietorial interest in Tupaia, for whom he had assumed financial responsibility when the Tahitian opted to join the Endeavour in the Society Islands, writing, “I do not know why I may not keep him as a curiosity, as well as some of my neighbours do lions and tygers at a larger expense than he will ever probably put me to.” When Tupaia died Banks assumed ownership of his personal possessions.
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			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Dalton</surname>
						<given-names>Doug</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>02</month>
				<year>2022</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue seq="304">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau11.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1651" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1651/3896" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1651/3897" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article comprises a rethinking of Mauss’s The gift, reciprocity, and exchange theory in anthropology, using theories of chaos and complexity to make sense of the author’s ethnographic data from Papua New Guinea. The article begins with an explanation of chaos and complexity, proceeds with an ethnographic demonstration focusing on pig feasts, marriage exchange, and exchanges within households, and concludes with a consideration of the implications of this analysis for Mauss’s legacy.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/2029</identifier>
				<datestamp>2026-05-02T14:10:34Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">2029</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/740621</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Growing up in Europe: The European concept of kinship and how it shapes society and the state</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Sedlenieks</surname>
						<given-names>Klāvs</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>02</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2026</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date>
			<volume>16</volume>
			<issue seq="301">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau16.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2026 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2026</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2029" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2029/4650" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/2029/4651" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>I argue that theories of kinship and their critique have been dominated by emic perspectives on Euro-American (European, for short) relatedness which has confused kinship for the whole of European relatedness. I review a string of nineteenth- to twenty-first-century European social theories, demonstrating that they are all about European relatedness: a dynamic spectrum integrated through the notion of growing up. As such European relatedness is an integral part of the social structure and the state.</p></abstract>
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		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1385</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-02-13T10:25:48Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1385</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/706803</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Headless queues: Disorder and disorientation in a Zimbabwean market, 2007–2008</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Jones</surname>
						<given-names>Jeremy L.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>jjones@holycross.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>11</day>
				<month>02</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2019</year></pub-date>
			<volume>9</volume>
			<issue seq="104">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau9.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1385" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1385/3378" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1385/3379" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this paper, I analyze Zimbabweans’ efforts to make sense of ubiquitous queues for basic goods during a period of record-breaking hyperinflation. My discussion draws on a series of daily journal entries kept by a resident of the urban informal economy during 2007 and 2008. Besides opening a window onto everyday life amid economic collapse, his journals show how economic and political turmoil was registered in mundane actions (like standing in queues and buying goods on the black market) and perceived violations of established moral geographies and social processes. He framed this experience using common-sense notions of disorder, which were themselves internal to ideas and practices of ordered hierarchy. For him and for many others, then, the country’s so-called “crisis” registered less in explicit historical narrative than in perceptions of reversal and absence.</p></abstract>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>crisis, disorder, queues, everyday life, Zimbabwe</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
</article>			</metadata>
		</record>
		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1902</identifier>
				<datestamp>2024-11-16T04:42:35Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1902</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/732626</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Android existence: The affect of artificial vitality</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Hoeck</surname>
						<given-names>Kristian</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>16</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2024</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date>
			<volume>14</volume>
			<issue seq="204">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau14.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2024 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2024</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1902" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1902/4398" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1902/4399" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article investigates the affective vitality of the technical in Japanese android-making through the creation of the android Alter and its artistic performance in the “android opera” Scary Beauty. By following the technical processes invested in Alter, I highlight how Alter’s technical components are brought into affective synergy with artistic and cultural traditions whereby these traditions are reinvigorated with technical vitality. This research shifts the focus from a human-centered to a technically centered perspective on Japanese robotics. By this move, the article shows how the technical nature rather than the humanlike nature of such beings influences the collaborative environments from which they grow. In doing so, I address the affective and ambiguous vitality that brings such artificially made beings to life, and highlight the creational affinity to artistic processes of creation and their shared techniques of the artificially real.</p></abstract>
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				<kwd></kwd>
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		<record>
			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/521</identifier>
				<datestamp>2015-10-26T00:18:54Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
	xmlns="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3"
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	xml:lang="EN">
	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau5.2.012</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau5.2.012</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Descartes’ shadow: Boxing and the fear of mind-body dualism</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Descartes’ shadow: Boxing and the fear of mind-body dualism</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Hopkinson</surname>
						<given-names>Leo</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Edinburgh</aff>
					<email>l.g.h.hopkinson@sms.ed.ac.uk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>20</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2015</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date>
			<volume>5</volume>
			<issue seq="208">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau5.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2015 Leo Hopkinson</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2015</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau5.2.012" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores the body and self engendered through a boxer’s training, drawing on fieldwork conducted in boxing gyms in Montreal and Edinburgh. Contrary to contemporary anthropological accounts of the sport, I argue that training practices in these gyms instill a dualistic sense of self, evocative of Cartesian dualism. Paradoxically this is not alternative to, but concurrent with, a sense of embodied knowledge and selfhood in proficient boxers. Dualistic selfhood is traced throughout training regimes and in a boxer’s progress from novice to experienced pugilist, considering the different practices developed and encountered during this progress. I conclude by problematizing the anthropological fear of the Cartesian body. By treating the Cartesian body as a philosophical mistake rather than a social reification, social scientists working with concepts of body and self risk creating a straw man that inhibits their capacity to analyze mind-body dualism as a social construct.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>This article explores the body and self engendered through a boxer’s training, drawing on fieldwork conducted in boxing gyms in Montreal and Edinburgh. Contrary to contemporary anthropological accounts of the sport, I argue that training practices in these gyms instill a dualistic sense of self, evocative of Cartesian dualism. Paradoxically this is not alternative to, but concurrent with, a sense of embodied knowledge and selfhood in proficient boxers. Dualistic selfhood is traced throughout training regimes and in a boxer’s progress from novice to experienced pugilist, considering the different practices developed and encountered during this progress. I conclude by problematizing the anthropological fear of the Cartesian body. By treating the Cartesian body as a philosophical mistake rather than a social reification, social scientists working with concepts of body and self risk creating a straw man that inhibits their capacity to analyze mind-body dualism as a social construct.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>boxing, dualism, embodiment, Descartes, sport</kwd>
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	<body><p>Descartes’ shadow






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Leo Hopkinson. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.2.012
Descartes’ shadow
Boxing and the fear of mind-body dualism
Leo HOPKINSON, University of Edinburgh


This article explores the body and self engendered through a boxer’s training, drawing on fieldwork conducted in boxing gyms in Montreal and Edinburgh. Contrary to contemporary anthropological accounts of the sport, I argue that training practices in these gyms instill a dualistic sense of self, evocative of Cartesian dualism. Paradoxically this is not alternative to, but concurrent with, a sense of embodied knowledge and selfhood in proficient boxers. Dualistic selfhood is traced throughout training regimes and in a boxer’s progress from novice to experienced pugilist, considering the different practices developed and encountered during this progress. I conclude by problematizing the anthropological fear of the Cartesian body. By treating the Cartesian body as a philosophical mistake rather than a social reification, social scientists working with concepts of body and self risk creating a straw man that inhibits their capacity to analyze mind-body dualism as a social construct.
Keywords: boxing, dualism, embodiment, Descartes, sport


Carl is a mountain of a man: at 6’2” the former super-heavyweight boxer cuts an imposing figure. Previously a nightclub bouncer and sports nutritionist, Carl is now coowner of The Clover Boxing Gym in Montreal. Loud and enthusiastic, Carl is The Clover’s patriarch and beating heart. While he is not necessarily first into the gym in the morning, he is last to leave at night; his gym is his passion. He is actively interested in his boxers, whether they are novices or professionals, and always has time to check in with them:

“Wassup baby?” Carl booms across the gym floor at me.
I apologize for not having been there the last week.
“Don’t worry about it, just checking up on you because I hadn’t seen you in a while, where you been man?”

[178]I first met Carl in September 2010 when I began training regularly at The Clover. Under Carl’s guidance I trained in earnest for the first time and competed in my first amateur bout in May of the following year. It was at The Clover, as a novice boxer under Carl’s tutelage, that I first noticed and became subject to the dualistic schema of the sport.
Located on the first floor above a cheap burger joint, overlooking a busy intersection, the Clover Boxing Gym comprises a single ring in an L-shaped space; seven or eight heavy punching bags litter the rest of the room. The two inside walls of the “L” are lined with mirrors, running from two feet off the ground to eight feet up the wall. Two small changing rooms, male and female, are separated from the main space by a three-quarter-height partition wall. A smaller, rectangular room adjacent to the main space is also lined with mirrors along one side and hosts five heavy bags at the end nearest the window. A mirror is visible from any given point on the gym floor, including in the changing room. Like the archetypal boxing gym, The Clover sports minimalistic interior décor. Posters of former and current Canadian champions adorn the whitewashed walls: Adonis Stevenson, Jean Pascal, and Dierry Jean, among others. Air conditioning ducts and water pipes crisscross the ceiling, and a bank of windows on the wall opposite to the mirrors look out over the intersection below.
The Clover is a multilingual space in a multilingual city, serving a diverse boxing community. While I trained there, The Clover hosted boxers from Montreal’s Lebanese, sub-Saharan African, Quebecois, North African, Eastern European, Southeast Asian, and central European communities, to mention but a few of the groups that contributed to the gym’s diverse membership. Training at The Clover is conducted in English and French, all coaches are bilingual, and all written materials at the gym are in both English and French.
The bank of windows overlooking the intersection has become opaque with condensation—the sweat pouring off bodies inside is in stark contrast to the bitter Montreal winter on the other side of the glass: it is February 2011. Carl works with three boxers including me in the ring. On his hands are the padded oval mittens known ubiquitously throughout the boxing world as “pads.”1 We throw several combinations each at the pads then circulate around the ring, each of us spending equal time with Carl. As we shuffle around, Carl barks increasingly difficult combinations at us, focusing on the specific weaknesses he perceives in our technique. Carl is trying to increase the power in my straight right and right hook. I don’t throw my hips into the punch enough or rotate my back foot effectively, preventing the full transfer of my weight and resulting in less power:

“I wanna see you throw those hips through, concentrate baby!”
I throw the jab, right hook again, but it’s not good enough.
“You gotta move the hips; rotate your foot like this.” Carl imitates my action then demonstrates what he wants from me in what resembles a bizarre dance move. Despite his intimidating frame he rotates his hips, [179]swings his shoulders, and pivots on his toe with the ease and grace of a ballet dancer. I imitate him and as I’m doing so he guides my hips with his great paws. Having gone through this miniature dance he swings up the pads again.
“Jab, right hook!”
I throw the combination and concentrate on moving my hips and pivoting.
“Crack!” the punch lands with the satisfying snap of a well-timed, sharply aimed blow.
“Yeah baby! That’s what I’m talkin’ about!” He grins broadly and I shuffle around the ring.
In the spare moments when I’m waiting my turn again I repeat the movement, focusing on my hips and rear leg. We rotate around and I’m up in front of Carl again.
“Show me that big right hand baby! Jab, right hook!”
As I throw, I focus solely on my right hip. I imagine what it looks like and it becomes hypersensitive. I feel my shorts rub against the skin of my hip as I twist through the punch. The punch lands but there’s no resounding crack. I’m disappointed and confused.
“You gotta keep that elbow up as you throw, that’s where the power comes from!”
I throw a slow motion punch and Carl takes hold of my arm, hands like canoe paddles in the pads, and lifts the elbow. I had dropped my elbow as I threw the punch; I was too focused on the hips and the foot. He guides my elbow again, letting me experience bodily how the punch should be thrown. He calls the punches again and I throw the punch, concentrating on my elbow.
“Crack!”
“That’s good, but keep those hips moving through, bury it [the punch into the pad] with those hips. Bury it!” He demonstrates the full movement again.
“Damn, forgot about the hips!” I think to myself as I shuffle around; the beat goes on.

This episode, typical of coach-novice interaction in all three gyms I worked in, demonstrates clearly how during a boxer’s training the body is continually objectified, and further objectified in parts. Carl moves my limbs individually, objectifying each as he does so. Furthermore the way Carl urges me to actively articulate subsections of my body—twist my hips or raise an elbow—shows how each body part is conceptualized as subject to the individual’s mental control. Cartesian dualist philosophy posits that the material body is separate from, and subject to in a machinelike way, the mind, which transcends material perception. Breaking down the body into units as in the above episode—an arm, a leg, an elbow, a foot—mirrors the [180]process by which Ian Hacking (2006) and Stefan Ecks (2009) argue a Cartesian self is generated through biomedical engineering.
At the beginning of every training session, Carl’s boxers would shadowbox in front of a mirror for ten minutes. While they did so, he would sit on the corner of the ring or pace up and down between them, looking them up and down and constantly reminding them to look up into the mirror. Occasionally he would lower his voice and talk with an individual; by demonstrating a movement with his own body and articulating theirs with his enormous hands, Carl ensured each boxer experienced bodily, and felt, the right technique with which to throw a punch. Before leaving them to practice he would remind the boxer to watch an elbow or look to see their foot pivoting in the mirror. It is in the routine practices of the gym— such as the constant objectification of the body using mirrors—rather than in the exceptional circumstances of a bout, that boxers’ selfhood develops a profoundly dualistic slant.
While demonstrating how technique is learned by way of objectifying the body in a dualistic way, this vignette also shows how embodied, sensory engagement is key to creating this perception of selfhood. The sensing body derives information in many ways, both on the part of the coach and the boxer: learning to associate the “satisfying snap” of the pad with a correctly delivered punch; Carl’s physical touch when articulating boxers’ limbs, which allows them to experience the embodied sensation of the correct movement; or the sensation of power that Carl feels when he receives a well-delivered punch, prompting him to shout, “Yeah baby! That’s what I’m talkin’ about!” To know that a punch has been delivered correctly from the “crack” that it produces when it hits the pad is a faculty of engagement as sensing, sensory body, an association confirmed by the sensory perception of the coach, both in hearing the noise and feeling the punch on the pad. Novices learn a dualistic appreciation of self by objectifying their body in individual parts, while beginning to engage with the sport as embodied, sensory subjects.

Dualism as emergent selfhood
Building on George H. Mead’s criticism of Cartesian dualism (1967), Nick Crossley argues that the Cartesian subject, the “mind” that Descartes perceives as our essence, is “an emergent property of social interaction” derived from intersubjective engagement with other actors in the world (2011: 84).2 Crossley posits, “we do, through interaction, become capable of reflexive thought” (2011: 86). Both Mead’s [181]and Crossley’s work debunks the myth of the Cartesian schema as a true reflection of our being in the world, positing that it is derived from intersubjective social interactions rather than being primordial. Following Mead and Crossley, my analysis seeks to address how that derivation occurs within the specific context of the boxing gym. I ask how boxers’ and coaches’ dualist attitudes form a “material philosophy ... embedded in everyday practice, rather than those more purely abstract systems of thought” (Graeber and da Col 2011: xi).
Carl’s work with me on the pads shows how the intersubjective interaction between the coach and the boxer facilitates the boxer’s reflexive thought in a specific, dualistic way. The touch of the coach, physically objectifying the boxer’s body in parts, and the sensory appreciation of correct technique, felt by the boxer as the coach articulates their limbs, are intersubjective moments constituted by interaction and recognition between the novice and Carl. In these moments boxers’ reflexive capacity and dualistic sense of selfhood emerge and are shaped.


Boxing in the social sciences
The progress of the article mirrors the boxer’s progress from novice to expert, tracing how a dualistic sense of self emerges in tension with a sense of embodied knowledge throughout a boxer’s training. From the process of learning the movements of a punch, to the advanced training techniques of veteran boxers and their experiences in the ring, a dualistic sense of self is propagated in the boxer’s work. In his seminal ethnography of a boxing gym, Loïc Wacquant uses Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to undermine the assumption of the Cartesian schema (Wacquant 1995a, 2004), showing how the mind-body, subject-object divide is eroded through boxing as the proficient boxer becomes reliant on embodied knowledge and ability more so than on an individual subjectivity of mind. No doubt this is true of the sport, that punches, rolls, and feints become engrained in the bodily schemata. However, to supplement Wacquant’s argument, I suggest that boxing training also generates and perpetuates a dualistic selfhood in parallel to embodied knowledge.
My discussion ultimately considers boxers’ practice in the ring during a bout, and how they reflect on these experiences as they look forward to future bouts. In doing so I draw on Jeremy Hunter and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of “flow,” the experience of embodying knowledge and ability during sporting competition (2000), to consider how boxers modulate between embodied and dualistic, objectifying senses of self when in and out of the ring. Thinking through “flow” brings a temporal appreciation to boxers’ embodied experience, and allows a more nuanced consideration of how analytic, dualistic selfhood exists alongside and in tension with an embodied sense of self.
My research resonates with that of previous ethnographers of boxing (Wacquant 2004; Woodward 2007; Lafferty and McKay 2004; Mennesson 2000) in that it draws on fieldwork conducted in boxing gyms in Western countries. The growing literature on boxing is beginning to address the issue of place; whether it is possible to talk about boxing as a global practice, as it is often assumed to be, or conversely whether a discussion of the corporeal practice of boxing must ultimately be sited within its geographic and social context. Kath Woodward’s Globalizing boxing [182](2014) discusses how the global boxing industry facilitates and reflects social change on a global scale, whereas a number of articles (Ishioka 2012; Rennesson 2012) consider martial practices similar to boxing in their social contexts, such as in Stéphane Rennesson’s analysis of Muay Thai in Thailand (2012). As martial practices these may be similar to boxing, and therefore parallels may be drawn, however scholars must be careful not to conflate culturally and practically different forms of martial practice on the strength of the fact that they share the name “boxing.” For that reason, I site my research in specific practices common to all three gyms (learning techniques and particularly shadowboxing) in sites that practice amateur boxing by the AIBA open boxing rules (AIBA 2015).3
By situating my research in several gyms rather than focusing on the global practice of boxing through the representation of a single gym as other authors have done (Woodward 2007), my research develops an account of boxing sited specifically in contemporary Western society. I draw on commonalities in specific practices and attitudes between three gyms, The Clover in Montreal, and the East Side Boxing Gym and Loanbridge Amateur Boxing Club (ABC), both in Edinburgh, to suggest that a dualistic sense of mind and body is propagated through these common practices, and as such argue that this form of selfhood is a feature of amateur boxing in the Western context.


The body proper—The body problematic
Since Marcel Mauss’ Techniques of the body ([1935] 2007) the social sciences and anthropology in particular have gone to great lengths to buck against the Cartesian mind-body complex. The list of anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers whose work has contributed to this underlying theme is extensive and diverse; from Mauss ([1935] 2007) to Maurice Merleau-Ponty ([1962] 2007), Margaret Lock (1993, 2007) to Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 1994) to Thomas Csordas (1990, 1994), to mention but a few, the project of demonstrating how human experience eludes Descartes notion of separate and distinct mind and body has been a central theme of their work. In this endeavor Margaret Lock and Judith Fraquhar’s Beyond the body proper (2007) stands as the most complete manifesto to date for discarding Cartesianism as a relic of our philosophical past. Cartesian dualism and its corollary the “body proper,” so the theory goes, limit our potential to understand the diversity of lived experience within the world.
[183]Embodiment, the proposition that the body as a material whole is the site and source of knowledge, cognition, and experience, has been a major conceptual approach to the project of deconstructing assumed mind-body dualism. Unsurprisingly, embodiment has been a major paradigm in anthropological and sociological accounts of the sporting body over the last twenty years. Drawing largely on Bourdieu’s theory of Habitus (1990, 1994), anthropologists and sociologists have sought to discuss how bodies are disciplined and conditioned through sport, how “sports participants have an understanding of how to do their sport ... [that] is not just cognitive but also corporeal” (Hockey and Allen Collinson 2007: 3). In this sense the sporting body, alongside the medicalized body, is a key site for destabilizing the notion of mind-body dualism and the “body proper.” Despite this return to the physical, experiential body, sociological and anthropological accounts of sporting bodies have remained somewhat detached from the corporeal realities of sport (Hargreaves and Vertinsky 2007: 8; Hockey and Allen Collinson 2007; Wainwright and Turner 2003: 267), instead addressing abstracted concepts such as gender and injury narratives. Ethnographic analyses of boxing have been more grounded in practice, addressing issues of gendered bodies (Lafferty and McKay 2004; Mennesson 2000; Woodward 2007; Wacquant 2004), bodily capital (Wacquant 2004, 1995a), and poverty and structural violence (Wacquant 2004, 1995b; Sugden 1996).
Whereas most researchers address the boxer’s body through the paradigm of embodiment, I ask whether this paradigm accurately represents the boxer’s aims, experiences, and practices in the gym. Human experience is no doubt more complex than the broad narrative of Cartesian philosophy, but considering how dualisms are engrained in practice remains relevant to understanding experience within a society that has such a history of collusion with Cartesian philosophy. Following Marilyn Strathern’s (1999) argument that reifications are one of the fundamental objects of anthropological investigation, if the Cartesian body is a reification like any other, a contextual analysis of how it is lived and how it shapes experience is surely pertinent to any anthropology of the body.


Methodology
I began my ethnographic study with the intention of examining gendered identity. However, as my research progressed it became clear that the theory of embodiment posited by previous authors (Wacquant 2004; Woodward 2007) did not resonate fully with my gym-mates practice and experience. My ethnography draws on observations, personal experiences, and numerous conversations and interviews with boxers and coaches at the three gyms. All three gyms trained boxers to compete under the same rules in the same format at the time of my research (AIBA 2015). In spite of this, training practices remain in many respects deeply idiosyncratic, with each coach and boxer in the different gyms favoring particular exercises and training regimes. By conducting participant observation at three gyms in different countries, I was able to identify common practices and attitudes enmeshed in these idiosyncratic rituals and routines. Accordingly, the practices that I have highlighted below, namely shadowboxing in and out of the ring and the various teaching methods described, were common to all three gyms, and the observations I make hold [184]for all three gyms I worked in. Furthermore all interview transcripts and vignettes cited are illustrative of widely held opinions and attitudes rather than referring to isolated statements or events. As such it is appropriate to discuss these practices in the three gyms together, and indeed the strength of this multisited approach is that it allows continuities in practice to be drawn out of the research process.
Physically engaging in the sport as an ethnographer presents several methodological issues. As a participant learning to box, the ethnographer is largely confined to “description” (Clifford 1990: 51)—writing field notes after participation. Not only is there the problem of accurately recalling events while under the physical stress of training, but the notes themselves present a compound narrative of the subject evoked and of the ethnographers viewpoint inflected through the recall and writing process (Clifford 1990: 62). Furthermore, as an active participant I found that knowledge was often assumed by fellow boxers, leading to less articulate or reflective discussion and answers. In order to address these issues I split my research time between pure observation and participant observation in the different gyms. This allowed me to accurately note interactions and conversations as they happened, in addition to positioning myself as an observer, which prompted answers from boxers and coaches containing much less tacit knowledge and much more detailed description.


Learning to box
Loanbridge ABC is located in an old industrial area of Edinburgh, and sports similarly minimal interior décor to The Clover. Loanbridge, however, houses two rings and ten or more moveable punching bags in close proximity to one another, hanging from scaffolding frames that crisscross the ceiling. Inside, the gym has the same familiar smell of canvas, leather, and sweat; the soundscape of an electronic buzzer that starts and finishes every two minute round, the shuffle of feet on the floor, the rhythmic clack of skipping ropes, the slap of leather gloves on a punching bag, and the rushes and grunts of exhaled air as boxers throw punches are also strikingly familiar.
The gym is run by Joe, an ex–Scottish national amateur and professional boxer. Joe is an Edinburgh boy; he grew up in the city before travelling throughout the United Kingdom and United States as a professional boxer. He has a thick Scots accent and, like Carl, an incredible energy and passion for his gym and his sport. Loanbridge hosts a diverse range of boxers from across the city, including significant membership from Edinburgh’s Polish and Eastern European communities, although the majority of boxers I met there were Scottish. Joe’s novice classes tend to host a broader age range of boxers, including many in their thirties and forties, whereas Joe’s competitive amateurs for the most part are young men in their late teens and early twenties. The majority of boxers at Loanbridge are male, although every session I attended included at least one female boxer, and Joe has a core of four or so female amateur boxers who compete for the gym.
A sense of dualism is first instilled in boxers as they learn the techniques of movement involved in throwing a punch and practicing the sport. As such, to disregard a dualistic sense of self in favor of a theory of total embodiment is to [185]misunderstand a fundamental precept of boxers’ training. During a training session at Loanbridge, I shadowbox with a group of inexperienced and novice boxers. Pacing up and down among us, Joe talks the group through the motions of throwing various punches, at times physically articulating the body parts of individual boxers in much the same way as Carl does.
Joe teaches the group of approximately thirty boxers ever more complex combinations, interspersed with the rhythmic call “Jab, jab, double jab.” He explains each combination as we throw the punches. We’re learning the combination jab-right cross-left hook:

“Jab, right hand, left hook!”
We throw.
“Keep your hands up!” The hands should always be up protecting the face when not throwing a punch.
“We’ll go over that again, throw the jab and cross then stop.”
We do it, suspended with torso twisted around to push our right hand as far forward as possible.
“Weight on your front foot, back heel off the ground, back leg slightly bent, hips twisted forward to extend the right hand in a straight line at eye level, left hand back to the chin with your weight on your front foot. Simple. OK, so from there the left hand comes forward and around,” he demonstrates, “the right hand comes back to the chin and the weight is transferred from the front foot to the back foot, that’s how you get the power. Practice it now, transfer your weight from your front foot to your back foot, do it. Tell your body to do it then do it.”
“Jab, right hand, left hook!” Faster now, “jab, right hand, left hook, tell your body to do it, then do it.” As the rounds tick by and we tire, he bawls again, “Just tell your body to do it, then do it!”

To learn the punch, the body is objectified as a whole, and is subject to the control of “yourself.” The boxer learns to control their body in a distinctly dualistic way. When Joe tells the boxers to stop and hold their position mid-punch, he facilitates a third person perspective in the boxer, encouraging them to imagine a body that can be stopped in a “freeze frame” style, allowing more effective objectification and thus critique. Both Carl and Joe objectify boxers’ bodies in separate parts, dividing them into arms, elbows, hips, feet, et cetera. Each body part becomes an object in its own right. Carl moves my limbs like a doll’s, and I objectify those limbs individually, concentrating on each to execute the punch correctly. By breaking bodies into parts, each subject to the control of the mind and the control of others (Carl or Joe in this instance), the Cartesian mind-body self is instilled within the boxer’s habitus. Nowhere is this more elegantly articulated than when Joe repeatedly yells across the gym: “Tell your body to do it, then do it!”
Wacquant suggests that the subject-object distinction of Cartesian dualism is subverted as the punch becomes engrained within the boxer’s bodily schemata (2004: 69). The punch becomes simply done by the boxer, not thought. Knowledge is embodied in the accomplished fighter, as the speed at which the sport [186]occurs demands an immediate bodily response, not an abstract “thought” response (Wacquant 2004: 97). The process by which the boxer inscribes this knowledge paradoxically reinforces dualistic selfhood. All, including the most accomplished boxers, require the reflexive capacity to think of their bodies and selves in a dualistic way. The capacity for self-criticism and reflection were fundamental parts of the training practices I observed, and are a central value in a boxer’s socialization (Wacquant 2004; Sugden 1996; Lafferty and McKay 2004: 265; Woodward 2007: 67). This sense of self-control is primarily achieved through self-objectification in a distinctly dualistic way.
With this in mind, “pugilistic excellence” (Wacquant 2004: 97) as in an individual who totally embodies their knowledge of boxing, directly contradicts the boxer’s focus on self-control and objectification. It is rather the case that a dualistic concept of mind/body is central to demonstrating pugilistic excellence. Nicky, an experienced boxer at Loanbridge, expanded on this paradox when reflecting on the skills of one of the gym’s foremost boxers, Sam. Nicky is a senior boxer in the Loanbridge gym, having trained and competed there for several years; he is a regular at training sessions for competitive amateur boxers. Sam is one of the most experienced boxers in the gym, a former Scottish champion in his weight class renowned not only for his technical boxing ability but also the power of his punches. Nicky holds Sam in high esteem as the best boxer at Loanbridge and describes how Sam is special because he does not need a loss to motivate himself to improve. Sam’s rare and exemplary ability, as Nicky describes it, is one of constant self-critique. Nicky tells me how Sam learns from every bout by reflecting on what he did well, and what he did badly, maintaining a constant auto-critique. He never simply embodies his technical abilities but rather constantly critiques them, and in doing so constantly objectifies himself. Despite having the bodily knowledge of when and how to throw a perfect right hand without thinking, Sam maintains a running critique of himself, and in doing so exemplifies the value of self-control. The embodied self runs in parallel to a dualist auto-critique in the accomplished boxer. The high value that boxing places on self-control demands that the accomplished boxer must always maintain an element of self-critique and objectification, even when there appears to be no necessity to critique one’s performance. Sam does not need a loss in order to stimulate a process of self-critique, and to Nicky this makes him “a bit special.”
It is perhaps no coincidence then that the majority of coaches I encountered were former boxers themselves—bar one at The Clover who was not considered to be of the same quality as the other coaches, according to the boxers. Coaches had thus been through the process of acquiring embodied knowledge, becoming living repositories of boxing skill. Coaches expressed their knowledge through the metaphor of mind-body dualism in order to begin and extend the process of indelibly etching the technical ability upon the trainee boxer. The boxer then necessarily understands herself in terms of this metaphor, and as such the dualistic sense of self is propagated and supported (as opposed to being subverted) by the training process. The fact that a coach articulates and imparts their embodied knowledge and experience of the sport through a dualist metaphor again demonstrates a moment when simultaneous dualistic and embodied senses of self are negotiated and traversed in the gym.


Descartes’ shadow
[187]The practice of shadowboxing, in its various forms, is central to realizing the tension between Dualistic and embodied selfhood. Shadowboxing describes throwing punches into thin air and moving around accordingly as if fighting an imaginary opponent. It occurs either in front of a mirror or in the ring, and these spaces define the purpose and goals of the two different forms. Shadowboxing in the ring is the preserve of experienced, refined boxers, while boxers of all abilities practice shadowboxing with a mirror. Loanbridge newcomers, for example, are immediately placed in front of a mirror to shadowbox. Shadowboxing was performed with metronomic regularity in each of the three gyms, and was incredibly highly valued: in Joe’s words, “It’s the most important thing we do here.” The distinction between shadowboxing with a mirror and in the ring was made by the majority of boxers and coaches I asked, all of whom insisted that the two were considerably different.
Shadowboxing with a mirror
Boxers informed me that the purpose of working with a mirror was self-critique. In front of a mirror one is able to visually assess, against theoretical knowledge of what a punch should look like, how effectively it is performed. During this visual self-critique one often focuses on subsections of the body. For example Lewis, a Loanbridge boxer, told me, “I check my hand is going out in line with my shoulder and my eye, that my hands stay up or return to my chin, that kind of stuff.”
Lewis was at the time a recent recruit to the boxing gym: he joined less than a year previously and was looking forward to beginning his competitive amateur boxing career at an upcoming boxing event. As a relative newcomer, Lewis was in the process of transitioning away from the position of novice boxer. At the time he had recently begun attending nonnovice training sessions and working more closely with coaches on an individual basis. As such, Lewis often came up with perceptive reflections on his training, as he was still in the process of understanding it himself rather than embodying it in the way that a more experienced boxer like Nicky might. As Lewis’ words show us, the mirror further enables subdivision and objectification of the body. Lewis often related this back to his interactions with coaches when he described how Joe would tell him to focus on a particular movement or body part as he worked in front of the mirror.
Watching us shadowbox at The Clover, Carl often told us not to go too fast or throw long combinations we had not been taught, as the purpose was to go at a speed that allowed us to check our bodies were doing everything they should be. He would boom across the room: “Check that hands are up, check that your feet are moving, check your shoulders aren’t square ...”
Carl demonstrates the powerful capacity of the mirror in allowing the individual to objectify their body from a third-person perspective, and subsequently subdivide it. It was always possible to follow the eyes of a boxer into the field of the mirror where they would rest intently upon a leg or an arm as they repeated a movement, getting to know their bodies as objects at the disposal of their minds. However, we note again how this third-person perspective is generated intersubjectively. As boxers shadowbox with a mirror, they do not automatically objectify their [188]body in the specific way described. Rather, this objectification emerges out of the boxer’s interaction with the coach, and by the boxer identifying with the subjectivity of the coach. Boxers must learn what to look for, how to look into the mirror, and how to respond to the mirror image.
Lewis objectifies his body not simply by encountering the mirror image but by taking on the role of the coach through the medium of the mirror. My opening vignette describes how Carl walks among his boxers as they shadowbox in front of a mirror, encouraging them to throw combinations at a pace that allows selfcritique, directing them to focus on a specific limb, and articulating their bodies so that they feel the correct delivery of a punch. As he does so, his gaze alternates between the boxer’s body and the boxer’s mirror image, and he continues to direct the gaze of the boxer toward the mirror image. Carl is not only teaching boxers the correct technique but also teaching them a specific mode of interaction with the mirror image, and in doing so instilling a specific form of dualist self-critique. Carl’s alternating gaze, from the mirror to the boxer and back again, facilitates a third-person perspective, and a dualistic distinction between mind and body in the boxer, as he encourages them to identify with and take up this gaze. Reflexive dualism emerges from this intersubjective interaction (Crossley 2011), as the boxer learns to objectify his or her body using a mirror by identifying with the coaches gaze. The intersubjective interaction between boxer and coach provides the platform from which boxers conceive of themselves as an objectifying mind and an objectified body using the mirror.4
The question remains as to how the boxer relates to the mirror image and the role of the mirror image in creating the boxer’s notion of selfhood. The mirror image is not seen as the self-ideal but rather functions in a dialectic way as the object of continual self-critique. In The mirror stage, Jacques Lacan (2001) discusses an infant recognizing its own image in a mirror as separate from “the persons and things around him” (2001: 2). Lacan’s infant sees in the mirror an “Ideal-I” or “Gestalt” (2001: 2), which is an idealized, all-powerful self-image. On looking in the mirror the boxer also objectifies himself and generates a “gestalt.” However, whereas the infant’s mirror image is infinitely capable (it is the gestalt) the boxer’s mirror image is constantly critiqued as imperfect.
Csordas argues that Lacan mistakenly assumes the omnipotence of the objectifying self (Csordas 1994: 40), discussing a moment that predicates the Cartesian “structure” (282) into which Lacan’s infant instantly falls. In this moment the [189]infant, instead of immediately self-objectifying, experiences the alterity of embodiment (281), in which the difference between subject and object, mind and body, is collapsed. The notions of subject and object are then inferred by the structure the individual inhabits (281). However Csordas’ structure (acting on our boxer) is not only the values, practices, and structures of boxing but also a society that itself perpetuates a Cartesian mind/body imaginary (Hacking 2006; Ecks 2009). As such, prior to seeing his mirror image the boxer already exists within that structure, and thus the noncontextual immediacy of Csordas’ embodied self is dissolved. When the boxer looks in the mirror she generates a Gestalt (third-person self-image) specific to her engagement with the sport, cultivated through the intersubjective interaction with the coach. She continually compares what she should be doing (Gestalt) and what she is doing (the mirror image). The mirror image is not the Gestalt, a subject greater than the sum of its parts but is rather the opposite—an object that constantly performs imperfectly, never realizing the potential of the sum of its parts. I contend then that boxing training instills a specific dualism in the boxer, one that is focused on objectification for the purpose of self-critique. Furthermore, training in my field sites engendered a perpetually self-critiquing selfhood, where value was placed not only on correctly embodying techniques but also on one’s ability to reflect on embodied experience and in doing so objectify oneself.
One afternoon, while I observed a training session at Loanbridge, Joe brought a novice boxer to train alongside Lewis, Nicky, and another boxer who I knew less well.
I’m watching Lewis, Nicky, and a short, muscularly built man shadowboxing in front of the mirror when Joe walks over with a new recruit. He places the man in front of the mirror and begins to walk him through some basic punches, physically moving his body into the right positions, then directing him to concentrate on these particular aspects of his body. Joe then points to the mirror and tells the new recruit to focus on himself and watch to see that he’s doing the right things in the mirror.

“It’s all about focus, focus on yourself in the mirror,” says Joe.
Joe continues watching and I ask Nicky and Lewis what they’re doing as they shadowbox. They give me a standard description of self-critique and analysis of their bodily image in the mirror, and I then ask the short muscular man what he’s doing.
“I just try to focus on a spot on the mirror, make sure my punches are going there and that they’re always landing in the same place,” he tells me.
I ask, “Are you watching yourself in the mirror when you shadowbox?”
“Nah, not really, I’m just focusing on a spot and trying to land my punches there.”

As the rounds go on he seems less focused than the others, he shadowboxes for a few minutes then looks over to the side, his attention wanders to a car alarm outside or a bird passing the window. As I’m watching him, Joe, who is behind him watching the four boxers, nods at the short, muscular guy and shakes his head at me dismissively.
[190]Later I speak to Joe about it and he tells me that the short, muscular guy “wasn’t getting it” and that he was doing it wrong. “Did you see how he kept looking around, not focusing? He wasn’t focused, he wasn’t concentrating on himself.”
Here, concentration is not the primary function of the mirror (as the short, muscular boxer uses the mirror to concentrate on landing punches in the same spot), rather bodily objectification is. Joe clearly defines the objective of shadowboxing with a mirror as focusing on objectifying one’s body and subjecting it to the control of one’s mind. In doing so he illustrates the critical function of the mirror in facilitating the boxer’s dualistic selfhood. Whereas Lewis and Nicky concentrate reflexively on objectifying their body through the mirror image, the short, muscular boxer does not engage with the mirror image in the same way. “Not focusing,” in the case of the short, muscular boxer means not focusing on one’s self-image and not focusing on objectifying the body. The presence of the mirror does not, in and of itself, generate reflexivity and dualism in the boxer’s concept of body and self. Rather it is the boxer’s correct engagement with the mirror image, born out of the intersubjective interaction with the coach whereby the boxer learns to take up the third person perspective that ultimately generates a dualistic sense of self.
Shadowboxing in the ring
Whereas less experienced boxers are sent to a mirror, more experienced boxers often shadowbox in the ring in addition to working with a mirror. The ring represents something of a sacred space within the gyms I worked in. While boxers move freely around the majority of gym space in between rounds, entering the ring is tacitly forbidden without permission. The majority of a boxer’s work in the gym does not occur in the ring, and as such it was reserved for specific activities such as sparring or sometimes pad work. An experienced boxer might step in to the ring to shadowbox but only with the permission of a coach. This is either agreed beforehand when a coach has previously told them they are allowed to shadowbox in the ring (recognizing that they understand the purpose and method of doing so), or more immediately as a boxer is told to shadowbox in the ring and proceeds to do so.
Stepping into an empty ring to shadowbox is initially an unnerving experience. As I first did so I felt extremely exposed: what was I to do without a mirror image to critique, nothing to watch? Spatially, too, the ring presents a new challenge. The boxer becomes “tied” to a mirror because in order to critique himself, he must be able to appreciate his mirror image, limiting his field of movement. When boxers shadowbox in front of a mirror, their movements seem curiously artificial, rarely rotating or pivoting beyond perpendicular, and always moving in relation to the static plane of the mirror. Like a dog on a chain, the boxer’s movement is limited by a direct line of sight, while remaining close enough to appreciate bodily movements in detail. In the ring, however, the boxer is no longer linked to a focal point but rather externally bounded by the ropes of the ring, caged as opposed to tied. Shadowboxing in the ring looks much more fluid and less contrived than working with a mirror. The spatial difference reflects the fundamental conceptual difference in the purpose of the two practices. The change in the nature of the space is unsettling for a novice as it destabilizes what it means for the novice to shadowbox, how to do it, and what is to be gained by doing so.
[191]Shane, an experienced Loanbridge boxer, described to me how shadowboxing in the ring should be fast paced, and that during this time you focus on an imagined opponent, not yourself. You move around the ring engaged in an imaginary battle, not a state of introspection. As I spoke with Shane, Joe stood at the corner of the ring watching another experienced amateur boxer, Johnny, shadowboxing in the ring:

Johnny rolls in and out, feels out his opponent with a series of jabs then lands a crunching left hook, parries blows, bobs and weaves, all against nothing but an empty ring.
Joe yells, “Bully him! Bully him! Throw that one, two, left hook.... Hooks to the body then the head, work him!”
The sound of Johnny  exhaling as he throws each shot, the rustling tracksuit, and feet squeaking on the ring mat fill the empty gym. They become a symphony in their own right, a complete performance of one and a thrilling encounter where Johnny goes on the attack but is swiftly repelled, made to defend and slip an onslaught before coming back with a counter right hand and going on the offensive again...

Wacquant describes the boxer as a “body that learns and understands, sorts and stores information, finds the correct answer in its repertory of possible actions and reaction, and becomes the veritable ’subject’” (Wacquant 2004: 98). This shines some light on why only experienced boxers shadowbox in the ring. Experienced boxers have absorbed into their bodily schema the actions of punches and rolls, slips, and parries. They embody their technical prowess and their devotion to self-critique and control (Woodward 2007: 75). In the ring they practice this embodied knowledge. As Joe shouts instructions, or as Johnny imagines an opponent, his reactions are not the result of abstract decision-making and the dualistic self but the pugilistic habitus engrained in his bodily schema. Johnny becomes, in part, Wacquant’s “subject.”
However Johnny generates his opponent, and thus his reactions, from his imagination. His lived experience as subject is itself subject to an imagined situation; he is at once subject and object. This is again facilitated by the coach who provides a model third-person perspective. In sporadically calling for Johnny to throw specific combinations, but never explicitly telling him exactly what to do for more than a few seconds, Joe again provides a model “mind” position, encouraging Johnny to objectify himself from a similar third-person perspective. As Wacquant notes, the final collapse of the Cartesian subject-object division comes only when two boxers meet in the ring (2004). Shadowboxing in the ring provides a “dress-rehearsal” as it allows the pugilistic habitus, inscribed on the bodily schema, to exist in a situation where it is practiced, but is ultimately objectified. Shadowboxing functions to reinforce the dualistic self of the boxer, but when practiced in the ring also subverts it, allowing space for an embodied sense of self to exist in parallel. The dualism experienced by the boxer shadowboxing in the ring is subtly different from that of the novice learning to punch, or the boxer working with a mirror. In the ring the body is not objectified in parts so much as the embodied knowledge and performance is objectified. As the boxer becomes more proficient, their dualistic sense of self modulates subtly.[192]
Flow in the Ring

The fight is won or lost far away from the witnesses, behind the lines, in the gym, and out there on the road; long before I dance under those lights.
—Muhammad Ali

Ali’s quote speaks to a common idiom in boxing, that while the performance of boxing may occur in the ring, much of the boxers experience is not explicitly part of this performance. Essentially, much of the sport happens not during the bout but beforehand in the gym and other spaces and practices associated with the sport, such as roadwork and dieting. How then do boxers relate their experiences in the ring during a bout, and in the gym, to one another? Wacquant argues that only during a bout is true embodiment achieved by the boxer, as the “boxer’s ability to cogitate and reason in the ring has become a faculty of his undivided organism” (Wacquant 2004: 98). However, he does not address so clearly what happens outside of the bout, during the rest of a boxer training when the embodied self is less fully realized.
Hunter and Csikszentmihalyi’s work addresses how during sporting competition (such as a boxing bout) competitors experience phenomenological embodiment in the form of what they call “flow.” They suggest that, “In flow states people ... experience a merging of action and awareness” (2000: 12), whereby the world is experienced phenomenologically, through the mind and body working in “harmonic unison” (15). This results in the loss of self-consciousness, a transcendent form of bodily awareness and a loss of time perception, which subverts the dualistic sense of self (15). Flow is a momentary, fleeting experience for the boxer, not a permanent state, and as such provides analytic space to think about the transition and tension between embodied experience in the ring, and the more reflective, analytic selfhood of the boxer in training. Flow lends a temporal definition to embodied experience that Wacquant’s engagement with embodiment hints at but does not expand on. Framing a discussion of boxers experience through flow allows space to consider how, outside of moments of more complete embodied experience, embodiment is one of several aspects of the boxers appreciation of self.
During my fieldwork, boxers often reflected on how a flow-like state was experienced during a bout, how a change in consciousness occurred away from reflexivity and toward more automated action. Boxers described how it was “hard to think” during a bout, and how they felt actions became more automated. They also described how this feeling was intensely enjoyable. Here my ethnography directly supports Hunter and Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow, and Wacquant’s accounts of boxers’ embodiment. However the boxers I worked with also described a different side to their conceptualization of flow states, and the value judgments they made about these states. Their ambivalence shows a clear tension between embodied and dualistic selves in the boxers’ experience.
Hunter and Csikszentmihalyi argue that one of the necessary conditions for a flow state to be reached is “a clear goal combined with feedback” (2000: 12). Paradoxically for the boxer, the clear goal and feedback involves the objectification of the body, in the guise of an ongoing, internal performance critique aimed at maintaining self-control throughout the bout. Nicky described this paradox during an [193]interview regarding a recent loss during a “show” (a public event involving several bouts) in Edinburgh.
Nicky lost his bout by unanimous decision, and described how the intense build up to the fight prevented him from effectively controlling his emotions and actions, leading him to abandon his usually effective technical boxing style and to adopt a confrontational, aggressive style:

Nicky: Well, the fight, for me, was one of the ... it was just a bad performance on my behalf, because ... you know ... the guy was made for my style. You know I like to box on the back foot, I don’t let my ego get too much involved, I’m happy for him to take the center of the ring, and I’ll just let him walk on to my shots, and he was just happy coming on to me like that. Well, I think it was a few things, firstly the crowd that got me ... well for about ten or fifteen minutes before you’d seen the build up.
Ethnographer: Yeah, it was huge. (The build-up involved a lights show, fireworks, loud music, a parade of the boxers, and videos introducing each boxer and showcasing their hand speed and muscular physiques.)
N: So I was pretty fired up, hey. So from then I was’nae wanting to slip, I was’nae wanting to do my usual stuff you know. Everything just went over my head, it was like I was fixated on the guy you know, and I just got caught up into his fight. But that’s what competitive sport’s all about, eh. ...It’s about trying to get them to do what you want, y’know what I mean, eh, and I was just falling into his wee trap, eh. It’s just fucking ... I made the fight for him, because that’s what he came here to do isn’t it.
But if I’d changed that in any way around at any point in the fight, you know what I mean, I would have been happy with my performance. But it never, it just got worse and it got worse and it got worse. And that’s why I couldn’t stop it, you know what I mean, I knew what was happening but I couldn’t change it.

Nicky articulates how the pressure of the build up and the crowd pushed him to abandon his technical abilities as a boxer in favor of an approach governed by his “ego.” Nicky identified with the type of heroic, confrontational masculinity (Woodward 2007: 1) engendered by the build up, and with the crowd’s desire for aggression and confrontation. This contrast became clear in another boxer’s (named Jarred) dramatic but technically less proficient, knockout victory, which received by far the most applause of the evening. Nicky’s inability to control this “alter-ego” is ultimately blamed for his poor performance, his aggression lamented, and his lack of emotional and physical self-control bemoaned.
In this episode Nicky’s “clear goal” of emotional and physical self-control during a bout presents the paradox of aiming to achieve a dualistic goal, and in doing so subverting the dualistic self by boxing in an embodied, technically efficient way. During a bout, as when shadowboxing in the ring, dualistic and embodied selves appear to exist simultaneously in the boxer. During the bout one does feel a visceral thrill, and this does lead to a loss of consciousness. Minutes feel like hours (especially when your lungs are burning and you are being punched in the face) but then seem to be over before they began.[194]
“Boxing is a conversation with yourself ”
Tacked onto several walls and hung beside the ring in Loanbridge are a number of laminated A4 sheets of paper each bearing the words,
BOXING IS A CONVERSATION WITH YOURSELF.
Success in the ring, as Nicky described above, is equated with an objectifying selfcontrol, both emotional and physical. The boxer embodies their technical ability while personifying the “view from nowhere characteristic of a post-Enlightenment approach to knowledge” (Lock 1993: 138). Surrendering to the visceral thrill of the moment becomes the antithesis of the boxer’s aim. Boxers described this process of engaging dualistic self-control with embodied skill and technique simultaneously as “not getting caught up in the moment,” or simply as “boxing, not fighting.”
Hunter and Csikszentmihalyi argue that selfhood is strengthened and enhanced following a proficient performance (2000: 14). A boxer’s focus on self-control serves to do the opposite, to subject performance to objectifying self-critique. Nicky’s description of Sam’s exemplary qualities described earlier demonstrates this clearly. Sam critiques himself after victories (during which he reached the “flow” state), and aims not to emerge “strengthened by the knowledge of a masterful performance” but to actively criticize his performance. Although the boxer may experience the embodiment of “flow,” the emphasis on self-control and critique means embodied experience is then objectified in the postfight auto-critique. To be considered a successful boxer, as Sam is, selfhood is strengthened in moments of critical reflection and self-objectification, not only through embodiment and “flow” in the ring.
Even during a bout a critical, dualistic self is balanced against embodied knowledge. Indeed the ultimate experience of embodiment during competition is conceptualized by boxers as being dependent upon the integration of the socially constructed dualistic self into that moment. Boxers do not consider their experience in the ring as ultimately embodied, or as dissolving the dualistic subject-object distinction completely. Rather, they perceive it as a synthesis of the two appreciations of self, with successful embodied practice dependent upon the integration of the socially constructed dualistic self. This is clear in Nicky’s account of how disappointed he was in not being able to “change it around at any point,” in not being able to exercise a degree of control over his physical performance from what he perceives to be a removed, third-person perspective.
Studies of embodiment in sporting practice often revolve around the proposition that skilled and highly practiced bodily movements become engrained in the individual’s bodily schemata to the extent that they no longer represent abstract knowledge but rather are embodied potential. The assumption made is that “this skillful fusing of knowledge and action gradually becomes, over time and with much practice, embodied and largely taken for granted” (Hockey and Allen Collinson 2007). The various practices of the gym—in particular the different forms of shadowboxing and boxers’ accounts of virtue in their craft—demonstrate that, far from practice and time being needed to take embodied knowledge for granted, considerable effort is made to actively critique engrained practice. Nicky’s account of Sam’s critical virtues, one that I heard in different forms throughout my fieldwork and since, attests to the importance of dualistic auto-critique in a boxer’s [195]training and sense of self. The boxer’s practice in and out of the ring encourages dualistic and embodied senses of self to exist simultaneously, giving space for each to take primacy at different times. Following Csordas, dualistic structure and embodied experience are not alternatives, but ultimately exist in parallel in boxers’ experience (Csordas 1994: 282).


Conclusion
Robert DeNiro, playing Jake LaMotta, a washed-up, middleweight boxer on the standup circuit twenty years after his boxing career ended, puffs on a cigar in front of a dressing room mirror. La Motta is the central character of Martin Scorsese’s Raging Bull, a biopic based on LaMotta’s autobiography. The camera sits behind LaMotta, obscuring his face; the shot focuses on LaMotta’s mirror image rather than on the man himself. Overweight and breathing heavily, he recites a classic Marlon Brando monologue from On the Waterfront to his reflection.

“I was never no good after that night Charlie.
...
I had class, I could have been a contender.... I could have been somebody, instead of a bum.
Which is what I am.”
Steadying himself, he looks his reflection in the eye.
“Let’s face it, it was you Charlie. It was you, Charlie.”

LaMotta reflects on what could have been, on what should have been, and what is. His moments in the dressing room in front of the mirror bookend the tragic tale of his descent, both in and out of the ring. These reflective moments allow the audience to see into the violent, troubled man, to glimpse a humanity that recognizes that something—or in LaMotta’s case many things—haven’t quite worked out. LaMotta’s introspection and his reflection itself are key rhetorical devices that allow the audience to empathize with a character whose violent, selfish actions seem in many ways beyond comprehension. In a similar way contemplative reflection, and one’s image in a mirror, facilitate a specific form of selfhood, bodily awareness, and lived experience for boxers in training.
I have argued that a dualistic mind-body divide is cultivated in the novice boxer from the very start of their pugilistic education. The continual objectification of the novice boxer’s body during the routines of the gym involves a dualistic rhetoric from both coaches and boxers alike, while the physical articulation of boxers’ bodies by others plays a critical role in encouraging the perception of the body as a tool at the disposal of the mind. Through these intersubjective interactions the concept of distinct mind and body is developed in the boxer.
As boxers become more experienced, the practice of shadowboxing continues this development of a subject-object relationship between the mind and body, albeit a relationship that objectifies the body and embodied knowledge in a subtly different way to the dualism involved in learning techniques. The different forms [196]of shadowboxing, in the ring and with a mirror, demonstrate the inherent tension in the sport between embodied knowledge and constant, objectifying self-critique. The conceptual importance of self-control to the boxer provides the driving force behind this tension, creating the motivation for self-criticism while simultaneously asserting that only through self-control can embodied knowledge be most effectively expressed. By remaining “in control” in a detached, dualistic way, a boxer is most capable of exhibiting his or her skill effectively, of “boxing, not fighting” in Nicky’s words. A boxer’s practice and experience indeed undermines the Cartesian paradigm in certain respects, but the same practices also reify mind-body dualism on the part of the boxer. The developing dualism presented here is clearly not exactly the same as Descartes’ concept, but rather is a distinct progression of dualism produced through the specific practices of the gym.
* * *
In his engaging reflections on ethnography in practice, Harry West writes of his confusion when, upon delivering a symbolic analysis of “sorcery Lions” to his Muendan coresearchers in Mozambique, he is faced by the criticism that the lions are not only symbols but that “these lions you talk about ... they’re real” (West 2007: 5). West suggests that this episode “prompts us to ask not if Muedan sorcerers and the lions that they make (or that they become) are ’real’ or ’illusory,’ but instead to what kind of reality they belong.” (2007: 47). Similarly where ethnography suggests that the boxer lives a reality that balances two theoretically irreconcilable positions—embodied agent and dualistic mind/body—the question West’s work suggests is; what kind of reality do these boxer belong to, and how do their practices facilitate this balance?
Considering the specific practices of amateur boxers shows how a dualistic selfhood is imagined and inhabited not only as an abstract way of thinking but a “material philosophy ... embedded in everyday practice” (Graeber and da Col 2011: xi). Where dualisms are encountered in the field, they pose the question not only of how experience eludes a dualist appreciation of self but also how actors arrive at that appreciation. The implications of this question go beyond the ring and the gym. They raise the issue of how to engage with the continued permeation of dualistic ways of being within contemporary societies. Anthropological questioning can move forward to discuss “how do dualisms exist, under what circumstances, and why?”
It has become clear in the last century that the Cartesian model is just that—a model, a reification brought to life through practice and conceptual deployment. As Hacking states, “We are persons, not minds in machines. That is surely the wisdom of our times. Hence it is worth reflecting how different our practice is from what complacent truisms teach” (2006: 15). I am not suggesting here that there is a deeper truth to the Cartesian body, or contesting the fact that when implied or assumed with no critical reflection, it does indeed inhibit our understanding of human experience. However Cartesian philosophy and dualistic selves happen to exist, it is important to recognize that they are engrained within everyday practice. If Lock is right that anthropologists should seek to “situate the body as a product of specific social, cultural and historical contexts” (1993: 134), then in order to [197]understand the type of body involved in and produced by boxing training, it must be accepted that mind-body dualism is entrenched within that training. To reduce boxing to an ultimately embodied experience is a gross oversimplification. When considered as a “terrible leftover from a horrible mistake” (Hacking 2006: 89), Cartesian dualism together with “the body proper” becomes a straw man—a social construction presented as an incorrect fact. That mind-body dualism is engrained into the very fabric of our society to the extent that it does indeed belie the complexity of human experience is reason enough not simply to discard it but to treat it as any other social construction; as a relevant object of study.


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———. 2014. Globalizing boxing. London: Bloomsbury.


L’ombre de Descartes: la boxe et la peur du dualisme corps-esprit
Résumé : Cet article explore le corps et le sens de soi produit par l’entraînement du boxeur, à partir d’un travail de terrain conduit dans des salles d’entraînement à Montréal et Edinburgh. Contrairement à d’autres travaux anthropologiques sur le sport, je suggère que l’entraînement dans ces clubs de boxe transmet un sens de soi dualiste, qui évoque le dualisme cartésien. Paradoxalement, pour un boxeur compétent, ce sens de soi n’est pas une alternative, mais il est en compétition avec un sens de soi et un savoir incorporé. Ce sens de soi dualiste est manifeste dans divers régimes d’entraînement et dans la progression du boxeur, qu’il soit novice ou confirmé, ainsi qu’au vu des différentes pratiques auquel il se familiarise durant sa progression. La fin de mon article problématise la peur anthropologique du corps cartésien. En traitant le corps cartésien comme une erreur philosophique plutôt qu’une réification sociale, les chercheurs en sciences sociales qui ont recours au concepts de corps et d’esprit risquent de créer un homme de paille qui entrave leur capacité à analyser le dualisme corps-esprit en tant que construction sociale.
Leo HOPKINSON is a PhD candidate in social anthropology at the University of Edinburgh. His PhD research is focused on boxing communities in Accra, Ghana, concerning how multiple engagements with the sport contribute to articulations of ethnic identity in contemporary Accra. His research also considers how the Accra boxing community engages with the sport as a global industry. He has previously conducted research on embodied learning, caring, and recognition with boxing and capoeira communities in Edinburgh and Montreal.
Leo HopkinsonDepartment of Social AnthropologyUniversity of EdinburghSchool of Social and Political Sciences15a George SquareEdinburgh EH8 9LD, UKl.g.h.hopkinson@sms.ed.ac.uk


___________________
1. “Padwork” involves hitting padded mittens on the hands of a trainer. It is designed to improve speed, accuracy, timing, and power, and allows the boxer to practice body positioning, footwork, and movement while throwing punches.
2. Crossley (1996, 2001) builds on a rich, interdisciplinary criticism of Cartesian philosophy, the idea that the “mind” is the essence of the individual, and a distinct object apart from  the physical body. Beginning with Spinoza (2000), criticisms have come from philosophy (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Ryle 1949) as well as the social sciences, and more recently from the natural sciences; for example, neurologist Antonio Damassio’s Descartes error: Emotion, reason and the human brain (1996). Anthropological approaches tend to draw mainly on Merlau-Ponty’s phenomenology (1962), and Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1992) in showing how human experience eludes Descartes division of mind and body.
3. Others (Wacquant 2004; Woodward 2007) have noted the gulf in practice between amateur and professional boxing but often have not followed through with this distinction in their discussion. Two of the three gyms I trained in worked only with amateur boxers, the exception being The Clover. As such, my ethnography from The Clover refers only to amateur boxers and amateur boxing practices in the gym. As institutionally separate sports, governed by different rules and motivations, it may be that parallels can be drawn between amateur and professional boxing, however it would be naïve to assume that ethnography from one sport can necessarily speak to the practices of another.
4. Other sporting activities also use mirrors to develop technique and ability, for example various genres of dance. As I have shown here the role or function of the mirror is not self evident, it is a cultivated engagement, generated intersubjectively, and that informs a specific appreciation of self. To understand this, the mirror image cannot be taken as a given, but must be placed within the context of the specific interactions and practices involved in working with a mirror. In other words, the mirror image is never just a mirror image but emerges as meaningful through the social interactions that surround it. Other sporting practices may indeed use mirrors in similar ways, but any understanding of how and why mirrors are used in these sports must engage not only with the fact of a mirror and corresponding image but with the specific practices and values that inform engagements with the mirror.
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				<article-title>The role of volunteers in pilgrimage studies: Autobiographic reflections on belief and the performance of multiple roles</article-title>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Given the predominantly secular approach towards religion by anthropologists and sociologists, we contend that a discussion of the researcher’s positionality with regard to faith and belief, as well as the autoethnographic approach in pilgrimage studies, is methodologically important. Drawing on years of volunteering at two pilgrimage sites, we explore what kind of methodological impact our role as volunteers and our private lives have had on both research at and interpretations of the pilgrimage sites. For one of us working as a volunteer was a personal choice motivated by faith, while for the other it was based on the pragmatics of doing research. In both cases gaining access involved the generation of social capital through the gifting of time and free labor within a hierarchical structure of power exchange. Our role as volunteers gave us an opportunity to explore the faith-based positionality and self-interest which informs pilgrimage volunteering and involves power exchange. Our article seeks to show how we address our own religious beliefs but, at the same time, stay grounded in ethnographic observations and analysis.</p></abstract>
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						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Beyond the stories of collapse, devastation, and moral uncertainty in Iraq’s recent history there are tales of connections, relations, and the entanglements of lives which are named in forms such as friendship and family, and modes of comporting to others such as care, attention, and even love, which have yet to become part of how one thinks and writes about life after the invasion. In this article the authors draw attention to a picture of the lives of Iraqis as caught not merely in the forms and structures of tribal obligations and sectarianism, and the violence and destruction of terror, but also in the rough ground of mundane affairs and encounters. We argue that in the overlappings and relations of lives and intentionalities resides an intercorporeal ethics of the rough ground of the everyday. An ethics of the rough ground of the everyday is one understood not only in terms of the ways in which life is open to the pain, suffering, joy, and ennui of others, but in terms of how in the entanglements and relations of lives with other lives in the everyday, lines of care and concern emerge, are fostered, and also frayed. </p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Beyond the stories of collapse, devastation, and moral uncertainty in Iraq’s recent history there are tales of connections, relations, and the entanglements of lives which are named in forms such as friendship and family, and modes of comporting to others such as care, attention, and even love, which have yet to become part of how one thinks and writes about life after the invasion. In this article the authors draw attention to a picture of the lives of Iraqis as caught not merely in the forms and structures of tribal obligations and sectarianism, and the violence and destruction of terror, but also in the rough ground of mundane affairs and encounters. We argue that in the overlappings and relations of lives and intentionalities resides an intercorporeal ethics of the rough ground of the everyday. An ethics of the rough ground of the everyday is one understood not only in terms of the ways in which life is open to the pain, suffering, joy, and ennui of others, but in terms of how in the entanglements and relations of lives with other lives in the everyday, lines of care and concern emerge, are fostered, and also frayed. </p></abstract-trans>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
	<body><p>Al-Mohammad and Peluso: Ethics and the “rough ground” of the everyday
		
	
	
		
			
				
		
			This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Hayder Al-Mohammad and Daniela Peluso. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online)
		
		
			Ethics and the “rough ground” of the everyday:
		
		
			The overlappings of life in postinvasion Iraq
		
		
			Hayder Al-Mohammad, Keele University
			Daniela Peluso, University of Kent
		
	
	
		
			Beyond the stories of collapse, devastation, and moral uncertainty in Iraq’s recent history there are tales of connections, relations, and the entanglements of lives which are named in forms such as friendship and family, and modes of comporting to others such as care, attention, and even love, which have yet to become part of how one thinks and writes about life after the invasion. In this article the authors draw attention to a picture of the lives of Iraqis as caught not merely in the forms and structures of tribal obligations and sectarianism, and the violence and destruction of terror, but also in the rough ground of mundane affairs and encounters. We argue that in the overlappings and relations of lives and intentionalities resides an intercorporeal ethics of the rough ground of the everyday. An ethics of the rough ground of the everyday is one understood not only in terms of the ways in which life is open to the pain, suffering, joy, and ennui of others, but in terms of how in the entanglements and relations of lives with other lives in the everyday, lines of care and concern emerge, are fostered, and also frayed.
		
		
			Keywords: ethics, everyday, Iraq, Basra, moral anthropology
		
	


		
			I was the first of my family to return to Iraq since we left during the early skirmishes of the Iran/Iraq War in 1982.1 It was the summer of 2005 and I entered Iraq via Kuwait, as my intended destination was Basra, only an hour or so by car from the border. I was meant to stay with my uncle on my mother’s side and his family; however, it was the height of summer when the heat exceeds 45°C almost daily, and the women of the family would be required to cover up in my presence. I could not bear the idea of making a family I barely knew even more uncomfortable in that intolerable heat, nor did I want to impose on a household I knew to be struggling financially.
		
		
			Instead of staying with my uncle I decided to stay in a hotel near the center of Basra. Friends and family knew I was coming to Iraq, but none were told the date of my arrival as my plans were continually changing. When I arrived at the center of Basra I searched briefly until I found a hotel and checked in. As soon as I was in my room I called my father in London to tell him of my safe arrival and where I was staying. He thought I had done the right thing by going to a hotel and not staying with my uncle saying it was, “best to stay away…they have too many problems.” I put the phone down and began to unpack. I had joked with a few of the hotel workers as I was checking in and already felt somewhat at ease in my new environment. I turned on the small television in my room to watch the news as I unpacked. A series of explosions have rocked the center of Baghdad. Battles were ongoing in Najaf. A spate of kidnappings in Nassriya.… The news was always the same in those days.
		
		
			After a brief period of time my mobile phone rang. I looked at the number and to my surprise, it was a local one. Who could have my number? I answered with trepidation, “Hello?”
		
		
			“Hayder? I’m downstairs”
		
		
			That was the call. I had no idea who it was and must admit to being confused and slightly worried at the time. I took the stairs from the first floor to the ground floor hoping to catch a glimpse of who the caller might be. I did not recognize anyone out of the two or three people who sat in the lobby. From behind a pillar a middle-aged man jumped out at me, almost screaming: “Hayder?!… Give your uncle a kiss. What are you, English? Your father is a great man…. Your mother, she was too good for that man…you’re fat…too fat…what’s the matter with you?”
		
		
			That was Abu-Hibba. He was sixty years old or so when I first met him. I found out later that my father had called Abu-Hibba immediately after speaking to me and sent him to check to see how I was, what the hotel was like, and generally to make me aware that I was anything but alone in Basra. Abu-Hibba’s family had owned a shop opposite the one my father ran from the late 1960s until 1979. Abu-Hibba and my father were friends; they had not seen nor heard from each other since 1979—when my father left Basra to live in Baghdad and eventually fled the country until a week before I arrived in Basra. My father had managed to acquire Abu-Hibba’s and several of his other friends’ telephone numbers from Basrans living in London in order to tell them of my arrival. As soon as my father spoke to Abu-Hibba and told him I was in Basra, he arrived at my hotel.
		
		
			Abu-Hibba took great care of me during those initial weeks when I first visited Basra. He checked on me daily by coming to visit me under almost any circumstance, even when rival gangs and militias were doing battle near the hotel. He opened his home and family to me; his family problems became my problems and when good news came to them I was one of the first they called to tell.
		
		
			A few weeks after our initial encounter I was walking with Abu-Hibba eating ice cream in the evening and thanked him for his kindness and generosity. He responded with irritation in his voice: “You need to understand one thing: you’re one of us. You’re part of our family. Anything you want we will do for you, even if we can’t we’ll try…. Your father and I grew up together. We were beaten up together…we fought and argued with each other…when your father left, a part of Basra left went with him…none of us ever forgot him…. We shared a life, your father and I…we fell in love and got married to our wives at the same time…and shared in each other’s lives and happiness; that never gets forgotten, no matter how many years you and your father have been away. Your life is connected [marboot] with ours…so don’t thank me…ever.”
		
		
			It has been in such conversations and moments that both authors have increasingly come to feel there is an account to be given of how in the overlappings and relations of lives and intentionalities an ethics of care resides in the rough ground of the everyday. Such an ethics repeats Wittgenstein’s critique of the philosophy of language of his time in which the rarefied conceptual clarity of works by figures such as Frege and Russell and the Vienna Circle unmoored language from precisely the space it is resident and made intelligible within—namely, the everyday. In Wittgenstein’s words: “We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal; but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” ([1953] 2007: §107, emphasis in original). Hence, if in the philosophy of language we have to return language to where it is used and made intelligible, then an ethics of the rough ground of the everyday would be one in which ethics is neither judged nor understood against an ideal of the Good or extracontontextual imperatives. Rather, an ethics of the rough ground of the everyday is one understood in terms of the ways in which life is not only open to the pain, suffering, joy, and ennui of others, but also to how in the entanglements and relations of lives with other lives in the everyday, lines of care and concern emerge, are fostered, and also frayed.2 Such an ethics, which resides in living-in-action—that is, as phenomenologically, experientially, and sensibly grounded—points to an obscure and dynamic understanding of social life in the south of Iraq whose horizon is not determined or limited by categories such as kinship, tribalism, Islam, and sectarianism.
		
		
			Much research on Iraq since the invasion of 2003 has focused on the implications of the collapse of the Ba’thist regime (Barakat 2005; Ismael and Ismael 2005; Bensahel et al. 2008), the incoherency of the strategic ambitions of the occupying forces (Allawi 2007; Boyle 2009; Katzman 2009), the rise of gender inequality and violence (Al-Ali 2005; Cardosa 2007; Al-Jawaheri 2008), and the destructiveness of terrorist attacks and the emergence and rise of militia and gang violence within Iraq (Al-Mohammad 2011a). Academic and journalistic accounts, which have insisted on highlighting the breakdowns, suffering, and destruction of the country have often ignored the much more complex imbrications of violence, struggles, life, and the everyday, which are not necessarily exposed nor become manifest in the devastation of terrorist attacks or battles between militias and gangs. Borrowing from Wittgenstein the notion of the rough ground of the everyday ([1953] 2007: §107), this article is not merely attempting to provide a corrective to some of the rather overblown rhetoric found in accounts of life in Iraq, nor does it merely turn to everyday life in Basra to give an account of some of the multiple ethical forms of coping and care that reside in everyday interactions (cf. Kwon 2010; Lambek 2010). Rather, this article turns to the everyday as itself where lives come together in complex ways and in which care, and also neglect and violence, ravel and unravel the entanglings of lives with other lives.3 Thus, this article pushes—ethnographically and theoretically—for a broader understanding of ethics beyond one which happens to reside within the everyday, or is merely an aspect of the everyday; and it also attempts to move beyond the dominant paradigm of an ethics of the self, or self-cultivation (cf. Al-Mohammad 2010b: 434–40).
		
		
			In the works of Saba Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2006) the important move was made to insist that ethics is not some anonymous imposition of body techniques that blindly form ethical beings in consonance with social norms of how one should carry oneself, act, and behave. Rather, ethical selves are actively made and cultivated by persons themselves; furthermore, a whole set of technologies, apparatuses, and discourses are in play in this active formation of an ethical self. However, one area which seems to have received little interest from anthropologists researching ethics is how one can think of an ethics of the relationship or the with of social life (cf. Al-Mohammad 2010b). The etymology of “ethics” is in sympathy with the focus on “selfhood” particularly if one turns to the Ancient Greek ēthikē which is based on ēthos, a person’s nature or disposition.4 What is odd, however, is our ability as anthropologists to commit to a notion of human being as ex-centric (i.e., outside itself), or in the parlance of postmodernism, “de-centered,” spatially and temporally, interinvolved and intersubjective; yet our notion of ethics tends invariably toward and centered on an ethics of the “self,” or an ethics tied only to a specific institution (e.g., Cook 2010). Michael Lambek’s edited volume Ordinary ethics (2010) is one of the more recent attempts to develop an ethics beyond social norms and rules and the ethics of the self. However, most of the essays within the volume do not engage with what an ethics of the “ordinary” itself might like look, focusing instead on aspects of the everyday to be engaged with in ethical terms.
		
		
			Turning to Iraq’s recent history below, we outline the context in which discourses about the social and moral breakdown of Iraq can be located in the political-economic shifts of the country. This focus on the breakdown and unraveling of life in Iraq is shown to limit our understanding of what problems and difficulties Iraqis have faced since the invasion of 2003. In the subsequent two sections we turn to minor events and encounters between several Iraqis in their everyday lives that highlight some of the ethicality and openness of life to the lives of others. These ethnographic vignettes develop a picture of life in postinvasion Iraq not caught solely in violence and the desperation of sectarian attacks, but in the complex imbrications and frictions of everyday lives making their way in the world. The article ends by briefly engaging with Erving Goffman’s (2010) study of how individual pedestrians are able to successfully maneuver their way in the city without bumping into others. Taking some of the critiques of Goffman’s privileging of sight over the body’s practical sense, we push for an understanding of the way in which people in Iraq make their way in the world as an intercorporeal, and also an ethical experience.
		
	
	
		
			The unraveling of life in Iraq?
		
		
			On March 20, 2003, American forces stormed across the Kuwaiti border and began their race from the south of Iraq to Baghdad having the day before employed “surgical airstrikes”5 on the suspected locations of Saddam Hussein and senior government officials. The bulk of the British forces were committed to securing the major strategic sites in the Basra Governorate, such as Iraq’s only seaport, Umm Qasr, and the Rumaila oil field (one of the largest oil fields in the world), to prevent any major damage to oil reserves or infrastructure. Once secured, several brigades closed the two major road links from Basra to Baghdad to seal off the city from any organized threat from the Iraqi Army, and then moved to capture the city as well (cf. Gordon and Trainor 2007: 74–92). At the time there was an expectation that the heavily Shi’ite Basra would repeat in some form or another the 1991 post-Gulf War’s active and armed resistance against the Ba’thist regime (Cordesman and Davies 2008: 93–98; Synnott 2008: 106–9).
		
		
			There are at least two reasons why such an outpouring of violence against the regime did not occur at the time of the invasion. First, Iraqis were not to repeat the costly mistake of the intifada of 1991 in which an army weary from the recently concluded eight-year war with Iran and returning home from the devastating defeat of the First Gulf War, rose up against the Ba’ath regime emboldened by the soft rhetoric coming from Western governments, particularly the Americans.6 Basra was the first city on March 1, 1991, to rise up against the Ba’ath regime. Karbala, Hilla, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawa, Kut, and Diwaniya also joined in, with the north of Iraq also staging its own uprising (Goldstein and Whitley 1992: 29–65). That tens of thousands were brutally killed as the international community watched on was a chastening experience and indicated to many Iraqis that the British and Americans were not to be trusted (Davis 2005: 231–33). However, even if Basrans, and Iraqis more generally, were able to trust their supposed emancipators, the Iraq of 2003 was not the Iraq of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Weeks after the end of the first Gulf War a special UN mission to Iraq wrote a report stating the following:
		
		
			
				It should, however, be said at once that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. The recent conflict had wrought near-apocalyptic results upon what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology. (Ahtisaari 1991)7
			
		
		
			Second, many Iraqis were not sure in those initial days that the Saddam government had been toppled and the Ba’athists neutralized. The Ba’athist regime had managed to inveigle its way into almost every aspect of life in the country—the privacy of home life included—and as weak and limited as the Ba’thists may have seemed to the international media and its consumers, Iraqis had granted Saddam an almost omnipotent-like quality (cf. Makiya 1989: 270–75). Living under the totalitarianism of Ba’athism since 1968, and within the bubble and desperation of the war and sanction years, Iraqi friends and acquaintances of mine have described how they did not know what it was they wanted after Saddam had gone because many had given up hope that he and his family would ever leave power.
		
		
			What did occur as soon as British forces had secured the city of Basra was the beginning of what became a national phenomenon: looting. Saddam had called the war of 2003 the “Harb Al-Hawasim” (i.e., the Final War); once the looting began Iraqis immediately renamed the looted goods and those who stole and illegally built temporary homes on private or government land “al-hawasim.” Patrick Cockburn writes that the initial phase of the looting contained “a social revolutionary ferocity in the robbery and destruction that now swept the country” (2009: 161). Along similar lines criminologists Green and Ward (2009) have claimed that impoverished Iraqi looters targeted the homes of Ba’athist leaders both in acts of political revenge but also to satisfy long accumulated material needs. If there was a “revolutionary force” initially behind the criminality it soon dissipated as organized gangs took over the thievery. Not to be left out, sectarian and political groups also joined the free-for-all, especially Muqtada Sadr’s own private militia, the Sadrists. By early May 2003 Muqtada Sadr (who publicly decried sectarian killings) issued the “al-Hawasim” fatwah decreeing that looters could retain their stolen property as long as they made a contribution of 20 percent of the value of the looted goods (khums) to their local Sadrist office. Many of the wealthier and more powerful Shi’ite drew the conclusion that al-Sadr was little more than a gang boss and distinguishing between the “political” actions of the Sadrists from those of ordinary criminal gangs was not always easy.
		
		
			Coming out of the horrendous experience of sanctions and the bombardment of the 2003 invasion, many Iraqis felt that the experience of widespread looting, the explosion in the number of murders and violence that seemed to have no explicit political aim—nor the anti-Ba’athist vengeful focus as was claimed by many journalists and commentators—pointed to a moral corruption within Iraq itself. Statements such as “How else does someone like Saddam stay in power for so long if we aren’t somehow to blame as well” became commonplace within the country, which pointed to either an inherent corruption within Iraqi social life itself, or, at least, a wide complicity of Iraqis themselves that sustained the brutality of Ba’athist violence. In more theological terms, friends would remark, “Who killed the Hussain?” referring to the fact that the Prophet Mohammad’s grandson Imam Hussein was martyred in Iraq signaling the long history of violence within the country and also the refusal to stand with “good” against “evil” by its citizens.
		
		
			It is against the backdrop of the violence of militias, gangs, and terrorists, and stories of the breakdown of the social in Iraq that I first arrived in Basra on that summer’s day in 2005. The heading of this section, “the unraveling of life in Iraq?” is taken from journalist Farnaz Fassihi’s (2009) book in which she recounts personal accounts of everyday life in the country in the peak of the violence. As she stresses the violence, the breakdown in the socio-political apparatuses of everyday life, and the suffering that Iraqis have endured for decades, Fassihi, like many who have written on Iraq, gives a compelling account of how lives have unraveled under such pressures. But, life has not stopped in Iraq; Iraqis do not make their way in the everyday as simply victims or despondent souls. More complex and nuanced stories are required of how life was still possible in Iraq after the invasion, and how Iraqis and those outside the country contributed not only to the devastation but also to the conditions of life within the country.
		
		
			Hence, beyond the stories of collapse, devastation, and moral uncertainty in Iraq’s recent history there are tales of connections, relations, and the entanglements of lives that are named in forms such as friendship and family and modes of comporting to others such as care, attention, and even love, which have yet to become part of how one thinks and writes about life after the invasion. There are other relations and entanglements that we have no satisfactory language for as anthropologists, which exist in our haphazard and contingent engagements in the “hurly-burly” of the everyday (Wittgenstein 1967: §567). It is this picture of the lives of Iraqis as not caught in the forms and structures of tribal obligations and sectarianism, and the violence and destruction of terror, but in the rough ground of mundane affairs and encounters, which clears a space to think of the care and ethics of daily life in Iraq. Such a narrative, however, does not do away with the politics, suffering, and history of the country; it indicates, rather, the thinness of thinking only of the unraveling of life in Iraq without also accounting for its ravelings as well—ravelings which are not merely counterpoised to violence and suffering, but which emerge from, through, and even against them.
		
		
			It is important to clarify the everyday here is not opposed to the eventful and the outbursts of violence and destruction. An ethics of everyday life seeks to move past the disjunction of events/moments and the everyday to allow for an appreciation of the everyday itself as eventful (Das 2007: 6–9; Stewart 2007: 16–19, 48, 98–99). Instead of life, as such, unraveling in postinvasion Iraq, specific forms of life, or complexes of entanglements, were certainly undone or became looser in those periods, particularly as tribal, sectarian and nonsectarian groups, and gangs mobilized during the period of the collapse of the Saddam regime to gain power (cf. Dawod 2003; Al-Mohammad 2010a; Al-Mohammad 2011b). The rise and proliferation of Shi’ite, Sunni, and other political organizations and militias in Iraq after 2003 in no meaningful way translated into attempts to take on the vital work of securing basic forms of healthcare, security, or even basic provisions for the poorest in the country. Allied forces constituted reconstruction teams to aid with the transition to Iraqi self-determination and governance with mixed success and great controversy (Barakat 2005; Ismael and Ismael 2005; Cardosa 2007). However, if one turns to the everyday in Iraq one can find small gestures, moments of kindness and care, which are not simply positive tales contained within the destruction of postinvasion Iraq, but are the very grounds by which many Iraqis have been able to survive and live through the terror and uncertainty of the last decade.
		
		
			It is to this world of gestures, moments of recognition, small acts of generosity, and the slow intertwining of lives with other lives in the everyday that we now move. The series of events and exchanges recounted below (which took place over several years) point to the precariousness and faintness of the ethics and care of everyday life, which is not located in one phenomena but exists only along the distributions and movements of lives entangled in the lives of others in the everyday.
		
	
	
		
			Lives entangled and ethics
		
		
			One evening in the spring of 2009, Abu-Hibba chose not to join our group of friends for dinner. He rarely came with us to this particular restaurant even though the food is usually very good and we all know the owner and had become friends with the staff. Abu-Hibba had driven us in his old car to the restaurant and suddenly made his excuses to leave. We mocked him as we got out of his car for being too old (at the age of sixty-five) to stay out late in the evening. He ignored our comments and drove away. We had become used to Abu-Hibba not staying for dinner when we ate at this restaurant so we quickly moved on to talk about the rise in the numbers of killings and crime in the city. Eventually, I got up to talk with the cook who stood over the grill to tell him of our order and to have a chat with him. We usually share a few jokes with one another and discuss the well being of mutual friends in Basra. This evening was somewhat different. The cook, Abu-Sabar, asked to speak to me privately. We went round the back where nobody could hear us. “I need to see you tomorrow, it’s very important.” I asked what the matter was but Abu-Sabar insisted it wait until tomorrow.
		
		
			The next day I met Abu-Sabar at a friend’s shop. Immediately he took out a wad of Iraqi dinars and gave it to me. “I’ve seen you with Abu-Hibba all over Basra, I know you are very close to one another…. A year or two ago I could not afford to pay my rent and the landlord wanted to kick me and my family out onto the street. We lost whatever money we had…. What could I do?” I interrupted Sabar asking what this had to do with Abu-Hibba and me. “I don’t know how Abu-Hibba heard about the problem but he went and paid my rent behind my back…he did it for three months. It took me a long time to find out who did it…but it was him.” I was somewhat incredulous because I was aware of how little money Abu-Hibba had and how paltry the sum of money was that he received bimonthly for his pension. I asked Abu-Sabar if he knew Abu-Hibba well, or was related to him. “No…we worked together in the Fertilizer Company for years…spoke to one another regularly…. I knew him, of course…but we had no relationship outside work other than saying hello to one another if we bumped into each other in the market or a wedding.”
		
		
			That same day I went to Abu-Hibba’s home to give him his money. He looked at me and asked what the money was for. “It’s from a friend… Abu-Sabar.” Abu-Hibba shook his head: “He shouldn’t have given you this.” I joked with Abu-Hibba that if he had so much money to pay other people’s rent maybe he could give me a few hundred dollars. Abu-Hibba has never been much for talking but on this occasion he wanted me to know about what happened. A distant cousin of his who I had met on several occasions was Abu-Sabar’s landlord. He had contacted Abu-Hibba to ask if he knew of any possible tenants looking for a house to rent near old Basra, as he was soon to evict Abu-Sabar and his family for not paying their rent. “When I talked to my wife and daughters we all saw ourselves in their position…. We just couldn’t eat knowing that they would be on the streets or hiding in a small shack—how could you expect us to let that happen? I’m not religious Hayder…. I’ve never prayed and I drink [alcohol]…but these people we’ve grown up and lived with, we have to try to take care of each other as much as we can.”
		
		
			In living with and sharing a life in the everyday of work, lines of care and interest emerge almost unrecognized. Abu-Hibba and Abu-Sabar came to know of each other through glances or brief moments of interaction only, but in these meetings and encounters the slow entangling of their lives takes place. This entangling of lives that manifests through interest, attention, or small gestures of politeness—which has no formal account as an ethics of the everyday within the social sciences—indicates movements, understandings, and encounters of lives that exist beyond the monopoly that Islam, sectarian and religious identities, or social forms and structures such as tribalism, enjoy within studies of the Middle East. Not only is life something which cannot be merely encompassed by social and cultural institutions, ethics itself as the inclination of life toward others exists both prior to and beyond the forms of existence and rationalizations of institutions (Benson and O’Neill 2007; Baracchi 2008: 7–9). Emmanuel Levinas writes that as first philosophy, “ethics cannot itself legislate for society or produce rules of conduct whereby society might be revolutionized or transformed…. [Ethics] hardens its skin as soon as we move into the political world of the impersonal ‘third’—the world of government, institutions, tribunals, schools, committees, and so on” (Levinas and Kearney 1986: 29–30). However, in the anthropology of ethics, which has raised to such prominence the institutional discourses and practices of self-formation, the everyday of life in Basra is one where violence and the struggles of militias and gangs also intersects with the movements of everyday life, care and interest, joy and monotony, and also the proximal frictions and tensions between friends, family members, and acquaintances.
		
		
			Months later I was sitting and talking with Abu-Hibba and several friends about visiting the family of an acquaintance who had died the previous day. Abu-Talal, a middle-aged man who runs a small shop in Basra that sells stationery talked of the wajab (“duty”) one had of paying respect to the deceased and his family. I recalled at the time Wilfred Sellars’ (1963) felicitous phrase fraught with “ought”—in social action and discourse, does there come a silent claim on the other?—but I remained quiet throughout the conversation, caught as I was briefly by my mental wanderings back to the academy. Abu-Hibba broke the late afternoon torpor with a set of challenges: “Don’t any of you come to my funeral out of wajab. You’re absolved of that. I’ve buried a sister who raised me…showed me love…. I buried two of my nephews who I protected with my own life when our house was under attack…. I buried friends who were more important than any brother ever could be to me…. I went to their funerals because they are all we have…. What is my life without all of you here?” Almost correcting himself, Abu-Talal jumped in. He spoke of his heart disease, the fear he had of dying, but also that his death would be one that people dear to him would come to his funeral to grieve and remember him: “On this dirt and under this sky we’ve lived all our lives…we suffered for decades but also we cared for each other.”
		
		
			The conversation moved on to how each person’s life was reliant on the faint and barely perceptible gestures, actions, and moves made to open possibilities for others or to shield loved ones and acquaintances from threat. But more than that, and much more difficult to locate, was the sense that their lives are caught in the hopes, ambitions, and thoughts of others. A small gesture common among my Basran friends was to buy a bag of fruit or sweets and simply to drop them off at someone’s house. One might say to a friend: “The apples looked good today and we couldn’t enjoy them if you did not eat them as well.” It would be easy to think of the fruits or sweets as symbols or externalizations of the care one has for others; beyond such an understanding there is an indication that joy and pleasure do not merely reside within our own skin, but are caught in the experiences of others intimate to us as well.8 This is one of the ways to understand Zygmunt Bauman’s theoretical framing when he suggests that “moral behaviour is conceivable only in the context of coexistence, of ‘being-with-others,’ that is, a social context” (1989: 180). That is, the claim of life being caught in the lives of others is not simply a metaphysical claim, but more basically, a claim of the ethicality of everyday sociality.
		
	
	
		
			The ethics and intercorporeality of everyday life-trajectories
		
		
			In his recent book Edward Casey (2007) dedicates a chapter to the ethics of the glance as a way of thinking precisely about what an ethics of everyday life might be grounded in. Casey highlights the dynamics and responsiveness of everyday ethical life by, for instance, the way one’s attention is drawn by the sound of someone screaming, or seeing someone unbalanced and about to fall. Such experiences can sometimes draw us outside of ourselves into states of affairs, situations, or to persons we might be able to help. Pretheoretically, the possibility of someone in need of help makes a claim on me; it asks, or maybe even demands, a response from me. Casey also draws attention to another ethical world usually hidden that passes us by in our everyday lives; not merely the world of interior psychological life, but the visible yet barely recognized movements and gestures of care, love, attention, and all the other faint inclinations of life toward the lives of others. Take, for instance, the example of someone holding the door open for another person, or the briefest of smiles as someone walks past another person.
		
		
			One of the ways to develop on Casey’s important intuitions about the ethicality of everyday life is through Erving Goffman’s (2010) acute analyses in Relations in public. In his account of the rules and modes of conduct that govern pedestrians walking down a busy street, Goffman tries to locate the implicit norms and modes by which pedestrians do not continually bump into one another. Goffman argues pedestrians are, through varying forms, in continual communication with other pedestrians: they use glances, feints of the shoulder, or avert the sight of others if they simply want to maintain their own line. The body is used as a medium of expression to allow others on the street to see where one body wants to go (what Goffman calls “body gloss” [2010: 11]) so other bodies can modulate and respond to both avoid a collision and still maintain their own progression down the street.
		
		
			Nick Crossley (1995) and Tim Ingold (2004) both give different expositions of Goffman’s failure to recognize the practical sense (sens practique) the body has of other bodies, achieved not through sight alone, but an embodied, corporeal know-how. Thus, both Crossley and Ingold push for an understanding of social relations not as intersubjective but as intercorporeal. The intercorporeal understanding of the sociality of walking down the street also moves the story from rules and codes to bodily dispositions and inclinations that expose there is a direct interrelation between my body and the other’s body. As important as these critiques are, we can go further. It is not simply the case that we do not often bump into other bodies when walking down the street simply because of the social rules, norms, or practical sense we have of other bodies. More basically, the failure to move out of the way of a person making their way in the world is an ethical failure to recognize the other and grant them the tiny space they require to pass through. These acts of opening one’s body to allow someone through, or the slowing of one’s gait to create an opening for a passerby, are, more often than not, done with little attention or thought; prereflexively, the fluctuations of rhythms and tempos of one’s body, the continual adjustments of one’s body in relation to the bodies and lives of others, ground the possibility of others being able to make their way in the world. It is the complex weaving of intentionalities, bodies, and lives through the lives of others in the everyday which must be thought of in much more ethical terms (cf. Al-Mohammad 2012).
		
		
			These theoretical elaborations are ones that resonate with my own experiences in Iraq where I was continually drawn to how persons who seemingly have little or no relation to one another, through their everyday practices, behaviors, and the paths they took to get to various places, their lives entangled with others precisely through these barely perceptible gestures and movements. If I turn to my first few days in Basra, I remember one occasion wandering around the edges of the center looking to buy some fruit to share with the hotel workers later that evening. I found a fruit and vegetable stall on my way that seemed to be run by a relatively young woman no older than in her mid-twenties. As I was looking at the fruit deciding what to buy, the stall owner screamed, shouted, and then started to insult me. I was mortified. I felt embarrassment and anger at this public humiliation. I was new to Iraq and did not know how to react. I walked away hurriedly as if I had done something wrong.
		
		
			Weeks later I was walking with Abu-Hibba. Even in those early days it felt as if we were close friends so I would walk with him whenever he had a chore; on this occasion Abu-Hibba wanted to buy some sweets for his children. As we were walking and talking I could see we were nearing the stall where the woman shouted at me. I asked Abu-Hibba where we were going. He pointed to the stall. I told him of what had happened to me; surely he would not shop from a place that had been so horrible to me? Abu-Hibba ignored me and told me to wait nearby and he would return in a few moments.
		
		
			I was irritated with Abu-Hibba for ignoring my protestations—what sort of friend was he to ignore my humiliation at the hand of the person working behind the stall? I had worked myself into quite a state by the time Abu-Hibba had returned. I unleashed an initial volley of indignation hoping to arouse some contrition. Abu-Hibba told me to stop being so silly. I was stunned. After a brief moment of awkward silence he leaned toward me and told me to look closely at the stall. I saw the same woman who had shouted at me; I also noticed some young children. Abu-Hibba told me to look closer. I made out an old man who sat on a low stool or crate behind the stall, almost hidden against the wall that the stall rested on to its side. That was her father. Abu-Hibba told me the young woman looks after her whole family. He told me of how her father had been beaten badly years previously and had suffered brain damage, and how her mother had died when she was still a teenager. For more than a decade the young woman was both provider and carer. I found out later that the young children working on the stall were orphans and children living on the streets. The woman who ran the stall took as many of the children she could and would feed, clothe, and house them.
		
		
			I had not noticed any of this. Abu-Hibba went on: “We have lived through the years of her troubles, and what she has done for her family. We have seen how many young lives depend on her…so, whenever I, or others like me can, we try to buy something from her stall…. She shouts at all of us…she’s tired…. People try to rob and cheat her daily…years ago she was shot at to intimidate her in the hope she would give up the profitable stall.” It was not only Abu-Hibba, but many more, whose daily grocery shopping or meanderings through the streets that happened to take them to that particular stall and indulgently buy some fruit or sweets for the household, or for some friends or neighbors.
		
		
			Moreover, it was not this one stall but many, which Basrans frequented in a small gesture to keep a family in business, or to stand with them against intimidation. Outside a formalized system of caring for others, Basrans in their everyday trajectories responded as much as they were able or inclined, to the suffering and needs of others—sometimes even anonymous others. However, to return to the Goffmanian picture of lives making their way amid the lives of others, it should not be overlooked that Iraqis do bump into others in the everyday. Sometimes through neglect and indifference, other times because of acts of petty violence, and sometimes even through outright violence. Abu-Hibba and other Iraqis are not mythical or heroic figures; many help the people they can, but also, at times, they can be indifferent to the pain and suffering of others. Nevertheless, in not marking off the ethical as a separate or partial domain, but as intrinsic to the ways in which lives make their way through, against, and with others, an ethics of the rough ground is one that is not a moral perfectionism, but grounded in the ambiguous, complex, and vacillating inclinations of life toward the lives of others (cf. Das forthcoming).
		
	
	
		
			Conclusion
		
		
			The ability of Iraqis to survive the two recent gulf wars, the crippling twelve years of sanctions, and the violence and deprivation of life after the invasion points to some of the courage, relentless battling, and “talent for life” (Scheper-Hughes 2008) it has taken to maintain one’s own life, and those one cares for and looks after. It is in these complex entanglements and threading of lives through the lives of others that we have tried to think through in much more ethical terms.
		
		
			At the heart of this article is an attempt to move accounts about life in postinvasion Iraq beyond destruction and collapse to understandings of the ways in which Iraqis in their everyday forms of dwelling are not only making and remaking a world for themselves, but also each other amid tremendous daily pressures and struggles. This continual weaving and reweaving of the lines of life through the lines of others come with no guarantees. Many Iraqis have died needlessly when even the most basic of provisions or help could have saved them. An understanding of ethics proposed in this article does not exclude some of the callousness, violence, and indifference of everyday life, hence the rough ground of the ethics described throughout. Nor does violence and terror, however, threaten the very fabric of the ethics and forms of dwelling discussed. Rather, an ethics of the rough ground is one that does not oppose violence to the mundane, or the ethical to “evil”; instead, it focuses on the complex corporeality and vacillations of the inclinations and movements of lives toward others.
		
		
			As outlined in Goffman’s analysis of pedestrians, the possibility of others making their way in the world, in some small way is contingent on one’s ability, and even willingness, to grant the other some of the space one inhabits with a faint gesture, change of gait, or posture. What we have insisted throughout is that it must not be overlooked how the possibilities and limitations of life itself are distributed along the lives of others. Furthermore, the distribution of and overlappings of lives must be taken as a provocation to think of life and its everyday forms as an ongoing and precarious ethical struggle. That is, ethics is not something merely granted to life and its everyday; it is both concealed and explicit in the everyday negotiations, challenges, and strivings for life and voice in postinvasion Iraq.
		
	
	
		
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			L’éthique et le « terrain accidenté » du quotidien : chevauchements de vies en Iraq après l’invasion
		
		
			Résumé : Au delà des histoires d’effondrement, de dévastation et d’incertitude éthique reflétées dans l’histoire récente de l’Iraq, nous y trouvons aussi des récits de connexions, de relations et d’enchevêtrement de vies, au nom de la famille et de l’amitié. Des comportements tels que l’affection, l’attention, l’entretien et même l’amour de l’autre n’ont pas encore été intégrés aux modes d’écriture et de réflexion sur la vie suite à l’invasion. Dans cet article, les auteurs éclairent la manière dont la vie des Iraquiens est non seulement liée aux formes et structures d’obligations tribales et de sectarisme, de violence et de destruction par la terreur, mais aussi liée aux « terrains accidentés » des rencontres et affaires quotidiennes. Ils affirment que c’est justement au sein de ces connexions et relations de vies et d’intentionnalités que réside l’éthique intercorporelle du « terrain accidenté » du quotidien. Celle-ci peut être comprise non seulement par l’ouverture à la douleur, la souffrance, la joie et l’ennui de l’autre, mais aussi par l’émergence du soin et du souci pour l’autre, et les formes d’entretien et d’épuisement de ceux-ci.
		
		
			&gt;Hayder Al-Mohammad is an anthropologist who works on Iraq and the Middle East.
		
		
			Daniela Peluso is a cultural anthropologist who over the last two decades has conducted fieldwork in Lowland South America, the United States and the United Kingdom. Her current research addresses workplaces practices and ethics of the everyday. She has been involved in various local efforts on issues relating to health, gender, indigenous urbanization, and land-rights and works in close collaboration with indigenous and local organizations in Bolivia and Peru. She received her PhD from columbia University and is a Senior Lecturer in social anthropology at the University of Kent.
		
	
	
		
			___________________
		
		
			1. This article is based on Hayder Al-Mohammad’s fieldwork in Iraq, conducted between 2005 and 2012. Daniela Peluso and Hayder Al-Mohammad worked together on the writing of this article.
		
		
			2. In reaction to a perceived uncritical use of categories such as “ethics” and “morality” •without clear analytical distinction between the two, Jarret Zigon proposes the “distinction between morality as the unreflective mode of being-in-the-world and ethics as a tactic performed in the moment of the breakdown of the ethical dilemma” (2007: 137). In another article Zigon talks of the “ethical moment” in contradistinction to “morality,” which “is a moment of conscious reflection and dialogue with one’s own moral dispositions, as well as with the other two moralities, it is also a moment of freedom, creativity, and emergence” (2009: 83). The equation here of “conscious reflection” with “freedom” and the implication that “dispositions” are constraining or limiting is not particularly helpful and falls into an uncomfortable metaphysical logic. We may well arrive at conceptual clarity with Zigon’s distinction but this clarity comes at the expense of understanding and coming to grips with the heterogeneous phenomena of ethical life. Thus, to add to the list of what an “ethics of the rough ground” is not, it is also not an account of conscious reflection or how choices for “appropriate” actions are made.
		
		
			3. Contrary to classic notions of ethics as somehow deriving from a specifically “human” nature, such as the one to be found in Kant’s ([1788] 2002) Critique of practical reason, an ethics of the rough ground is one that is founded on precisely the lack of a uniting or unifying nature. Agamben puts it thus:
		
		
			
				The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible—there would only be tasks to be done. (1993: 42)
			
		
		
			4. Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. “ethike” and “ethos.”
		
		
			5. See Bisset (2003) for a conceptual and empirical debunking of the discourses of “surgical airstrikes” and “precision guided” weapons.
		
		
			6. In his speech on February 1, 1991, President George H. W. Bush declared the “Iraqis need to take matters into their own hands and force their dictatorial leader to step aside” (Dannreuther 1992: 63). Exactly one month later, on March 1, 1991, the uprisings broke out with many Iraqis thinking they would receive financial and military support from the United states, which ultimately, they did not.
		
		
			7. In 1991, an article in The New York Times that covered the UN Ahtisaari Report explains that the US administration’s view at the time was that “by making life uncomfortable for the Iraqi people it [i.e., sanctions] would eventually encourage them to remove President Saddam Hussein from power.” (Lewis 1991:1)
		
		
			8. Agamben, writing on the ontology of friendship within Aristotole’s Nicomachean ethics, picks out the ethicality of the entwinement of beings and sensation when he writes that there is a
		
		
			
				sensation, specifically a human one, that takes the form of a joint sensation, or a con-sent (synaisthanesthai) with the existence of the friend. Friendship is the instance of this “con-sentiment” of the existence of the friend within the sentiment of existence itself. But this means that friendship has an ontological and political status. The sensation of being is, in fact, always already both divided and “con-divided” [con-divisa, shared] and friendship is the name of this “con-division.” This sharing has nothing whatsoever to do with the modern chimera of intersubjectivity, the relationship between subjects. Rather, being itself is divided here, it is nonidentical to itself, and so the I and the friend are the two faces, or the two poles, of this con-division or sharing. (Agamben 2009: 34, emphasis in original)
			
		
		
			Through Aristotle’s and Agamben’s words we get a sense of the metaphysical, and also corporeal and sensual intertwining of lives with other lives.</p></body>
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						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>09</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2021</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2021</year></pub-date>
			<volume>11</volume>
			<issue seq="204">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau11.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2021 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2021</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1590" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1590/3774" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1590/3775" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In the anthropology of ethics there has been a growing interest in the concept of freedom, defined as the tool of consciousness that enables people to reflect on themselves and their circumstances, and make decisions about what they ought to do. The benefit of understanding freedom as a grounded ethical practice is that it allows us to appreciate how people constitute themselves through the choices they make. What this obscures, however, is an understanding of how freedom figures in situations where people no longer feel the need to consider what they ought to do and where choice becomes redundant. Through an exploration of nonviolent action in the 2011 Yemeni revolution, this essay proposes a notion of freedom as liberation from moral choice, where choice is a burden. It concludes by reconsidering the extent to which ethical thought can adequately account for the varieties of human freedom in different ethnographic contexts.</p></abstract>
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				<datestamp>2025-10-25T15:25:25Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1952</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/736367</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Disentangling entangled amaXhosa manhood in psychosis: A cross-cultural psychiatric case study, Cape Town, South Africa</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Vivian</surname>
						<given-names>Lauraine</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Nomngcoyiya</surname>
						<given-names>Thanduxolo</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>08</day>
				<month>08</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="113">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1952" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1952/4496" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1952/4497" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Recognizing how the amaXhosa people of South Africa value well-functioning circumcision rituals, our paper interrogates one Xhosa man’s coming-of-age entanglement in psychosis. In 2001, Xolile was admitted to the psychiatric ward of Valkenberg Hospital, Cape Town, suffering with a brief psychotic disorder. Its onset came days after leaving seclusion; triggers included his father’s absence and failing his university exams. We describe how cross-cultural therapy, in particular, Dr Soga’s voice, as a psychiatrist and amaXhosa diviner, embedded his emerging consciousness, and aided him to disentangle from psychosis. Xolile did not return to university; instead, he embraced his Xhosa manhood to work in this city. His challenges mirror those across this cultural landscape. Our interpretive study sits at this unique interface, biomedical versus cultural domains, to advance a theoretical perspective about a linked phenomenon that affects not only amaXhosa engendering, but comparatively how we secure safe rites of passage for youth into adulthood.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1296</identifier>
				<datestamp>2019-11-20T17:34:11Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">698411</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/698411</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Faith in anthropology</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Faith in anthropology</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Suhr</surname>
						<given-names>Christian</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Aarhus University</aff>
					<email>suhr@cas.au.dk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Willerslev</surname>
						<given-names>Rane</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>The National Museum of Denmark</aff>
					<email>Rane.Willerslev@natmus.dk</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>21</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2018</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2018</year></pub-date>
			<volume>8</volume>
			<issue seq="405">1-2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau8.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2018 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2018</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to rejoinders to Willerslev, Rane, and Christian Suhr. 2018 “Is there a place for faith in anthropology? Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 65–78.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Response to rejoinders to Willerslev, Rane, and Christian Suhr. 2018 “Is there a place for faith in anthropology? Religion, reason, and the ethnographer’s divine revelation.” Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 8 (1): 65–78.</p></abstract-trans>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Unable to see the diagnosis: Harmed bodies and oil extraction in Peruvian Amazonia</article-title>
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			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Guzmán-Gallegos</surname>
						<given-names>María Antonieta</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>18</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2023</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="211">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.1</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This article discusses two distinct notions of harm, wakllichishka and oil harm, and two distinct ways of shaping bodies. Following postcolonial and decolonial insights, I develop an approach that deploys two Indigenous concepts—wakllichishka, and not being able to see the diagnosis—as valid tools of analysis. Kichwa people in northern Peruvian Amazonia use both to analyze the condition of being harmed, illness, and the possibility of recovering. While wakllichishka rests on understandings and practices that assume that bodies are transformable and the locus of human and more-than-human sociality and agency, not being able to see the diagnosis reveals how biomedical and toxicological practices enact bodies as indicators of unspecific conditions and environmental degradation, and as incurable. Using Kichwa analytics shows the situatedness of these practices and counteracts a common disposition to undertake a colonizing reduction that defines our own categories as the only ones adequate for analysis of the consequences of extractive capitalism.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/990</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-11-09T16:49:15Z</datestamp>
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				<article-title>Governing the souls of Chinese modernity</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Governing the souls of Chinese modernity</trans-title>
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					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Kipnis</surname>
						<given-names>Andrew</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>The Chinese University of Hong Kong
The Australian National University</aff>
					<email>andrew.kipnis@anu.edu.au</email>
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					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
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						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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					<name>
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						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
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				<day>07</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2017</year>
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			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date>
			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="303">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Kipnis</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2017</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.2.023" />
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Philippe Descola argues that human societies can be categorized by the ways in which they utilize broad assumptions about interiority and physicality, where interiority refers to something similar to what Edward Tylor and James Frazer meant by soul . In Descola’s scheme, traditional Chinese culture, which gives play to infinite variability in both interiority and physicality, is strongly “analogist.” In contrast, Descola defines modern, Western societies as “naturalist.” We moderns see nature or physicality as universally fixed, but culture or interiority as variable. Contemporary China is rapidly modernizing and scientizing. In Descola’s terms, its culture should be transitioning from an analogist one to a naturalist one. Through an examination of practices of memorialization and funerary ritual in urban China as well as Chinese Communist Party attempts to steer the evolution of these practices in reaction to “modernity,” this essay attempts to tease out what is modern about the conceptions of soul implicit in contemporary Chinese dealings with death.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Philippe Descola argues that human societies can be categorized by the ways in which they utilize broad assumptions about interiority and physicality, where interiority refers to something similar to what Edward Tylor and James Frazer meant by soul . In Descola’s scheme, traditional Chinese culture, which gives play to infinite variability in both interiority and physicality, is strongly “analogist.” In contrast, Descola defines modern, Western societies as “naturalist.” We moderns see nature or physicality as universally fixed, but culture or interiority as variable. Contemporary China is rapidly modernizing and scientizing. In Descola’s terms, its culture should be transitioning from an analogist one to a naturalist one. Through an examination of practices of memorialization and funerary ritual in urban China as well as Chinese Communist Party attempts to steer the evolution of these practices in reaction to “modernity,” this essay attempts to tease out what is modern about the conceptions of soul implicit in contemporary Chinese dealings with death.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>China, death rituals, memorialization, Descola, soul, governing</kwd>
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	<body><p>Governing the souls of Chinese modernity






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Andrew B. Kipnis. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.2.023
Governing the souls of Chinese modernity
Andrew B. KIPNIS, Chinese University of Hong Kong and Australian National University


Philippe Descola argues that human societies can be categorized by the ways in which they utilize broad assumptions about interiority and physicality, where interiority refers to something similar to what Edward Tylor and James Frazer meant by soul. In Descola’s scheme, traditional Chinese culture, which gives play to infinite variability in both interiority and physicality, is strongly “analogist.” In contrast, Descola defines modern, Western societies as “naturalist.” We moderns see nature or physicality as universally fixed, but culture or interiority as variable. Contemporary China is rapidly modernizing and scientizing. In Descola’s terms, its culture should be transitioning from an analogist one to a naturalist one. Through an examination of practices of memorialization and funerary ritual in urban China as well as Chinese Communist Party attempts to steer the evolution of these practices in reaction to “modernity,” this essay attempts to tease out what is modern about the conceptions of soul implicit in contemporary Chinese dealings with death.
Keywords: China, death rituals, memorialization, Descola, soul, governing


In 1871, Edward Tylor (1871: vol 2, p.1) argued that belief in souls derived from visions of the dead seen in dreams. For “primitive man,” Tylor saw this belief as universal. James Frazer likewise saw primitive belief in the soul as universal, but linked the phenomenon to the experience of death:

If an animal lives and moves, it can only be, [the savage] thinks, because there is a little animal inside which moves it: if man lives and moves it can only be because he has a little animal or man inside who moves him. The animal inside the animal, the man inside the man, is the soul. And as the activity of an animal or man is explained by the presence of the soul, so the repose of sleep or death is explained by its absence; sleep or [218]trance being the temporary, death being the permanent absence of the soul. (Frazer 1978 [1911]:83)

Jumping forward a century, in a self-conscious revival of a much older style of anthropology, Philippe Descola argues that humans everywhere interpret the world through the categories of interiority and physicality, where interiority references more or less the same characteristics that Frazer and Tylor saw as soul: mind, consciousness, and intentionality (Descola 2013:116). For Descola, the categories of interiority and physicality derive simply from the universal experience of being an intentional subject with a body.
Descola’s scheme discards the explicit evolutionism of Tylor and Frazer. Western moderns also utilize ideas about interiority when identifying other beings as similar or dis-similar. But the manner in which they do so is unique. As “naturalists” in Descola’s fourfold ontological scheme, moderns see physicality or nature as having universal laws, but see interiority as variable. In the naturalist imaginary, other humans see the world through the lenses of different cultures, while animals have more limited interior capabilities. Nonmodern humans use three other modalities to categorize the beings of the world. Animists see all beings as having similar interiorities but differing physicalities; analogists see physicality and interiority as equally variant, while totemists see physicality and interiority as being shared by all. Though not explicitly evolutionary, the four varieties of society coalesce into distinct groupings: those who hunt and gather are overwhelmingly animists and totemists; those who farm and herd domesticated animals are analogists, and those living in industrial societies dominated by scientific thinking are naturalists. Descola further argues that historical transformations from one ontological mode to another often accompany but are not necessarily caused by “mutations in technological systems” (2013: 366), and he explores how the domestication of animals led to a transformation from animism to analogism among caribou herders in Siberia.
In this article I focus on the transformation of death ritual and memorialization in a modernizing, urbanizing, and scientizing China as well as the conscious attempts by Chinese communists to modernize the treatment of the soul in death ritual and memorialization. While remaining agnostic regarding debates about the origins of human notions of soul, I see death, death ritual, and memorialization as important moments for investigating the significance of soul to human society. Death is when the body loses its animating force; grief involves working through dreams and memories of the deceased; and memorialization necessitates immortalizing something of the spirit of the departed.
My use of the English term soul as a comparative category (as opposed to interiorities or a transliteration of a related Chinese term) is a deliberatively provocative act. It goes to the heart of the poetics and politics of this article. Three implications of the word are particularly useful. First, it bridges a religious/secular, modern/premodern, analogic/naturalist divide. Soul is often used in modern/secular contexts as in “soul music” or in the titles of scores of books on psychoanalysis, but its links to medieval Christianity resonate. Second, and relatedly, soul uses its connection to the premodern sacred to connote the relative permanence, power, and importance of the interiority it designates, even when referring to secular and modern entities. Tampering with someone’s soul is a more serious affair than manipulating their [219]“spirits,” which might be high or low on a given day because of a variety of factors. While useful for comparing agencies across all types of human culture, the term interiorities is too bland for this article’s political exploration of the blending of analogic and naturalist thought. Interiority lacks soul. Finally, soul allows me to invoke the work of Tylor and Frazer. The connotations of the word soul illuminate both my interpretation of Descola’s scheme and my critique of the ideology surrounding the political regulation of funerary practice in China.
If China is seen as a country that is modernizing—that is transforming from a place in which the majority of people are farmers who live in villages to one in which the majority live in cities and work in a diversity of manufacturing and service sector jobs, that is undergoing a demographic transition, an increase in the number of years children spend in schools, and a rapid time-space compression—then this modernization must be understood as recombinant process (Kipnis 2016). That is to say, rather than seeing modernization as a switch from one thing to another, we must examine how aspects of the premodern are reconfigured in modern arrangements. In Descola’s terms, we should see how the pieces of an analogic culture are restructured with the intrusion of institutions that favor naturalistic assumptions.
One question raised by Descola’s scheme is whether modern transformations require a total shift. The scheme implies that differing ontologies are incompatible with one another and that a gestalt-like switch must occur at some point in a history of a gradual accumulation of naturalist assumptions. Descola portrays such a process in his depiction of the transformation of an animist system into an analogic one (2013: 365–77). Poststructuralists, however, would argue that humans are perfectly capable of harboring two or more conflicting and possibly contradictory schemas at once,1 and contemporary Chinese cultures of memorialization do mix analogic and naturalist ontologies.
Many of the critical readings of Descola published in this journal have emphasized the rigidity of his structural scheme and the difficulty of illuminating cases of ontological mixture this rigidity creates (see especially, Feuchtwang 2014; Kapferer 2014; Lenclud 2014). Descola himself wrestles with this problem in his response to these essays (Descola 2014). At a theoretical level, accepting the blending of analogic and naturalist thinking undermines overly logocentric and ontological readings of Descola. That is to say, if humans can blend contradictory ways of thinking in their actions, then the logics of a given scheme are considerably less binding on human action than structuralist thought might suggest and structural assumptions are in this sense less “ontological.” Human practice itself rather than ideational schemes become generative. But even if naturalist and analogic ontologies can be blended, I still find these categories to vividly illuminate both the range of actions that take place in contemporary urban Chinese death rituals and the ideological debates surrounding them. In the context of the essays published in this journal, my use of Descola’s theory to construct a political critique is more noteworthy than any criticism I have of the theory itself.
According to Descola, in analogic ontologies, where physicalities and interiorities both differ, resemblance becomes the primary method of creating order. [220]Elaborate hierarchies of beings are seen to exist, but resemblances among microcosms and macrocosms enable ritual specialists to grasp the universe. Socially complex kin systems and long genealogies of ancestors emerge alongside relatively simple systems of “humors,” like yin and yang, which are used to manage the huge flux of singularities.2 Many aspects of premodern China’s cultures of memorialization mark it as analogic. Its cult of the ancestors, its hierarchical view of the relationship between ancestors and descendants, its complex practice of ancestral sacrifice, and its detailed system for locating and orienting graves to bring prosperity to future generations all fit Descola’s depiction of analogic societies.3
China’s funerary culture differs radically from animist and totemic ones. Descola argues, “It is impossible not to notice that sacrifice is present in regions dominated by analogical ontologies (in particular Brahmanic India, West Africa, ancient China, where it was above all associated with political functions, the Andean zone, and pre-Columbian Mexico), whereas it is virtually unknown in totemic Australia and the regions that are, par excellence, animist, namely Amazonia and subartic America” (2013: 228). Sacrifice, for Descola, whether to heaven, a God, or one’s ancestors is a way of creating a connection across a hierarchical divide. Animist and totemic societies are not hierarchical and thus find no need for sacrifice. In addition, animists and totemic societies typically lack significant regimes of property and patrimony. Where there is land to pass down to descendants, regimes of ancestral cults and unilineal descent become important. In analogic societies like premodern China, sons cannot inherit until they execute funerary rites (2013: 330). In Amazonia, there are neither ancestors nor significant memorialization (2013: 332).[221]
A wide range of Chinese terms refer to various forms of interiority that might be translated as soul. These include but are not limited to jing (精), shen (神), hun (魂), po (魄), gui (鬼), ling (灵), and various combinations thereof. There are gods, ghosts, and ancestors of many varieties. There are the three hun and seven po of Taoism. In this article, I make no attempt to make sense of all of these distinctions except to note that Descola’s depiction of the multiplicity of beings and agencies in the analogic imagination successfully summarizes the situation.
More modern and perhaps more naturalist in their implications are the compounds linghun and jingshen. Linghun is typically translated as soul and jingshen as spirit. As in English, the term linghun/soul connotes an entity more powerful and permanent than jingshen/spirit. But unlike English, the terms can reflect a modernist critique of religious “superstition.” Linghun often implies something supernatural while jingshen is used in secular phrases—like the spirit of Lei Feng (i.e., a spirit of hard work and self-sacrifice),4 or “that blouse is (makes you look) spirited” (neige yifu ting jingshen). My use of soul as a comparative term runs against and is meant to critique this particular distinction in Chinese. I justify my translation with a phrase from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda: “the soul of the Party” (dangde linghun). If linghun designates something that is supernatural, then how is it that the chief architect of secularist, antireligious ideology in China today credits itself (as well as various aspects of its being, like Marxist thought, or the socialist legal system) with having one? The answer is that Party propagandists mirror the poetics of the English language by using linghun’s sacred/religious connotations to imply that there is something permanent and powerful about the interiority that animates the Party. The Party’s critique of superstition in death ritual, and the related connotations of the jingshen/linghun distinction, reflect its desire to state that only the Party has an animating interiority important enough to be designated as a soul. By using soul as a catchall comparative term for divergent forms of animating interiority, I reject this particular claim.
Because of limitations of space, Descola omits regimes of temporality from his analysis (2013: 114), but conceptions of time are important to practices of memorialization. As Jason Danely defines it, memorialization involves “practices that recognize the mutual interdependence of the living and the spirits of the dead” (2014: 3). By definition, such practice requires positing that the spirit of the deceased persists in time beyond the demise of the body. In both analogic and naturalist societies, memorialization often implies that the soul or spirit of the deceased is permanent, immortal, or transcendent. For example, in China, as in many places, memorial markers are carved or set in stone, representing their relative permanence. In premodern China, emperors often erected large stone tombs for themselves; over the twentieth century, the use of stone gravestones spread across many sectors of society, and in the twenty-first century, the majority of the deceased have their names carved on a tombstone (what Thomas Laqueur [2015] call necronominalism; see also Kipnis [forthcoming]). Funerary rites likewise invoke a world where the soul exists forever. When donating flowers or giving a gift to the family at or before a funeral, Chinese urbanites will often have a couplet written for them to express their relation to the deceased and to ask for the soul to last forever, such as “Magnificent Uncle (father’s younger brother) last forever, your nephew, Kean” (叔叔大人千古，侄儿柯安；Shushu Daren Qiangu, Zhier Kean). The fact of death, however, forces us to recognize that human bodies are transient. Memorialization thus often involves a linking of tropes of transcendence with experience of transience. Whether done explicitly or implicitly, narratives that link the two [222]modes of temporality dominate interaction with the dead. In modern societies, particular functional and political logics surround these narratives, and analogic societies provide many cultural resources for these narratives to draw upon.

Death ritual in China today
As with most things in China, the state plays an important role in contemporary Chinese death. It promotes and often demands cremation, and it attempts to outlaw or discourage what it considers to be feudal practices. As is the case with the birth-planning policy, however, one could debate the extent to which it is mandating or encouraging practices that would anyway emerge in the course of modernization, without heavy-handed state intervention.5 Throughout East Asia, urbanization and the resulting decrease in space for burials as well as decreases in the sizes of households and kinship networks, have resulted in increases in rates of cremation and less lavish funerals.
Funerary practice differs across China with rural/urban differences highlighted by my interviewees. Rural people often have access to land on which to bury their dead without purchasing plots in graveyards, and rural people are more likely to bury dead bodies without cremation. While these differences are important, antirural prejudices often emerge in urban castigations of rural funerary practice. While rural people sometimes resist cremation, it is also true that many poor rural areas lack adequate crematoriums. In China as whole, between 1999 and 2003, as the number of crematoriums grew from 1,318 to 1,515, the overall cremation rate increased from 42 to 53 percent. In large urban areas and wealthy eastern provinces, nearly 90 percent of bodies are cremated (Chen and Chen 2008:265).
In large cities, non-Muslim families must cremate bodies at a state-run crematorium. Most people will hold a “farewell ceremony” (告别会；gaobiehui) just before cremation. The body is displayed in an open casket and there are opportunities for speaking, bowing to the deceased, and consoling immediate family members. The body is then cremated and the family receives the ashes in a cinerary casket (骨灰盒；guhuihe). The casket is most often buried in a graveyard. A minority chooses to scatter the ashes at sea or in a river, or dispose of the ashes in some other manner, but the ashes must be disposed through a state-sanctioned process. The private disposal of ashes without state approval is illegal. Urban funeral homes are usually located at the same place as the crematorium and are always run by the same state agency (the Ministry of Civil Affairs [民政局；Minzheng Ju]) that runs the crematoriums. The Ministry runs many urban graveyards as well, though in some urban areas there are also privately managed graveyards, run by large corporations that have been approved by the Ministry. Illegal and quasi-legal graveyards (often run [223]by villages on their own land but quietly opened to outsiders) have less expensive burial plots, but exist under the threat of state demolition.
Rituals may be held at many points during the funerary process and a wide variety of specialists can be employed. There can be rituals at the home or hospital where the person dies; rituals when the body is transported from the point of death to the funeral home; rituals when close friends, neighbors, and relatives come to visit a home altar for the deceased and pay respects to close family members before the funeral itself. After the farewell ceremony, there can be rituals when the cinerary casket is buried, banquets for close family members who attended the funeral, rituals marking various periods after the death, and rituals of grave sweeping during annual visitations at Qing Ming (April 4 or 5), the winter solstice, and certain days marked by the Chinese lunar calendar. These rituals are usually held at graves but can also be conducted at temples, mosques, and churches. In large urban areas, small private businesses offer to arrange the entire funerary process, securing death certificates and necessary government paperwork, arranging appointments for cremation and the farewell meeting at the funeral home, writing obituaries, and setting up an altar (灵堂；lingtang) in the home where guests can be received before the funeral, recommending graveyards, and providing introductions to whatever ritual specialists the family would like to employ. These entrepreneurs often advertise their businesses as a “one-stop dragon” (一条龙；yi tiao long) service because they cover the process from start to finish.
While religious specialists may be used in death rituals, in the large cities of Nanjing and Jinan, my best guess (based on interviewing one-stop dragon entrepreneurs) is that in over 95 percent of funerals, they are not. Most families have a secular master of ceremonies at both the farewell meeting and when the cinerary casket is buried. However, especially at the burial, the master of ceremonies often conducts a ritual with elements derived from a more analogic past. Families generally follow the master of ceremony’s directions, without commenting on whether aspects of the ceremony might be considered secular, religious, or superstitious. Families exert more agency when they receive guests at the home altar or visit the grave after the funeral proper. They often bring sacrificial offerings, flowers, and spirit money while speaking aloud to the deceased at the grave.
State regulation of this convoluted process takes many contradictory forms. Some practices, including the burying of uncremated bodies, are simply banned. The city of Nanjing recently also prohibited the use of firecrackers (to scare away unwanted ghosts). Such bans, and the lengths taken to enforce them, vary by jurisdiction. Members of propaganda bureaus often write books and papers encouraging the simplification of funerary ritual and the ending of all superstitious and religious practices, which would practically end all of the activities described above. Government agencies sometimes arrange funerals for their former employees, or give the family members of the deceased some monetary assistance and practical guidance. Party cadres in charge of such work advocate simple funerals. Other government agencies (typically the community office [社区；shequ]) arrange basic funerals for impoverished households or for elderly who do not have relatives. The funeral homes, graveyards, and crematoriums run by the Ministry of Civil Affairs are in a more contradictory position. On the one hand, they too are supposed to discourage superstition and promote “civilized” funerals. Very often, as part of the [224]government, they must accept limits on the prices for their most basic services such as cremations and burials in collective plots without gravestones. On the other hand, they are responsible for their own profits and losses, and are constantly on the lookout for ways to offer extra services. Some of the resulting pricing strategies are quite contradictory. For example, in Nanjing, rental rates for a small farewell meeting room are only 100 yuan (less than $20) per hour, but the price to decorate the room with layers of flowers wreaths range from 3,000–50,000 yuan.6
Tensions over funerals pervade the Party itself. As powerful people with access to state-funded funerals, the families of high-ranking cadres often hold some of the more lavish funerals in China. On the other hand, as exemplars of Party policy, they sometimes come under pressure to hold relatively simple funerals. Since Xi Jinping came to power and began his anticorruption drive in 2013, funerals for deceased Party cadres have become less spectacular. In Nanjing, funeral home workers told me that spending on the funerals for mid- to high- ranking cadres decreased from about 200,000 yuan in 2012 to about 50,000 yuan in 2014 (this price would not include a gravesite; an average funeral in Nanjing cost in the range of 10,000–20,000 yuan that year). In 2016, the Party further tightened regulations about the family rituals of Party members. In the city of Harbin, for example, funerals for the parents of party cadres were supposed to be limited to 100 people, all of whom must be relatives (Piao 2016; Zhao 2016).
While urban funeral homes have the capacity to hold large funerals for prestigious people, both one-stop dragon entrepreneurs and workers at state funeral homes in Nanjing and Jinan told me that the average size of urban funerals has decreased over the past decade. They suggested several reasons for this decrease. First, people are living longer. Extremely old people have fewer friends because some of their friends have already passed away, while others cannot leave their homes to attend a funeral. Second, as society has become more mobile, people are less likely to be close friends with their neighbors and are more likely to have relatives who live in other cities.
But some funeral workers felt that the size of funerals was not decreasing in rural areas. In the rural areas within the boundaries of Nanjing, families must cremate the bodies of their loved ones before burying the cinerary casket in a village graveyard. But other than the cremation itself, rural families have very little to do with the state-run funeral home. After death, they keep the body at home (in a refrigerated casket if necessary) for between three and seven days, while friends and relatives drop in to pay their respects. Everyone who comes gives a (cash) gift and is treated to a banquet. A one-stop dragon entrepreneur told me of a rural funeral where he arranged for over 100 banquet tables (enough for 1,000 people) and kept them in service for five days straight. He said that several thousand people consumed more than five thousand meals. The deceased had five children, all of whom were involved in successful businesses and had widespread social networks. But he also argued that even rural families without widespread networks would host banquets for all of the people in their village who were willing to attend, so even small rural funerals were larger than average urban ones. Although mobility [225]has increased across both rural and urban areas, rural villages, even in peri-urban areas, are more likely to house people who know their neighbors and are related to them. One funeral home worker in a peri-urban state crematorium complained to me, “Rural people don’t spend a penny to purchase our services. In fact, because we have to perform basic cremations at subsidized rates and often provide free cinerary caskets and transportation of the deceased’s body to the crematorium, we spend money on them. But they aren’t poor. They can spend over 100,000 yuan on the banquets and superstitious rituals they carry out in their homes. And even when they spend so much, they often make money after you consider all of the gifts they receive.”
While such accounts of rural funerary practice reflect both a degree of antirural prejudice and situations particular to the peri-urban rural areas around large eastern cities, they do show some of the directions in which differences in funerary practice are evolving across the rural/urban divide. They also speak to the similarities. In both rural and urban areas, the number of people who attend a funeral reflects the social and economic status of the family of the deceased.
Like funerary ritual, urban graveyards are sites of considerable class distinction. One way of identifying an elite graveyard is to examine the prevalence of eco-burials (生态葬；shengtai zang). Eco-burials involve ways of disposing of ashes that use less land than a standard grave with a tombstone, and it is official policy to encourage them. They include wall burials, in which small sections in a high wall are reserved for individual cinerary caskets, with the name of the deceased and the surviving relatives carved in a small piece of stone as if it were a tombstone; vault burials, in which thousands of cinerary caskets are placed in a deep underground vault with a pagoda on top of it, with the names of the deceased etched on the pagoda walls; and tree burials, in which the biodegradable cinerary caskets are buried in front of a tree with no marker. In most graveyards, very few people purchase eco-burial sites. In the most prestigious graveyards, however, many people purchase eco-burial sites, even though they cost several times the price of a regular gravesite at a less prestigious graveyard. Those who choose such burials explain their choice in terms of burying their relatives in a “good neighborhood.” Graveyard employees said that willingness to purchase eco-burial sites reveals the heightened consciousness and high “quality” (素质；suzhi) of the people who choose to bury their relatives there.
Some prestigious graveyards used to be sites reserved for high-ranking state cadres and national martyrs (烈士；lieshi). They have been recently opened up to anyone willing to pay a high price for a gravesite. Others were developed in the past decade or so, but managed to establish themselves as elite after the managers successfully offered free burial plots to the families of various political leaders, celebrated entrepreneurs, and famous entertainers. Still other graveyards became elite after earning the reputation of having a location with particularly favorable feng shui (geomancy). But once a graveyard is established as exceptional, the high prices it can charge for its burial sites will keep out the masses.
Elite graveyards often segregate their burial plots into sections for people from different walks of life. One section, for example, may be reserved for military men while another is reserved for cultural elites. Tombstones in such graveyards often give information about the career of the deceased, listing major accomplishments [226]and sometimes including carvings or etchings of something from the deceased’s professional life—a guitar for a musician or a book for an author. In contrast, tombstones in nonelite graveyards mostly display information about the familial connections of the deceased—the names of the family members to be buried together, the names of the surviving family members who purchased the gravestone and their relationship to the deceased, and occasionally homages to the deceased for being a loving mother, a caring father, or a devoted grandmother, or a cross if the deceased was a Christian.
Yu Hua’s novel The seventh day7 depicts seven days of events from the perspective of the soul of a recently deceased man. He attends his own funeral, attempts to understand the cause of his death, and chases up the mysteries of his childhood. The novel posits that seven days is the period after death during which the soul can clearly perceive events in the human world and travel freely in search of answers. The novel sarcastically details all the forms of social hierarchy that are imposed on death. Most souls wait for their bodies to be cremated for long periods in uncomfortable waiting rooms with hard plastic seats. But VIPs enjoy shorter waits in comfortable lounges with leather sofas. Yet, even the VIP souls argue among themselves for the privilege of being the first body cremated for the day, thus avoiding the pollution from previous bodies. Most VIPs in the novel are state officials, and their rank in life largely determines their treatment in death. But the novel also explores how wealth influences death rituals. For example, some hire Buddhist monks to chant sutras for a deceased soul. The extremely wealthy pay extra for chanting that effects rebirth in the United States. The novel ends with a nod to equality. The world of skeletons where souls reside after the seventh day has no burial sites, no clothes, no hierarchy, and no distinguishing markers of any kind. Nevertheless, hierarchies structuring funerary rituals and acts of memorialization pervade Chinese society in both its rural and urban, and both its analogic and naturalist varieties.


Memorialization, transcendence, and transience
As Katherine Verdery notes in her analysis of the reburials and the toppling of memorial statues that occurred in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, “Dead bodies have enjoyed political life . . . since far back in time” (1999:1). In China during the past few decades, there has been no regime change as dramatic as those that took place in Eastern Europe, but the politics of commemoration remain intense. At the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing, China’s cemetery for national leaders, heroes, and martyrs, bodies—or more recently, cinerary caskets—have been dug up, removed, and relocated a surprising number of times. The former Cultural Revolution–era Vice Chairman Kang Sheng, for example, was exhumed from the cemetery at the same time as he was expelled from the Party. Conversely, He Long died ignobly during the Cultural Revolution in 1969, but was posthumously reinstated into the Party in 1975. The Party then relocated his cinerary casket to the Babaoshan Columbarium that same year (Wang and Su 2011).[227]
Such dramatic events focus attention on the forms of transcendence or immortality upon which political regimes rely. The lives of certain founders or heroes come to represent the political soul of a particular regime or movement. Regime change thus requires a toppling of this soul. But even in times of political stability, when regimes are stable and graves and memorials rest in peace, the soul of political movements continues to evolve. In an essay on the “necropolitics” of self-immolation by monks in Tibet, Charlene Makley (2015) avoids the intense politics of Chinese state/dissident monk contention by examining the subtle differences among interpretations of self-immolation by diverse people within the Tibetan community. Although the following examples are less politically charged than Makley’s, they too suggest the ways in which funerary ritual is designed to permit reinterpretation while suggesting an air of immutability.
Consider first the practice of political education at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery. Students are routinely taken through the cemetery to have their patriotism reinforced by learning the stories of martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the Chinese nation. The ability of political educators to frame such lessons in a manner that resonates with the politically correct themes of the present relies on three mundane devices. First, many people are buried there. The political educators can take the students to the graves of those whose life stories most closely fit current concerns. When I visited the graveyard in September 2015, military men who had died in the war against Japan were highlighted. Second, interpretive signposts were placed in front of the graves that the educators discuss. These signs provide a relatively flexible medium for framing the words carved in stone on grave markers. Finally, a gigantic television screen was installed so that recently re-edited stories of the deceased’s lives could be presented.
The flexible contextualization of “words carved in stone” is enabled in many Chinese graveyards today through the use of two dimensional matrix codes (二维码; erweima) on tombstones. Such marks enable visitors to immediately download a life history of the person buried there on their smartphones. Needless to say, the life history that is saved in cyberspace can be amended as necessary.
But even the words carved onto tombstones are chosen to be reinterpretable while masking the shifting nature of their referents. The sales offices for most graveyards have photographs of various styles of gravestone and lists of suggested words and phrases for etching onto tombstones. These phrases reveal three strategies. The first is to mask the ways in which the meanings of the words might shift over time with references to eternity. Phrases like never forget (不忘; buwang), never ending (无绝期; wu jueqi), ever existing (永存; yongcun), and everlasting (永在; yongzai) are ubiquitous. The second strategy is to use words that refer to a type of abstract but easily accepted ideal persona or virtue—kind mother, caring father, loyal party member. While it is possible that the words these virtues invoke will fall out of style, they are also easy to reinterpret. What makes someone a good parent or a loyal friend can be retold in different ways. The third strategy is to choose words that enunciate relatively simple statements of fact—when a person was born, when they entered the Party, awards received. These statements can be used within a variety of narrative structures. There are limits to reinterpretation that make revolution and the consequent tearing up graves and memorials sometimes seem necessary. If, as may have been the case during the Cultural Revolution, the very idea of being [228]a good parent is called into question, then the desecration of graves that declared someone to be a good parent might seem like a good idea.
Sometimes the relation of the eternal to the transient is explicitly mapped on the gravestone. One device for doing so involves the colors in which names are etched into tombstones. Most Chinese graves are designed for elderly couples rather than for individuals. The name of the first member of the couple to pass away is often written in black (or now sometimes in gold leaf), while the remaining member’s name will be in red until that person passes away. In addition, the surnames remain in red, even after the person passes away. This indicates that family names are eternal, even though individuals are mortal. The individual is thus framed as a person whose life has been devoted to the cause of the family; women, perhaps unintentionally, are framed as having contributed primarily to their natal families. The practice of burying couples together also suggests that marriage itself transcends death. Thus, common folk too combine ideologies of eternity with the facts of mortality.
Another sort of reinterpretation of the lives of revolutionary martyrs takes place through the development of so-called red tourism. Many Chinese localities try to establish themselves as sites of red tourism by claiming the right to erect memorials to the deceased revolutionary martyrs and national leaders who were born there. This trend is especially prevalent in Hunan province, the birthplace of Mao Zedong, and thus a center of red tourism. In 1999, Peng Dehuai’s cinerary casket was dug out of Babaoshan and returned to Xiangtan in Hunan where a memorial hall was built around his new grave and his former residence was reconstructed as a tourist site. In 2009, He Long was similarly returned to He Long Park in Zhangjiajie, Hunan, while one of the “old five” members of the communist party, Lin Boqu, was returned to Lintan in Hunan in 2013 (Liu 2014). While the new memorials in Hunan undoubtedly reproduce politically correct biographies for these famous past leaders, they can do so in a manner that gives more emphasis to the role of their birth locality in developing their revolutionary personas.8
One reason that the central government allows its martyrs to be removed to red tourist sites outside of Beijing is that the Babaoshan cemeteries are full. In reaction to full cemeteries as well as the price of land and housing in big cities, the Party issued new rules about promoting eco-burials for Party members in 2013. While eco-burials save land, they also reflect the maturing of the regime. As a regime ages, the founding leaders are immortalized but those of the middle periods become less important. Contemporary leaders establish rhetorical links to the founding fathers, while ignoring their more recent predecessors. As the rewriting of history loses its emphasis on the recent past, their historical distance from the present enhances the political sacredness of the original leaders. The lack of living memories of their presence makes the rewriting of their biographies easier.
Rather than linking explicit permanence to implicit transience, some funerary rites highlight transience, while implicitly tying this change to something eternal. A Buddhist priest once explained to me the reason for chanting sutras on behalf [229]of the recently departed. The soul of the departed can hear the chanting and it helps them to make the journey to Western Paradise. He emphasized that it was important for the family members to not cry. “Crying makes the soul of the deceased less willing to leave this world and transition to Western Paradise. It creates unnecessary attachment. Birth and death are all part of life. Without death there could not be birth. We monks never cry at the funerals of our brethren.” But if life is presented in Buddhist ritual as transient, both the soul and Western Paradise—especially as they are popularly imagined—transcend. As Jason Danely explains regarding the memorialization of the deceased as both an ancestor and a Buddha, “Japanese Buddhism, like that found in China and Korea, is Mahayana, emphasizing the role of saint-like bodhisattvas whose compassion and wisdom provide the key to salvation without the necessity of numerous cycles of rebirth and merit accumulation more typical in Theravadan Buddhist cultures such as Sri Lanka or Thailand” (Danely 2014:29-30).
In China, the most famous dead body of all is that of Mao Zedong, whose mummified corpse is preserved in his mausoleum in Tiananmen Square. As Geremie Barmé (1996) points out, Mao’s legacy has been reinterpreted by a wide variety of actors for a wide variety of purposes both within and outside of China. For the first time since the 1990s, I revisited his mausoleum in September 2015, at 8 a.m. on a Thursday morning, and was struck by three aspects of how the presentation of his persona had evolved (see Wakeman [1988] for a description of a Mausoleum visit in the 1980s). First, the entire square had been redesigned for tourists from the Chinese hinterlands. In the crowds of thousands of people milling about the square with me that morning, I saw not one non-Chinese face. Many of the people there were dressed in a manner that suggested that they came from the countryside. The square itself had been redecorated with a nearly life-sized, plastic flower and bird covered Great Wall replica. The replica allowed tourists to get a perfect photo of a Great Wall–like structure without actually going there. Its pristinely clean but plastic construction marked it as designed to appeal to rural rather than urban tastes.
Second, the presentation of Mao has made him more God-like. While a sacred attitude toward Mao’s body was always encouraged, the mausoleum used to take more steps to encourage an appropriately secular communist attitude.9 Recently, there has been slippage in the direction of presenting Mao as a God. Entrants to the mausoleum must now take off their hats and remain silent. In addition, on my 2015 trip, all of the visitors I saw bowed three times before his statue at the entrance of the mausoleum, before placing flowers (sold for three yuan at the entrance) in the cauldron in front of his statue. The act both resembles and distances itself from the standard way one worships at a Chinese temple. The bows replace kowtows and the flowers replace burning incense. Thus, the communist ritual simultaneously declares itself different from “superstitious religions” while mimicking its form (for more on the deification of Mao see Wardega 2012). Finally, upon exiting the mausoleum, one is faced with a variety of stands selling Mao tourist kitsch. There are both official stalls within the cordoned off area of the mausoleum and unofficial stalls outside. Even the official stalls sold Mao badges and emblems of a type that [230]seem to be a blasphemy against Mao’s virulent anticapitalism. One 20-yuan gold-colored badge, for example, was decorated with a circle of fake diamonds and had a giant 福 (fu, prosperity) character printed on the back side. While there have long been Mao badges that present him like a God of Wealth, to see them for sale at an official tourist stall next to his Mausoleum on Tiananmen Square struck me as indicative of a new degree of official acceptance of this reinterpretation.
Governments often frame their memorials in a chronotope of eternity. Carved in stone at the entrance to Mao Zedong’s Mausoleum, as on many Chinese tombs, is the stock phrase remain forever without deterioration (永垂不朽; yongchui buxiu). As with the selection of words for tombstones, it is not just that words suggesting eternity are used but also that efforts are made to fix words flexible enough to last an eternity. Such a linguistic strategy applies to official funerals as much as tombstones. A cadre in charge of funerary arrangements for retired officials at a university once described to me the care taken with official obituaries. While no obituary can say anything bad about the deceased, the subtle gradations of positive words must be calibrated to match the rank of the retired cadre. “Fixing the words when you close the coffin” (盖棺论定, gaiguan lunding) is a Chinese tradition, this cadre concluded. While immortalizing the souls of their cadres, the CCP thus also seeks to immortalize the hierarchies created through their political rankings (see also Tsai 2017).
Tropes of permanence comfort us when death confronts us with our own mortality, fragility, and impermanence. They are also useful for political regimes that wish to project an image of invulnerability. But they should not fool us into thinking either that any regime or soul is permanent, or that the only pathway to change requires a revolutionary toppling of memorials. Death rituals and memorials, whether in the public political realm or a more private familial one, link tropes of transcendence with those of transience.


The arguments of communists
Despite the efforts made to immortalize the spirit of the CCP, officially endorsed attitudes toward funerary ritual are dismissive. In academic books about funerary ritual (Chen and Chen 2008; Wang 2002), the slogan thick care, thin burials (厚养薄葬；houyang bozang) is often repeated. The phrase suggests generous care of the elderly in life as an alternative to lavish funerals. These works present the culture of elaborate funerals as stemming from the intersection of numerous historical forces, including belief in the immortality of the soul (灵魂不灭; linghun bumie); experience with the regenerative power of soil in an agrarian civilization and the resultant belief that earth burial results in a peaceful resting place for the soul, as captured in the saying “entering the earth is peace” (入土为安; rutu weian); a Confucian morality that emphasizes filial piety in both life and death; the social structures of lineage organizations with their elaborate ancestral cults; the political ideologies of emperors who linked filial piety to respect for the emperor; a hierarchical society that encouraged conspicuous display at funerals; and forms of Buddhism and Daoism preoccupied with a smooth transition to another world (Wang 2002).
In treatises that advocate thick care and thin burials, modernity is imagined as inevitably leading to simple funerals. Modernity leads to a rejection of a social [231]structure organized around lineages and the development of one centered on the nation and society at large. Science demands rejecting belief in spirits. Nonagricultural societies can dispense with notions of “entering the earth is peace,” and demonstrate more care about saving the resources of the earth (Wang 2002:203). Although these writings suggest that modernity will bring about ritual change in itself, they also demand that the Party take the lead in guiding society through this modernization. As such, they find it necessary to criticize those who hold large funerals. These writings suggest that holding expensive funerals often reflects guilt about not taking good care of one’s elderly relatives in life; a fancy funeral makes a public display of one’s filial piety when in private one’s filial piety was lacking. They also dismiss lavish funerals as a mode of conspicuous consumption for the vainly status conscious.
I find most of these arguments to be one-sided. The criticisms of funerals as a form of consumption would be true about any other type of consumption. The automobile industry, for example, is highly supported by the government. But expensive cars are also status symbols and cars cause more pollution and waste than graves. So why are these reasons to criticize the funerary industry and not the automobile industry? If the automobile industry employs people, so does the funerary industry. The arguments about funerals as a form of superstition also seem superficial. Yes, funerary ritual in China can involve all manner of ghost, spirit, ancestor, God, and beliefs not proven by science, but funerary ritual in even the most modern and secular corners of society must speak of something spiritual. Thus, the specific ritual reforms suggested by the Party in the name of resisting superstition—substituting bows for kowtows, bringing flowers instead of burning spirit money, switching from more traditional funerary clothing (披麻戴孝; pima daixiao) to black armbands—seem more about form than substance. In the contemporary period, they often also reinforce antirural prejudice.
I once interviewed a cadre in charge of funerals for retired cadres who repeated most of the official arguments described above. When I pressed him about why flowers should be considered less superstitious than spirit money, he declared, “I am a materialist,” as if that explained everything. Materialism is one of the keywords of Chinese Marxism. It both reflects the idea that science is opposed to superstition and reconfirms Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s “idealism.” The terms idealism and materialism in Chinese seem even more extremely oppositional than they do in English. Materialism is rendered as “a belief in only concrete objects” (唯物主义; weiwuzhuyi) and idealism or spiritualism as “a belief in only ideals” (唯心主义; weixinzhuyi). If the Chinese Communist Party only believes in concrete objects, and if all Chinese funerary ritual invokes some sort of soul that transcends death, then why does the Party need to hold funerals for its own members? Why does it need graveyards for revolutionary martyrs and a mausoleum for its founding father?
Scholars of Chinese religion have detailed the roots of Chinese communist secularism in the semicolonial modernity of the late Qing dynasty (van der Veer 2012; Yang 2008), noted the scientistic excesses of and the religious influences on this secularism (Chau 2011; Goossaert and Palmer 2011; Ji 2011; Kipnis 2001; Kwok 1965), examined the contradictions between materialism and idealism in Chinese communist practice (Kipnis 2008), and introduced the vast expansion of religiosity [232]during the reform era and the resultant compromises official secularism has made with religious practice. Officially expressed attitudes toward funerals were an extreme variant of this scientistic and ideological secularism; they offered little acknowledgement of the complexity of actual practice and the spaces opened up for this complexity during the reform era, and ignored the memorialization practices of the Party itself.


The souls of modernity
Like Tylor and Frazer, official communist attitudes propagate an evolutionary schema in which the need for belief in the soul ends with modernity. With Descola, I believe that modernity has influenced the shape of our belief in souls but has not reduced our need for some sort of interiority. But beyond Descola, I also argue that the analogic souls of a premodern era and the naturalist ones of a modern one are not so distinct. What, then, are the souls of modernity, or more specifically, Chinese modernity? 
The tombstones, memorials, and funerals discussed above provide some clues. Modern political parties and leaders require an attitude, spirit, discourse, or ideology that consolidates the popularity or legitimacy of their cause, movement, or political persona. To use the language of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), politics requires an “articulatory practice” and articulatory practice requires symbolic nodal points to rally around.10 Abstract symbols or ideals suture over both the gaps between the political interests and stances of different people, enabling the formation of coalitions, and the gaps in political formation left by death and the transience of individual lives.
Beyond the level of Party politics, Chinese practices of memorialization reveal a continuing analogic faith in an afterlife and the ghosts, gods, and ancestors who inhabit and govern the realms of the deceased. At the same time, however, popular practice also evinces two or three types of modern, naturalist soul. The first and most common one is that of the family itself. As the tombstones depicted above reveal, although the individual perishes, the family lives on. The second, for those who enjoy more than just a series of jobs, is the spirit of the career. A teacher, or doctor, or anthropological researcher dedicates himself or herself to an abstract calling that transcends any individual life. The third, if it is to be a separate category, sits somewhere between the first two, and speaks to those who identify with a particular religion, ethnic group, or manner of inhabiting the earth. The devoted Christian, ping-pong player, or calligrapher might consider their devotion a matter of personal calling, a political identity, or something altogether different.
Funerals are for the living and the grief of living moderns must be consoled with a reason for living, a reason that is first attributed to the soul of the deceased and then grasped again by the living to continue their own struggle. For those with a career or an identity beyond that of their family, memorials devoted exclusively to a career or to both a career and a family can console. But for those with nothing but a rotten job, meaning is often obtained from familial reproduction. In China, [233]a discourse of “eating bitterness” as a form of familial sacrifice is commonplace (Kipnis 2016), and much of the rhetoric spoken at funerals and reproduced on tombstones exemplifies this discourse.
While familial reproduction might be seen as a theme with deep roots in premodern China, it is also modern. Moderns do not simply farm as their parents did. Rather, they must find a career or at least a job. For those who toil in alienating jobs, the meaning of work usually derives from the contributions to familial reproduction that income from the work enables. In this sense, devotion to family and the types of memorialization such devotion enables are not just vestiges of a premodern era but are central to modern life itself. Those who find meaning in a career are equally the products of modernity’s division of labor.
The title of this essay echoes the title of Nikolas Rose’s book, Governing the soul (1990), and his reading of modernity informs my take on the Chinese memorialization of souls. In particular, it is his emphasis on the rise of regimes of choice in modernity (rather than framing these regimes as neoliberalism or having Western origins) that illuminates modern practices of memorialization. When one’s career, one’s hobbies, one’s religion, and even one’s family become matters of individual choice, then a modern soul capable of choosing and finding motivation to stick by her choice must be cultivated. This evolution enables the differential interpretation of the family in analogic and naturalist ritual. In premodern ritual, the family forms an implicit doxa, an unquestionable starting point for life (Hsu 1971[1948]). In modern ritual it becomes an explicit reason for living, a counterweight to the alienating aspects of extrafamilial life. But the importance of family in both analogic and naturalist contexts enables the mixing of analogic and naturalist souls in death ritual.
The above depiction separates memorialization by the Party from the memorialization of “common folk,” but I see no philosophical divide between political and nonpolitical memorialization. As I have argued elsewhere (Kipnis 2008), almost anything can be politicized. In China as elsewhere, the memorialization of a soul can lead to its politicization. The deaths of political leaders became rallying points in both the 1976 and 1989 protest movements centered at Tiananmen Square. The deaths of less famous individuals have also formed the basis for thousands of more localized protests in China—against corrupt and incompetent doctors; against employers who do not pay wages on time or do not offer adequate compensation for workplace injuries; against government decisions to limit the welfare or pension rights of various categories of people; against powerful people who cover up their liability in automobile accidents and the corruption that enables the cover-ups to proceed. Such protests lead me to read the “only-concrete-object-ism” of the Communist Party as not simply mistaken philosophy but as crass ideological manipulation. The Party knows that grief is a powerful emotion and that the memorialization of souls can easily give rise to a politicized spirit. The scientistic rhetoric of the Party toward funerals also leads to the blurring of analogic and naturalist souls by forcing most practice to take place under a veil of silence.
The hierarchies of death, reflected in the value of graveyard plots, the words contained in obituaries, or the number of people who attend and give gifts at a funeral, clearly cross the line between Party and society. The Party would like its hierarchies to be the only ones that matter. The Party has been somewhat successful [234]in this regard as the value of graveyard real estate clearly rises when a large number of high-level cadres are buried there. But other forms of capital also influence funerary hierarchies.
In the logics of modernity, where individuals must choose their careers or jobs as well as their spouses and political causes, souls are needed to transcend the deaths of the individuals who make these choices. In a discussion of the relationship of transience to transcendence in acts of memorialization in Japan, Jason Danely states, “many older people found it meaningful to cultivate a sense of ‘yielding’ (yuzuri) to this passage of time, not only through passive resignation, but through actions that emphasized passing on tradition and values they felt deeply identified with. Transience of the individual, then, does not disrupt the overall cultural system, but motivates its narrative continuity” (Danely 2014:23). Here again, meaning in life is seen as coming from passing on a cultural soul that can transcend death.
If, following Descola, we accept that acts of memorialization are not so significant in animist and totemic societies, then what about the difference between analogic and naturalist memorialization? The forms of transcendence that I have been describing in the past few pages, whether involving the souls of cultural continuity depicted by Danely, the political propaganda of the CCP, or the careerist and familial souls of the masses, all involve the nature/culture dualism central to modern naturalist societies.11 Bodies are natural so they are mortal, but the souls of culture may be immortal. For the souls of culture to live on, they must be embodied by other humans. For hierarchies of humans to be constructed, the values enunciated by particular souls must be seen as more fully embodied by some bodies than others. Analogic souls can be read in a different light. In analogic societies, there is no strict line of difference between nature and culture, but there are subtle gradations of difference among a vast number of entities. Analogic interiorities come in many gradations and they do not only act in the world by animating physical human bodies. In China, ghosts, gods, and ancestors are all efficacious beings. As Heonik Kwon and Nguyen Van Huyen remind us for Vietnam, “the ‘ancestors’ presence in the domestic sphere is not in a mere passive state. The dead also act” (Nguyen, cited in Kwon 2006:84). Contemporary Chinese funerals blend naturalist and analogic souls. Perhaps the percentage of naturalist souls involved in Chinese funerals has increased and will continue to increase over time at the expense of analogical ones. But I doubt very much that such a shift will ever be total, absolute, ontological, or structural. Not only do analogic souls persist but also naturalistic souls have existed in China for a very long time. There have been state-designated martyrs and ideas about constructing traditions to transmit cultural souls for thousands of years.[235]
In his depiction of so-called modern societies, Descola separates analogic and naturalist practices of commemoration much more clearly than can be done in China. He writes, “despite our pronounced taste for commemoration and despite the ceaseless celebration of heroes of the past . . . there will be no trace among the Moderns of that subjugation to the ancestors” (Descola 2013:395). In China, this trace is quite evident. When a Chinese descendent burns incense at a home altar, or burns spirit money at a grave, or places cigarettes, food, and alcohol on a tombstone during Qing Ming, she does not specify whether she is venerating her father as an ancestor who can act in the present or paying respect to the modern naturalist spirit of his familial devotion. Similarly, when a rural tourist bows three times before the statue of Mao Zedong in his mausoleum, he does not specify whether he is worshipping Mao as a God who can act in this world or simply respecting the political spirit of the founder of the Chinese Communist Party. The distinction seems both impossible to draw and beside the point.


Acknowledgements
Grants from the Australian Research Council (DP140101294 and DP140101289) supported the research leading to this article. The anonymous readers for Hau as well as thoughtful audiences at the Australian National University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Nanjing University, London School of Economics, and Harvard University, provided valuable feedback. A heartfelt thanks to everyone!


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Gouverner les Ames de la Modernité Chinoise
Résumé : Philippe Descola suggère que les sociétés humaines peuvent être catégorisée en fonction de leur manière de concevoir de larges hypothèses sur la nature de l’intériorité et de la physicalité; l’intériorité signifiant ici quelque chose de comparable à ce qu’Edward Tyler et James Frazer appelaient “l’âme”. D’après Descola, la culture chinoise, qui offre une variabilité infinie à l’intériorité et à la physicalité, est une culture de “l’analogisme.” Par contraste, Descola définit les sociétés occidentales modernes comme “naturalistes.” Nous autres modernes voyons la nature et la physicalité comme universellement fixées, mais la culture et l’intériorité comme variables. La Chine contemporaine et sa culture scientifique se modernisent rapidement. Dans les termes de Descola, cette culture devrait connaître une transformation d’analogisme à naturalisme. A travers une analyse des pratiques de commémoration et des rites funéraires en Chine urbaine, ainsi que des tentatives du Parti Communiste Chinois de contrôler les évolutions de ces pratiques en réaction à la “modernité,” cet essai montre ce qui est moderne à propos des conceptions de l’âme implicites dans les pratiques ayant lien à la mort en Chine contemporaine.
Andrew B. KIPNIS is a Professor of Anthropology in the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author of five books including most recently From village to city: Social transformation in a Chinese county seat (University of California Press, 2016). Previous works include China and postsocialist anthropology (Eastbridge, 2008) and Governing educational desire (University of Chicago Press, 2011). For ten years he was editor of the China Journal.
Andrew B. KipnisDepartment of AnthropologyChinese University of Hong KongShatin, New TerritoriesHong KongAndrew.kipnis@anu.edu.au


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1. Vanessa Fong (2007), for example, makes such an argument with regard to Chinese morality.
2. Stephan Feuchtwang (2014) emphasizes that analogisms differ and that one of the particularities of Chinese analogism is the emphasis on processes over singularities. While agreeing that systemic thought in traditional Chinese science emphasizes processes, I would argue that singularities emerge in the thought of nonscientific thinkers in most places, including contemporary China.
3. William Matthews (2017) convincingly demonstrates that scientifically oriented diviners in China deny the distinction between interiority and physicality and thus he categorizes their thought as homologic rather than analogic. He further suggests that homologic ontologies are common among systematic thinkers, including Western scientists and many anthropologists. But Matthews also suggests that analogic thinking is common in China outside of philosophically oriented circles. I note both that systematic thinkers are more likely to come up with unified ontologies than others and that analogic thought—within which physicalities and interiorities are equally variant—perhaps blends into homologic ontologies more readily than naturalist or animist thought. Totemic thought might similarly be considered relatively compatible with monist or homologic schemes, as Ute Eickelkamp (2017) suggests.
4. Lei Feng was a model soldier who kept a diary that recorded his constant efforts to do good deeds and sacrifice his own time, energy, and well-being for the sake of others. Note that in English, spirit, like soul, can refer to both natural and supernatural entities.
5. Because the birth-planning policy resulted in so much intimate intervention in women’s lives and such severe consequences (e.g., forced abortions and sterilizations, fines equivalent to many years of a household’s income), this debate has considerable implications for the legitimacy of the Party (Greenhalgh 2003; Greenhalgh 2008; Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005; Wei and Zhang 2014; Whyte, Wang, and Yong 2015).
6. Jonathan Kaiman (2015) discusses some of the crass attitudes on display in state-run crematoriums.
7. Yu Hua (2013); for the English translation, see Yu (2015).
8. Heonik Kwon (2006) provides an insightful analysis of Vietnamese state reburials and the relationships between local interpretations of the war dead to those of the national government.
9. The tensions between communist and “feudal” elements in the very design of the mausoleum are discussed by A. P. Cheater (1991).
10. For further discussion of Laclau and Mouffe, see Kipnis (2008).
11. While many criticisms of the nature/culture dualism have been leveled (for one summary see Helmreich 2014), and although Descola’s book is titled Beyond nature and culture, the book reminded me of just how central the dichotomy remains to both modern (naturalist) thought in general and anthropology. Indeed, before reading the book I thought that I personally was over the distinction, but I am no longer so certain. The distinction is particularly apparent in modern practices of memorialization. Here, Michael Lambek’s (2014) views of the nature/culture opposition are more appropriate than critiques that simply dismiss the opposition as irrelevant.
 </p></body>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1461</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/709505</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>A tree of many lives: Vegetal teleontologies in West Papua</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Chao</surname>
						<given-names>Sophie</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>12</day>
				<month>11</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="805">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
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			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1461" />
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			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1461/3525" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, I analyze the ontology of the African oil palm among indigenous Marind communities in Merauke, West Papua. This introduced cash crop is conceptualized by Marind as tree and person, assailant and victim, and stranger and kin. Its ontology further multiplies through its material manifestations as plant, part, and product—from an individual stand to monocrop plantation, and from seedling to packaged oil. Drawing from two ethnographic accounts of negotiations between Marind and state and corporate actors, I then examine how Marind strategically foreground or background different facets of oil palm’s reality to serve the political ends of their activism, producing what I call “teleontologies,” or ontologies that serve an instrumental purpose. Essentializing the reality of oil palm is deemed necessary by many Marind for indigenous activism to succeed. But such essentializations are also deeply contested and can backfire unintentionally on the indigenous activists who deploy them.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1943</identifier>
				<datestamp>2025-10-25T15:25:25Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1943</article-id>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
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				<article-title>Rock climbing as lithic ethnography: Animacy, aesthetics, and deep time</article-title>
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			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Cohen</surname>
						<given-names>Adrienne J.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
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					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
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					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>08</day>
				<month>08</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="104">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
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			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1943" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1943/4478" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1943/4479" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>What does it mean for scholars to engage rocks ethnographically? And how is ethnography redefined back by an encounter with lithics? Although rock has long lingered in the background of sociocultural research, it is only recently that ethnographers have begun to foreground the geologic, often in conversations about extraction and extinction. But how do everyday practices of knowing and caring for rocks and lithic places articulate with what some call the “geologic turn” in the humanities and social sciences? In this article, I propose the term “lithic ethnography” to encompass research in and around cultural anthropology that is attentive to aesthetic, linguistic, and material/body practices of human–rock intimacy across scales. I showcase rock climbers as paradigmatic figures of a lithic ethnography, as they demonstrate what it can mean to privilege movement and correspondence over static form or identity and to try to forge relations—however partial—with lithic material.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/738</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-12-22T11:55:22Z</datestamp>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3.012</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.3.012</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Gravity fixes: Habituating to the human on Mars and Island Three</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Gravity fixes: Habituating to the human on Mars and Island Three</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Valentine</surname>
						<given-names>David</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of Minnesota Twin Cities</aff>
					<email>valen076@umn.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>22</day>
				<month>12</month>
				<year>2017</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2017</year></pub-date>
			<volume>7</volume>
			<issue seq="407">3</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.3</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 David Valentine</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2017</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.3.012" />
			<self-uri content-type="application/pdf" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.3.012/3077" />
			<self-uri content-type="text/html" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/hau7.3.012/3078" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>What shifts might emerge in theorizations of and debates over “the human”—as a historically specific entity or as nominating a general species difference—if Earth and its variable conditions no longer form the habitual grounds for these arguments? To answer this question, I examine two sites proposed by outer space settlement advocates: the surface of Mars, and the interior of a massive, rotating cylindrical space settlement called Island Three. I argue that these places unsettle habitual critical approaches to the human in outer space by posing radically different conditions through which to make accounts of the specific and the general, including that of humanness. Using gravity as both metaphor for significance and a physical quality and quantity that potentiates worlds and experience, I examine how a variety of problematics about humans and their histories are fixed—from Earth—in the imaginations of both settlement advocates and their critics, and explore problems for both critical theory and space settlement advocacy in thinking “the human” through nonterrestrial sites. I argue that thinking humanness from elsewhere in the cosmos offers new anthropological insights about questions of difference and relation, specificity and universality, Indigeneity and settlement, ontology and epistemology, and habits of embodiment on Earth.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>What shifts might emerge in theorizations of and debates over “the human”—as a historically specific entity or as nominating a general species difference—if Earth and its variable conditions no longer form the habitual grounds for these arguments? To answer this question, I examine two sites proposed by outer space settlement advocates: the surface of Mars, and the interior of a massive, rotating cylindrical space settlement called Island Three. I argue that these places unsettle habitual critical approaches to the human in outer space by posing radically different conditions through which to make accounts of the specific and the general, including that of humanness. Using gravity as both metaphor for significance and a physical quality and quantity that potentiates worlds and experience, I examine how a variety of problematics about humans and their histories are fixed—from Earth—in the imaginations of both settlement advocates and their critics, and explore problems for both critical theory and space settlement advocacy in thinking “the human” through nonterrestrial sites. I argue that thinking humanness from elsewhere in the cosmos offers new anthropological insights about questions of difference and relation, specificity and universality, Indigeneity and settlement, ontology and epistemology, and habits of embodiment on Earth.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>epistemology, ontology, settler colonialism, Indigeneity, chronotope, universals, relationality</kwd>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1754</identifier>
				<datestamp>2023-06-18T20:32:29Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1754</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/724921</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Home as a second skin: A contribution to a theory of magic (of tidying)</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Tasia</surname>
						<given-names>Edgar</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>18</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2023</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date>
			<volume>13</volume>
			<issue seq="202">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau13.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2023 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2023</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
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			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1754" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1754/4104" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1754/4105" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, I describe a “magical” dimension in the work of home organizers (HOs) in Belgium. HOs, I argue, as professional organizers, not only help their clients to deal with the disorder and clutter of their homes but deliver a promise of magic: that “care” for the home interior produces “care” for the mind, the body, and even the earth. To do this, they rely on the one hand on knowledge based on an epistemology of analogy; on the other hand, they use specific technical know-hows, allowing them to participate in world transformation. In the course of their interventions, an order of things—both ideological and pragmatic—takes shape. From this double ordering stems a marvelous feeling. Indeed, the analogical principle (body-home-earth) that animates the process of home organizing and the incorporation of collective representations allows the act of tidying to be magical.</p></abstract>
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			<header>
				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/824</identifier>
				<datestamp>2017-06-15T22:33:51Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
			</header>
			<metadata>
<article
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	<front>
		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
		</journal-meta>
		<article-meta>
			<article-id pub-id-type="other">hau7.1.021</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.14318/hau7.1.021</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Ethnographic X-files and Holbraad's double-bind: Reflections on an ontological turn of events</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Ethnographic X-files and Holbraad's double-bind: Reflections on an ontological turn of events</trans-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Apter</surname>
						<given-names>Andrew</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University of California, Los Angeles</aff>
					<email>aapter@history.ucla.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2017 Andrew Apter</copyright-statement>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The ontological turn asks difficult questions and pushes conceptual boundaries both forward and against the grain, challenging our standard epistemological orientations. That it replaces epistemological with ontological concerns is a position I oppose in the following reflections, inspired by Martin Holbraad’s “double-bind,” one which frames a predicament that not only resonates with my own ethnographic experience but also represents something of an occupational hazard (our X-files) for many of us working on spirit-worlds. In an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind, based on Moore’s paradox and my own exposure to Shango’s wrath in Nigeria, I propose a radical decoupling of Knowledge and Belief to obviate the ontological proliferation of worlds.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>The ontological turn asks difficult questions and pushes conceptual boundaries both forward and against the grain, challenging our standard epistemological orientations. That it replaces epistemological with ontological concerns is a position I oppose in the following reflections, inspired by Martin Holbraad’s “double-bind,” one which frames a predicament that not only resonates with my own ethnographic experience but also represents something of an occupational hazard (our X-files) for many of us working on spirit-worlds. In an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind, based on Moore’s paradox and my own exposure to Shango’s wrath in Nigeria, I propose a radical decoupling of Knowledge and Belief to obviate the ontological proliferation of worlds.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>mystical agency, ontography, possible worlds, Moore’s paradox</kwd>
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	<body><p>Ethnographic X-files and Holbraad’s double-bind






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Andrew Apter. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau7.1.021
Ethnographic X-files and Holbraad’s double-bind
Reflections on an ontological turn of events
Andrew APTER, University of California, Los Angeles


The ontological turn asks difficult questions and pushes conceptual boundaries both forward and against the grain, challenging our standard epistemological orientations. That it replaces epistemological with ontological concerns is a position I oppose in the following reflections, inspired by Martin Holbraad’s “double-bind,” one which frames a predicament that not only resonates with my own ethnographic experience but also represents something of an occupational hazard (our X-files) for many of us working on spirit-worlds.  In an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind, based on Moore’s paradox and my own exposure to Shango’s wrath in Nigeria, I propose a radical decoupling of Knowledge and Belief to obviate the ontological proliferation of worlds.
Keywords: mystical agency, ontography, possible worlds, Moore’s paradox



Logic isn’t as simple as logicians think it is.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letter to G. E. Moore

Like many of my somewhat skeptical peers, I have been equivocating over the relatively recent “ontological turn” in anthropology, wavering between glimpses of real profundity as its “ontographic method” (Holbraad 2012a: 86) proffers access to radically different worlds, and frustration that at the end of the day it represents the latest iteration of the cultural relativism and radical translation debates of the 1960s and 1970s, despite principled claims to the contrary. On the one hand, I appreciate its “quiet revolution” (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007: 7–10), reversing relations between concepts and things so basic to “representationalist” theories of knowledge, and by taking “things” and “native claims” on their own terms, as “true” by definition, thereby opening pathways to multiple ontologies. I also appreciate its intellectual genealogy, building on the work of worthy luminaries such [288]as Roy Wagner, Marilyn Strathern, Alfred Gell, Bruno Latour, Philippe Descola, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. On the other hand, I keep stumbling. Where does this really take us? Does it not implicitly invoke a sociocultural alterity that hardly exists anymore, if it ever did? Is such alterity greater “between” societies than “within” them? Where are the richer historical and sociopolitical contexts? Do native claims that sacramental wine is the blood of Christ, or that Jews are a chosen people, also open up different ontologies? Even if I finally do grasp that Ifá powder and power are the same “thing” in Cuban divination, as well as the “motile” logic which renders its disclosures indubitable (Holbraad 2007), then what? Can I “apply” such motility to other contexts, including Ifá divination in Nigeria or New Jersey? Or to the latest debates in nonstandard logics? In my less generous moments—off the record, of course—I have caricatured the ontological turn as bad philosophy and no ethnography (a charge that may equally characterize what follows!).1
But that is neither true nor fair, as growing research in this vein attests. The ontological turn asks difficult questions and pushes conceptual boundaries both forward and against the grain, challenging our standard epistemological orientations. That it necessitates a commitment to multiple ontologies is a claim that I will challenge in the following reflections inspired by Martin Holbraad’s “double-bind,” one which frames a predicament that not only resonates with my own ethnographic experience, but also represents something of an occupational hazard for many of us working on spirit-worlds. In an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind, based on my exposure to Shango’s wrath in Nigeria, I propose a radical decoupling of Knowledge and Belief to obviate the ontological proliferation of worlds.

Holbraad’s double-bind
In a provocative essay that takes us through the looking glass into the alternative world of Ifá divination in Cuba, Martin Holbraad opens with a discomfiting encounter familiar to many of us after returning from the field, when asked: “Do you think that oracles work?” (2012a: 81, original emphasis). How often have I encountered variations of this question, when asked if I believe in the Yoruba orisha, whether they are real, or might I even channel their power to help someone out? I usually respond that “No, I don’t actually believe in them, but . . . .” And if my interlocutor remains interested, I may describe ethnographic experiences that give uncanny credence to mystical intervention in human affairs. Such “X-files” from the field are by no means uncommon, and are found even among our most right-minded colleagues, archived as private and unsuitable for public release.2 Indeed, the public is always quick to exoticize alterity with “unsolved mysteries” of ghosts, zombies, and aliens, thus one learns to be careful about what one says to [289]avoid looking ridiculous and embarrassing the profession.3 Nor are such queries limited to lay persons, but, as Holbraad points out, come from colleagues as well. Which is why I find Holbraad’s reaction both familiar and refreshing. If he “loves” the question because it rattles the rationalist cage, he also “hates” it because it is so difficult to answer:

What I hate about it is that it tends to put me in a double-bind. If I say that I do not believe in oracles, I provide a quick fix for my interlocutor’s disquiet with what really is a lie. For there is an important sense in which I really do believe in oracles—but if I admit this, I create the conditions for misunderstanding, since the sense in which I trust oracles is very different from the more sensational one in which they are more than likely interested. (Holbraad 2012a: 82, original emphasis)

Holbraad (ibid.; 96–103) proceeds to illustrate the radically different ontological premises which make Cuban divination casts—as “truth-events”— indubitably true, an alembicated exposition that not only illuminates the motile logic of coinciding paths, but, in doing so, also offers a way out of his double-bind.4 For it is with recourse to this alternative ontology, based on a non-representational semantics, and thus not easily grasped by the untrained interlocutor (untrained, that is, in the ontographic method) that Holbraad does believe in oracles. Key to his analysis is the replacement of representational with revelatory notions of truth, such that divinatory disclosures are indubitably true not because they correctly “represent” the client’s situation, but because they manifest colliding pathways or “trajectories of motion,” in this case the mythic “paths” associated with divinatory tosses and the consultant’s problematic “path” in life, converging on a correct verdict and resolution. Truth according to this “motile logic” emerges out of points of intersection rather than correspondence with facts, making Ifa’s revelations true by definition. Moreover, the lesson to be learned from these intersecting pathways is less about expanding our epistemological horizons than exploring the intensional alterity of “other” concepts in other worlds.
Barring systemic scrutiny of Holbraad’s divinatory peregrinations for now, I would like to return to the double-bind itself, and reframe the terms of its solution. Embedded in Holbraad’s familiar predicament are ideas of truth, knowledge, belief, and trust that straddle two worlds, which, if ontologically grounded in radically different ways, nonetheless can be rendered somewhat mutually intelligible. When asked if he believes in oracles, the response “I do not believe in oracles” would be a lie: that is, not true, “in an important sense” that for lay persons is difficult to grasp. In this difficult sense, “I do believe in oracles” is true, a statement that is synonymous with “I trust oracles,” but is likely to be misunderstood. To believe or not believe? The resolution of the double-bind rests on the doubling of worlds and [290]their ontologically associated truth-conditions. In World One (“our” world, for the sake of argument), “I believe in oracles” is false, but in World Two (“their” world, for the sake of argument), “I believe in oracles” is true. However we get from World One to World Two, the journey will lead us out of the double-bind.5
Holbraad’s appeal to truth by way of its negation—a lie—brings epistemology back in, for what can be more epistemological than specifying the conditions under which “x” is true? And with epistemology comes the problem of knowledge: not merely believing that “x” is true, but determining that “x” is true independently of belief. In the unorthodox provocation that follows, I will argue that a radical separation of knowledge and belief offers an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind through the multiple X-files of a singular world. To get there, I return to my worst day of fieldwork in Nigeria.


A series of unfortunate events
Back in the day, and on that ill-fated day, my dissertation research focused on the politics of orisha worship within Yoruba kingdoms, and the factors that “controlled” its ritual variations. Applying Fred Eggan’s method of controlled comparison (Eggan 1954), I compared the centralized military kingdom of Ayede with the decentralized neighboring kingdoms of Ishan and Itaji (in Ekitiland) to map the correlation of political and ritual institutions over time and space, and to develop a framework for analyzing ritual performances as arenas of political negotiation and maneuvering. The “external” data were difficult but not impossible to get: shrines, memberships, altars in relation to lineages, political quarters, core and immigrant town sections, and so on. I realized that the dominant models in the scholarship were far too simplistic, underestimating the composite character of orisha cults and overestimating the lineage as the dominant sociological correlate, but that part was easy.6
Much more difficult was penetrating the domains of meaning, which were hidden and off-limits to noninitiates, safeguarded by an elaborate philosophy of secrecy that I would only gradually and partially assimilate. I was allowed to take pictures and make audio (and, later, video) recordings of festivals and rituals, but whenever I asked about the meaning of a symbol, oratorical reference, particular sacrifice, or choreographic sequence, the answer was invariably “Àsá ni” (It is our tradition), “Mi ò mo” (I don’t know), or, more enigmatically, “Awó ni” (It is a secret). As one educated chief from Ishan assured me, “Ogundele, no matter how many years you spend with the priestesses, they will never tell you anything. They will never reveal their secrets!” I began to despair that my work was destined to remain superficial, externalist, and basically blind. I could feel the allure of what I [291]eventually learned was called “imọ jinlẹ̀,” deep knowledge, and also “history,” ìtàn, as in the knowledge of the ancestors, but I despaired of ever gaining access to it.
Which is why, one early morning in April 1983, I was elated by my one and only “breakthrough” interview. It was with Ìyá Shango, the Shango priestess who had taken me on as something of a “son,” and remained my greatest patron and protector throughout my stay. Her own son, Olu Ibitoye, who became my closest research assistant, brought me to her personal shrine, where I offered schnapps and kola. What followed was simply extraordinary; after obligatory oblations to Shango, Ìyá Shango started to tell me important things. Passwords the priestesses gave each other, as well as hand signals to direct festival choreography; deep incantations to summon the gods, together with which leaves must be used, mixed with blood and palm oil; secret histories of Shango’s Nupe mother, incestuous relations, and more. As I wrote down feverishly in my notebook, I had the sense that finally I was breaking through, that the real research had begun, that I was entering into the world of the cults. The fact that the priestess whispered, with shutters closed in her personal shrine, was to prevent Shango from hearing, and getting angry. Ìyá Shango was taking quite a risk. To show my trust and appreciation, I had brought her a bag of my hair clippings from a haircut, since the hair of an òyìnbó (“European,” “white person”) was a valuable ingredient for juju, and Ìyá Shango was renowned in the medicinal arts.
But my newly gained access was not to be. Later that day, still elated, I drove off on my motorcycle with the master drummer Ajayi to Aiyegunle, about 25 kilometers northeast from Ayede, to document networks between percussionists. When we arrived, just after noon, greeting his friends, indulging in several beers, Ajayi asked if he could borrow my “machine” (motorcycle) for just twenty minutes to go off and greet another friend. Off he went, and as the minutes ticked by I grew more and more anxious. The minutes turned into hours, and I knew something was very wrong. Two hours, three hours, four hours. Finally, as the late afternoon shadows began to lengthen into evening, Ajayi turned up, weaving on my motorcycle blind drunk. Something was wrong; the fenders and handlebars were bent. He had crashed, and had a gash on his forehead. And what was worse, the backpack I had strapped on the back, with my “particulars” and precious notebook, was missing. Ajayi had no explanation other than it had disappeared. He could not explain why he was gone so many hours, other than one thing led to another—he had been drinking with friends and lost track of everything.
I was of course despondent because my breakthrough data were missing. The bike was repaired; Ajayi healed (although my relationship with him never fully recovered), but my secrets were lost forever. I tried to reconstruct them from memory but could not. Several days later a man from the “north” appeared in Ayede with my backpack and particulars, but the notebook was missing. I asked him where and how he got the backpack, but he wouldn’t say, other than that Ifá told him to bring it to me. (I had another powerful medicine in the backpack, called agbónádẹ̀rọ̀—hot becomes cool [lit.“soothing”]—which was also missing, and I think by returning the backpack he was neutralizing any revenge juju from my side.7)[292]
Anyway, I returned to my research, worked closely with the priestesses, gained access to otherwise forbidden spaces (sacred groves, inner shrines, etc.), built up a vast image and recording archive, collected oral histories of struggles and migrations, but never had a comparable interview. In fact, in the eighteen months that followed, none of the priestesses would acknowledge that the “level” of secret knowledge I had glimpsed even existed. And I stopped pushing as well. We all knew what had happened. Shango had punished me for going too far. Twelve months after the terrible loss of notes, I asked Olu if his mother believed that I had been punished by Shango on that unfortunate trip to Aiyegunle, and he said of course, it was perfectly clear to her—which was why she never blamed the drummer Ajayi since he was only an instrument of her deity. I gradually absorbed much of the character of deep knowledge, appreciating the social construction of discursive boundaries, the unstable sphere of interpretations which they sustained, and the political efficacy of its deployment in ritual, which I reworked into the concept of an indigenous hermeneutics of power (Apter 1992). In the end, the loss of that precious notebook may not have mattered that much. But I want to return to a question which the lost notebook raises: “What actually happened?” It is not just a question of ethnographic autobiography—it represents an ontological commitment to the present and the past.
Let me digress for a moment to explain why this question has returned with such resonance in my own professional life. As an anthropologist now among the historians, I am often asked what it is like shifting home departments, from anthropology at the University of Chicago, where we shared a theoretically driven commitment to critical cultural analysis, to history at UCLA, where a strong cadre of social and cultural historians use theory as a tool of illumination rather than an end in itself. To be honest, I have found the transition refreshing, captured in my typified response: “Anthropologists focus on the cultural and political frameworks and rhetorics through which the past is constructed, represented, and experienced (as historical consciousness), whereas historians are more interested in ‘what actually happened.’” I was so socialized into the constructivist perspective that the historian’s ontological commitment to “what actually happened” acquired a radical thrust, as if to say that analyzing constructions, figurations, discourses of the past is easy compared with the heavier task of figuring out the “actual.” Not a naïve invocation of the commonsense “real,” of course, but an admission that at the end of the theoretical day, after our critical investigations of object-construction, the social worlds of history and anthropology are worth getting a handle on. Figuring out what actually happened is much harder than merely exploring the sociocultural dynamics that shape and motivate representations of the real.
So returning to my worst day of fieldwork, what actually happened? Clearly any science of society requires a methodological base-line of empirical description, so where do we begin? We can start with a sequence of events, of social facts. Aspiring [293]anthropologist begins to break down barriers to secret knowledge in an early morning interview, feels excited and pumped up, takes off on his motorcycle with master drummer Ajayi for more research in Aiyegunle; lends Ajayi his Suzuki, which turns out to be a big mistake since Ajayi gets drunk, disappears for four hours, crashes the bike, returns wounded sans notebook and treasured interview data.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we can all agree on a similar version of such “events”: that is, Ajayi, the Ìyá Shango priestess, my sympathetic hosts in Aiyegunle, and my sympathetic friends and associates in Ayede. How, then, do we interpret these events, in terms of meaning and causality? Here is where cultural perspectives diverge, raising well-wrought questions of truth, relativism, method, and mystification. Reduced to essentials, a typical contrast between Western rationalism and African mystification would emerge along the following lines: American anthropologist has a breakthrough interview followed by some really bad luck, owing to his own foolish judgment giving in to Ajayi’s initial request, and to Ajayi’s reckless enthusiasm once he borrowed the bike. Western moral of the story: stand firm, learn how to say no to favors asked, and never let your fieldnotes out of your possession.
Yet, on the other side of the methodological divide, from the so-called “native” point of view, the events were causally connected by the violation of a taboo. The loss of the notebook was no mere bad luck, but was Shango lashing back, angry that his secrets were leaked and rectifying the situation by depriving me of my precious data. From the rationalist perspective of Western social science, this is of course a mystification, for how can we scientifically accord agency to mystical entities? Local natives may believe this happened, but belief and knowledge occupy very different orders of social determination. We “know” that 2 + 2 = 4 even if I believe (mistakenly) that it equals 5. For the objectivist social scientist, mystified beliefs become true only when they are explained with reference to the objective social (political, cultural, etc.) principles that govern their distortion. Cult secrets, from this perspective, are protected by social sanctions such as belief in mystical retribution when secrets are leaked. Much ink has been devoted to exploring this methodological divide, ranging from total relativism (what “happened” is always culturally specific, including the cultural specificity of Western scientific rationality) to scientific reductionism (we demystify “native” thought with reference to objective sociological principles), but this stark methodological opposition is today a caricature; the debates on both sides have become more complex.
Let me muddy the waters a bit. First, it is interesting to note that even at this preliminary stage of my time in the field, I suspected, no, I actually knew, that Shango was striking back. Nobody explained this to me, or suggested it to me. I felt it immediately, to invoke the language of Bourdieu’s embodied knowledge: I could just “tell” since I was already [294]working within a local knowledge-system that inculcated certain social and cognitive dispositions. Recall that I was already using juju, both as a gift from my body but also as a means of gaining social cooperation. Did I believe in it? Not really. Did it work? Yes. Do you among my readers know exactly what I am talking about? Many of you X-filers do.
Thus far, Western social theory can explain my incipient Yoruba cultural verstehen, my developing intuitive grasp of the events from a Yoruba perspective as a process of local socialization, the gaining of cultural competence that comes from working within a set of socially embedded structures of reproduction and calculation. But what happens when these boundaries between observer and observed, and their concomitant worlds, begin to dissolve? If critical anthropology has taught us anything, it is that our methodological appeals to rationality and objectivism are overdetermined by the historical conditions of their genesis—shot through with implicit assumptions of difference, evolutionism, personhood, and transparency that are anything but transparent. So what actually happened? I am not suggesting that what happened on my worst day of fieldwork was simply Shango’s punishment, but something more paradoxical: I know that Shango snatched my fieldnotes and literally erased my morning interview because such data, not properly “given,” had to be taken back. Yet I don’t believe that he did this because I don’t believe that Shango really exists. Here is my version of Holbraad’s double-bind. For him the way out is through ontographic explication: once we clarify the ontology of the world in which Shango strikes back, and the conditions in which “Shango took my fieldnotes” is true, then we can enter into this alternative world, and engage other actual and possible worlds. My solution is much more direct: I know that p is true even if I believe that it is false.8 Applied to Holbraad’s double-bind: I know that oracles never lie (hence always tell the truth) but I don’t believe it. How can we know what we don’t believe?
That is the question.


Knowledge, belief, and the irrational ethnographer
Perhaps it is best to begin by specifying what I don’t wish to convey by this ethnographic paradox. First, I am not extending Rodney Needham’s assault on the mercurial concept of belief itself, which for him generates so much ambiguity and confusion that it is best abandoned as a cross-cultural category—particularly when “ethnographical ascriptions of belief” serve as the basis of our studies (Needham 1972: 9). Rather I am negating what Skorupski (1976: 238) calls an “empirical belief” about the existence of Shango, and, by extension, the category of orisha that he manifests. Belief as such may come under critical scrutiny, and I may push it to questionable extremes, but I do not reject it as a meaningful concept. Second, and this may take some convincing on my part, I hope that I am not merely proposing a pseudoepistemological cover for what boils down to my own psychological ambivalence or denial, in the sense that I “feel” like I know that Shango intervened but can’t bring myself to believe it because I am an atheist and a realist. Rather, I maintain that such psychological denial provided the impetus toward developing a conceptually interesting position that goes beyond ascriptions of inner mental or subjective states. 9 Third, I am not seeking a “half [295]way house” (ibid.: 243) between religion and science, or ontological worlds, such that “I know p in World2 but don’t believe p in World1,” for that only resurrects the ontological divide that I ultimately seek to avoid. Although there are multiple logics and logically possible worlds, as a realist I maintain that anthropologists and those we study exist in one world. Nor, fourth, do I wish to replace different “worlds” with different levels of analysis, disbelieving in p as a mystical agent while knowing it as a Durkheimian social fact. If I remain inclined toward socially grounded illuminations and explanations, in this case they don’t apply because the p which is true (belief as a social fact) is not the same p which is false (mystical agent) in such formulations. And finally, I am not attributing my own paradoxical proposition to the Yoruba discourse community among whom it arose, although similar ambivalences exist. Like Graeber’s discussion of the skeptical framing of fanafody medicine in Madagascar (Graeber 2015), Yoruba attitudes toward the orisha include reflexive forms of bargaining power that are central to the devotee–deity relationship, as propounded in Karin Barber’s landmark essay “How man makes God in West Africa” (1981). But the case of my worst day of fieldwork in Nigeria foregrounds a different propositional attitude, one shared not by my Yoruba colleagues—who knew and believed that Shango lashed back—but among anthropological colleagues with similar experiences who know without believing. We thus frame the problem of Shango’s wrath with the irrationality not of “natives” but of ethnographers.
So how irrational are we? Can the sentence “I know that Shango intervened [by taking back my fieldnotes] but I don’t believe it,” or more simply, “I know p but I don’t believe it” (or even “p and I don’t believe it”) be dismissed as self-contradictory, or as an irrational (dis)belief? If so, then I have reached an aporia, and can go no further. The sentence, however, cannot be so easily dismissed, but belongs to a class of so-called “Moore-paradoxical” sentences—not surprisingly formulated by G. E. Moore—that has spawned a veritable industry of epistemological hair splitting (including within the subfield of epistemic logic, see Hintikka 1962: 64–78, 95–102; Henricks and Symons 2006) which began with an inspired Wittgenstein and shows no signs of slowing down (see, e.g., Green and Williams 2007; Schmid 2014).10 It was in fact Wittgenstein who coined the term “Moore’s paradox” in part II of his Philosophical investigations ([1953] 1972) (variations of which appear in Remarks on the philosophy of psychology based on writings from 1946–47), as posing a momentous logical problem. His immediate excitement is evident in a letter he wrote the day after Moore presented a paper to the Moral Sciences Club in October 1944 praising Moore for his important “discovery” associated with the “absurdity” of the assertion “There is a fire in this room and I don’t believe there is.” He adds, “Pointing out that ‘absurdity’ which is in fact something similar to a [296]contradiction, though it isn’t one, is so important that I hope you’ll publish your paper” (original emphasis).11
Wittgenstein’s ruminations on Moore’s paradox are characteristically complex, subtle, fragmentary, and elusive, but two features stand out in his philosophical framing that help develop my position.12 First, is the insight that Moorean sentences are not paradoxes, but only resemble them as seemingly absurd. For example, in the sentence “There is a fire in this room and I don’t believe there is,” both conjuncts can be true, whereas in a proper paradox they cannot (see also Moore 1993: 209; Sorenson 1988: 15; Williams 1979; Shoemaker 1995: 211). Moore-paradoxical statements “feel” or “sound” like paradoxes, but technically they are not. Thus we can say, somewhat reflexively, that the paradox of Moore-paradoxical sentences is that they are not paradoxical. The point is important because it establishes a philosophical justification for recasting statements like “Shango took back my fieldnotes and I don’t believe it” as nonparadoxical (and thus noncontradictory), with the additional virtue that they are philosophically interesting.13 The second striking feature of Wittgenstein’s take on Moore’s paradox is his rejection of psychological conditions such as states of mind associated with attributions of belief, thereby rejecting Moore’s own appeal to states of mind (belief) implied by assertions (Moore [1944] 1993; Malcolm 1995). As Wittgenstein (1980: 92e) remarked, “It would be asking for trouble to take Moore’s paradox for something that can only occur in the mental sphere,” pushing instead for logical approaches to belief in the changing contexts of different language games.14 Again, my point remains preliminary: Wittgenstein rules out psychological (or mentalist) resolutions of Moorean paradoxes because they side-step the deeper roots of the problem, which hinges on the slippage between supposition and assertion in first-person indicative statements of belief.15 Whether or not Wittgenstein resolved Moore’s paradox, he prepared the ground for nonpsychological solutions.[297]
With Wittgenstein, then, we have established that my way out of Holbraad’s double-bind remains valid: neither logically paradoxical nor psychologically reducible to an irrational state of mind, it provides an opening for a category of ethnographic experience—our classified X-files—that allows “knowledge of” without “belief in.” It is admittedly an extreme formulation that pushes the meanings of “knowledge” and “belief” not only to unusual limits, but also into novel semantic possibilities. If philosophers recognize the complex intersections of knowledge and belief, the lines remain notoriously fuzzy (Hintikka 1962; Stalnaker 2006). For example, in 1963, Edmund Gettier shattered an established epistemological position that all knowledge is justified true belief by proving that rational actors could hold justified true beliefs that nonetheless do not qualify as knowledge, based on possible if highly unlikely scenarios that lead to false conclusions. In Case I of Gettier’s famous three-page article (Gettier 1963: 122), for example, Smith knows that either he or Jones will get a certain job, and that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket; Smith also knows that Jones has ten coins in his pocket without realizing that he himself (Smith) also has ten coins in his pocket. Smith therefore has a justified true belief that Jones will get the job, which turns out to be false, because Smith himself (with his unknowingly held coins) gets the job. The so-called Gettier problems or cases are important because they prove that not all justified true belief is knowledge, relaxing their relations of material coimplication. Taken together, Moore’s paradox and the Gettier problems frame the limits of an epistemological opening between knowledge and belief.16 For Moore, “p and I don’t believe p” gives us knowledge without belief. Conversely, Gettier gives us justified true belief without knowledge.


Conclusion
If nothing else, I have offered an alternative solution to Holbraad’s double-bind in the Moorean sentence, depsychologized by Wittgenstein, of the form “I know p and don’t believe it.” Because it is neither a “true” paradox nor irrational, it is logically permissible even if its meanings strike us as enigmatic, and requires no further commitments to multiple ontologies. Such an epistemological alternative to the ontographic method may miss the point as far as the OTers are concerned, for whom “differences in ‘perspectives’ are to be seen in ontological rather than epistemological terms” (Holbraad 2013: 469), and this in order to gain insight into the possible worlds of radical alterity. The thinking subjects and thoughtful objects encountered by the new ontologists, taken on their own terms, project possible worlds which are actualized “for us” by ethnographic explication—through the kind of ontographic conceptualization that opens up new modalities of being. Perhaps. Yet the conjuring of these possible worlds by the ethnographer’s magic, and, more to the point, the “passage from one possible world to another” (Viveiros de Castro [2002] 2013: 479), remain dubious achievements, quite possibly impossible. In determining the meanings of proper names, as Kripke reminds us, “‘possible worlds’ are stipulated, [298]not discovered by powerful telescopes” (1980: 44, original emphasis). Nor, we might add, by ontological anthropologists.
Which raises the question, what kind of “possible worlds” are the OTers dealing with? At first blush, they appear very different from the arid counterfactual landscapes of possible-world semantics. In an article which for Holbraad (2013: 470) marks the turning point of the ontological turn, Viveiros de Castro ([2002] 2013: 478) invokes Sartre (“le regard”) and Deleuze (1969: 355) to argue that possible worlds are grounded in the structure of the Other as a kind of a priori alterity.17 If I follow him correctly, and at the risk of oversimplification, there seem to be two major moves involved in exploring other ontologically possible worlds. The first is to recognize the philosophical relationality underlying possible worldhood—including “ours”—a kind of transcendental other = x that guarantees the very category of world possibility. This relational condition is not only primordial, but also underscores the varieties of perspectivism (Amerindian and “otherwise”) through which it is empirically manifested (e.g., Viveiros de Castro 1998). The second move into empirically possible worlds involves ethnographic discovery procedures of the ontographic method: taking “native” statements, objects, meanings, and practices that manifest internally the relational (perspectival) concepts of the Other as starting points for anthropological inquiry. It is precisely those statements that seem “strange” or “irrational” to “us,” such as “peccaries are human,” or “powder is power,” which provide openings for the following question: In what possible world are they true? That the question is philosophical, inspiring thought experiments with other possible worlds, brings philosophy into an applied or experimental mode. In a playful (if somewhat unfortunate) reversal of disciplinary registers, Viveiros de Castro proclaims: “If in ‘real philosophy’ imaginary savages are altogether abundant, the geo-philosophy proposed by anthropology conducts ‘imaginary’ philosophy with ‘real’ savages” ([2002] 2013: 488). We may recall not just the noble and ignoble “savages” of early modern political philosophy, but also Quine’s imaginary “native” whose utterance “Gavagai” (“rabbit,” “undetached rabbit part”) established the inscrutability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation (Quine 1960: 29–46).
But the “geophilosophical” crossroads also share a common ground, although possible-world semantics developed with very different goals in mind: namely the search for necessary meanings across all possible worlds rather than those specific to particular ones. Like its ontographic cross-cousin, its basic modus operandi stipulates that the meaning of a sentence specifies how the world would have to be for that sentence to be true (or false). If, for philosophers, possible worlds serve meanings, and for ontographers, meanings serve possible worlds, both approaches share the same stipulative conditions of truth by definition. If such truths, in principle, are conceptually knowable, are they believable? To be sure, the philosopher does not need to believe in the possible world where Richard Nixon died at age four to determine, or even “know,” the meaning of his proper name.18 But what of the possible worlds which the ontographer explicates, and in some sense actualizes [299]“for us”? That the question is important for Viverios de Castro is revealed by his response to Isabella Lepri, a student also working with Amerindians who asked him if, by taking the statement that “peccaries are humans” seriously, he believed that it was true. When he replied in the negative, she responded: “How can you take the [Amerindians] seriously if you only pretend to believe in what they say?” (Viveiros de Castro [2002] 2013: 493). He reflects: “I am convinced that Isabella’s question is absolutely crucial; that all anthropology deserving of the name should answer it; and that it is not at all easy do so very well” (ibid.).
Viveiros de Castro’s solution is to dismiss this question of “our” belief as irrelevant, no more pertinent to Amerindian ideas than “greenness” is to the number two, a category error better avoided by focusing on “what the Indians are saying when they say that peccaries are human” (ibid.: 494). Here is where applied philosophy takes over: “how to transform the conception expressed in a proposition like this into a concept” (ibid.), which, when properly done, provides access to other construals of human–animal relationality in its manifold complexity. My own reply to Isabella Lepri, based not on native testimony but on my worst day of fieldwork in Nigeria, would be: “Peccaries are human and I don’t believe it.” Moore’s paradox lives on in the ethnographic present without proliferating ontological commitments to multiple worlds. It not only resolves double-binds and epistemological conundrums in the field, but may help us rethink our potentially embarrassing X-files, and what we mean by “knowledge.”


References
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Bessire, Lucas, and David Bond. 2014. “Ontological anthropology and the deferral of critique.” American Ethnologist 41 (3): 440–56.
Borges, Rodrigo. 2014. “How to Moore a Gettier: Notes on the dark side of knowledge.” Logos &amp; Episteme 5 (2): 133–140.
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Gettier, Edmund L. 1963. “Is justified true belief knowledge?” Analysis 23 (6): 121–23.[300]
Graeber, David. 2015. “Radical alterity is just another way of saying ‘reality’: A reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (2): 1–41.
Green, Mitchell, and John N. Williams, eds. 2007. Moore’s paradox: New essays on belief, rationality, and the first person. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heal, Jane. 1994. “Moore’s paradox: A Wittgensteinian approach.” Mind (N.S.) 103 (409): 5–24.
Henare, Amiria, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell. 2007. “Introduction: Thinking through things.” In Thinking through things: Theorising artefacts ethnographically, edited by Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell, 1–31. London: Routledge.
Henricks, Vincent F., and John Symons. 2006. “Where’s the bridge? Epistemology and epistemic logic.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 128 (1): 137–67.
Hintikka, Jaako. 1962. Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of two notions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Holbraad, Martin. 2007. “The power of powder: Multiplicity and motion in the divinatory cosmology of Cuban Ifá (or mana, again).” In Thinking through things: Theorising artefacts ethnographically, edited by Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell, 189–225. London: Routledge.
———. 2012a. “Truth beyond doubt: Ifá oracles in Havana.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 81–109.
———. 2012b. Truth in motion: The recursive anthropology of Cuban divination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 2013. “Turning a corner: Preamble for ‘The relative native’ by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro.” HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (1): 469–71.
Idowu, Bolanle. 1962. Olódùmarè: God in Yoruba belief. London: Longmans.
Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
MacIver, A. M. 1938. “Some questions about ‘know’ and ‘think.” Analysis 5 (3/4): 43–50.
Malcom, Norman. 1984. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A memoir. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1995. “Disentangling Moore’s paradox.” In Wittgenstein: Mind and language, edited by Rosaria Egidi, 195–205. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McGinn, Marie. 2011. “Wittgenstein and Moore’s paradox.” In Image and imaging in philosophy, science and the arts, Vol. 1, edited by Richard Heinrich, Elisabeth Nemeth, Wolfram Pichler, and David Wagner, 59–82. Frankfurt: De Gruyter.
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1944) 1974. “Letter to G. E. Moore [M.42].” In Ludwig Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes, and Moore, edited by G. H. von Wright, 177. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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Les X-files de l’ethnographie et la double contrainte de Holbraad: Réflexions sur le tournant ontologique des évènements
Résumé : Le tournant ontologique pose des questions difficiles et repousse les frontières conceptuelles À la fois en avant et À rebours, mettant au défi nos orientations [302]épistémologiques standards. Dans cet essai, je m’oppose À l’argument selon lequel les questions ontologiques remplacent les enjeux épistémologiques. Je m’inspire À cet égard de l’idée de “double contrainte” émise par Holbraad, qui constitue une problématisation résonnant avec mon expérience ethnographique, mais qui représente aussi une part du danger professionnel (nos “X-files”) pour ceux qui comme moi, s’intéressent au monde des esprits. Dans une solution alternative À la double contrainte de Holbraad, qui s’inspire du paradoxe de Moore et sur ma propre expérience de la colère de Shango au Nigéria, je propose un décuplement du savoir et de la croyance afin d’éviter la prolifération ontologique de mondes.
Andrew APTER is Professor of History and Anthropology at UCLA. His books include Black critics and kings: The hermeneutics of power in Yoruba society (1992); The pan-African nation: Oil and the spectacle of culture in Nigeria (2005); Beyond words: Discourse and critical agency in Africa (2007); and Oduduwa’s chain: Locations of culture in the Yoruba-Atlantic (2017), all with the University of Chicago Press. He also coedited Activating the past: History and memory in the Black Atlantic world (Cambridge Scholars, 2010) with Lauren Derby, and is currently working on History in the dungeon: Atlantic slavery and the spirits of capitalism.
Andrew ApterDepartments of History and AnthropologyUCLA6265 Bunche HallBox 951473Los AngelesCA 90095-1473USAaapter@history.ucla.edu


___________________
1. For two signal critiques of the ontological turn, see Bessire and Bond (2014) and Graeber (2015).
2. As Graeber (2015: 35–36) reminds us, even Evans-Pritchard (1937:34) went partly public with his X-files.
3. In 1996 I appeared in an A&amp;E Unsolved Mysteries television episode on Haitian zombies, to weigh in on the question “Are zombies real?” I quickly realized there was no room for anthropological subtleties; the answer was either yes or no. I argued no, contra Wade Davis.
4. For his richer ethnographic case study of Cuban divination along these “lines,” see Holbraad (2012b).
5. Holbraad’s worlds are not to be confused with Popperian Worlds (see Popper 1972).
6. I conducted dissertation fieldwork in Nigeria from September 1982 to December 1984, funded by Fulbright–Hays and the Social Science Research Council. For the dominant models of orisha cult organization at that time, see, e.g., Bascom (1944); Verger (1957); and Idowu (1962). For an important shift beyond from the “lineage” model, see Morton-Williams (1964).
7. The agbónádẹ̀rọ̀, also called ojú mẹ̀jo (“eight eyes”) because of its eight cowries protruding from its leather binding, had been a gift six years earlier from the late Twins Seven-Seven in his maternal natal village of Ogidi, in gratitude for my cutting a ring (with my Swiss Army knife) from his finger after it had grown deeply into his flesh—a procedure that endured into the early morning hours and involved considerable bleeding and ogogoro (local gin). I was told that the juju had returned to Ogidi after Ajayi’s motorcycle accident. But that is another story and potential X-file.
8. Michael Lambek notes that the reverse proposition is more common, “believing something true even when we know it is false” (personal communication). This point adds a new level to the hierarchy of constraints on the knowledge–belief relation and resonates with the Gettier problems discussed below
9. The edited debate by Berliner (2016) raises many related issues pertaining to the significance of contradictory ideas, attitudes, and beliefs of anthropologists in the field, suggesting that multiple selves may be a subjective alternative to multiple ontologies. I am particularly drawn to Richard Shweder’s defense of the law of noncontradiction in this discussion precisely because that is the virtue of Moorean sentences, which preserve the noncontradiction of knowing without believing (see below).
10. According to von Wright (1974: 177–78), the first to formulate “the puzzle about saying and disbelieving” was MacIver (1938). See also Moore (1942: 543; 1944: 204; 1993).
11. Wittgenstein’s letter to Moore was published as M.42 by von Wright (Wittgenstein [1944] 1974). Although von Wright (1974: 177–78) notes that he could not find Moore’s unpublished paper, it was later given to University Library, Cambridge, by his son, Timothy Moore, and published as Moore (1993). In his Memoir, Norman Malcolm recalls Wittgenstein mentioning that “the only work of Moore’s that greatly impressed him was his discovery of the peculiar kind of nonsense involved in such as sentence as ‘It’s raining but I don’t believe it’” (1984: 66). See also Sorensen (1988: 1), who opens his book with this quote and devotes his first chapter to Moore’s paradox as paradigmatic of philosophical “blindspots.”
12. For helpful expositions of Wittgenstein’s position on Moore’s paradox, see Heal (1994), Malcolm (1995), and McGinn (2011).
13. Since “but” is not a logical operator, we can use “and” in its place, as per standard practice.
14. For an elaboration of this strategy, see McGinn (2011). See also Green and Williams (2007: 6–8).
15. For a critical engagement of the “assertability conditions” approach to Moore’s paradox, emphasizing hearers over speakers, see Williams (1994).
16. To my knowledge, Borges (2014) is the first to see that Moore’s paradox and Gettier cases are intimately linked.
17. The article was first published in 2002 as “O nativo relativo,” Mana 8 (1): 113–48.
18. The example derives from Kripke (1980: 40-49).
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			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>17</day>
				<month>06</month>
				<year>2015</year>
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			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2015</year></pub-date>
			<volume>5</volume>
			<issue seq="101">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau5.1</issue-id>
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				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2015 James H. Smith</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2015</copyright-year>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, I examine some of the ways in which artisanal mining communities in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo experience digital age capitalism. I show how an extractive economy in tantalum, tin, and tungsten (referred to in NGO circles as the &quot;3 Ts&quot;) shapes experiences and understandings of space, time, and value. Making use of oral narratives and other ethnographic data, I focus on the interconnections among time and price, as well as the war over price in an extractive economy characterized by great temporal uncertainty and rupture.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>In this article, I examine some of the ways in which artisanal mining communities in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo experience digital age capitalism. I show how an extractive economy in tantalum, tin, and tungsten (referred to in NGO circles as the &quot;3 Ts&quot;) shapes experiences and understandings of space, time, and value. Making use of oral narratives and other ethnographic data, I focus on the interconnections among time and price, as well as the war over price in an extractive economy characterized by great temporal uncertainty and rupture.</p></abstract-trans>
			<kwd-group xml:lang="EN">
				<kwd>artisanal mining, price and price wars, value, temporality, digital age, Democratic Republic of Congo, infrastructure</kwd>
			</kwd-group>
		</article-meta>
	</front>
	<body><p>“May it never end”






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © James H. Smith. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.1.002
“May it never end”
Price wars, networks, and temporality in the “3 Ts” mining trade of the Eastern DR Congo
James H. SMITH, University of California, Davis


In this article, I examine some of the ways in which artisanal mining communities in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo experience digital age capitalism. I show how an extractive economy in tantalum, tin, and tungsten (referred to in NGO circles as the “3 Ts”) shapes experiences and understandings of space, time, and value. Making use of oral narratives and other ethnographic data, I focus on the interconnections among time and price, as well as the war over price in an extractive economy characterized by great temporal uncertainty and rupture.
Keywords: artisanal mining, price and price wars, value, temporality, digital age, Democratic Republic of Congo, infrastructure


This article shows how an extractive economy in tantalum, tin, and tungsten (referred to in NGO circles as the “3 Ts”) shapes experiences and understandings of space, time, and value in the Eastern DR Congo. Using oral narratives and other ethnographic data, I hope to illuminate what kind of world the only partly visible penumbra of an extractive economy makes, while describing some of the imaginative ways that miners and middlemen account for and respond to their situations. I focus on the interconnections among time and price, as well as the war over price in an economy characterized by great temporal uncertainty and rupture. An important aspect of the argument is that Eastern Congolese involved in the artisanal minerals trade grasp capitalism as a socially produced reality rather than an abstract totality, and that this is clear from their apt theorizations about how social networks influence price (bei). Price is a total social fact, and fluctuations in the prices for minerals create and foreclose opportunities, as well as connections with [2]other places and possible futures—indeed, there are places where, when mineral prices drop, cargo planes stop going back and forth, food is no longer imported, and peoples’ very survival is put at risk. Price fluctuations also symbolize the capacity of others to manipulate and control peoples’ lives in the DR Congo. Eastern Congolese try to understand and, if possible, control price so that they can have the predictable social relations and incremental temporality that also make predictable prices somewhat more possible. Those involved in the trade do this, in part, by modeling their interpretations of other people’s powerful social networks. If defunct material infrastructure produces rupture and uncertainty about price, those involved in the trade try to build up their social infrastructure to produce incremental temporality and predictability—making themselves, in the words of one interlocutor discussed below, “better than machines.”1
Coltan, the ore from which tantalum and niobium are derived, has been the main subject of my research, but people who mine and trade coltan never limit themselves to this ore: they move between this and other artisanally mined minerals that are found in similar locations. The so-called 3 Ts share certain properties in common (appearance, weight, density, visibility), are mined in the same way and often even in the same location, pass through the same networks, and require similar permits from diggers (creseurs) and traders (negociants).2 Mines vary greatly in size and are governed by a diversity of often overlapping regulatory and taxation regimes; in contrast, the organization of work at mines, the divisions of labor, and the titles employed to describe these divisions, are remarkably consistent throughout the artisanal mines3 of the region (Nest 2011).4 The mechanics of this trade [3]are not the subject of this article but, briefly, these minerals pass through multiple middlemen via fluctuating geographic routes and networks of state and non-state actors before they make their way to smelters outside Congo and Africa. Much of this product is eventually sold to electronics manufacturers, ending up in many high tech devices.
All of these aforementioned substances are essential to digital devices: tantalum is needed to produce digital capacitors, and tin is used for wiring. Tungsten is found in laptop screens and is used to make cell phones vibrate, among many other things. Global demand for tantalum increased by 24 percent per year during the 1990s, alongside the emergence of the “information age” and so-called knowledge economies; over half of tantalum demand continues to come from electronics companies (Johnson and Tegera 2005; Roskill [2002] 2009, 2012). Not only will our vaunted twenty-first-century digital technologies not work without these minerals, but these minerals’ prices are also strongly influenced by digital cultures. Congolese “3 Ts” are traded on spot markets, so their values fluctuate radically and rapidly: for example, online speculation helped produce the spike in coltan prices in late 2000, when Sony ran out of the tantalum it needed to meet Christmas demand for PlayStation 2 (the time Eastern Congolese know as bisikatike, “may it not be broken” or “may it never end”).
Many Congolese state authorities and people involved in the trade argue that, although they have been the object of armed conflict, these minerals have the capacity to positively rebuild a tentatively “postwar” Congolese society and transform state-society interactions in a way that gold and diamonds can not. This because of their weight and manifest transparency, and the fact that they bring together many different kinds of workers (porters, diggers, transporters, and people who sell goods to miners) who either pay “tax” directly to state figures, purchase permits for their work, or both. And the visibility of these minerals makes them open to official government taxation, whereas gold and diamonds are more easily smuggled. The labor conditions around these mines are often described as more democratic because there are few barriers to this kind of work—except for “strength,” a trait perceived as masculine, underscoring that this work is usually gendered in very clear ways (see also Cuvelier 2011).5 But there are subtle differences among these minerals that make it possible for people with more information, higher up on the “commodity chain,” to trick the people “below” them, those with less information. Though they look very similar, these substances fetch different prices at different times. In the case of coltan, the percentage purity of tantalum varies from site to site and changes over time at a given site. Only middlemen are really aware of what is in demand at any given time and they try to fool diggers about this when they can. And only those higher up in the chain have the machines necessary to determine [4]the purity of coltan (although these machines can also be manipulated). Moreover, the rapid fluctuation in prices, combined with the temporal delays produced by bad or nonexistent infrastructure, leads to a great deal of conflict and confusion about price and value between buyers and sellers on the ground.
The rupture of incremental time and predictable work is central to the experiences of those involved in this extractive economy. Elsewhere I have drawn attention to the process of “temporal dispossession” in Congolese mining areas— or the usurpation, by others, of the ability to produce social relations incrementally (Smith 2011). Within this broad theme, the main focus of this article is on what I describe as a war over price on multiple fronts: many Eastern Congolese experience war as the instrument through which the price for these minerals is determined, and time and price are among the many “resources” through which war is carried out. Transnational networks are experienced as the main mechanism through which outsiders have expropriated Congolese resources and been victorious in the war over time and price, and Congolese try to mobilize their own social networks—along with the “resource” of mobility—to exercise some control over the volatility and insecurity that characterize their lives. Among Eastern Congolese miners and traders, price is not merely a measure of value but also a representation of the viability or nonviability of social networks, and a mechanism for altering space-time in ways that could be positively or negatively transformative for a person, a group of people, or an imagined nation. Price fluctuations are also sources of collective memory and of hope for the future.
This article relates to a larger literature on temporality under neoliberalism (also post-Fordism and the post–Cold War, terms that refer to the same historical moment with different emphases). Most of this work has focused on how, in poststructural adjustment Africa, established ways of getting ahead and getting by were sabotaged, producing a sense of ruptured temporality and reversed or forestalled “development” that has been felt and acted upon in multiple, overlapping registers.6 The West Africanist Jane Guyer has argued that the erasure of incremental time is a global phenomenon: the precarity brought about by neoliberalism has made the “near future” inconceivable, leaving us only with the instantaneous now (“punctuated time”) and the far away future, be it utopic or apocalyptic (Guyer 2007). In a related vein, Daniel Hoffman argues that the “just in time” production of military actors in Sierra Leone responds to post-Fordist economic shifts, which take place at a moment’s notice (Hoffman 2011). James Ferguson’s pioneering work examines how colonial era social investment in African mining underpinned an expectation of the longue duree, and of mining futures now past (Ferguson 1999, 2006). The historic, neoliberal shift from socially and temporally “thick” to socially “thin,” hit-and-run extraction informed a number of other changes related to work and [5]time in Africa, including the concentration of political sovereignty around “mining enclaves” where multiple historical and political repertoires come into play.7 Drawing a connection between the experience of time and the experience of price, the material below builds on these concerns, while also focusing on the work that people do to produce incremental time in the wake of rupture.
I consider narration, and the telling of stories—whether “true” or “false,” or false in ways that point to larger truths—to be part of that effort to shape events, but conspiracy theories are certainly not the only kind of action addressed in this article. Below I elaborate upon four narratives that at first glance appear unrelated, connecting them with reflections regarding their social and historical conditions of possibility. The first is one version of a widely held conspiracy theory about the Second Congolese War (1998–2003), portrayed as a predetermined plan in which price, value, and temporality loom large. Specifically, this story concerns the transformation of Congolese social value and incremental time into volatile price, set by outside players. The second narrative concerns the creation of an alternative world, or what I refer to—building on the descriptions of my Congolese interlocutors—as a “wormhole,” produced by the coltan boom of 2000. The third narrative concerns the imagined international demand for albino skeletons and hangman’s ropes in South Kivu. And the fourth and final case examines one miner’s efforts to become the state and establish meaningful social networks in a small town in Maniema.

Vignette #1: On the benefits of planning ahead
I came to know a rather mysterious person I will call Bush (like many former combatants, he used a pseudonym) while conducting fieldwork near the coltan mine of Numbi, North Kivu when it was under the control of the Congolese army. Whether it was actually the Congolese army was never entirely clear, because the officers were former “enemy” soldiers (adui) who had been absorbed into the army following the “brassage,” and continued to send tribute from the mine to their commanding officers, who were Tutsi.8 Bush was neither Rwandan nor a Congolese “Rwandaphone” but a Shi person who had fought alongside them during the First Congolese War (1996–1997) and was now very close friends with some of the officers (more about these historical events and concepts below). Bush had fought with Laurent-Desire Kabila, current President Joseph Kabila’s father, but found himself [6]demoted from his top position after Laurent’s assassination in 2001. According to Bush, when he was with Laurent Kabila he was lucky to have a chance to read the official “Top Secret documents” that contained the “Hima plan for the future domination of all Africa,” which Kabila’s spies had allegedly stolen from Julius Nyerere, the former Tanzanian president. Bush was stunned to learn that their plan to occupy Congo was bigger and more complex than anyone had ever imagined and that, according to him, “eventually they must win.”
Bush began by introducing the context: beginning in the early 1990s, “the Hima” organized an international, anti-Bantu plot to take over all of Central Africa and its resources. The term Hima confused me, for I knew only two of its uses. One was to refer to an aristocratic pastoralist clan of the Ankole Kingdom in Uganda, and the other was derogatory, used by Burundian Tutsis to refer to low-status Tutsis, some of whom were agriculturalists (Malkki 1995). In either case, I knew the term to refer to a discrete group or groups, and not the international cabal Bush had in mind. Did Bush mean a “Hamite” conspiracy—the terms Belgians gave to Tutsis and others that they imagined to have come from the Middle East, and to have been something other than African? He insisted that these terms referred to the same thing: the conspiracy included all Nilotic people from the North—the entire nations of Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and others, all of whose people traditionally raised cattle. Bush said that Nyerere was the chief originator of this conspiracy, claiming he was a Kikuyu (he wasn’t), an ethnicity that he also claimed to be Nilotic (it isn’t).9
According to Bush, Nyerere had forged his plan for conquest in collaboration with Western powers, which wanted to “eat” Congolese resources. He explained:

In Rwanda, before the genocide, the Tutsis had a plan to kill and bury all the Hutus in holes. Each Tutsi had dug a hole in his backyard to bury the Bantu in, but President Habyarimana [the Rwandan president whose plane was shot down just before the genocide against the Tutsis] found out about it, and that’s why his plane was attacked. Then the people tried to kill the Tutsis with a genocide, in order to protect themselves from the genocide the Tutsis were planning. But after the genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, when the Hutus returned to Rwanda, the Hima realized that guns and force were not enough to rule Central Africa, so they came up with another way. The presidents of each of these Hima countries sent emissaries with AIDS to the Congo on a secret mission to spread the virus, and to silently kill everyone over a course of 10 years. So now, even when the war is over, it continues.
The war continues after it is over and is aimed at destroying women and the communities they produce through marriage and childbirth. Bush explained that the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and their subsequent offshoot, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), kept “wives” who they never married but whom they purposefully infected with the HIV virus, so that they would go on to infect others. This was followed by what Bush referred to as “economic colonialism”: the Tutsis and Congolese Banyamulenge [7](South Kivu pastoralists that the RCD tried to recruit into their new government) set about making life in rural Congo unlivable, ultimately driving villagers into the city. Bush explained how they imposed a “taxation” regime on rural household income and agricultural produce that was as high as 90 percent of what these families were earning through their labor. The RCD combined this regime with a policy of constant harassment by local military authorities, who came to inspect and carry away household wealth, while lower ranking soldiers raped women. Both of these planned actions—the expropriation of household wealth and the rape of women— Bush figured as forms of “theft” aimed at uprooting people from their lived worlds and making them available for a particularly capricious form of extractive capitalism. Over time, this constant harassment forced people out of the countryside and into Eastern Congolese cities, like Goma and Bukavu.
As more people moved into these cities, they encountered a food shortage because of the high demand for food in the city and the fact that there were now fewer people in the rural areas producing food (rather, they were mining coltan and gold). The food shortage and the density of the urban zones led to generalized price inflation and dependence on imported food, especially from Rwanda. Then, these Hima/Tutsi, who were secretly organized by Nyerere (who was, again, working alongside Western powers, including the United States), developed a massive real estate project, which included a plan to build ten million luxury homes throughout the country. They set the prices for these homes artificially high, so no ordinary person could live in them. They then sent for, and filled these houses with, other Nilotes and some Europeans, all of whom were NGO employees, mostly working for human rights groups.10 As a result of all of this demographic and economic pressure, Eastern Congolese people—both women and the men who pimped them out—turned to prostitution, selling the only thing they still possessed to make ends meet. Even this was part of the original Hima plan, Bush explained, synergizing with the first prong of the plan, to spread HIV/AIDS.
Bush concluded by asserting that the war would only be over when the “Hima” have succeeded completely, and he believed that ultimately they would (for him, the discovered document alone was very strong evidence). When I pushed Bush on this conspiracy and questioned whether it was possible for everyone who was of some Nilotic, or even Rwandan, descent to be aware of the intricacies of this well laid plan, he offered an explanation that sounded to me a lot like science fiction. “Most Hima do not know about the conspiracy, or that they’re part of it. They don’t even have anything against Bantus,” he offered, “But when the leaders find the moment to be right, these people will be directed to act.” In my field notes, I wrote that the social network of Hima were like Battlestar Galactica’s Cylon “skin jobs,” cybernetic beings who have, unbeknownst to themselves, infiltrated human society without yet being “switched on.” Though it is my metaphor, derived from science fiction, it does convey the local recognition of there being a highly ordered and integrated network controlling events in Congo from afar, compelling seemingly [8]disparate monads to become part of a unified transnational force when the time is right.
Bush’s story about the economic conspiracy that drove the war was more detailed than most others I have heard. But nearly universal is the idea that there are powerful international networks mobilized to capture the immeasurable and inscrutable value that everyone knows lies in the Congolese ground. Moreover, it is widely understood that these transnational associations and conspiracies are complex and only barely visible, such they require much thought, investigation, and interpretation to understand. “Who is really behind that militia, and what entity is behind the person behind the militia?” Such are the eminently social questions that people pose in their efforts to understand the ruptures brought about by war and price fluctuations. What seemed to be most meaningful about the above story, for Bush, was the spatial-temporal encompassment entailed in the plan. The entity that is imagined to control Congo’s destiny manages events according to a predetermined design that it is able to realize: the plan’s principal object is the management of price, while the destruction of autochthonous generative social worlds (produced through agriculture, livestock, and women’s re/productive powers, among other practices) is its main strategy. It may seem that the proliferation and mutation of militias on the ground is based on nothing but a Hobbesian struggle to control land, but behind this illusion of chaotic fractiousness there is incremental cohesion. Moreover, these seemingly disparate events (a price hike, a real estate project, a violent assault, the presence of UN troops from Kenya and Eritrea, sex work) are ingeniously tied together by powerfully networked outsiders bent on producing temporal rupture through generalized dispossession. It turns out that Bush’s theory is much closer to the truth than the Hobbesian notion that informs how most of the world thinks about Congo, “experts” included.11
It bears mentioning that price is not an inscrutable mystery for this transnational entity (nor is disease for that matter), but an instrument that it wields for its benefit, knowing full well what it does. As a result, these foreign others do not experience the dialectics of “movement” and “chaos” brought about by global and regional price fluctuations. Rather, they consolidate their control over others incrementally. [“Mouvement” and “desordre” are French terms that Congolese in the mineral trade use to describe what happens during price hikes: first there is movement, as money, things, and people change hands and end up in unpredictable places. But movement is followed by chaos, as diverse state officials and others seeking “movement” follow these various workers (the porters, the middlemen, the diggers, the vendors, the sex workers, etc.) into the forest, collecting “tax.” Ultimately, these authorities produce constriction, conflict, and stasis, which put an end to movement.] One of the subtexts of the story is that Congolese should work to model some aspects of these foreigners’ behavior by forging generative social networks that encompass space and time in a way that works for them.
[9]I want to step back now and provide context for appreciating the truths in Bush’s narrative before considering the possible futures opened up by price fluctuations. What follows is meant to provide the barest historic context so that the ethnographic material can be put into greater perspective.12


A history of the wars over price: Dispossession, dependence on minerals, and vulnerability to price
The Eastern Congo has been an extractive economy at least since King Leopold established the Congo Free State, when ivory and rubber were the chief commodities in demand.13 The ruthless system of violently enforced labor that got under way during that time made Congo and King Leopold internationally infamous and led ultimately to the formation of the Belgian Congo (a supposedly “regular” colony), where forced labor nevertheless continued in mines (Marchal 2003). International competition for Congolese minerals in the period of decolonization—and in the context of the Cold War—led to the “Congo crisis” of civil wars and assassinations between 1960 and 1965 (Congolese uranium was used to make the bombs that dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and both the United States and the Soviets vied for Congo’s mineral wealth). “Resources” were crucial to the strife of that period, as they would be later on: The mineral rich province of Katanga tried to secede with Belgian support; Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba (who reached out for help from the Soviets during the Katanga secession and made populist promises about Congo’s vast wealth) was murdered; and the Simba insurrectionists (in some respects a precursor of today’s Mai Mai militias) founded a short-lived state supported by the Soviet Union and China, based in present day Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville).14 From 1965, the US-backed Cold War ally President Mobutu Sese Seko presided over a notoriously kleptocratic regime until he was ousted in the first Congolese War (1996–97) with Ugandan and Rwandan support. The unwillingness of Laurent Kabila’s foreign allies to leave the Congo precipitated the Second Congolese War (1998–2003).
While the Second Congolese War was not caused by the struggle for minerals (it was triggered by the Rwandan genocide and the extension of that war into the Eastern Congo, but it’s causes were multiple), the war became an opportunity for neighboring countries, or particular state elites, to compensate for their own bankrupted treasuries in the poststructural adjustment era (Prunier 2011). Different [10]armed groups controlled the mines during the war, Congolese army, indigenous Mai Mai, Hutu “rebels” from Rwanda, the Ugandan army, and the Rwandan-backed RCD being the main ones. The United Nations confirmed that foreign corporations, from the United States, Europe, and Asia, were major players behind the scenes during both wars (United Nations Security Council 2002). While the invasion of the Eastern Congo by Rwanda and Uganda was given a “Congolese face,” as Thomas Turner puts it, most Eastern Congolese knew that the “rebels” and their governments were networked with neighboring African countries, which were in turn receiving support from other nations and companies, just as Bush noted (Turner 2013).
Eastern Congolese continue to speculate about the actual allegiances of various Congolese military figures, and even of President Joseph Kabila himself, imagining him to be “really” connected to a larger network that includes the Rwandan government (or to have at various points ordered the Congolese army to fall back in its battles against allegedly Rwandan-backed militias like M 23, the March 23rd Movement). The point is that, behind the conflicts that they are observing, Eastern Congolese are convinced that there is another, more meaningful and determining level of conflicts, which they struggle to comprehend and narrate. While Bush and many other Eastern Congolese may overstate the extent to which militias, states, companies, and ethnicized groups are networked together in a struggle for Congolese resources, their insights are also experientially true. As Turner puts it in reference to the war, “An elite network exported mineral and other wealth (including timber and coffee) from each of the three [occupied] zones [of the DRC]: Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan … the three networks varied in composition, and included Congolese, foreign Africans, and non-Africans of many nationalities (including Lebanese, Israelis, Indians, Pakistanis, Americans, Britons, and Belgians)” (Turner 2013: 158). Indeed, generating the right social networks, typically with militarized actors, became the main coping strategy for displaced people during the war, and mining provided a means for communities to accomplish this.15
The armies and militias that invaded the DR Congo waged a war on ordinary people and communities, as well as the means through which they produced their social and economic lives, incrementally. As Bush suggested, the dispossession of people from their livelihoods and their related capacity to produce incremental time was accomplished in large part through attacks on women, and through the impact these attacks had on families and larger communities (broken marriages, unwanted pregnancies, abandoned fields, etc.). Since women are the main agricultural producers in the DRC, and agriculture was the main source of livelihoods, the “war on women” has also been a war on agriculture and agricultural sustainability (see also Turner 2013). The outcome has been that men and women have been driven into the artisanal mining economy in one way or another, where they are [11]subject to the vagaries of prices for imported food and exported minerals. (Ironically, while mines were fought over during the war, they have often been safer places to live and work than the towns and fields that surround them, if only because soldiers need work to proceed regularly). The dollarization of the economy during the coltan boom of 2000 combined with decreased food production to exacerbate inflation, which was compounded by the gradual decline in the value of the dollar (Jackson 2002, 2003). Dollarization has fuelled the local conviction that foreigners are controlling economic processes and prices for their own benefit.
Despite the important aforementioned events, there is no single history of mining in the Eastern Congo, as these histories vary tremendously according to location. In some places, such as the towns of Kalima and Punia in Maniema, industrial mining towns have a long history: built as model towns, they came complete with picket fences, basketball courts, and swimming pools—at least for the company manager’s house. In other mining areas, such as much of Walikale and Masisi, mining companies conducted some surveys, but actual mining came much later and was pioneered by Congolese artisanal miners. Even where there were colonial mining towns, most Congolese were outsiders looking in, and throughout the region they remember legal and cultural prohibitions on mining (e.g., stories about how they were told that gold was poisonous, such that even touching it required incessant hand washing for long periods of time). Regardless of the region, most people were occupied with farming, some with grazing, and others still with hunting, and today claim that they knew little or nothing about the value of what was in the ground. Where there was a mining company, townspeople saw the planes going back and forth, and knew something of value was there, but they couldn’t distinguish one kind of “rock” from another, to say nothing of the mystery of price. While Mobutu Sese Seko is widely credited with liberalizing artisanal mining in the 1980s, most people say that it was the wars that introduced people to the real value of minerals. It was then that they saw Rwandan and other invaders dealing in them, and came to know their true worth, represented in price, a worth that was often realized through horrible and memorable acts of violence. While some of the worst violence of the period correlated with price increases for certain minerals (specifically, the coltan boom of late 2000, when prices went up tenfold), many miners and traders also point out that the price was especially good during that time, and that the war “democratized” mining (this is their phrasing).16
I have heard several different people in different mining areas say that they or other Congolese are now “addicted” to mining, likening it to a drug. In doing so, [12]they personalize their war-generated dependence on mining, discussing it as if it were a habit that has caused them to lose the ability to plan or to patiently wait for harvests. They make a similar argument about the indigenous Mai Mai militias that emerged to fight the invaders: many came to depend on minerals, lost their way, and became as ruthless as any other invading militia (when this happens, they are no longer considered “true” Mai Mai, who instead enjoy a coherent relationship to the ancestors and the past). Dependence on mining has continued even after conflict ceased, for several reasons: in certain cases, mining has ruined the agricultural topsoil; the destruction of basic infrastructure has made commercial agriculture difficult; and land titles are insecure, especially over longer periods.17 Today, the closer one is to a mine, the more difficult it is to get food, and certain mining areas depend entirely on food from other places (often urban areas or neighboring countries). Moreover, the availability of food depends on the outflow of minerals. For example, in Kailo, Maniema, where a small cassiterite and coltan mine was the only source of income for most people, I came to know one older man who claimed to have not seen an egg in thirty years, despite the fact that the area was ostensibly rural. He lamented that his twenty-something-year-old son had never seen this now almost mythical thing.
Indebtedness is yet another reason for regional dependence on mining, as people stay at the mines to try to pay off their debts or to escape their debts. The worst of these debts were generated during the Congolese war, just before the prices dropped, leaving people with what they often describe as “sand.” For example, one of the most violent and well-known militia leaders, Cheka, started off as a coltan miner in Walikale; he found himself indebted to soldiers (by most accounts, Rwandan), and formed a militia to earn their money back, allegedly using weapons he received from these soldiers. Debts between transactors are generated in multiple ways (as, for example, when a financier or buyer agrees to finance another buyer’s trip to the forest but doesn’t receive the money back; or when a buyer agrees to purchase a certain amount of coltan but then is told by the seller that the money received was too little, after the fact; or when a digger gives money to a trader to go to the city and buy tools that never materialize). But the volatility of price is the main, underlying reason that transactors give for these conflicts over money owed: the mines in the forest are usually far from the towns and, given the state of infrastructure, the trip can take some time and be beset with obstacles. By the time a negociant reaches the city, the price is likely to have changed, and the buyer may be unable to pay off his financers or satisfy his buyers (or, alternatively, he might stay at the mines interminably, waiting for the price to go up, and spending money throughout). The problem of indebtedness informs the practice, on the part of miners and traders, of establishing reliable social networks by coming up with agreements about price that endure regardless of what happens to “the market.” In recent years, indebtedness has been made worse by the international response to “conflict minerals” and the resulting stagnation in the “3 Ts” mineral trade.
For a decade now, a group of international NGOs have joined journalists and others in making the case for “conflict-free minerals” by arguing that our demand [13]for minerals—and our consumption of high-tech electronics—has funded lawlessness and war in the DR Congo.18 The work of NGOs like the Enough Project and Global Witness resulted ultimately in different forms of “conflict minerals” legislation, notably Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Known as “Obama’s Law” in Congo, it compels American companies to reveal whether the columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold, or wolframite in their products originated in the DRC or any adjoining country, to report on the “due diligence” undertaken to examine the supply chain, and to take measures if the minerals are not “conflict free.”19 The law informed President Joseph Kabila’s decision to shut down the artisanal mineral trade in the Eastern Congo for six months in 2010. When he did this, prices and production in the Kivus and Maniema each decreased by between 80 percent and 90 percent, leaving people with few opportunities and causing many to join the very militias that the law’s passing was intended to squelch (Matthysen and Montejano 2014). Eastern Congolese tended to see the law as a maneuver in the war over price (an attempt by the United States to help Rwandan smugglers to control the trade and so get a better price), and Kabila’s move as an attack on Eastern Congolese by the government in Kinshasa. Today, a network of transnational actors, which includes high-tech companies (e.g., Intel and Apple), NGOs, and the International Tin Research Institute (ITRI, an organization of smelters), hopes to reopen the Congo to legal international business. They have developed tracking schemes to ensure that the minerals that go into microprocessors and other devices are “conflict free” (Pistilli 2010; Leshnev and Bafilemba 2014). But as of now, their schemes—such as ITRI’s “bag and tag” initiative—are locally understood as an exogenous effort to control the price by limiting the number of legal middlemen and buying houses. “Regulation” is yet another prong in the ongoing war over price.
Even thought the “3 T” mineral trade has been in a slump since 2010 for the reasons discussed above, the potential for these minerals to act as conduits to alternative worlds is a major part of the collective memory of miners and traders, who traverse a leftover landscape still known by the names conferred upon places during the time of “may it never end” (bisikatike). To provide a better sense of how price fluctuations are experienced, let’s move on to the Maniema Province iterations of the United States of America and Kigali, and the simulacral war that kept them going for a time.


Vignette #2: Price fluctuations produce wormholes
The mine known as Les Etats Unis, or the United States of America, is a memorable place, where people made a true fortune from their sweat. From a distant, hardto-reach forest in the middle of nowhere, the United States grew into a nation of [14]immigrants almost overnight, and all in the midst of one of the most destructive wars the world has ever seen. As one former miner man remembered,

When you were approaching the United States of America, before you even saw it, you could hear it. It sounded like a great torrent of rushing water, but that’s not what it was. It was the sound of people at work, all the people digging. The movement! You’d find workers from Senegal, from Nigeria, even from Kenya.
In the beginning, there was no government to speak of in the United States, but over time the Mai Mai army brought law: “The more people worked, the stronger the Mai Mai army grew. They grew rich from the 50 percent that they earned from the diggers.” But even then, like its namesake, the United States of America was known as a relatively liberal place with many freedoms and this helped to make it a land of opportunity: “A person could go from nothing to something, and no one cared who you were or where you were from, what your ethnicity was, so long as you were strong, and could work.” Because so many people wanted to go there, and there was a constant threat to security, when a newcomer visited the United States of America she had to apply for a visa: “They gave you an identification card, and the Mai Mai told you, ‘Welcome. You are in the United States of America now, another country. You have left Congo behind.’ ” There were customs officials there, inspecting goods, assessing value, and placing tax.
But the citizens of the United States of America were living on borrowed money, and this indebtedness created problems in the long run. As another recalled,

When you left the United States and walked out of the forest, one of the first places you came to was called Kigali 2. The market in Kigali 2 was lined with the tents of prominent Rwandan generals. They had with them all of the things they had looted from Congo, and many things they had brought with them from Rwanda, like mobile phones. They gave these things to traders who were on their way to the United States of America.
The Rwandan military figures had their own network of buyers, a market, and they had come with motorcycles, televisions, radios, and money. But the most commonly traded items were mobile phones, which people in this region claim to have first seen during the war. The phones were brought by Rwandan soldiers, who were also after the coltan that was, unbeknownst to Congolese at the time, a constituent component of these phones. The very expensive Sim cards were also manufactured by a Rwandan company, and these days people joke about how they were “raped” (kubakwa) at every turn: first their things were taken away from them, then they were thrown about and displaced. And finally they had to pay the Rwandan companies exorbitant prices when they wanted to use phones they bought from Rwandans to reconnect with the people who had been torn from them because of the war with Rwanda. Mobile phones and other goods were given to Congolese coltan middlemen on credit, which turned out to be quite dangerous when prices suddenly fell:

People thought [the boom] would last forever, and this is why it was called the time of “bisikatike” (let it not be broken, or may it go on forever). But when the price for coltan dropped, people were unable to [15]pay back their creditors. I lent someone 5,000 dollars during the time of bisikatike and then the price collapsed. This man didn’t have my money, but he eventually went to work at a cassiterite mine to make it up for me. This debt, this is why no one who mined coltan ever returned to farming.
Nowadays, the United States has returned to being a forest and, in the village of Mgongo (Kigali 2), sometimes one can’t even buy a bar of soap, the loaded icon whose absence many Eastern Congolese use to signify absolute poverty.20 Its residents are left to wince at the name Kigali 2, the only moniker outsiders know their village by, since the term implies that they were traitors who assisted the Rwandans during the war—the smear is the only thing that remains of that time, while the real Kigali enjoys near-unlimited Wi-Fi thanks to Congo’s minerals. If the larger-thanlife fantastical miracle of Mgongo has become pathetic once again, new miracles have popped up to replace that one. Often these towns spring up from different substances, and perhaps the next new town will explode from a substance that Congolese people don’t even have a word for yet. Such possible artisanal futures fascinate traders and diggers, who easily remember when they had never heard of wolframite and other minerals. For example, when the price for coltan fell, it left a large itinerant population hanging around in the forest between Punia and Walikale, far from home. Many of them were heavy with loans they needed to pay back to soldiers and businessmen; others simply didn’t have the wherewithal to move. When an Mkumu trapper discovered cassiterite and bauxite in Bisie in 2002, just one year after coltan prices collapsed, those who had been in The United States joined others in the rush through the miles of torturous trails to that place in the middle of the rainforest. Bisie became a city of nearly 20,000 almost overnight, the largest artisanal mine in the Congo (recently made famous by the television show Vice). Its rapid emergence from nothing in the middle of the forest showed that anything could happen, and that success consists in being ready to move and to adapt to changing conditions by developing and breaking off social connections as need be, while learning about the new and changing manifestations of the constant truth that is Congolese value.21
There was more going on in the United States and Kigali 2 than rapid movement, I would suggest. Rather, there was a transformation of reality, and of space and time, evoked in the change of names. These were not the only places that came to life in the forest: near Punia alone there is still Modern Times (Les Temps Modern), Kuwait, Last Chance, Morocco, Leave the World Behind, Find Your Own, Grab Your Own, End of Life. All signify a rare rupture in space-time—a quickly emerging opening that is likely to close up just as quickly.22 Such moments also have the [16]potential to rupture the relationship between signs and referents, distorting reality. The resulting confusion extended to the everyday experience of the war itself. A coltan trader who worked in the United States at the time remembered how this trade worked, and how cooperation depended on the appearance of violent conflict in order to continue. This dissimulation intensified alongside price increases. As he explained it, in the beginning, Congolese commanders in the RCD who sympathized with Mai Mai would use their mobile phones to communicate with Mai Mai officers, discussing terms with the leaders and exchanging minerals for guns. Later, when prices shot up, even Rwandan officers and Mai Mai engaged directly in this trade of minerals for guns:

This is how it worked. The Mai Mai would go to the RCD officers with coltan, and when the RCD would come to get this coltan they would come with guns, and they would make a lot of noise with their weapons, pretending to be under attack. Then they would go away, leaving their guns behind. Everyone thought that a battle had taken place, but it had not—the Rwandans got coltan, which they used to make money for themselves, and the Mai Mai got guns.
In a related vein, others discuss how war-making consisted in an attempt to fix reality, as when soldiers tried to identify the “true” nature of civilians’ loyalties by tasting their soup: salt in a soup might indicate trade relationships with Mai Mai, for example, since planes had stopped landing and only militarized groups had access to these resources.
If price fluctuations can distort reality and create wormholes, predictable price can also stabilize it, and having access to the right social networks can be the most viable way of accomplishing this goal. But even if a relationship can be established and realized in a known price, there remains an even deeper problem—mainly that Congolese do not know or control what is in demand. And it very often seems that what is demanded is their own capacity to live and work—that is, their bodies, and even their bodies’ disparate parts.


Vignette #3: On information asymmetry
When I started doing research with miners, the main thing they wanted to talk to me about was price. When I asked them what the stuff they were mining was for they said they didn’t know and didn’t care—they just wanted to know the “true price,” which they believed I must know because of my relative social proximity to the people who set the price. [A couple years later, they began consistently saying that Rwandans used these minerals to make the bullets that they used to kill them with (some claimed that President Kabila had said this on the radio).] I soon discovered that, when people asked me questions about price, they were also asking [17]me to develop a direct relationship with them, and to cut through the disinformation and dissimulation that characterized the trade so that they could predict and make plans. Diggers and middlemen, or negociants, were locked in a conflict with one another over price, and together they also struggled with other state “tax” collectors and regulators who also had their own price.
They were convinced that true price was being hidden from them and used against them. They saw the absence of roads as a plan hatched by politicians to keep the price for minerals low. They held that foreign powers colluded with the president of Congo to determine the price for local minerals, and conflicts spiked and abated as a result. Wars were said to begin when foreign nations become jealous of Congo’s wealth and of Kabila’s exclusive relationship with others; these foreigners used other nation states and militias to force their way into the market. Some even claimed that the “failure” of their state was part of an international plan to destroy Congolese sovereignty—that the multiplicity of monads assessing “tax” on the ground was the outcome of a unified design hatched in foreign lands.
Though price seems, to Congolese, to be manipulated by outsiders, there are many things that they can do to affect price: Cartels of middlemen can collaborate with each other to set the price, naming themselves cooperatives and agreeing to only buy at a certain set price. Groups of diggers can try to do the same, and can use social pressure or even the threat of violence to make sure that minerals are sold at a certain price. They can also come together to resist the importation of machines by foreign investors (as they did in Bisie), just as local authorities can cooperate in forcing buyers to recognize the rights of all state and state like authorities to receive tax. In all cases, these groups will try to justify their positions by referencing a supposedly “true” price that they claim exists elsewhere. Other price fixing practices include “sitting on” minerals in the hopes that the price will change and calling friends or partners in the city to determine the “true price.” Mobile phones are especially important for diggers, who lack other means for negotiating the current price in relation to middlemen. Indeed, so crucial is the use of mobile phones that middlemen prefer doing business in towns that don’t have cell phone towers, even if these places are more dangerous (which they invariably are).
Being out of the loop with regards to the flow of knowledge in what some regard to be the Information Age can take many, unpredictable forms. In a village on Idjwi Island, on the lake that separates DR Congo from Rwanda, I was eating dinner together with a group of friends, all of them involved in the mineral trade as diggers or low level buyers, when there was a knock on the door. The owner of the house arose to answer it, and went outside for a bit, murmuring clandestinely with the visitor. After a few minutes, he returned to sit at the table, looked at me and offered, “Do you want to buy an albino skeleton? There’s a guy who has one to sell.” Apparently, the visitor had heard there was an American around and, believing there was a foreign demand for albino skeletons, decided to try his luck, just as others had been doing with various stones and minerals, from gold to garnet. After expressing genuine surprise and rejecting the offer, I asked “But what do people want albino skeletons for?” My friend’s adroit response was, “Well, you’re the one who can tell us that.” After all, like all other valuable substances, the demand came from outside and I alone would be expected to have information about use, value, and price.
[18]From there, the topic shifted to hangman’s ropes, which they saw as being related to the albino trade. The owner of the house went on to explain that people in this community know that there is a foreign demand for these two things (albinos and ropes that have been used to murder someone, or to hang oneself). But, like minerals, the substances are processed and put to use elsewhere. While they were able to speculate on their uses, it was crucial for those at the table that the demand came from outside, where people had the knowledge needed to turn albino parts and hangman’s ropes into something else. This external demand had created a local demand, which led to people feeding off of the population in a search for exportable albino skeletons and ropes. The concern about these murders seemed real enough, but there was a lot of mystery surrounding it. Many people in this town insisted that gangs of youth were involved in murdering people with ropes and selling the ropes to outsiders. Some said that, to be valuable, the ropes should be used to murder albinos but others said it didn’t matter, that any rope that had been in touch with death would do. In general, they said that suicides were quite rare.
According to one of my interlocutors, the foreign demand for albinos had led to an albino rush, culminating in the murder of nonalbinos, or counterfeit albinos, when genuine albinos ran out. After all, you can’t tell if a corpse is an albino once the skin is removed, and it is the intact organs and bones (including eyes, tongues, and heart) that are most useful. Ropes are used to murder albinos in order to keep the organs intact. The rope was therefore a by-product of the albino trade: “Ropes are like wolframite,” he offered, referring to the ore from which tungsten is derived. Wolframite is found alongside coltan and cassiterite, and came to be known as a valuable and marketable commodity relatively recently, after the coltan and cassiterite booms. In a similar vein, ropes came to be known as valuable as a result of the trade in albinos, as an ancillary product, demanded by those higher up in the “commodity chain,” who had discovered uses for these ropes unknown to “producers.”
One person at the table disagreed with this analysis and insisted that the uses of rope are separate from the uses of albinos: any rope used by a suicide victim (albino or not) is of value, but ropes that are used to murder someone are not actually valuable, he claimed. They are wrongly passed off as the ropes of suicide victims, and the foreigners who buy them are getting a raw deal. Therefore, there is a trade in counterfeit ropes as well as counterfeit albinos. Like the others, he insisted that, “The thing is that Congolese people do not know what these ropes are used for. The demand for them is international.” He explained that the trade is organized by Rwandan Tutsis with military connections, who use Congolese middlemen to collect the skeletons and the ropes, while remaining in the background. Crucial was the fact that these ropes pass through commodity chains identical to those that minerals pass through: the same buying houses, or comptoirs, are involved. They were convinced that some of the Congolese agents of these Rwandans had already been arrested and were in jail in Bukavu.
Finally, another friend raised his voice and declared, “No! This is not the real reason behind the demand for these ropes!” The startling and ironic truth, he explained, was that there was no longer any international demand for suicide ropes at all, though once there had been. Rather, young men on Idjwi Island believed there was demand and continued to murder people in the hopes that they would [19]find a market for these ropes, but the demand created by the rope bubble had existed only for a brief moment in time. In truth, he explained, some years back there was a German NGO that was trying to ascertain the reason people in South Kivu were committing suicide so they could do something about it. The scientists who worked for this NGO collected the ropes of the deceased from the families of people who had committed suicide. They then inserted these ropes into a computer that could tell them the conditions under which the person died, including what the person was thinking and feeling when she or he passed, and the general conditions that were producing suffering for everyone. The idea was that the ropes registered these feelings and troubles, which a computer could then read, and the scientists could go about proposing solutions to societal problems. When the NGO was around, these ropes were actually going for a very high price, and so there was indeed a very brief trade in ropes that had been in contact with death. Only now, because of their “stupidity,” people continue to act as if this market exists when it doesn’t, because the NGO left years ago, leaving people high and dry as they so often do.23 Peoples’ behavior, my friend went on, was generally symptomatic of the lack of market information people have with respect to what is in demand at any given moment.
A couple years later, I heard the same story about hangman’s ropes in another South Kivu village, but the narrative had changed somewhat: now it was said that ropes that had been used to murder people (not suicide ropes) were going for a lot of money. People told stories about poor men, usually house servants, who were informed by others that, if they called a particular mobile phone number after murdering so-and-so with a rope, the person at the end of the line would pick up the rope in exchange for $5,000. In these stories, the poor man would invariably kill the mark “on spec,” only to find that no one was on the other end of the line when it came time to make the call. Still, nobody knew why there was a demand for the ropes, but they knew that this demand came from outside: the most likely culprits were MONUSCO (the military wing of the United Nations, largely Pakistani) and Rwanda. Frequently, both were said to be operating together, as they were known to have done with respect to the smuggling of minerals like coltan.
It would certainly be possible to break down some of the elements in these stories (perhaps starting with albinos and ropes) and construct a social history for these loaded objects. One could complement this with an investigation of actual instances of murder and suicide to see what “really” happened, and how the “reality” aligned with or differed from the representations. It would definitely be good to know how many people were being murdered in South Kivu and why, and perhaps this would return us to a number of aforementioned issues, including interpersonal debt. I don’t have all of these answers as of now. But what I would like to focus on in [20]this narrative is the commitment to the concept of there being an unknown and capricious demand from Outside, which could settle on anything and cause desperate people to act against all moral sense at a moment’s notice. (After hearing the story, I wrote, “Everything is to be used!” in my notebook, to draw attention to how this extractive economy turns everything into a possible resource.) This was the foundational subtext underlying all the variations in the story, from when I first heard it until now. Also underlying all of these stories was the awareness that Eastern Congolese suffer from a temporal lag vis-à-vis more powerfully networked outsiders: they may be acting in one way, perhaps at the expense of everyone around then, when circumstances actually call for something else entirely.
The rumors and stories that circulate in this out-of-sync space strain to keep up with what’s going on “out there,” where the markets are imagined to be, but end up leading people to act in totally divergent ways that may very well have nothing to do with anything (encouraging people to collect hangman’s ropes when there is no actual demand for them, for example). The resulting horror is that a life that had a value and no price can be turned into something with a valuable but unknown price only to become a thing with no price and no value. When that happens, people are truly at the end of their ropes, so to speak. It is hard to imagine a more dramatic iteration of the consequences of what the economist Joseph Stiglitz has called “information asymmetry,” where one party in a transaction has vastly more information than another (Stiglitz 2013). I am confident that my friends would have agreed with the economists who claim that “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” are among the consequences of inequality in knowledge and knowledgeable social networks.
Some of these stories have been pretty harrowing, I know. And for good reason, considering what people have experienced, and how the loss of incrementally generative social resources has forced people to respond to unstable prices. But there are somewhat more positive stories, perhaps a bit harder to find and requiring a little more interpretation. I’d like to turn now to the King of Cassiterite, a man who domesticated the state and planned for the future despite the rumors that surrounded him—who, even though he was a miner of tin, understood that the most valuable Congolese resources were people and fungible social networks, not things in the ground.


Vignette #4: The king of cassiterite
La Gomme is a man of a little less than forty years of age from the city of Kisangani, who now leases an artisanal cassiterite mine in Chamaka (in Maniema Province), a full day’s walk from the town of Punia, through the forest and across a river. Both Punia and Chamaka were at one time company mining towns operated by a Belgian mining company, which was later taken over by the a joint venture of mining companies and government called SOMINKI (Societe Miniere et Industrielle du Kivu). It continued to be managed by Belgians until the mid-1980s, when the price of tin crashed and SOMINKI turned to gold. Now the area is technically owned by another company in which the state has a share—SAKIMA (Societe Aurifere du Kivu et du Maniema), which leases out space to people like La Gomme. In the town of Punia and the mine at Chamaka, the halcyon days of industrial mining [21]and the formal employment that came with it serve as a baseline for most every thing that is said, thought, and done today. It wasn’t just that people back then had jobs and income (how many really did?) but rather that the state and the company, seemingly conjoined as a single entity, seemed able to produce a consistent, incrementally realized social order through the regulation of work and the disciplining of ordinary people (to this day, Saturday is Siku ya Posho, or day of the portion, or salary/ration).24 At least in senior people’s memories of that time, the company and seniors collaborated to create and manage a moral economy in which traditional values (Belgian and Congolese) held sway, and in which no moment was unaccounted for.25 After all, the Belgians supposedly “hated idleness” and made sure everyone was working all the time, even if they had to resort to violence to do so. In Punia and the forest town of Chamaka, people would get excited when they saw me because they hoped that maybe a real company was coming back, one that would bring jobs and set about production. What could they do or tell me, they wanted to know, to make this happen faster?
Moreover, the state officials in Punia were notoriously aggressive in their pursuit of miners’ income, and the presence of a company might keep this in check. It seemed like every single state official was trying to make money off of miners by “selling” them papers to do business.26 Since, in Punia, mining was the only real game in town, state officials didn’t let go of diggers just because the price went down due to the decline of outside demand—they increased the pressure. Ultimately, in the mine at Kasese in 2012 and 2013, miners took to hiring a Mai Mai group, Raia Mtomboki (“the infuriated citizens”) to protect them from state officials and to help them to find an alternative route for their minerals, so they wouldn’t have to pass through the legal channels, including the distant and difficult to reach provincial capital of Kindu.27
It is against this backdrop of nostalgia for the company that people in Punia and nearby Chamaka understand artisanal mining as a chaotic, unpredictable, and immoral (if also necessary) activity. And it’s against this memory of industrial mining that La Gomme (the rubbers, or flip-flops) is understood in Punia. La Gomme, whom they say used to bathe in beer just because he could, made all his money from mining and selling cassiterite. Like the dirt La Gomme mined, there was never anything glamorous about him—he was a simple, uneducated person—but he was [22]for a time the most fabulously wealthy man in Punia, and that’s why he gave himself that self-effacing praise name, La Gomme. You might be ashamed to enter the city of Kisangani without good shoes, and your friends might look down on you for having to wear them, but at the end of the day everyone has to go to the bathroom, and so everyone has to wear la gomme. And so too anyone in Punia who wanted anything would sooner or later have to come to La Gomme, the despised, lookeddown-on thing that everybody needs and that is proof of the basic sameness of everyone. People also called La Gomme kikombe, or cup, because everybody had to drink from him, and little kids used to sing a song about how La Gomme was the father of the WC, the king of the toilet.
People said that La Gomme made his wealth through a sacrifice. They said it was his mother who helped him get rich, by sacrificing someone’s life (exactly who no one knew), so that La Gomme could find seemingly endless cassiterite. His mother never got anything enduring from that sacrifice and she must have been angry, because all the cassiterite La Gomme found he gave away to women or sold to buy things he now no longer has. La Gomme made so much money from his line up in Chamaka that he didn’t know what to do with it all—people said that it was his mentality, the fact that he “couldn’t see far,” couldn’t plan, or make good investments. Like all artisanal miners, he didn’t know anything beyond what he immediately experienced and couldn’t imagine a future beyond the here and now. He was just like Lungwa 4, another local antihero who made a fortune out of gold. Lungwa 4 bought a huge stereo and hired a guy to carry it behind him when he walked through the forest. Then he bought a car battery for the stereo and paid for another guy to follow the guy with the stereo. And all of these guys were surrounded by another fleet of guys with umbrellas as well as guards to protect Lungwa 4, his stereo, and the battery when they walked through the forest to his mine.
When people came to La Gomme to buy cassiterite, they would come with things like motorbikes and stereos and leave them outside the door to his place in Chamaka. La Gomme never inspected the things—he would just say, “leave the stuff there.” Or he would let people walk away with 500 kilos of cassiterite at whatever price popped into his head (say 15 dollars a kilo), usually way below the actual price. He was, it seemed, recklessly indifferent to the price of these things, but for a while it didn’t matter. So many people wanted access to his mine, or the cassiterite that came from it, that to even talk to him you needed to bring two goats. So if twenty people came to talk to La Gomme today, there would be forty goats in front of his place at the end of the day. Eventually, La Gomme had accumulated a whole lot of motorcycles and he needed to get rid of this stuff, so one day he had all of these bikes transported by truck to the town of Punia and, when that happened, the police confiscated everything. This, after all, was a visible form of wealth upon which they could levy tax. When La Gomme got the cell phone call saying that his things had been confiscated, he invited the police up to his carriere, or mine/ workplace, but first he rented a generator from Sakima so they could talk in the light. And so the police and La Gomme sat down and discussed, and La Gomme agreed to pay a certain amount of money to the police, after they had established the appropriate price.
La Gomme wanted something in return from the police: to effectively shut down the state for a period of one month. He demanded that all drivers in Punia [23]be able to come and go as they please without buying licenses or paying tickets—there should be no police on the road at all. This was agreed to, after which he earned copious praise, because all the motorcycle taxi drivers went around singing his name—“hey, La Gomme, La Gomme!!”—and there were parades when he came to town. But making the state disappear for a month was only the beginning for La Gomme. So many state officials were still coming to him, looking to collect tax, that he decided to become the state himself—La Gomme went to Kisangani, and paid off some bigwig in ANR (Agence Nationale de Renseignement), the not-so-secret Congolese police (like the FBI), so that he could become the director of ANR in Chamaka. Once that happened, La Gomme was the state—the other state authorities no longer had any authority over him, and so mostly left him alone.
But at some point, the stories went, things went downhill—most said it was the fact that La Gomme’s wealth was the product of a sacrifice, the fruits of which are always ephemeral. In any event, suddenly La Gomme had, or seemed to have, nothing. He lost all of his things and all of his women, and he became an example of what happens when you can’t see far. In general, the discourse about La Gomme was ambivalent: yes, he was great and worthy of praise and he did manage to sequester the state, but he was also stupid and short sighted. He had money but he never built anything that lasted and now it was gone. One young woman talked about how she met him on the way to school one day and he said that she was beautiful. She responded that she had no time for him, that she was going to school. And he asked her why she should go there in the first place: he would buy her, the school, and the teachers, destroying in one gesture the most generative of Congolese social practices—marriage and education (or at least that’s how others interpreted all of this).
I was wary of taking these rumors about La Gomme as literal truths. After all, living “in the moment” can be at once a strategy and a quality that is imputed to people by those higher up in the social order (Day, Papataxiarchis, and Steward 1998). To learn more about the man behind the story, I decided to walk through the forest to see La Gomme, informed by all the rumors that I had heard about the young man who knew nothing but the ups and downs of artisanal mining and who therefore was incapable of seeing far, and of conceptualizing the day after tomorrow. On the way, we either passed through or came fairly close to a number of other mines whose names spoke to the new, otherworldly, extreme, and risky character of artisanal mining and the mineral trade.
When we finally made it up to the town of Chamaka, we were, as usual, confronted with state authority, particularly DGM, the official representing immigration. I won’t delve into all of the various rituals of state-making that Charles, the DGM official, went through with his stamp and pen and uniform, or the lengthy discussions that took place afterward about what his job was, or what DGM was for, and what the state was—except to say they took place in a French that grew increasingly eloquent, as the state became ever more reified and imaginary, and that the conversation included miners and traders, SAESSCAM, SAKIMA, and my research assistant. At bottom, the discussion concerned what the appropriate fee, or price, of an immigration official should be in the forest, when there is no border anywhere nearby. For his part, Charles was convinced that I was the grandson of [24]one of the former managers of SOMINKI, and that a store of cassiterite had been hidden long ago and no one knew where, except for me. I had come to find it and Charles wasn’t going to let me out of his sight (he wanted his cut).
The next day, we walked to La Gomme’s mine and, as soon as we arrived, Charles rushed to La Gomme and asked him for “rice” and “cooking fat” for having brought me, a potential business partner, to him. Charles called it his frais de mission, the price of his work. Over the next few days, I got to know La Gomme a little better, and one of the first things I came to know was that his father was the chief of engineering when the company was there and had taught him everything he needed to know about that particular site (he had maps), as well as how to go about mining. La Gomme had been studying this since he was a kid. His father had long since passed away and La Gomme, coming into adulthood in a time when there was no company, abandoned any hopes of becoming part of it and instead struck out on his own, negotiating with state figures and easily finding cheap labor—people who had been tossed around by war and ended up with nothing.
La Gomme turned out to be nothing like his image of a loud, self-aggrandizing fool. He was soft-spoken (even shy), self-effacing, and detail oriented. And, rather than having his sights on every woman in the world, as per the rumor, he seemed particularly upset about an old flame who had jilted him and left him hurt. La Gomme was very proud of his loyal and well-oiled operation that, he was quick to point out, was more productive and faster than a “machine” (his words). And he was equally proud of the way he had worked to keep the state in check— he did confirm, somewhat shamefacedly, the stories about shutting down the police and becoming ANR. And he was proud of the money that he gave to ordinary people to build roads and bridges and pay for kids to go to school—acts of reciprocity and community-building that everyone confirmed he did in fact do.
Over time, he explained to me the organization of his mine, which varies depending on a variety of factors: La Gomme has to be prepared to expand and contract when necessary. When I met him they were in a state of expansion in a new mine, and were expecting to be producing in earnest in a couple of days—hence the delays. La Gomme explained how he, the PDG (La Premiere Director General or President Director General, a CEO) is the head of the carriere, which means that his job includes but is not limited to organizing “traditional” matters for the mine— he negotiates with the senior representatives of the land, as well as the company SAKIMA. Under him is the director general, who is concerned with the whole administration of the carriere. And then there is the director of finances, a treasurer. There is the director of mines, who deals with wachimbaji, or diggers, and there is a mwandishi, or secretary. Then there is a Chef de Camp, who inspects the entire camp and where people are working. There is the Commisaire ya Madini, police who protect people in the carriere and who are concerned with security and regimentation, making sure that work starts at 8 a.m. and ends at 6 p.m. There is the Chef de Chantier, who coordinates work among all the different holes. The Chef de Secteur works with the Chef de Chantier to observe the organization of work. And so on, and so on. The point was that it was highly organized and that this organization interacted with the state but was not subsumed by it, or created by it. The terms were borrowed from the old company days, and drew attention to those days, remembering and reproducing them. Nor were these terms La Gomme’s invention: [25]they circulate throughout the artisanal mines of the Eastern Congo, recuperating an imagined social order from the past (see also Nest 2011).
These days it is not trendy to point out the difference between people’s beliefs and reality—we anthropologists are often expected to drop the concept of belief entirely and treat everything as an equivalent “force” in the world (indeed, part of my argument, in this piece, is that Congolese stories about their extractive economy are often very accurate interpretations of how “interscalar” systems operate). Leaving aside the value of this, I couldn’t help but be drawn to the radical difference between the stories people told about La Gomme and what I saw in La Gomme. So, when I returned home from Chamaka I put people in Punia to task about La Gomme: There was no way La Gomme sacrificed people to find that vein of cassiterite. His dad was an engineer. And he wasn’t some caricature of the artisanal miner, concerned only about the present moment—he was in fact quite the planner and architect, not only of mines but of social forms, which he cultivated as if they were, in his own words, machines. And really, wasn’t it possible to see a positive plan in La Gomme’s practice: whenever he could, he collapsed or took over the predatory state and supplanted it with another form of organization. And his practice also envisioned a social future in which the state was no longer necessary—didn’t he give out gifts to people who built roads and bridges of their own volition, without any help from the state? And wasn’t he the best, or most unobtrusive, ANR that Punia had ever seen?
Invariably, my interlocutors agreed with me—La Gomme’s dad was a chief engineer. The mines are organized. And, yes, La Gomme turned out to be a pretty nice guy. But the stories about La Gomme continued and, I was surprised to discover, some of my very friends who confirmed everything I said about La Gomme to be true, also persisted in telling these stories about how, for example, La Gomme’s mother had sacrificed a loved one so La Gomme could have that cassiterite. Why, I wondered, is there this discrepancy between what I saw as the reality of La Gomme (a man who outmaneuvered and out-tricked the state, while trying to develop sustainable social networks outside of it) and the narratives that people spun about La Gomme, as destroying incremental time so that he could enrich himself at the expense of others, without even realizing that the fruits of such momentary sacrifice are always unsustainable?
The answer, I think, is this: In these stories, the possibility of a society without oppressive state authorities, in which people voluntarily contribute to the improvement of their world, is acknowledged (after all, La Gomme is praised) and then foreclosed (he is also ridiculed) in favor of a society that values education, jobs, and functioning state institutions. Because ultimately these stories about artisanal miners sacrificing the future valorize formal employment, steady wages, and secure futures, and in them the artisanal miner is the scapegoat, the sacrificial lamb, for all that is wrong in the society. The true potential of the artisanal miners, and of artisanal production broadly conceived, is acknowledged and then disavowed in favor of a future based on formal employment and a rehabilitated state. But through it all, La Gomme continues his work, day by day. And he continues to enact a certain kind of state-like network by providing for others and modeling a potential incremental future—even if others sometimes see him as being synonymous with the “punctuated time” of here and now neoliberal capitalism (Guyer 2007). Most [26]important of all, he does everything he can to build working networks of young men who had little else to live for—most of them had lost everything in the war and had gone through truly horrible events—so that he can live without having to compel others to pay a particular price. While state officials go about demanding their “price” for nothing at all, La Gomme neglects to follow up on what things are “worth,” using the wealth of his social infrastructure (reviled by others as it might be) to make more wealth. No wonder he is sometimes reviled for not knowing about the price of things when there is clearly a war over price.


Revisiting the war over price
There is a joke told by a Congolese stand-up comic who performs in Europe, whose routine is known by many Congolese. The story is retold in many different venues and the shortened, redacted version goes something like this: George H. W. Bush, Queen Elizabeth, and former Congolese President Mobutu are all dead and in hell. They want to communicate with people on earth, either because they have or want information, but they can’t because hell is in a totally different dimension. But Satan has a special, interdimensional mobile phone, which he can use to connect to his lovers on earth. The three of them harass Satan until he allows them to use the phone for a price. Satan charges Elizabeth thousands of dollars for a couple minutes, and he charges Bush even more. But when Mobutu uses the phone, he talks for hours and only pays two dollars. When the others complain about the injustice, Satan says Mobutu has to pay less because they’re on the same network. The joke is supposed to be that Congo and hell are experientially close to one another, and so a Congolese person should be expected to pay less than a Briton, and far less than an American. But the lesson that is often derived from this joke, when people tell it at weddings or in bars, is that it’s very important to have friends—that the right social networks can collapse space-time and make all manner of things possible. A good price is the representation and outcome of these good relations over expansive space and a bad price is the result of unbridgeable distance between people involved in transactions. Sometimes this distance is so great that it is synonymous with a state of war (which is not to say that when there is war, prices are low, because the opposite is usually true).
To clarify the point of the narratives I have selected above, the main Congolese understanding of the war over price goes something like this, with variations. Minerals do not have a “real price” that is relevant to anyone (say, in the sense of what Adam Smith [(1776) 1976] referred to as the “natural price,” or the price of producing a thing). Rather, the price is always reached through an agreement between transactors. People are out there agreeing to buy and sell minerals at a certain rate, and the price one is able to get for one’s minerals depends on how good one’s connections are with others, and who those people are. If you are far down on the ladder and don’t have connections with people higher up, there are those who will try to force a particular price on you, either by compelling you, ganging up against you, or preventing you from having access to information (i.e., when middlemen form a cartel or try to do business in a place with no cell phone tower). For creseurs, the most immediate obstacle are the coalitions of petit negociants, or lower-level [27]middlemen, often backed by powerful people in the background, who set the price and try to limit their access to other buyers and to knowledge about price.
The situation is complicated by the fact that multiple state and extrastate actors (e.g., competing lineages with different bundles of customary rights over land) are trying to get their proper price as well, and this can eat into everyone’s profits, making it so the primary buyer doesn’t get the minerals for the agreed upon price.28 Maneuvering is ongoing, and happens in relation to real-time events, especially price fluctuations. For example, if a military figure is in control of a mine, collecting tax, he may order his men to take over the most productive holes, or all of the holes, when the price goes high, perhaps allowing other braches of government, like immigration or the Ministry of Mines, to use workers to dig in certain holes for a period of time so they’re not left completely out of the picture (this happened when I was in Minova in 2009 and 2011). Meanwhile—at least according to the understandings of people involved in the mineral trade—people at the higher end of the “commodity chain,” such as Congolese politicians, will do what they can try to keep the price they pay as low as possible. They’ll use their position to make life difficult for Congolese in mining regions, such that people in the rural areas don’t have a lot of options (by making sure roads aren’t built, the planes don’t run on time, etc.). This situation leads to higher prices for food around the mines, and side-investments in things like the bullets hunters use to kill forest animals to feed the miners (I have seen that bullets and meat can become the center of investment bubbles in the forest, sometimes resulting in the death of all the animals). Whatever happens, those at the lower end of this commodity chain are so cut off from the flow of information that it is conceivable that a person could even end up murdering someone for no reason based on a rumor (as in the story of the hangman’s ropes).
But all of this is just one dimension of the war over price. All of this maneuvering over price, this war of position, takes place within certain defined limits. The outer limit of these struggles over price is what Congolese call “true price.” True price is not the “natural price,” but the price established by an agreement among the most powerful people involved in the transaction chain, typically the presidents of nation states and the heads of corporations. According to the explanations of Eastern Congolese involved in the artisanal mineral trade, the “true” value of Congolese minerals is defined by the agreement reached between these subjects.29 That [28]is the price that people outside of Congo, the smelters, will expect to pay for these minerals, and the price that an American, for example, should be familiar with. When there is peace, the president has the capacity to define that price with a view to what all the various Congolese transactors are likely to get as a percentage of that true price, although he cannot control how it all works out, and it would not be in his interest to try. The deals that the Congolese president makes with foreigners are dangerous though, because if he’s not careful, he can incite the competitors of the people he’s transacting with. It’s understood by Congolese that all the world’s powers need Congolese resources. So, from the Eastern Congolese perspective, the Congolese president is like the only butcher in a market filled with buyers of meat (even if, in fact, there are multiple sources for these minerals). If he agrees to sell to one buyer at an egregiously different price, or if he closes certain people out of the market altogether because of bad sense or politics, he will incite the other buyers, all of whom must have “meat.” If one of those left out buyers is more powerful than the others, war is in the offing.
So it is that the American president can be jealous of Congo’s relationship with China and incite Rwanda to make war, thus acquiring a better price through Rwanda. For Congolese involved in the mineral trade, war is a double-edged sword. The number of recipients of tax is simplified: it is only the soldiers who are setting the price, and they want production to move quickly, so they keep the price relatively high. Congolese now realize something close to a true price in this time of a kind of “democracy.” But as Bush’s story made clear, this is illusory, because the invaders are working to make everything else costly so they can control events. The diggers might be getting a good deal, but everyone else is dying or being expropriated from, and ultimately they’ll have to work for whatever price is set by the invaders. Militarized actors try to keep war from getting in the way of production by waging war on women and villages and making agriculture impossible, so people are compelled to mine. They even wage fake wars when prices get high, or collude around mines where there is relative peace. If war does get in the way of production, it is a problem for the primary buyers of these minerals, so they will try to counteract this by lowering the price of the minerals. This will eventually cause militias and armies to go away. Usually, competition among the world powers will drive the prices up again, making war more likely, but right now a monopoly is being established, under the sign of regulation, which keeps prices low for diggers. Dollarization, proxy militias, the destruction of infrastructure, the military wing of the United Nations, the demise of agriculture, and even the mass rape of women—all emerge as if to ensure that powerful people, and even more powerful foreigners, obtain a better price for Congolese wealth, which is reduced to the price in which it is represented.
Price changes are related to the experience of time, in that high prices bring fast mobility, and low prices stasis. Time is also a weapon in the war over price. Those who are unable to master it are not only thrown around, but also find themselves involved [29]in all kinds of troubles and conflicts because of the volatility of price and time. Yet when prices are very high, all manner of boundaries seem to implode and we have the opening of wormholes, which can close just as quickly. The money the miners gain they lose just as quickly, complaining that one hundred dollars in the town is like ten dollars in the mine. In general, the outcome of the above war on price has been to make it so people have a hard time producing incremental, social time. They are subject to a volatile temporality in which prices define the rate of movement and in which agriculture seems inadequate or even impossible.
Even in the current context, though, with so many people dependent on mining, they can still generate incremental temporality by building their social networks, even if Congolese often seem willing to sacrifice generative social networks for substances like gold or coltan. La Gomme is a poignant example of someone who has tried to build sustainable social relationships and networks from the bottom up, often in a way that defies the war over price, as well as state authority. This so-called King of the WC recycles things and people that others have deemed worthless and helps to forge them into something generative and impressive. At times he may seem to lose the war over price but he is still able to win more times than not, by cultivating his seemingly worthless but actually invaluable social connections. Indeed, La Gomme’s apparent refusal to rely on price as the measure of the value of things or relationships points to an emerging argument about social value, a “theory from the South” presented from the vantage of those who walk the earth in unfashionable footwear.30
The paradox at the heart of Congolese understandings of price and price wars captures the reality of capitalism’s social foundations. Congolese involved in the mineral trade see price as entirely constructed and negotiable in that it is nothing more than the agreement that people arrive at together. On the other hand, price is completely fixed because Congolese are removed from the social personages that manufacture price for their own advantage. The “true price” is a price that they will never see, but not because there is anything abstract about it. Price is removed from them and from their capacity to influence it not because it is independent of culture and social relationships, as the well-trained American investment bankers that are the subject of Karen Ho’s masterful ethnography of Wall Street imagine to be the case (Ho 2009). Rather, price remains beyond their control for entirely social reasons: because a network of powerful agents continues to manage events in their pursuit of Congolese wealth, in an ongoing and incremental way, the likes of which Congolese only glimpse in moments some of them hope will never end.


Acknowledgments
This article has benefitted greatly from feedback from a variety of sources. I would especially like to thank Jeff Mantz, Joshua Walker, Bekah Wilson, Gustav Peebles, James Ferguson, John Comaroff, Andrew Apter, Allen Roberts, Vincanne Adams, Ian Whitmarsh, and the anonymous Hau reviewers. Gustav Peebles was especially helpful in pushing me to make certain connections regarding information [30]asymmetry, natural price, and price wars (I first learned about the first two concepts from him). Earlier versions of this article, or parts of it, were presented at the American Anthropological Association Annual Meetings (2013), Harvard University, Stanford University, the University of California–San Francisco, UCLA, the UC Davis Humanities Institute’s Temporalities Research Cluster workshop, and the American Ethnological Society Annual Conference (2015). This on-going research is funded by the National Science Foundation, and was carried out principally in North Kivu (mines and mining towns in Walikale, Masisi, and Idjwi Island), South Kivu (Uvira, Luhwindja, and Shabunda) and Maniema (Kindu, Kalima, Kailo, and Punia) over a period so far totaling over one year.


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“May it never end”: Guerre des prix, réseaux et temporalité dans le marché minier des “trois T” de l’est de la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC)
Résumé : Dans cet article, j’examine l’experience du capitalisme de l’ère digitale des communautés minières de l’est de la RDC. Je montre comment une économie extractive du tantale, de l’étain (tin), et du tungstène (que les ONG appellent les 3T) forge l’expérience et la compréhension de l’espace, du temps, et de la valeur. A l’aide de récits oraux et d’autres matériaux ethnographiques, je présente les connections entre temps et prix, ainsi que la guerre des prix de cette économie caractérisée par une grande incertitude temporelle une situation de rupture.
James H. SMITH is an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at UC Davis. He received his PhD in anthropology from the University of Chicago, and was a Rockefeller Fellow at the Kroc Institute for International Peace-building at the University of Notre Dame. He works in Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo, where he is currently conducting research on the artisanal mining of coltan and tin as well as efforts at regulation, with support from the National Science Foundation. Smith’s books include Bewitching development: Witchcraft and the reinvention of development in Neoliberal Kenya (University of Chicago Press, 2009), Email from Ngeti (University of California Press, 2014), and Displacing the state: Religion and conflict in neoliberal Africa (ed., with Rosalind Hackett, University of Notre Dame Press). He has published many articles and book chapters, including “Tantalus in the Digital Age: Coltan ore, temporal dispossession and ‘movement’ in the Eastern DR Congo” (American Ethnologist 2011).
James H. SmithDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of California DavisOne Shields Avenue. Davis, CA 95616jsmit@ucdavis.edu


___________________
1. In contrasting material infrastructure with social infrastructure I have in mind Abou Maliq Simone’s (2004) formulation of “people as infrastructure” in contemporary Africa; see also de Boeck (2012).
2. Unlike gold, which can be easily smuggled and which soldiers continue to control the mining of, even when they have moved away from the more visible “3 T” mines.
3. Artisanal mining is a term that emerges from the “development” world, which to many evokes a sense of miners as entrepreneurial craftspeople in the manner of artisanal cheese or chocolate makers. In fact, the literature on artisanal mining tends to be divided between those who see it as inherently chaotic, violent, and prone to militarization (see for example Global Witness 2009; IPIS 2002; Dorner, et al. 2012; and Perks 2011), and those who see in it a kind of bottom-up neoliberal future in which entrepreneurs and workmen remake their societies artisanally (for more on this see Hilson 2007; Hayes 2008; Hentschel, Nruschka and Priester 2002; Garrett and Mitchell 2009. See also Mantz 2008 for a particularly insightful take on such “improvisational economies” in the DRC).
4. Mines are governed and taxed by a combination of figures and “genres,” including customary authorities, diverse nonmilitary state actors, mining companies in which the government has a stake, and military actors. The state emerges differently at different mines and, as one informant put it to me, “each mine is its own universe.” The larger the mine, the more complex and multiple are the governing systems to be found there. These days, the Congolese army (FARDC) is often involved in the “taxing” of miners and, especially, the transport of minerals, despite efforts by Congolese state actors and international NGOs and corporations to regulate the trade. Many, perhaps most, mines do not have a military presence (their presence is illegal at mines), though military actors are often involved in transport (illegally). Some mines are controlled by non-FARDC militias, such as Mai Mai or FDLR.
5. Men are typically involved in digging and organizing labor, while women may be involved in cleaning and sorting minerals, or preparing food and other necessities. During certain price hikes, women and children have also been directly involved in digging and selling minerals.
6. See, for example, Smith 2008; Piot 2010; Jones 2010. Much of the work on Pentecostalism in Africa has similarly been concerned with how practitioners work to either break away from the constraints of the past or recuperate it for various projects: see, for example, Smith 2008; Smith and Mwadime 2014; Meyer 1998; Piot 2010. I have referred to postcolonial African struggles to control people’s movement through time or to upend modernist teleologies of progress as tempopolitics, which I see as a distinctive feature of postcolonial African life (Smith 2008).
7. The contrast between “thick” and “thin” extraction is James Ferguson’s. The focus on mineral enclaves as sites of emerging sovereignties amid the transformation of nation state sovereignty has been proposed by William Reno (1999) and elaborated on by Ferguson (2006).
8. The war came to an official end in 2003 and, beginning in 2005, enemy combatants from occupying militias like the RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy) and MLC (the Uganda-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo), as well as indigenous Mai Mai militias, were absorbed into the army. This led to multiple problems within the army, most notably the fact that commanding officers were often former RCD combatants who now commanded their former enemies, Congolese army and Mai Mai insurgents, while also monopolizing the opportunities that mines, and their taxation, afforded.
9. Kikuyu are a major Kenyan Bantu ethnicity, many of whom have, ironically, long had a conflicted relationship with the Nilotic Kenyan Luo.
10. This story of gentrification also accords well with what has actually happened in cities like Goma. See Buscher and Vlassenroot (2010) on the humanitarian industry’s role in gentrifying Goma and driving up real estate prices.
11. The transformation of Congolese militias is truly difficult to comprehend and keep up with. Take, for example, Jason Stearns’s (2012) well-researched piece on how elements of the CNDP “evolved” into M 23, and the various offshoots that resulted. Or Christophe Vogel’s (2014) complex discussion of one of the newer Mai Mai groups, Raia Mtomboki.
12. For excellent and exhaustive accounts of DR Congo history, as well as more recent events, see Van Reybrouck 2014; Nzongola-Ntanjala 2002; Prunier 2011; Lemarchand 2008; and Turner 2013.
13. For a more nuanced, subtle, and historically informed understanding of this period than I can present here, see Hunt (2008).
14. See former CIA station chief Lawrence Devlin (2008) for a remarkably honest account of US foreign policy in DR Congo in the early postindependence period, including a discussion of the CIA plot to assassinate Lumumba and install Mobutu. See also Weissman (2014).
15. As Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers have put it, local entrepreneurs sought out networks with Rwandan and Ugandan invaders (the “rebels”) because “connection with the rebels was a necessary condition to continue or expand their activities and to increase the predictability of commercial activity in terms of logistics and revenue” (quoted in Turner 2013: 159). They also point out that the exploitation of local resources forced the invaders to negotiate with Congolese entrepreneurs, so the need for predictable social networks ran in both directions.
16. The wars date back to 1993 in the Kivus, even though the first Congolese War of “liberation,” in which President Mobutu was ousted, started in 1996 and ended in 1997. The Second Congolese war (1998–2003) involved around nine African nations and led to the DRC being partitioned up by militarized groups, which governed their zones until 2003. At that time, a transition government was created, and four vice presidents were selected from among the main occupying factions. Some militias, particularly different Mai Mai groups and the FDLR, continue to be active in some regions to this day, though the war officially ended in 2003. By some estimates, around six million people have died from war-related violence since the onset of the war, more than any single conflict since World War II.
17. According to Nicholas Garrett and Harrison Mitchell (2009), over ten million Congolese people depended on mining at the time of their study.
18. For examples see Harden (2001); IPIS (2002); United Nations Security Council (2002); Human Rights Watch (2009); Global Witness (2009); for an overview and critique of the crafting of the NGO conflict minerals argument see Nest (2011).
19. For critical commentaries on the impact that these NGOs have had, on Dodd-Frank’s consequences, and on the concept of “conflict free” minerals see Seay (2012); Raghavan (2014); Worstall (2011); King (2014); Bafilemba, Mueller, and Leshnev (2014).
20. For a broader, historical understanding of the semiotics of soap in the wider region see Burke (1996).
21. The value that artisanal miners place on mobility, and the relation between and new forms of masculine subjectivity, has been noted by many, including Cuvelier (2011); Smith (2011); de Boeck (1998); and Jønsson and Bryceson (2009); Ferguson (2006) has argued that mobility is a feature of neoliberal state transformation.
22. This appropriation of fantastic far away names to describe the promising potential of Congolese space is a well-known practice of urban place making, especially in Kinshasa (de Boeck and Plessart 2004). But in the case of mines, the urban emerges suddenly in the forest only to disappear just as quickly, and so the naming practices draw attention to the almost-but-not-quite—the just out of reach, tantalizing promise of radical transformation that becomes momentarily visible during sudden changes in price.
23. This reflects the general sense of NGOs being opportunistic hit-and-run organizations that leave behind more problems than they’ve solved. When I was in Punia in 2013, an NGO had been sanitizing the water and making sure the local hospital was stocked with medicines. When it left suddenly, without most people knowing, many people (myself included) became terribly sick from drinking the tap water they had recently grown accustomed to. Soon there were no medicines in the hospital and young children and infants died at an alarming rate.
24. Not only in Punia but also throughout the Eastern Congo.
25. Punia is remembered as an old man who met the Belgians when everyone else ran away, and whose great-grandson now collects the rent for Sakima.
26. The introduction of SAESSCAM (Small Scale Miners Technical Assistance and Training Service), an internal subdivision of the Ministry of Mines, was intended to assist artisanal miners and ensure their safety and well-being. But this had not happened, mostly because they lacked the resources. Rather, it had made matters worse by adding a whole other category of people that wanted “tax” (SAESSCAM is not unique to Punia).
27. In 2010, new regulations in mining mandated that minerals had to pass through the provincial capitals so that tax could be collected there, even though the traditional export towns of Goma and Bukavu were connected to Punia by cargo plane.
28. I have come across several mines in which two or more descent groups compete over the right to collect tax, typically with one making claims about rules of descent, and the other making a territorial claim. In each case, these groups sought out different state authorities to make good on their claim, pitting those authorities (e.g., a military official and a mayor) against one another.
29. This also reflects how deals and prices are made in the DR Congo. Take the case of Dan Gertler, a 38-year-old Israeli diamond trader who began doing business in the DR Congo when he was in his early twenties. He is now worth over two billion dollars and “has stakes in companies that control 9.6% of world cobalt production (Wild, Kavanagh, and Ferzier 2012).” He began by buying rough diamonds, and gradually developed political connections that continued through two Congolese presidencies. Today he uses his government connections to buy state-owned mines at low prices and then resell them, earning himself billions while Congolese people lose out on all the potential mine revenue. Thanks to the anthropologist of artisanal diamond mining in Mbuji Mayi, Joshua Walker (personal communication), for bringing this story to my attention.
30. The phrase is from John and Jean Comaroffs’ book of the same name.
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			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1699/3991" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Discussions of embodiment in the virtual world mostly focus on online games and virtual reality technologies. By taking the case of Indonesian buzzers—persons employed to propagate opinions on certain issues or products—we argue that social media platforms also allow for virtual embodiment occurring within a Twitter cyberplace. This article theorizes virtual bodies by examining Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach. We also work with Boelstorff’s conception of chora and virtual bodies to argue that virtual bodies can be seen as a practical extension of physical bodies: a cyborg body. Intertwined within marketing relations, we then attempt to see how this amalgam of physical and virtual bodies is disciplined by panopticism, while briefly considering local Javanese particularities in shaping this discipline. Thus, through this examination of an Indonesian case, we bring up wider theoretical issues on social media, technologies of governance, and subjectivity.</p></abstract>
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				<datestamp>2025-04-29T00:43:15Z</datestamp>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1916</article-id>
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			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Sexual im/mobilities: On queer Muslim pilgrimage</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Thimm</surname>
						<given-names>Viola</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>author@haujournal.org</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>29</day>
				<month>04</month>
				<year>2025</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date>
			<volume>15</volume>
			<issue seq="204">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau15.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2025 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2025</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1916" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1916/4426" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1916/4427" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>The current conflations and opportunities created by globalization lead to an invisible phenomenon of mobility: pilgrimage performed by queer Muslims. Broadly understood as either impossible to be queer and Muslim or as a sin, queer Muslim pilgrimage is a global phenomenon of our times. However, it only gains sketchy attention in mainstream debates on Muslim identities. What is missing is a conceptual understanding of queer Muslim pilgrimage as a basic mode of sexualized mobilities. This article discusses regimes of power that enable, impede, or channel pilgrimage undertaken by queer Muslims in Malaysia. It is argued that “regimes of sexualized mobilities” function ambiguously in Malaysia in order to control and discriminate LGBTQIA+ and to simultaneously cherish them. This ambiguity is based on the entanglement between processes of politicizing Islam as well as on Islamic principles and the historical condition that transgender people have always belonged to Malay society.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/772</identifier>
				<datestamp>2016-11-03T03:19:16Z</datestamp>
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			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<trans-title xml:lang="EN">HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</trans-title>
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				<article-title>Attuning to the webs of en: Ontography, japanese spirit worlds and the &quot;tact&quot; of Minakata Kumagusu</article-title>
				<trans-title xml:lang="EN">Attuning to the webs of en: Ontography, japanese spirit worlds and the &quot;tact&quot; of Minakata Kumagusu</trans-title>
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			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Jensen</surname>
						<given-names>Casper Bruun</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Leicester University
Osaka University</aff>
					<email>cbruunjensen@gmail.com</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Ishii</surname>
						<given-names>Miho</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>Kyoto University</aff>
					<email>yqk05626@nifty.ne.jp</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Swift</surname>
						<given-names>Philip</given-names>
					</name>
					<aff>University College London</aff>
					<email>p.johnswift@btinternet.com</email>
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					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
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					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>31</day>
				<month>10</month>
				<year>2016</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2016</year></pub-date>
			<volume>6</volume>
			<issue seq="304">2</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau6.2</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2016 Casper Bruun Jensen, Miho Ishii, Philip Swift</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2016</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>An experiment in ethnographic theory, this article aims to finds new ways of getting Japanese spirit worlds into view. In the attempt to find ways of repopulating spirit worlds with more than beliefs, socioeconomic realities, and politics, the broader “ontographic” issue is how to facilitate engagement with spirits in a way that is not overdetermined by the assumption that such entities do not really exist. After examining how Japanese folklore studies and so-called “monsterology” framed their questions around concerns with beliefs, we explore the thought of the maverick scientist Minakata Kumagusu. In his work we find an original, proto-ontological perspective, centering on “tactful” encounters and modes of attunement unfolding in cosmic webs of en.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>An experiment in ethnographic theory, this article aims to finds new ways of getting Japanese spirit worlds into view. In the attempt to find ways of repopulating spirit worlds with more than beliefs, socioeconomic realities, and politics, the broader “ontographic” issue is how to facilitate engagement with spirits in a way that is not overdetermined by the assumption that such entities do not really exist. After examining how Japanese folklore studies and so-called “monsterology” framed their questions around concerns with beliefs, we explore the thought of the maverick scientist Minakata Kumagusu. In his work we find an original, proto-ontological perspective, centering on “tactful” encounters and modes of attunement unfolding in cosmic webs of en.</p></abstract-trans>
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	<body><p>Attuning to the webs of en






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © Casper Bruun Jensen. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau6.2.012
Attuning to the webs of en
Ontography, Japanese spirit worlds, and the “tact” of Minakata Kumagusu
Casper Bruun JENSEN, Osaka University
Miho ISHII, Kyoto University
Philip SWIFT, University College London


An experiment in ethnographic theory, this article aims to finds new ways of getting Japanese spirit worlds into view. In the attempt to find ways of repopulating spirit worlds with more than beliefs, socioeconomic realities, and politics, the broader “ontographic” issue is how to facilitate engagement with spirits in a way that is not overdetermined by the assumption that such entities do not really exist. After examining how Japanese folklore studies and so-called “monsterology” framed their questions around concerns with beliefs, we explore the thought of the maverick scientist Minakata Kumagusu. In his work we find an original, proto-ontological perspective, centering on “tactful” encounters and modes of attunement unfolding in cosmic webs of en.
Keywords: Japan, ontology, animism, spirit worlds, tact


In “Freedom of expression: The very modern practice of visiting a Shinto shrine” (2000), John Nelson takes his readers on a tour of the Kamigamo Shrine in Kyoto, a tranquil space of lawns and courtyards, encircled by verdant woodland. Here and there around the grounds are smaller shrines dedicated to a range of subsidiary deities, as well as the main hall, in which the principal divinity, Wake Ikazuchi, is enshrined. Clapping, bowing, and making small offerings of money, people come pray to these divinities. But far from all visits to the site are undertaken for purposes of worship; visitors might be sightseeing, picnicking, or simply passing by. By night, the shrine is used for such diverse activities as radio-controlled car racing, firefly watching, and nocturnal tête-à-têtes (ibid.: 48–50). Nelson observes that the shrine is a flexible space of distraction and recreation, as well as worship; a heterotopic [150]space, in which forms of “freedom of expression” go hand in hand with a certain detachment from the supposedly rigid requirements of everyday Japanese life.
Throughout his ethnographic ambit, Nelson maintains a rigorous empiricism; he will only show us what he can see: the buildings, the behaviors—the physical business of visiting the shrine. What is difficult to ascertain is whether the ostensibly “religious” activities on display are accompanied by corresponding religious feelings or beliefs: “Observations showed that a majority of individuals coming to the shrine do interact in some way with the spiritual and visual ideology of the site, yet few of these individuals would describe themselves as ‘worshippers’” (2000: 51). Here, however, his empiricism begins to slip: for, strictly speaking, interaction with a “spiritual ideology” is not something one can observe.
Nelson’s substitution of “interacting with ideology” for “relating to divinities” exemplifies an approach that transforms the tricky invisibility of spiritual beings into other intangible, though more academically respectable, entities—like ideology, economy, or culture.1
An experiment in anthropological theory, the present article aims to find new ways of getting spirit worlds, and, specifically, Japanese spirit worlds, into view. This endeavor is premised on a sense that something is missing in many existing theories of spirits and supernatural beings. In the early days, many studies centered on the cognitive deficiencies or flawed beliefs of those who claimed the existence of such phenomena. Some scholars engaged in more activist struggles against superstition. Later, as more cultural relativist sensibilities took over, the emphasis shifted to the study of spirits and witchcraft as instantiating diverse forms of sociality (e.g., Geschiere 2013), or modes of political resistance (e.g., Taussig 1980; Comaroff 1985). While spirits are no longer seen as figments of belief, they are now generally interpreted as responses to broader social and cultural realities. Notwithstanding their significant differences, these diverse approaches are broadly similar in one sense: they depict spiritual beings as primarily reactive.
As the literary scholar Stanley Fish (1980: 1) has written (in quite a different context), “The field of enquiry is constituted by the questions we are able to ask” (original emphasis). Complementarily, the questions we are able to ask have everything to do with what we are capable of conceiving the field to be populated by. The present discussion therefore entertains the possibility (which is not, of course, a guarantee) of eliciting the voices, actions, and bodies of spirits and divinities in ways that do not a priori evacuate them of reality. Accordingly, we experiment with repopulating the field of inquiry with more than beliefs, socioeconomic realities, and politics. The broader issue is how to facilitate engagement with spirits in a way that is not overdetermined by the assumption that such entities do not really exist.
What we refer to below as an ontographic engagement with anthropological theory is particularly inflected by the fact that our point of departure is Japanese spirit worlds. For one thing, there are specificities to Japanese spirits, including their vast numbers and wide variability. For another, a long history of Japanese and foreign [151]scholarship has interpreted spirits in ways that partly overlap with, and partly differ from, scholarship elsewhere.
After outlining some of the central stakes for anthropological theory, we examine how Japanese folklore studies and so-called “monsterology” framed their questions around concerns with beliefs. Later, in some ways analogous to the transformation of anthropological theory elsewhere, these forms of inquiry gave way to interpretations that centered on the nationalist politics of spirits.
In the second half of the article we turn to the work of the maverick scientist Minakata Kumagusu. We find in his work an original perspective on how spiritual beings and people encounter one another in cosmic webs, and on how to engage with such webs. For Minakata, the key to accessing these webs of en was the cultivation of what he called “tact.” Apparently, this notion originated from his encounters with Western science. In Minakata’s interpretation, however, tact was given an ontological dimension, as it was parsed through readings of esoteric Buddhism. Adding another layer to this complicated set of translations, we suggest that Minakata’s tact in turn offers a vantage point for reconsidering some problems anthropologists have with spirits. By articulating the ontological traffic and translation between theories and methods for studying spirit worlds,2 the article further aims to contribute to the repopulation of, and engagement with, such worlds not only in Japan but also elsewhere.

Resisting bifurcation: An ontography of spirits
In the Japanese context, an extensive literature routinely expounds on the difficulties of differentiating “religion,” “spirituality,” “magic,” and “ritual” (see, e.g., Fitzgerald 2000: 159–98; Isomae 2003; Josephson 2012). It is also common knowledge that the population of spiritual entities is immense. Efforts to classify the heterogeneous population of deities (kamigami), ancestor spirits (senzo), ghosts (yūrei), and monsters (bakemono) resemble nothing so much as what Moby Dick’s protagonist Ishmael, with reference to the study of cetology, called the “classification of the constituents of a chaos” (Melville [1851] 1992: 145).
There are further complications. On the one hand, as the anthropologist Alan Macfarlane has noted, in Japan, “everything is imbued with ‘spirit’ or kami— pots, computers, goldfish, space, time, tea, stones, sumo, peaches, echoes” (2007: 202). On the other hand, “there is no God or gods and there is no separate supernatural world” (ibid.: 186). So spirits appear simultaneously everywhere or nowhere. But in this case, he wonders, “with what can ritual communicate?”
Yet Macfarlane’s question assumes both too much and too little. Too much, because the general recognition of animist tendencies in Japan notwithstanding, not everything is, or has been, “kamified” (Herbert 1967). And too little, because [152]whatever it is that all of these rituals and practices communicate with, it is certainly not nothing. But how, then, to get this “not nothing” into view?
Anthropology has developed a rich palette of responses to this question. In his path-breaking study, Roy Rappaport (1979: 178) argued that anthropologists tended to approach the question of occult efficacy as based either on the “affective force and persuasiveness of ritual performance” or on “certain characteristics of language.” Recent sophisticated treatments along these lines see ritual as performing people and relations, for example by instantiating a “poiesis of history” and by “articulating a historical consciousness composed of multiple voices” (Lambek 2013: 9–11).
Another influential body of work has focused more specifically on the political dimensions of spirits (e.g., Taussig 1980; Comaroff 1985). Indeed, Todd Sanders (2008: 108) has argued that the politicization of spirits has “become the anthropological orthodoxy in many quarters.” Peter Geschiere (2013), for example, sees witchcraft as a means of coping with modern political developments.3 In the Japanese context, Izumi Kyōka (1873–1939), a contemporary of Inoue Enryo and Yanagita Kunio, whose approaches to spirits we examine below, insisted with poetic force that monsters belong at the heart of modernization: “I want to put them in a place where a train’s bell is audible in the middle of Edo” (Figal 1999: 166). Yet, though it is undeniable that spirits and politics are related in various important ways, the consequence of elevating politics to an explanatory principle is that spirit practices become strictly derivative formations.
In arguing that “politics” as a category may itself be shaped by spirits, Nils Bubandt’s “Interview with an ancestor” (2009) introduces a subtle shift in orientation. For in this case, political categories cannot function as independent explanatory principles of spirit worlds. Rather than being determined by politics, they may transform it. Of course, they would not do so all by themselves, but in interaction with a complex set of forces (Boddy 2013: 445).
If we turn to studies of animism, Graham Harvey (2013: 6) observes that this domain, too, has been depicted in widely differing ways. Some scholars view animism as a characteristic of certain religions, whereas others describe it as a cognitive phenomenon, and yet others, Harvey notes, use the term to direct “attention towards the continuous interrelation of all beings or of matter itself.” This latter mode of directed attention connects with our ontographic interest in coming to terms with “several ways to exist” (Latour 2013: 201). Whatever the modes of existence of spirits are, our premise is that room must be created for them to operate as something more than psychological symptoms or sociopolitical reactions (see also Blanes and Espírito Santo 2014).4[153]
Focusing on the ways in which spirit worlds are made and populated, the present discussion gives a particular inflection to the “ontological turn” (Holbraad, Pedersen, and Viveiros de Castro 2014). An ontological orientation is especially interesting in the Japanese context, where such approaches have hardly been deployed, and have yet to have much impact (Swift 2010; but see; Clammer 2001; Jensen and Morita 2012; Kasuga and Jensen 2012; Swift 2012).
Martin Holbraad (2009) argues for “ontography” as an anthropological method. In the context of spirit worlds, however, the term has an older and, for our purposes, more pertinent origin, since the protagonist of one of the celebrated Victorian writer M. R. James’ (2013: 76) ghost stories was no less than a professor of ontography. Our adaptation of this term is premised on construing (spirit) alterity as a question of worlds rather than worldviews, a switch in emphasis the import of which we detail in the following section.
For a start, however, we can note that one important reason for adopting an ontographic approach is to avoid what Alfred North Whitehead (1920: 30) described as the

bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality, which, in so far as they are real, are real in different senses. One reality would be the entities such as electrons which are the study of speculative physics. This would be the reality which is there for knowledge, although on this theory it is never known. For what is known is the other sort of reality, which is the byplay of the mind.

As Whitehead argued, the bifurcation of nature creates a dichotomy between the realm of primary qualities, like “molecules and electric waves,” and “merely subjective” secondary qualities, like the experience of seeing something “red” (ibid.: 29).
Whitehead insisted that “for natural philosophy everything perceived is in nature. We may not pick and choose” (ibid.). Thus he adamantly rejected any “theory of psychic addition to the object” (ibid.) along with the aspiration to partition “what is in the mind and what is in nature” (ibid.: 30). Transposed to the realm of spirit worlds, such bifurcation precludes the attempt to come to terms with the various forms of existence that spirits or their kin may have.


Worlds and worldviews: Experiment and equivocation
Obviously, the switch from worldviews to worlds, or from epistemology to ontology, raises many questions (Gad, Jensen, and Winthereik, 2015). After all, do we not also bring along epistemological presuppositions, theories, and concepts, even unquestioned beliefs? Moreover, might our assumptions not be at odds with those of our informants, thus contradicting their worlds? Clearly, it is insufficient to simply assert that “there is spirit stuff, there is spirit affliction, it isn’t a matter of metaphor or symbol, or even psychology” (Turner 1993: 9, original emphasis; cf. Ishii 2013). Yet, although the epistemological objection is important, it is neither intractable, [154]nor ultimately fatal for an ontographic approach. For while it goes without saying that there are many perspectives or worldviews, it is not quite obvious what is entailed by this proliferation.
For one thing, the bifurcation between facts (what the world is) and perspectives or epistemologies (how the world is viewed) to which Whitehead objected is itself embedded in Western ontology. However, this ontology is not made up exclusively of perspectives, since, as exemplified by Jonathan Crary’s (1990) “techniques of the observer” (among other things), perspectives are also themselves enabled by material transformations. Technological and scientific equipment, that is, generates perspectives, theories, and epistemologies, including the ability of Westerners to think of the world as objective in the first place. Indeed, the very capacity to think of the world as bifurcated is an outcome of specific transformations in the practical and materialized ontologies of the West.
None of this means that perspectives, worldviews, or epistemologies vanish, or even that they lose importance. Instead, it means that all perspectives, our own included, are a subset of worlds that are also made up of many other things. The implication is that while worldviews are part of practical ontologies and affect them in multiple ways, the former are not coextensive with the latter. One entailment is that anthropologists are in the business of comparing ontologies that contain multiple epistemologies rather than consisting only, or predominantly, of epistemologies. Hence, again, lies our interest in spirit ontography.
Another consequence, however, is the impossibility of fully taking leave of one’s own ontology. In fact, this is a variant of critics’ insistent objection that—protests notwithstanding—“ontologists” are still beholden to their own assumptions or, indeed, as we would say, to their own worlds. Yet, rather than a damning contradiction, this simply means that any attempt to grapple with other worlds will be premised on equivocation. As Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2004: 10) wrote, the point is not to try to “unmake the equivocation” but rather to “dwell there,” which means to “open and widen the space imagined not to exist between the conceptual languages in contact . . . to communicate by differences, instead of silencing the Other by presuming a univocality” (cf. Lambek 1998). The point, in short, is that a sustained effort must be made to control the equivocation.
Below we argue that the controlled equivocation entailed by the effort to activate spirit worlds requires tact and attunement. But tuning in to other worlds does not mean fusing them. At issue, rather, is a process of mutual interference. Thus, our analysis can be described as itself an ontological meshwork, in which our worlds interact with those of Japanese spirits, and those of Minakata, who, moreover, himself embodied a complicated ontological mixture of Western science and esoteric Buddhism.
This is why we describe our inquiry as having an experimental dimension. It is experimental in the sense of entailing risk and uncertainty, since we cannot be certain in advance of our ability to control the equivocation between our worlds and spirit worlds, and also in the different sense of aspiring to an improved ability to discriminate between ways of apprehending and engaging with spirit worlds. While we are interested in allowing spirits to speak differently to us, at issue is therefore also how we will thereby be allowed to speak differently about other things—such as spirit worlds, ontography, or, indeed, anthropological theory.[155]


Tapping into spirit realms
In Natural reflections: Human cognition at the nexus of science and religion, Barbara Herrnstein Smith (2009: 11) wrote that: “Throughout our lives we interact with our environments in ways that continuously modify our structures and how they operate, and these structural and functional modifications affect our subsequent interactions with our environments, both in what we perceive and how we behave.” Aligning with this pragmatist observation, some of the most promising alternatives to approaches that psychologize and politicize spirits have focused on processes of embodiment and materialization. Yet, from the point of view of an ontography of spirit worlds, an exclusive emphasis on materialization carries with it its own risks.
Consider, for example, Inge Daniels’ (2003, 2010) fascinating studies of luck and spirituality in Japan. Explicit about the importance of materialization, Daniels studies engimono, omnipresent good luck charms, which are at once spiritual devices and commercial products, and ichimatsu dolls, given to children to “absorb evil.” Dolls, charms, and people, she observes, are “experienced as intermingled agencies” (Daniels 2010: 167).
Daniels’ analyses show dolls and charms to be channels through which luck travels. As spiritual conduits, Daniels (2003: 633) argues, these entities exhibit no clear separation between the material and the symbolic, for these dimensions are “inextricably entwined.” The argument resonates with Philip Swift’s contention that Japanese spirituality does not depend on the Western opposition between the created and the made, since spiritual agency is effective to the extent that it is fabricated (Swift 2010; see also Latour 1999).
Yet, in spite of her attentiveness to the “intermingling” of bodies, Daniels’ project remains resolutely anthropocentric. Thus, she argues that “the anthropological study of religion has been compromised by . . . its respect for belief and supernatural beings” (Daniels 2010: 153, our emphasis). The turn to materiality and embodiment, in other words, functions as a bulwark not only against “belief” but also against “supernatural beings,” which are seen, precisely, as beliefs. And this collapse is far from coincidental. After all, supernatural beings epitomize the “beliefs” that caused such explanatory problems for the anthropology of spirits, magic, and religion in the first place. If beliefs go down the analytical drain, it is thus little surprise that supernatural beings tend to be flushed out with them.
In order to get spirit worlds into view, a focus on processes of embodiment and materialization is in one sense a step forward, since it holds the potential to confer on spiritual beings forms of liveliness that they lack when rendered as symbols and beliefs. Thus, for example, ichimatsu dolls and engimono can embed vital energies. As further exemplified by Daniels, however, a material emphasis can also whisk spirits away. Material and bodily practices can be used to keep spirits firmly out of sight since “we all know” that they are not material.
It is not difficult to see why a material emphasis may work against the ambition to keep spirit worlds in sight. After all, lack of observability has long caused well-known methodological anxieties in the study of witchcraft, spirits, and ghosts. Thus, Hans-Peter Duerr (1985: 67) reminds us that the Winnebago “do not say what the spirits are, but what they are not” (original emphasis). “Of course demons are not ordinary objects of experience,” he continues: “We do not meet them in [156]everyday life” and “the scientist will look for them in vain” (ibid.: 69, original emphasis). Of course, it may also be that spirit and demons do not want to be seen under just any circumstances. Theories focusing on beliefs, discourses, symbols, politics, and materialization each offer their own paths out of this aporia.
Yet, whether we do not meet spirits in everyday life obviously also depends on who “we” are. Inasmuch as “we” are middle-of-the-road Westerners, including would-be ethnographers of spirit worlds, perhaps it is true to say that we tend to “look in vain” (Duerr 1985: 69; but see Favret-Saada 1980; Stoller and Olkes 1987; West 2007). However, following Smith’s argument, this would simply be in consequence of the fact that the bodily and perceptual capacities of members of this collective have generally not been modified in ways that allow for interaction with spirit ecologies. There is thus an ontological dimension to “seeing” aside from what immediately meets the eye. Moreover, as both Duerr and Smith emphasize, the capacity to encounter other beings is subject to modification.
Rather than deploying a resolutely material focus in order to steer clear of the problem posed by supernatural beings, we might therefore imagine a different kind of inquiry. At issue would be a process of learning to become affected by foreign environments, finding ways of tapping into different realms. It is with a view to just this possibility that we turn to the work of Minakata Kumagusu. To provide context and contrast, however, we first examine some of the predominant ways in which matters of spirit(s) have been dealt with in the Japanese context.


Spirited away: Folklore studies and monsterology in Japan
An interest in Japanese spirits is by no means novel. Indeed, Japanese folklore (minzokugaku), and to a lesser extent monsterology (yōkaigaku), has given rise to an “immense literature” (Figal 1999: 8). In this section we contrast the research programs defined by Inoue Enryō (1858–1919), the father of Japanese “monsterology,” with folklore studies as initiated by Yanagita Kunio (1875–1962). In different ways, these figures are important because they specified agendas for spirit studies, the presuppositions and problems of which largely remain with us today.
A famous intellectual, Yanagita is generally viewed as the originator of Japanese folklore studies. This still thriving discipline centers on collating, identifying, and cataloguing the facts of the folk, including their mysterious experiences. Writing around the same time, Inoue, affectionately known as “Dr. Monster,” specified a research agenda, which he named “monsterology.” Using the terminology of Michel de Certeau, Gerald Figal (1999: 118) has argued that both of these intellectuals engaged a “problem of the ‘redistribution of epistemological terrain’.” That redistribution had to do with determining the boundaries separating natural occurrences from subjective beliefs. This terrain, however, could also be seen as ontological.
These scholars held strikingly different views of what would constitute a satisfying “redistribution.” Yet, certain similarities also tied their efforts together. For one thing, in spite of their differences, Inoue and Yanagita both located spirits within the minds of those who claimed to encounter them. Doing so, they both emptied spirits of worldly existence. Aside from its immediate psychologizing impetus, that evacuation paved the way for the dominant contemporary view of politicized spirits.[157]
Though he instituted monsterology, Inoue was neither a fan of, nor a believer in, the monsters that formed the object of his study. Indeed, like his contemporary Tylor, he was committed to the “extermination of superstition” (meishin taiji; Inoue 1897: 10). Deploying the language of hygiene, he announced that monsterology would contribute to a “great clean-up of delusions” (meishin no ōsōji; ibid.): it was the disciplinary disinfectant that would “kill the bacteria of superstition” (meishin no bakuteria wo korosu; ibid.: 16; Figal 1999: 88). Because his investigation was premised on entities like goblins and ghosts having no material foundation, the explanation for their putative existence would be sought in disorderly mental states; monsterology was thus “a branch of applied psychology” (Inoue quoted in Miura 2014: 299). In terms of material causes, he ventured that many monstrous occurrences could be traced to bodily defects, such as bad eyesight or nervous disorders (Figal 1999: 50).
Inoue organized a hierarchy of mysterious entities, including what he called “empty,” “artificial,” and “false” mysteries (kyokai, gikai, gokai; see Foster 2009: 82–83; Miura 2014: 306). Even so, he also posited another category, “true supernatural beings” (shinsei no yōkai), which existed outside the space of explanation and of knowledge. These entities inhabited a transcendent domain of wonder that Inoue named the “true mystery” (shinkai). As a prominent Buddhist thinker, Inoue seemingly wanted to locate a safe space where Buddha and other divinities could dwell unmolested by scientific explanation.5 Yet even these divinities were stripped of any capacity to act, becoming “transformed into merely temporary names for an abstract truth” (Josephson 2006: 162).
While Inoue busied himself with whittling down the population of spiritual entities, Yanagita was organizing a campaign of conservation. Although, in Yanagita’s conception, folklore studies have interests that go considerably beyond the supernatural, the archiving and preserving of the mysterious was integral to the endeavor. Indeed, the emergence of the field is conventionally traced to Yanagita’s hugely popular 1912 publication of the “Tales of Tōno” (Tōno Monogatari), which was based on a series of mysterious stories told to Yanagita by Sasaki Kizen, a university-educated native of Tōno city in northern Japan. Yanagita himself was fascinated by the “twilight” (tasogare): at once a time where vision becomes indistinct as shadows lengthen, and a space where the objective and the imaginary blur and transform. This twilight zone was the poetic expression of his method, which aimed to tap into and understand the abiding “life-consciousness” (seikatsu ishiki) of the Japanese folk that survived at the margins of modernity (Yanagita 1989: 253–54, cited in Figal 1999: 113).
For Yanagita, the spirits and monsters that occupied this crepuscular realm were integral to Japanese identity (Foster 2009: 143). As for the identities and capabilities of the spirits themselves, Yanagita placed these in an evolutionary scheme according to which the powers of spirits diminished as civilization advanced. In this evolutionary demonology, a spiritual entity can possess (tsuku) human beings in the early stages of civilization, but at a later stage, it is only able to surprise (odorokasu; [158]Yanagita 1962: 467; see Foster 2009: 155). In the most downgraded state, entities once capable of invading human bodies are reduced to going “Boo!”
At one level, Inoue and Yanagita pursued very different projects. While Inoue’s spirits would be made to disappear under the bright lights of science, Yanagita, with his more literary cast of mind, recognized an epistemological twilight zone where the real and the imaginary mingled. At another level, however, their approaches were similar. Thus, both Inoue and Yanagita were concerned with “wonder” (fushigi) (Tanaka 2004: 70; see also Foster 2009: 83), and both saw most wonders as human productions, subject matters that ultimately concerned the psychic realm.6 Viewed thus, the difference was simply in their methods for treating the wondrous. Whereas Inoue saw most wonders as cognitive errors, Yanagita viewed them as something to be cherished: “Why is it that such unthinkable visions are realized in the brains of humans? . . . In the end, one has to say that it is human beings that are the greatest wonder in the universe” (Yanagita 1963: 376; see Foster 2009: 145).7
The historical uptake of Inoue’s and Yanagita’s efforts and the disciplinary successes of their respective endeavors have been strikingly different. Whereas monsterology is presently viewed as something like a curiosity, folklore studies remains a respectable field. Given that modernity is in part defined by its relegation of spirits and monsters to the “backwards,” this might seem like a surprising turn of events. After all, it was monsterology that adopted this enlightened stance, whereas Yanagita’s relation to supernatural beings was far more ambiguous. Yet, monsterology’s demotion to a curiosum can also be seen as an index of its very success. After all, Inoue aimed to eradicate his subject matter. Analogous to a medical science that would have succeeded in ridding the world of disease, with the modern demise of monsters having defeated its object, monsterology obviated itself. And thus it gradually became difficult to imagine Japanese spirits and monsters as anything but sociopsychological entities.
However, this was not quite the end of the story. For when spirits reappeared on the anthropological scene in Japan, as elsewhere, they donned the clothes of cultural politics.


The spirit(s) of politics
With the beginning of Japanese anthropology as a professional discipline, spirits, as agents, were analytically exorcized.8 Meiji period scholars strove not only to [159]give Shinto a foundation in physical science (in conversation with Galileo and Newton) but also to define it as a political project “capable of healing the ‘body’ of the Japanese nation” (Josephson 2012: 97). As we have seen in the case of Inoue, a crucial dimension of this “healing process” was the eradication of superstitions; a process in which monsters came to be seen as “pests to the modern project” (Figal 1999: 7). Slowly but steadily they transformed from being dangerous (but real) to backwards (and unreal) (Josephson 2012: 173). Upon becoming unreal, spirits then fall prey to the “reality” of politics. This particular story continues into the present.
Sarah Thal (2002), for example, considers the far-reaching transformations that took place with the foundation of the Meiji state in the late nineteenth century. As Japan changed, so too did its deities. Following a series of edicts, divinities were subject to radical acts of identity reassignment, as they were stripped of their existing Buddhist names and affiliations in order to realign them with the requirements of national, and imperial, ritual. Thal effectively shows how various priests and institutions negotiated these changes. However, she conceives these actions as so many reactions to externally imposed demands. The priests did what they did “for political purposes . . . for economic survival” (ibid.: 399). In other words, whereas politics and the economy act, cosmology merely responds; divinities become symptoms, not agents of change. Thus, although the importance of critically examining relations between religion and politics is undeniable, one of its casualties in the Japanese context has been to turn Shinto into little more than a projection screen. The consequence has been a diminished capacity for engaging spirits and deities as anything but political entities (Jensen and Blok 2013).
Of course, the politicization of spirits is by no means a prerogative of Japanese intellectual life. As wryly described by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2003: 1), Tylor’s trail-blazing claim that “the science of culture is a reformer’s science” defined anthropology in general as a “‘Ghostbusters’-like enterprise.”9 Illustrations are visible in spirit anthropologies from Africa to Japan. However, even if the politicization of spirits in Japan in many ways resembles these broader tendencies, its manifestation is different in one significant respect. Whereas the tradition of the Comaroffs, for example, shows people engaged in occult economies, working spiritually to reinterpret and rework oppressive political and economic systems, scholars of Shinto and Japanese nationalism have routinely highlighted the success of the Japanese state in ridding Shinto of anything resembling spiritual content (Ivy 1995; Thomas 2001; Golley 2008). To paraphrase Jean Comaroff’s (1985) title, there is certainly a body of power there (the state, that is), but apparently little spirit of resistance.
In the following, we turn to the thought of Minakata Kumagusu for an ontographic alternative to this idea. For Minakata, as we shall see, life unfolds as an interweaving of visible and invisible webs. One can learn to navigate these orders by developing “tact.”[160]


Webs of en and in
Above we argued that the possibility of a more expansive engagement with spirit worlds hinges on a process of bodily, perceptual, and conceptual modification. The Japanese microbiologist Minakata Kumagusu (1867–1941), a scientific maverick and a contemporary of Yanagita and Inoue, would probably have agreed that the inability of most modern people, anthropologists included, to meet supernatural beings is due to insufficient modification. In itself, however, this says little about the kinds of change required to meet other beings. Minakata, however, offered an ingenious and, as it may now seem, proto-ontographic answer to this question. Reading his work today, one may have a feeling of traveling back to the anthropological future.
Minakata was an accomplished, though eccentric, scientist. Similar to Yanagita, he was also keenly aware of the gaps of scientific knowledge and method. In his own day, Minakata’s main claim to scientific fame was his work on slime molds (myxomycetes and mycetozoa). However, he also took a keen interest in folklore and the supernatural, and he engaged in philosophical reflections on the relations between different kinds of knowledge and various kinds of phenomena.
Conceptualizing the combined set of worldly phenomena in the shape of a mandala, encompassed by the great mystery (daifushigi) of Dainichi Nyorai,10 Minakata distinguished between “wonders” belonging to what can be roughly translated as abstract things (koto), concrete things (mono), the mind (kokoro), and reason (kotowari) (Minakata 1951: 271–75; see also Gill 1998: 158).11 Not unlike Evans-Pritchard, Minakata insisted that the scientific search for the law of causality does not facilitate an understanding of all the world’s relations (en and in).12
En (Skt. pratyaya) is a Buddhist term which, narrowly conceived, denotes indirect, external causes that are complemented by in, direct, internal causes (Nakamura et al. 1989: 76). More broadly, en connotes ties or relations (enishi), invisible orders beyond human knowledge, which form webs around all things in the universe. One can neither predict nor comprehend the design and work of en. However, though usually invisible, the threads13 that connect humans and nonhumans may be brought to attention through unexpected meetings. Actualized through chance and coincidence, en forms the reason (kotowari) behind all things in the universe:[161]

Today’s science grasps (or is expected to grasp) the riddles of causality. It comprehends . . . causality or “in” (but not coincidence or “en”). . . . “En” is what emerges out of the inter-twining of one series of causes and effects with another. In order to grasp the total picture of the world, both cause and effect (in) and their interrelationships (en) should be understood. (Tsurumi 1998: 169–70; see also Minakata 1971: 391–92)

For Minakata, reasons, relations, and entities in the realm of daifushigi actually existed but their manner of existence fell outside the scope of modern science, which deals only with concrete things (cf. Chakrabarty 2000: 111). But if chance and coincidence was pivotal to under-standing the ontological manner of things, how then to modify one’s perceptual abilities in order to grasp them? This, Minakata suggested, required tact.


Minakata’s tact
It is curious to find the single unreferenced English word “tact” in the midst of Minakata’s cosmological musings. In itself, however, his use of English is hardly surprising. By 1903, Minakata had lived in the Americas for five years and in London for nine. Among other things, he had studied accounting and agriculture, and worked for a traveling circus. During his lengthy stay abroad, he had also become an avid reader of the folkloristic periodical Notes and Queries, to which, between 1899 and 1933, he contributed more than three hundred essays.
Robert Merton and Elinor Barber (2006) have discussed the role Notes and Queries played in the history of the word “serendipity.” Based on his reading of the Sri Lankan fairytale “The three princes of Serendip,” Horace Walpole had originally coined the term in 1754 to designate “accidental sagacity.” The word lived an obscure existence for over a hundred years. In the late nineteenth century, however, it came to describe the chance discoveries of collectors and scientists. The diverse usages of serendipity that flourished in the Notes, Merton and Barber (2006: 57) wrote, spoke to “a single fundamental tension . . . between the attribution of credit for an unexpected discovery on the one hand, and to auspicious external circumstances on the other.”
In 1874, the English economist and logician William Stanley Jevons had written that “the greater the tact and industry with which a physicist applies himself to the study of nature,” the higher his chance of meeting “fortunate accidents” (Jevons 1874: 164–165, cited in Merton and Barber 2006: 45). We do not know whether Minakata read this particular sentence. We do know, however, that he submitted a rejected, and subsequently lost, paper on serendipity to the Notes in 1904 (Shimura 2015: 134). Moreover, he continued to write on “tact” in Japanese in the years that followed.
In certain ways, Minakata’s notion of tact appears similar to Jevons’ formulation. It is, however, dramatically different in drawing also on reservoirs of Buddhist thought. This unusual combination created a perspective from which Minakata was able to deal with just “those ‘mysterious’ workings of the universe, that other men take as only the starting point for rational scientific investigation” (Merton and Barber 2006: 55).[162]
“Things in the universe,” wrote Minakata (1951: 276, 277–78), “naturally proceed smoothly without being conscious as long as one can apprehend the reasons for such things. . . . A discovery is . . . nothing but understanding things in the universe, as they are, through . . . encountering tact” (emphasis added). The formulation “as long as one can apprehend the reasons” (yoki kotowari ni sae tsukamaeatareba) implies both that one apprehends and that one is apprehended by reasons. Like a hunter wandering in a forest, tracing faint signs of game, tact entails trying to sense the “reasons” of nonhuman orders. To respond to the slightest sign, the hunter must wait while searching, all the while staying attentive to the motions and sounds of the world. Thus, tact can be seen as the limit point where that which one has consciously learned encounters worldly surprises that go beyond this learning. It concerns the cultivation of a receptive attitude toward the surprises of (nonhuman) things; even things that might lie hidden in plain view (Delaplace 2014: 54).
Even so, Minakata did not see tact as akin to the intuitions or inspirations of genius. As exemplified by the hunter, or the stonecutter who perfectly dresses a hand mill, all the while chatting with his friends, tact has practiced experience as a necessary condition. But, though necessary, practice itself is insufficient. While tact can emerge out of repeated practice, there is no guarantee that this will happen (Minakata 1951: 275–78; see also Gill 1998: 161–62; Figal 1999: 61).
In a famous example, Minakata describes a dream which foretold that he would find a particular slime mold, if he was to search around Mukōyama in the Nachi area. Following the dream, he visted the area in search of the mold. After engaging in a long fruitless search, he was forced to take a detour. Passing the imperial mausoleum of Kazan-tennō, the slime molds appeared before him (Minakata 1951: 280).
In writing about this chance encounter, Minakata does not claim that the dream made him find the molds. Indeed, he admits that a sufficiently careful explorer would probably have found them in any case. Crucially, however, he rejects any explanation based on “psychic addition.” There could be no issue of subconscious recollection, for example, since he had never even seen a real-life specimen of these molds before. Hence, “it was nothing other than ‘tact’” (ibid.) that enabled the discovery.
Minakata thus conceives of tact in the form of heightened attentiveness induced by his dream. He found the slime molds: “because I searched carefully, inspired by the revelation of a dream. . . . Considering the fact that there was nothing at Mukōyama, despite the dream [saying that] they must be there, this dream had no grounds and yet, also, was not strange” (Minakata 1951: 280–81). In other words, the dream revelation was not a direct cause (in) of his discovery. Rather, by providing an oblique clue, the dream set in motion a quest that attuned Minakata to the environment and intensified his perceptions. The dream and the tactful search it engendered were themselves components of en, indirect causes that related the traveling researcher, the mountainous fields, and the slime molds.
As the episode suggests, tact worked by modifying what was perceptible to Minakata in, and as, broader ecologies of practice (cf. Stengers 2005). And, in fact, Minakata was among the first to adopt the English term “ecology” in Japanese.14 [163]Yet there was a Buddhist supplement to his translation and usage, for, in addition to human, animal and plant relationships, this ecology encompassed spiritual beings. Compared with Inoue and Yanagita, Minakata did not objectify such beings but aimed rather to sense them more subtly. Expanding beyond Western ideas of “natural” or “physical” surroundings, his ecology comprised the entire web of innen, and ultimately the great mystery, daifushigi, itself. In his critique of shrine mergers, for example, Minakata argued that, aside from harming natural habitats, the mergers also threatened “kami-worship,” by leading to enshrinement of shady beings like snakes and foxes (Minakata 1971: 573). Moreover, his letters and diary are peppered with experiences of nonhuman communication with ghosts, sympathetic encounters with forest creatures, and dreams about his late male lover (e.g., ibid.: 31–32; 1987: 57, 418–19, 421; see also Karasawa 2012a, 2012b). Indeed, he declared himself “a child of the deity of the old camphor tree of Fujishiro-ōji” (Minakata 1973: 411). Within this web, as Figal (1999: 62) summarizes, “tact begins to take shape as a tactic by which to tackle the intangibles . . . that must be taken into account in any model of causation in the human world.”
In spite of the invocations of mysterious communion, however, Minakata’s tact was not an antonym of reason. Instead, the intensified attention indexed by tact enabled a sense of “wonder” and “mystery,” which was integral to an expanded reason. This ontological tact resonates with Whitehead’s (1920: 163) observation that “delicacy of sense-apprehension means perception of objects as distinct entities, which are mere subtle ideas to cruder sensibilities.”


Encounters beyond belief
In stark contrast with the epistemological and moral disjunction that Inoue posited between science and nonscience, Minakata depicted a world filled with surprising forms of agency—from slime molds to Dainichi Nyorai—working in webs of en. Rationalist science and institutionalized religion both come up short against such diverse forms of agency. Yet this is not because these entities are ultimately immaterial, disembodied, or unreal (rendered as beliefs). Rather, Minakata’s ontological tact, tallying with Shingon Buddhist notions, responds to a heterogeneous but mutually implicated cosmos. Rather than disembodied, this cosmos could be described as superembodied, since everything in it, even spiritual beings, has varied, and variable, corporeal forms.
Moreover, it is just because the entities woven in this cosmic web are so heterogeneous that empiricist or positivist methods for encountering them are inadequate. The notion of the “wondrous” itself marks the recognition that the bodies and environments of the world are so varied that they can be domesticated neither by scientific descriptions nor by lived experience in its conventional phenomenological guises.
As a living mandala, webs of en are at once transitory actualizations and immanent reasons of the great mystery. Contingent, and charged with transformative potential, this is anything but a static scheme of being. Rather than positing a fixed, dual relation between humans and divinities, depending on circumstantial arrangements almost everything may turn out to be either divine or mundane.[164]
As we have seen, both Inoue and Yanagita considered spiritual beings as the results of people’s collective imagination. This view embedded the assumption that the world transforms in tandem with people’s mindsets. In contrast, Minakata considered the environment in terms of unstable networks of innen, encompassed by the great mystery. According to this view, entities are always surrounded by innumerable en, each of which has potential for evoking an event and affecting a person or thing. Whether the potentials of en are actualized or not depends on how one learns to be affected within the web:

Without cause (in), there is no effect (ga). And if the cause is different, then the effect also becomes different. En means that as one series of cause and effect (inga) continues, it is infiltrated by another series. The influence of en is called an occurrence (ki). . . . Therefore, various series of cause and effect continue in the body. At any moment, we encounter innumerable en. They can make occurrences happen, depending on how one minds them or how they touch one’s body. Because of these occurrences, some causes and effects that were continuous until now move out of their orbit, while others return to their original path. (Minakata 1971: 391)15

As this difficult passage suggests, events beyond scientific cognition are captured neither by the dichotomy of “belief or disbelief” nor by that of “existence or nonexistence.” Rather, the occurrence of such events is consequent upon having learned to be affected by different entities and relations within the webs of en. Within these webs, tact may change the orbit of causes that create occurrences, thereby rearranging the webs in turn. In the case of slime molds, one needs tact to notice them, while in the case of spirits, tact is required not only to notice but also to be noticed. In both cases, however, rather than aiming to bring one into contact with the world conceived as an already stabilized form of being, tact works by activating relations in a dynamic process of attunement.


Activating spirit worlds
In this article, we have used Japanese materials as a test-site for experimenting with anthropological theory. Minakata’s webs of en and in, and his sense of tact, we have argued, offer possibilities for an anthropological activation of spirit worlds. Such activation is premised on the possibility of modifying bodies, and their perceptual [165]and conceptual apparatuses, to make them receptive to typically imperceptible dimensions of being. Conferring on spirits and their worlds a degree of existence that they are often deprived of, Minakata’s tact also offers a distinct vantage point for considering the question of relational and transformable ontologies.
Echoing a number of recent critiques, Peter Geschiere (2013: 170) has commented that ontological approaches, by emphasizing radical contrasts between worlds, are premised on a “vision of essential cultural difference.” Yet, rather than worrying about the supposed essentialism of ontological approaches—supposed, since what we have described is a thoroughly temporal process of unpredictable modifications of people, spirits, and the webs they inhabit, including the anthropologist—we find it more problematic that it often appears as if everything one might want to say about spirits is really about something else. Anthropological contextualization, that is, almost always leads to a form of substitution, where peoples’ minds, their economic systems, their political projects, or their social relations fill the place initially held by spirits. As these supposedly real realities replace the spirits, the latter are emptied of existence.
In one sense, there is no way around ventriloquizing spirits. This extends to the present argument too, for, after all, it is not spirits that are writing this text. Yet, we have tried to create an opening for conferring more agency and liveliness on spirits and their worlds. While we are sympathetic to analyses that show spirit worlds to be shaped by a whole range of forces—from language to economics and politics—we would like to provide further opportunities for spirits to add their own surprises.
Minakata has taught us that creating such opportunities requires resisting the bifurcation between reality and fiction. A brief detour to ancient Greece can further clarify what we mean by this. In Greek comedy, parabasis designated the time when the chorus, digressing from the storyline, directly addressed the audience. This was the point when reality—the outside—interfered directly in the play. Following this usage, the literary theorist Paul de Man offered a paradoxical definition of permanent parabasis as “the continual or omnipresent intrusion of the real into fiction” (Smyth 2002: 12). The paradox is that if parabasis is permanent so that reality continuously intrudes into fiction, then fiction is never wholly fictional. Indeed, the only fiction would be the idea of a “pure fiction” untouched by any reality at all.
Transposed to spirit worlds, the implication is that what is truly unreal is the idea that spirits lack any reality of their own. And indeed, in the twilight that fascinated Yanagita, the apparently real and the seemingly imagined blurred, compromising the distinction, and undermining the premise of a bifurcated world. Thus, the ontographic potentials of an anthropology of spirit worlds depend on activating the apparently fictitious.
Rather than unmasking, Minakata depicts a world of webs of causes, coincidences, diverse forms of corporeal modification and transformation. The “wondrous revelation” of entities and relations usually imperceptible depends on tact, which simultaneously describes a way of tuning in to usually imperceptible webs, tapping their potentials, and interfering with them.
Inflected by Minakata’s tact, ontography, as we have used the term here, offers a way of characterizing the entire process of encountering particular forms of en, noticing unexpected occurrences, and experiencing/transforming webs of relations. As a kind of ontological attunement, tact operates at once as a lure, [166]making hitherto invisible beings and powers perceivable, and as a catalyst for transforming the web of en relations, and its implicated entities, including everything from slime molds to people and spiritual beings.
In our view, describing such transformations with as much ethnographic care as has been bestowed upon social, political, and economic forces would substantially enrich not only the anthropology of spirit worlds, but also anthropological understanding of relational ontologies and their transformations. Thus, we see ontography as indicating a path forward for creating ethnographic and conceptual resonance between worlds usually held to be separate—or, often, held to not really exist at all.


Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the five reviewers and the editor for their thoughtful encouragements and critiques. We would also like to thanks Taisuke Karasawa, Masaki Shimura, and Yoshiya Tamura for commenting and for providing details on Minakata Kumagusu.


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S’accorder aux réseaux de l’en: ontographie, mondes des esprits au Japon et le “tact” de Minamata Kumagusu
Résumé : Cet article, à vocation expérimentale en matière de théorie ethnographique, tente d’éclairer sous un nouveau jour les mondes habités par les esprits au Japon. Afin d’éviter de laisser entendre que ce qui peuple vraiment les mondes des esprits sont des superstitions, le reflet de réalités socioéconomiques et de politiques, nous devons trouver des manières de regarder les esprits qui ne sont pas surdéterminées par la présupposition que ces entités n’existent pas: c’est là le réel enjeu “ontographique.” Après avoir examiné les problématiques inspirées par les croyances présentes dans les études folkloriques sur le Japon et la “Monstrologie,” nous nous arrêtons sur la pensée non-conformiste du scientifique Minikata Kumagusu. Dans ses travaux nous trouvons une perspective originale et protoontologique, particulèrement attentive aux rencontres pleines de tact et aux modes d’engagement harmonieux au sein des réseaux cosmiques de l’en.
Casper Bruun JENSEN is Associate Professor at the Department of Anthropology, Osaka University. He is the author of Ontologies for developing things (Sense, 2010) and Monitoring movements in development aid (with Brit Ross Winthereik; MIT Press, 2013) and the editor of Deleuzian intersections: Science, technology, anthropology (with Kjetil Rödje; Berghahn, 2009) and Infrastructures and social complexity (with Penny Harvey and Atsuro Morita; Routledge, 2016). His present work focuses on delta ontologies and environmental infrastructures in Southeast Asia.
Casper Bruun JensenDepartment of AnthropologySchool of Human Sciences,Osaka UniversityYamada-oka 1-2Suita, Osaka 565-0871Japancbruunjensen@gmail.com
Miho ISHII is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Kyoto University. She has conducted fieldwork in Tanzania, Ghana, and India. Among her publications are “Playing with perspectives: Spirit possession, mimesis, and permeability in the buuta ritual in South India” (Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 2013) and “Caring for divine infrastructures: Nature and spirits in a special economic zone in India” (Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, 2016).
Miho IshiiInstitute for Research in HumanitiesKyoto UniversityYoshida HonmachiSakyokuKyoto 6068501Japanyqk05626@nifty.ne.jp[172]
Philip SWIFT is Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Anthropology, University College London. His fieldwork was concerned with the Japanese new religion, Mahikari. His research interests include ritual theory and the anthropology of cosmology, conversion and transformation.
Philip Swift4C Belmont StreetLondon NW1 8HHUKp.johnswift@btinternet.com


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1. For an attempt to place spirits on an equal explanatory footing as other such apparently empirically invisible entities as culture, economy, “the market,” and so on, see Blanes and Espírito Santo (2014).
2. “Spirit worlds” should be understood as a compressed expression, an encapsulation of complex realities along the same lines as the phenomenological shorthand “lifeworlds”. Like lifeworlds, spirit worlds are evidently not configured in the same way across contexts.
3. Other studies on magic, witchcraft, and spirit possession analyze these phenomena not merely in terms of a critique of modernity, but as constitutive of it (e.g., Behrend and Luig 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff 2002). These approaches remain wedded to the idea that the most important anthropological dimension of spirits is their role and function in political discourse. For critiques of this tendency, see Kapferer (2003) and Ishii (2013).
4. That spirits in Japan are to be taken as social, psychological, or political indices is the premise adopted variously by Davis (1980), McVeigh (1996: 285), Bargen (1997), and Shimazono (2004: 176). For an important historical study that counters this tendency, see Faure (2016).
5. In Inoue’s last article “Shinkai” (2000), he argued that most mysteries could be scientifically explained in terms of physical science and psychology. However, science cannot easily explain fundamental questions such as “what are things?” and “what are minds?” and thus it is rational to call these questions shinkai (see Shibata 2014). In this sense, Inoue’s idea of “true mystery” resembles Minakata’s “great wonder,” which we discuss later.
6. Along similar lines, Michael Scott (2013) sees wonder as an important aspect of contemporary ontological thinking.
7. The legacy of Inoue and Yanagita as psychologists of Japanese beliefs is confirmed by Komatsu Kazuhiko, today’s leading figure of yōkaigaku, who describes the study of yōkai as “nothing other than the study of human beings who have created yōkai” (Komatsu 1994: 10; see also Foster 2009: 208).
8. We speak of analytical exorcism, since political exorcism has a longer history. The latter is exemplified, for example, at Tokugawa Ieyasu’s mausoleum in Nikkō, where signs tell demons to “keep out.”
9. Although, regarding ghosts, perhaps “debunking” rather than “busting” might a more apt designation, since the Ghostbusters of cinematic fame were concerned to prove to an initially skeptical public that the entities they captured, and disposed of, were very real.
10. Dainichi Nyorai (Skt. Vairocana), the cosmic Buddha, is a central divinity in esoteric Buddhism (Nakamura et al. 1989: 543).
11. Deeply influenced by ideas of Shingon Buddhism (see Tsurumi 1978: 20, 82), Minakata elaborated his unique cosmology, including the “Minakata mandala” (ibid., 1992, 1998), and his ideas about wonders, en and in, science, and religion in letters to Dogi Hōryū (1854–1923), a prominent Buddhist scholar who became the chief administrator of the Shingon sect on Mount Kōya.
12. Innen is a compound word composed of in and en. See below for further discussion of these terms.
13. Japanese has several expressions in which a thread is used as an imagistic metaphor for en, e.g. “tying en” (en-musubi) or “cutting en” (en-kiri).
14. Shin’ichi Nakazawa (1993: 295–329) has compared Minakata’s radically expanded concept of ecology to the arguments of Gregory Bateson and Félix Guattari.
15. Minakata’s notion of two intertwined causalities reminds us of Evans-Pritchard (1937). According to Evans-Pritchard, if a granary fell upon a particular man, the Azande would ask why two different series of causes (the granary collapsing and the man happening to sit under it) should intersect. Witchcraft (mangu) would then provide an explanation. For the Azande, witchcraft therefore worked as a shared “philosophy,” which transformed mere coincidence into inevitability. While Minakata’s tact has nothing to do with witchcraft per se, it describes a bodily and perceptual capacity for becoming aware of potential intertwinements, thus enabling desirable encounters and events. In this sense, though it is far broader, the idea bears resemblance to the skilled performances of artisans, hunters, or artists (e.g., Gell 1998; Ishii 2013).
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			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Anthropologists often take recourse to the word “world” as if its meaning were selfevident, but the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a perilously polysemic fashion. So, the question of “what world are we engaging?” imposes itself, particularly as it leads to another important question: are there “worlds”? This latter question raises some of the fundamental perplexities that have haunted anthropological theory throughout the past century. In this series of two articles, I propose to abandon the established dichotomy between rather crude forms of realism and equally crude forms of semiotic idealism. I sustain that we cannot discuss world without considering for whom, but that this is fully compatible with single-world ontology if we take into account the role of personhood in the human condition. This first article argues for a single-world ontology and for the centrality of personhood. It explores the implications of a form of minimal realism that best suits the ethnographic gesture, while the second article responds to the question of world-forming, the matter of worldview.</p></abstract>
			<abstract-trans xml:lang="EN"><p>Anthropologists often take recourse to the word “world” as if its meaning were selfevident, but the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a perilously polysemic fashion. So, the question of “what world are we engaging?” imposes itself, particularly as it leads to another important question: are there “worlds”? This latter question raises some of the fundamental perplexities that have haunted anthropological theory throughout the past century. In this series of two articles, I propose to abandon the established dichotomy between rather crude forms of realism and equally crude forms of semiotic idealism. I sustain that we cannot discuss world without considering for whom, but that this is fully compatible with single-world ontology if we take into account the role of personhood in the human condition. This first article argues for a single-world ontology and for the centrality of personhood. It explores the implications of a form of minimal realism that best suits the ethnographic gesture, while the second article responds to the question of world-forming, the matter of worldview.</p></abstract-trans>
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				<kwd>world, ontology, worldview, representation, intentionality, monism</kwd>
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	<body><p>World






This work is licensed under the Creative Commons | © João de Pina-Cabral. ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau4.1.002
World
An anthropological examination (part 1)
João DE PINA-CABRAL, University of Kent


Anthropologists often take recourse to the word “world” as if its meaning were self-evident, but the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a perilously polysemic fashion. So, the question of “what world are we engaging?” imposes itself, particularly as it leads to another important question: are there “worlds”? This latter question raises some of the fundamental perplexities that have haunted anthropological theory throughout the past century. In this series of two articles, I propose to abandon the established dichotomy between rather crude forms of realism and equally crude forms of semiotic idealism. I sustain that we cannot discuss world without considering for whom, but that this is fully compatible with single-world ontology if we take into account the role of personhood in the human condition. This first article argues for a single-world ontology and for the centrality of personhood. It explores the implications of a form of minimal realism that best suits the ethnographic gesture, while the second article responds to the question of world-forming, the matter of worldview.
Keywords: world, ontology, worldview, representation, intentionality, monism.



Anthropologists, historians, and qualitative sociologists often take recourse to the word “world” as if its meaning were self-evident. While, indeed, it might be argued that the broad enterprise of science is nothing but a study of “world,” the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a perilously polysemic fashion in the course of any single debate. When we describe some feature of the “world of the Nyakyusa” (Wilson 1951), which differs from that of other peoples, the meaning of the word is rather distant from that given to it by philosophers when they speak of “world-involving sentient activity” (Hutto and Myin 2013: 157); when we oppose “home” to “world” (Jackson 1995); or yet when we talk of “social world,” as Bourdieu so often did (e.g., 1991). How do these meanings combine? Is “world” still a useful category for anthropologists?
Of late, as it happens, the category has been playing a rather crucial role in anthropological debates. Tim Ingold, for instance, predicates one of his seminal arguments with the statement, “people do not import their ideas, plans or mental representations into the world, since the very world … is the homeland of their thoughts” (1995: 76, 57–80). Here, we can assume that Ingold means by “world” something akin to Martin Heidegger’s “the manifestness of beings as such as a whole” (1995: 304), in short, everything that there is. So, the meaning of the word would differ from a more socially localized one, as in “the world of the Nyakyusa.” And yet, that leaves out the main perplexity posed by Ingold’s sentence: there being many ways of deciding what there is, which one should his reader adopt?
These perplexities have haunted the social sciences for a very long time. Twentieth-century anthropologists ranged from those who espoused more or less unsophisticated forms of realism to those who adopted semiotic idealisms. On the one hand, for example, Max Gluckman’s positivism or Marvin Harris’ materialism; on the other, the kind of idealism that Boon and Schneider argued for in the 1970s when they proposed “liberating” kinship as a “cultural semantic field” from “sociofunctional prerequisites” granting it “an autonomous integrity analyzable in its own right” (Boon and Schneider 1974: 814). There is a dichotomic propensity at work in anthropological theory that makes it somehow safer to adopt either one or the other extreme. In mid-century England, this was largely represented by Evans-Pritchard’s radical rejection of the Durkheimian positivism of his predecessors in his 1949 Marrett Lecture (1950) and was long instanced in the Oxford versus Cambridge divide. But the dichotomic propensity continued: once again, in the 1980s American post-modernist interpretativism reengaged it and then again, in the 2000s, perspectivism brought back the issue all over again.
Over the decades, as I proceeded with my own ethnographic projects,1 I could not help but feel that we had to overcome this propensity, as it was both intellectually reductive and ethically unviable. In this series of two articles I attempt to articulate the structure of the concept of world as it is being used in contemporary anthropological debates (cf. Frankfurt 2009: 2). I propose a view concerning world that aims at overcoming the effects of the all-or-nothing fallacy that so often dominates anthropological theorization, that is, “the fallacy of reasoning from the fact that there is nothing we might not be wrong about to the conclusion that we might be wrong about everything” (Davidson 2001: 45).
My inquiry in these articles is different from Martin Heidegger’s question in his famous lecture course of 1929/30 (1995): “what is world?” My purpose differs in that I aim to lay out the conditions of possibility for the ethnographic gesture. I do not ask about the essence of world or its entities, but about “the world which is present at hand” to the ethnographer, as Heidegger would have put it. Thus, I do not ask “why world?” but “what world are we engaging?”—that world that is permanently a component of all anthropological debate. In these two articles, I will not run through the ethnographic record in order to establish exhaustively how different anthropologists have defined world. Two examples that call forth very diverse terrains will have to suffice. Rather, I attempt to propose an outlook on world that allows both for the universalist hopes of the anthropological endeavor and for the particularistic demands of the ethnographic practice.
Again, I concern myself with the world of humans, but this does not mean that I discard or reduce the significance of what Heidegger calls “the comparative examination” (1995: 176–78). In fact, his three theses that a stone has no world, that an animal is poor in world, and that a human is world-forming, help us focus on an important aspect of some of the debates that have been firing the social sciences and humanities of late. In the wake of Bruno Latour, there are many who question not only that humans are the only world-forming agents but also that stones have no world. Vital materialists, such as Jane Bennett (2010), argue convincingly in favor of the need “to undo the conceit that humanity is the sole or ultimate well-spring of agency” (2010: 30). Similarly, William Connolly sustains that we live in an “immanent world of becoming” and thus he decries what he calls “the anthropic exception,” that is, the “radical break between humanity and other processes” (2011: 31).
I agree broadly with these thinkers but I still find that Heidegger’s theses—while they cannot be taken on board today in the way they were phrased—do outline three broad conditions of differentiation before the world that impose themselves. I find it impossible to follow Jane Bennett’s diktat that we must “bracket the question of the human” (2010: ix) for that is precisely what anthropology cannot do. It is hardly a matter of “placing humans at the ontological centre or hierarchical apex” (Bennett 2010: 11) but it is a matter of understanding the specific characteristics of the human condition. To do that we have to engage with the nature of personhood, since only human persons can engage in propositional thinking and, therefore, address the world as world. Ours is not a generic human condition, it is the condition of historically specific persons in ontogeny. World is not only human but it is personal. This calls us to be attentive to the “ambivalent character of the concept of world,” the step from which Heidegger starts his questioning (1995: 177ff). That is also, therefore, the essential point of departure to what follows. Much like him, I do not aim to abolish such ambivalence, I just aim to contribute toward its further unveiling.


A minimalist realism
Of late, anthropological theory has been oscillating between two alternative options concerning world-making. There are those who follow a metaphysical path in proposing to reenchant the world, with all of the rhetoric charm that goes with such excesses (Viveiros de Castro 2009; Kohn 2013); there are others, however, such as myself, who have opted to stick to the more pedestrian path of building a scientific analysis of what is to be human in the world, for which you have to assume that all humans share common paths of humanity and of animality, and that only within these paths does it make sense to be a social scientist at all. Social analysis is carried out by persons in ontogeny, and it is to be received by persons in ontogeny. Verisimilitude, therefore, is an indispensable feature of all successful sociological or anthropological description, as any social scientist who has had to defend a PhD thesis well knows. And verisimilitude depends on assuming the background of a common human world. This approach is, no doubt, less exciting from a rhetoric point of view because it obliges us to the constant exercise of critical attention implied in the fact that we are always part of what we observe and that there are insuperable limits to certainty.
As such, I aim to contribute toward developing a realism that is minimalist to the extent that it sees humans as capable of engaging the world in very diverse manners (cf. Lynch 1998). Humans are part of the world and respond to its becoming like the members of other species but they do so in a particular way.2 Like many animals, we too can only make meaning in a social way, but unlike them we develop propositional (symbolic) thinking. This means that we are capable of contemplating our position vis-à-vis the world. Yet we do so only in as much as we develop personhood (cf. Hutto 2008; Pina-Cabral 2013a).
I agree, therefore, that we cannot discuss world without considering “for whom.” But, contrary to the belief of those who succumb to the all-or-nothing fallacy, this minimal realist position is perfectly compatible with a single-world ontology based on a nonrepresentational approach to cognition of the kind espoused by Donald Davidson in his late writings, where he develops further his notion of “anomalous monism” inspired by Spinoza’s thought (cf. Davidson 2005: 295–314). Anthropologists would do well to play greater attention to Davidson’s interpretivist rereading of W. V. Quine’s critique of understanding, for it provides a ready escape route to many of the quandaries concerning mind, knowledge, and belief that have haunted anthropological theory since Evans-Pritchard’s days and that were brought to a skeptical paroxysm in Rodney Needham’s Belief, language, and experience (1972).
Essentially, Davidson’s view is that “there are no strictly law-like correlations between phenomena classified as mental and phenomena classified as physical, though mental entities are identical, taken one at a time, with physical entities. In other words, there is a single ontology, but more than one way of describing and explaining the items in the ontology” (2004: 121, my emphasis). Taken at its broadest implications, this “anomaly,” to use Davidson’s clumsy expression, is not exclusive to humans but its effects are potentiated by human propositional (symbolic) thinking. Again, we must steer off our propensity to indulge in the all-or-nothing fallacy: humans are not only social, they are also persons who can appreciate that their own selves are part of the world—to that extent they are world-forming. Thus, for a minimalist realist, the relation between personhood and world is fundamental.
For some, like Connolly, this emphasis on the anomaly is incorrect: “The line between agency and cause is historically linked to Cartesian and Kantian contrasts between human beings invested with the powers of free will and non-human force-fields susceptible to explanation through nonagentic causes. But the powers of self-organization expressed to varying degrees in open systems of different types translate that first disjunction into a matter of degree” (Connolly 2011: 173). One is bound to agree with him concerning intentional forms of thinking, which humans share with other species, but not concerning the possibility to conceive of the person as separate from the world, which is a function of propositional, human-specific thinking (cf. Hutto and Myin 2013).
I believe that, from such a perspective, we can bypass the all-or-nothing fallacy and the dichotomic propensity of anthropological epistemology, which ontologist idealism again rehashes (e.g., Holbraad 2010) and develop the bases for a truly ecumenist anthropological theory, that is, one that works toward a common anthropological field of debate, one which all humans can access should they so desire.


The word
Today, the more general acceptation of the word “world,” is “what exists,” that is, everything. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, however, the main reference is to the planet Earth. The etymological root of the word lies in the Old English word woruld, meaning “human existence, the affairs of life”; itself derived from the Proto-Germanic *weraldiz, a combination of the words for “man,” (*veraz; related to Latin vir) and “age” (*aldiz, meaning age, generation), thus, implying “the age of man.” Furthermore, it would seem that both the Latin mundus and the Greek kosmos bore etymologically connotations of order, cleanliness, and neatness.
It is important to realize that the etymological connotations we have just briefly outlined have not lost their relevance. For example, when people claim that the most pressing problem of our time is humanity’s relation to a world that can no longer be taken as infinitely robust and inexhaustible, what meaning are they placing on the word? In this context, the limited meaning of planet Earth is not sufficient by any means but the meaning “all that exists” is also not the point. On the other hand, the further implications that emerge from the etymology, concerning humanity’s dwelling place and an ordered context for human habitation, are decidedly at stake. There are lessons to be learned from the word’s polysemy and, as we will see in this article, it will eventually turn out to be impossible to cast it aside.
However, due to the importance of the legacy of Christianity in the development of the scientific tradition in Western Europe, the word has absorbed into itself the theory of man’s fallen condition. As such, the world—that which presently exists— has come to be opposed to that which is to come: Christ’s second coming. This range of meanings is condensed in the notion of mundane; a notion that conjoins in a millenarian fashion two very separate but metonymically related meanings: (a) the everyday humdrum existence and (b) that which is not divine, spiritual, heavenly, and is therefore assumed to be shallow, false, doubtful, even irregular (as when, in French, a prostitute is called une mondaine). The conjoining of the two carries within itself a world-denying implication that facilitates the dualist strains in European thinking (anthropology included) and is best represented by Descartes’ radical philosophical restart—his cogito ergo sum declaration—that is so fundamental to the development of the modern scientific tradition. A somewhat different type of dualism concerning the deception of the senses also plays a central role in the Buddhist traditions and has remained globally very influential. In fact, historically, it constituted a major source of tension with China’s Confucian tradition, which is probably the least world-denying of the major philosophical traditions.
Therefore, for contemporary anthropologists, after the profound epistemological changes that took place in mid-twentieth-century philosophy, the best way of going about discovering what is world, is surely to see how it presents itself in people’s historically situated lives. Note, I did not say, “what meaning the word has for the people we study,” as anthropologists are prone to put it, for that is only part of the issue. I am, therefore, performing a little slide in meaning that I believe I should not silence. If I agree with Davidson and the late Wittgenstein that triangulation with the world is an indispensible component of all acts of human communication, then my suggestion that we should research world cannot be limited to the collecting of the meanings of the word “world,” the category “world,” or even less the belief “world.” I argue that world exists and is immanent (in the sense of imposing itself, cf. Connolly 2011), so world is anterior to language and is a condition for it, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.3 Thus, “the accessibility of beings” (cf. Heidegger 1995: 269) is an intrinsic condition of all human communication, including when the latter deals with world, such as our present communication.
We are bound to cast aside the dualist suspicions concerning the world’s reality that characterized both the Christian and the Buddhist traditions, and which were based on a systematic distrust of the senses, for they were victims of the all-or-nothing fallacy. So, we follow Davidson in claiming that, “If words and thoughts are, in the most basic cases, necessarily about the sorts of objects and events that commonly cause them, there is no room for Cartesian doubts about the independent existence of such objects and events” (2001: 45). If, in this way, we reject the duality between scheme and content (which we will discuss in the latter part of this article), then all our communication is based on an always-anterior existence of world.4 Therefore, inspired by Hannah Arendt (1958: 233), we must make an effort never to abstract from history: irreversibility and unpredictability are constitutive aspects of the human condition in this world of becoming.


Person and world
For an anthropologist, to study the varied ways in which humans inhabit the world (the ways they are “at home in the world”) is to study the particular conditions of our humanity. So, when anthropologists focus on cohabiting, we are speaking of specific human persons who encounter each other jointly in spaces that are common to the extent that they are historically specific, that is, spaces that carry a history of sociality within which the particular ontogenesis of each participant of the company was shaped.5 There is no sociality without persons; we are pressed to avoid the twentieth-century proneness to consider sociality in an abstracted way, as something that exists beyond personhood (in terms of the species or of groupness). Furthermore, embodiment as persons is a condition for all sociality. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued for category formation (1999), and Rodney Needham discovered for duality (1987), our own body experience (of containment and of handedness, respectively) is constitutive of our most basic mental processes.
Moreover, inhabiting the world as humans is not only to be of the world or to be directed at the world, as in the philosophical meaning of the word intentionality. For humans, inhabiting the world is confronting the world formatively, in the sense of thinking propositionally. I take recourse here to the distinction that Daniel Hutto sets up between intentional thinking, which humans share with other species (“basic mind”), and propositional thinking in language, which is specific to humans (“scaffolded mind”).6 Humans inhabit the world in both intentional and propositional ways. That means that humans as persons are in permanent ontogenesis, that is, they work reflexively at the fabrication of their own singularity. But note that I am not limiting propositional thought to the boundaries of “conscious/linguistic” thinking, an error that has persecuted anthropological theory since the days of Marcel Mauss. The world feeds back our ontogenetic actions in ways that we had not foreseen—the notion of “scaffolding of mind” is, in this way, usefully evocative.
Two important corollaries can be taken from this: first, we are subject to the indeterminacy of interpretation, that is, no meaning will ever be fixed or permanently determinable; second, we are subject to underdetermination, that is, there will never be certainty in knowing. This is what Davidson meant when he claimed that he was a “monist” (there is one single ontology) but that his monism was “anomalous,” for the world will ever remain indeterminate and underdetermined, that is, it will remain historically diverse.
The person is born as a member of the human species but is not born fully human, as it is only in the course of ontogenesis that the person enters into humanity. We are neurologically equipped with a propensity to enter the world of human communication and to remain within it through memory (Pina-Cabral 2013b). But in order to enter into the world of human communication (to acquire a scaffolded mind), we have to be enticed into humanity by other humans who had already been enticed by others before them, and so on and so forth back to the gradual and discrete origins of the human species.
As Daniel Hutto has argued, “nonverbal responding, quite generally, only involves the having of intentional—but not propositional—attitudes” (2008: xiii). This is something that remains as part of us for our whole lives. But, over that, through the immersion in the complex communicational environments of early ontogeny and the relations of mutuality through which carers capture and are captured by children (dwelling in company), young humans develop propositional thinking. The central propositional attitudes of belief and desire can only be acquired by participating in what Hutto calls “unscripted conversational exchanges” (2008: 136). It is by participating in complex communicational contexts where viewpoints clash and where we are subject to a series of diverse unscripted narratives and explanations (in short, company), that we are driven away from infant solipsism.
In his foundational lecture on the category of the person, Marcel Mauss noted that there never has been “a tribe, a language, where the word ‘I—me’ … has not existed and has failed to express a clearly delineated thing…. Apart from the pronouns that languages possess, a great number of them are marked by the usage of numberless positional suffixes which reflect in broad terms the relations that exist in time and space between the speaking subject and the object of which he/she speaks” (1938: 264). While this is true, it must also not be forgotten that pronouns do not all function in the same way. Long ago, Émile Benveniste demonstrated that the first person and the second person pronouns operate differently from the third person pronoun (he/she) in that they are “empty,” as he put it: “their role is to provide the instrument for a conversion … of language into speech” (1966: 254). While I and you are positional indicators, he/she are substitutes for objects of speech (as in, “Peter ate the apple. He loved it.”). I and you are positional, they do not demand a reference external to the speech act; to the contrary, he/she stand for something that is external to it.
There is, indeed, a profound truth to this observation, for it has implications in the matter of early personal ontogenesis. We must not assume that there is any anteriority to the first or second persons, for if we did we would be falling into the trap of separating language use (speech) from the historical process of the constitution of the speaking person, both in ontogeny and in phylogeny. We have to understand that the “substitution” that the third person operates, to use Benveniste’s terms, is the original process that allows for the constitution of the other two: as we have come to know, subjectivity follows on intersubjectivity, not the other way round (see Trevarthen 1980).
There would be no speech acts if there were no persons to position themselves within them. The third person, in some sense (a very Freudian sense, as it turns out), is the door into language because it is his/her presence that leads the person into selfhood. For there to be a first person ego there has to have been a previous process of differentiation, an ego relatedness. People are called into language from the outside, so the third person is a previous requirement for the use of the other two persons and their respective personal pronouns (cf. Butler 2012). Thus, each human being starts his or her personal ontogenesis—his or her path of being—inside human contagion. We discover our own personal singularity from within intersubjectivity—and this is why the very word “intersubjectivity” is equivocal, since it seems to suggest that subjectivity would be anterior to it, which is not the case.
Singularity and partibility coexist in the human condition, mutually creating and destroying each other (Strathern 1988: 11–14). Meyer Fortes has famously demonstrated that for the Tallensi, it is only after death that a man can fully achieve the status of full personhood ([1973] 1987). As it happens, there is a profound universalist validity to that particular aporia, since it highlights that personhood is a variable, even in contexts where it is not presented as such. As a matter of fact, in the course of personal ontogenesis, each one of us will never be more than an “almost-one,” that is, singular but only almost so, because indeterminacy and underdetermination are inescapable conditions of propositional thinking. We can only think to the extent that we are willing to enter into sociality and that is a communicational process that has to happen in a historically specific location, in a world of becoming. The very idea that it may be possible to inhabit the world in solitude is ludicrous—as Davidson famously put it, “the possibility of thought comes with company” (2001: 88).
As it happens, this is something that my own ethnography of personal naming among secondary school children in Bahia (NE Brazil) strongly confirmed, providing to me an entry into the study of the scaffolding of mind. Children assumed their personal names, played with them, and manipulated them (by means of small adaptations and recontextualisations, erasures, hypocoristics, diminutives, etc. [Pina-Cabral 2013a]). All this happened, however, in a context where their namers and primary carers were present (or had absented themselves with significant implications) and engaged in processes of personal surrogation with them—that is, relations of profound affective mutuality (Pina-Cabral 2013b). The perspectival foci that structured the child’s world—self, home, family, nation—emerged from a game of triangulations within an embodied world where new affordances were constantly offering themselves. The children were assessing these within frames that were provided to them by the narrative contexts in which they were immersed, as they learned more about the world and interacted in ever widening circles. Their docility toward the adoption of these frames (together with the hegemonic relations they carried) was a condition for their own coming into personhood. Deep historical recurrences (going way beyond anything the children themselves could consciously formulate) combined with shallow local specificities; engagement with the world at large combined with a deeply felt sense of local closure. They could only revolt (and that they did) to the extent that they had already entered into sociality.


At home in the world
If we want to explore what world can be to humans, then, perhaps the best starting point is to choose an ethnographic study by an anthropologist who has set out to examine just that. My surprise is that since the days of Lévy-Bruhl so few philosophers have chosen to avail themselves of this rich lode of evidence. Out of a number of possible examples, I have chosen to focus on Michael Jackson’s phenomenologically inspired study of the Warlpiri Aboriginal people of Australia (1995). Called At home in the world, the book is an attempt to theorize the concept of “home” by overcoming the obvious and much-noted sedentarist implications that the concept carries in most contemporary scientific thinking, and that owes a lot to the long-term history of Western Europe (Pina-Cabral 1989). As Jackson puts it in the synopsis of his book, “ours is an era of uprootedness, with fewer and fewer people living out their lives where they are born. At such a time, in such a world, what does it mean to be ‘at home’?” (1995, back page). In fact, as he proceeds to explore the ways in which the Warlpiri produce and inhabit what we might choose to call their “home,” he is forced to give us a varied and increasingly complex set of suggestions concerning what world is, both to him and to them.
After all, it is not possible to debate “home” without placing it in “world” for two main reasons: one is that home is that which is not world; the other is that home is perhaps the central feature of any person’s world. These two contrasting meanings actually constitute boundary markers for a complex continuum of contexts where the word “world” seems to most of us to come in handy. I insist on this latter aspect, because in fact I believe that Jackson does make a convincing job of it in his book. Furthermore, his insights can be available both to most trained anthropologists and to the Warlpiri themselves, with whom he debated the book before publishing it. His study, therefore, is not out of history; it is very much part of what world is becoming. Much like myself when I worked in coastal Bahia (2012: chap. 9) and like most anthropologists these days, there are no sharp linguistic barriers between Jackson and his subjects. Yes, there are profound linguistic differences that Jackson does indeed explore, but both he and the Warlpiri had a significant take on each other’s linguistic universes anterior to their actual (historical) encounter.
I want to use this ethnographic example to show how there are subtle veins of meaning that go from one usage of “world” to another, both creating semantic overlap and inducing difference. They lead us from one aspect to the other, much like a salesman who wants to sell us a car goes through the various aspects of the vehicle without ever losing touch of the notion that this is the vehicle that we must want (not just this kind of wheel, or this kind of motor, or this kind of paint, etc.).
So Jackson tells us that “I had learned that for the Warlpiri, as for other Aboriginal people, the world was originally lifeless and featureless. It had been given form, instilled with life, and charged with meaning by totemic ancestors” (1995: 57). Here we meet up with the old paradox of the world-before-the-world: if for the Warlpiri such a world had no meaning, was it world? For the purposes of the present discussion, however, the more relevant aspect is the further question: what is at stake for the Warlpiri when the notion of “world” is used so generically? In this case, from the context, we can assume that Jackson’s sentence refers to what we might call a cosmos, an environment that embraces humans and reaches beyond their existence. And yet we know that the Warlpiri are aware that there are places in the world where there are no Warlpiri-kind totemic ancestors, so it is legitimate to ask them: who formed the world of non-Warlpiri peoples? In short, a universalist meaning of world (the cosmos) and a localized meaning (a specifically sociocultural meaning, as in “the world of the Nyakyusa”) are somehow made to merge as a result of Jackson’s ethnographic mediation, both for him and for the Warlpiri.
A few pages earlier, musing about his African experiences among the Kuranko of Sierra Leone, Jackson had told us, “I wondered if any person is ever free to begin anew, to walk out into the world as if for the first time” (1995: 51). Of course, the answer to his question turns out to be negative because all persons are rooted in anteriority and there is no exit from history. But for our present purposes, there is a noteworthy difference between this world and the one of the earlier sentence. Here, “world” is the opposite of “home”; it is the contrasting outside that accounts for the presence of self and home and whose manifestation is the planet Earth and the bodies within it, in their material diversity.
In this case, the “world” in the earlier sense of cosmos is made up of world plus home. In short, another set of meanings emerges that assumes that world is fundamentally perspectival: this second vector of world results from postulating a perspectival “home” or “self” that opposes it. Such a meaning is inscribed in our historically acquired proclivities as anthropologists, due to the role that the notion of mundanity plays in Christian theology. But there is a case for arguing that home and person are constants of human experience: as Godfrey Lienhardt argued, “one can lay too much one-sided stress on the collectivist orientation of African ideas of the person…. The recognition of the importance of an inner, mysterious individual activity, comparable to what is meant by speaking in English of ‘what goes on inside’ a person is attested by many proverbs” (Lienhardt 1985: 145). I chose this example because of Lienhardt’s emphasis on “mysterious”—on the evanescent nature of the perspectival center. This meets up with the way Jackson proceeds: “At that moment, sitting there with Zack and Nugget, Pincher and Francine [his partner], I think I knew what it means to be at home in the world. It is to experience a complete consonance between one’s own body and the body of the earth. Between self and other. It little matters whether the other is a landscape, a loved one, a house, or an action. Things flow. There seems to be no resistance between oneself and the world. The relationship is all” (1995: 110).
As he experiences a merging of embodiment and propositional thinking, Jackson is forced to qualify world by reference to “the body of the earth” and this is no passing matter, since the groundedness of being is precisely what he is trying to get at in this passage. Person/home are now integrally and materially part of world and this implies cosmic universality again: “In shared bodily needs, in patterns of attachment and loss, in the imperatives of reciprocity, in the habitus of the planet, we [that is, all humans] are involved in a common heritage” (1995: 118).
In the wake of Merleau-Ponty, he comes to see that the very possibility of anthropology and ethnography is dependent on this “habitus of the planet,” not contrary to it. “The possibility of anthropology is born when the other recognizes my humanity, and on the strength of this recognition incorporates me into his world, giving me food and shelter, bestowing upon me a name, placing upon me the same obligations he places upon his own kinsmen and neighbors. I am literally incorporated in his world, and it is on the basis of this incorporation and my reciprocal response to it that I begin to gain a knowledge of that world. Anthropology should never forget that its project unfolds within the universal constraints of hospitality” (Jackson 1995: 119).
There could be no better ethnographic instantiation of what lies behind Davidson’s principle of “interpretive charity.”7 And this is why I am surprised that philosophers have not given enough attention to the insights derived from ethnography. Anthropology can go beyond the limits of speculation to point to the actual empirical conditions under which humans produce meaning. Note the way in which Jackson lays out in this sentence the central paths for the possibility of the ethnographic gesture: food, shelter, name, relatedness. Personhood, both in its physical (food, shelter) and its social specificity (name, relatedness) is a boundary condition for world and it is universal in its diversity. So a third vector of meaning of world appears to emerge: one that opposes the visceral groundedness of personhood to propositional thinking (within language). This conjoining is the quandary that Ingold tries to address in the sentence I quoted earlier: “people do not import their ideas, plans or mental representations into the world, since the very world … is the homeland of their thoughts.”
In Jackson’s engagement with the Warlpiri, then, we witness the various implications of world coming together in a set of three principal vectors of opposition: (i) the cosmic vector—the universally embracing cosmos as opposed to the locally conceived culturally-constructed worlds; (ii) the perspectival vector—the encompassing world as opposed to the central but evanescent reference point of home or self; (iii) the propositional vector—the world as embodied materiality as opposed to propositional thinking.
These three vectors of world manifest themselves in formally distinct manners: (i) wider and vaguer levels of cosmic embracement operate as contexts for more locally defined and more clearly structured worlds; (ii) world encompasses self, home, or heimat in such a way as these perspectival positionings both contrast with it and are a constituent part of it; (iii) materiality contains our sense of internal existence (our “arena of presence and action,” cf. Johnston 2010) in that it constrains it, preventing its spreading and situating it (see also Lakoff and Johnson’s [1999] notion of bodily containment).8 Embracement, encompassment, and containment are distinct but related processes, and in everyday experience the three vectors of world combine in a process of becoming through which world constantly unfurls and multiplies. It is a movement of (i) totality versus singularity; (ii) encompassment versus identification; (iii) exteriority versus interiority, which never stops being vaguely aporic because totality, encompassment, and exteriority never disappear before singularity, identification, and interiority. Even as world becomes worlds, world remains.
Thus, for example, in a sentence like the following by Glenn Bowman writing about Jerusalem as a pilgrimage site, we see the three vectors evolving in such a way that world unfolds into a number of worlds while remaining present as world, in as much as it is the condition of possibility both for the distinct pilgrimages and for the author’s ethnographic study of them: “The centrality of the [Biblical] text meant that it was the reference point by which religious Christians judged the world through which they moved, but the proliferation of meanings accreted around it as it variously developed through the historical spread of the Christian faith, meant that the worlds constituted in its terms were very different—even when, as in the case of Holy Land pilgrimages, those worlds were nominally the same” (1991: 100). Other pilgrims too go around those very same streets and react to the very same texts. The sharing of a space and a text imposes itself on the pilgrim at the very moment they are postulating a divergent perspective from pilgrims of other kinds. The evidence of the embracing world challenges the completeness of the job of ethnic or religious identification. Alterity9 remains irreducible and identification incomplete.
At this point we must be reminded of Davidson’s injunction that there can only be communication between two speakers when they can triangulate it with the world, that is, the “habitus of the planet” is a condition of possibility for humans to mutually understand each other (both at the level of person-to-person understanding and at the level of culture-to-culture understanding) but it is also what divides us. Confronted with the desert’s unresponsiveness to human presence Jackson experienced a moment of doubt: “In the desert, I had become convinced that it is not in the nature of human consciousness to enter the world of nature. The truth of nature does not participate in the truth of human consciousness” (1995: 116). The reference to the desert here is not a passing one; it is essential to what he is telling us that the desert is a specific environment that shapes human experience. In this momentary confrontation with the desert, the reduction of mind to “consciousness” again calls our attention to the unresolved, aporic aspect of the third vector identified above: human mind (propositional, reflexive mind) and world interpenetrate without ever fully meeting, that is the major implication for anthropology of the theory of the indeterminacy of interpretation (Feleppa 1988). Humans are of the world but they confront the world. “Some balance must be possible between the world into which we are thrown without our asking and the world we imagine we might bring into being by dint of what we say and do” (Jackson 1995: 123). This is what Jackson calls “the existential struggle” and it is the principal object of his book.
When he speaks of “disengaging from the world about us” in order “to be in touch with ourselves” (1995: 123), or when he claims that the sound of traffic outside is “a world away,” he is using the more general cosmic implications of the word. But then, speaking of a moment of great personal intensity, he says, “It was not unlike the experience of watching someone you love dying—the same sense of the world falling away, of oneself falling away from the world, and of all one’s awareness condensed by pain into a black hole. At such times, the world at large is diminished and loses its hold, eclipsed by the viscerally immediate world of oneself. It is always a shock, going outdoors again after a birth or a death, to find that the world has not changed along with you, that it has gone on unaffected and indifferent” (1995: 135).
Here we find a kind of logical non sequitur: “the world falling away from us” is held to be the same as “us falling away from the world.” In fact, the error is only apparent, because the “world at large” and the “visceral world” cannot quite come to separate from each other, they are held together by the fact that sociality and intentional thinking are preconditions for propositional (reflexive) thinking. The world embraces to the extent that it places us—not in space, not in time—but in existence. There is, then, something external in world, for there is no way out of world, we are contained by it; but the world is also an openness, as we are recurrently “confronted by the indeterminate relations between words and world” and our condition is not only to inhabit world but also to inhabit language. We are world-forming.
There would then be three angles to world that Jackson is manipulating without ever being willing to separate them, for he sees them as mutually constitutive: (a) the cosmic world; (b) the perspectival world; and (c) the propositional world. The central conclusion we take from our examination, however, is that personhood— the fact that humans are propositionally thinking embodied creatures—is what holds together the complex dynamic between world and worlds.


Globalization
Let us now take another example in Ulf Hannerz’s reflections concerning the present situation of anthropology and his own personal trajectory within it. Anthropology’s world: Life in a twenty-first-century discipline (2010) takes a very different perspective on world from Jackson’s book, as it is less concerned with how people studied by anthropologists inhabit world, and more with anthropology as a mode of inhabiting world. The focus is shifted toward the condition of being an anthropologist in a world that is becoming more … global. While never referring to Henri Lefebvre’s concept of mondialisation, Hannerz explores the way in which his condition as an anthropologist in the second half of the twentieth century was affected by this “shift from the nation-state to the world scale,” this process by which a new political and economic order emerged that followed on from the nation and the city, imposing new forms of domination, repression, and hegemony (cf. Elden 2004: 232–35).
His was the curiously contradictory life of someone who, never having left his own Swedish academic base (for he retired from the same department where he carried out his undergraduate studies)10 worked and dialogued with colleagues and informants all over the world and had a worldwide academic impact. However, he notes, his “cosmopolitan” condition, is two-sided: on one side, the worried face of someone who contemplates humanity as a whole and its evolving political turmoil (the scale of the mondial); and, on the other side, the happy face of the one who looks out on the fascinating diversity of meanings and meaningful forms in the human world (Hannerz 2010: 93).
There is an affinity between the two faces, he suggests, which is potentiated by anthropology’s main challenge, as he sees it, of “making the world transparent.” Now, transparency is a project of mediation between the two faces of the cosmopolitan observer: the globalized condition can only remain humanly pleasing to the extent that pluralism survives. “The world of anthropology keeps changing” (2010: 1), he claims: for anthropologists, the global and the cosmopolitan are two manifestations of facing the contradictoriness of world’s becoming. We are tempted to refer here to Heidegger’s famous dictum: “The world never is, but worlds.” Therefore, as I shall explore in the next article, I am tempted to read Hannerz’s transparency as a mode of worlding (cf. Tsing 2011 or Descola 2010).
In fact, in the very first page of his book, Hannerz outlines the nature of the aporia that confronts him as he looks back at his life as a fieldworker (in Washington DC, the Caribbean, Nigeria, and among international reporters in Jerusalem, Johannesburg, and Tokyo). As it happens, he brings out the same three vectors that emerged from Jackson’s study: the cosmic vector—“anthropology’s world is the wider outside world”; the perspectival vector—“anthropology is a social world in itself”; and the propositional vector—“it is a world anthropologists are inclined to think of as made up of a multitude of ‘fields.’” (Hannerz 2010:1)
As the book evolves, we see him turning time and again to a central quandary concerning the very definition of his discipline. In Sweden, his decision to become an anthropologist in the 1960s had involved a political conviction. That is why he had wanted to carry out research in Nigeria. The period was one of decolonization, and the young Hannerz’ burning wish, that turned him into a social scientist, was to understand that process and contribute actively toward it. He saw the internally turned volkskunde (folklore) type of academic engagement being carried out in the department next door as dubious and problematic. As he puts it, he wanted to be an “expatriate researcher,” not someone turned in onto the historicist preoccupations of a national/nationalist type of research engagement. So the opposition between “away” and “home” fieldwork engagements was formative.
However, as things evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, neocolonialism turned into neoimperialism, and the face that contemplated the global order (the mondial) became sadder and sadder. His experiences in Nigeria, when he finally managed to get there, were particularly distressing. At the same time, anthropology’s other face also changed radically. There were departments of anthropology in most places where previously anthropologists had been expatriates and a new “anthropology at home” emerged that was as cosmopolitan as his own “away anthropology.” It could hardly be classified in the same bag as the earlier nationalist-driven research that he had avoided in the 1960s. By the early twenty-first century, studying international reporters, Hannerz himself was going everywhere, from interviewing a neighbor of his in Stockholm to Washington, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, or Tokyo. Thus, he calls for the need to retain the “awayness” of the anthropology of the past that he most cherishes, by preventing the new cosmopolitan anthropology from becoming at the global level what folklore had been at the national level. His aim is to retain “our part as anthropologists as helpers of a worldwide transparency, as men and women in the middle” (2010: 91).
It is worth confronting here the quotes of two anthropologists of the earlier generation that inspire him. In 1988, Clifford Geertz had declared, “the next necessary thing is to enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourse between people quite different from one another … and yet contained in a world where, tumbled as they are into endless connection, it is increasingly difficult to get out of each other’s way” (quoted in Hannerz 2010: 88–89). Hannerz then quotes Fei Xiaodong who, in 1992, claimed that people “shaped by different cultures with different attitudes towards life are crowded into a small world in which they must live in complete and absolute interdependence” (quoted in Hannerz 2010: 100).
This sense that, faced with the world’s increasing smallness, there is a burning need to build on the world’s plurality is what drives his efforts at passing on anthropology to the next century. Between the cosmic and the perspectival dimensions of world, anthropology would be a kind of propositional mediator that turns interiority into exteriority and vice versa, thus preventing the global order from destroying the conditions for its own cosmopolitanism. Worlding is a task carried out by persons who use the very means that turn them into persons (that is, propositionally thinking beings) into an instrument for the production of ever-wider bird’s-eye view effects (cf. Tomasello 2008).


A plurality of worlds
A number of arguments have emerged of late—some more coherent than others—claiming that there are “worlds” or better still that there is “a plurality of ontologies.”11 The simpler form of the argument may be phrased in the following terms:

Rather than using our own analytical concepts to make sense of a given ethnography (explanation, interpretation), we use the ethnography to rethink our analytical concepts. Rather than asking why the Nuer should think that twins are birds, we should be asking how we need to think of twins and birds (and all their relevant corollaries, such as humanity, siblinghood, animality, flight or what have you) in order to arrive at a position from which the claim that twins are birds no longer registers as an absurdity. What must twins be, what must birds be, et cetera? (Holbraad 2010: 184)

Thus formulated, the argument is immediately unacceptable due to its blatant ahistoricism and to the presupposition that “us” is a geopolitically recognizable vantage point. One must ask the author how he accounts historically for the fact that he reads ethnographies; how Evans-Pritchard actually managed to fall through the trappings of “our” world to enter into “the Nuer world,” only to come out again at the end; one must try very hard not to remember that Collingwood’s theory of history ([1946] 2005) was quite as influential to Evans-Pritchard’s formulations concerning the Nuer as were the Nuer themselves; and, finally, why Nuer ethnography is the author’s chosen example.
There are, however, other versions of the argument. These claim that we must “not see ethnography as a kind of translation from one worldview to another,” that “all ontologies are ‘groundless’ in the sense that no one is the True Ontology” (Paleček and Risjord 2013: 10, 16). In their essay, Martin Paleček and Mark Risjord revisit Davidson’s injunction that we ought to reject the dualism between scheme and content, attempting to adapt his nonrepresentationism to anthropology (Davidson 1984: 183–98).12 This is a laudable exercise. Unfortunately, together with most of their colleagues of this inspiration, the authors’ use of the word “ontology” depends on a slide in meaning concerning world that bedevils all their successive arguments. Contrary to what the authors believe, the adoption of ontological monism does not imply the claim that one can have access to the one-and-only True Ontology. Ontological monism does not postulate that truth lies beyond the realm of human experience but rather that truth is a foundational feature of thinking: “without the idea of truth we would not be thinking creatures, nor would we understand what it is for someone else to be a thinking creature” (Davidson 2005: 16).
That apart, we have a problem: anthropologists are so used to looking at ethnography as translation, in the old Evans-Pritchardian manner, that we have stopped thinking whether that is really a useful metaphor (cf. Beidelman 1971; Pina-Cabral 1992). What do ethnographers do precisely? Now, skeptical relativism is buried so deep into the tissue of our anthropological language that we find it hard to give an account of ethnography that bypasses the problems raised by representationalist theories of thinking (cf. Chemero 2009). Paleček and Risjord are correct in trying to go beyond this, but they go on to argue that “Davidson’s later work can be used to scaffold the inference from a rejection of the scheme-content distinction to a pluralism of ontology” (2013: 16). Yet this is an incorrect assumption: Davidson is absolutely explicit about the fact that there is only one single ontology (there is only one world) and his dialogue with Spinoza at the end of his life is precisely an elaboration on that idea (2005: 295–314). To attempt to salvage the metaphysical nature of Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism (his Métaphysique cannibale [2009]) by twisting Davidson’s positions is plainly a misguided step.
The discussion, however, cannot simply be left at that. From the indubitable observation that there is evidence for the existence of distinct “webs of interpretation” that apply in different historical contexts, the authors conclude that “ontologies” exist and are incommensurable. According to them, ontologies are “the product of human interpretive interactions with one another and with their environments. These interactions are often very different, constituting different ontologies. They are incommensurable in the sense that no one way of engaging the environment is right or wrong in metaphysical terms” (Paleček and Risjord 2013: 16). I honestly can see no difference between this definition of the word “ontology” and the meaning traditionally attributed to the anthropological concept of “worldview,” apart from the fact, of course, that the word “ontology” is tinted with a spirit of idealism (a métaphysique) and the word “worldview” is not (because it presumes its own plural, implying that, if there are differing perspectives, then there is one world).
This matter of “incommensurability,” in fact, has a very long history, particularly by reference to Thomas S. Khun’s argument about scientific revolutions. In his later life, Khun himself took to criticizing the excessively relativist interpretations of his argument (1962, 1983). In his survey of the debate, Philip Kitcher finds that Khun’s earlier claims of incommensurability were interpreted too literally and that “we can revert to the idea that full communication across the revolutionary divide is possible and that rival claimants can appeal to a shared body of observational evidence” (Kitcher 1982: 690). The conceptual incommensurability that divides scientific paradigms turns out to be just like that which divides languages that are subject to translation—but always only partly due to the limits imposed by the indeterminacy of all communication. Kitcher’s reading of the late Khun’s take on incommensurability carefully avoids the all-or-nothing fallacy, arguing that most of Khun’s readers go too readily to irrationalist conclusions that are essentially conservative and are, in any case, unnecessary in order to interpret the historical evidence presented by scientific revolutions.
In the same line, I espouse Davidson’s claim that there are no radically incompatible human worlds because all humans are endowed with the possibility of developing intelligent communication with all other humans (bar exceptional circumstances: e.g., insanity, drunkenness, extreme fear, etc., and I am not limiting myself to linguistic communication). Since all our thinking is based on intentional thinking as much as on propositional thinking, radical ontological breaks are inconceivable. We are historically part of the world. To claim otherwise would be tantamount to saying that ethnography is an impossibility since, in order to learn what other humans think, we first have to engage with them as human and, more than that, as humans cohabiting a recognizable world, as we saw Jackson arguing earlier. Without the triangulation of the world there is no place for communication.13
Paleček and Risjord formulate this aspect of Davidson’s thought in the following terms: “Insofar as we are not able to separate our knowledge of the object from the object itself, we are not able to separate our knowledge of ourselves from the knowledge of others. The interpreter becomes a crucial aspect of what it means to have thoughts” (2013: 12). From this, then, they proceed: “The ethnographer is engaging not just an individual in one-on-one communication but a whole interpretive community” (14). Surely that is an important point—quite as important as its symmetrical point: the critique of ethnographic exceptionalism. That is, in engaging the ethnographer, the peoples of the world that were being subjected to imperialism throughout the modern era, were not only engaging an individual in a one-on-one communication, but were engaging the full force of imperial globalization.
Now, it would seem that, if there are “interpretive communities,” there are “worldviews,” that is, that which differentiate interpretive communities in face of others. Of course, it may well be argued that these should not be seen as “views,” for that would be to cede to representationism and to an unjustifiably strong form of realism. Philippe Descola has recently produced a formulation of our relation to world where he tries to argue just this (to have the cake and eat it, so to speak).
He adopts a kind of minimalist realism such as I have been defending in my own writings since the early 2000s, but then he appends to it a critique of the notion of worldview:

There can be no multiple worlds because it is highly probable that the potential qualities and relations afforded to human cognition and enactment are the same everywhere until some have been detected and actualized, others ignored. But once this worlding process has been achieved, the result is not a world-view, i.e., one version among others of the same transcendental reality; the result is a world in its own right, a system of partially actualized properties, saturated with meaning and replete with agency, but partially overlapping with other similar systems that have been differently actualized and instituted by different persons. (Descola 2010: 339)

Here, Descola is right concerning the minimal realism but is wrong concerning the worldview issue, since he is unwittingly engaging in the all-or-nothing fallacy again. He is assuming (à la Paleček and Risjord) that the alternative to a multiple ontologies posture is a one-and-only True Ontology posture. His option of denying that when humans share worldviews they are essentially engaging a historically common world is ahistoricist and feeds into the primitivist strain in anthropological thinking that engages in what Hammel long ago used to criticize as “one-village-one-vote comparativism” (1984: 29–43). Furthermore, there is human exclusivism in this, because it is reducing world to propositional thinking (and to conscious categorical thinking at that). But world in humans is grounded in the sort of intentional thinking that we share with animals; scaffolded thinking only comes after and above that and, as we have argued already, it is in any case rooted in our common human embodiment. Too many decades of unchallenged interpretativism have led anthropologists to assume implicitly that thought is primarily systemic in a culturalist sort of way and, therefore, that there are “worlds.”
But the ethnographer in the field is not engaging an interpretive community, she is engaging singular humans or, if we want to see it in time, a number of singular persons. Now that is of the essence, for it is due to her human sense of coresponsibility (her proneness to shared intentionality—cf. Tomasello 2008) that the ethnographer can achieve communication through interpretive charity, never through any sort of person-to-group communication. In short, I may communicate with a number of different persons at the same time, but I can only communicate with them because they are singular humans (persons in ontogenesis) like me. To forget that is to allow ourselves to slip back into Durkheimian sociocentrism or worse.
Therefore, we are here faced with another version of the quandary that the anthropology of kinship has been intensely addressing for a number of years:14 there is a constant dynamic oscillation between singularity and duality in the construction of the dividual person. The unquestioned use of the word “individual” by authors such as Paleček and Risjord actually carries implications of which they might not be aware, for it assumes too casually the unitariness of personhood.15 That unitariness is precisely what gives credence to ethnographic exceptionalism (that is, the image of the lone ethnographer faced with the whole of the tribe in front of her tape recorder and then coming back to “us” speaking out the words of the “tribe” and not of the persons in it—explaining why twins can be birds or why blood is beer to jaguars, to use the more tired examples). But what we have learned from the long history of the debate about personhood and kinship is that singularity and plurality imply each other in relations of mutuality (Strathern 1988: 11–14; Pina-Cabral 2013b). Therefore, the ethnographer who is carrying out her task is permanently oscillating between plurality and singularity in a process of ontogeny—she can only access interpretive communities because she engages singular communicators and she can only engage the latter because she is willing to enter into their interpretive communities. Again, we are faced with the hegemonic strength of the all-or-nothing fallacy. There is no matter of True Ontology as much as there is no matter in denying the veridicality of all ontologies. The notion of a truth that can exist outside of human interaction in history is absurd. Truth is a feature of mind and “mind is a function of the whole person constituted over time in intersubjective relations with others in the environing world” (Toren 2002: 122).
Thus, yes, there is only one world but, yes, there are interpretive communities. If these were truly incommensurable then there would be no ethnography. But the contrary is also the case: as no communication can happen outside the indeterminacy of meaning, the question of commensurability is always relative from the start and cannot ever be anything but relative.


Conclusion
Having examined the way in which the word “world” is used by anthropologists, I conclude that the meanings attributed to it reflect a basic tension between being of the world and being in the world. In turn, this tension operates along three basic vectors: for each embodied person, (iii) the world in its materiality opposes itself to propositional thinking due to (ii) the constant constitution of perspectival centers (home/self); in turn, the evanescent nature of these centers allows for (i) a constant play between the world as an embracing cosmos and the world as a locally produced context. Personhood (propositionally thinking human beings historically engaged in sociality) is what allows for the three vectors of polarization to come together in a broad category of world.
The world is one because, in personhood, alterity is anterior; as phenomenology has taught us, human experience is social before it is rational. The world, in all of its plurality, cannot escape from history; all those untold historical determinations that accumulate in the single act of any singular person. There is freedom in personhood to the extent that propositional thought institutes its own processes of determination that accumulate over material determination; because of what Davidson called “the anomaly.”
World, therefore, like persons, will ever waver in the unstable terrain that lies between singularity and plurality; it is one and it is many. In part 2 of this article I will examine what are the structural conditions of world and how ethnography may best approach them in the light of the transcendentalist strains that have ever accompanied anthropology since it became an academic discipline.


Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Eva-Maria Knoll and Andre Gingrich for their invitation to present this paper on the occasion of Andre’s festschrift in October 2012 in a beautiful hall overlooking Vienna’s Autumnal Prater. At this time, the paper was debated with a group of colleagues, including Ulf Hannerz and Marcus Banks, whose useful contributions I have taken into account. The idea for the article emerged from conversations I had with Andre and Christina Toren at the time of our seminar on “The Challenge of Epistemology.” I am deeply indebted to Glenn Bowman and Joan Bestard Camps for their sustained intellectual companionship and to Giovanni da Col for what turned out to be a very learned and engaged critical editing of this paper.


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Monde: Une exploration anthropologique.
Résumé : Les anthropologues ont souvent recours au mot « monde » comme si son sens allait de soi. Le mot reste cependant très ambivalent, et sa signification dangereusement polysémique. « Quel monde ? » doit-on se demander, ce qui mène à une autre question importante: y a-t-il« des mondes » ? Cette interrogation nous oblige à confronter certaines des perplexités fondamentales qui ont hanté la théorie anthropologique tout au long du siècle dernier. Dans cet article en deux parties, je propose d’abandonner la dichotomie établie entre les formes assez grossières de réalisme matérialiste et les formes tout aussi rudimentaires d’idéalisme sémiotique. Je soutiens que nous ne pouvons pas discuter du monde sans tenir compte du « pour qui », mais que cela est compatible avec l’ontologie d’un monde unique si l’on prend en compte le rôle de la personnalité dans la condition humaine. Le premier article plaide pour une ontologie du monde unique et la centralité de la personne. Il explore les implications d’une forme de réalisme minimal qui convient mieux à la posture ethnographique, tandis que le deuxième article répondra à la question de la formation du monde, et de la vision du monde.
João DE PINA-CABRAL is Professor of Social Anthropology and Head of the School of Anthropology and Conservation, University of Kent, UK (cf. www.pina-cabral.org). He has published extensively on matters related to kinship and the family, religion and belief, personhood, and ethnicity in postcolonial contexts and carried out fieldwork on the Alto Minho (Portugal), Macau (S China), and Bahia (NE Brazil). His principal publications are Sons of Adam, Daughters of Eve: The peasant worldview of the Alto Minho, Between China and Europe: Person, culture and emotion in Macau, and Gente Livre: Consideração e Pessoa no Baixo Sul da Bahia (coauthored with Vanda A. Silva). He has also coedited with A. P. Lima Elites: Choice, leadership, and succession, with F. Pine On the margins of religion, and with Christina Toren The challenge of epistemology: Anthropological perspectives.
João de Pina-CabralSchool of Anthropology and ConservationUniversity of KentCanterbury, Kent CT2 7NRJ.Pina-Cabral@kent.ac.uk


___________________
1. See www.pina-cabral.org for a review of these projects.
2. Cf. Davidson: “It may be that not even plants could survive in our world if they did not to some extent react in ways we find similar to events and objects that we find similar. This clearly is true of animals; and of course it becomes more obvious the more like us the animal is” (2001: 202).
3. Cf. Ingold: “History is but the continuation of an evolutionary process by another name” (1995: 77).
4. Cf. Davidson: “We do not first form concepts and then discover what they apply to; rather, in the basic cases, the application determines the content of the concept” (2001: 196).
5. I find Ingold’s “dwelling perspective” an interesting formulation of what may be involved here (1995: 75–77).
6. Cf. Hutto and Myin: “The very possibility of conceptual meaning, even in the case of phenomenality, requires an inter-subjective space. Acknowledging this entails no denial of the existence of nonconceptual, noncontentful experiences with phenomenal properties associated with basic minds…. Our facility with concepts about such experiences is parasitic on a more basic literacy in making ordinary claims about public, worldly items…. The acquisition of such conceptual abilities depends on being able to have and share basic experiences with others” (2013: 173).
7. The principle of charity “directs the interpreter to translate or interpret so as to read some of his own standards of truth into the patterns of sentences held true by the speaker. The point of the principle is to make the speaker intelligible, since too great deviations from consistency and correctness leave no common ground on which to judge either conformity or difference” (Davidson 2001: 148).
8. With hindsight, I can see in this distinction an echo of Heidegger’s three moments of occurrence of the Dasein: “(1) holding the binding character of things towards us; (2) completion; (3) unveiling the being of beings” (1995: 348). However, it will be nothing more than a loose correspondence, as I feel that our contemporary discovery that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience that does not involve mental con-tent—representation—may come to alter significantly all of our earlier understandings of being-in-the-world (Hutto and Myin 2013).
9. This article’s reviewers argued that Emanuel Lévinas’ thought (much as Heidegger’s) is too divergent from my guiding inspiration in Donald Davidson’s philosophical world for it to be a useful reference. I found, however, that the late thinking of Davidson (2005) was in many ways compatible with Lévinas’ use of the concept of “alterity as anterior,” which so inspired me in discussing ethical issues (cf. Lévinas 1971).
10. I was privileged to be part of the fascinating retirement symposium that his colleagues organized, which brought out very vividly his lifework and its curiously understated creativity.
11. Perhaps this is no more than “a certain (and thus unavoidably fading) moment in the recent history of the discipline, where a vaguely defined cohort of mostly Cambridge-associated scholars found it exciting to experiment with the nature of ethnographic description and anthropological theorizing in a certain way,” as Morten Pedersen puts it (2012), but if that is so and Martin Holbraad’s intention amounts to little more than ironic conservative posturing, then all the theses and books that are monthly being produced in its wake make little sense. I propose that Pedersen’s explanations are, in fact, less convincing than the original posture.
12. To my mind, to the contrary, Maurice Bloch’s refusal to abandon an intellectualist model of mind in his otherwise interesting book on the challenge of cognition reduces its relevance (2012).
13. I insist, there is in this argument no claim that the borders of humanity with other animals are precise nor that human proneness to communication cannot elicit forms of communication with animals that often approach interhuman communication. As Heidegger would have it, intentional thinking in both humans and animals presupposes world, but a poor world (1995).
14. See Marriott 1976; Strathern 1988; Sahlins 2011a, 2011b; Pina-Cabral 2013a and 2013b.
15. An aspect that Maurice Bloch’s “blob” unfortunately also does not manage to bypass (2012).
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					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
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				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>26</day>
				<month>05</month>
				<year>2022</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2022</year></pub-date>
			<volume>12</volume>
			<issue seq="205">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau12.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2022 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2022</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1668" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1668/3930" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1668/3931" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>Vdra-ba society in western Sichuan, China, has been represented by evolutionist Chinese scholars as a primitive matrilineal society that was in transition to a patrilineal system, and it has been likened to that of the Na/Moso. This is a misleading characterization. Vdra-ba society has no tribal organizations and was critically shaped by the overarching Tú-sī system for many centuries. The kinship system is centered on the “house,” and is better described as undifferentiated. The gá-yì (visiting) relationship, with marriage in rare occasions, and conventions of adoption, allows their ideal of a female line to be practiced and transformed in the house into an undifferentiated form of inheritance and accession. There is no descent group. The Vdra-ba kindred, however, is individual-centered rather than ancestor-centered, with its bilateral character.</p></abstract>
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				<identifier>oai:ojs.haujournal.org:article/1419</identifier>
				<datestamp>2020-07-04T08:12:21Z</datestamp>
				<setSpec>hau:ART</setSpec>
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		<journal-meta>
			<journal-id journal-id-type="other">hau</journal-id>
			<journal-title>HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory</journal-title>
			<issn pub-type="epub">2049-1115</issn>			<publisher><publisher-name>HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory</publisher-name></publisher>
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			<article-id pub-id-type="other">1419</article-id>
			<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1086/708542</article-id>
			<article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories>
			<title-group>
				<article-title>Experiencing presence: An interactive model of perception</article-title>
			</title-group>
			<contrib-group>
				<contrib corresp="yes" contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Corwin</surname>
						<given-names>Anna I.</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>aic3@stmarys-ca.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="author">
					<name name-style="western">
						<surname>Erickson-Davis</surname>
						<given-names>Cordelia</given-names>
					</name>
					<email>cred22@stanford.edu</email>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>High</surname>
						<given-names>Casey</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Neiburg</surname>
						<given-names>Federico</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Carrier</surname>
						<given-names>Neil</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Lombard</surname>
						<given-names>Louisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Masquelier</surname>
						<given-names>Adeline</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="editor">
					<name>
						<surname>Herzfeld</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Admin</surname>
						<given-names>Hau</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>da Col</surname>
						<given-names>Giovanni</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Gros</surname>
						<given-names>Stéphane</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dowdy</surname>
						<given-names>Sean</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Lambek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tocino-Smith</surname>
						<given-names>Juliette</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Sheldon</surname>
						<given-names>Zachary</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Wilson</surname>
						<given-names>Brian</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Billaud</surname>
						<given-names>Julie</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Frausel</surname>
						<given-names>Rebecca Rose</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chladek</surname>
						<given-names>Michael</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Dostaler</surname>
						<given-names>Ned</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>le Roux-Kemp</surname>
						<given-names>Andra</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Genovese</surname>
						<given-names>Taylor R.</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Kladky</surname>
						<given-names>Ellen</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Herman</surname>
						<given-names>Kate</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Mittermaier</surname>
						<given-names>Amira</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Chisholm</surname>
						<given-names>Jennifer</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>McKamy</surname>
						<given-names>Lisa</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
				<contrib contrib-type="jmanager">
					<name>
						<surname>Tansino</surname>
						<given-names>Samantha</given-names>
					</name>
				</contrib>
			</contrib-group>
			<pub-date pub-type="epub">
				<day>04</day>
				<month>07</month>
				<year>2020</year>
			</pub-date>
			<pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2020</year></pub-date>
			<volume>10</volume>
			<issue seq="303">1</issue>
			<issue-id pub-id-type="other">hau10.1</issue-id>
			<permissions>
				<copyright-statement>Copyright (c) 2020 The Society for Ethnographic Theory</copyright-statement>
				<copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
				<license xlink:href="">
				</license>
			</permissions>
			<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1419" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1419/3444" />
			<self-uri content-type="" xlink:href="http://www.haujournal.org/index.php/hau/article/view/1419/3445" />
			<abstract xml:lang="EN"><p>This essay brings literature in experimental psychology and visual perception into conversation with psychological anthropology to propose a new theory of presence. We examine data on Catholic nuns’ experiences of God’s presence, proposing that presence—indeed all perceptual consciousness—can be conceived of as the dynamic and ever-emerging interaction of a perceiver-environment system. By understanding presence as interactional, we shift away from framing experience of the divine as a puzzle to be explained in the face of what we know about the natural order of things toward a model in which perceptual experience is co-constituted by a perceiver and environment in relation. By proposing a common language that can be used to talk across the bounds of the “natural” and “social” sciences, this essay introduces a model that can capture and represent the lived experiences of individuals in a way that both takes that experience seriously and renders that experience open to empirical investigation.</p></abstract>
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